

Wittgenstein makes a very interesting remark in §301 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. He says "An image is not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it." What is the difference between an image and a picture? How can a picture correspond to an image? These are the questions I will attempt to answer. The answers to these questions, if correct, should explain Wittgenstein's point in the previous section, where he said, "The image of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language game by anything that we should call a picture. — The image of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense, only not as a picture." The goal of this paper is to understand this passage. The method of exposition will be to present Wittgenstein's ideas, as much, as possible, in my own words. I will present examples, <sup>etc</sup> similar to ~~the ones~~ ones given by Wittgenstein, in an order I find convenient to the above purposes. I will try to give references to passages in Wittgenstein, where he is making a point similar to the one I make.

One of the important differences between an image and a picture is pointed out in §389 of PI. Wittgenstein quotes the following

"The image must be more like its object than any picture. For however like a model the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else as well. But it is essential to the image that it is the image of this and of nothing else."

If one thinks of the meaning of a word, say ~~N~~<sup>N</sup>, as a ~~picture~~<sup>picture</sup> of the object<sup>N</sup> the name stands for, then one will think of the relation between the ~~picture~~<sup>picture</sup> and object as one of likeness. But likeness will not do. ~~There is no image~~<sup>One may</sup> speak of an image of ~~N~~<sup>N</sup> but the image must be the image of N and nothing else. A picture of N could also be a picture of something else. Wittgenstein concludes "There one might come to regard the image as a super-likeness." The image is not a likeness, or a super-likeness either. What can a super likeness do that likeness can't do? This theme is developed further in the following passages of PI.

"I draw a head. you ask 'Whom is that supposed to represent?' - I: 'It's supposed to be N' - you: 'But it doesn't look like him, if anything, it's rather like M.' - When I said it represented N. - was I establishing a connexion or reporting one? And what connexion did exist? (683)

If a connection was being reported, it wouldn't be one of likeness.

"What is there in favour of saying that my words describe an existing connection? Well, they relate to various things which didn't simply make their appearance with the words. They say, for example, that I should have given a particular answer when, if I had been asked, and even if this is only a condition, still it does say something about the past." (684)

It is true that a relation exists between the ~~words~~ <sup>statements</sup> asserting a connection between the drawing and N, and various things about the past. However, the statement is not an assertion of those related things. Thus ~~the~~ various things about the past must be true, ~~which~~ which connect the drawing and N, but the statement "It's supposed to be N" is not an ~~assertion~~ <sup>description</sup> of those things. The statement neither reports a connection nor simply creates one. A connection already exists, but the statement is used in a different way than a description of the connection is used.

"I am thinking of N." "I am speaking of N."

Now do I speak of him? I say, for instance,

"I must go and see N today." — But surely that is not enough! After all, when I say "N" I might mean various people of this name.

— Then there must surely be a further, different connexion between my talk and N,

for otherwise I should still not have meant HIM.

Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you imagine it: namely by means of a mental mechanism." (689)

When one realizes that the statement is not describing the sort of connection indicated 694, one thinks some other sort of connection must <sup>already</sup> exist. One imagines a mental mechanism making the connection.

"When I make a remark with an allusion to N., I may let this appear - given particular circumstances - in my glance, my expression, etc.

You can show that you understand the expression "to allude to N." by describing examples of alluding. What will you describe? First of all, circumstances, then what someone says. Perhaps his glance, etc. as well. Then what someone making an allusion is trying to do.

And if I go on and tell someone the feelings, images, etc. which I had while I was making that ~~allusion~~ allusion, these may fill out the typical picture of an allusion (or one such picture). But it doesn't follow that the expression "alluding

to N " means: behaving like this, feeling this, imagining this, etc. And here some will say "Of course not! We knew that all along. A red thread must run through all these phenomena. It is, so to speak, entangled with them and so it is difficult to pick out." and that is not true either.

But it would also be wrong to say that "alluding" stands for a family of mental and other processes. - For one can well ask "Which was your allusion to N?" "How did you give others to understand that you meant N?" but not: "How did you mean this utterance as an allusion to N?"

"I alluded to him in my talk." -  
"When you said what?" "I was alluding to him when I spoke of a man who..."

"I was alluding to him" means roughly: "I wanted someone to think of him at these words, but 'I wanted' is not the description of a state of mind. Neither is 'understanding that N was meant' such a description." (Zettel 26)

Is it possible that Wittgenstein is suggesting that besides the connection of related things, there is also ~~a~~ <sup>another</sup> connection <sup>which is</sup> created, or to be created. The statement is the creation of this connexion, not a description of it, such

a creation is only possible if certain other connections already exist, but the statement doesn't describe these connections either. This helps me understand

" "you said, 'it'll stop soon'. - Were you thinking of the noise or of your pain?" of he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning" - is he observing that the connection existed, or is he making it by means of these words? - Can't I say both? Of what he said was true, didn't the connection exist - and is he not for all that making one which did not exist." (682)

The connections which already exist are such that a further connection can be made either to the pain or the piano tuning. The further connection is made by the statement. Without the statement, one could have a picture of the man, displaying pain behavior and saying "it'll soon stop" in the presence of piano tuning, and a multitude of other events. The <sup>connection</sup> statement creates the connection between the previous statement and his pain or the piano tuning, which ~~will~~ will then be what he was thinking off. The picture is unable to convey this connection.

"If I say 'I meant him' very likely a picture comes to my mind, perhaps of how I looked at him, etc.; but the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture." (663)

"We want to say: 'When we mean something, it's like going up to someone, it's not having a dead picture (of any kind)'. We go up to the thing we mean." (455)

"In numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture and once it is found the application as it were, comes about of itself. In this case we already have a picture which forces itself on us at every turn, — but does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins here." 425

"A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture seems like something muddled. ... In the actual use of the expressive we make detours, new ones by side road. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed. (426)

I give someone the order "Imagine N."  
His compliance with this order consists in  
forming a mental picture. A picture <sup>of an object</sup> is  
connected with the object it is a picture of  
by likeness. But the picture may be like  
a number of objects; it may be a picture of  
a number of objects. But an image of N  
is ~~an~~ image of N and ~~not~~ not an image of  
N or anything like N. To imagine N is to  
form an image of N; but an image of N is not  
a picture of N.