

Wittgenstein makes a very interesting remarks in §301 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. He says, "an image is not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it." What is the difference between an image and a picture? How can a picture correspond to an image? These are the questions I will attempt to answer. The answer to these questions, if correct, should explain Wittgenstein's point in the previous section, where he said, "The image of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language game by anything that we should call a picture. - The image of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense; only not as a picture." Before answering the questions above in the context of pain and pain-behavior, I will consider Wittgenstein's remarks where he is treating images and pictures more directly. ~~By doing so, we will avoid the misunderstandings that arise from the passages~~ By doing so, ~~we~~ misunderstandings are less likely to arise. An image is not some sort of mental entity. ~~As I said in all contexts,~~ Imagining is not a mental process. At least not in all contexts. "... here imagining is not a particular mental process during which one usually shuts one's eyes or covers them with one's hands" (RFM, II-1)