The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.* 3802 North Kenneth Avenue Chicago Illinois 60641

RUSSELL SOCIETY NEWS
No. 66
May 1990

(1) Highlights: Annual Meeting: Program (2); Registration Form (37). Ted Turner is Humanist of the Year (11). BR on Nelson Mandela (40). How Beatrice Webb saw Bertie & Alys (3). Nominations wanted for Director-Candidates (19). Halsman's great BR photo is back (7). New 16-Year newsletter Index for sale (8). Times Mirror Company's generous help (20). The Index is on the last page (43). An asterisk in the left column indicates a request.

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(2) ANNUAL MEETING (1990)

* Register If you haven't sent the REGISTRATION FORM that appeared in the February newsletter, please use the one in this newsletter. Soon,please! (Item).

How to get to McMaster. See Item .

The Program:

FRIDAY, JUNE 22:

4:00 - 6:00	Registration
6:00 7:30	Dinner
7:30 - 9:15	Awards, and talks by recipients
9:15 - 9:30	Coffee break
9:30 - who knows?	Board Meeting (all members welcome)

SATURDAY, JUNE 23:

8:00 - 9:00	Registration
9:00 - 10:00	Lee Eisler, *The History of The Bertrand Russell Society.*
10:00 - 10.45	Harry Ruja, *Knowing and Feeling in Religion.*
10:45 - 11:00	Coffee break
11:00 - 12:30	Tour of The Bertrand Russell Archives
12:30 - 1:30	Lunch
1:30 - 2:15	Chandrakala Padia, *Russell's Socio-Political Views.*
2:30 - 3:15	Michael J. Rockler, *Bertrand Russell and Education: Katharine Tait's Critique.*
3:15 - 3:30	Coffee break
3:30 - 4:15	Marvin Kohl's Workshop, *Russell's Theory of Rational Love.*
4:15 - 5:00	Joan Houlding, *Platonic Themes in Russell's Views on Education.*
5:00 - 6:00	Free time
6:00 - 7:00	Red Hackle Hour
7:00	Banquet. Talk by Louis Greenspan, Staff Member, The Russell Archives, and Managing Editor, The Bertrand Russell Editorial Project

SUNDAY, JUNE 24

8:45 - 9:45	Don Jackanicz Discussion, *Religion and Science.*
9:45 - 10:00	Coffee break
10:00 - 11:00	Tim Madigan, *Russell and Dewey on Education: Similarities and Differences..*
11:00 - 12:00	Thom Weidlich, *The Bertrand Russell/City College Case. 1940*
12:00	Adjournment. So long, Auf Wiedersehen, A bientôt, Ciao!

* NOTE: Suggested reading for Marvin Kohl's Workshop: *The Good Life,* from *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell,* pp. 371-375 (NY:Simon & Schuster, 1961); also *Analyzing Love* by Robert Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); *Brink, Russell and Rational Love* (Russell Society News 64, Item 6, Page 3); *Liking vs. Loving* by Robert J. Sternberg (Psychological Bulletin 102:3 (1987), 331-345.

Suggested reading for Don Jackanicz's Discussion: *Religion and Science* by Bertrand Russell (NY: Oxford University Press, 1961)

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*Russell Society News, a quarterly. Lee Eisler, Editor, 1664 Pleasant View Road, Coopersburg, PA 18036
Marvin Kohl, Co-Editor, 715 Maytum Hall, SUNY at Fredonia, Fredonia, NY 14063
Russell Society Library: Tom Stanley, Librarian, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(3) From *The Diary of Beatrice Webb, vol. 2,*, 1892-1905 (London: Virago. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), with thanks to HARRY RUJA:

The Russells are the most attractive married couple I know. Young and virtuous, they combine in the pair personal charm, unique intelligence, the woman having the one, the man the other, in the superlative degree. Romantically attached to each other, they have divine interests; Alys concerns herself with social reform, Bertrand with the higher mathematics. The scheme of their joint life is deliberately conceived to attain ends they both believe in, and persistently yet modestly carried out. The routine of their daily existence is as carefully planned and exactly executed as our own. They breakfast together in their study at 9 o'clock (we breakfast at 8!), then Bertrand works at mathematics until 12.30, then three-quarters of an hour reading together (Ranke's *History of England* since we have been here), a quarter-hour stroll in the garden together. Lunch with us 1.30, chat in our sitting-room or out-of-doors over cigarettes and coffee: then Bertrand plays croquet with Logan [Pearsall] Smith (Alys's brother who lives near here) until tea at 4.30. After that mathematics until 6 o'clock: reading with Alys until 7.30, dine at 8 o'clock, chat and smoke with us until 9.30: another hour's reading aloud with Alys until 10.30. They sleep and dress in the same room, and they have no children.

As individuals they are remarkable. Alys comes of an American Quaker family. She is charming to look at – tall, graceful, with regular features, clear skin, bright blue eyes and soft curly nut-brown hair, always smiling, often laughing, warm-hearted and sympathetically intelligent. She has not the gift of intimacy except with her husband. Her manner is the same to everyone, at least as far as I have seen. She has no art of flirtation, if anything she prefers women to men, and I think really likes the womanly woman better than the professional. She has no moods or they are controlled. She seems always happy and grateful for happiness and yet perpetually thinking how to make others happier. Since we have been here she has spent days away nursing a friend at Cambridge, with no consciousness of virtue, responding to a call of friendship as readily as most women respond to a call of pleasure. If she has a defect it is a certain colourlessness of intellect and a certain lack of 'temperament'. But in a woman are these defects?

Bertrand is a slight, dark-haired man, with prominent forehead, bright eyes, strong features except for a retreating chin, nervous hands and alert quick movements. In manner and dress and outward bearing he is most carefully trimmed, conventionally correct and punctiliously polite, and in speech he has an almost affectedly clear enunciation of words and preciseness of expression. In morals he is a puritan; in personal habits almost an ascetic, except that he lives for efficiency and therefore expects to be kept in the best physical condition. But intellectually he is audacious – an iconoclast, detesting religions or social convention, suspecting sentiment, believing only in the 'order of thought' and the order of things, in logic and in science. He indulges in the wildest paradox and in the broadest jokes, the latter always too abstrusely intellectual in their form to be vulgarly coarse. He is a delightful talker, especially in general conversation, when the intervention of other minds prevents him from tearing his subject to pieces with fine chopping logic. He is always fruitful, especially in clearing up definitions and distinctions or in following out logical conclusions. He is fastidious with regard to friends and acquaintances. He dislikes bores and hates any kind of self-seeking selfishness or coarse-grainedness. He looks at the world from a pinnacle of detachment, dissects persons and demolishes causes. And yet he recognizes that as a citizen you must be a member of a party, therefore he has joined the Fabian Society! And more or less accepts

Sidney as his 'representative' man. But the kernel of his life is research into the processes of reasoning. Of this new and highly abstract form of logic, more abstract than mathematics, I have no vision. All that one can say is that the effect on his own mind of these processes of pure reasoning is to make him singularly helpful in clearing up more concrete issues; even when he starts with no specialized knowledge of facts. To sum up, he is an expert in the art of reasoning, quite independently of the subject-matter.

A vigorous intelligence, at once subtle and honest, with the best kind of pride, the determination not to swerve from his own standards of right and wrong, truth or falsehood, are perhaps his finest characteristics. What he lacks is sympathy and tolerance for other people's emotions, and, if you regard it as a virtue, Christian humility. The outline of both his intellect and his feelings are sharp, hard and permanent. He is a good hater.

I observe in Bertrand a curious parallel between his intellectual and his moral nature. He is intolerant of blemishes and faults in himself and others, he dreams of Perfection in man. He almost loathes lapses from men's own standards. So in his thought he is almost violently impatient of bad reasoning. A right conclusion come to by bad arguments is offensive to him. It is the *perfection of the reasoning* that he seeks after, not truth of the conclusions. Now it seems to me that there is the same sort of connection between an intellectual concentration on applied science, and a tolerant, if not lax judgement of men. Just as I am always striving to adjust my order of thought to the order of things – exactly as I am always looking to results as the test of right reasoning (power of prevision, for instance, by the result of shockingly bad reasoning?) so I am perpetually excusing myself and others for any lapses in morality. I analyse and describe my own and other's faults. But these faults seldom offend me in themselves, but only because they result in what is unpleasant and ugly. I have no 'sense of sin' and no desire to see it punished. Bertrand, on the other hand, is almost cruel in his desire to see cruelty revenged.

KATHARINE RUSSELL TAIT

(4) Kate Tait's talk at the Women's National Democratic Club was reported in *The Washington Post* (3/12/76). (Thank you HARRY RUJA.)

Growing Up Liberated: 'No Place to Go'

By Michael Kernan

When Bertrand Russell took his family down the rocky Cornwall cliffs to the beach for a swim, there was always a solemn discussion: of the tides, the wind, the course of the sun. Not until all factors had been logically worked out did anyone sit down on the sand—there to smile covertly at the foolish day trippers who had settled themselves in the path of a rising tide.

"Both my parents liked being different, being rebels," said Katharine Russell Tait, the great philosopher's only daughter, "and they brought us up liberated. The problem was, there was no place to go from there. We had everything, but my feeling was that it was a no-man's land."

Speaking at the Woman's National Democratic Club yesterday, the author of "My Father, Bertrand Russell" admitted that she would have like to be a bit more like "Brown, Jones and Robinson": she could belong, she could feel safe.

"It was a demanding life. You were free to be brave and adventurous—we were allowed to be dirty, rude, and take risks, and nobody ever said to be careful—but an awful lot was expected of us."

Having a famous father has happened to any number of people, but being a child of the celebrated radical idealist, militant atheist and cosmic thinker Lord Russell was something else.

"I learned to read at 3," commented Tait, who is staying with friends at Arlington while she hunts for a writing job, "and at 4 my father started our schooling. He was not permissive about learning."

It did have its compensations.

"There was a tower on top of the house which was my father's study, and we'd all go thundering up there for our history lessons. He had his Chinese rug there, and his Chinese ivories and paintings and the bust of Voltaire he always had near him, and he'd be reading in front of the fire with his spectacles on. And he knew it all, whatever we would ask, he'd know it and would make it all sound like a fairy story."

Educated in England and at Radcliffe, Tait married an American minister and raised five children—but not in the rigid traditions of her own childhood. There were a number of things she learned to discard as she grew up and out of her father's shadow.

"He believed in progress, and I don't," she said. "Actually, I'm not sure he felt it himself. He taught us to believe in the equality of women—his godfather was John Stuart Mill, a great feminist, and in 1907 he stood for Parliament as a women's suffrage candidate—but he liked a wife who did nothing else except be his wife. And he had four of 'em."

Brought up as a pacifist, Socialist and rational skeptic, Bertrand Russell's daughter gradually found out what Russell himself began to suspect at the end of his 98-year life: that human perfection may be possible, but it is hardly just around the corner.

"I think he realized, at the end, that nothing was as rational and simple as he had thought."

Quiet words from a quiet woman. But one senses painful years forgiven if not forgotten.

(5) *My Father, Bertrand Russell,* by Katharine Tait, from the Book Review Section, p. 16, *Los Angeles Times* (4/25/76), with thanks to HARRY RUJA.

Expurgatory Paean to Bertrand Russell

BY KEITH S. FELTON

MY FATHER BERTRAND RUSSELL by Katharine Tait (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $8.95).

"'It is very difficult,' my father once told me, 'pretending to an emotion you don't feel all the time. Even when I am half asleep I have to show affection. I cannot relax for a moment.'"

—Bertrand Russell to his daughter

This book bears weighty testament to the notion that if you look between the lines of a personal biography, you will find an autobiography. Katherine Tait's skillfully written account of her life as the daughter of Lord Bertrand Russell, F.R.S., O.M., Third Earl Russell and unparalleled 20th-century philosopher, is a knife which makes an incision into a long-passed life. It is the story of a well-to-do and worldly thinker, his wives, his lovers, his children; but what is exposed for surgical attendance by this biographer is a good look at her own life.

Tait shares with us much about her experiences with her father—often in the form of anecdote, frequently in the fashion of exposition of his famous views on education and his adherence to rationalism. But much more than any episodic memory of a famous man, this is a chart of a daughter's trials in the tripartite underdog roles of child, female and servant to a genius-father's theories. Katharine Russell Tait's story is binding and literate, but it is also bitter and pervasively sad.

Though she claims not to have worshiped her father in any unqualified sense, there is a strange thread that runs, sub rosa, through the author's narrative and it can only be called filial resentment. Rather than emerging as some full-blown lifelong gripe, however, it is transmogrified into a sort of feminist stance, and as such, Tait develops a theme which can be acceptably open in her story. This is the tale of the trials of the women in the Russell families—chiefly the philosopher's four wives and the author herself—against the overpowering figures of the males they contended with, most notably of whom were Russell himself and the favored son John, born after Katharine and following a trip their parents made to China.

In view of Lord Russell's long libertinism, and especially in view of his choices of women (feminism was always a key to his interest in women), it may seem contradictory to feel from his daughter this muted sense of daughterly disparagement. But these plaintive cross-sections of the Dominant Male Russell are only resonators, really, of the great man's own turn-of-the-century philosophical paradox. Raised in as puritanical an environment as anyone in England, he grew out of this, with his first marriage, and into the spirited dissenter who was a liberal clarion from Verdun to Vietnam.

Indeed, Mrs. Tait's love was never blind love at all; this she makes certain. But there are moments, even in her expressions of virulent dissatisfaction with her father, when the reader is sure that the Russell family tendency to paradox was passed on: Love of and hate for the giver of life can sometimes abide so passionately and for so long in one's offspring.

These themes—of women versus men, and idealism versus pragmatism—are keenly noted in Tait's chapter on Beacon Hill. Describing her childhood education at this institution, the Russell family's private free school, the author says, "We were freaks and never knew it, because we lived protected from the world." Fearful that some might attribute the school to her mother's efforts alone, after her father's interest in it failed, she speaks of her parents' equal involvement in its charter in such a way almost as to exonerate her mother for any untoward blame.

Far from a "free" school for young Katharine, she seemed hemmed in: "I remember (a bright and sunny hall) as a place of desolation. I remember standing in the middle of the polished floor, surrounded by space and dark woodwork, not knowing which way to go or what to do, having no belonging place in all that vast building." It makes her all the more seem to the reader that she was a child lost in the cavern of her father's will.

Whatever awkwardness in inspiriting a free education, the family togetherness remained a powerful force in the Russell household, and Katharine's father was to be a part of her life for many years. During the period preceding World War II, her parents' mutual affection died, and Russell's teaching brought him to the United States, and to a lectureship at UCLA. And somewhere in this transmigration, Katharine Russell implanted her spirit in American soil. A further period in Pennsylvania and at Radcliffe College, seemed to cement in Mrs. Tait a sense of belonging more in harmony with this country than with England. But a more powerful force for her was destined to provide direction for the future: She underwent a conversion toward a most un-Russellian concept—a living God. This inspiration became a deity so important to Mrs. Tait and her husband that they felt it "should lay claim to the whole of our lives, though we were not quite sure how to offer them to Him."

In facing the blank page to begin her record of her father, Mrs. Tait tells us that the praises have stepped aside in favor of the "buts" and "complaints." They come out in her book, spoken as a sigh, but they are gale-forced in old, deeply felt, apparently long-withheld feeling. This remembrance is a paean, but it is also movingly and subtly a daughter's expressive expurgation; and using the public form of this book seems somehow to have provided a necessary part of the later growth of this once-celebrity-shadowed child. Mrs. Tait is to be commended for her candor, and encouraged to delve deeper into her father; it feels from her writing to be a self-search of the most exigent kind.

Felton is a local free-lance writer.

BOOK REVIEWS

(6) *Cambridge Essays, 1888-99,* reviewed in *The Listener* (1/26/84). Thank you, HARRY RUJA. The book has also been reviewed by Sidney Hook (RSN41-25) and Justin Leiber (RSN42-18). John Watling's review is on the next page.

John Watling

Russell's beginnings

Cambridge Essays, 1888-99.
By Bertrand Russell
Text edited by Kenneth Blackwell
Allen and Unwin £48

Throughout his life, Bertrand Russell hoarded his manuscripts, but not without some selection. Two years before his death he sold most of them. Rupert Crawshay-Williams notes in *Russell Remembered* that they fetched hundreds of thousands of pounds. It is that book that reveals that Russell did destroy some things, 'masses of extremely purple passages [written] in his early Twenties'. The manuscripts went to McMaster University, Canada, where the collection has been brought nearer completion by further purchases. Editors at McMaster, with the help of an international board, now plan 28 volumes of those of Russell's shorter papers that, as the editors put it, 'record his own thoughts', but omitting letters. The letter collection is said to be not yet complete enough for publication to begin. Volumes Two to Twelve of these papers will contain his writings on philosophy, including theoretical ethics, logic and mathematics. Into the rest will go his writings on all other topics, international relations, history, political theory, religion, education and practical ethics. Volume One, now published and entitled *Cambridge Essays*, contains his shorter writings of all kinds before 1901, except for one group of the papers on geometry thought more suitable to Volume Two.

The papers in *Cambridge Essays* are of four kinds. There are two secret diaries. The earlier, spanning the year in which he became 16, was protected by the use of the Greek alphabet and the heading 'Greek Exercises'; the later, written mainly two years afterwards but with very sporadic entries during three following years at Cambridge, had a clasp with lock and key. There is a set of study essays, a few from his preparation for the Trinity College scholarship examination and many from his work for the philosophy tripos. There are papers read to the Cambridge discussion society, the Apostles. Finally, there are papers written during his graduate work, and published work stemming from it. Some of this concerns economics and politics, for Russell hesitated between politics and the philosophy of mathematics for his research, but most is on the nature of geometry.

How much of this material has been published before? Fairly extensive selections from the Greek Exercises were included in *My Philosophical Development* and in the autobiography. None of the study essays seem to have seen the light of day before. Russell, apparently, included some of the school essays in an early draft of his autobiography but deleted them later, and Alan Wood never carried out a plan to use the philosophy essays in a study of Russell's philosophy. One of the papers

Russell: educated to be Prime Minister

read to the Apostles appears in *Why I Am Not a Christian*. Of the papers arising from his graduate work, the most substantial are two articles reprinted from philosophical journals, no manuscripts having survived, some are reviews, and some are drafts from his fellowship dissemation on geometry.

Besides the main material, there are two appendices of considerable interest. One includes very competent newspaper reports of a series of lectures on geometry Russell gave at Bryn Mawr College in 1896. The other is a reading list covering the whole of Russell's twenties. It was made in a note-book with the printed heading 'What Shall I Read?' but is thought by the editors to be a list of books actually read by Russell and, in the later of the years, his wife Alys. Many of the one-word comments he made at the time have been heavily obliterated by Russell, efficiently enough nearly always to defeat modern methods of restoration. The general and textual notes, the chronological information and the bibliographies are copious and meticulous.

One exception to that is worth noting. The editors should, I think, have indicated that the view that Kant was unaware of the possibility of non-Euclidean geometry, held in the 19th century and, if the report of the Bryn Mawr lectures is accurate, shared by Russell, has been substantially undermined by Gottfried Martin in his book *Kant's Metaphysics and the Theory of Science*. Martin shows that Saccheri, one of the earliest investigators of the consequences of denying Euclid's axiom of parallels, was in communication with Kant. Martin argues that Kant's theory was developed in the light of the belief that a non-Euclidean geometry could be developed, not in ignorance of the possibility. Certainly, that accords with Kant's theory itself, which allows that such geometries would not be self-contradictory, while offering an explanation of why they cannot possibly be true. Russell himself largely ignored Kant's insistence on the synthetic character of the geometrical axioms; why he supposed the development of non-Euclidean geometries to refute Kant's belief in the necessity of Euclid is not explicit in these papers. Russell's own purpose was to vindicate Kant's approach, as far as he thought it feasible, by identifying a common basis to both Euclid and non-Euclid and showing that to be known *a priori*.

Fuller information would have been welcome in a note to the second Greek Exercise. Can the author of an article in *The Nineteenth Century* really have suggested sexual passion, a tinge of melancholy and a desire to commit suicide as common characteristics denoting both genius and madness? Mustn't the young Russell have been misinterpreting him?

This is a volume for the biographer, not the philosopher. The study essays are excellent pieces of work but provide little illumination. It is hardly to be expected that they should. What is more, they come too early in his studies to throw light upon his philosophical development. Taken together with the editors' account of the lectures Russell followed during his year's course for Part Two of the philosophy tripos, they reveal the limitations of that course as a grounding in philosophy. There was nothing on logic, to which Russell made his major contributions.

In the first diary we find him, in rather Olympian style, attempting to reconcile religion and science with the hypothesis that God instituted the laws science discovers, concerned about the problems posed by man's free will and consciousness, and congratulating himself upon the perfection of his education. In some ways, that education was less than perfect. To contravert his grandmother's adherence to conscience rather than utility as a guide to conduct, he argues that conscience is a product of education 'as for example common Irishmen do not consider lying wrong'. The consciences of politicians, and Russell was brought up among politicians, allow them to lie more freely than the consciences of common Irishmen have ever done, a fact which an education for the role of Prime Minister, which Russell's was, ought surely to have imparted. The diaries have some value in correcting errors in the autobiography. For example, the locked diary contains no account of his grandmother's reactions to his wish to marry Alys, as Russell says it did; yet there are, apparently, no pages removed. However, the expectations raised by the measures taken to ensure their privacy are unfulfilled. They provide a very pale shadow of the story told in the autobiography.

There is much interest in many of these writings, in others, very little. That is inevitable in a publication of this kind, which Russell's standing as a major figure in many fields demands. It is in the later volumes that the interest will come.

FOR SALE

(7) It's back! After being out of print for several years, our favorite photo of BR -- taken in 1959 -----> by Philippe Halsman -- is once again available on a postcard, $1 for the first one, 75¢ each for more ordered at the same time. Postpaid.



(8) 16-Year Index of BRS Newsletters, 1974-1989, Issues 1-64, 43 pages, 2379 entries. Buy it from the newsletter, $7 postpaid (within the USA). Or borrow it from the BRS Library, $2 postage (within the USA). Addresses on Page 1.

(9) Members' stationery. 8 1/2 x 11, white. Across the top: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." Bertrand Russell" On the bottom:""Motto of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc." New reduced USA price, $5 for 90 sheets, postpaid. Canada & Mexico still $6. Order from the newsletter, address on Page 1.

CHURCH/STATE SEPARATION

(10) Ophelia Hoopes reminds us -- with an article from *Church & State* (March 1990) -- that England, despite its many great merits as a democracy, still has an official state religion. Here is an excerpt:

> Nowhere else in Europe does a religion by law established enjoy anything like the privileges the Church of England enjoys here. A totalitarian regime wishing to indoctrinate the population with its beliefs could hardly ask for more: favored time on radio and television, a guaranteed unique role in the law and constitution, reserved places in the upper House of Parliament, the exclusive religion of the head of state, a special protected status in the school curriculum, the right to the leading role on occasions of national solemnity, and a vast tax-free income.
>
> Clifford Langley, religion writer,
> The Times of London

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

(11) AHA -- the *American Humanist Association* -- chose Ted Turner as its 1990 Humanist of the Year. Turner accepted the award on April 27th, at AHA's 49th Annual Conference, in Orlando. (We were there.)

An excellent article in *The Humanist* (Nov/Dec 89) tells the remarkable Turner story in a few pages. Here is one excerpt:

> In a speech to the Hollywood Radio and Television Society this past Spring [1989], he exorted the 990 industry executives in attendance to "stand up, get off your knees, and go to work instead of spending all your time praying." He then unveiled his ten "voluntary initiatives" -- a humanistic alternative to the "obsolete" Ten Commandments. (see below)

WARREN SMITH says Turner "fearlessly told Dallas broadcasters that he'd like to see his Ten Voluntary Initiatives replace the Ten Commandments."

We think Turner is a great choice. We also think you'll find the Turner article in *The Humanist* worth reading.

Here are Turner's Ten:

TURNER'S "VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES"

1. I promise to have love and respect for the planet earth and living things thereon, especially my fellow species—humankind.
2. I promise to treat all persons everywhere with dignity, respect, and friendliness.
3. I promise to have no more than two children, or no more than my nation suggests.
4. I promise to use my best efforts to save what is left of our natural world in its untouched state and to restore damaged or destroyed areas where practical.
5. I pledge to use as little nonrenewable resources as possible.
6. I pledge to use as little toxic chemicals, pesticides, and other poisons as possible and to work for their reduction by others.
7. I promise to contribute to those less fortunate than myself, to help them become self-sufficient and enjoy the benefits of a decent life, including clean air and water, adequate food and health care, housing, education, and individual rights.
8. I reject the use of force, in particular military force, and back United Nations arbitration of international disputes.
9. I support the total elimination of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction.
10. I support the United Nations and its efforts to collectively improve the conditions of the planet.

(12) NECLC -- the *National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee* -- devotes almost the entire issue of its publication, *Rights* (March-April 1990) to remembering Leonard Boudin, a great civil rights attorney. This issue can be borrowed from the BRS Library (address on Page 1, bottom)

(13) *Society for the Right to Die* cites an article by Columnist Jane Bryant Quinn, of the *Washington Post*, headlined A LIVING WILL IS THE BEST WAY TO AVOID SPENDING LAST DAYS ATTACHED TO A TUBE. The Society's own letter says it has been fighting "monstrous abuses of medical technology...where a family is forced to stand by helplessly as a loved one is connected to a machine that does nothing more than prolong dying." "In many cases patients are held captive to unwanted treatment because they have not put their wishes in writing. The solution is to make out a document called a Living Will, that allows you to describe the kind of treatment you do and do not want." Quinn says you can get the appropriate documents free by sending a self-addressed stamped envelope to the Society at 250 W. 57th St., NY NY 10107.

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(14) David Horowitz, Director of The Bertrand Rusell Peace Foundation, 1964-1967, writes as follows...in *Ramparts* (April 1970)...with thanks to Al Seckel:

Bertrand Russell: The Final Passion

TOWARDS THE END OF his life, Bertrand Russell spent most of his time in Plas Penrhyn, Wales, in an ample but not opulent house set high on a cliff, with a spectacular view of the Glaslyn estuary below. He came down to London rarely, the wearying six-hour trip and the dank urban climate presenting hardships he could risk less and less as time went on. Because of an intestinal kink, and the inadvisability of an operation at his advanced age, he was already living on a wholly liquid diet, which he roguishly supplemented with seven Red Hackle scotches a day.

I met Lord Russell on one of the increasingly rare occasions when he was spending a few months in London in his Chelsea flat. It was on a crisply clear day early in the fall of 1964, and I remember feeling anxiety and agitation as I searched out the number I had been given among a row of indistinguishable and modest red brick houses. A compulsive early arriver, I walked around the block several times after locating his flat in the hopes that others would have arrived by the time I got there, and I could slip in unnoticed. Finally, I knocked weakly on the door.

It was opened by a diminutive, incredibly frail and fragile-looking white-haired old man. A mixture of feelings came up like a blush—awe, humility, admiration, and most of all, a sense of unbridgeable distance. He smiled, amused at my confusion but also so warm and friendly that he had already overcome the worst of it, although I never did manage to conquer that sense of being where I didn't belong, of not being remotely capable of stepping across that awesome gap—a gap created by time, by culture and by forces of history that I could only dimly imagine.

I followed Lord Russell's slow steps down the corridor, past the portraits of his ancestors: Lord John Russell, his grandfather, who as Prime Minister presided over the famous Reform Act of 1832; William Russell, who, as he pointed out later with a puckish twinkle in his eye, had opposed authority and had his head cut off. The short walk was obviously a great burden on him, and it alerted a Bellowesque guilt in me. ("Jesus, Lord Russell, you didn't have to come all the way to the door just for me.")

Later, when I got used to Russell and his routine, I was to realize that these efforts—the arduous trek down that short but seemingly endless hall, the pouring of tea for everyone from what appeared more a cauldron than a teapot in those frail, bony hands—were, for him, part of a fierce struggle against the failing of the life force, against time which had not beaten him over all the generations, although it had beaten down those he had known, loved and fought. ("*I believe*," he had written, "*that when I die I shall rot and nothing of my ego will survive. I am not young and I love life but I should scorn to shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is nonetheless true happiness because it must come to an end. Nor do thought and love lose their values because they are not everlasting.*") On that first day, however, after we got settled and began talking, one thing quickly became clear: the physical decline was deceptive; the mind which peered out through those at once sad and twinkling eyes was keen and resilient.

The gathering which I had come to attend was a meeting of the members of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to discuss plans for setting up an International War Crimes Tribunal to investigate America's war in Vietnam. The room was filled with people who were under thirty, and more likely under twenty-five—all born after Russell had attained more than twice that age. In the political actions in which he engaged during the last years, it was always thus: we who served him and laid plans with him always looked at him across a full lifetime. A memoir by Ralph Schoenman, his secretary, captures it well: "We are separated by 64 years. His talk is studded with Lenin, Victoria, Poincaré, Mill, Browning, Wilde—people he knew or disputed. . . . 'How close were you to Bakunin, Bertie?' 'Not all that close, but then I wasn't well acquainted with Methuselah either.'"

THE MEETING ITSELF was one of those interminably windy sessions familiar to anyone who has been in on the organizing of anything. It veered off on a dozen tangents, all the time increasing for me the incongruity of the afternoon—the legendary Lord Russell, godson of John Stuart Mill, holding court with these youthful activists and entering their circumambulatory discussions about organizational details and structures of the forthcoming Tribunal. Russell was concerned that the plans should not be too grandiose and appear ridiculous in the outcome. One long digression of the afternoon concerned possible sites for the Tribunal, and elaborate speculation as to whether any government would allow it. Russell was heavily inclined to doubt the will or ability of any officials—Russian, Swiss or Third World—to be hospitable to a project which they wouldn't control and which would undoubtedly get them into hot water with the United States.

This skepticism—which turned out to be simple realism—was a feature of Russell's intellect that was to impress me again and again in the brief period in which I was a director of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Russell's incapacity for illusion—that ingrained sense of doubt which was his inheritance from the age of Victoria—was an essential characteristic of his being. In a BBC interview on his 94th birthday, Russell had been reminded that many of his critics were claiming that the youngsters who had followed him in his nuclear protests were just young and irresponsible, and that when they got to be over thirty, they would become conservative and respectable and abandon him. What did he think? Russell, whose actions had foreshadowed and inspired the upsurge of mass protest in the '60's, replied: "Yes, that's probably true. "Could I, I would ask myself many times after hearing this story, put my life energies into the political struggle if I did not really believe I was helping to shape a future majority, if I was not confident of the ultimate triumph of reason and justice?

There was on the other side of Russell's profound skepticism, however, an equally profound romanticism. Among his books was a whimsical one-sentence work which he had written in his 89th year, called "History of the World in Epitome." It began with a picture of Adam and Eve and ended with a photograph of the atomic bomb. "Since Adam and Eve ate the apple," read the text, "man has never refrained from any folly of which he was capable." He had a passionate love for this same wicked, folly-ridden creature, man. Some called it quixotic but Russell was well aware of the monstrous cruelties

his passion encompassed. He was like those favored figures of Shakespeare's imagination, romantic skeptics who, like Hamlet, were disgusted by the animal in man and the vanity in his works, yet recognized him as the noblest of creations. It was in this ability to embrace antitheses that the compelling magnetism of Russell lay. You had in Russell's presence at once awesome tradition, genius and age, and from the very center of all these humbling radiances, a ninety-year-old imp who would puncture the illusion, the pomp and the heroic vision with a deflating barb. As his old friend Leonard Woolf once remarked of Russell, "It is very rare to be a Socrates and a Puck at the same time."

Nothing was more alien to Russell than posturing, and nothing more devastating to pretension than his own searing vision: if there is a lesson in his life, it is that in the last analysis, the truly heroic can arise only on the ground of the relentlessly real.

[II]

"IN HIS YOUTH HE DID work of importance in mathematical logic, but his eccentric attitude toward the First World War revealed a lack of balanced judgment, which increasingly infected his later writings." So Russell wrote of himself in a mock obituary which he composed in 1937. But this whimsy became, in the eyes of editorial writers in the great Western newspapers, reality, and their abuse of the political writings and activities of his last years was unstinting. These culminated in an incredible viciousness directed against the last great effort of his life—the pitting of his intellect and final energies against the American destruction of Vietnam.

From the editorial page of the New York Times, under the headline "Corpse on Horseback," C. L. Sulzberger "informed" readers that Russell had "outlived his own conscious ideas and [become] clay in . . . unscrupulous hands." The tragedy of the War Crimes Tribunal, Sulzberger continued, "cannot fairly be laid at the door of the wasted peer whose bodily endurance outpaced his brain. . . ." This was written in May 1967, a week before Russell's 95th birthday, when the Tribunal was in session, and while Lyndon Johnson was still President of the United States. It was written before the revelations about the massacres at My Lai and elsewhere, and before the great revulsion against the war which broke forth in the massive Moratorium demonstrations. Even now, however, the consensus of obituaries on Russell is that this last gesture (referred to variously as a "mock trial" or the "notorious trial") was something to be ashamed of, a final unfortunate surrender to the naivete, caprice and inconsistency which characterized his involvement in social affairs.

Such a distortion is easily conjured out of the press symbols of Russell's career. To see Russell clearly across the near century of his life, however, is to comprehend the inner consistency of his stance, from his resistance to World War I, through his nuclear protests, to his last defense of Vietnam's revolutionary peasants—this final act, the hardest, the most courageous, the most important gesture of them all.

RUSSELL'S VERY FIRST BOOK was a critical account of German Marxism (with an appendix by his wife Alys on Marxism and the woman question). His first venture into politics saw him stand unsuccessfully as a socialist candidate for Parliament with woman's suffrage as one of his main planks. In *Roads to Freedom* (1918), Russell outlined a program of guild socialism and laid down the two principles of reform in international relations which became the all-consuming cause of the last decade and a half of his life: "First, the avoidance of wars, and, second, the prevention of the oppression of weak nations by strong ones."

It was the *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920), written on his return from a trip to revolutionary Russia where he met Lenin and Trotsky, that established Russell's reputation as an early anti-communist. What he had written about this crisis in world history, however, was something quite different from what his reputation as a "liberal anti-communist" might suggest. "I believe," Russell declared at the outset, "that Socialism is necessary to the world, and believe that the heroism of Russia has fired men's hopes in a way which was essential to the realization of Socialism in the future. Regarded as a splendid attempt, without which ultimate success would have been very improbable, Bolshevism deserves the gratitude and admiration of all the progressive part of mankind."

It was the method by which the Bolsheviks were attempting to establish Socialism that caused Russell's doubts. What he reacted to most negatively in this "method" was its fanatical intolerance and its welcoming of class war and its hatreds which the counter-revolution had, he conceded, made necessary. With the advent of Stalin came the institutionalization of the worst elements and tendencies in Bolshevism as he had witnessed them in 1920. It was only after Stalin's death, and the subsequent changes in Soviet policy, that Russell's view of Russian Communism became less censorius. In this he was greatly influenced, as were many other socialists, by the writings of the Marxist biographer of Trotsky, Isaac Deutscher, whom he later chose to serve on the War Crimes Tribunal.

Prior to Russell's invitation, Deutscher had not participated in a political action since the 1930's, when he had been expelled from the Polish Communist Party (whose entire Central Committee later perished at Stalin's hands) for "exaggerating the dangers of Nazism" and similar Trotskyist sins. Denounced as a Marxist revolutionary by the right, as a spokesman for Wall Street by the Communists, and as a Stalinist apologist by the Trotskyists, Deutscher had lived the last 30 years of his life in political isolation for his principles, a situation which Russell understood well.

I remember how moved Deutscher was when we brought him the invitation from Russell, and how deep was the respect which this classical European Marxist expressed for the English empiricist's life and work. The Russell-Deutscher relationship subsequently provided one of the most touching and fulfilling moments in the Tribunal proceedings. On November 13, 1966, the Tribunal met for the first time in closed session in London. Russell appeared and read a brief statement asserting the need for such a Tribunal "composed of men eminent, not through



their power, but through their intellectual and moral contribution to what we optimistically call 'human civilization'." When he finished, there was a respectful silence as he turned, and with his usual slight annoyance at the hands that went out to help him, began the slow, aching, proud steps that would take him to the door. I understood the silence—again that awesome gap between the figure and his audience, though this was a group considerably closer in age and in distinction than most—but I felt it still and especially inadequate. And then Deutscher rose and addressed him for all the others, for the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, for the Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer, for the eminent mathematician Laurent Schwarz and the rest. Deutscher, who orally dictated his epic historical works, had the most literary and finely-architected speaking style of anyone I have ever heard, and now his central European accents filled the room as he told Russell what a magnificent and courageous task he had undertaken, what a beacon of hope he was to the young, what a light to the oppressed, and what a debt of gratitude was owed to him. The old man nodded, visibly moved, and then turned again to make his slow way out.

[III]

EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL Tribunal figures was, like Russell, one of those displaced intellects that had been cast into the twilight zones of politics because of his commitment to the Enlightenment ideals that capitalism and imperialism had made impossible, and that the Stalinist revolutions had betrayed. There was Sartre, the President of the Tribunal, who had traveled from Existentialism to Marxism, but because of his fierce and principled independence had been compelled to live a political career under attack from Communists and liberals alike. And there was Dedijer, the Chairman, a thrice wounded Communist partisan, once one of the four top leaders in Yugoslavia who had been cast into internal exile for defending Milovan Djilas, even though he did not share Djilas' views.

These men, and most of the other Tribunal members, were Marxists, it is true, albeit independent ones. Russell's intellectual distance from Marxism, however, has been exaggerated (on occasion even by himself). Where the basic divergence really lay was in Russell's stress on psychological factors as motive forces in history, and even more profoundly in his skeptical outlook, which was both philosophical and constitutional: "Throughout my life," he wrote in the second volume of his *Autobiography*, "I have longed to feel that oneness with large bodies of human beings that is experienced by the members of enthusiastic crowds. The longing has often been strong enough to lead me into self-deception. I have imagined myself in turn a Liberal, a Socialist, or a Pacifist, but I have never been any of these things, in any profound sense. Always the skeptical intellect, when I have most wished it silent, has whispered doubts to me, has cut me off from the facile enthusiasms of others, and has transported me into a desolate solitude." These lines were written a propos his anti-war activities during the First World War, when he worked with "Quakers, non-resisters and Socialists" as an ally, but not a comrade. He would tell the Quakers that some wars were justified, and the Socialists that he opposed the tyranny of the state, and get suspicious looks from both.

World War I and its aftermath had deepened Russell's skepticism to the point of despair. "The optimist now," he wrote in 1948, "is the man who thinks it possible to hope that the world will not get worse; to suppose that it may get better in any near future is scarcely possible except through wilful blindness." In the two decades that Russell lived after these words were written, and especially after the development of the hydrogen bomb in 1953, he dedicated his political energies not only to the end that the world should not become a worse place to live, but that it should not cease to be a place to live altogether. In 1954, he concluded a radio broadcast on the hydrogen bomb by saying, "I appeal as a human being to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death." In 1955 he initiated a joint manifesto of scientists from both East and West (a radical departure for the times) warning against the dangers of nuclear annihilation. From that time on he became the intellectual symbol of the struggle against the bomb.

In 1957 he launched the Pugwash conferences of East-West nuclear scientists, which had an important influence on the subsequent development of the nuclear test ban, and in 1958 helped to found the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which he served as president. In 1960 when the CND and its Aldermaston marches were at the height of their popularity, he resigned as president to lead a campaign of mass civil disobedience under the auspices of a "Committee of 100." Early in 1961, Russell led a sitdown of 5000 people at the Ministry of Defense. Later in the year he addressed a meeting in Hyde Park, which was stopped by the police (the microphones were removed while he was speaking) because a permit was lacking. Russell was arraigned with other members of the Committee and was sent to Brixton prison for seven days. (He had previously spent six months there for his opposition to World War I.) This frail eighty-eight-year-old had replied with a firm "No I won't" when the magistrate offered to exempt him from jail if he pledged himself to good behavior. When the sentence was pronounced, cries of protest went up from the onlookers. This gesture of concern wounded the old man's pride. "It angered me," he said. "I knew that it was well meant, but I had deliberately incurred the punishment and, in any case, I could not see that age had anything to do with guilt. If anything, it made me the more guilty. The Magistrate seemed to me nearer the mark in observing that, from his point of view, I was 'old enough to know better'."

In October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis brought mankind to the brink of the disaster that Russell had fought so long. The crisis over America's former neo-colonial dependency, coupled with the steady escalation of U.S. intervention in Indo-China, brought to a climax a change in Russell's sense of the priorities involved in mankind's survival. In many ways this change represented a return for him to his perspective when he first raised his voice in rebellion during the 1914 War which, he noted wrily on his 90th birthday that year, had been the war to end peace.

Nineteen-fourteen marked for him a dividing line not only between eras, but between worlds. A phrase in a diary note he set down a week before his birthday in 1950 expresses the almost preternatural significance of that date for him. Writing of the marital difficulties of his children he says: "They were born after 1914, and are therefore incapable of happiness."

[IV]

DURING THE YEARS OF his opposition to the First World War and his consequent isolation, there was one figure who stood out above all the rest in Russell's admiration and foreshadowed his own future course. E. D. Morel was a liberal crusader against the atrocities being committed by white Europeans in Africa, particularly the Belgian Congo, and was the founder of the Congo Reform Association. A major theme of Morel's work was that the bestiality, violence and aggression of European imperialism in Africa had come home to roost in the European conflict. For this, he was (in Russell's words) "more than any other opponent of the war . . . attacked by politicians and the press," and was eventually thrown in jail, where "he suffered an injury to his health from which he never recovered," dying in 1922.

Russell himself recognized the economic, as well as the moral and political interaction between imperialism and the World War, and in 1934 finished his book *Freedom and Organization* with the following admonition: "The same causes that produced war in 1914 are still operative, and, unless checked by international control of investment and of raw material, they will inevitably produce the same effect, but on a larger scale. It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wide economic organization, that civilized mankind is to be saved from collective suicide."

For a considerable period, coinciding with the early Cold War, Russell had thought that Stalin's tyranny was taking an expansionist turn, patterned on the Napoleonic episode after the French Revolution. Since the mid-fifties, however, like many others, he had changed his views and recognized the essential conservatism of Stalin's foreign policy. Nuclear weapons had made the ambition of global empire a possibility, but it was the "free world" empire of the United States, with its thousands of overseas bases, and property rights to most of the

world's natural resources, that was expanding across continents and oceans, intervening in underdeveloped countries and raising threats to world peace. "As my researches into the origins and circumstances of the war in Vietnam showed, the United States was embarking upon military adventures which increasingly replaced war with Russia as the chief threat to the world. The fanaticism of America's anti-Communism, combined with its constant search for markets and raw materials, made it impossible for any serious neutral to regard America and Russia as equally dangerous to the world." So Russell wrote at the end of volume three of his *Autobiography*, adding that, "For people in the West, this was most difficult to admit, and again I experienced the silence or opposition of those who had come to accept my views of the previous decade."

There is a control in these words, a suppression of personal bitterness and pain wholly characteristic of the man, which gives no hint of the vicious weapons of attack that were wielded against him in his last years, the wounds he suffered, or the anguish of the battle he fought. Even now, one can only guess at their measure. To attend the press conference announcing the War Crimes Tribunal, for example, Russell, now a few months shy of ninety-five, undertook the long trip to London in the dead of winter. Caxton Hall, where the conference was held, has a winding staircase which must have seemed interminable to the old man as he mounted them at snail's pace

[HIS 95TH BIRTHDAY]

to confront the glaring inquisitorial klieglights and the hatchet faces of the world's press jammed in intimidating, hostile numbers in the inadequate room. For his attempt to lend an aged hand to the Vietnamese, the most distinguished living philosopher in the West was featured in the august New York Times Magazine, which described his entry thus: "A stir, a bustle, a craning of necks; he comes! *He* comes? Say rather, without disrespect, *it* comes. . . . The man who has now become the holiest relic the international left possesses is to be unwrapped and shown to the populace."

IT WAS NOT ONLY the West that dealt blows to Russell at this hour. Because it was independent and because the uncompromising terms of its mandate would make cooperation with the United States more difficult, the Communist countries had disapproved of the Tribunal from the outset. By their silence, the Soviet and East European press assured a minimal awareness of the Tribunal's findings in the white sectors of the world where that awareness was needed most.*

From its inception, the Tribunal had had no real base of support, beyond the agreement of the Vietnamese to cooperate. The money to finance its $200,000 costs came almost entirely from Russell himself, who had only a modest annual income from books. As a young man he had given away his inheritance, and the controversies which arose over his anti-war activities and liberated views on sex made university appointments scarce. Readers of the *Autobiography* know what a struggle it was for him for decades to live on royalties from his books, so that it was a poignant and touching irony that when the advances on the *Autobiography* brought him a small fortune for the second time in his life, he gave it all to the War Crimes Tribunal.

It is difficult to know how deeply the unscrupulous reporting of the prestige press in the West, along with the lack of immediate success of the Tribunal, affected Russell. His 95th birthday took place just after the first Tribunal session. In contrast to his 90th, where an orchestra had played in his honor and he had been toasted by lords, ladies, old distinguished friends and celebrated intellects, this one saw him once again isolated, probably more than he had ever been. The Tribunal had deprived him of being regarded affectionately as a remarkable antique from the Victorian era, to be trotted out for annual celebrations. He had done something that old men aren't supposed to do: he had rebelled against the respectability his age and achievements guaranteed him. As a younger man, he had raised his voice against the bourgeois morality that stifled sex, and now he protested against the morality that sanctified official murder.

THE BATTLE WHICH RUSSELL had chosen to enter in his last years was infinitely bloodier and dirtier than the previous ones he had come through so well. In part this was in the nature of the contest. It was as though a revered prince of the Philistines had taken his stance by the side of David and slung verbal thunderbolts at the giant. To oppose in its own citadel white western civilization, to take up the cause of the niggers of the earth, to lay the finger of blame on the technological Goliath, the "last best hope" of liberal democracy, as it committed mass murder in the rice paddies of Southeast Asia—this was to court devastation. And thus, the media of the Western world entered a loose conspiracy to take revenge against Russell by portraying him as a senescent, bird-like and wrinkled creature who should have done himself the favor of dying when his reputation as a humanist and philosopher was unsullied by such follies as intruding in global politics on the side of the weak and oppressed.

But there was another more personal cross which Russell had to bear into the conflict. In his last triumphant battle as the head and inspirer of the Committee of 100, he had stood forth as advocate and antagonist and led his troops in his own person into the fray. Between then and the Tribunal the body had begun to give up. No longer could he speak extemporaneously before the public: the eyes had weakened, and

* A 650-page account of the proceedings of the Tribunal, called *Against the Crime of Silence*, is available for $5.75 from O'Hare Books, 10 Bartley Road, Flanders, New Jersey 07836.

read only with immense effort under the television lights; the voice was thinner and seemed at times ready to disappear forever; the dignified stride had collapsed into an unseemly shuffle; and the face often became slack, giving a false impression of vacuity that the incomparably quick mind still burning inside must have found especially painful to bear.

History has already vindicated the public acts of Lord Russell's last years: the historical record will show that the War Crimes Tribunal—the climax of what began as a lonely crusade—correctly characterized and identified a war of atrocity, a war conducted to maintain imperial dominance in Southeast Asia, a war representing the archetypal conflict of the age and the chief threat to mankind's future survival. But history will not show the inner struggle of the man who initiated this Tribunal. It will not record the triumph of an heroic will that could not hear the cry of suffering without attempting to answer, or the passionate concern for human survival that moved an old man to put himself in an international pillory before the greatest power in the world as the defender of a peasant people and its struggle to be free.

For most, Lord Russell will be remembered as the great mathematician and philosopher, the man whose life encompassed the transition from Victorianism to the modern world, the friend of men as various as Alfred North Whitehead and D. H. Lawrence. But for me, the image was formed on that first day in Chelsea: the arduous shuffle, the pixy smile, the brittle bowed movements, the kind, wise face which hid the anguish of its own struggle.

To have known him is always to be humbled by the courage, the immense guts of the old man, and the sustaining calm of the inner vision: "An individual human existence should be like a river," he had written, "—small at first, narrowly confined within its banks, and rushing passionately past boulders and over waterfalls. Gradually the river grows wider, the banks recede, the waters flow more quietly, and in the end, without any visible break, they become merged in the sea, and painlessly lose their individual being. The man who, in old age, can see his life in this way, will not suffer from the fear of death, since the things he cares for will continue. . . . I should wish to die while still at work, knowing that others will carry on what I can no longer do, and content in the thought that what was possible has been done."

PROMOTING BR & THE BRS

(15) Newspaper story. An enterprising staff writer for the Times Mirror newspaper in Allentown, PA, *The Morning Call*, noticed that the small BRS classified ad in *The Nation* said we were located in Coopersburg.

Coopersburg is a town in the region covered by his newspaper, so he decided to investigate. First, he sent us a postcard, asking for information about the BRS, which is what our ad invites people to do. After a while, he phoned for an interview, and got one. Later he sent a photographer.

The final result was a surprisingly big story in *The Morning Call* (4/5/90). We show it here greatly reduced, to indicate the prominence it was given; there couldn't have been much real news that day. As shown here, it's much too small to read; if you just can't stand not knowing what was in it, you may borrow it from the RS Library. We're pleased to report that the story succeeded in bringing in inquiries and new members.


A pregnant 'Molly Dodd' doesn't exactly fit the TV family mold

am MAGAZINE

Surveillance of workers raises tough issues

Reinforcer of Russell Ideas

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

(16) John Lenz, BRS VP, who told us about his Fulbright year in Greece and Turkey, in RSN64-16, now tells us about his new job, his first: "I am happy to report that I will be a Visiting Instructor, (and soon to be an Assistant Professor) in Classics, at Union College in Schenectady, NY. It's a nice old campus, graced by a statue of an alumnus, Chester Arthur." [Vice-President Arthur became President Arthur when President Garfield was assassinated, in 1881. We looked it up.]

OBITUARIES

(17) Helen Page -- BRS Member and wife of BRS Director, Frank Page -- died on 11/25/89. We offer Frank our sympathy.

(18) Willard S. Sellars is honored in death by some of his philosopher-colleagues...in a Letter to the Editor in The New York Times (8/15/89). He is the third distinguished philosopher to have died last summer; the other two were Sidney Hook and A.J. Ayers. (Thank you, STEVE REINHARDT.)

A Philosopher Who Shattered Our Complacency

To the Editor: NYT 08-15-89

Wilfrid S. Sellars (obituary, July 6) revolutionized both the content and the method of philosophy in the United States.

Along with W. V. O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars thoroughly shattered our Cartesian complacency, and taught us that a proper philosophical understanding of the relation of thought to reality, and of thought to action, would have to be much more subtle — and probably much messier — than we had supposed.

But his work is difficult, and largely inaccessible to nonphilosophers. Its impact on the larger world of letters and science has been made through the influence it has had on other more readable writers.

Professor Sellars, who many informed scholars believe was the greatest philosopher of his time, perhaps unfortunately never took the time to write a textbook.

Some measure of Professor Sellars's impact on his discipline can be found in the professional honors conferred upon him. He gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford, the John Dewey Lectures at Chicago, the Ernst Cassirer Lectures at Yale and the Paul Carus Lectures.

He was president of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern division. Professor Sellars's 75th birthday was celebrated by hundreds of philosophers from around the globe, meeting for several days of lectures and seminars on the implications of his thought.

Anyone who wishes to begin to understand the reason for the extraordinarily high regard for Professor Sellars's work among professional philosophers would do well to start with his early collection of papers "Science, Perception and Reality." These essays demand a bit less of the reader than his later work, and they contain deep and compelling refutations of traditional empiricist positions in epistemology, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science, together with at least a partial picture of the Sellarsian alternative.

JOSEPH L. CAMP JR.
ADOLF GRUNBAUM, JOHN MCDOWELL
Pittsburgh, July 14, 1989

The writers are professors of philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. The letter was also signed by four other professors in that department.

ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

(19) Nominations for Directors, please. We wish to elect 6 Directors this year, for 3-year terms starting 1/1/91. This will give us a total of 24 elected Directors. The August newsletter will provide a ballot for voting.

We are asking you to nominate candidates (whose names will appear on the August ballot.) Any member may nominate any other member to be a Director-Candidate.

If you wish to be a Candidate yourself, notify the Elections Committee and someone will probably nominate you. The duties of a Director are not burdensome. Directors are occasionally asked their opinion about something or other by mail, and they are expected to make a reasonable effort to attend annual meetings, though not at great expense. The cost of attending meetings is (federal) tax-deductible for Directors.

We would like to have more than 6 names on the ballot,so as to give members a choice.

A brief statement about the candidate should accompany a nomination. If you are volunteering, include a brief statement about yourself.

Directors whose terms expire at the end of 1990 are IRVING ANELLIS, BOB DAVIS, JIM MCWILLIAMS, HUGH MOORHEAD, KATE TAIT.

TO NOMINATE SOMEONE -- or to volunteer yourself -- write the Election Committee,c/o the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

THANK YOU *VERY* MUCH!

(20) The Times Mirror Company -- publisher of the excellent *Los Angeles Times, The Morning Call* (Allentown, PA) and 10 other newspapers -- responded most generously to our request for help on a research project.

As you may know, HARRY RUJA and KEN BLACKWELL are preparing a comprehensive bibliography on BR. BR visited the United States and Canada repeatedly during the 55-year period, 1896 to 1951, and gave many, many lectures and interviews. Newspapers carried a great number of stories about him during this period. The comprehensive bibliography aims to include as many of these newspaper items as can be located. It will be published by Unwin, Hyman, London.

We wrote to the 6 newspapers that cover this part of Eastern Pennsylvania -- from Philadelphia to Easton -- requesting the dates of BR items that had appeared in their papers during the period. We also wrote to *The Times Mirror Company* and to *Knight-Ritter, Inc.*, each of which owns one of the papers.

We did not ask for photocopies of the items; we thought that might impose too great a burden; we asked only for the dates of the items. The researchers could then go to their libraries, and, knowing the dates, locate the items.

None of the 6 newspapers responded to, or even acknowledged, our request. *Knight-Ritter, Inc.* responded politely, with regrets. But *The Times Mirror Company* came through handsomely!

The Times Mirror Company supplied not only the dates, they also provided photocopies of the items themselves, more than 50 of them, along with a gracious covering letter wishing us "success in compiling and publishing the Russell bibliography."

The Times Mirror Company clearly invested a lot of time and money, as a contribution to the success of the Russell bibliography, and we feel greatly indebted to them.

BRS AUTHORS

(21) From *The New York Times Book Review* (3/18/90) ----------> Thom, you recall, is a BRS Director, and will be giving a talk on the same subject at our June meeting at McMaster. (Thank you, Jean Anderson and Linda Egendorf.)

Author's Query

For a book on the Bertrand Russell/City College case of 1940, in which Russell was prevented from accepting a post there because of his unconventional views on social behavior, I would appreciate hearing from participants or observers who have reminiscences.

THOMAS WEIDLICH
349 West 123d Street
New York City 10027

NEW MEMBERS

(22) We welcome these new members:

MR. CLARK D. ADAMS/P.O. BOX U-1876/UNIV. SO. AL/MOBIILE, AL 36688
MS. LYNDA ARCHER /40 NAVAHO DRIVE/WILLOWDALE, ONTARIO/ /CANADA/M2H 2X3
DR. GEORGE AUSTIN /2320 BATH ST. SUITE 301/SANTA BARBARA/CA/93105/ /
MR. JEFFREY A. BYARS /295 BEACON ST. (APT. 1)/SOMERVILLE/MA/02143/ /
MS. MARIE CARDELLA /48-32 GARDEN VIEW TERRACE/EAST WINDSOR/NJ/08520/ /
MR. LOU CLARK /30 MORGAN ST./MELROSE,/MA/02176/ /
DR. STACEY L. EDGAR /PHILOSOPHY, SUNY/GENESEO/NY/14454/ /
DR. WILLIAM J. EDGAR /PHILOSOPHY, SUNY/GENESEO/NY/14454/ /
MR. DANIEL W. GEDDES /35 N. MCKINLEY APT. 311/ATHENS/OH/45701/ /
MR. DAVID M. ONDIK /127 FIFTH AV./JONESBORO/GA/30236/ /
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MS. RUTH SPIRA /1506 PLEASANT VIEW ROAD/COOPERSBURG/PA/18036/ /

THE RUSSELL ARCHIVES

(23) The Bertrand Russell Editorial Project -- which aims to publish all of BR's "shorter writings" -- went through some agonizing times a few years ago when the Canadian Government stopped funding it, and almost the entire staff had to be let go. You may recall that the BRS contributed a modest $1000 to help pay for some secretarial assistance (RSN60-21) -- that's how desperate the situation was.

Now, happily, things seem to be back on track, as this letter from Louis Greenspan indicates:

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
The Bertrand Russell Editorial Project

Togo Salmon Hall, Room 719
1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ont., Canada L8S 4M2
Telephone: (416) 525-9140 Ext. 4896
Fax: (416) 527-0100
E-mail: (via BITnet) GREENSPN@MCMASTER

19 March 1990

THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL
1: Cambridge Essays, 1888–99
Published 1983
7: Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript
Published 1984
8: The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 1914–19
Published 1986
9: Essays on Language, Mind and Matter, 1919–26
Published 1988
12: Contemplation and Action, 1902–14
Published 1985
13: Prophecy and Dissent, 1914–16
Published 1988
IN PREPARATION:
2: Philosophical Papers, 1896–99
3: Toward the "Principles", 1900–02
4: Philosophical Papers, 1903–05
Logical and Philosophical Essays, 1909–13
14: The No-Conscription Fellowship: Pacifism and Resistance, 1916–18
Bibliography
I: Separate Publications
I: Serial Publications
PUBLISHED BY
Unwin Hyman Ltd

Mr. Lee Eisler
The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
RD 1, Box 409
Coopersburg, PA 18036
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Eisler:

This letter has been passed on from various people and finally reached my desk.

It is indeed true that we have been funded again. Volume 2 titled Philosophical Papers, 1896-99 was sent to the publisher in October and currently we are working feverishly on volumes in mathematics and the First World War.

Funds were restored by SSHRC but as ever the SSHRC grant must be supplemented by the University. We hope that by 1992 five more volumes will appear. There are ten people on the staff.

Yours sincerely,

Louis Greenspan
Managing Editor

LG/ad

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(24) NEW ADDRESSES

MR. ADAM PAUL BANNER /600 W. HURON APT.122/ANN ARBOR/MI/48103-4257/ /
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MR. FRANK G. WISE /GENERAL DELIVERY/EL DORADO/TX/77598/ /

ANTI-NUCLEAR

(25) From *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, 2/18/61, p.2. Thank you, Anna Adams, for the translation. Thank you, Harry Ruja, for the item.

DEMONSTRATION FOR PEACE IN GREAT BRITAIN

Not a political demonstration. Bertrand Russell present

By John J. Meehan

London,17 [Feb 61.] (UP) -- Lord Bertrand Russell and about 20,000 demonstrators congregated in London and Scotland, in order to protest against allowing United States nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles to be based in Great Britain.

The British Communist Party is apparently unaware of the demonstrations planned for tomorrow in London and Glasgow, which are directed as much against the United States as against Russia. In fact, the marches are a protest against all nuclear armaments, whether of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, or France.

The Committee of 100, formed in London -- in order to fight against the establishment of Polaris nuclear submarine bases in Britain -- by the philosopher, Lord Bertrand Russell, and other distinguished pacifists, predicted that at least 10,000 people would assemble in front of the statue of Lord Nelson in Trafalgar Square.

Acts of "non-violence"

Later, an "assault force" of about 20,000 non-violent pacifists will march past Whitehall, after which they will stage a sit-in on the sidewalk in front of the British Defense Ministry for 3 hours. The demonstrators will not offer resistance if the authorities decide to arrest them.

In Glasgow the pro-nuclear-disarmament Scottish Council announced that it hopes that some 7,000 demonstrators will march in the streets of the City to the sound of bagpipes, as an expression of protest against Polaris submarines that are on their way to patrol the seas around Russia from a base in Holy Loch, Scotland.

In advance of tomorrow's demonstration, groups with posters like this -- "We don't want Polaris bases in Scotland" -- today marched through the streets of Glasgow carrying torches, as a prelude to tomorrow's march. They demonstrated today, at mid-day, in front of the American Consulate in Glasgow, where they plan to spend the next 24 hours.

MANIFESTACION POR LA PAZ EN GRAN BRETAÑA

No tiene carácter político: Presencia de Bertrand Russell

Por JOHN J. MEEHAN

Londres, 17 (UP) — Lord Bertrand Russell y alrededor de 20.000 manifestantes se congregaron esta noche en Inglaterra y Escocia para protestar por la concesión de bases en Gran Bretaña a submarinos nucleares de los Estados Unidos, provistos de proyectiles Polaris.

El partido Comunista británico, aparentemente ignorante de que las marchas que deben realizarse mañana en Londres y Glasgow están dirigidas tanto contra los Estados Unidos como contra Rusia, prometió su asistencia.

Las marchas serán también una expresión de protesta contra el armamento nuclear de los Estados Unidos, Rusia, Gran Bretaña y Francia.

El Comité de los 100, formado en Londres para luchar contra el establecimiento de submarinos nucleares Polaris en bases británicas, por el filósofo lord Bertrand Russell y otros destacados pacifistas, predijo que por lo menos unas 10.000 personas se reunirán ante la estatua de lord Nelson en la plaza Trafalgar.

Acción de los "no violentos"

Más tarde, una "fuerza de asalto" de unos 20.000 pacifistas partidarios de la "no violencia", realizarán una marcha por el Whitehall y se sentarán luego en las aceras, frente al Ministerio Británico de Defensa durante un período de tres horas. Los manifestantes no harán resistencia alguna si las autoridades deciden detenerlos.

En Glasgow, el consejo escocés pro desarme nuclear anunció que espera que unos 7.000 manifestantes marchen por las calles de la ciudad al son de gaitas, como expresión de protesta por submarinos Polaris que se hallan en viaje para patrullar los mares vecinos de Rusia, desde una base en Holy Loch, Escocia.

Una avanzada de la manifestación de mañana marchó hoy por las calles de Glasgow llevando antorchas, como preludio de la marcha de mañana.

Grupos que llevaban carteloncs en los que se lee "no queremos bases de Polaris en Escocia", montaron guardia hoy a mediodía frente al consulado norteamericano en Glasgow, donde piensan permanecer durante 24 horas.

BRS LOCAL CHAPTER

(26) The BRS Chapter at McMaster met on 3/1/90 to hear a new paper by I. Grattan-Guinness on the contemporary -----> state of Russell Studies and its resources. The Chapter also discussed plans for the forthcoming annual meeting at McMaster of The Bertrand Russell Society.

McMASTER UNIVERSITY
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

BERTRAND RUSSELL (1872–1970):
BY ACQUAINTANCE
AND BY DESCRIPTION

I. Grattan-Guinness

This new paper by Dr. Grattan-Guinness, scheduled to be published in the *Notes and Records of the Royal Society*, will be read in his absence.

The paper concerns the contemporary state of Russell Studies and its resources.

Dr. Grattan-Guinness is an historian of mathematics and a distinguished Russell scholar. He is editor of *History and Philosophy of Logic*.

The meeting will also discuss progress in organizing the annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society, Inc., to be held at McMaster on June 23-25, 1990. The theme for submission of papers is Illusion vs. Reality: Education and Religion.

Thursday, March 1, at 12:30. UH-317
All welcome.

CUBA (1962)

(27) From the *Los Angeles Times* (2/16/62), with thanks to HARRY RUJA:

LORD RUSSELL URGES U.S.: LET CUBA ALONE

HAVANA (Reuters) — British philosopher Bertrand Russell Thursday appealed to the United States government to let Cuba solve its problems without interference.

Lord Russell was replying, in a statement published in the newspaper Revolucion, to the newspaper's appeal to world statesmen and thinkers for their opinions about "North American imperialism's preparations for another armed attack on Cuba."

The newspaper reported that Russell wrote:

"It seems possible the U.S. contemplates another attempt to impose on the Cuban people a regime which is contrary to their wishes."

Stating that a U.S. attack on Cuba could lead to nuclear war, Russell said Premier Fidel Castro's regime "deserves confidence and simulation, not blind hostility."

FINANCES

(28) Treasurer Dennis Darland reports on the year ending 12/31/89:

Bank balance on hand (12/31/88)			1,780.26
Income: New members	1659.50		
Renewals	5482.59		
total dues	7142.09		
Contributions	1112.50		
Library sales & rentals	292.40		
Misc. income	360.72		
total income	8907.71		8,907.71
			10,687.97
Expenditures: Information & Membership Committees	2755.78		
Library expense	46.63		
Subscriptions to *Russell*	2006.00		
Meetings	725.00		
Doctoral Grant	1000.00		
Misc. expense	258.22		
total spent	6791.63		-6,791.63
Bank balance on hand (12/31/89)			3,896.34

(29) Treasurer Dennis Darland reports on the quarter ending 3/31/90:

Bank balance on hand (12/31/89)			3896.34
Income: New members	273.50		
Renewals	4785.62		
total dues	5059.12		
Contributions	560.00		
Library sales & rentals	126.00		
Misc. income	17.00		
total income	5762.12		+5762.12
			9658.46
Expenditures: Information & Membership Committees	2697.68*		
Library expense	223.86		
Subscriptions to *Russell*	456.00		
Meetings	0.00		
Doctoral Grant	0.00		
Misc. expense	6.00		
	3383.54		-3383.54
Bank balance on hand (3/31/90)			6274.92

* a 6-month period

FROTH

(30) From *A Brief History of Time* by Stephen -----> W. Hawking (NY: Bantam, 1988), p. 1, with thanks to STEVE MOLENAAR.

A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He described how the earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man, very clever," said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down!"

BR, PANELIST

(31) Hegel, ugh!, In the great days of radio -- before TV overshadowed it -- CBS had a weekly radio series titled *Invitation to Learning*, where one could hear intelligent talk by intelligent people. These talks were later published as a book, *Invitation to Learning* by Huntington Cairns, Allen Tate, and Mark Van Doren (NY:Random House, 1941).

Here is one of the talks, from Pages 410-421, with thanks to TOM STANLEY:

(MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL, GUEST)

Cairns: Mr. Russell, I have a letter here from you in which you state: "Hegel's *Philosophy of History* is important as a source of much evil, but (I think) of no good." Would you like to amplify that statement? It was the last sentence in your letter, and it was left hanging in the air. It whetted my appetite.

Russell: I am quite willing to amplify that statement. I think Hegel's *Philosophy of History* is a very important book indeed, judged by the effects it has had, and a totally unimportant book judged by any truth that it may contain.

Tate: Mr. Russell, don't you think it may contain a few incidental truths here and there?

Russell: It is a long book and it is difficult for a man to avoid saying something true when he uses so many words.

Van Doren: I like your distinction between influential books and true books. Rousseau's *Confessions* is often said to be an important book because it is influential. I assume it cannot be called important because it is true.

Russell: We do not know much about Rousseau's *Confessions*, whether they are true or false.

Cairns: Would you like to be a little more specific about Hegel?

Russell: I should be glad to be more specific about Hegel. I think Hegel's *Philosophy of History* is important, partly because it presented a pattern in history—a scheme, a system—according to which historical events were supposed to have developed, which of course people like. It is a simple formula and they think "now we understand it all"; if it is false, they do not notice it.

Cairns: That is an objection to all philosophies of history so far devised. The safest course, it has always seemed to me, is to reject the system and ascertain if the philosophical position of the writer contributes anything illuminating to the discussion of particular historical points. Nothing short of omniscience can devise a system that will embrace all the world.

Tate: But didn't Hegel, himself, say that he actually understood it all?

Russell: He understood it all. Oh, yes, of course, he understood it all.

Van Doren: As if he knew all history.

Russell: He, of course, happened to have read it all; so he knew.

Tate: You say his formula is simple. Could it be stated briefly?

Russell: Everything proceeds by thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and what moves it is the self-development of the Idea, and the Idea is what Hegel happened to believe. The whole course of the universe is making it just such as Hegel thought it was. That is the formula.

Tate: Don't you think one of the marvelous things in Hegel's system is that it applies both at the top and at the bottom? That is, he has a speciously convincing psychological argument, almost like Descartes', that consciousness has two aspects. First, it knows something, then the next problem is what it knows. It knows itself. When Spirit, or Idea, is triumphant, then the condition is reached where we become pure spirituality, and everybody will be merged in the state.

Cairns: Hegel claims that the great virtue of the system is that it accounts for everything in the universe. It is all-embracing, and it assigns to everything in the universe the place that is absolutely proper for it.

Russell: It is bound to; he thought the universe as a whole was the only reality, and if it did not account for the universe, it did not account for anything at all, because he thought you could not pick the universe to bits.

Cairns: Do you object to his primary aims? They are first to write a universal history and secondly to write history in terms of ideas representing periods.

Russell: I object to the second point. I do not mind a man writing universal history, if he has time; but I do object to the notion that there is a simple scheme or thread running through it all.

Tate: Most of us would probably disagree with a great deal that Gibbon says, but you would not object to that kind of comprehensive history, would you?

Russell: No, I don't.

Cairns: Would you mind elaborating a little your objection to writing history in terms of abstract ideas?

Russell: Such a system must be false. Let us say, if you think so, that it is what Hegel calls rational; of course, there are abstract ideas that can be distilled out of the facts, but they must be taken out of the facts and it is not a rational development.

Tate: Didn't Hegel try to distill the facts out of the ideas?

Van Doren: And it was easy for him to do that because any facts that he found he could use. He could choose among the infinite facts there are.

Cairns: I understand Mr. Russell's point to be that he objects to Hegel's system, or rather Hegel's basic notion that historical sequences follow the order of logical categories.

Russell: I object to that.

Cairns: I have no disagreement with you on that point. Such a notion is bound to lead to absurdities, as in Hegel's deification of Prussia. The order of logical categories, at least in Hegel's system, is finite, but since historical development is not finite, one of the two must yield. In Hegel's hands it was history that yielded. The question now, however, is not whether Hegel's sys-

tem is true, but the nature of the objections which can be brought against historians for writing history in terms of abstract ideas.

Russell: Take Hegel's disciple, Marx. You can get Marx out of Hegel by just a few transformations. Where Hegel talks of nations, Marx talks of classes. Where Hegel talks about the Idea, Marx talks about methods of production. With those two changes the two are practically identical.

Cairns: But you are not going to attribute the sins of the disciple to the master?

Russell: I say they are the same sins. I do not say that Hegel is responsible, but I say that the same sin is there in both cases, of thinking there is a simple formula.

Tate: Won't you describe the relation of Marx to Hegel, Mr. Russell?

Russell: It was just the relation of a Hegelian of the left. Hegel started two movements in philosophy, the one of extreme conservatism and the other of extreme revolution. The one represented by the conservative Hegelians and the other by Marx and his followers. But there is not nearly as much difference between Marx and Hegel as there seems to be.

Van Doren: Couldn't the same objection be raised against both historians, insofar as Marx and Hegel were historians? For them, history writes itself. There is an idea, there is a spirit; the idea and the spirit express themselves in the things that have actually happened. The aim, as Hegel somewhere says, is equivalent to the result. In other words, whatever we see has happened in the world must have happened. For my part, I can see no point in either of them calling himself a historian, properly speaking; history is too easy for them to write. Anything that happened had to happen.

Tate: It seems to me that Hegel's conception of freedom is a complete paradox and is unreal. If history is the determinism of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, then freedom has no real meaning at all; it is nothing but a fiction.

Van Doren: History is completely determined.

Tate: Yes, an intellectual determinism, a logical determinism of history.

Russell: Certainly there is, but Hegel uses freedom in a very peculiar sense. Freedom means the right to obey the police, and it means nothing else at all in the works of Hegel.

Van Doren: I wonder if you don't want to substitute one word there. This might be fairer to Hegel: Freedom is the desire to obey. Not the right to obey, but the desire.

Cairns: I think he would say it is a duty to obey because the happy life, as he defined it, was one lived in accordance with duty.

Van Doren: I do not think so. When he describes a happy people, an effective people such as the Athenians, he says that a single Athenian's instinct was to love Athens and to obey its laws; and he represents the English people of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century as very happy at being Englishmen. There is nothing else they want to be. Their desires coincide, as he says, doubtless in a pretty highfalutin way, with their destiny. There is nonsense in the background of that, but there is something real in the foreground.

Cairns: I do not think Mr. Russell would make your point a ground of criticism of Hegel, if there is any evidence in support of the position that you just outlined. As I understand it, Mr. Russell, you think that the course of history cannot be determined speculatively.

Russell: I do.

Cairns: At the same time, you also think that the course of history is subject to laws; but that they cannot be determined because of their complexity.

Russell: I think the course of history is subject to laws and is probably for a sufficiently wise person deterministic; but nobody is wise enough. It is far too complicated and nobody can work it out; and the person who says he has done so is a charlatan.

Van Doren: Back to the subject of freedom for a while. Freedom probably does not mean freedom to do nothing, does it? Freedom is surely freedom to do something.

Tate: I think Hegel bases his most plausible argument on that very point, that there is no such thing as perfect freedom, or pure freedom.

Cairns: At one end he puts despotism and at the other end anarchy.

Tate: Hegel has a real insight there, even if it is a very common one and not at all profound. There is no such thing as unchecked freedom. But the trouble with Hegel is that he proceeds then to take that insight and contradict it with his logical determinism.

Russell: There is a different point here that we have not yet raised. That is Hegel's worship of the state, which I think is a far worse thing than any of the points we have mentioned. He says that the state is the perfect embodiment of spirit, that it is the divine idea as it exists on earth.

Cairns: I do not know what that means; it sounds like nonsense. Would you like to explain it to us?

Russell: It seems to me, of course, nonsense; but what Hegel means by it is that the state is the element of unity in the community, and the element of unity in the world is what he calls God; therefore, the state is analogous to God. He has first misused the word "God"; then he misuses the word "state," and so he comes to the conclusion that the state is what is divine.

Tate: Is he perfectly straightforward when he maintains that this vast unity of the state is based fundamentally upon a prior moral unity in the individual? I am not quite convinced by that, because I don't think he is much interested in unity in the individual.

Van Doren: He is interesting here. He seems to say that a man who is fortunate enough to be born into a state and not into a tribe such as the Scythians, for instance, or the Thracians—a man who is fortunate enough to be born in Athens is indeed fortunate because he has something to obey, something he is delighted to obey and honor.

Russell: But I think it is the community and not the state. Let me give an illustration. Hegel says: All spiritual reality that a human being possesses, he possesses through the state. Now let us apply that to St. Paul, who said he was a Roman citizen. Is anybody going to say that all the spiritual reality of St. Paul came from the Roman State? The thing is preposterous.

Cairns: I am not sure it is as simple as that. Hegel gives this illustration to explain his notion of freedom. He says it is real-

ized by acting within the system and not in opposition to it. He gives a biological analogy, as I recall it; if you want to realize your full capacities as a human being, you must do so within the limitations of your human organism. If you oppose it, you do not realize your aspirations and you destroy your organism.

Russell: But there are many organisms besides the state. Take the church; or suppose you were a man of science and belonged to a learned body.

Cairns: That is true; and the political question is: Which institution has the right to demand the greatest degree of loyalty?

Tate: What did Socrates do about this very problem when he was condemned? Did he not accept the verdict of Athens and refuse to escape? He rejected the chance to evade the sentence of death. Now, why did he do that? Was it the community or the state that commanded his loyalty even to the point of death?

Cairns: My recollection is that Socrates said it was the state.

Russell: There it was, I think, the state; but then his loyalty was extremely limited. He made it perfectly clear that he would not stop talking, not for all the states in the world. He said there was only one way he could be made to stop talking; that was to make him drink the hemlock. However much they ordered him not to talk, he would talk. He makes that quite clear.

Van Doren: Of course, he could not have talked in any other country than Greece. Your instance of St. Paul was interesting, but say a contemporary of St. Paul lived in Vladivostok with all St. Paul's qualities, his brains and his heart. Now, you deny that St. Paul's achievement can be attributed to the existence of the Roman state. I think it might be so attributed, because a citizen of Vladivostok with those same qualities could have got nowhere.

Russell: I did not say his achievement; I said his spiritual reality—which is Hegel's phrase. Now, the spiritual reality of the man in Vladivostok may be the same.

Cairns: Some sentences have been quoted from Hegel that certainly cannot stand analysis. But have we been entirely fair to Hegel? He says explicitly that he is opposed to despotism; that the monarch or the ruler must act for the best interests of the people; that the monarch must encourage the utmost liberty among his people so that he will have an informed public opinion to guide him in his decisions. The monarch must encourage the liberty of the press to the utmost, that is to say, to the limit of abuse. This means that the ruler must submit to vilification on the part of the press as the price of greatness.

Russell: I think you are really overestimating what he says about the liberty of the press. You are not allowing for the fact that he always uses words in a Pickwickian sense.

Cairns: He does indeed.

Russell: He says there should be liberty of the press but not to the point of making the government ridiculous. It must stop short of that. And he sees a whole lot of limitations about that.

Cairns: But he also does say that the ruler must endure vilification.

Russell: He says this of the despot, for instance: The ruler should not be a despot. A despot is an absolute monarch ruling over a country which is not Prussia. That is the definition of a despot.

Cairns: Is that fair? Let us apply his own dialectic to that problem. What is the thesis? Despotism—is it not? The antithesis is democracy and aristocracy, and the synthesis is monarchy. He must, therefore, on his own logic reject despotism wherever it is; and he did so, it seems to me, in his *Philosophy of History.*

Russell: Take again, Mr. Cairns, what you said about public opinion. He is very clear that public opinion is not always right and that it must not always be submitted to; there may be a certain expression of it; but the ruler should not think it is right.

Cairns: He is certainly clear that public opinion should not always be submitted to. I do not think you would insist that a ruler should be bound by public opinion in all cases.

Russell: Absolutely bound. I do not know what else there is that is better, because while public opinion is very likely to be wrong, so is the ruler.

Cairns: That is right. But you must allow for the case where the ruler may have private sources of information not open to public opinion.

Van Doren: Private wisdom?

Cairns: No, I won't say private wisdom. No ruler's private wisdom is necessarily greater than that of public opinion. But I insist we must provide for the case of greater factual knowledge on the part of the ruler.

Tate: May I ask a question about another phase of this same point? In what respect does Hegel's despotism as thesis, aristocracy and democracy as antithesis, and monarchy as the synthesis of the two differ from the kind of compromise that Aristotle contemplated? I think it is the Aristotelian "commonwealth" that is a compromise between oligarchy and raw democracy. Now, doesn't Aristotle have some notion there of the Hegelian "synthesis"?

Cairns: It has always seemed to me that Hegel's theory was quite similar to some of Aristotle's thought.

Russell: I agree. I think it is very similar; but I do not think the better of it on that acccount.

Cairns: Are you implying that Aristotle is as wicked a man as Hegel?

Russell: Yes.

All together: Oh, you are?

Tate: Mr. Russell, before we began this conversation you said that Plato was very wicked. You would have neither of them, then?

Russell: I think that philosophy has suffered four misfortunes in the world's history: Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. If they were eliminated, philosophy would have done very well.

Cairns: Who would be left, Mr. Russell? We will exclude present company.

Russell: There would be very many people left. There would be Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibnitz and Spinoza.

Tate: A very bad tradition, Mr. Russell.

Van Doren: What about this man as a historian? I was interested in a certain conversion of terms that he seemed to make. Here is this sentence: "History in general is, therefore, the development of Spirit in time, as nature is the development of the Idea in space." He makes a distinction between time and space which may remind us of Lessing in his *Laocöon.*

Cairns: I think it goes back to a point we were discussing before. In history the Idea unfolds its various phases in time and the dominant phase at any epoch is embodied in a dominant people. The succession of these phases, in Hegel's theory, constitutes world history.

Van Doren: Perhaps it is a modern—I wonder if it is an especially modern—notion that a philosopher can turn his attention from space relations which are either metaphysical or physical, scientific or rational, to those relations which are in time? Here is a philosopher trying suddenly to develop a new language—altogether a temporal language instead of a spatial one.

Cairns: He devised his own language to a large extent. While he viewed history as a temporal sequence, he did not thereby neglect spatial elements.

Van Doren: I wonder if you can see things arranged in time as clearly as you can see them arranged in space?

Russell: I think you can, yes. Of course, it did not suit him so well arranged in space because he wanted a dialectic process, so that the one-dimensional series was more suitable for his purposes.

Van Doren: But dialectic originally considered was not anything that took place in time, was it?

Russell: No, it was purely logical, but it was a one-dimensional series.

Van Doren: Something anterior in logic is not necessarily earlier, is it?

Russell: Not necessarily, but for Hegel it was.

Van Doren: Hegel literalized the anterior and posterior relation into before and after.

Cairns: If he proceeded in space, he would have to exclude America from the development of his system, as he did anyway.

Van Doren: Exclude what?

Cairns: America.

Van Doren: I thought you said a "miracle."

Tate: It is the same thing.

Russell: He did not exclude America. He said America was some day going to be very important; there would be a great war, he said, between North America and South America; that was when America was going to be important.

Cairns: He said America at that time, and he was speaking or writing in the 1820's, was not worth discussing because it was an echo of Europe, which may have been true in the 1820's.

Tate: Now, this question of time and space: I should like to ask about Spengler's relation to Hegel. It seems to me that Spengler's leading notion is the flow of time; it eliminates space altogether; the Faustian or modern culture is the great culture, and space is annihilated. Do you think he derives from Hegel?

Russell: A little, I think, yes.

Tate: His notion of the destiny, destiny of the world historical figure and of a culture, seems to me to come from Hegel.

Russell: Yes, the whole notion of the pattern in history. Of course, there is one spatial element in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*—he thinks that the absolute idea is always moving westward.

Tate: That is a geographical notion.

Cairns: Do you think it is unreasonable to think of the universe as Hegel did, both of nature and mind, as a process, a development, a history?

Russell: It is unreasonable to think of it as the development of an idea; because, while possibly it may be, it certainly is not a development of my ideas or your ideas or Hegel's ideas. Hegel assumes that he is as wise as the Creator of the universe when he says it is his ideas that are developing.

Van Doren: He tells us equally little whether we ask him what the Idea is or whether we ask him how he knows what it is. In either case, he has no answer to give us. If we do not believe this book, he cannot convince us.

Russell: I always think a man's inconsistencies are the key to his passions. Hegel thought that unity was the important thing and that the whole was always more real than its part, and so forth. He should, therefore, have emphasized mankind rather than separate nations or separate states. In fact, he makes the state supreme. He says no state has any duty whatever in relation to any other state. War is, therefore, a thing not to be deplored but is good. That is inconsistent with his metaphysic and shows therefore that he had a passion in favor of war.

Van Doren: The significant events for him have been military events.

Russell: He says men are warriors. He says, "War has the higher significance, that through it the moral health of peoples is preserved in their indifference toward the stabilizing of finite determination." He says war is the condition in which we take seriously the vanity of temporal goods and things.

Tate: Don't you think probably in the long run he would contemplate a world state, a Pax Germanica?

Cairns: No, he expressly repudiated the idea of a universal peace.

Tate: Would that not logically develop if the Idea is going to be completely realized?

Russell: That is just the point. It should have followed from his premises.

Van Doren: Is there anything for a philosopher to worry about in the notion some people have—Tacitus had it, William James had it too—that peace can be degenerating and softening? If we could imagine peace stretching ahead of us now for 10,000 years, is it possible to imagine what human beings would then be like? What would they be doing, what would they be interested in? Would they be bored to death? Is this a problem to be solved? The existence of such questions is the reason philosophers have advanced for worrying about the notion of universal peace.

Russell: Yes, they have; but I always regard that as a mark of brutality. I think that if you have brutal instincts, you like killing people. War is the only occasion when you can do it without being hanged. That is the sole reason why anybody likes war; anybody who praises war praises it from beastliness.

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H Cloth, otherwise paperback
R Remaindered by Simon and Schuster. With the exception of the usual remainders' mark on the bottom edge, these are in Fine condition.

Prices are Postpaid. Please send check or money-order, payable to the Bertrand Russell Society, to The Russell Society Library,

Tapes for rent ----->

The Society has purchased VHS videotapes of eight additional titles in the Bertrand Russell Speaks series of television programs. All thirteen dialogues are now available for loan from the library:

Audio cassette 229	Philosophy, taboo morality, religion, and fanaticism.
Audio cassette 230	The role of the individual, happiness, power, and the future of mankind.
Audio cassette 237	Nationalism, Great Britain, communism and capitalism, war and pacifism, and the the H-bomb.
Videotape 263	Philosophy, the role of the individual, happiness, power, and the future of mankind.
Videotape 268	Religion, taboo morality, fanaticism and tolerance, and nationalism.
Videotape 269	Great Britain, communism and capitalism, war and pacifism, and the H-bomb.

The loan fee for videos is $4, for audio cassettes $1.00.

Chicago radio station WFMT has supplied the library with an audio cassette of Studs Terkel's 1962 interview with Russell. Portions were published in Terkel's Talking to Myself and reprinted in RSN 15, 44. Tape 236 runs 39 minutes.

Misc. ----->

Recent acquisitions:

The donor's name appears at the end of each entry.

Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals by Lillian Aiken.
The Philosophy of Mr. B*rtr*nd R*ss*ll, edited by Philip Jourdain. Paul Doudna.
The Right to be Happy by Dora Russell. (spare copy). Paul Doudna.
Fact and Fiction. Paul Doudna.
"Muddleheadedness verus "Simplemindedness-Comparisons of Whitehead and Russell" by George Lucas and "Whitehead the Anglican and Russell the Puritan: The Traditional Origins of Muddleheadedness and Simplemindedness" by Paul G. Kuntz. Offprints from Process Studies. 18pps. Paul Kuntz.

New and forthcoming:

The Problems of Philosophy by Russell. "The least expensive edition in print of this highly accessible classic." Hackett Publishing Co. $4.95 paper.
The Bertrand Russell Case, edited by Dewey and Kallen. Reprint of 1941 edition. Da Capo Press. $29.00 Cloth.
All the titles in the "Library of Living Philosophers" series are now back in print. The volume on Dewey has a 1989 preface and an expanded, updated bibliography. The Russell volume may be ordered from the publisher: Cloth $49.95, Paper $24.95, shipping $1.75. Open Court, General Books Division, Box 599, Peru, IL 61354.

The list price of the Simon & Schuster paperback edition of A History of Western Philosophy is $17.95. The library has seven copies available for $6.50 PP. Also worth noting, we have copies of the Woburn Press cloth edition of Ayer's Bertrand Russell for $8.00 PP.

ANTI-NUCLEAR

(33) *The Saturday Review* featured BR's views in several editorials during 1958. The editorial of 5/31/58 appears below. The editorial of 7/19/58 appears on the following page. With thanks to WILLIAM K. FIELDING.

The Saturday Review

Editor: Norman Cousins
Publisher: J. R. Cominsky
Associate Editors: Harrison Smith, Irving Kolodin

Associate Publisher W. D. Patterson
Feature Editor Peter Ritner
Science Editor John Lear
Poetry Editor John Ciardi
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Why I Changed My Mind

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The following guest-editorial by Bertrand Russell was written in response to criticism that his position on the USSR has drastically changed. Thirteen years ago he felt that the West should threaten war against the Soviet Union. Today he urges the pursuit of agreements.*

LONDON.

AT A TIME when America alone possessed the atom bomb and when the American Government was advocating what was known as the Baruch Proposal, the aim of which was to internationalize all the uses of atomic energy, I thought the American proposal both wise and generous. It seemed to me that the Baruch scheme, if adopted, would prevent an atomic arms race the appalling dangers of which were evident to all informed opinion in the West.

For a time, it seemed possible that the USSR would agree to this scheme since it had everything to gain and nothing to lose. Unfortunately, Stalin's suspicious nature made him think that there was some trap, and Russia decided to produce her own atomic weapons. I thought, at that time, that it would be worthwhile to bring pressure to bear upon Russia and even, if necessary, to go so far as to threaten war on the sole issue of the internationalizing of atomic weapons.

My aim, then as now, was to prevent a war in which both sides possessed the power of producing worldwide disaster. Western statesmen, however, confident of the supposed technical superiority of the West, believed that there was no danger of Russia achieving equality with the non-Communist world in the field of nuclear warfare. Their confidence in this respect has turned out to have been mistaken. It follows that, if nuclear war is now to be prevented, it must be by new methods and not by those which could have been employed ten years ago.

My critics seem to think that, if you have once advocated a certain policy, you should continue to advocate it after all the circumstances have changed. This is quite absurd. If a man gets into a train with a view to reaching a certain destination, and on the way the train breaks down, you will not consider the man guilty of an inconsistency if he gets out of the train and employs other means of reaching his destination. In like manner, a person who advocates a certain policy in certain circumstances will advocate a quite different policy in different circumstances.

I have never been a complete pacifist and have at no time maintained that all who wage war are to be condemned. I have held the view, which I should have thought was that of common sense, that some wars have been justified and others not. In the present situation, if a great war should break out the belligerents on either side and the neutrals would be equally defeated. This is a new situation and means that war can no longer be used as an instrument of policy. It is true that the threat of war can still be used, but only by a lunatic.

Unfortunately, some people are lunatics. Not long ago lunatics were in command of a powerful state. We cannot be sure this will not happen again. If it does, it will produce a disaster compared with which the horrors achieved by Hitler were a flea-bite. The world at present is balanced in unstable equilibrium upon a sharp edge. To achieve stability, new methods are required, and it is these new methods that those who think as I do are attempting to urge upon the East and upon the West.

I do not deny that the policy I have advocated has changed from time to time. It has changed as circumstances have changed. To achieve a single purpose, sane men adapt their policies to the circumstances. Those who do not are insane.

Though I do not admit inconsistency, I should not be wholly sincere if I did not admit that my mood and feelings have undergone a change somewhat deeper than that resulting from strategic considerations alone. The awful prospect of the extermination of the human race, if not in the next war, then in the next but one or the next but two, is so sobering to any imagination which has seriously contemplated it as to demand very fundamental fresh thought on the whole subject not only of international relations but of human life and its capabilities. If you were quarrelling with a man about some issue that both you and he had thought important, just at the moment when a sudden hurricane threatened to destroy you both and the whole neighborhood, you would probably forget the quarrel. I think what is important at present is to make mankind aware of the hurricane and forgetful of the issues which have been producing strife.

I KNOW it is difficult after spending many years and much eloquence on the evils of Communism or Capitalism, as the case may be, to see this issue as one of relative unimportance. But, although this is difficult, it is what both the Soviet rulers and the men who shape the policy of the United States will have to achieve if mankind is to survive. To make such a realization possible is the purpose of my present policy.

What is needed is a new direction on both sides and a determination, not only to make proposals, but to find compromises which give no net advantage to either side. The risk involved in not negotiating is the extermination of the human race. This, surely, is a greater risk than that of some diplomatic advantage to one side or the other. We must hope that this will become obvious both to Russia and to the United States. What is needed is emphasis on our common interest in human survival rather than upon the matters in which our interests are supposed to differ. Whether we wish it or not, the only road to the welfare of each is the welfare of all.

—BERTRAND RUSSELL.

(34) Here is the *Saturday Review* editorial of 7/19/58:

The Saturday Review

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Contributing Editors Cleveland Amory, Henry Hewes, Granville Hicks, James Thrall Soby, Horace Sutton, John T. Winterich

In the Direction of Sanity

ON THE second floor of a small walk-up apartment in London, overlooking the Thames River, I had a chance to chat with Bertrand Russell. He was surrounded with papers, letters, and documents relating to the one matter that commands his dominant attention and concern these days—the danger of nuclear war. It was on the eve of his eighty-sixth birthday, but he had lost none of the alertness or intellectual agility that had so impressed me when we had met in the United States almost fifteen years earlier.

Lord Russell escorted me to the narrow balcony facing the Thames and pointed out some of the sites in the surrounding area. He spoke of the color of the sky and water at dusk in terms that were none the less poetic because of the reserve in which his appreciation was phrased. Then we came into his workroom and spoke about the movements in the United States and Great Britain aimed at creating policies adequate to cope with modern weapons and modern totalitarianism.

This led me to say that I had been troubled by reports reaching the United States; he had been quoted by several interviewers as having advocated surrender to the Soviet Union in order to avert nuclear war. I told Lord Russell I had been deeply distressed at these reports and indeed had been in the unhappy position of having to disagree with him editorially in *The Saturday Review*. Many Americans shared his apprehensions over the effects and implications of continued nuclear testing and on the danger of nuclear war in general. But we did not believe it was necessary to turn in our freedoms or our values in order to meet the challenge. And we condemned the opposite view; namely, that the only way to meet the threat was through preventive war.

Lord Russell smiled as I spoke.

"There's still no difference between us," he said. "I have never believed and I do not now believe that capitulation is the only way out. Recently some commentators from the United States came to interview me. They felt my position on nuclear testing was inimical to the interests of the West. I responded by making the case that the West could not survive except through a workable system of control over nuclear weapons, for the West is totally vulnerable to atomic attack and, if war came, the West would disappear as a force in history, assuming of course that anything would be left at all anywhere.

"At any rate, my interviewers continued to force the issue. Finally, one of them put the question to me in its most extreme form: namely, if I were convinced that the only way of averting worldwide nuclear extermination would be by surrendering to the Russians, what would I do?"

Lord Russell interrupted himself at this point to light up his pipe.

"I replied to the interviewers," he resumed, "that I did not believe that these alternatives were the only ones before the world, therefore it did not seem to me that any answer I might give would be a useful one. But my interrogators continued to press me on this: how would I answer the question theoretically, they demanded.

"Theoretically, I replied, if I were convinced that the only way of avoiding a war of extermination would be through surrender to Communism or to anyone else, then under those terms I would be obligated to prefer surrender. Not that life would not be oppressive under totalitarianism; it would be. And it would be foolish to expect that the oppression would be lifted until after many years. But the important thing is that human life would continue and with it the hope that man eventually might be able to restore some measure of his values and his good sense. In this context, therefore, my choice was not a difficult one. Human survival is the real issue and the higher value. Without people, you have neither freedom nor the hope of freedom. I believe in both.

"The alternatives before the world today are neither preventive nuclear war nor capitulation," Lord Russell continued. "We still have a chance to apply sanity to our problem in a way that very possibly might preserve the peace and keep our freedoms. But a policy based on the illusion of security through nuclear supremacy is unworkable. The only security is through a plan of control over nuclear weapons and, eventually we hope, over the causes of war itself."

I put a question to him that had come up time and again in the U. S.

"Don't people ask how you propose to get the agreement of the Soviet Union to such propositions?" I inquired.

"Certainly," he said. "They put it much more severely than that. They remember that I advocated a policy of toughness toward the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. Now they want to know whether I've gone soft and why I've changed my mind.

"And I tell them that any man who doesn't change his mind in the light of changed conditions is an idiot. Profound changes *have* taken place. Apart from the changes of personnel and policy in the Soviet Union, we have the great changes in the world itself, the biggest of which is the change in the nature of warfare. To advocate a policy based on the feasibility or the eventuality of war is to advocate extermination.

"The big question, therefore, is to find out whether it is possible, in the interests of mutual survival, to come to any agreements with the Russians in the nuclear field. I think we ought to begin with nuclear testing, not only because of the demonstrated danger of nuclear testing but because the Russians have said they would agree to a cessation with inspection and safeguard. For us to refuse to pursue this possibility makes no sense. Naturally, we do not have 100 per cent certainty or safety in any course of action we may take. But it helps when one moves in the direction of sanity. It helps more than a little."

—N. C.

HONORARY MEMBERS

(35) Honorary Member review. These are the present Honorary Members: Katharine Tait, Conrad Russell, Paul Edwards, D.F. Pears, Sir Karl Popper, Paul Arthur Schilpp, and Linus Pauling. Two former Honorary Members have died: A.J.Ayer, and John Russell. If you wish to name someone for consideration as an Honorary Member, please do so, and say why you think he/she may qualify.

BRS/APA 1991

(36) Call for Papers.

The Bertrand Russell Society announces a call for papers to be presented at its meeting with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in December 1991. Papers may be on any aspect of Russell's Philosophy. They should have a reading time of about one half an hour and should be submitted in triplicate, typed and double spaced with an abstract of not more than 150 words. The name and address of the author and the title of the paper should be submitted on a separate page. The submission deadline is April 1, 1991 and the papers should be sent to David E. Johnson, Chair, Philosopher's Committee, The Bertrand Russell Society, Sampson Hall, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402-5044. Those desiring the return of their papers should enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

ANNUAL MEETING (1990)

(37) Registration form: **1990 Annual Meeting, The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.**

June 22-24 McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

Name(s)_____

Address_____

City_____**Zip**_____**Phone** (___)____-_____

Single or double occupancy?_____ **Amount enclosed (Canadian)** $_____

One all-expense fee includes registration, lodging Friday and Saturday nights, 5 meals (including Banquet) from Friday evening meal through Sunday morning breakfast, Red Hackle Hour. Double occupancy $110; Single $125; Canadian money.

Send completed Registration Form and Fee as soon as you can to:

Bertrand Russell Archives, Mills Memorial Library,
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, L8S 4L6

(38) How to get to McMaster. You can travel to McMaster via Toronto or via Hamilton (which is closer to McMaster).

If you fly to Toronto, take the Trentway-Wagar bus to Hamilton ($16.50.), then bus or cab to McMaster. Or take the luxury minivan from the Airport directly to McMaster ($33). About an hour's ride.

If you fly to Hamilton, take the bus to Hamilton; then bus or cab to McMaster.

If you drive, park your car in Zone 1 (north of the tennis courts).

Check in at The Bertrand Russell Archives, in Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University.

CONTRIBUTIONS

(39) We thank these members for their recent contributions to the BRS Treasury:

MR. MICHAEL P. BERTIAUX /1130 S. MICHIGAN AV. #3309/CHICAGO/IL/60605/ /
MR. STEVE DAHLBY /9115 N. CARESSA WAY/CITRUS SPRINGS/FL/32630/ /
DR. DAVID S. GOLDMAN /35 E. 85TH ST./NY/NY/10028/ /
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We solicit contributions from members. You may send a contribution at any time, in any amount, large or small, care of the newsletter or the RS Library, addresses on Page 1, bottom.

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(40) BR ON MANDELA (1962)

From *The Daily Worker*, London, 21 December 1962, p. 5, with thanks to HARRY RUJA:

We are in great debt to Nelson Mandela, leader of the banned African National Congress, says Earl (Bertrand) Russell.

Paying tribute to the African leader in a message to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Lord Russell says South Africa is one great concentration camp.

"Because this is so, the protest of those who stand out against it is all the more incredible and courageous," he adds.

CLEAR DUTY

"There is in South Africa the most clear duty of conscience. Conscience requires that everyone who finds it possible to do so should resist to the limit until this filthy regime is eliminated and the people of South Africa are free."

BOOK REVIEW

(41) *Bertrand Russell on God and Religion*, ed. Al Seckel, a "Paperback Original" reviewed by Jonathan Kirsch in the Book Section (p.13) of the *Los Angeles Times* (4/20/86).

Another lion of the English literati is celebrated in **Bertrand Russell on God and Religion**, edited by Al Seckel (Prometheus: $12.95), an anthology of Russell's essays on the varieties of faith, and the lack of it, in his times. We are reminded that Russell, who may be best remembered for his early leadership of the contemporary nuclear disarmament movement, "began thinking about philosophical questions at the age of fifteen"—in 1888! His famous confession of faith in pure reason, "Why I Am Not a Christian," was an address first delivered in 1927: "The whole conception of God is a conception derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms," he proclaimed. "It is a conception quite unworthy of free men." Indeed, the sheer elegance of Lord Russell's language, the strict logic of his argument, and the extremely civilized tone of even his most ardent rhetoric all seem almost antique. Still, "On God and Religion" is a classic not only because of its place in the history of ideas, or its roots in the tradition of Western literature and philosophy, but also because the truths that it offers are truly timeless; Russell could have been writing for today's op-ed page when he observed that "the qualities most needed are charity and tolerance, not some form of fanatical faith such as is offered us by the various rampant isms."

ABOUT BR'S VIEWS

(42) Dewey and Russell. BRS Laureate Alan Ryan in *The Wilson Quarterly* (Winter 1990), with thanks to MARK HOGAN:

Having only recently published a political biography of Dewey's British counterpart, Bertrand Russell, I was intrigued and amused by the similarities and differences between Diggins's hero ["John Dewey: Philosopher in the Schoolroom," *WQ*, Autumn '89] and mine. The similarities, of course, are many and obvious; both were ardent defenders of an education in which the child learned by doing, both began by doubting the need for any authority in the classroom other than the discipline of the subject matter itself, and both came to think in Hobbes's memorable words that children "are born inapt for society." Both, again, were hard to place on the spectrum that runs from left-wing liberalism to moderate socialism; Dewey, as Diggins remarks, thought FDR by no means went far enough in reconstructing the American economy after the Depression, while Russell all his life hoped that mankind would become rational and adopt the decentralized Guild Socialism to which he and Dewey had both subscribed in optimistic pre-war days.

What is more striking than their similarities is the absolute barrier that divided them. Diggins only touches on it when he observes that critics of pragmatism "believed that pragmatism simply confused truth with the process of its verification." For Russell at any rate, pragmatism was a sort of secular blasphemy. With God gone and most ethics shaky, all mankind had left was a concern for the truth—not a concern for what it would "pay to believe," but a concern for how things really were.

By bringing philosophy back into the marketplace, Dewey closed the breach that Russell had opened between the concerns of the intellectual and the duties of the plain man. By the same token he lost something important. It is not only, as Diggins says, that critics like Van Wyck Brooks and Lewis Mumford could complain that he exalted the practical at the expense of the spiritual. It is more that Dewey's passion for closing all gaps and rejecting all dichotomies is ultimately less true to life than Russell's insistence on the tragic dimension of everyday existence. A strong sense of the uselessness of truth and its unrelatedness to human affairs still strikes many of us as an indispensable element in the psychology of the serious philosopher.

Alan Ryan
Department of Politics
Princeton University

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GOOD QUOTES

(44) How to say a lot in a few words:

Science offers evidence without certainty. Religion offers certainty without evidence.

Credit Ashley Montague (RSN55-5).
