The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.* 1500 Johns Road Augusta Georgia 30904

RUSSELL SOCIETY NEWS
No. 29
February 1981

(1) 1981 annual meeting (2,47). AHA's 2 anti-fundamentalist conferences (3d). Science Committee: plans (5a), Pugwash 1980 (5b). Results of vote: both proposals carry (6). Essay by BR:"What Is Happiness?" (7). Karl Popper's "Favorite Russell" (8). Vatican may OK Galileo (22). Photos: BRS Award (Chicago), BR Memorial (London) (29). "Nuclear Nightmares" reviewed (34). Index (48). An asterisk in the left column indicates a request.

ANNUAL MEETING

(2) The 1981 Annual Meeting will take place at the Russell Archives, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, June 26-28, from Friday evening till Sunday noon. For details — such as costs, how to reserve a room, how to get there, etc. — see (47).

REPORTS FROM OFFICERS

President Bob Davis reports:

(3a) Work on the Annual Meeting at McMaster continues. It will be organized primarily by Ken Blackwell, a BRS founding member and Director of the Russell Archives. Speakers are needed and suggestions are
* welcome. Questions or suggestions may be sent either to Ken (Russell Archives/ McMaster University/ Hamilton, Ontario/Canada L8S 4L6) or to me (2501 Lakeview Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90039).

(3b) In November we had a local BRS meeting at my house. Present were LOUIS ACHESON JR.,JACQUELINE BERTHON-PAYON & guest Gary Aurouze,PHIL FREER, JOE GORMAN,CHARLES GREEN, ARLYN KRAVIG & guest Berry Hall,MARTY LIPIN, and ELLEN YOUNG. We discussed "Why I Am Not A Christian" and "What Is An Agnostic?"

(3c) We decided to have another meeting, and our poster tells the story:

> BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY will hold a public meeting Sunday, February 15 at 12:30 P.M. at the Claremont College Faculty House. There will be 2 Bertrand Russell filmed interviews, and a discussion of his views on religion, based mainly on "A Free Man's Worship","Why I Am Not A Christian","What I Believe","What Is An Agnostic?" More information from Jacqueline Berthon-Payon, Joe Gorman, and Robert Davis (we listed addresses and phone numbers.) Also lunch (optional).

We felt that, in this age of increasing religious obscurantism, BR's works have peculiar merit, in that they address the questions directly and honestly and provide a rational alternative.

I urge members in other cities — who are concerned about the growing power of the fundamentalists — to get together and do something similar, as part of the good fight.

(3d) On the following page is a letter from the American Humanist Association. I plan to attend their San Diego conference in April, as does Joe Gorman. Note that they are having another conference in late October at the University of Maryland. This provides an opportunity for Maryland-area members who feel strongly about the resurgence of religious fundamentalism, to do something about it! Let AHA know, probably at the Amherst address, that you plan to attend.

(3e) I am taking a one-week course on how to raise funds from foundations, in early February, here in L.A. The BRS has many projects it could pursue, if it had money. Perhaps, with the aid of this course, I can raise some.

Treasurer Dennis J. Darland reports:

(4a) Deductible expenses. As previously reported, the cost of attending a BRS meeting is a deductible expense, for US income tax purposes,for some BRS members — those whose presence is essential to the conduct of the meeting, such as directors, officers,committee chairmen who report to the meeting (and probably committee members who supplement a chairman's report.) The BRS does not reimburse these expenses.

*Russell Society News, a quarterly (Lee Eisler, Editor): RD 1, Box 409, Coopersburg, PA 18036
BRS Library:Jack Ragsdale, BRS Co-Librarian, PO Box 28200, Dallas, TX 75228

(3d cont.)



AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
National Office — 7 Harwood Drive, Amherst, New York 14226 · (716) 839-5080

January 8th, 1981

The Bertrand Russell Society
R.D. 1, Box 409
Coopersburg, PA 18036

Dear Sirs,

We would like to extend a special invitation to you to designate a representative from The Bertrand Russell Society, to participate in a panel at the Annual Conference of the American Humanist Association, April 17-19, in San Diego, California.

We regret we cannot cover travel and lodging costs, but perhaps you may have a member living in or near San Diego would could be officially delegated.

Our panel will focus upon the many varieties of Humanism, Freethought, Rationalism, Secularism, Atheism and Agnosticism in the US today. How do we differ? In what ways are we alike? Then, the second main point of consideration will be how we might join forces to counter the attacks upon freethought in all forms, coming from the radical Fundamentalist fringe groups which figured so markedly in the recent election.

Please reply at your earliest convenience to:

Annual Conference Committee
American Humanist Association
953 8th Avenue Suite 208
San Diego, CA 92101

We plan another conference in late October, at the University of Maryland. Again, we would extend an invitation to your group to come. Our goal is to invite the many similar groups to all futurs conferences of the AHA, to build toward cooperative efforts in support of our common goals.

Sincerely,
Lyle L. Simpson
Bette Chambers
American Humanist Association
President emeritus

cc Lyle L. Simpson
Fred Edwords
Annual Conference Committee, AHA

HUMANISTS OF THE YEAR
Anton J. Carlson — 1953
Arthur F. Bentley — 1954
James P. Warbasse — 1955
C. Judson Herrick — 1956
Margaret Sanger — 1957
Oscar Riddle — 1958
Brock Chisholm — 1958
Leo Szilard — 1960
Linus Pauling — 1961
Julian Huxley — 1962
Hermann J. Muller — 1963
Carl Rogers — 1964
Hudson Hoagland — 1965
Erich Fromm — 1966
A. H. Maslow — 1967
Benjamin Spock — 1968
Buckminster Fuller — 1969
A. Philip Randolph — 1970
Albert Ellis — 1971
B. F. Skinner — 1972
Thomas Szasz — 1973
Mary Calderone — 1974
Joseph Fletcher — 1974
Henry Morgentaler — 1975
Betty Friedan — 1975
Jonas E. Salk — 1976
Corliss Lamont — 1977
Margaret E. Kuhn — 1978
Edwin H. Wilson — 1979

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* * * * * * * * *

(4a cont.) The following is new; it modifies what was said in RSN27-33: There is no need to report these expenses to the BRS Treasurer.

Keep receipts for your expenses, and a copy of the meeting's program. The value of your services are <u>not</u> deductible, only out-of-pocket expenses are. Mileage may be deducted, at 8¢ a mile; this amount may have been increased. Dollar contributions to the BRS are, of course, deductible, and these are recorded by the BRS Treasurer.

(4b) <u>Treasurer's Report</u> for the year ending 12/31/80:

Balance on hand (12/31/79)		2,716.10
Income: 90 new members	1,089.22	
170 renewals	2,822.50	
Total dues	3,911.72	
Contributions	3,907.00	
Sale of RSN, books, etc	282.45	
Annual meeting fees	328.20	
Total income	8,429.37	8,429.37
		11,145.47

Forward		11,145.47
Expenditures: Information & Membership Committees	4,541.88	
236 subscriptions to "Russell"	826.00	
2 Travel Grants @ $500 ('79 & '80)	1,000.00	
Russell Memorial (London)	1,032.50	
Library	264.59	
1980 Annual Meeting	1,295.49	
Corporation Fee	15.00	
Bank Charges	36.56	
Other	91.35	
Total expenditures	9,103.37	-9,103.37
Balance on hand (12/31/80)		2.042.10

REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES

(5) Science Committee (Alex Dely, Chairman):

(5a) Future plans. Alex wrote the following letter to a member who had expressed interest in getting on the Science Committee. We print it because others may also wish to know what this Committee is going to be doing.

> You have already discovered that the BRS is a loosely knit organization devoted to critically evaluating the relevance of Russell's ideas to today's world problems. Russell, during the last 25 years of his life, was first and foremost concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons. In the light of the continued proliferation of such weapons, I consider this issue to be of towering importance.
>
> Secondly, implicit in Russell's (and Einstein's) thought was the concept that man, in order to prosper as a species, must learn to live in harmony with nature. For that goal to be achieved, the public must be made aware of the intricate ecological balance of nature.
>
> Thirdly, Russell delighted in the phenomenal explosion of radical concepts throughout the physical and biological sciences. However he would have been pained by the lack of comparable breakthroughs in their philosophical consequences, i.e., our outlook on the Universe, our "World View". Indeed, our sciences at present live in the spirit of analysis,whereas what we desperately need (in order to have the public understand, value, and adopt our conclusion) is an attempt at synthesis, an integration of the emerging concepts and their meaning. In short, we must construct a comprehensive philosophy that is relevant to today's world problems and which incorporates findings of all the sciences.
>
> The above are the three main interests I would like to develop through the Committee. However, you are probably more interested in specific tasks. Here they come!
>
> It will not help a bit if we restrict our ideas to the BRS itself. I have expressed these concerns through some newsletter reports,e.g.,"The Social Responsibility of Scientists" (RSN27-8). I think we should approach the print media. Although my time is limited and my interests vary widely, from physics to politics, one series of projects I have in mind is to compose a series of short essays on environmental matters, to be sent to newspapers for inclusion in their editorial pages. Those essays could be expanded for magazines such as"Saturday Review" and many similar publications. As we are in a depressed economy, the environment will take a back seat politically, which I greatly deplore.Some topics are: DNA dangers and possibilities, pesticide dangers, untested chemicals' effects on the foodchain,quality of food we consume, sources of pollution...and the list goes on, as you well know.
>
> A similar series of essays could be written on nuclear weapons or biological & chemical warfare, which was the approach that interested my predecessor, Joe Neilands. Finally, most of today's problems are global: the world food situation, energy, population, technology transfer, etc.,etc. They can only be solved at an international level. That would be an excellent topic for essays, especially in the light of the prevalent attitude that government intervention is necessarily harmful. Is it? When does it become so? How can we make an international effort that's effective? Are ideologies, parties,etc., harmful to the cause? There is literally no end to the topics that need to be brought to the public's attention, lest it remain uninformed. That is the first leg of my specific actions. I'm in the process of writing a series of such short essays and will soon start sending them off. I also hope to do something similar in the semi-technical scientific journals, such as "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" and "Physics Today", in my area of specialization.
>
> Finally, at the local and state level in Arizona, I'm hoping to get politically involved in environmental matters, and at the federal level, in energy policy.
>
> I try to spend 4 hours a week on the aforementioned essays and other committee work, primarily gethering information and taking notes. Every couple of months, I summarize these, and compose a few essays. I have built up a modest collection over the past 4 years. Soon, after expanding some of them, I expect to start sending them out. The main purpose is to spread concern over issues that concerned Russell, and to spread awareness of the Society and ourselves.

Perhaps you are thinking,"My God, all that sounds great, but it is so frustratingly complex! Where do I start? Will it make a difference?" I understand the feeling of inadequacy at times. I have had it many a time! However, Russell, in his 80s took to the streets of London to protest nuclear weapons and was thrown into jail. With this in mind, I say, let us all do what we humanly can and feel we should according to our values.

I'm sure your interests differ widely from mine. The projects above are strictly my plans for myself. They are not fixed Committee plans. Since I receive only on-and-off help from other members, I am pretty much on my own; that's why I mention my interests. However, I'd be delighted if you could join me on the Committee. Choose your own title and pick your topics, if mine don't suit you. Spend as little or as much time at it as you wish. We're dealing with a world full of problems crying out for thought. Every bit of help would be appreciated.

(By the way, the State Department has authorized construction of a nuclear plant at Bataan in the Philippines, after geologists found active quake faults only 10 miles away. Disconcerting!)

(5b) Pugwash 1980. Alex's report,which follows, is based in part on the November 1980 issue of "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" and in part on correspondence with some of the Belgian and Netherlands organizers of the 1980 Pugwash Conference (which was held at Nijenrode, Breukelen,Netherlands): Dr. Smith, Netherlands Pugwash Director; R. Gastmans, of Louvain, Belgium; Unesco's Dr. Apostel, of Ghent, Belgium; and a Russian emigré in Belgium who prefers not to be named.

In "A New Approach To Peace," Russell states "...Not only would such a (nuclear) war be a total disaster to human hopes, but...a nuclear war may break out at any minute... We have first to persuade governments and populations of the disastrousness of nuclear war... Of these tasks, the first has been largely accomplished... They have succeeded in making very widely known, even to governments, the dangers of nuclear war..."

However, today, neither governments nor a majority of the populations seem to take this view. The Russians, we are indoctrinated, are using sophisticated technology and are ahead of us, so nothing but the best, latest, and most modern nuclear weapons are necessary to protect the free world. (Nobody seems to worry about the continued abysmal performance of the 54 25-year-old Titan missiles, rotting in the Southwest.) The public is swallowing that scenario whole.

Instead, limited nuclear war has become respectable, whereas mutual assured destruction (MAD) is considered outmoded (primarily because scientists in many laboratories have developed new generations of nuclear weaponry.) Professional patriots, including our President, have opted for a first-strike capability.

That nuclear war will probably occur before this century ends was an unspoken fear at the 1980 Pugwash Conferences, a formal conference of scientists and scholars from all parts of the world. This past August's 30th Conference — on Science and World Affairs — was the 25th Anniversary of the first Pugwash Conference, that resulted from the "Russell-Einstein Manifesto", which advised men to "remember your humanity and forget the rest." Here are some of this Conference's conclusions:

1) "A major nuclear war would mean the end of civilization. And yet — nuclear arms are proliferating to many additional states,...while attempts are made in various countries to lend respectability to the insidious notion of a winnable nuclear war."

2) "Military expenditures ($500 billion worldwide, and growing at $20 billion a year) consume resources needed for improvement of human life, especially in poor nations."

3) "Resulting economic, social,and political inequities...create dangerous foci for the outbreak of local wars, which could easily escalate."

4) "We must more than ever make this appeal:'Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?'"

Alfred Nobel thought that once armies were able to annihilate each other in minutes, civilized nations would then recoil with horror. Well, we have reached the point where not only armies but entire populations can be wiped out. Yet no public outcry is forthcoming. Science and technology are continuing to play devastating roles. Immediately after SALT I was signed, both superpowers started to develop new kinds of weapons (such as the cruise missile) that were not covered in the treaty.

What can be done constructively?

I. International agreements must remain a priority.First-strike capabilities must be outlawed.

II. Disarmament has been a failure, in the main, because the negotiators have been the superpowers themselves, who want to preserve their power-superiority over the rest of the world. The smaller states must get deeply involved in the negotiations, and end their sin of silence; those nations are the ones where a limited nuclear war would be fought!

III. Pugwash has tended not to take sides. They must throw away their respectful attitudes toward ineffective agreements. Pugwash must organize the scientsts and leaders of small nations to use their superiority in numbers to influence the superpowers.

IV. Scientists in the nuclear nations must speak up.Many, as individuals, speak out against nuclear war.

Many, however, remain silent on the public front, for fear of losing jobs and prestige. As long as the public does not show them appreciation for whistleblowing, their first loyalty will be to those by whom they are fed, paid, and nurtured. In short, the public, and only the public, can make the position of nuclear-war-protester a prestigious and rewarding one.

V.Opposition to renewing a nuclear arms race has, traditionally, been confined to individuals and small groups outside the policy-making establishment. In all countries, large coalitions are needed, consisting of schools, universities, churches, labor unions, the private sector and those agencies of government that would have to deal with the remains of society after a nuclear war. Such coalitions, to be effective, would need an enormous grassroots network of dedicated and informed indivuals in all communities. Organizing such a network involves small sacrifices from lots of people, and most jobs could be handled by ordinary citizens.

VI. The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has, over the past 12 months, effectively staged a Campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament (END), for a nuclear-weapons-free Europe.Due to its persistance — and the work of others — the British Parliament held its first debate on nuclear weapons in 15 years, in January 1980! Even though Britain is notorious as a country where public debate on defense issues is severly hampered by lack of information and resources, the END Campaign shows that accomplishment is possible.

VII. Finally, what must every BRS member do? They must get involved in at least one of the above activities, more than one if possible. They must inform themselves, join local groups of discussion and public education, they must speak in schools and before school boards. They must use radio, TV and newspapers to get their activities and messages across. If religious zealots can do so, so can we! We must run for local government positions, so we can have meaningful input into community decisions and can influence public policy. Ultimately, in a nation, everything ties together. If things go wrong, aggression comes alive. All of us can take a few hours a month and compose a short article, or paraphrase a Russell idea on nuclear war. If we do so, and send them to local, state and national mass magazines, we will spread Russell's word and our own concern for mankind's fate. Those among us who do not contribute in their own way do a grave disservice to the memory and image of Russell, a man who fought for his beliefs. There is a world out there that needs our message. It may not be there for long!

Alex is insistent about what ought to be done."If the BRS is not to be seen as a farce in studying and spreading Russell's activism, all our members should be as informed and involved as possible... Any human endeavor consists of two main phases: one is analysis and information gathering, the second is action. Either one without the other is doomed to failure..."

If Alex sounds too insistent, it is well to remember what BR said when accused of being fanatical about the need to get rid of nuclear armaments: "It's hard not to be fanatical about it, because the issue is so * important and we have no Ark." (Can someone supply the source of this quote?)

(5c) Alex gets a grant, a $2500 grant from the Arizona Research Labs, to use as he sees fit.

(5d) "How To Avoid Nuclear War" — a 12-page essay that Alex and Jerre Moreland (Psychology Department, Bradley University) submitted in the Essay Competition of "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists"(RSN27-19,RSN28-3) — is available from the BRS Library, address on Page 1, bottom.

(Thanks to CHERIE RUPPE for sending the pages of the November 1980 "Bulletin" referred to above.)

RESULTS OF THE VOTE

(6a) Expulsion. The members voted to expel John Sutcliffe. The vote was not close.

(6b) Travel Grant change. The directors voted in favor of changing the "Travel Grant" (formerly the "Travel Scholarship") to a Doctoral Grant, starting in 1982. The Grant will be $500, to be spent as the doctoral candidate wishes.

BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

(7) Bob Davis is a book collector, as we know(RSN28-36). When in England for the unveiling of BR's bust (RSN28-48), he located 2 volumes,to each of which BR had contributed a chapter. Here is one of them (the other will appear in RSN30):

What Is Happiness? by 10 authors. London: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1938. BR's contribution follows.

HAPPINESS depends upon a combination of internal and external causes. Writers on happiness, most of whom have been in comfortable circumstances, have unduly emphasized the internal causes.

What Marcus Aurelius would have thought if he had been put on a raft in the Arctic Ocean with nothing to eat or drink, would not have been quite what he said in his writings. Any man who maintains that happiness comes wholly from within should be compelled to spend thirty-six hours in rags in a blizzard, without food.

There have, no doubt, been men who could have remained happy in such circumstances, but they have been few and not far removed from lunacy. For the overwhelming majority of mankind certain elementary necessities and comforts are an indispensable condition of happiness. I do not much admire those rich men and women who tell the poor that happiness is spiritual and just as easy on a small income as on a large one.

Omitting saints, lunatics, and men of genius, ordinary people need, for their happiness, certain fairly simple conditions, which with a little wisdom in economics and politics, could be fulfilled for almost everyone. I put first the purely physical conditions—food and shelter and health. Only when these have been secured is it worth while to consider psychological requisites.

Having said this, however, I do not want to deny the importance of mental causes. We all know many people who have good health and enough to eat, who are nevertheless miserable. They may suffer through external circumstances: unpopularity, lack of success, unhappiness in marriage, or unsatisfactory children.

Or they may suffer through internal maladjustment, through conflicts in their own psychology. Not infrequently, external misfortunes have their source in the character of the sufferer; but conversely, the character of the sufferer may be warped by external misfortunes.

Happiness, if it is to have any depth and solidity, demands a life built round some central purpose of a kind demanding continuous activity and permitting of progressively increasing success. The purpose must be one which has its root in instinct, such as love of power or love of honour, or parental affection.

Some people, it is true, are like cats, and can be contented so long as they can lie in the sun; but this is exceptional, at least in northern countries. As the mental life develops, men become less and less able to find happiness in mere passive enjoyment.

Nor is activity for its own sake satisfactory; what is needed is activity directed to a desired end. For the great majority of mankind there is too much of this: the time and energy spent in earning a living condemn the hours of leisure to fatigue and futility. But I doubt whether those who win sudden wealth in a sweepstake or a lottery are able, after the first, to enjoy their new leisure, unless they can become sufficiently interested in something to take again to work—though not such severe or uninteresting work as most people find necessary in order to avoid starvation.

Economic insecurity is, at present, one of the great sources of unhappiness. I am thinking not only of that extreme form which consists in fear of utter destitution, but of the dread of a descent in the social scale. This is not only painful in itself, but is a cause of terrible political consequences—Fascism, imperialism, and militarism are all reinforced by it.

It is entirely preventable: with a better economic system there need be no destitution and no social classes. But meanwhile the evil perpetuates itself by filling men's minds with envy and fear. So long as our economic system remains competitive, these emotions, with all their evil progeny, will continue to govern large parts of the lives of individuals and nations, making happiness precarious and embittered unhappiness very common.

The psychological sources of unhappiness, which are studied by psychiatrists in their extreme forms, mostly have their source in unwise treatment during childhood. A child may be unloved, or may feel that another child is unjustly favoured at his expense; the result is almost sure to be a proneness to discontent and envy and hostility.

Or he may be thwarted in his legitimate impulses of adventure and exploration, with the result that he becomes either timid or blindly rebellious.

This form of mistake is especially common with uneducated parents, who are perpetually saying 'don't' when there is no occasion for prohibition. It must be admitted that this attitude is not surprising in harassed and over-worked mothers, since a child's adventurousness is dangerous to himself and inconvenient to others.

This is one of the arguments in favour of nursery schools, where the environment can be free from dangers and fragile objects, and the child can learn muscular dexterity without fear of disaster.

There is an opposite danger, which is that of 'spoiling' by too much emotional affection and too little training in self-discipline. This produces an adult who is too much attached to a parent to be able to form new ties, or so accustomed to indulgence as to make impossible demands upon contemporaries.

These are only a few of the ways in which bad handling during the first years may produce a character incapable of happiness or success in later life.

The happiest body of men in the modern world are, I should say, the men of science. Their work is interesting, and difficult without being too difficult; they feel it to be important, and the world agrees with them; their sense of power is gratified, since science is transforming human life; and in spite of the new horrors that science has added to war, most of them are convinced that the effects of scientific knowledge are pretty sure to be beneficial in the long run.

They have the pleasure of exercising skill, the pleasure of winning public respect, the pleasure of seeing the practical benefits of their discoveries, and their work has a large impersonal interest which is a protection against self-absorption.

The conditions of a happy life, it seems to me, are: first, health and a fair degree of economic security; second, work which is satisfying both because it is felt to be worth doing and because it utilizes whatever skill a man possesses without making impossible demands; third, personal relations that are satisfying, and especially a happy family life; fourth, a width of interests which makes many things enjoyable.

Our age is not a happy one, because it is oppressed by vast organized hostilities, of nation against nation, class against class, and creed against creed. These evils have their root in political and economic evils, but they are perpetuated also, in part, owing to defects in individual psychology, which make mass appeals to hatred and fear more successful than appeals for sanity and co-operation.

If the majority of men were individually sane they would soon make an end of the collective insanities which threaten our civilization. But it is difficult to see how individual sanity is to be brought about in the countries whose Governments depend for their existence upon its absence.

Perhaps there is in human nature an impulse towards sanity which will reassert itself before long. It has been so in the past after epochs of temporary madness; we may therefore hope that it will be so again.

"MY FAVORITE RUSSELL"

(8) Karl Popper writes that his favorite Russells are The Problems of Philosophy and Mysticism & Logic. He regrets that he cannot say more at present because he is "totally snowed under by urgent unfinished work and I simply cannot spare the time to write. I am sure you will understand." We do, and we were pleased to hear from him.

BR POPULARIZED

(9)

The New York Public Library at Lincoln Center

BRUNO WALTER AUDITORIUM

111 Amsterdam Avenue Telephone 799-2200

THE OPEN BOOK

presents

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S
GUIDED TOUR OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH

dramatized by **Marvin Kaye**

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1979
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1979
4:00 P.M. ADMISSION FREE

The use of cameras in this theatre is not allowed.

Free tickets may be obtained at the Amsterdam Avenue entrance on the day of the event. For evening programs apply in person after 4:00 p.m.; after 12 noon on Saturdays. For 4:00 o'clock programs, apply after 3:00 p.m.

PROGRAM SEQUENCE:

Introduction	Full Ensemble
Autobiographical Interlude	Bill Bonham
Remembrance of Friends Past	Bill Bonham, George DeLucenay Leon
On Education	Beverly Fite, Saralee Kaye, George DeLucenay Leon, Toby Sanders, Nancy Temple (wearing mortarboard)
On Sex and Marriage	June Miller, Saralee Kaye (seated at beginning of section), Toby Sanders
Mr. Bowdler's Nightmare	Beverly Fite (Mrs. Bowdler), George DeLucenay Leon (Mr. Spiffkins), June Miller (Narrator), Toby Sanders (Mr. Bowdler)
On Old Age	Bill Bonham
On Comets	Full Ensemble
On the Future of Mankind	Full Ensemble

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S GUIDED TOUR OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH was originally commissioned and performed by the late Robert Rounseville as a one-man show. Portions of it were staged by him at Deerfield Academy and Western Washington State University.

The complete script is a two-act drama. The present version, arranged for reading ensemble, represents roughly half of the full play, revised and slightly condensed to meet the strict staging limitations of THE OPEN BOOK productions.

Incidental Music: *Two Studies for Flute, Coronet, & Cello* by Burt Levy; used by permission of the composer.

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S GUIDED TOUR OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH is the only authorized dramatization of the writings of the late Lord Russell. It is performed with the permission of the joint copywright owners, Marvin Kaye and The Bertrand Russell Estate, and is expressly authorized by those parties, as well as Edith, Countess Russell; George Allen & Unwin Ltd., the publishers of Bertrand Russell's works; and The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

THE OPEN BOOK is a professional readers theatre company sponsored by Jay Broad and Jose Ferrer and registered with the New York State Charities Commission.

We've been in touch with Marvin Kaye since 1973 (yes, '73, before we were born, so to speak. The BRS was not founded till '74.) (For more, see NL3-33 and NL6-32.) His group, THE OPEN BOOK, is now a federally-approved non-profit organization, and is now seeking funding, in order to put "Guided Tour" on in NYC and also to make it available for touring. We've asked him to let us know next time "Guided Tour" is staged, so that members in the NY area who wish to can attend.

BR QUOTED

(10) "Forbes" loves BR. Hardly a month goes by, it seems, without finding BR quoted in "Forbes". The issue of 11/24/80 offers this:

It is the preoccupation with possession, more than anything, that prevents men from living freely and nobly.

How odd of "Forbes"to pick this particular quotation for its readers, mostly businessmen.

(Thank you, WHITFIELD COBB)

BR MEMORIAL

(11) The announcement of the unveiling, issued by the Appeal Committee, is reproduced here, for the record:

BERTRAND RUSSELL MEMORIAL

An Appeal made by Sir Alfred Ayer, Lord Brockway (Chairman of the Appeal Cttee), Peter Cadogan (Secretary), Lord Ritchie Calder, Frank Dobson MP, John Gilmour, Dora Russell, Lord Willis and Baroness Wootton.

c/o SPES, Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, London WC.1. Tel: 01. 242. 8032/3.

The Unveiling Ceremony

of the bust of Bertrand Russell - sculptor, Marcelle Quinton

12.00 mid-day, Thursday 23rd October 1980
in the Gardens of Red Lion Square, London WC.1

LORD FENNER BROCKWAY

DORA RUSSELL (who will unveil the bust)

SIR ALFRED AYER

PETER CADOGAN (ex-Committee of 100)

and

THE MAYOR OF CAMDEN
CLLR RON HEFFERMAN

All who would like to pay tribute to the life and work of the great philosopher will be welcome.

For photos taken at the unveiling by DON JACKANICZ, see (29).

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(12) Asimov's minibiography, in Asimov's Biographical Encyclopedia of Science and Technology. "The Lives and Achievements of 1195 Great Scientists from Ancient Times to the Present." Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 1972.

[821] **RUSSELL**, Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3d Earl
English mathematician and philosopher
Born: Trelleck, Monmouthshire, May 18, 1872
Died: Penrhyndeudraeth, Merionethshire, February 2, 1970

Russell's parents died while he was very young and his grandfather John Russell took charge. This grandfather had been Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1846 to 1852 and from 1865 to 1866, and was created 1st Earl Russell in 1861.

Young Bertrand led a lonely, unhappy childhood in the puritanical home of his grandparents. He entered Cambridge in 1890, where George Darwin [642] was one of his teachers and where Whitehead [748] grew interested in the young man.

Bertrand Russell inherited the earldom from his elder brother in 1931 but preferred not to use the title. This was all of a piece with his strong and unconventional liberal views. Through much of his life he had been a militant pacifist (which is not the contradiction in terms it seems) and for this lost his college post during World War I and spent some months in jail in 1918. He ran for Parliament (unsuccessfully) on the Labour ticket in 1922.

His views on social problems were equally unconventional. From 1927 to 1932 he ran a school for children in which advanced notions of discipline (or, rather, lack of it) were used. In 1940, when, during a temporary stay in the United States, he was appointed to the staff of the City College of New York, his published views on sex were used by the clergy and the Hearst press to arouse a storm of disapproval against him. His appointment was pusillanimously withdrawn as a result by a State Supreme Court order.

During the stressful times before World War II, Russell retreated from pacifism, but with the coming of the nuclear race and the cold war of the 1950s, he returned to his earlier views with greater force than ever. In his nineties this militant patriarch led the forces of neutralism in England and constantly defied the government, confident that it would not choose to jail him (although it did for a short while in 1961).

Russell heard Peano [731] lecture in mathematics in 1900 and grew interested in the basic logic of mathematics. In 1902 he made his first mark in this direction when he wrote to Frege [657], pointing out what has since become a famous logical paradox and asking how Frege's new system of mathematical logic would handle it. Frege was forced to admit that his system fell short and so added a footnote to his two-volume work that nullified all that had gone before.

Russell then went on to try to answer his own question by setting up a still better system of logic on which to base mathematics. This effort reached its climax in the publication from 1910 to 1913 in collaboration with Whitehead of *Principia Mathematica*, a name reminiscent of Newton's [201] great work. This was the most ambitious and nearly successful effort to make all of mathematics completely rigorous, but as Gödel [1069] was to show twenty years later, all such efforts were doomed to failure.

Russell wrote numerous books and in 1950 he received the Nobel Prize in literature.

ASSESSMENTS OF BR

(13) Gilbert Ryle on BR the Philosopher. Ryle read the following at a meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 5-7 Tavistock Place, London, WC 1, on Monday, December 7, 1970, at 7:30 P.M.

We members of the Aristotelian Society are here tonight to say 'Goodbye and thank you' to that grand philosophical thinker, Bertrand Russell, who gave his first paper to this Society in 1896.[1] This is not an occasion for an exegetic commentary on the almost infinite variety of his thought, but rather one for concentrating our gratitudes on those three or four determining impulses by which his thinking has given to the philosophical thinking of all of us, quite irrespective of our particular opinions and specialities, much of its whole trajectory.

For what concerns us today and, I maintain, for what should chiefly concern the future historians of twentieth-century thought, it matters comparatively little whether a few or many of us accept, or whether a few or many of us reject, this or that Russellian doctrine. The fact that he did not found a school or capture disciples was due partly to the accidents of his career, but especially to certain admirable features of his thinking. Among these was his immunity from reverence in general and especially from reverence for himself. He would have found Russell-acolytes comical and Russell-echoes tedious. On the other hand, what matters immensely is that, not what we think but, so to speak, the very style of our philosophical thinking perpetuates, where we are ordinarily least conscious of it, a style of thinking that had not existed in philosophy before, say, 1900.

(1) In speaking, metaphorically, of the Russellian style of thinking, though I am not alluding primarily, I am alluding secondarily to one particular intellectual temper for which the credit – the great credit as I think – needs to be divided between William James and Russell. For in one respect James and Russell were quite unlike Mill, Sidgwick and Bradley, quite unlike Brentano, Meinong and Husserl, and quite unlike even Moore, namely in their combination of seriousness with humour. Hume and Bradley had wit, and Hume could play. But James and Russell found out for themselves and so taught us at our best how to pop doctrinal bubbles without drawing blood: how to be illuminatingly and unmaliciously naughty: and how, without being frivolous, to laugh off grave conceptual bosh. Stuffiness in diction and stuffiness in thought were not, of course, annihilated, but they were put on the defensive from the moment when James and Russell discovered that a joke can be the beginning, though only the beginning, of a blessed release from a strangling theoretical millstone.

(2) Much more important was a new style of philosophical work that Russell, I think virtually single-handed, brought into the very tactics of philosophical thinking. Anticipated, I suggest, only by the unremembered Aristotle, Russell occasionally prescribed and often delib-

erately practised what can be called 'aporetic experimentation'. In his *Mind* article of 1905 'On Denoting', he says:

> A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science. I shall therefore state three puzzles which a theory as to denoting ought to be able to solve; and I shall show later that my theory solves them.

In 1904, near the beginning of his first *Mind* article on 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions', he had praised Meinong for the excellence of his quasi-empirical method of psychological research. His 1908 article 'Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types' opens with a list of seven selected contradictions demanding some common solution. Now of course other philosophers, indeed all other philosophers worthy of the name, always had resolutely and conscientiously tried to overcome theoretical difficulties. They knew that their theories were in jeopardy so long as hurdles remained uncleared or uncircumvented. Nearly all of them, too, had from time to time opposed error by putting up obstacles in the way of the erroneous views or the bad arguments of others. It is not criticism or self-criticism that Russell invented. What was, I think, new was Russell's heuristic policy of deliberately mobilising, stiffening and constructing his own hurdles against which to pit his own nascent speculations. Difficulties in the way of a theory are no longer obstacles to thought; they can be and should be constructed or collected as aids to thought. They can be the self-applied tests by which philosophical thinking may become a self-correcting undertaking. As in the laboratory a well-designed crucial experiment tests a physical or chemical hypothesis, so in logic and philosophy a well-designed conceptual puzzle may be the *experimentum crucis* of a speculation.

To us, in 1970, this heuristic policy is obviously right. The most modest discussion note in one of our philosophical journals presupposes that philosophical progress requires positive and planned operations of sifting the tares from the wheat of doctrines and of arguments. Criticism is now not hostility; self-criticism is now not surrender. But we should, I suggest, search eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy in vain, cases of a philosopher actively hunting for and designing conceptual hurdles to advance his own future progress.

In his *Principles of Mathematics*, chapter X, entitled 'The Contradiction', and in its second Appendix, Russell had launched himself on what was to prove to be that most arduous of his theoretical undertakings which culminated many years later in his history-making Theory of Types. Already, in 1903, he was marshalling a battery of heterogeneous paradoxes against which he would test the desiderated solution of the special paradox of self-membered classes. Each of these auxiliary paradoxes, whether superficial or fundamental, was to serve as a testing device, with its own special edges, of the theory-to-be of self-reference.

Two precautionary words. By 'aporetic experimentation' I do not mean tentativeness, diffidence or even undogmatism. Russell meant some of his conceptual experiments to yield not 'perhapses' but definite results. Next, in using the notion of *experimentation*, I am not, of course, referring to physical tests; and I am not supposing that it is the mission of conceptual experiments – if anything has this mission – to engender inductive generalisations.

Unlike Wittgenstein, Russell was not focally, but only peripherally concerned to fix the places in human knowledge of logic and philosophy. When, as in *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, he did try to do this, he adopted too easily the idea that philosophy could and should be disciplined into a science among sciences. It was not, however, by this sort of promised assimilation of philosophy to science that he taught us a new kind of dialectical craftsmanship, but by the examples that he set of planned puzzle-utilisation. Like Moore, Russell constantly preached Analysis; but what, when pioneering, he practised included this far more penetrating, because self-testing, method of inquiry.

(3) At the end of the ninth chapter of *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) Russell wrote:

> The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being. The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life. The world of existence is fleeting, vague, without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan of arrangement, but it contains all thoughts and feelings, all the data of sense, and all physical objects, everything that can do either good or harm, everything that makes any difference to the value of life and the world. According to our temperaments, we shall prefer the contemplation of the one or the other. The one we do not prefer will probably seem to us a pale shadow of the one we prefer, and hardly worthy to be regarded as in any sense real. But the truth is that both have the same claim on our impartial attention, both are real, and both are important to the metaphysician. Indeed no sooner have we distinguished the two worlds than it becomes necessary to consider their relations.

Here Russell declares, what his writings show, that he himself knew and loved the views from the Alpine heights where there dwelled Plato, Leibniz and Frege, but also knew and loved the valleys that were tilled by Hume, Mill and James. Russell was that rare being, a philosopher whose heart was divided between transcendentalism and naturalism. His mind had been formed in his youth both by John Stuart Mill and by pure mathematics.

Indeed Russell got much of the impetus and nearly all of the turbulence of his thinking from his being homesick for the peaks while he was in the plains, and homesick for the plains when he was on the heights. However drastic, his reductionisms had some reluctances in them; however uncompromising, his Platonisms were a little undevout. Neither transcendent being nor mundane occurring felt to him either quite real, or gravely unreal. When in the mood he could think flippantly of either.

His ice-breaking and Ockhamising article 'On Denoting' came out only two years later than his ice-breaking, Platonising *Principles of Mathematics*; and in his *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) the second chapter 'Logic as the Essence of Philosophy', which is Fregean in inspiration, is immediately succeeded by two chapters entirely in the vein of the phenomenalism of John Stuart Mill. His paper of 1919 'On Propositions', which is very largely in the idioms of Watson, James and Hume, succeeds by only a year his lectures on Logical Atomism, where he is talking as if in the hearing of Meinong, Whitehead and the youthful Wittgenstein.

In his very early Platonising days he submitted in the *Principles of Mathematics*, section 427, a list of terms or objects that possess being, though they lack existence, namely, 'Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces . . . if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them'. Though he wrote this with complete seriousness, yet we can surely detect in his list an accent of sly shockingness, as if he could already guess what it would be like to season this overhospitable platter of being with a pinch of salt; and even what it would be like one day, though not yet, to investigate the credentials of the argument 'if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them'.

Conversely, however far he moved away from the Platonism of his youth, he never conceded to Mill's reductionism about the truths of mathematics anything more than the recognition that it really is one business of pure mathematics to be capable of being applied to what there is in the everyday world. In the Introduction to the 2nd edition (1937) of his *Principles of Mathematics* he rejects the formalism of Hilbert for, apparently, excluding applications of mathematics to the real world; he allows, with regrets, that mathematical truths, with those of formal logic, being 'formal' truths, cannot, as he had once thought, be construed as describing transcendent entities. He allows too, again with regrets, that there is something in some way 'linguistic' about these formal truths. But not for a moment does he concede to Mill that these truths are merely high-grade inductive generalisations about things that exist and happen down here. None the less he would quite soon be developing a theory of perception and, therewith, a theory of physical objects which does not do very much more than bring up to date the phenomenalism of Mill's *System of Logic*.

It is sometimes said that Russell merely oscillated, pendulum-like, between transcendentalism and naturalism, or between Platonism and empiricism. The truth, I suggest, is that, anyhow in his formative and creative years, we find him neither at rest in the valley nor at rest among the peaks, but mountaineering – trying to find a way from the valley back to the peaks, or a way from the peaks back to the valley. He had two homes. But where he toiled, and where he was alone, and where he was happy was on the mountainside.

(4) The last of the four determining impulses by which Russell directed the course of subsequent philosophy is this. Russell was not only a pioneer formal logician, but, like Aristotle and Frege, he was a logician-philosopher. He saw every advance in formal logic as, among other things, a potential source of new rigours in philosophy; and he saw every philosophical puzzle or tangle as a lock for which formal logic might already or might some day provide the key. It was due to him, as well as, in lesser degree, to Frege and Whitehead that some training in post-Aristotelian formal logic came fairly soon to be regarded as a *sine qua non* for the philosopher-to-be; and debates between philosophers on philosophical matters quickly began often merely to ape but sometimes to apply or employ the blackboard operations of the formal logician.

Naturally it was, at the start, the more dramatic innovations in Russellian logic that were adopted by philosophers. The new term–relation–term pattern of simple propositions was for a time expected to accomplish nearly all the philosophical tasks at which the sub-

ject–predicate pattern baulked. But even if not into this new pattern, still formalisation into some newly sponsored pattern or other was for a time expected to make short work of any surviving philosophical problems. But to say this is only to say that Russell, Whitehead and Frege made many philosophers enthusiasts for their new so-called Symbolic Logic – and enthusiasts are always impetuous. The remarkable thing is that these three – and Russell more than the other two – did fire this enthusiasm. Even outside the English-speaking world they fired it, partly through the mediation of Wittgenstein, as far away as Vienna; and without this mediation as far away as Poland.

Doubtless some of these zeals were ephemeral or factitious; doubtless, too, some of the Frege–Russell hopes for a monolithic Euclideanisation of mathematics were doomed to disappointment; and certainly we have long since forgotten the promise, if it was ever made, that philosophical problems would now receive their solutions by instant formalisation. None the less, philosophy in the English-speaking world has inherited from the *Principles of Mathematics* and *Principia Mathematica*, as well as from Frege's logical writings, not only a respect for rigour, but a discipline in rigour, the absence of which from what, with reservations, I label 'continental' philosophy still makes cross-Channel discussion unrewarding.

However, I do not wish merely to acknowledge the huge effects of, especially, Russell's logicising of philosophy. There was another massive legacy left by Russell, the logician-philosopher, which we can call the Theory of Types.

By 1903 Russell had found, and imparted to Frege, a contradiction in that notion of *class* which had been a central concept in the work of Cantor, as well as in Frege's and Russell's own definitions of *number*. With this contradiction the young Russell had associated a whole battery of partly similar antinomies, for all of which, it seemed, some general diagnosis and, hopefully, some general cure could be found. Either answer, 'Yes' or 'No', to the question 'Is "I am now lying," true?' seems to establish the other: 'Yes, if no; but no, if yes'. To the question 'Is the class of classes that are not members of themselves a member of itself?' the only answer again seems to be 'Yes, if no; but no, if yes'. Russell came, in the long-postponed end, to the conclusion that for a specifiable reason these questions are unanswerable by 'Yes' or by 'No'; they are improper questions. Epimenides's assertion was a pseudo-assertion; an assertion cannot be a comment upon itself; and a given class C can only be nonsensically spoken of as one of the items that belongs, or even does *not* belong as a member to C.

Besides the sentences that convey standard propositions that are true or else false, there are grammatically passable sentences which are neither true nor false, but nonsense. It was some, but only a very few, nonsense-excluding rules that Russell, in his Theory of Types, tried to formulate and justify.

It is of some historical interest that the Vienna Circle misappropriated Russell's notion of nonsense for its own special Augean purposes. But it is of huge historical importance that the whole *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* can be construed as a Procrustean essay in the theory of sense/nonsense. The *Philosophical Investigations* also is, in large measure, an inquiry into the rules of 'grammar' or 'logical syntax' of which patent or latent absurdities are in breach. In his lectures on Logical Atomism Russell showed how he had already been glad and proud to learn from the young Wittgenstein of 1912–3 some of the expansions, extensions and new applications of which his former Theory of Types had now become capable.

In these different, though doubtless internally connected ways, Russell taught us not to think his thoughts but how to move in our own philosophical thinking. In one way no one is now or will ever again be a Russellian; but in another way every one of us is now something of a Russellian. Perhaps we do not even read Russell very much; but in at least four radical ways what we say to philosophers and write for philosophers differs in intellectual method and intellectual temper from what we would have said and written in pre-Russell days and from what we would say and write today if we were – shall I say? – Puritanians.

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Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume, George W. Roberts, ed. New York: Humanities Press, 1979 London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 16–21

(14) W. I. Matson on BR's Ethics:

> ***Spinoza is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers. Intellectually, some others have surpassed him, but ethically he is supreme. As a natural consequence, he was considered, during his lifetime and for a century after his death, a man of appalling wickedness.*** (*A History of Western Philosophy*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1945: 569; a passage written with the fervour of fellow feeling, soon after the CCNY affair)

The first I heard of Bertrand Russell was in the 1930s when half a page, with portrait, was devoted to vituperating him in the Hearst Sunday paper. I can't remember the particular occasion; I think he was just being denounced on general principles as an enemy of the people, an atheist and immoralist. He was quoted as having described his outlook as like that of Lucretius – an opening which the author exploited in this way: 'All we know of Lucretius comes from Bishop Eusebius, who in his *Chronology* notes for the year 55 BC: "T. Lucretius Caro died. Having been driven mad by a love potion, in intervals of sanity he wrote some poems which were edited by Quintus Cicero." ' That's the kind of man Russell is (the furious scholar continued): an admirer of sexual psychopaths.

With youthful perversity I was led to find out more about Russell, and Lucretius too, whose poems, I discovered, were still extant in our public library. So I took up philosophy because William Randolph Hearst hated Bertrand Russell. There must be many of my generation who, whether or not as a result of these protreptic discourses, got their first enthusiasm for philosophy from some encounter with Russell's work. Not mathematics, philosophy; and not epistemology, ethics; for what first aroused our interests and passions were the same books and essays that shocked Hearst, those coolly sensible, humorous, and humane disquisitions on what kind of life is worth living for a human being.

Man has been called a rational animal, yet to look at the human condition rationally is often thought an inhuman thing to do. Most people cannot examine life; some, like Dr Johnson, can but do not want to; of the few who are willing and able, most, like Plato, Marx and Freud, throw away received opinions only to set up new orthodoxies often more constricting than the old, thus justifying Dr Johnson. It was the rare merit of Russell, as of Voltaire, to have looked at the way of the world with a gaze childlike in its directness yet deeply penetrating and to have asked of what he saw: Does this help or hinder a man in his effort to live a life worth living by a rational animal? If not, why do we have it, and could we not have something better?

Life does not get examined even by its appointed examiners unless some shock sets them off. With Russell it was the First World War. No wonder. He was not a pacifist, but he saw that there was not enough at stake on either side to justify the slaughter, and that a negotiated settlement, on almost any terms, would be better than its continuance. This empirical approach, whereby what it would be best to do is decided not in accordance with rigid and mechanical deduction from abstract principles, but by attention to the particular circumstances of the case at hand, is the rule from which he never deviated. In the seventeenth century he would have been called a trimmer; in the twentieth he was an act utilitarian.[1]

Like Aristotle's, Spinoza's and John Stuart Mill's, Russell's idea of the happiness that ought to be the aim of conduct is not titillation but the untrammelled development and exercise of innate powers: vitality. Vital activity manifests itself more as what we do on impulse than in accordance with plans and schemes, Russell believed. In his early ethico-political treatise *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, impulse, hymned as the very 'expression of life', generated some curiously sophisticated varieties, such as an impulse towards art and science, and even one 'to avoid the hostility of public opinion'. He recognised that not all impulses are splendid, nor all premeditated actions mean, and the tone of *HSEP* is more cautious. Nevertheless Russell always saw happiness as roughly measurable by the scope afforded to spontaneity, and the occupational malady of civilised life as the subordination of impulse to purpose that it necessarily imposed.

The means–end distinction has great importance in Russell's ethical thinking, defining the place of reason in conduct and clarifying the difference between purpose and impulse. Reason, we are told, is concerned only with 'the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends' (*HSEP*: 8), which are the bailiwick of the emotions. The picture is familiar. There are the things you want – the objects of your impulses and feelings, and there are the means you may adopt to get them, your planned actions. The latter are the domain of reason, the finding out of how things are and of the logical relations that may hold between statements. Whether such and such a course of action is likely to obtain what you want, is something on which reason may deliver a verdict. But whether you want it or not is simply a matter for feeling – you just *do*, or don't, have this emotional attitude towards the thing. It is not reasonable, nor unreasonable, to like or dislike anything for its own sake. 'There is no such thing as

an irrational aim except in the sense of one that is impossible of realization' (*HSEP*: 11). When we call something good or bad, we are not making a statement that is true or false, we are making an exclamation, expressing a wish, or commanding or suggesting.

Some philosophers in this century have been content with this emotive ethical theory descended from Hutcheson through Hume. Russell, however, was dissatisfied, at least part of the time, and strove through his life to work out a version that would not lead to the consequence, which he confessed to *feeling* was profoundly wrong, that reason has nothing to choose between the ends pursued by Adolf Hitler, on the one hand, and Dag Hammarskjöld, on the other. Much of his last and most important ethical work, *HSEP*, is concerned with the problem of avoiding having to say that no ethical judgment is liable to criticism on grounds of truth – that condemnation of Nero boils down to 'Nero? Oh fie!' (*HSEP*: 26).

His way out was to hold that although ethical judgments are based on feelings, still the feelings of mankind are sufficiently in agreement to allow for the possibility of ethical generalisations valid for all animals like us. He summed up his efforts in four 'propositions and definitions' which, he claimed, 'provide a coherent body of ethical propositions, which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science':

(1) Surveying the acts which arouse emotions of approval or disapproval, we find that, as a general rule, the acts which are approved of are those believed likely to have, on the balance, effects of certain kinds, while opposite effects are expected from acts that are disapproved of.
(2) Effects that lead to approval are defined as 'good', and those leading to disapproval as 'bad'.
(3) An act of which, on the available evidence, the effects are likely to be better than those of any other act that is possible in the circumstances, is defined as 'right'; any other act is 'wrong'. What we 'ought' to do is, by definition, the act which is right.
(4) It is right to feel approval of a right act and disapproval of a wrong act. (*HSEP*: 115 ff.)

If ethics is to be founded on 'the fundamental data of feelings and emotions' (*HSEP*: 25), this is a more plausible version than some others. It does not base goodness and badness directly on the feelings that we allegedly report when we assign the words 'good' and 'bad' to things. Rather Russell says that we have 'emotions of approval' (whatever those might be) for reasons that boil down to beliefs about the likely consequences of the acts approved. If the Aztec approves of human sacrifice and cannibalism, that is because he believes them important for securing a bumper crop of maize. We may disagree with his belief, but we do not disagree with his contention that a bumper maize crop is a good thing – or at any rate that feeding the surviving people is good. The relevant agreement would still exist even if we happen not to desire the continued supply of maize to Aztecs. For what the Aztec thinks is a good thing is enough maize for his group: we likewise value food for *our* herd. This is not a logical truth – the Aztec, or we, could desire the starvation of our respective groups without violating any logical laws – but Russell thinks it unlikely, in fact, that we would. He is saying that, as a general rule, human beings disagree only about means, not about ends. And disagreement about means is not really moral disagreement, for the question whether a certain act is likely to have a certain effect is a factual one, resolvable in principle by scientific methods. We could grow maize with and without the assistance of human sacrifice, and by statistical analysis of the yields conclude whether the means proposed was, in fact, efficacious.

Again the means–ends distinction is made to bear the whole philosophical load. This is a heavy burden. Except for the acts of God, everything we have to contend with is the effect of a human action, and anything at all may be approved or disapproved. So you may approve, and I disapprove, the same act, just because we both believe (correctly, let us assume) that it is likely to have the effect of diminishing the population of *X*'s. As this kind of disagreement is frequent, this kind of effect cannot be what Russell has in mind as falling within the scope of the generalisation (1), which affirms general agreement of the 'emotional' reactions to agreed facts. And the reason is easy to see. Disagreement at this level doesn't count, for we have not yet reached the realm of ends. Why do you approve of diminishing the population of *X*'s, while I disapprove? Because you think that something ultimately desirable, let us say the ecological balance, will thereby be furthered. But perhaps I agree with this estimation of the facts, and still disapprove: perhaps because I think it's better to upset the ecology, which within broad limits can take care of itself, rather than cause widespread and acute suffering here and now. So we have to go on to a still higher plateau, where you want the ecology let alone in order to produce a better world (or at any rate not a worse one), and I likewise want a better, or non-worse, world. Here we agree, but it is a sterile kind of agreement. What, indeed, would it be like to wish for a worse world – worse for everyone and everything, and for oneself as well? We have reached the end, to find there only a tautology. Thus, it was not quite right of Russell to claim that the ethical propositions advocated were 'true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science', at least not if one holds, as Russell did, that the most general propositions of science are non-tautological.

One should not make too much of objections like these to the four-proposition ethics, however. For that was not really the ethical system that Russell advocated, even though he sincerely believed he did.

Russell thought along these lines: Ethics ought to be objective. Objectivity means being scientific. Being scientific means generalising by induction from particular data. Now, the data of ethics are not the sense-data out of which science is constructed; but they are another species of the genus consciousness, namely, feelings or emotions. Ethical propositions, therefore, are generalisations from those feelings in which mankind agree, as science is generalisations from the percepts that command agreement.

We need not here consider whether this is a satisfactory conception of the structure of science, for the analogy with ethics does not hold. An 'objective' system based on feelings as data would be, as we have seen, either false or trivial. And even if it were neither, it would still not be ethics, but rather a compendious statement of what people feel – sociology or psychology, without normative import, despite the 'definitions' in the second and third propositions. This is not to say that you can't derive 'ought' from 'is' – but you can't do it this way. You might just as well come right out and say something like

What ought to be approved is what enhances vitality.

If you are an optimist, you may also say

What is approved = What ought to be approved.

Russell certainly believed the first of these. Equally certainly he did not believe the second. But there is also the Kantian element: Russell wrote of 'that respect for the human being as such, out of which all true morality must spring' (*Marriage and Morals*, New York, 1929: 153), and however little formal attention this non-utilitarian principle got, it is never far beneath the surface in all his particular disquisitions.

Thus, Russell's real ethics was at least in part Aristotelian-cum-Kantian – somewhat ironically in view of the rough treatment he gave those philosophers in his *History* and elsewhere. That this was his real 'system' can be seen, for example, in his consistent and emphatic opposition to Marxism, an opposition for which the four-proposition ethic provides no grounds; on the contrary, the two almost conflate themselves. Russell detested Marxism because it is a philosophy stemming from and perpetuating hatred,[2] manipulating human beings and suppressing their spontaneity and individuality more thoroughly than any other.

No one in his century had a mind freer of cant than Russell's. Such freedom had its price, as he often found to his rue. He could not solace himself among the intellectual herd when buffeted by Hearst & Co. If Russell had lived only to the age recommended by the Psalmist, he would have died in poverty, far from home and virtually friendless. Happily, he survived to attain high honours and moderate wealth. But he would not have been pleased to see, as I did, his portrait stuck on the wall in the place of honour between Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara in a den of student revolutionaries. It is a nice question whether it is better to be praised for the wrong reasons than not to be praised at all. But an undoctrinaire apostle of common sense seldom has another choice.

Department of Philosophy
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NOTES

1 An act of which, on the available evidence, the effects are likely to be better than those of any other act that is possible in the circumstances, is defined as 'right' (*Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (*HSEP*), London, George Allen & Unwin, 1954: 116). This is vastly different from rule utilitarianism, *alias* the domino theory, which got us into the Vietnam War.

2 Even more perhaps from envy, an emotion whose importance in human affairs Russell aristocratically underestimated.

Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume (as above), pp. 422-427

BR'S INFLUENCE

(15) Abbie Hoffman, in an interview in the Tucson Weekly News (12/10/80):

Q:Do you see people returning to an organization like SANE?

A: Yes, I would think an organization like SANE, Ban the Bomb, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, I think that's going to happen. Nuclear weapons are going to become big issues.
The Sixties began for me really with those movements, triggered by Bertrand Russell in Trafalgar Square — Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament — CND. We saw the image of fifty to a hundred thousand people and him with his lion mane up there on a platform, and people would sit down and they wouldn't let traffic come through. They blocked off Trafalgar Square with 100,000 people. And those images filtered across this country. And that was very early. Against the testing of nuclear weapons.

(Thank you, ALEX DELY)

BRS PROJECTS

(16) "Russell on Ethics" is the title of a short paper by PHIL STANDER, written in response to our request (RSN28-10). It's the first of a series of short papers that present BR's views on a variety of subjects. How about offering
* to write one? See RSN28-10 for suggested topics. Here is "Russell on Ethics":

"All human activity is prompted by desire or impulse." On this point Russell is emphatic. "If you wish to know what men will do, you must know not only, or principally, their material circumstances but rather the whole system of their desires with their relative strengths."(1)

Russell states his own desires:"...three passions, simple and overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind."(2) In all that Russell writes, there is the implicit or explicit view that, although both love and knowledge are the two main requisites for right action, love is more fundamental. This is so, Russell tells us, because it will lead men to seek knowledge in order to find out how to benefit those they love.(3)

Russell considers the general happiness of man a legitimate ethical end or aim. Contempt for happiness is easier when the happiness is other people's. History demonstrates that the men who did most to promote happiness were those who thought happiness important, not those who despised it in favor of something more "sublime".(4) Only a philosophy based on love, empathy and compassion can serve man, can produce stable improvements in human affairs, and can avoid the nightmare of war.

The fundamental data of ethics, for Russell, are feelings and emotions. Ethics differs from science, for an ethical judgment does not state a fact. "It states, though often in a disguised form, some hope or fear, some desire or aversion, some love or hate. The Bible says,'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' and a modern man, oppressed with the spectacle of international discord, may say,'Would that all men loved one another'; these are pure ethical sentences which clearly cannot be proved or disproved merely by amassing facts."(5)

Since, in Russell's view, actions are determined by subjective desires, how is it possible to say that some actions are ethically superior to others? Russell finds it possible by examining desires.

Russell calls a number of desires "compossible" (a term borrowed from Leibniz) when all can be satisfied by the same state of affairs. When desires are not compossible, they are "incompatible". When a nation is at war, the desires of all its citizens for victory are mutually compossible, but incompatible with the opposite desires of the enemy.Obviously there can be a greater total satisfaction of desire when desires are compossible than when they are incompatible. Therfore, according to Russell's definition of the good:

> ...compossible desires are preferable as means.It follows that love is preferable to hate, cooperation to competition, peace to war, and so on.(Of course there are exceptions: I am only stating what is likely to be true in most cases.) This leads to an ethic by which desires may be distinguishes as right or wrong, or,speaking loosely, as good or bad. Right desires will be those that are capable of being compossible with as many other desires as possible; wrong desires will be those that can only be satisfied by thwarting other desires.(6)

From this ethic of general happiness, or the common good, one can infer an indefinite number of ethical maxims. In addition to the test of compossiblity, there is a simple rule by which all ethical maxims are to be tested:"No ethical maxim must contain a proper name," meaning "any designation of a particular part of spacetime" — not only the names of individuals but also of regions, countries, and historical periods. Russell is suggesting something more active than a cold intellectual assent, something in the nature of real desire, "something which has its roots in sympathetic imagination. It is from feelings of this generalized sort that most social progress has sprung and must still spring."(7)

"If your hopes, wishes, desires and plans are confined to yourself, or your family, or your nation, or the adherents of your creed, you will find that all your affections are paralled by dislikes and hostile sentiments. From such a duality in men's feelings spring almost all the major evils in human life — cruelties, oppressions, persecutions, and wars. If our world is to escape the disasters which threaten it, men must learn to be less circumscribed in their sympathies."(8)

Given this emotive basis of programs of action, i.e., the principle of universal love or reverence for life, and its manifestation in the generalized sort of sympathetic imagination he calls "abstract sympathy", Russell proceeded to design programs of reform which would insure the future of man. World government and world-wide democracy as the organizational panaceas and a tolerant population characterized by a sense of the unity of the world and the family of man constitute the general aims of Russell's programs of reform.

1.Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics, New York: Mentor Books, 1952,p.132
2.Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell(1872-1914),Boston:Little Brown, 1966,p.3
3.Russell, Education and the Good Life, New York: Liveright, 1926,p. 187
4.Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New York:Simon & Schuster,1945, pp.644-5
5.Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p.19
6.Ibid. p.47
7.Russell, "A Philosophy for Our Time," in Portraits From Memory and Other Essays,New York:S&S,1951,p.182
8.Ibid.

PHILOSOPHY

(17) 'ANALYSTS' WIN BATTLE IN WAR OF PHILOSOPHY,says the heading on this story in The New York Times (1/6/81),p.C1:

By EDWARD B. FISKE

BOSTON

As in Athens, so in America: Philosophers disagree, sometimes with passion. Last week, in a battle fought with virtually every traditional academic weapon short of hemlock, proponents of "analytic" philosophy reasserted their control of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.

At the division's annual meeting here, the analysts soundly defeated candidates of a coalition of "pluralists" who charge that they have been unfairly excluded from positions of leadership.

The debate, marked by personal acrimony as well as philosophical differences, dramatized the political nature of the world's oldest academic profession. "All academic fields have factions and personality conficts," said John J. McDermott, a pluralist from Texas A and M. "In philosophy the issue seems to be whether some of us are actually in the profession."

Since World War II, the "analytic" approach to philosophy has been dominant in American universities. Primarily a product of such 20th-century thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, it seeks to clarify traditional problems of philosophy through logic and by careful analysis of language and concepts. "Philosophy is a continuation at a more abstract or inclusive level of the natural sciences," said Willard Quine of Harvard University, one of the greatest of contemporary American analytic philosophers.

The opposing term, "pluralist," describes not a single approach but a variety of nonanalytical schools, including phenomenology, existentialism, metaphysics and the American "pragmatism" that grew from the thought of John Dewey and William James. Unlike the analysts, they see philosophy as a way of describing the world rather than analyzing thoughts, and they see themselves as heirs to the philosophers and issues of the past.

In discussing the ethics of abortion, for example, an analytical philosopher might begin by analyzing terms such as "non-voluntary," while a representative of one of the pluralist schools might start by describing a situation in which an abortion took place.

Pluralists charge that analysts' fascination with logic and highly technical arguments — coupled with their acknowledged indifference to the history of philosophy — is driving undergraduate students away from philosophy courses. "In schools like Vanderbilt and Stony Brook, where pluralists are represented on the faculties, you get as much as 15 percent of students enrolled in philosophy courses at any given time," said Donald Idhe, a professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. "At places like Maryland or Pittsburgh, where the analysts are dominant, you get only about five percent."

Continued on Page C4

Continued From Page C1

The struggle between the two factions broke out at last year's convention of the Eastern Division, when the "Committee on Pluralism" successfully challenged the "official" slate of officers. The dissidents managed to elect John E. Smith of Yale as vice president and captured the other two available elective seats on the 10-member executive committee. Professor Smith now moves up to the presidency of the 3000-member division.

At last week's convention, the analysts fought back. A letter was circulated over the signatures of nine past presidents charging that the Committee on Pluralism "seeks to obtain through political means a position of influence which its members have not been able to obtain through their philosophical work."

The counterstrike succeeded. When the votes were counted, Adolf Grunbaum of the University of Pittsburgh, an analytic philosopher who had lost the election last year, won the vice-presidency over William Barrett, the New York University professor who was the pluralist entry. The pluralist candidates for the executive committee, John Lachs of Vanderbilt University and Sandra Rosenthal of Loyola in New Orleans, were also defeated.

The rhetoric of the political debate left little doubt that the participants were professional philosophers. At a rally organized by pluralists on the eve of the election Bruce Wilshire of Rutgers University said that he looked forward to a day when "the various groups and parts of it will define themselves as parts of the whole, not parts which are the whole."

Privately, the two sides frequently engaged in personal attacks. A Yale analyst described one pluralist colleague as "a joke" and another as "not a serious contributor to philosophical literature." Professor Lachs riposted for the pluralists: "How about those who have the political power without philosophical distinction?"

Underlying the conflict are some fundamental nonintellectual tensions within philosophy. As in other fields, there has been a dispersion of talent beyond such traditional bastions of influence as Harvard, Princeton, Michigan and, more recently, Pittsburgh: and departments at universities such as Vanderbilt, Kansas and Arizona have become increasingly visible.

The pluralists, most of whom come from such newer institutions, claim that the structure of the A.P.A. does not reflect this "democratization." "It's a revolt of the provinces against the Northeast," said Mr. Lachs.

The pluralists also claim that analysts conspire to keep nonanalytic philosophy out of the influential journals and that they do not regard the pluralist approaches as serious philosophy. It would be most unusual, for example, for a student at Harvard to do a dissertation on Dewey or James.

Analysts readily concede that they are not particularly familiar with the opposition. Professor Quine, asked whether individual pluralists might be exceptions to the generalizations in the letter he signed, replied, "I suppose so, but I don't know their work."

A variously attributed saying in higher education is that academic politics are so bitter because "so little is at stake." At the convention this became a serious issue.

Pluralists argued that, by controlling the association, the analysts are in a position to advise foundations and the National Endowment for the Humanities where to distribute their grants, suggest experts to evaluate departments, determine who presents and publishes scholarly papers and influence who gets jobs and who does not.

The analysts, however, deny that such power flows from the organization. "Philosophers do philosophy, not associations," said Ruth Marcus of Yale. "I can't think of a single occasion where the A.P.A. was called upon to compose a council or make a grant for someone."

The Eastern division voted last week to elect future officers by mail ballot. Pluralists said this procedure would give a voice to philosophers from smaller institutions who cannot afford to come to the meetings. One analyst disputed this conclusion, however, saying "they will still vote for the people they read."

Professor McDermott, formerly a professor at Queens College in New York City, noted that there is not a single major philosophy department in this country devoted to American pragmatism. He called it "rather ironic" that he travels from Austin to Cambridge to complete a new edition of the works of William James, shunned by the analysts at Harvard.

Asked whether he agreed that this was indeed ironic, Professor Quine look somewhat quizzical and said, "I don't believe I know McDermott."

The New York Times/ Edward B. Fiske

Ruth Marcus and William Barrett

(18) "Russell's Cryptic Reply to Strawson" — an article by James W. Austin in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research" (June 1979) — concludes with a paragraph that "ought to ignite the interest of Russell scholars," says DAVID PAUL MAKINSTER.

The paragraph refers to Russell's article,"Mr. Strawson on Referring," in "Mind" (July 1957). Here is the paragraph:

> Most read his article as the incomprehensible ramblings of an old warrior no longer able to rationally defend his theory from its detractors. While his thoughts are admittedly skeletal and recondite, they are neither ultimately incomprehensible nor the ravings of senility. Moreover, they are right.

David continues:"This article, together with a companion piece by the same author (DENOTING PHRASES AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS, "Southern Journal of Philsophy", Vl. XIV,#4), constitutes an original and sympathetic illumination of Russell's contributions to the theory of reference — contributions too often given short shrift by contemporary linguistic philosophers."

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

(19) Medvedev's nuclear disaster on "60 Minutes" Nuclear Disaster in the Urals — a 1979 book, which is an expansion of a 1976 magazine article, by Zhores A. Medvedev — is a piece of scientific detective work that points to a nuclear disaster in Russia in 1956 (RSN23-14). This was at first disputed (RSN24-6) and later accepted as probably correct (RSN26-18).

Medvedev's nuclear disaster finally got the national attention it deserves when it was discussed on CBS's "60 Minutes", on November 9, 1980. The point — especially for the USA, where we may or may not go ahead with nuclear power plants — is that nuclear accidents can contaminate large areas, and have.

(20) END — the European Nuclear Disarmament Campaign launched by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation — has been endorsed by "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists." The Bulletin carried the Foundation's "Statement on a Nuclear Free Zone" in its December '80 issue. To refresh yourself on the text of the Statement, see RSN26-36.

(Thank you, BOB DAVIS.)

For book reviews of Nuclear Nightmares, see (34).

RELIGION

(21) Creationism, continued. From "People"(12/8/80):

THE SCOPES TRIAL SETTLED THE ISSUE OF EVOLUTION, RIGHT? WRONG: DARWIN IS ON THE RUN AGAIN, CLAIMS AN EXPERT

Stephen Jay Gould admits that if nature had endowed him somewhat differently, "I would have been happy playing center field for the Yankees or singing Wotan in Wagner's Ring *cycle at the Met." As it turned out, he's done all right. Raised in Manhattan, a court stenographer's son, Gould graduated from Antioch College and received his Ph.D. in paleontology from Columbia in 1967. That same year he joined the Harvard faculty and is now a tenured professor of geology. A gifted writer, Gould produces a monthly column on evolution for* Natural History *magazine. Called "This View of Life," it won the 1980 National Magazine Award for Essays and Criticism. Thanks to "a lucky bit of physiology," the 39-year-old professor can work past midnight seven days a week, sleep for only six hours and awake totally refreshed. Under this regimen, he has written* Ontogeny and Phylogeny, *a 1977 scholarly study of the theory of evolutionary stages, and two volumes of collected essays,* Ever Since Darwin *(1977) and his recently published* The Panda's Thumb *(W.W. Norton, $12.95). Gould lives in Cambridge, Mass. with his wife, Deborah Ann, and sons Ethan, 7, and Jesse, 11. There he discussed the facts and fantasies of man's origins with Eric Levin of* PEOPLE.

Is evolution really a controversial idea anymore?

In the last five years there's been a tremendous resurgence by creationists, or fundamentalist Christians, who deny evolution and hold to the Bible as literal truth. Instead of hoping to discredit evolution entirely, as they did with the Scopes Trial in the '20s, they're willing to settle for a so-called dual model, the teaching of evolution and creation side by side. During the campaign President-elect Reagan made a statement supporting the dual model. This is becoming one of the most pressing political issues today.

Is the dual model catching on?

The creationists are getting even more than they asked for from local school boards. Instead of adopting the dual model, the boards sometimes just kick evolution out. Cowardly textbook publishers have been quietly excising evolution too.

Are religion and science reconcilable?

Certainly. Science can't answer the ultimate questions of where it all came from. Either matter was here all the time, or something that created matter was here all the time. Either way, some notion of eternity is inescapable.

"Calling an Edsel a dinosaur is unfair to dinosaurs," says Gould. Diplodocus (left), like his brethren, was really an efficient creature.



Mickey Mouse's evolution toward a more youthful appearance, Gould argues, resembles a process in humans called neoteny.

I don't think the facts of nature necessarily prove the existence of an ordering agent—which is what a lot of people mean by God—but that's an issue science doesn't get into. Science does not threaten anyone's faith. What galls me is that the creationists selectively distort the work of scientists and prey on the public's misconception about what the word "theory" means.

How?

In the American vernacular, a fact is something well established, while a theory is more dubious and a hypothesis is just a guess. The creationists say ignore evolution because it's only a theory. That isn't the way scientists use the words at all. Facts are the data of the world; theories are ideas that help us interpret and explain facts. The *fact* of evolution is as certain as the *fact* of gravity. You can debate endlessly, as physicists still do, whether Newton's or Einstein's theory of gravitation is better, but apples still fall. Likewise, scientists debate whether Darwin's theory of evolution or somebody else's is better; but people still evolved from ape-like ancestors. The debate indicates not that evolution is in trouble, as the creationists would have you believe, but that biology is alive and well. In fact, it's a marvelously joyous and fruitful debate.

What has the debate focused on?

Mainly, the Darwinian hard line of the last 40 years. It states that small genetic variations occur at random in local populations of a given species. Gradually, over vast spans of time, natural selection preserves those variations that help the organism better adapt to its environment and eliminates other variations that do not. The hard line says, although Darwin himself never took this hard a line, that *any* major change must be seen as an adaptation produced by natural selection, or survival of the fittest.

For example?

One classic case of natural selection is the peppered moth. The species around Manchester, England became black over 50 years or so after the Industrial Revolution. It was an adaptive response to trees darkened by soot from local factories. Camouflaged against the sooty bark, they survived. The light-colored moths, easily spotted by hungry birds, were eaten and died out.

How is the Darwinian hard line being challenged?

We've seen that a lot more genetic variation occurs than we thought. It's been found that individual genes may exist in as many as 20 different chemical states, each state being a kind of mutation. Some mutations don't change the behavior or form of the organism, so they don't affect the organism's ability to survive. Thus evolution may be less survival-oriented and more random than we thought.

What other myths about evolution are being exploded?

Darwin argued that change is always slow and gradual, but we now see otherwise. Today, for instance, 5,000 to 10,000 years is often cited as the average time required for the production of a new species—for example, for polar bears to arise from their immediate ancestors, the brown bears. Darwin would not have denied that species *could* develop that quickly, but he would have said that in general a lot more time is necessary.

Ten thousand years is "quick"?

Absolutely. You have to consider that most species survive an average of five to 10 million years. If they arise in 5,000 to 10,000 years, that is about one-tenth of a percent of their entire existence. On a geological time scale, that is instantaneous.

How could Darwin have missed this?

Today we know a lot more about the actual mechanics of how species arise than Darwin did. Also, Darwin was very much a 19th-century man who shared the cultural bias of his day that slow, steady progress was the way of the world. The historical cataclysms of the 20th century have discredited that notion. Perhaps the most subtle point is that we are no longer making excuses for the fossil record, as Darwin and his immediate successors did.

What do you mean?

The fossil record—the record of the past as documented by fossils—has never indicated slow, gradual change between species. It has shown species arising suddenly. For years scientists explained that away by claiming the record was spotty. We can't say that anymore. Millions more fossils have been found since Darwin's time.

Doesn't the fossil record show any intermediate evolutionary forms?

Very rarely for lower-level species. But for enormous transformations like the rise of mammals from reptiles —which took tens of millions of years —there are numerous steps. For instance, two small bones of our middle ear called the hammer and anvil were originally components of the reptilian lower jaw. We can very distinctly trace their slow movement to the back of the jaw and then into the head, decreasing in size and increasing in sensitivity to sound as they went.

So evolution builds new parts with materials already on hand?

Exactly. As the French biologist François Jacob once said, nature is an excellent tinkerer. A wonderful example is found in pandas, which is where I got the title of my book. They spend their days eating bamboo, stripping off the leaves by running the stalk between the pad of their paw and what seems to be an opposable thumb. Actually it is not a thumb but a greatly enlarged wrist bone. It's a somewhat clumsy solution, but just such odd arrangements prove that evolution is a real process, full of imperfections.

Did such imperfections cause the dinosaurs' extinction?

No, extinction is a natural part of life. Dinosaurs, in fact, were one of the most successful animal groups ever. They ruled the world for 100 million years. Humans beings have only been around 200,000 years as a species and five million years as a lineage distinct from apes. Dinosaurs have really gotten a bum rap. The old view was that they were slow, clumsy brutes, inefficient and very dumb. Recent anatomical reconstructions show that dinosaurs were perfectly efficient, adequate creatures whose brains were the right size for reptiles of their dimensions. They were finished off eventually by climatic change, biological competition and possibly the impact of an immense asteroid 65 million years ago.

If extinction is a natural part of life, then how long do we human beings have?

That's not answerable because we've altered the earth so much it just isn't a biological question anymore. Our destiny is in our own hands. I seriously doubt, however, that we or any species now existing will still be here in five billion years, when the sun blows up and the earth comes to an end.

Why do you cite Mickey Mouse as an example of evolution?

A long time ago I noticed that Mickey Mouse's appearance had changed considerably since his invention in 1928. He started as a nasty, rambunctious creature, but as he became a national symbol Disney made him more lovable. Mickey's nose got thicker and shorter, his eyes bigger, his limbs softer and puffier and his ears moved back. All this made him appear more cuddly and juvenile. The Disney artists intuitively understood what changes would make Mickey cuter; I don't think they realized the biology behind it.

What is the biological significance?

Human evolution follows a process called neoteny—the retention of youthful features. We, meaning mankind, grow more slowly and mature sexually much later than other primates. We retain certain features in adulthood—lack of body hair, small nose, small teeth, large eyes—that are part of the juvenile stages of other primates. This has been extremely important to us in at least two ways. One is that our large brain is partially the result of brain growth continuing into early life. In most animals, the body keeps growing but the brain stops. Perhaps more important, we remain flexible in our behavior. As adults we can play and learn the way other primates can do only in infancy. We are, in a literal sense, grown-up children. So Mickey's evolution mirrors our own. □

(22) Vatican Opens Study on Clearing Galileo says a headline in the Los Angeles Times (10/24/80). Here are excerpts:

On instructions of Pope John Paul II, the Vatican has undertaken a new study of Galileo Galilei with the apparent objective of reversing the 347-year-old finding of heresy brought against him by the Holy Office.

...In 1611 he was convicted of heresy for arguing that the sun is at the center of the universe, and he was found "at least erroneous" for arguing that the Earth was not at the center of the universe but in fact was in motion.

No formal action was taken against Galileo at that time because he agreed to abandon the censured views and not to communicate them to others.

In 1633 at the age of 69, he was again brought to trial on grounds of his new findings again supporting the theories of Nicolaus Copernicus, the 16th Century Polish astronomer who said the planets revolve around the sun.

The court concluded that he was "vehemently suspected of heresy" and he was forced to kneel and forswear the scientific findings and then face life imprisonment. House arrest in Florence was substituted for the prison term.

J. Bronowski tells the story of Galileo's trials and triumphs in The Ascent of Man, Boston: Little Brown, 1971, pp.198-218.

(Thank you, JOHN HARPER, JR.)

BR devotes 8 pages of The Scientific Outlook (New York: Norton, 1931) pp.24-32, to excerpts from the sentence passed on Galileo in 1633. Here is how it starts:

Whereas you, Galileo, son of the late Vicenzio Galileo, of Florence, aged 70, were denounced in 1615 for holding as true a false doctrine taught by many, namely, that the sun is immovable in the center of the world...

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

(23) Adam Paul Banner has good reason, we think, to feel pleased. Here's why, as reported in the Midland Daily News:

Banner's petition answered

By DONNA SANKS
Daily News staff writer

If you buy a wood stove next winter and are surprised at the amount of information in the accompanying literature about how to install and maintain it, you can thank Adam Paul Banner.

Banner, [redacted], decided in 1977 that consumers needed to know more about the coal and wood burning appliances that, when improperly used, were burning their houses down.

He petitioned the Consumers Product Safety Commission to require manufacturers to put safety information on coal and wood-fired appliances and in literature about them.

Starting in May, manufacturers will be required to do just that.

The commission's new rules, issued almost four years after Banner initiated the action, requires product makers to provide information on the appropriate clearances between the stove and chimney connector and combustibles to avoid fire, type of chimney and floor protection to be used, how to prevent over-firing, inspection and cleaning information and the name and address of the manufacturer.

Banner said he decided to petition the product safety commission while working for a local building supply company which sold coal and wood burning stoves.

"I detected a tremendous lack of education on the part of consumers about how to use and maintain them," he said. Much of the information required by the commission will have to be permanently attached to the burners so when they change hands, the new owner will be aware of safety precautions.

Banner's petition contained fire data from New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan about the number of fires and deaths caused as a result of improper use of coal and wood-fired heaters.

According to the product safety commission about 14,000 fires and 115 deaths are estimated to have occurred in 1978 from the use of wood or coal stoves. The major causes of fires was improper installation, placing the devices too close to combustibles which are ignited from the heat of the stove, the commission report said.

Banner said he doesn't expect the new regulations to cut down dramatically on the number of house fires or deaths resulting from improper use of the stoves. "There is the possibility that people will tend to become more aware of what the problems are," he said.

"You don't change people. You contribute in small quiet ways. Maybe you may save one or two lives. What does it matter. Even if you save one, it's worth it," Banner said.

The Midland resident said he is interested in energy and the environment and regularly reads the federal register, where new regulations must be printed before going into effect.

Adam Paul Banner
"This is just another step in consumer education," he said.

(24) Len Cleavelin writes: "I'm still in Chicago, contending with the winter (mildly unpleasant), with the law(ditto), and with lawyers (dreadful). If that weren't bad enough, there's the small matter of the presidential election. As Clarence Darrow said, 'I was told, as a child, that anyone could become President. I'm beginning to believe it.'"

(25) Peter Cranford, author, has a publication date for his new book: April 15. We don't yet know its title or cost.

(26) Don Jackanicz is working on a paper on BR and the House of Lords, which he intends to present at our '81 meeting. * He would appreciate hearing from anyone who has relevant information. (3802 N. Kenneth Avenue, Chicago, IL 60641)

(27) Joe Neilands, first Chairman of the Science Committee and Professor of Biochemistry at UCBerkeley reports:

The film, "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell", was shown to an audience about about 30 here in the Biochemistry Department on December 19. It was my Xmas present to the Department. For a fee of $50 to the copyright holder, we obtained permission to make a video tape of this very fine film. It is now available in our library, where students may view it at their leisure.

(28a) Conrad Russell's book, Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629 (Oxford University Press, 453 pp.), was reviewed in "The New York Review of Books" (12/18/80, pp.58-61). The reviewer, J. H. Hexter, Director of the Yale Center for Parliamentary History, says: "Russell's main views diverge sharply from those of every specialist for the past century, and if he is right, then the interpretations of other historians of the years between 1560 and 1660 are surely askew." (Thank you, BOB DAVIS.)

(28b) The program of the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association lists Conrad Russell, Yale University, as presenting a paper, "Causes of the English Civil War." (Thank you, DON JACKANICZ)

PHOTOS

(29)

Top row, 1 to r: •Paul Arthur Schilpp receiving the Bertrand Russell Society Award plaque from BRS Secretary Don Jackanicz (Chicago, June 29, 1980) •Professor Schilpp reminiscing about BR after receiving the Award • Lord Brockway speaking at the unveiling (London, October 24, 1980) •Peter Cadogan speaking •Professor Sir Alfred Ayer speaking 2nd row:Counsellor Ron Hefferman, Mayor of Borough of Camden, speaking • BRS President Bob Davis speaking •The bust of BR by Marcelle Quinton, not yet unveiled •Dora Russell, after the unveiling, in front of Conway Hall. She made it all happen. Bottom left:The crowd at the unveiling.

Rather than reproduce a very poor picture of the bust, unveiled, we intend to get a good picture of it by next issue. A dark outline of the bust appears in the picture of Lord Brockway, above.

(Thank you, DON JACKANICZ)

NEW MEMBERS

(30) We welcome these new members:

ALFRED BERGER/Box 1004/Thiells,NY 10984
BARBARA BUSCA/18,Ch. François-Lehmann/1218 GRAND SACCONEX/Geneva, Switzerland
GARY R. CHINN/290 E. 49th/Eugene, OR 97405
LORNE ELLASCHUK/42 Dekay St./Kitchener, Ont./Canada N2H 3T2
MARK E. FARLEY/PO Box 9086,NT Station/Denton, TX 76203

FRANK GALLO/6727 Poplar Avenue/Takoma Park, MD 20012
EARL N. GEORGE/307 Montgomery St./Brooklyn, NY 11225
MARGUERITE GIESELER-NEWMAN/1540 Joshua Place/Camarillo, CA 93010
CHARLES HELLER/11 Fort George Hill/New York,NY 10040
AMY L. HOCK/Box 30 MHA/Ferdinand, IN 47532 (but see address change below)

DOUGLAS IRONSIDE/Box 3113/Bellingham, WA 98272
REV. FREDERICK E. KIDDER/St. Stephen's Episcopal Church/Elemi 103 (Alt. Santa Maria)/Guaynabo,PR 00657
DAVID KOZACZEWSKI/108½ S. Maple/Sturgis, MI 49091
PROF. ROBERT P. LARKIN/6565 Snowbird Drive/Colorado Springs,CO 80918
FRANK B. MYERS,JR./Rt. 5, Box 142/Washington, NC 27889

DICK NELSON/7417 Alto Caro Drive/Dallas, TX 75248
DALE PARAYESKI/PO Box 1069/Hamilton, Ont./Canada L8N 3G6
MARIA FRANCESCA SCHIERA/144 Chambers St./New York,NY 10007
JOHN S. SCHWENK/RD 2/Garrison, NY 10524
MIKE WILLIAMS/UVM Married Students Housing #53/Winooski,VT 05404

ELLEN M. YOUNG/Chapman College/Box 9461/Orange, CA 92666
KEITH W. YUNDT/Political Science Dept./Kent State University/Kent,OH 44242

ADDRESS & OTHER CHANGES

(31) New addresses or corrections. Corrections are underlined.

AMY P. BLOCK/1610 Hearst Avenue/Berkeley, CA 94703
PATRICK DEVANE/683 Cherokee/St. Paul,MN 55107
DAVID ETHRIDGE/Box 1321/Jackson, MS 39205
ALI GHAEMI/ Use this shorter version of his name.
JOHN HAILU/528 City Island Avenue/Bronx, NY 10464

BRUCE HEDGES/Synergy,664 San Juan St./Stanford, CA 94305
AMY L. HOCK/2016 Oakland/Portsmouth,OH 45662
DAVID MAKINSTER/858 Hawkeye Pk./Iowa City, IA 52240
WILLIAM MC KENZIE-GOODRICH,B.A.
STANLEY R. ORDO/8310 14th Avenue(102)/Hyattsville, MD 20783

GLENNA STONE/2109 Tech Drive/Levelland, TX 79336
DANIEL A. TITO II/PO Box 1183/Wilkes-Barre,PA 18703

RECOMMENDED READING

(32) "Gödel,Escher,Bach" by Douglas R. Hofstadter(New York: Vintage Books, 1979). "This is a book about mathematics and logic that you don't have to be a mathematician or logician to understand," says Lee Eisler. The book has been on the NYTimes best-seller list, to everyone's surprise. Here's part of what Gerald Jonas says, in "Behind The Best-Sellers" (New York Times Book Review,12/28/80,p.18):"The germ of the book was Mr. Hofstadter's conviction that something should be done about the average person's ignorance of one of the epochal discoveries of 20th Century mathematics, Gödel's Theorem. In a rough paraphrase, this theorem states that no formal system capable of rigorous distinctions between truth and falsehood can ever be both consistent and complete. Gödel is one of the spoilsports of modern science; along with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, Gödel's Theorem sets unpassable bounds to man's ability to know and control everything."

(33) "Cyril Burt, Psychologist" by L. S. Hearnshaw, Cornell University Press, 1979. "A study of a charlatan," says ADAM PAUL BANNER. By chance, we happened to see what "Discover" (February 1981) said about it. It will curl your hair.

Errant Knight

No question about it: **Sir Cyril Burt** was a cad. For several years, the British Psychological Society had hoped desperately that the reputation of its late president could be salvaged. Alas, the evidence was too persuasive.

Burt spent the major part of his career trying to prove that intelligence is genetically, not environmentally, determined, and that upper-class people have inherently higher I.Q.s. In his most famous study, Burt published what appeared to be convincing data on 53 pairs of identical twins who had been brought up separately from birth under starkly different social conditions, yet had precisely the same I.Q.s. His work was a key influence leading to Britain's 1944 Education Act, which set up a school system that effectively segregated children on the basis of their I.Q. scores. So respected was Burt that in 1946 he became the first psychologist in Britain to be knighted.

Five years after his death in 1971, he was branded a fraud by several American and British scientists and a London *Sunday Times* reporter. They claimed that Burt had fabricated both his statistics and the research assistants he cited in his papers. Other scientists rushed to verify those findings, and soon Sir Cyril was in posthumous disgrace.

For four years the British Psychological Society ignored the accusations. Meanwhile one of its most respected and cautious members, Professor Leslie Hearnshaw, embarked on his own study of the Burt affair. The society hoped that Hearnshaw would return with good news, but in the end he reported that Burt had indeed been "high-handed, devious, and corrupt."

Still, the debate rages. Just how devious was the inventive psychologist? His supporters insist that he began to fabricate data only in the latter half of his life, when disease, depression, and retirement nearly drove him mad. Detractors claim that Burt was "bent from his early years." They are trying to gather more damning evidence, but will probably have little luck; nearly all Burt's earliest research material was destroyed during a German air raid in the early 1940s.

BOOK REVIEWS

(34) "Nuclear Nightmares" is a book that thinks about the unthinkable and shows how it could happen. 2 reviews follow:

(34a) From The New York Times Book Review (11/3/80,p. 18):

NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES

An Investigation Into Possible Wars. By Nigel Calder. 168 pp. New York: The Viking Press. $10.95.

"If you listen carefully you can hear the cackle of chickens coming home to roost," writes Nigel Calder in this grim, ironic look at the ultimate evil of our time. We citizens of the nation that introduced nuclear warfare to the world now find the prospect of sudden nuclear death a steadfast if uninvited house-guest; his ghostly form attends every supper table in America, and he will not go away.

The danger that nuclear arms will again be used in anger has not diminished in the 35 years since Hiroshima. Meanwhile the consequences of nuclear war have mounted to a Moloch's stature with the growth of the weapons stockpiles, up now to something approaching 10,000 warheads each for the United States and the Soviet Union — "deliverable," as they say, into our laps and theirs upon a moment's notice.

So ghastly would be the consequences of even a "limited" nuclear war that optimists count upon its very horror to keep it forever at bay. (If you listen carefully, you can hear whistling in the dark.) The aim of "Nuclear Nightmares" is to dispel unwarranted optimism of this sort by outlining four plausible ways a nuclear war might start.

Mr. Calder's first scenario envisions nuclear conflict arising out of "conventional" war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. For 25 years NATO had made it clear that this would be the likely result of any Soviet aggression in the area, though Western Europe is a poor nuclear theater, for as one NATO officer complained to Mr. Calder, "German towns are only two kilotons apart."

Nuclear assault by one of the less powerful nations now acquiring the bomb makes for Mr. Calder's second "nightmare." Here the very paucity of warheads can invite their use, as Mr. Calder notes: "If you have a thousand, and can hide some in submarines at sea and scramble others into the air at a moment's notice, then it is technically difficult to destroy all of your nuclear weapons in a surprise nuclear attack. . . . If, on the other hand, you have only two bombs, one of them parked in a grotto near the airport and the other in the stables of the summer palace, it is possible for a well-informed aggressor who has three bombs to use two of them to annihilate your nuclear weapons and the third to destroy your capital city."

Mr. Calder's third and fourth scenarios rear their frightening heads from the very complexity of the modern nuclear war machines. Accident remains a risk — a communications anomaly during a world crisis might prompt the commander of a single submarine to deal death to millions — but still worse risks wear the mask of sanity, as when the increased accuracy of multiple nuclear warheads invites a cold-blooded decision to strike against an opponent's missile silos before he can hit yours.

Mr. Calder is a science writer of the first order, the author of "Violent Universe," "Einstein's Universe" and the estimable BBC documentaries associated with them, but he is not superhuman and he has no grand solution to offer to our nuclear dilemma. "My feelings," he writes, "are those of a busybody who has shouted 'Fire!' in the theater and now cannot point to the safe way out." He urges signing a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which at least would slow the alarming technological acceleration of the nuclear arms race, but his view of our future even with this improvement is dark. Writing this sane, informative and depressing book does not appear to have given him much pleasure or satisfaction. The nuclear house-guest sits at his table as at ours, threatening to remain until the end of the world, as evil a legacy as ever a generation bequeathed its children. ■

(4b) From The Progressive (December 1980, pp.55-57):

NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE WARS
by Nigel Calder
Viking Press. 168 pp. $10.95.

Scott Sanders

Within half an hour from the moment you read these words, an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union could murder some 300 million people outright and sentence incalculable millions more around the globe to lingering death by hunger and disease. The long-term effects of radiation and ecological disruption would exterminate many species, perhaps including, within a generation or two, our own.

The mind recoils from such a prospect. We either stop thinking about the menace of nuclear war or we tacitly assume, as readers of Victorian novels once assumed, that all will turn out right in the end. Meanwhile, we go on paying our life insurance premiums, planting orchards, taking care that our children eat healthy foods, debating the merits of space colonies, trusting there will be a future. Surely the doomsday weapons will never be launched. Surely the holocaust is impossible.

On the contrary, nuclear war is quite possible, and is rendered more likely with each new bomb constructed, each new weapon devised, each new country joining the holocaust club. That is the chilling and convincing point of Nigel Calder's *Nuclear Nightmares*. Among the myriad possible routes to nuclear war, Calder examines the four likeliest ones: the escalation of a conventional war in Europe; the proliferation of nuclear weapons; the breakdown in military command or electronic control of weapons; and the quest by both superpowers for first-strike capability.

The European war scenario, centered in Germany, will be familiar to readers. But many may not realize, as I did not, that official NATO policy promises first use of nuclear weapons should conventional defenses fail. Deployment of "tactical" nuclear weapons, ranging in size from artillery shells to guided missiles, makes firing the first salvo easier. Once the swapping of missiles begins, combatants are not likely to exercise gentlemanly restraint. If war flares in Europe, with thousands of nuclear weapons aimed across the ideological border, the continent will almost surely be reduced to ashes.

According to Calder's second scenario, acquisition of the bomb by one government after another, including racist regimes such as South Africa's and dictatorships such as Brazil's, will eventually lead to the local use of nuclear weapons. Since the two superpowers claim the whole planet as their province, any local outbreak might well become global. The members of the nuclear club caution other nations to leave the atom alone, while daily they add to their own arsenals. Both SALT treaties permit—indeed, virtually mandate—large increases in atomic stockpiles. France, Germany, America, and the Soviet Union export nuclear reactors, fuels, and reprocessing equipment to client nations. They persevere in this commerce even though critics have shown—see, for example, "Nuclear Power and Nuclear Bombs" in the summer issue of *Foreign Affairs*—that any state possessing reactors can readily build the bomb.

The third possible route to apocalypse leads through the electronic and bureaucratic thickets surrounding the weapons. As military decisions become increasingly dependent on satellites, radar, and computers, faults in that system may precipitate the very disaster it is built to prevent. Twice in the past year, for instance, our computers announced that the Soviets had launched a nuclear strike. The mistake was discovered in time to avert our promised retaliation. But on some future midnight, when political tension is higher or human judgment slower, mistaken warnings might provoke one side or the other into firing away at these electronic ghosts. Furthermore, as the chain-of-command stretches from the President down to officers in the missile silos, the opportunities for error and for malevolence multiply.

According to Calder's fourth scenario, the superpowers might lurch into war as a consequence of perfecting counterforce weapons. Such instruments are aimed at destroying missiles and submarines and bombers instead of cities. All of that sounds humane enough until you reflect that counterforce weapons only make sense if used *first*. There is no profit in firing a superaccurate missile, such as the proposed MX, at empty Soviet silos. Every major weapons development of the past decade, most of them pioneered by the United States, has strengthened the incentive for striking first. If each U.S. missile carries ten independently targeted warheads, by firing first we would theoretically be able to destroy ten Soviet missiles for every one we expend. The Soviets, of course, would enjoy the same ugly advantage by striking first.

"When both superpowers are armed to the teeth with 'counterforce' nuclear weapons," Calder notes, "the danger is not that either side is tempted in cold blood to make his strike, but that both are driven toward it by mutual fear. There may come a moment when, without any malice in your heart, you have frightened your opponent so badly you must hit him before he hits you. Nuclear deterrence becomes nuclear impulsion." Thus the Carter Administration describes the B-1 bomber, cruise missile, MX, and Trident as defensive measures; but they can be viewed only as aggressive by the Soviets. The Soviet arms build-up, justified in the name of defense, appears belligerent to us.

As in his several previous volumes on modern science where he dealt with subjects ranging from meteorology to relativity, here Calder analyzes complex technical issues lucidly, and demonstrates, through his elegant turns of mind, the virtues of reason. There are many complexities in the nuclear arms debate: How can military parity between the United States and the Soviet Union be measured? How can test bans be policed? How can proliferation be halted?

The central issue, however, is elementary: The nuclear arms race is suicidal. It must be halted. The spawning of new weapons must be stopped. Existing arsenals must be dismantled. Means must be found for settling disputes between nations without war. And all these wonders must be brought to pass quickly, perhaps before the

turn of the century, if humankind is to survive. I say "wonders," because no one familiar with the nuclear morass, least of all Calder, imagines the political and technical problems can be easily solved. Most of the political issues with which we deal are trivial by comparison, as if a homeowner were busily oiling a squeaky door while a fire smolders in the cellar. The penalty for failing to quench that fire, as *Nuclear Nightmares* makes painfully clear, will very likely be planetary annihilation.

As a start, Calder urges the United States to renounce all nuclear testing for a period of, say, three months. If the Soviets reciprocate, we can progress to a comprehensive test ban treaty. By the same means we could establish a missile-test quota. Both restrictions, on nuclear explosions and missile firings, could be readily monitored by existing satellite systems. Both proposals are featured in the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," a citizens' initiative aimed at forcing the superpowers to disarm, available from the American Friends Service Committee, 15 Rutherford Place, New York, New York 10003. Another useful guide to citizen action is "Nuclear War Prevention Kit," available for $1 from the Center for Defense Information, 122 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.

Scott Sanders is a novelist, essayist, and professor of English at Indiana University.

BRS LIBRARY

(35) See RSN30. Unfortunately, we have had to postpone this item — which gives all the holdings of the BRS Library — till our next issue (RSN30), because of the last-minute inclusion of details about the 1981 meeting (47).

FINANCES/CONTRIBUTIONS

Deductible expenses. See (4a).

(36) Russell Memorial (London) contributions. Our thanks to FRANK PAGE for his additional contribution.

(37) BRS Treasury contributors: KEVIN BOGGS, LEN CLEAVELIN, JACK COWLES, DENNIS DARLAND, DOUGLAS IRONSIDE, JIM O'CONNOR, JACK RAGSDALE...and PETER CRANFORD and KATHY FJERMEDAL on a continuing, regular monthly basis. We thank them all for helping to keep us solvent.

BRS BUSINESS

(38) Bylaw amendments proposed. The bylaws say (Article X, Section 1): "These bylaws may be amended by a majority vote of the Society, voting at a meeting called at least in part for this purpose, and after prior notification of at least thirty days."

This, then, is notice — and it is at least 30 days in advance of the annual meeting scheduled for June 26-28, 1981 — that that meeting is being called at least in part for the purpose of amending the bylaws.

These amendments (and perhaps others) will be proposed at the June meeting:

(38a) Term of office. At present officers are appointed by the directors for one-year terms. The bylaws do not specify when that one-year shall start and end. Up till now we have assumed that it coincides with the calendar year, that is, that the term runs from January 1st to December 31st. This change is proposed: that the term of office — for officers appointed by the directors at an annual meeting — shall start as soon as they have been appointed, and shall end at the following year's annual meeting, when the directors again appoint the officers.

Strictly, this may not require an amendment; but we propose that it be written into the bylaws as an amendment.

(38b) Vice-Presidents. At present, the bylaws call for one Vice-President. We propose that it be permissible to have more than one Vice-President when the directors so wish.

Suppose a BRS member wishes to become active in a fund-raising campaign aimed at outsiders. Now, it is generally known that outsiders like to know that they are dealing with someone in a position of authority. Therefor the fund-raiser will be more effective, and his job will be made easier, if he is a Vice-President That's why we propose that the BRS not be limited to one Vice-President. Incidentally, banks usually have more than one Vice-President for the same reason.

(38c) Article VII, Section 4. We propose that this section be dropped. It is not relevant. It reads:

> Contract with Officers. The Board of Directors may contract with officers for their services, but in no case shall the term of the contract exceed one year. Compensation for services of officers shall be set by the Board of Directors.

(38d) Agenda. The bylaws (Article IX, Section 1) say, "The agenda for Society meetings shall be prepared by the Board of Directors. Items for the agenda may be proposed by any member, and must be submitted to the Chairman

of the Board of Directors in writing."

We propose that the agenda for the Directors' annual meeting be prepared by the Chairman of the Board; and that the agenda for the General Meeting (also called the "Members' Meeting" or "Business Meeting") be prepared by the President; and that items for the agendas may be proposed by any member, to the Chairman or the President, in writing.

This is a way of dividing the work (of preparing agendas) between the 2 chief officers, and is what in fact we have been doing for the past several years.

(38e) Expulsion. At present it takes a two-thirds vote of the members voting to expel a member (Article II,Section 3). We have just seen how cumbersome that is. It required nearly 2 pages of RSN28 to state the case against Sutcliffe, plus 2 more pages for the ballot; that is, about one-sixth of the entire newsletter was taken up by the matter. 4 pages of other items of interest had to be dropped or postponed.

We propose that the voting on expulsion be done by directors instead of by the entire membership, by a two-thirds vote of the directors voting.

The directors are the more interested and more active members of the BRS. Their vote can be counted on to be at least as well-considered, at least as fair, as a vote by the entire membership. It would be handled by a memo to the directors, and would free a lot of space in the newsletter;it would also save money. For these reasons, we recommmend the change.

(39) Student dues raised, from $5 to $10 a year. We maintained the old $5 rate for a long time, even though it did not cover costs, because we were (and are) glad to have younger people as members. But recently the number (and proportion) of student members has increased (which is good) and increased our losses (which is bad). Also our costs are higher. Hence the higher dues.

FOR SALE

(40) BRS members' stationery. 80 sheets, 8½x11,$3.50 postpaid, while it lasts. It will cost more next time we print. Order from the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

(41) 118-page Denonn catalog, listing the items in Lester's great Russell Library, is available from JOE GORMAN, 1333 Mountain, Claremont, CA 91711.$4.50. $5 for the printed-only-on-one-side, for the"annotatively bibliomanic". While they last. Postpaid.

ABOUT OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

(42a) 4th Russell Tribunal. The following report appeared in the newspaper "24 Heures" of Lausanne, Switzerland on October 27,1980:

Un Tribunal Russell sur les Indiens d'Amérique siégera à Rotterdam

A session of the Russell Tribunal — the 4th of that name — will take place in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, from November 24th to the 30th, on the rights of American Indians.

The first Russell Tribunal (named for the British mathematician and Nobel Prize winner, Bertrand Russell) met in 1967 to investigate the Vietnam war.

The idea of setting up an international tribunal surfaced in 1977 after the UN Conference on the plight of the Indians. The jury of 15 prominent international persons will examine charges — made by Indians from all parts of America — of genocide, confiscation of territory and natural resources, repression, and violation of treaties.

Incomindios, an international committee for the defense of American Indians,announced the formation of the Tribunal at a press conference in Zurich on Wednesday. According to Incomindios, the entire international community should feel responsible for violations of the rights of Indians.

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* * * * * * * * * *

Although The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation is not named in the above report, the 4th Russell Tribunal was set in motion by them, as were the first 3. RSN18-49 reported on the setting up of the previous Tribunal, the 3rd — in West Germany, in March 1978.

(Thank you, WALTER BAUMGARTNER. Our translation.)

(42b) 4th Russell Tribunal, continued. The following is from the "Washington Peace Center Newsletter" (January '81):

The Fourth international "Russell Tribunal" held a week long hearing about Indian treaties and human rights violations,in Rotterdam. The jury, consisting of members of European parliaments, labor union representatives, and church leaders, is funded by the "Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation" (Bertrand Russell was a famous philosopher and Nobel laureate in mathematics). The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the rights of Indians all over South, Central, and North America are denied. The uranium mining on Indian land by multinational corporations in the United States was one of the main issues discussed. On the Navajo and Hopi reservations, hundreds are suffering from cancer and leukemia because of the radioactive pollution in air and water. The Indians accuse the US government of planning genocide of their people.

(Thank you WHITFIELD COBB. Thank you also for advising the WPCN that BR's Nobel Prize was in literature, not mathematics.)

Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation's END Campaign: see (20).

(43) Center for War/Peace Studies seeks members and asks for support in its work,"Applied Research Toward a World of Peace With Justice". It is particularly involved in 4 issues: the Law of the Sea,arms control and disarmament, the Middle East, and United Nations reform.Its sponsors include Elizabeth Mann Borgese,Lord Caradon,Stuart Chase, Norman Cousins, Alva & Gunnar Myrdal. Tax-deductible membership is $20. 218 E. 18th St.,New York,NY 10005.

PERIODICALS RECEIVED

(44) "The Churchman", "A Humanistic Approach to Religion, Ethics, and Education.""An independent journal of religious humanism...edited in the conviction that religious journalism must provide a platform for the free exchange of ideas and opinions; that religion is consonant with the most advanced revelations in every department of knowledge; that we are in a fraternal world community; and that the moral and spiritual evolution of man is only at the beginning." Henry Steele Commager and Linus Pauling are among its Associate Trustees, most of whom are ministers. The contents of the November 1980 issue are about as liberal as a liberal could wish. $6.50 per year.1074 23rd Avenue North, St. Petersburg, FL 33704.

(45) "Exploring the Bible" Newsletter, a 5-page mimeographed monthly, explores the Bible unsympathetically. $6 a year, from DISCOVERY, Box 20331, West Valley, UT 84120

(46) "Adelante"(August 1980) is a 16-page Spanish language publication of the anti-Castro Cuban Democratic Socialist Party(PO Box 350,805, Miami, FL 33135).Its editorial (in English as well as Spanish) urges a vote, not for Carter or Reagan, but for McReynolds. "He represents the end of Imperialism and Capitalism in America."

LAST MINUTE ITEMS

(47) To attend the Annual Meeting,1981:

Transportation: The easiest way to get to Hamilton is to travel to Toronto, either by train or plane. Buses go regularly and frequently from the Airport and from the Toronto Bus Depot, about an hour's ride.
Programme: this will consist of films, papers, a Red Hackle Hour, business meeting, and banquet. The papers will be on a diversity of topics associated with Russell's life and work: Russell and Spinoza (or at least Russell's practical ethic); Russell's intellectual development before going to Cambridge; etc. Those wishing to give papers are requested to write to The Bertrand Russell Archives, Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont., Canada L8S 4L6; please provide an abstract and tentative title. The banquet promises to be a true gala affair at the Russell Archivist's home.
Costs:total cost of the banquet (including wine) and registration for the meeting is $25. Cost of lodging and other meals is $39,double, or $49,single. Payment of the $25 is to be sent in advance to the Russell Archives. Payment of the $39 or $49 should be sent to Conference Services, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ont.,Canada L8S 4K1 by June 12th at the latest(see next page for 2 mailing coupons.)
On arrival at McMaster June 26th,go to the Main Lobby Registration Desk in the Commons Building, to register and pick up room key. You can then settle into your room, and then go to the Russell Archives for programme details. (Thank you, CARL SPADONI. Carl is Assistant Archivist.)



McMaster University

The Campus

Alumni Memorial Hall	8	Kenneth Taylor Hall	38
Applied Dynamics Bldg.	33	Lewis Field House	13
Bates Residence	40	Life Sciences Bldg.	39
Biology Greenhouse	30	Matthews Hall	26
Brandon Hall	36	McKay Hall	27
Burke Science Bldg.	11	Mills Memorial Library	10
Campus Serv. Bldg.	31	Moulton Hall	18
Chester New Hall	23	Nuclear Reactor	15
Commons Bldg.	28	Nuclear Research Bldg.	9
Day Care Centre	41	Tandem Accelerator	32
Divinity College	17	Prelim. Lab Bldg.	T13
Edwards Hall	5	President's Residence	7
John Hodgins Engineering Bldg.	16	Psychology Bldg.	34
E.T. Clarke Centre	12	Refectory	4
Faculty Club	8	Thode Library of Science and Engineering	42
General Sciences Bldg.	22	Senior Sciences Bldg.	25
Gilmour Hall	20	Togo Salmon Hall	29
Hamilton Hall	2	University Hall	1
Hamilton Teacher's College	T16	Wallingford Hall	6
Health Sciences Centre	37	Wentworth House	21
Ivor Wynne Centre	24	Whidden Hall	19
		Woodstock Hall	35
		Parking Lots	P



Miles to Hamilton from

Niagara Falls	42	Fort Erie	60
Sarnia	150	Windsor	195
Toronto	43	Ottawa	300
Montreal	396	London	82
Stratford	63	Kitchener	36
New York	512	Chicago	457

McMaster University
Conference Services
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K1
(416) 525-9140 ext. 4781

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
1981 ANNUAL MEETING
JUNE 26-28, 1981

RESIDENCE ACCOMMODATION
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario

Registration Deadline: June 12
Cancellation Deadline: June 23

On campus accommodation in one of McMaster's modern residences is available to all members attending the Annual Meeting of The Bertrand Russell Society, June 26 to 28, 1981. The residences feature single and twin bedded rooms with centralized washroom facilities.

Interested delegates are asked to complete and return the attached form with full payment to McMaster University no later than Friday June 12 , 1981 .

The following rates will apply:

$39.00 per person based on double occupancy
$49.00 per person based on single occupancy

These rates include:

2 nights in residence	(June 26,27)
2 breakfasts	(June 27,28)
1 lunch	(June 27)
1 dinner	(June 26)
Parking	(June 26 - 28)

The University regrets that application for accommodation received after the deadline of June 12, 1981 cannot be guaranteed. Cancellations with a full refund will be granted if notice of cancellation is received by Conference Services no later June 23, 1981.

Check in time : 4:00 p.m. Check out time : 12:00 noon

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