

In The World and the Individual,  
Royce considers four conceptions  
of Being. Three of these are shown,  
by Royce, to be inconsistent, ~~and self-contradictory~~  
~~and self-contradictory~~. Thus we are left with one  
remaining conception of being, Idealism. ~~(p. 48)~~  
Royce's proof of Idealism consists in the  
fact that all other conceptions of  
being are self-contradictory (I, pp. 48, 349).  
Why does Royce consider these four  
conceptions of being to be all-embracing?  
Let us consider his definitions of these  
four conceptions of being, in <sup>view</sup> of this  
question: Realism says to be is to be  
independent of ideas. Mysticism says  
to be is to be totally immediate, i.e. ideas  
as merely present, without any volitional  
content. Critical Rationalism says to  
be is to be ~~analyzed as a~~ <sup>analyzed as a</sup> Possible Experience.  
Idealism says to be is to be the complete  
embodiment of an ideal conscious purpose  
or will.

Royce presupposes that Being is the object of truth and that truth is a relation between idea and object. Realism is inconsistent because if it<sup>a</sup> being can stand in no relation to ideas, and hence not in the relation of truth, Mysticism is rejected since, in fact, there is nothing left, if all relation is removed from an idea; hence there would be no truth for mysticism, Critical rationalism is also inconsistent. For consider if an object of experience is merely possible, then it is not an object of truth, and ~~hence not real~~, and hence not real. Thus, it is seen that whatever is is always contained in ~~an~~ ideas. Royce's conception of being thus follows almost immediately from the way in which he asks the question: "What is being?" From his philosophy we learn that either being is larger than truth or truth is

not merely a relation between idea and  
object, ~~if the truth that being is beyond the~~  
~~truth that being is not~~ or we must  
accept a kind of ~~Platonist~~ Idealism.  
If it is true that being is larger than  
truth, then the statement itself cannot  
be true because it is about being, as a  
riddle. Perhaps it could be said to be  
non-sense and a kind of negation  
would result. It is also notable that  
if this non-sense is "true", these would be  
beings totally independent from ideas,  
i.e. beings in the sense of realism. It would  
also be "true" that subjects of merely  
possible experiences would no longer be  
inconsistent with stable being. However,  
if nonsense is put to silence, we are left  
with only one alternative to Royce's ~~Platonic~~  
Idealism to speak about. In this case,  
truth is not a relation between being and  
idea (or Royce's sense). ~~Truth~~ Truth would  
gain a kind of independence from ideas, though  
not a total independence. Truth could be  
a sort of incorporation of universal forms

into being a sort of Platonism. However  
being would be the particular in these  
things and the forms would not be  
as such. Talking about the forms would  
thus seem to be ~~non-sense~~, unless there  
are forms of forms, etc. But the investigation  
of this would be detailed and difficult,  
besides not being directly relevant to  
Boyle.



