The MetaLogic of Belief

I believe I have mostly been working on the MetaLogic of belief. I have done enough that the point should be clear. Opacity does not present any problem for the reality of beliefs. But expressing our beliefs in this way is very cumbersome and so not practical, even for logic, use. Unless we agree on the meaning of words, our agreement or disagreement on beliefs expressed in their terms means nothing. Even saying one does not believe in God, or spirituality means nothing unless it is clear what one means by ‘God’ or ‘spirituality.’ But working out the minute details of a MetaLogic of belief seems not worthwhile. I agree with Fodor in “Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes” in _Representations_, “In a nutshell: intentional theories explicate knowledge structures, and knowledge structures are among the psychological mechanisms which interact in mental processes. To claim that the mental processes of an organism are a model of logic, in the sense of that notion that is now at issue, is thus not to claim that there is a belief of the organism corresponding to each theorem of the logic …. It is to claim only that the postulates of the logic are mentally represented by the organism, and that this mental representation contributes (in appropriate ways) to the causation of its beliefs.” (page 120)