[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

1) [illegible]

2) [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (p [illegible])

3) [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

5) [illegible]
[illegible] (p [illegible])

4) [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (p [illegible])

[illegible] (4) [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] Applications of the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (p. 34) [illegible]

It seems desirable to examine three characterizations of the content of observation sentences, as regards the role of the observation sentences in testing conflicting theories. The three types of content are:

1) stimulus content
2) stimulus content and the content determined by a portion of all the laws and rules of the theory. (core content)
3) stimulus content and content determined by all the laws and rules of the theory. (total content)

Case 2

Suppose O_1 and O_2 hold theories T_1 and T_2 respectively. It is impossible that any observation statement will have the same total content for O_1 and O_2 as long as T_1 and T_2 differ. So that if agreement on the total content of observation statements is required to test the theories, then a test is impossible.

Case 1

Suppose some set S of observation statements have the same stimulus content for O_1 and O_2, but that O_1 and O_2 hold no laws or rules in common. Is it possible that T_1 and T_2 can be tested? It is possible that O_1 and O_2 could make a set of observation statements {p, q, r ...} [illegible] all in the set S [illegible] of observation statement

[illegible] If a set S is such that [illegible] they occur in two theories T_1 and T_2 and there is a set of consistent observation statements [illegible] A, [illegible] such that on the basis of A, T_1 predicts an observation statement p in S and T_2 predicts ~p. Then the ordered tuple $\langle S, T_1, T_2 \rangle$ will be said to be observationally critical. A set [illegible] of observation statements such as A will be said to be a critical set of observation statements.

Suppose O_1 and O_2 make a critical set of observation statements. O_1 predicts p and O_2 predicts ~p on the basis of the observation statements and the theories T_1 and T_2 respectively. Later both make the observation ~p. Clearly O_1 will be lead to suppose his own theory needs some sort of revision. However, is there any reason to believe he will adopt T_2? I think not. Even though, in fact, the observation statements in S have the same stimulus meaning for O_1 and O_2, O_1 may on the basis of his incorrect theory conclude that they have different stimulus content. ([illegible]) [illegible] T_2 [illegible] T_1 and T_2 [illegible] observation statements [illegible] stimulus content [illegible] $\langle S, T_1, T_2 \rangle$ [illegible] observationally critical [illegible]

Although the above [illegible] [illegible] that it [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] (S, T_1, T_2) is comparable iff T_1 and T_2 [illegible] that [illegible] both T_1 and T_2 [illegible] the same [illegible] [illegible]. Thus there [illegible] T_1 and T_2 [illegible] [illegible].

Suppose now that [illegible] T_1 and T_2, and that [illegible] the same [illegible] (T_1, T_2) [illegible] and [illegible]. Then [illegible] A [illegible] T_1 and T_2 [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] T_2 [illegible] the [illegible] T_2 [illegible] T_1 [illegible] T_2 [illegible] of the theory [illegible] T_2 [illegible] T_2 [illegible] [illegible] the same.