

"I see that bicycle". Now is this to be analysed?

I and the bicycle are objects and seeing is a relation between them. Then the logical form is  $R(a, b)$ .

You see the bicycle so  $R(c, b)$ .

But we don't really see the same thing, we see different perspectives of the same thing. The bicycle is inferred. Really, I have an immediate visual experience, certain colors, in a certain pattern. I am the object (logical subject). The pattern of colors is a property (logical predicate). (adverbial theory)

Things will get very complicated logically if there are objects, for which a predicate, significant when applied to me, is not significant. If  $F(a)$  is significant, then  $(x)F(x)$  is significant. If there is an object  $b$  such that  $F(b)$  is not significant then  $(x)$  is not completely general. Unless there is reason to do otherwise, it is best to assume that any predicate significant of I is significant of any object whatsoever, (monism)

What predicates are there?

Is red a predicate?

Yes, not red.

Is 'being red' a predicate

I see red, but this is abstracted from immediate experience.

Of the basic predicates as to be concrete in the immediate experience they cannot be abstracted. Then any <sup>basic</sup> predicate applies simply to the entirety of any one possible immediate experience. All basic predicates are mutually exclusive, (as a matter of fact we could never use such predicates).

We are forced to admit that basic predicates are abstracted from experience. The best form of such predicates can come up with is  $F[A]$ ,  $R[A, B]$ , etc.  $A, B$ , etc are not really objects here. They may be regarded as intensional objects. What ~~is~~ usually regard as propositions are really only predicates, of which I am the subject.  $F[A](I)$ ,  $R[A, B](I)$  etc.

If  $A, B$ , etc are regarded as regions of immediate experience, and there is a relation of extensive connection, then lines, points, etc can be defined through extensive abstraction, as in Whitehead.

Now, what is the bicycle?

Well besides objects having predicates, they have relations, but we are never immediately aware of these. There are causal relations between objects. These are roughly expressed in the laws of physics. The objects in the past of an object determine its character, more exactly, given the relations between all objects, and predicates of all objects at a given time, and whatever causal laws hold, there are nine possibilities as to the extent the past and future are determined.

Preliminary definitions

a = some relation between, and predicates of, objects in the future are determined  
 b = " " " " " " " " " " are not "  
 c = " " " " " " " " " " past are "  
 d = " " " " " " " " " " are not "

The following possibilities hold:

1	a, b, c, d	(the cases
2	$\sim a, b, c, d$	$\sim a, \sim b, c, d$
3	a, $\sim b, c, d$	$\sim a, \sim b, \sim c, d$
4	a, b, $\sim c, d$	$\sim a, \sim b, c, \sim d$
5	$\sim a, b, \sim c, d$	a, b, $\sim c, \sim d$
6	a, $\sim b, \sim c, d$	$\sim a, b, \sim c, \sim d$
7	a, b, c, $\sim d$	a, $\sim b, \sim c, \sim d$
8	$\sim a, b, c, \sim d$	$\sim a, \sim b, \sim c, \sim d$
9	a, $\sim b, c, \sim d$	

all ~~of~~ hold if and only if the past & future do not exist)

The only ones which are symmetrical, as regards the extent to which the past and future are determined

are a, b, c, d (partial determinism)  
 $\sim a, b, \sim c, d$  (absolute indeterminism)  
 a,  $\sim b, c, \sim d$  (determinism)

I would like to assume ~~nothing~~ for now, leaving b & d undecided, as this is the weakest assumption that will serve my purpose.

The bicycle is the existence of certain relations between, and predicates of, objects which, among other things, cause certain other objects to have the predicate "seeing the bicycle". They also cause a similar group of relations of relations between, and predicates of, objects to exist in the future, so the bicycle endures.

But I get confused about the past and the future. Does the past exist? No. Then the past can't cause anything. For if there is a causal relationship  $C(x, y)$  so that  $x$  is the cause of  $y$ , then if  $y$  is in the present,  $\sim(\exists x) C(x, y)$ .

So there are 3 alternatives (1) deny causal laws in the traditional sense, (2) grant that the past exists (3) introduce another kind of quantification which covers the past and future objects. (subsistence)

If (2) is accepted, then I am doing everything now that I have ever done. The I's would refer to different objects (me at different times), but all would equally exist and have certain relationships and properties. Change would be impossible. There would be a constant illusion of change.

(3) might work out formally, but even if it does, it is unacceptable. Either something exists or it doesn't, there is no middle ground.

We are stuck with (1).

Statements about the past could be construed as really statements about the present, in terms of seeming to-be past, etc. But then two people could never talk about the same thing. The bicycle can't be defined as I thought it could. This language is unusable, although I never thought it would be an analysis of ordinary language, ~~but~~ I thought it could be used to serve the purposes of ordinary language and have many advantages over it.