The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.* 3802 North Kenneth Avenue Chicago Illinois 60641

RUSSELL SOCIETY NEWS
No. 61
February 1989

(1) Highlights: Annual Meeting 89: program (2), arrangements (4). Ayer interview (33). BR reviews Schweitzer book (13). Early renewer Honor Roll (19). Are your dues overdue? (24). *15-Year Index* of BRS newsletters (32). High praise (unintended) from *Punch* (3). Lamont's new book (25). Moorhead's *Meaning of Life* (26). Recommended reading: *Opposing Viewpoints* (18). Ryan's *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*, reviewed by Galbraith (8), Goodman (10, Hampshire (5), Kramer (6). The Index is at the end. An asterisk in the left column = a request.

ANNUAL MEETING (1989)

(2) June 23-25, 1989, NYC. The theme: *Reality vs. Illusion: Death, War and the Problem of Skepticism.*

Tentative program---------->

Friday, June 23...at Milford Plaza Hotel

4-6pm	Registration
7:30-8:45	Welcome, Presentation of 1989 Book Award, and "Russell's Political Life"
8:45-9:00	Coffee break
9:00	Board of Directors Meeting [all members welcome]

Saturday, June 24...at Ethical Culture Society (Social Hall)

8-9am	Registration
9:00-10:00	Russell movies, tour of NYC, or possible panel on "Skepticism and the Positive Rule of Illusion"
10:30-10:45	Coffee break
10:45-11:45	General Meeting
12:00-1:30	Lunch
1:30-3:00	Paper: Alan Ryan, Princeton University "Russell's Pacifism"
3:00-3:15	Coffee break
3:15-4:15	Paper: Marvin Kohl, SUNY at Fredonia "Understanding the Pragmatics of Pacifism"
5:00-6:00	Red Hackle Cocktail Hour
8:00	Banquet...at Milford Plaza Hotel
9:00	Presentation of 1989 BRS Award to Paul Edwards Talk: Paul Edwards, CUNY at Brooklyn "Voltaire and the Role of Skepticism"

Sunday, June 25...at Ethical Culture Society

9;30-10-30	Paper: Tim Madigan, *Free Inquiry* "The Rationality of Waging War"
10:30-10:45	Coffee break
10:45-11:45	Paper: Michael Rockler, Rutgers at Camden "Skepticism and Education"
12-1:30	Lunch
1:3--6:00	Open Possible paper: "Russell's Optimism about the Future"

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(3) High praise (unintended), from *Punch* (5/17/67, p. 702), with a bow to HARRY RUJA:

> According to the founder of the new Havelock Ellis Society, "all of us are members of the Abortion Law Reform Society. My wife and I are also members of the Family Planning Association, The Homosexual Law Reform Society, and I'm an executive of the Vegetarian Movement." Gather ye rosebuds, chum; it can only be a matter of days before Lord Russell makes a takeover bid.

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Page 23 -- with Dora Russell's obituary in the London Times -- is missing from this issue, the result of a printing foul-up. The last two paragraphs of the obit. appear on Page 24. We will include the entire item in the next (May) issue.

ANNUAL MEETING (CONTINUED)

ETHICAL CULTURE SOCIETY
2 West 64th Street
New York, NY 10023

MILFORD PLAZA HOTEL
270 West 45th Street
New York, NY 10036

Registration Fee = $65.00 (Includes Banquet)

Single Day Registration: Saturday = $15.00

Sunday = $10.00

Students and Senior Citizens pay no Registration Fee
Banquet = $40.00

(4) Arrangements---------->

To register: use Registration Form on blue top page of this newsletter

Please mail completed Form and Registration Fee (payable to BRS '89) by May 15th to:

Professor Michael Rockler
Department of Education
SUNJ Rutgers at Camden
Camden, NJ 08102
609-757-6051

To reserve a room at Milford Plaze Hotel:
from any State except New York State: 800-221-2690
from NY State: 800-522-6447
from New York City: 869-3600

Rate = $80.00 Single, $90.00 Double. Identify yourself as a Bertrand Russell Society member to get the reduced rate. Reserve by May 15th

Alternative accommodations: West Side YMCA, 5 West 63rd Street, New York, NY 10023. One block from Ethical Culture Society. 212-787-4400

BOOK REVIEWS

(5) *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life* by Alan Ryan, is receiving a great many reviews. We included three of them in our last issue, and have four in this one. The great number of reviews of this book indicates the great interest in Russell that continues to exist 19 years after his death.

Author Alan Ryan will present a paper, *Russell's Pacifism*, at the BRS Annual Meeting, the afternoon of June 23rd.

Here is Stuart Hampshire's review, in the *New York Review of Books* (2/2/89, pp. 7-9):

Engaged Philosopher

Bertrand Russell: A Political Life
by Alan Ryan.
Hill and Wang, 226 pp., $19.95

Stuart Hampshire

International politics since about 1938 has had one feature in common with the stock market: the major events have proved to be unpredictable, or at least they have not been predicted by the experts. In guessing the future, one would have done just as well to go to a fortune-teller or to try a crystal ball. Some examples of the major turning points have been, listed in no particular order: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Erhard's *Wirtschaftswunder* in West Germany, the erection of the Berlin Wall, the success of Sputnik, the Sino-Soviet split, Khrushchev's introduction of missiles into Cuba and the ensuing crisis, the eclipse of the Communist party in France, the recent Palestinian uprising and its successful prolongation. It is not surprising that the experts and commentators are usually caught off-guard, explaining the change in retrospect in various plausible sounding styles. We have no general theory, even of the roughest kind, that might point to the mechanisms of political change, or that might pick out salient tendencies and suggest to us what we should expect in international affairs in the next year or two.

In his very pleasantly written and enjoyable book, Alan Ryan often has to say that Bertrand Russell's analyses of international politics at particular moments, and his expectations based on the analysis, were plainly wrong, particularly during the later part of his life, in his seventies, eighties, and nineties, when he was disappointed, embittered, and angry, and when he was unwilling any longer to write in measured tones. But when they are judged by the criterion of successful prediction the wise commentators, calm editorial writers, and careful political analysts in my reading have not done much better than Bertrand Russell or Proust's M. Norpois.

From 1914 onward, Russell immersed

himself in a sea of uncertainties because the horror of the war had implanted in him an intense and unappeasable sense of public responsibility. He could not bear to think of the suffering and the immense and continuing waste of life attributable to political stupidity. Yet his autobiography shows that the search for certainties was the driving force in his intellectual experiences, and the center of some of his strongest emotions. There is therefore a strangeness in the story that Ryan has to tell of the masterful philosopher of logic who turned himself into a political commentator and militant activist.

The response of ordinary men and women to the outbreak of war in 1914 provided the dividing line in Russell's life. Their normal response in Britain was one of resolute cheerfulness, optimism, steady loyalty, and a readiness to endure the unanticipated ghastliness of the trenches almost without comment. Even now it is difficult to read about the battles of the Somme or Nivelle's offensive or the battle of Passchendaele without amazement, because in World War II only the battles on the Eastern front could show an equal profligacy in the waste of lives in an ocean of suffering. Privately educated among aristocratic radicals, and self-consciously the heir of a famous tradition of liberal reform, Russell had an outlook upon the world that had been set in a final mold in Cambridge; and this was the Edwardian Cambridge of Sidgwick and of G.E. Moore, which at the time seemed likely to be entirely secure in the propagation of its values far into the tranquil future, and at least as long as the British Navy policed the seas. That the great movement of democratic reform in the preceding century had led up to the catastrophe of hate, destruction, and unthinking nationalism that occurred in 1914, that the mass of the population in Britain, and particularly of the working population, accepted the facts of modern mechanized warfare without protest – both these considerations led Russell to change his way of life, and to become a permanent and active enemy of established moral values. Estranged from his friend and collaborator in the great *Principia Mathematica* of 1910, A.N. Whitehead, and from many of his colleagues at Trinity College, Cambridge, having lost his fellowship there, and imprisoned for his antiwar activities, he became henceforth a prophet of Enlightenment as well as a philosopher, and supported himself by his writing outside the shelter of British universities.

In explaining Russell's public life after 1914, Ryan emphasizes the confidence, and the sense of natural leadership and political responsibility, that Russell derived, perhaps only semiconsciously, from his aristocratic birth. This is no doubt part of the truth, and Ryan cites evidence from the correspondence with Ottoline Morrell, the daughter of a duke, whom Russell had for some years loved and who was always an intimate friend. I believe that his prophetic role had another and more direct source in his intellectual formation at Cambridge. It would be an exaggeration to say that throughout his life he always found it difficult to take any man seriously who was not educated at Cambridge, but not too much of an exaggeration; Oxford University and the United States, for example, he viewed with a suspicion and distaste which sometimes were half-humorous attitudes, but also half-serious. England was the country to which he was fiercely attached, as he declared in his autobiography, and attached with an undisguised chauvinism. This left foreigners in second place, even while they conveyed their admiration of him as logician and as philosopher from all over the world. Within England Cambridge was his spiritual home, and, after his parents died early in his life, he had had no conventional home that could compete with Cambridge in his memory. He always retained the manner of one who had as a young man belonged to an intellectual elite, a manner that was characteristic of those who had belonged to the secret society of the Apostles in its heyday.



Russell's pastoral attitude to the mass of mankind, his sense of superiority and of responsibility and his lack of shame in expressing them, seems to me to have been on the whole reasonable and not to have been at all malign in its effects. Here I am in part disagreeing with Ryan's interpretation of Russell's political philosophy and of some of the reasons and motives behind it. He remarks that Russell

> plainly felt a contempt for uneducated people which is entirely at odds with the sentimental profession of solidarity with humanity's offerings which opens his *Autobiography*. The assertion that Darwin was worth thirty million ordinary men is not easy to reconcile with the claim that "Echoes of cries of pain reverberate in my heart."

I believe that there are two misunderstandings here. First, there is a confusion between, on the one hand, allegiance to liberal and socialist values and, on the other, a respect for the voice of the people and for the opinions of the majority. There generally is not in fact any correlation between these two attitudes, and I cannot see why such a correlation should be expected. Secondly, there is, I believe, a misunderstanding of Russell.

Russell early in his life experienced an intense response to the beauty of intellectual order. He found that he was happiest when he could discern hard, rock-like patterns of thought that stand out distinctly and unmistakably in a rarefied air, at a great height of abstraction and away from ordinary objects, and from their casual associations. The *Autobiography* describes his joy in following Euclid as a child. This joy in intellectual order permeated his whole life and it could be heard in the accents of his speech and in the shape of his sentences. When he gave the first, and easily the best, set of Reith lectures on a public theme on the BBC, under the title *Authority and the Individual* (1949), a very large audience listened with pleasure to the flow of abstract argument. His own love of clarity and order, alive in his sentences and in his voice, made the logical abstractions seem as concrete as chairs and tables. It was a feat of popularizing argument unequaled in my experience, because it was so evidently spontaneous. From childhood to old age, chairs and tables, the actual or apparent furniture of the world, were never as real for him as logical structures, and in these broadcasts he was just opening a corner of his private world to the public.

A passion for intellectual order, and an emotional response to the beauty of abstract ideas, ranked and linked together, is one possible model of a philosopher, the model that Plato promoted as his ideal. Perhaps Plato himself half conformed naturally to this ideal, and half felt contrary temptations, temptations to diversions and digressions, to the play of imagery and to literary experiment and to storytelling. The wholehearted Platonic philosopher, like Russell, is unavoidably aristocratic in his attitudes, because he rejects received opinions and unexamined prejudices, and, above all, he hates demagogy. Hating demagogues and bad arguments, he is unlikely to show respect for their victims in the populace at large, who perpetually ensure by their credulity that specious arguments are profitable. In oligarchic societies, as in Plato's Greece, or in mid-nineteenth-century England, it was unnecessary to pretend to respect the opinions and judgments of the majority, and Macaulay and Matthew Arnold, for example, were in this respect Russell's companions in making no pretense of admiring ordinary men, as opposed to arguing against the social system that oppressed them. But since 1918 in Britain, and in the age of Lloyd George and of H.G. Wells, liberalism and populism became increasingly associated as naturally marching together. Following the successes of popular conservatism in the US, Britain, Israel, and elsewhere, we now know that *vox populi* only rarely and in exceptional circumstances – after a war, for instance – proclaims the supremacy of liberal values. Russell certainly looked down on the majority of his compatriots as the largely helpless victims of hired opinion makers and Establishment hacks. This did not prevent him from feeling agonized by the waste of lives through wars and through avoidable poverty.

In 1896 six witty and clear lectures delivered at the recently founded London School of Economics were published under the title *German Social Democracy*. This was Russell's first entry into social philosophy. He rejected Marx's labor theory of value and he was shrewd and amusing in his assessment of Ferdinand Lassalle's leadership of the Socialist party in Germany. The years of great philosophical achievement followed: *Principia*

Mathematica, written with Whitehead (1910, 1912, 1913), and *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), a small masterpiece. His practical radicalism and militancy began with the No-Conscription Fellowship in 1915. He was never to look back and to recapture the comparative calm and philosophical detachment of his late Victorian and Edwardian years. Immediately after the war he published some philosophical work of permanent value, for instance, "The Notion of Cause," a chapter in *Mysticism and Logic* (1918), and *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919), and he returned to thinking about philosophy in the late Thirties. *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940), the outcome of this late thought, has passages that are still of great interest to philosophers.

From 1918 until Russell's death in his nineties, there is a continuous flow of books and articles and lectures on every aspect of public policy: on education, peace, and armaments, on marriage and sexual morality, on the future of science and its social effects, and on the nature of happiness. The orderly and elegant sentences, and the even pace of the arguments, never fail and the occasional cackle of wit, so characteristic of the man, at intervals relieves the prose. Written in ink to the accompaniment of many cups of tea, Russell's manuscripts, at least in this later period, have very few erasures. He wrote, as he talked, within an iron frame of rational order. Unexplained uncertainty, muddle, and ambiguity are nowhere to be found. As a matter of taste, they were an offense to him when he observed them in public institutions and he could not tolerate them in his own thought. Precisely this splendid virtue was often in the long run a defect in his political writing, because it seemed that many of the uncertain features of the real world, muddled as it is, had slipped through the silken net of his lucid prose, as he reflected on education or on international relations or on monogamy and sexuality. Even many of his admiring readers felt that they were often presented with an idealized, Platonic equivalent of life in place of life as it is actually and confusingly lived. But this is certainly not true of *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920), which is a masterly anticipation of the evils to come in the Soviet Union, based on a visit there; nor is it true of *Freedom and Organisation* (1934), an original survey of ideas and personalities between 1815 and 1914, written with the aid of his third wife, "Peter" Spence.

Ryan reviews these popular writings of Russell's middle period, before the Second World War, with a light touch, half admiring, half critically detached, which seems entirely just and in harmony with the material. A free-ranging intellectual certainly had a role to play in those years of Stanley Baldwin's rule in Britain, alongside Bernard Shaw, Aldous Huxley, and, rather earlier, G.K. Chesterton. Russell's strength was that, unlike the other three, he had a fully articulated and coherent philosophy to support his wit and his iconoclasm. He was not merely teasing the bourgeoisie with Irish mockery, as Shaw was, or playing with the paradoxes of religious conversion and of rationality, as Chesterton genially liked to do. He did not flirt with his public, and he did not try to be genial, which are strategies for concealing the operations of the intellect from a population that will otherwise resent these operations. He had a defined philosophical position, and a largely unchanging one, and everything that he wrote flowed, directly and without concealment, from the central tenets of his philosophy, which was a theory of knowledge developed early in his life while he was working on the foundations of mathematics. A decent human being is a person who discards or suspends all accepted opinions that, when examined, are seen to have no tested and secure foundations, either in logic or in empirical evidence. The search for secure foundations of knowledge is the first duty of man, and it is the only way to approach any serious issue, whether of public policy or of private happiness. Once the limits of human knowledge concerning an issue are fixed and clear, love and loyalty and kindness should then hold sway.

Russell had abandoned the rigorous study of philosophy because Wittgenstein told him in Cambridge after the war and the Armistice that his search for the foundations of knowledge, whether mathematical or empirical, was a mistake, a misconception of the nature of knowledge, which did not have foundations. Wittgenstein was later to show that knowledge grew in a less clearly marked and a more untidy way, and nothing could be done to make it more tidy. Russell was so impressed by the evidence of Wittgenstein's genius that he thought that he was probably right, and he preferred not to start to think about philosophy all over again. This would be painfully to repudiate his own past and to disavow his own most steady commitments. Much later, in *Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits* (1948), he returned to his old epistemological habits, and there were several occasions when he fiercely denounced the influence of Wittgenstein within philosophy. Wittgenstein by his example had converted many analytical philosophers, particularly in Britain, from the pursuit of logical rigor to the recognition of the value in philosophy of informality, of inconclusiveness, of respect for the idioms of common speech. In Russell's philosophy the idioms of common speech deserved no respect, because they embodied only the people's ancient and prescientific ignorance, "the metaphysics of the Stone Age." Russell was probably as much disappointed by the eclipse of "scientific philosophy," as he had conceived it long ago, as by the survival of national ambitions in politics. He was lonely in his last decades, his visions rejected as unreal and his hopes as unrealizable, both in philosophy and in politics.

Ryan gives a stirring account of Russell's determined reentry into platform politics after World War II. "During the 1940s," Ryan writes, "he was almost isolated... in his insistence that America must use her monopoly of nuclear weapons to create a world goverment armed with the power to destroy any country which tried to create nuclear weapons of its own," even if this meant war with the USSR. The bombs would fall on Leningrad and Moscow in the cause of perpetual peace. This was the low point of Russell's political thought, the consequence of his habit of abstract calculation without any concrete imagination of people walking on the earth and soon to be burned alive. After the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, he was a leader in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and of the campaign of protest against the Vietnam War.

Ryan does not conceal or defend the injustice and the violence of language of some of Russell's anti-American utterances. Like Freud, Russell often felt an intense antipathy to American civilization and to the forms that the unrestrained pursuit of wealth had taken in the US. When the US embarked on a cruel war that could not be seen as a defense of a vital national interest, he ceased to be just in his calls for justice, and he talked nonsense about the nature and intentions of the Viet Cong.

Finally, Ryan gives an admirably balanced account of the Cuban missile crisis and of the extraordinary historical moment in which Khrushchev and Kennedy, replying to telegrams from Russell urging a compromise, presented their arguments to the world "through the sitting-room of a ninety-year-old philosopher." Ryan remarks that Russell knew that his role in the episode was almost accidental, but that he enjoyed the feeling of being at the heart of events. He then states the moral that the whole book skillfully conveys: the significance today of Russell's sustained efforts to provoke thought on public issues, and particularly on the issues of war and peace; Russell's involvement and participation, in spite of all the hostility and derision that he aroused.

Democracy has its overriding virtues, first of all, the virtue of preventing an oligarchy or dictatorship from monopolizing, or nearly monopolizing, power over a long period of time without the majority of the population endorsing this monopoly; and power here includes the power to make war. This primary virtue brings with it a secondary virtue, that of comparative efficiency in government, because the government has periodically to satisfy the voters in some essential respects, which include at least seeming efficient; and this is not true of oligarchies and dictatorships. On the other hand, democratic institutions are often praised for virtues that they manifestly do not possess. There is an ideology of democracy that is as deceiving as the ideologies of capitalism and of communism. This ideology suggests that, given democratic institutions, the people as a whole, through their representatives in the Congress, and perhaps also through public opinion polls, are able to make their wishes known on the acceptability of any specific risk of war when it arises.

In a slowly unfolding war, such as the war in Vietnam, this may not be a wholly unrealistic suggestion; even if the publicly available information is deceptive, public opinion can still have a substantial effect, and in fact it did so in that case. But there is at present no certain way in which the popular will can be brought to bear through a democratic process on a decision between peace and war, if that issue arises unpredictably from a confrontation of armed forces in the field, in the air, or at sea. There has not so far been a debate in the political arena to determine why US administrations have been unwilling to accept a no first-strike policy, and on the dangers of confrontation without such a policy. From the standpoint of the safety of the US population, and with all the risks and probabilities computed, this caution about adopting a policy of no first use may be the right policy. But also it may be wrong, and the risk of wholesale destruction of most of the population and its habitat are at issue.

The recent presidential election could not allow a question of this gravity to come up for debate, if only because the candidates could not afford to seem "soft on defense"; and most voters recognize constraints such as this in a spirit of controlled contempt for such democratic elections. Demogogy rules at that time and will continue to rule. Who then will raise the issue of first strike if not lone and obstinate intellectuals, not ashamed of their obstinacy, such as Russell and Sakharov (who has taken a clear position against first use)?

Conservatives in the US and in Britain and in the Soviet Union will of course continue to call these interventions ignorant and unrealistic, and then will go on to denounce the interference of intellectuals in politics. It is true that dissident intellectuals, doing what Russell did and Sakharov still does, do not have access to the information that the government and the chiefs of staff possess, and that their protests must be to this extent ignorant and unrealistic. But they raise the questions, and without them there would be little or no public questioning of the wisdom of the elected administrations and their chiefs of staff. This is surely an uncomfortable thought when the survival of many nations, and also of future generations, is at stake: not only uncomfortable, but contrary to the intentions embodied in the American Constitution.

The intention of the Founding Fathers was that the decision to declare war should always be part of a democratic process and should be taken by the elected representatives of the people. If the modern technology of war makes this utopian and impractical, as it probably does, at least the delegations of the power to respond to attack should be made matters for public discussion. For example, can the commanders of submarines with nuclear weapons maintain communications with Washington in an accidental confrontation, or must they be given unchecked responsibility? One thinks of the *Vincennes* incident in the Persian Gulf, when an Iranian civil aircraft was shot down by an American cruiser by mistake. It is not only the superpowers who will be at sea and in the air with nuclear weapons.

Ryan ends his book with a retort to those who are inclined to sneer at Russell's protests against the war in Vietnam when he was ninety-three years old. Let them ask themselves, he writes, how well they have lived up to the injunction not to

follow a multitude in assenting to evil. Russell was a philosopher and, like Plato and Spinoza, he never had the slightest inclination to follow the multitude in any direction; this was part of his strength and contributed to the exemplary value of his life. But the key word in Ryan's retort is "assent." Russell and Sakharov belong to the rare type of intellectual who does not just acquire a scientific or scholarly reputation, and then, pleading lack of expert knowledge, leave the future of the species to be decided by their rulers without their unscholarly questionings and protests; they did not passively assent, either in their earlier creative scientific careers or later as responsible human beings. However one judges relevance, Ryan's story is relevant to the political dilemmas facing us now.

The reviewer, Stuart Hampshire, is identified this way by and in --------> the *New York Review of Books*

STUART HAMPSHIRE, formerly Warden of Wadham College, Oxford, is Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. He is the author of *Spinoza, Freedom of the Individual, Freedom of Mind and Other Essays*, and *Morality and Conflict*.

(6) ***Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*** **by Alan Ryan is reviewed by Hilton Kramer in *The Wall Steet Journal* (10/20/88). Russell-haters will love it. Thank you, BOB DAVIS.**

Mischief and Bad Judgment

By Hilton Kramer

Is there something about the vocation of philosophy in our time that debars even superior minds from holding wise or decent or reasonably informed political views? The evidence of the present century suggests some unpleasant answers to this question. Jean-Paul Sartre, for many years the most famous and influential philosopher in Europe, was notoriously profligate in embracing at one time or another virtually every form of leftist totalitarianism that came to power in his lifetime, and his intense hatred of bourgeois democracy remained undiminished to the end. Martin Heidegger, by common consent one of the great philosophical minds of the century, took up the Nazi cause at the very moment when it was beginning to destroy—along with much else—the intellectual life of his native Germany. Even our own much-admired Hannah Arendt, who had so much to teach us in her great work on "The Origins of Totalitarianism," was reported to be so fearful in her last years about fascism coming to power in the U.S. that she spoke of seeking refuge in Switzerland. Clearly, a talent—or even a genius—for philosophical reflection is no guarantee of either political wisdom or, as these cases attest, political common sense.

It is in the life and work of Bertrand Russell, however, that we encounter the most protracted example that this century has to offer of a first-rate philosophical mind repeatedly adopting political views that so often proved to be utterly capricious and contradictory where they were not simply odious. Given Russell's intellectual eminence and the world-wide attention that his political views were so often accorded over a very long period—he lived from 1872 to 1970—it is surprising that Alan Ryan's new book, "Bertrand Russell: A Political Life" (Hill & Wang, 226 pages, $19.95), is the first to be devoted to the subject of the philosopher's politics.

Now that such a book exists, it is easy enough to see why better minds than Mr. Ryan's have in the past shied away from a subject that turns out to be, even in this sympathetic account of it, far more bizarre than most of us have suspected.

Consider some of the more spectacular episodes in Russell's political history. In the '30s he urged the British to submit to a Nazi invasion since resistance, in his opinion, was certain to result in the destruction of European civilization. (The assumption was, of course, that Hitler's triumph would not.) In the '40s, when the U.S. still enjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons, he argued for a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union. By the 1960s, however, he had decided that, as Mr. Ryan writes, "The sole cause of evil in the world was American imperialism." And along the way there were many similarly obtuse pronouncements—e.g., that Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister, was "much more wicked than Hilter"; that the CIA had caused President Kennedy's assassination; and that "the American government [in the 1960s] was ~~genocidal~~."

In his earlier years, to be sure, Russell had occasionally written with keen insight about some of the pivotal political developments of the time. In the most important of the books he wrote on politics, "The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism" (1920), he gave the world a prompt and stunning analysis of the totalitarian character that had marked the Soviet regime from the outset—an analysis that Russell himself afterward ignored, when it suited his political outlook to do so, most appallingly when in his last years he attacked the Soviet Union, as Mr. Ryan duly reports, "for excessive timidity in supporting national liberation movements, and demanded Russian intervention on behalf of the Vietcong, and in support of Cuba, the Angolan independence movement, and the Palestine Liberation Organization into the bargain." In the end, as Mr. Ryan writes, Russell believed that "Russia's chief duty was to send arms and advisers to every anti-American cause wherever it might be found."

How are we to account for this lamentable and often ludicrous record of political

Bookshelf

"Bertrand Russell: A Political Life"

By Alan Ryan

mischief and bad judgment? Russell was clearly no totalitarian himself, but he wasn't much of a friend of democracy either. His responses to the grave political crises of his time tended to be either utopian or defeatist—to favor some all-embracing solution, such as world government, or to settle for a brutal imposition of power. Reading Mr. Ryan's melancholy chronicle, one has the sense that the real life of politics didn't finally interest Russell very much. He was impatient with its processes, contemptuous of its institutions, and full of snobbery and disdain for the kind of people—so much less cultivated and intelligent than himself—who served in its ranks.

Mr. Ryan, a British academic now teaching politics at Princeton University, is not an ideal guide to this dismal history. For one thing, he is too much in awe of Russell's genius (and genealogy) to be really critical of his subject's almost unbroken record of failed judgment. And for another, Mr. Ryan himself so completely shares the standard left-liberal views that held Russell's mind in thrall in his dotage that he cannot see beyond them. As he acknowledges in his preface, "it would be idle to pretend that I find Dean Rusk, General Westmoreland, the editors of The New York Times—or Lloyd George and the War Office of 1916—as sympathetic as Russell." What he has given us is a labored defense of a political record that is largely indefensible.

Mr. Kramer is the editor of The New Criterion.

(7) **Longevity.** ***The Conquest of Politics*** **by Benjamin Barber is reviewed by Francis Kane in the *NY Times Book Review* (12/18/88, p 28). Here is its first paragraph...with thanks to THOM WEIDLICH.**

HOW can you not like a book that offers the following characterization of the illustrious Bertrand Russell's notorious inconsistency? "There is nothing like a timely death to lend vigor and consistency to a life's work. Russell had to contend with staying alive; and by the time he was ninety, consistency must have seemed to him less like the hobgoblin of little minds than the hallmark of a short life."

(8) *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life* by Alan Ryan, is reviewed by John Kenneth Galbraith in *The Washington Post's Book World* (10/30/88,p.1). Thank you, DON JACKANICZ.

Philosopher At the Barricades

BERTRAND RUSSELL
A Political Life
By Alan Ryan
Hill and Wang. 226 pp. $19.95

By John Kenneth Galbraith

I AM NOT quite sure whether Ronald Reagan has legitimized resort to personal anecdote or been a warning against it. Risking that it is the first, I begin with one.

I have shared with Bertrand Russell an association with Trinity College, Cambridge, over many years—his as a lecturer, prospective fellow (the fellowship offer was withdrawn because of his inconvenient agitation against conscription in World War I, when he also went for six months to Brixton gaol) and later as a much cherished fellow; mine, for some 50 years, first as a frequent visitor to economists at the college and later as a fellow and honorary fellow.

John Kenneth Galbraith is Paul M. Warburg professor of economics, emeritus, at Harvard University.



BY EVA HEMMANN

Bertrand Russell

One of my visits was in 1945 or 1946, when I took a day or two off from public business and came down from London. Reading matter was scarce in those stringent years, and on the way I checked the newspaper stalls in vain. At Trinity I found, to my delight, a large volume inscribed "To The Old Guest Room from Bertrand Russell."

My pleasure did not last. It was a tract somewhat in the spirit of Velikovsky, alleging, to the best of my imperfect recollection, that human tenancy on this planet began in A.D. 200, when voyagers from outer space landed suddenly on what is now, in all probability, Soviet Armenia. All earlier history was the richly imagined construction of those who came after. I tried the book two or three times and gave up.

That evening at High Table I found myself, to my pleasure, seated next to Bertrand Russell. He asked where I was staying, and in telling him, I unwisely mentioned what I had been reading.

"Do tell me what you thought of it," he said in distinctly impressive tones.

I faced the moment of truth. It was a book evidently endorsed by a man large in my vision. It was also *that* book. I struggled and said, "I'm afraid I· —*Continued on page 13*

couldn't make a great deal of sense out of it."

"There is none whatsoever," said Russell, "but you would be delighted at how many, seeing my name, praise it inordinately."

My justification for this story is that this is very much the Bertrand Russell of Professor Ryan's book. (Alan Ryan is professor of politics at Princeton and taught earlier at New College, Oxford.) Russell was a man relentlessly in pursuit of the forgivable foibles, errors, inanities, aberrations and insanities of humankind, with perhaps some special attention to Americans.

Alan Ryan seeks on occasion, if somewhat unsuccessfully, to exclude Russell's more deliberate work in philosophy and mathematical logic. He is concerned with the political essayist and sometime participant in matters of religion and ethics; also the determined and even heroic opponent of British participation in World War I and very specifically the conscription of the young; also the man of diverse and, at the time, very challenging views on education, which were expressed both in writing and in the practical experience of running the perilously impoverished Beacon Hill school. Ryan concludes the book with Russell's opposition to Hitler and Stalin and his last years as a relentless advocate of nuclear disarmament and critic of American participation in the Vietnam war.

IT IS a fascinating and even breathtaking account. One marvels that anyone could write as much as Russell did and do so much in any one year or even in a lifetime that extended a full 98 years to 1970. Russell wrote to advocate, instruct and, over many years, also to make money, of which he was recurrently in need. The sheer volume, especially of the nonacademic writing, is a problem for Professor Ryan. There is simply too much to summarize, but he tries, and the reader is left at times with a feeling of the sketchiness of the comment as well as with a far greater number of textual references than anyone could possibly keep in mind.

Yet there is redemption. In nearly all this account one is struck by Bertrand Russell's prescience. On the inbuilt resistance to thought and accommodation of great organizations, public and private, he was far ahead of his time. And likewise on encouragement and excitement as opposed to discipline and punishment in education; and on sex and sex education; and extensively on religious orthodoxy; and on the supreme futility of the mass murder in World War I, then a treasonous view, now largely accepted; and on the repressive tendencies of comprehensive socialism and of Joseph Stalin; and on the nature and consequences of our intervention in Vietnam; and on the awful threat of the arms race and nuclear devastation. Not only did he lead on these matters, but he went on repeatedly to education and agitation. In his last years the latter gave way to extreme and even incoherent condemnation, especially of the United States, some, perhaps much, coming from close associates who had appropriated his name. It is a warning to us all of the dangers of living too long.

As I've noted, the volume of Russell's writing is a problem for Ryan. So, in lesser measure, is the frequency with which Russell changed his mind. One reason he was so often right was that he abandoned with no hesitation any view that showed itself to be fragile or at fault. (Sometimes he apologized very decently to those he had earlier persuaded.) The first chapter, in which Ryan summarizes Russell's early and evolving liberalism, and the one following on "Religion, Ethics and Liberal Politics" are especially demanding, as the author covers a wide range of personal history and writing and must deal with changing views.

These problems apart, this is a very good book. One reads it with a certain chauvinist sorrow. An egregious intervention on religious and personal behavioral grounds in 1940 denied Russell a professorship at City University of New York. Had it been otherwise, we might have had him here in the United States for our even more intimate instruction for the next 30 years.■

FOR SALE

(9) Members' stationery. 8 1/2 x 11, white. Across the top: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." Bertrand Russell" On the bottom: ""Motto of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc." New reduced USA price, $5 for 90 sheets, postpaid. Canada & Mexico still $6. Order from the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

BOOK REVIEWS

(10) ***Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*** by Alan Ryan, is reviewed by Walter Goodman in the ***NY Times*** (12/29/88). Thank you, SHOHIG SHERRY TERZIAN.

The Politics of the Philosopher

By WALTER GOODMAN

Insofar as the name of Bertrand Russell means anything to Americans today, it probably conjures up the gaunt white-haired patriarchal leader of sit-ins against the nuclear bomb and speak-outs against the war in Vietnam. In the closing decades of his long life, the British Nobel Prize-winner turned entirely away from his provocative and innovative work in philosophy, logic and education toward what he saw as life-and-death issues of the time.

In concentrating on the public figure, Allan Ryan makes a pertinent contribution to Russelliana. His analytic new book reminds us that Russell's "political life" began long before his emergence as a radical leader in his 80's and 90's. He came by politics naturally, as a descendant of an aristocratic family of liberal inclination. In Russell's 1896 work, "German Social Democracy," Mr. Ryan notes, the grandson of Britain's first Liberal Prime Minister carved out a position of his own on the political left: "He had no time for inherited power, doubted the legitimacy of landed property and thought universal adult suffrage the only tolerable basis of political authority; but he was no socialist. He felt no sort of solidarity with working people; and he thought that under any regime differential rewards for differential contributions would be required." In 1907, he ran for Parliament on a platform of women's suffrage.

Russell's first wholehearted plunge into politics came in World War I, which he viewed as "a lunatic enterprise" brought about by national envy. His unswerving opposition to the war in general and conscription in particular brought him a brief stay in jail. Mr. Ryan, a former Oxford don now teaching politics at Princeton, observes that here as elsewhere, Russell's views did not fit into established categories. Although he denied that self-defense was a sufficient reason for fighting a war, Russell was no pacifist. Mr. Ryan calls him "a consequentialist." To put the case bluntly, the killing of large numbers of people was defensible if the good achieved was sufficient. But whatever his theoretical position, in practice Russell opposed war and favored a vague sort of world government.

Bertrand Russell
A Political Life
By Alan Ryan
226 pages. Hill & Wang. $19.95.

Pictorial Parade, 1980
Bertrand Russell

In the 1920's, he stood as a Labor Party candidate for an unwinnable seat in Parliament but parted from much of the British left in his critical view of Russia's October Revolution. Although he opposed Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks, Mr. Ryan writes that he discerned in the new Soviet regime "old-fashioned Asiatic brutality, tsarist inefficiency and an attitude to Marxism which blended superstition and hypocrisy." He saw little hope for freedom under any Marxist regime.

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Russell's attitude toward the United States was more ambiguous. He was attracted by liberal democracy but put off by a capitalism he saw as exploitive and potentially bloodthirsty. When he lost the offer of a chair at the City College of New York in 1940 under the pressure of the Roman Catholic Church and others who had been affronted by his writings on religion and sex, it could only confirm a distaste for America that would color his later views.

In Mr. Ryan's fair assessment, the 1930's were not Russell's brightest years as a political prophet. Guided by his belief that a second world war would mean the destruction of civilized life, he preached appeasement of the Nazis, a position he soon came to regret. He put his hopes for post-war peace in some sort of Platonic society — a planned economy that would combine American productivity and Russian authoritarianism.

After the Allied victory in World War II, when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, Russell, outspoken if not prudent, urged a war to end all war against the Soviet Union. Some years later he would conclude that it was the United States that was the true threat to peace, and he sought Soviet intervention in behalf of the Vietcong, Cuba and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Mr. Ryan confirms that in his last decade of activism through the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmanent and his impassioned opposition to the war in Vietnam and in favor of the Vietcong, Russell was influenced, if not controlled, by some of those around him. But the biographer makes a convincing case that the fierce hostility Russell displayed toward America was not an aberration of "extreme old age or thrust upon him by wild young men." Mr. Ryan finds the roots of his view that "the American government was genocidal, the police efforts pretty much on a par with the camp guards at Auschwitz and black rioting a justified response to a campaign of extermination" in his earlier writings.

What the generally sympathetic biographer considers alarming about his final years is the high proportion of abuse to argument (Russell called British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan more wicked than Hitler, then regretted doing so) and the habit of asserting disputed facts without any suggestion that they were open to doubt. Grievous charges against a philosopher — but then Bertrand Russell had long since moved away from that line of work.

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The 6 BRS officers are also directors, ex officio

OPINION

(12) From *The Saturday Review of Literature* 2/2/52, p. 14. Thank you, HARRY RUJA.

"Cheer up, Gilbey—we're close to civilization!"

BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

(13) BR reviews Schweitzer's book, *Civilization and Ethics*, in *The Dial*, April 1924. Thank you, TOM STANLEY.

DOES ETHICS INFLUENCE LIFE?

CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS. *(The Philosophy of Civilization, Part II.) By Albert Schweitzer. Translated by John Naish. (Black. 10s. 6d.)*

DR SCHWEITZER'S book is of considerable importance, and deserves to be read with care. The translator tells us that the lectures at Mansfield College, on which the book is based, were delivered in French, while the MS. was in German. The explanation is that Dr Schweitzer is an Alsatian; and this no doubt has given him a certain impartiality in the conflicts of our age.

Dr Schweitzer traces our misfortunes to a curious source: the mistaken belief that our views on ethics must be dependent upon our views as to the nature of the world. He greatly admires the Eighteenth Century, because of its enlightenment and optimism. But machinery and Darwinism and other modern improvements destroyed optimism about the nature of the world, and therefore (because of the above erroneous belief) also destroyed men's ethical optimism, though the outward form of optimism was preserved by degrading ethical valuations to the level of what were thought to be facts about the actual world. Hence our profound immorality, with all its attendant ruin.

Dr Schweitzer's own position is agnostic as to the real world. He is more or less Kantian both in this matter and in the belief that ethics can stand without any support from metaphysics. But he does not follow the Critique of Practical Reason in using ethics to establish metaphysical conclusions. His ethics consists of a single principle, which he calls "reverence for life." This principle he carries almost as far as the Buddhists. He says that if you work with a lamp on a hot summer night you should keep your windows shut for fear of hurting moths; that if, on a wet day, you find a worm on the pavement you should pick it up and put it on damp earth; and so on. Nevertheless, he does not enjoin vegetarianism or condemn vivisection, though on the latter subject he has qualms. It is not clear whether he is an out-and-out pacifist, though he commends the Quakers as the only religious body which throughout the war remained faithful to the teaching of Christ. He holds, as against the Socialists, that private property and inheritance are sacred rights, which cannot be taken away without infringing his principle of reverence for life; though, of course, he goes on to say that it is our moral duty to use our property for the benefit of the community.

These positive conclusions are contained in the last few chapters; the bulk of the book is concerned in discussing European philosophers from Socrates to Count Kayserling, and affirming their inferiority to the philosophers of India and China, whom he does not discuss. One must suppose that these critical chapters appear to the author, and will appear to many readers, to afford a solid argumentative foundation for his own opinions. This, however, is not and cannot be the case: his criticisms all assume his own point of view, and are only valid if that is granted. For my part, I share

his opinions to a very great extent; but I should not attempt to give a basis for an ethical opinion by criticism of the stock philosophers. The argument that what ought to be cannot be deduced from what is, seems to me valid, and sufficient to condemn almost all European ethics and metaphysics, which have attained their "profundity" by confusing the good with the true. But it follows that when a man tells us "such-and-such is good in itself" he cannot advance any valid argument for his position, nor can we advance any valid argument against it. What passes for argument, on such questions, is really exhortation or rhetoric; and, for my part, I should prefer not to disguise this fact by an apparatus of irrelevant erudition.

There are two matters of importance on which I find myself in disagreement with Dr Schweitzer. One concerns his ethical criterion of reverence for life, and the possibility of using it to decide practical difficulties; the other concerns the causal importance of ethical opinions in relation to public events.

Life, in itself, seems to be neither good nor bad, and it is difficult to see why we should reverence it. We do not know how far the lower forms of life are associated with sentience; and, apart from sentience, living matter is ethically indistinguishable from dead matter. There are passages which suggest that Dr Schweitzer believes in hylozoism; he speaks of destroying an ice crystal in the same way in which he speaks of destroying a flower or a moth. But, if so, he falls into the error which he is chiefly concerned to attack, namely, that of founding his ethic upon a highly disputable metaphysic. He certainly conceives "life" in some more or less mystical way: he defends mysticism, and urges that ethics should be "cosmic." It is difficult to understand what he means by this, since human actions can only affect events on or near the surface of the earth. Physics is "cosmic" because it applies to the whole known universe; but ethics seems as terrestrial as geography, unless we assume some such view of the world as Dr Schweitzer rightly declares to be ethically irrelevant.

Passing by these difficulties, and confining ourselves to the higher forms of life, we find that they contain not only all that is good in the known universe, but also all that is bad. If reverence for life is the good, a tiger must be bad. If we assign to the tiger the same importance as to each of the animals that it kills, we shall kill it in order to maximize life. We are thus committed to a calculus of causes and effects, just as the utilitarians were. All the usual justifications of war, slavery, and so on, become theoretically admissible, and must be examined on their merits, not dismissed *à priori*. This is not what Dr Schweitzer intends. He wishes us to decide each moral problem in some intuitionist way which is not clearly defined. He says: "Only the reverence of my will-to-live for every other will-to-live is genuinely ethical. Whenever I sacrifice or injure life in any way I am not ethical, but rather am I guilty, whether it be egoistically guilty for the sake of maintaining my own existence or wellbeing, or unegoistically guilty with a view to maintaining those of a majority." It follows that a man who kills a tiger is "guilty"; and yet Dr Schweitzer would not say that we ought to abstain from killing tigers. On this point he seems to have failed to think out his ethic, as also on the different degrees of intrinsic value attaching to different forms of life.

Finally, it is difficult to agree with Dr Schweitzer in the importance which he attaches to ethical opinions as a cause. If all the professors of ethics in all the universities of the world had taught his ethical system throughout the last one hundred years, I doubt whether one line of the Versailles Treaty would have been different from what it is. It is true that the ethical opinions of the average man have altered during the last century, but they have altered as a result of machinery, not of academic theory, and they have altered so as to justify what the average man was going to do in any case. Speaking causally, our ethics are an effect of our actions, not *vice versa*; instead of practising what we preach, we find it more convenient to preach what we practise. When our practice leads us to disaster we tend to alter it, and at the same time to alter our ethics; but the alteration of our ethics is not the cause of the alteration of our practice. Experience of pain affects the behaviour of animals and infants, although they have no morals; it affects the behaviour of adult human beings in the same way, but the change is accompanied by ethical reflections which we falsely imagine to be its cause. Dr Schweitzer's book is an example of such reflections. But neither it nor its academic predecessors seem to the present reviewer to have that importance in moulding events which the author attributes to them.

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(14) From the *Detroit Jewish Chronicle*, 18 Nov 1927, with thanks to HARRY RUJA:

Bertrand Russell

It is eminently fitting that Bertrand Russell, coming to Detroit Saturday, should appear under the auspices of the B'nai B'rith. Those who have followed the writings of this greatest of all modern thinkers know that there is almost a family resemblance between the thought of Bertrand Russell and the thought of the best Jewish minds today.

This kinship of attitude and approach is no mere accident. Jewish thought today, wherever it has freed itself from the confining narrowness of ecclesiasticism, is intent upon just the sort of intellectual realism that makes Russell the philosopher of modernity. Accepting nothing that cannot be logically demonstrated, weighing all things that can ge weighed by human understanding and viewing all the rest with an open mind—that is the mental attitude of Russel. And that is the mental attitude of the Jew today.

We would caution those who are familiar with Russell and his philosophy only from the chapter in the "Story of Philosophy" by Will Durant, that our English guest is not at all the cold thinking machine that the popular Mr. Durant makes him out to be. The thousands who have received that impression from Durant's book will, if they hear Mr. Russell during his tour of the United States, be very much surprised to find that he is really a high-strung, emotional man—a fact that does not emerge from his writings. He is the inspired mathematician, the poet of numbers. He knows and understands the emotions of man and gives them their due place in the scheme of things as they are.

In this he is again the uncompromising realist. He views science, not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end—an end that we do not, perhaps cannot know.

He is not deceived by the noisy blatancies of our civilization. Human values transcend all other values in his philosophy. He allows the machine its proper place in society but he does not glorify the machine. Neither does he fall into the alternative error of egocentric pride. To him man is not the center of the universe but he is the center of his own little universe. He knows our human fears but he neither pities nor blames us for them, much less does he deride us, as some have seen fit to do recently. He is the scientist of the human mind. He observes, understands and records.

It will be obvious that in that respect Russell resembles Spinoza. Like the great Jewish thinker, he sees the universe as a vast machine of cause and effect, but, again like Spinoza, he does not jump to the conclusion that the problem of human life and its meaning is solved by that phrase. Spinoza has been called the "God-Intoxicated man." Russell, too, experiences a sublime intoxication, but it is Science that intoxicates him. Not the methods of science, which change with every new problem, but the aim of science, the intellectual approach of science.

There is still another analogy between Russell and Spinoza. It has been said that "Spinoza's God was an atheist." So also is Russell's Science. It is not quite sure of itself. Which, after all, is the very quintessence of the scientific approach.

We have had occasion in these columns to commend Pisgah Lodge for its enterprising intellectual advancement programs. May we one more congratulate this splendid organization for having arranged to bring Mr. Russell to Detroit. The whole community owes Pisgah Lodge a rising vote of thanks.

BOOK REVIEWS

(15) **Whitewash.** From *The Troubled Face of Biography*, Eric Homberger and John Charmley, eds. (NY: St. Martin's Press)...with thanks to PETER CRANFORD. The following excerpt begins by referring to Tom Moore's *Life of Byron* (1830):

> ; but his work is tainted by the un-Byronic timidity of the age in which he wrote, and our sense of what is missing is the more vexing because we know that Moore, and suspect that his executor, Lord John Russell, destroyed many of the documents on which it rests.
>
> Later biographies of the nineteenth century are far worse. I confess that I never realised how far the Victorians were ready to go until I read the life of Lord John Russell's widow by her daughter, Lady Mary Agatha Russell, and Desmond MacCarthy (1910). Seldom can family piety have gone so far. None of the dramas and anguishes which Bertrand Russell makes so fascinating in his various accounts of his family (he was Lady John's grandson) is allowed to emerge. The result, necessarily, is that Lady John, one of the most remarkable women of her time, never for an instant comes to life, even though her biographers conscientiously follow Boswell and Moore by intruding as much primary material as they can lay hands on and fillet. The *Life* of Lady John Russell exemplifies the process by which Boswell's brilliant art was congealed, in pious hands, into the dismal official two-volume biographies which Lytton Strachey made it his business to discredit.

WITHOUT GOD

(16) SOS has competition. AAARG! -- American Atheists' Addiction Recovery Groups -- "concerns itself with saving lives, not souls (whatever those are)." It calls itself "the only national alternative to the cultish Christian Alcoholics Anonymous." It is the second "substance abuse" organization to come to our attention. The first was SOS -- Secular Organizations for Sobriety -- which we reported on in RSN58-21. AAARG!'s address: P.O. Box 6120, Denver, CO 80206-0120. Thank you, JACK COWLES.

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RECOMMENDED READING

(18) *Opposing Viewpoints Series* is a truly remarkable series of books on just about every controversial issue you can think of:

> Abortion, Aids, American Foreign Policy, American Government, The American Military, American Values, America's Elections, America's Prisons, Constructing a Life Philosophy, Crime & Criminals, Criminal Justice, Death & Dying, The Death Penalty, Drug Abuse, Economics in America, The Environmental Crisis, Latin America & the U.S., Foreign Policy, Male/Female Roles, The Mass Media, The Middle East, Nuclear War, The Political Spectrum, Poverty, The Problems of Africa, Sexual Values, Social Justice, The Soviet Union, Teenage Sexuality, Terrorism, The Vietnam War, War and Human Nature.

Many books on controversial subjects are published in America, but not many get wide distribution, and usually sink without a trace. One of the surprising things about this series is that you will probably find at least some of the volumes in your own local library. We found them in two small branch libraries that we visited.

They seem ideal for use in high schools, for classroom discussions. They are also good reading.

The volumes present opposing viewpoints by competent experts. For instance, the volume, *"Constructing a Life Philosophy"*, now in its 5th edition, includes an essay on Humanism by Corliss Lamont, one on Atheism by Madalyn O'Hair, and one, *"Jesus Christ Gives Life Purpose"* by Billy Graham. *"Religion and Science"* includes *"The Church Should Not Have Final Authority in Science,"* by Galileo Galilei [1614], and *"The Church Should Have Final Authority in Science"* by the Roman Curia. It also presents opposing essays on *"Are Science and Religion Compatible?"*, *"How Did The Universe Originate?"*, *"How Did Life Originate?"*, *"Should Ethical Values Limit Scientific Research?"*

Each volume has an admirable introduction by the publisher, David L. Bender, who discusses *"Developing Basic Reading and Thinking Skills"*, skills which include *"Evaluating Sources of Information"*, *"Separating Fact From Opinion"*, *"Identifying Stereotypes'*, and *"Recognizing Ethnocentrism"*.

The 2 volumes mentioned above are paperback, priced at $8.95, $9.95 delivered; we ordered them by postcard from the publisher, Greenhaven Press, 577 Shoreview Park Road, St. Paul, MN 55126, and charged them to a credit card. Greenhaven's Spring 1988 Catalog shows a price of $6.95; maybe you can buy them for less than we did. Greenhaven's phone: 1-800-231-5163

RENEWAL HONOR ROLL

(19) A record number of members -- 149 -- paid their 1989 dues before January 1st. We are delighted by this fine showing, which gives the renewal-process a real head start. Here are the 149 early birds:

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BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

(20) *A Guide For Living In The Atomic Age* is the title of this article in United Nations World, November 1949, 3(11),33-36...with thanks to TOM STANLEY.

WHAT is meant by "loyalty"? When is it a virtue, and when

"loyalty" may be defined as willingness to make personal sacrifices for the good of a group of which one is a member. Men can and do feel loyalty to many different kinds of groups, of which family, nation, class, party, creed, are the most important. The first three are biological, the last three mental. Buddha, Christ and the Stoics taught that we ought to feel loyalty to all mankind, but how far their teaching has had effect.

Is loyalty always a virtue? I should say emphatically No. It is common to think that all bad conduct springs from selfishness, and to infer that any conduct which has an unselfish motive must be good. But if by "good" we mean "likely to promote human welfare," then much unselfish conduct must count as "bad." Everything depends upon the cause to which sacrifice is made.

Broadly speaking, loyalty is undesirable when the group concerned has harmful purposes. A pirate may risk his life to save that of his captain, when it would be a good thing if his captain were killed. Similarly, a soldier may die for his country in an unjust war. The world would now be better than it is if, in the two world wars, Germans had been destitute of loyalty—at least so most people who are not German think. What can be said generally is that no group is likely to achieve any collective purpose, whether good or bad, unless most of the members of the group are loyal to it. It may also be said that loyalty in a good cause is not likely to exist unless blind unquestioning loyalty has become a habit. On this ground many people value loyalty regardless of its object. But I think that such people have failed to realize how much of what is worst and most dangerous in the existing world situation is due to this very practice of unquestioning loyalty, particularly loyalty to the national State.

Today it has become of the utmost importance to generate, if possible, new loyalties which transcend the boundaries of national states. But can loyalty be extended from the national State to a supra-national group of states? The problem is difficult both politically and psychologically. Let us consider first what are the most usual or most potent causes of loyalty itself.

IT IS clear that loyalty has an instinctive basis; it exists in savage tribes. It seems to be natural to human beings to view members of their own herd with feelings that are friendly in the absence of specific causes of hostility, and to view everyone else with feelings that are hostile in the absence of special reasons for friendliness. Among savages the herd is small, and every member of it is known to every other; the basis of friendliness in this case is familiarity. Although, in a large modern nation, this basis is not so directly present, it still supplies a background. Members of the same nation, on the average, have more in common than members of different nations—language, ways of behaving, habits in eating and drinking, and so on. But, above all, they have the same enemies. Foreigners may always be a source of danger, and if this happens compatriots are likely to find themselves on the same side. Connected with the sense of danger is love of home. A hen will risk death by crossing a road in front of a car, because she feels safer at home. Human beings also feel safer at home and emotionally they feel as if all compatriots had the same home. This makes all compatriots lovable in times of danger.

In addition to the instinctive grounds of loyalty, there are others that have a more or less rational basis. The chief of these are common interests and common beliefs. Among groups generated by the former are pirate crews, invading armies, and companies for the development of backward areas; among the latter, political parties and religious sects. But loyalties of this sort are not very secure under stress, unless they have a backing in instinctive loyalty or a very obvious and compelling appeal to self-interest. It is this that makes the difficulty in generating a supra-national loyalty. The instinctive part tends to remain purely national, while the remainder, so long as it depends upon reason and argument, is liable to break down just when it is most needed.

THE problem of supra-national loyalty differs according to whether the new unit is world-wide or is only a group which has, or may have, external enemies. The Western Union, or the countries in the Atlantic Pact, may acquire unity and intensity of loyalty, from fear of Russia or of Communism. Fear of external enemies has always been the most powerful source of social cohesion. This can be invoked, given adequate propaganda, whenever there is any obvious external common danger. But it is not easy to picture in this way a loyalty to the whole human race or to a world State.

Communists have to a great extent succeeded in creating among their non-Russian adherents a loyalty which is supra-national. They have done this in four ways: by a dogmatic common creed; by inspiring hate and fear towards non-Communists; by completely rewriting history; and by a monopoly of all means of propaganda (including education and the press) wherever they have acquired power. These methods cannot produce a world-wide unity except by the complete victory of Communism. The methods are, in the main, such as non-Communists cannot adopt without being untrue to their principles. We must, therefore, look for other ways of producing a supra-national loyalty.

I THINK it should not be very difficult, in the course of fifty years or so, to generate a very reliable loyalty to a group such as the Western Union, or even to the whole of Western Europe and English-speaking North America. There is a considerable degree of cultural unity, produced first by the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, and strengthened in our own time by science and scientific technique. There is (rightly or wrongly) a common apprehension of danger from the East. These causes have already given rise to a vigorous movement towards political union, and they should, before long, produce a corresponding degree of economic cooperation.

If a group of Western Powers are genuinely anxious to create a supra-national sense of solidarity among the nations composing the group, there are certain things that they must do. First, they must rewrite the textbooks of history used in schools, which should become the same in all countries concerned. The new textbooks should lay stress on whatever cultural unity exists, and should minimize cultural differences. They should carefully abstain from glorification of any one member nation at the expense of any other. They should make past wars between member nations appear as foolish civil wars. And they should suggest that the nations composing the group can do great things for mankind in the future, provided they remain friends and not enemies.

Next, they should have a common flag and a common supra-national anthem. The Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack must no longer obtrude themselves on the consciousness of children, and it must not be for "God Save the King" that we all stand up. But these powerful methods of emotional stimulation must not be discarded; they must merely be transferred to new symbols. I am sure the reader will feel a vehement resistance to this suggestion. I feel it myself. But the strength of our unreflecting resistance is the best proof of the necessity of the change that I am advocating.

THERE is another measure which may be desirable with a view to stimulating a feeling of unity, but which has its dangers. The unity of a nation is symbolized by a King or President, and a supra-national union, if it is to make an equally strong appeal, must also be symbolized by a person. In modern times such a person cannot be a King or Emperor, but must be an elected President. There are, however, two dangers. One is that the President might become a Führer; the other is that there might be jealousies and contests between the nations as to which of them the President should come from. To obviate the first of these dangers, I should give to the President only such functions as belong to our King. To obviate the second, I should decree that he must come from a country with a small population. Given these two conditions, I think the President should be chosen for life, prayed for in church, and saluted with a salute of more than twenty-one guns.

Loyalty to a group of Powers which is not world-wide can be much facilitated by methods which retard the advance to world unity. Fear of hostile groups is the main cause of such supra-national unity as now exists or is within the sphere of practical politics. To emphasize such fear in education and in political propaganda is one of the easiest ways of stimulating the sentiment of unity. Another is to preach the superiority of our own group of nations; for instance, by calling it the Christian group, and dwelling on the merits of Christianity as compared to other religions. Such methods of producing unity in a group, though they may be necessary for practical reasons, are to be deprecated in the long run, except is so far as they are a liberation from the tyranny of a narrow nationalism. Combinations of groups of nations are, I think, very necessary for a number of urgent reasons, but only a world-wide unity affords any real solution of the appalling problems with which civilization is faced. And for the present the prospect of world-wide unity is very dim.

TO GENERATE the kind of sentiment which (one hopes) will ultimately make world unity a real thing, first leaders and then populations must undergo a long process of re-education. We must learn to think and feel about mankind collectively. We must give our attention to the things that have been achieved by the human race: tools, fire, language, agriculture, art, science, industry, etc. We must emphasize both biological evolution and the diffusion of culture. The history that we teach to the young must show how, over and over again, civilizations have climbed to a certain height, and then decayed by ossification or been destroyed by war. In economics, instead of laying stress on competition, we must show how wealth has resulted from co-operation in larger and larger units. The aim should be to create ing for man as man, and a r tion of the ways by which more and more develop the by which he is distinguished fr rest of the known universe. Th sult should be that, when any is proposed, our first sponta reaction is to consider how affect mankind, not how it will this or that group.

ALTHOUGH our main emph should be on the hope of pos achievement, there is still a place the rational realization of dan Do you wish the human race to exterminated by atom bombs?

you content that we should conti to suffer from plagues and pestile which a concerted effort could w out? Are you willing to look passively while the population creases to a point at which an a quate food supply becomes impos ble? Of such world-wide human pro lems there are many. They cann be tackled at present, because no o effectively cares for mankind a whole. If governments so desir the young could be educated way which would make them vividly aware of such problems they now are of those affecting t safety of their own nation.

Before this can happen, howeve we have a long way to go. It is nin teen hundred years since Christ said "Thou shalt love thy neighbor thyself." I wonder how many mo years it will be before people beg to think that this was sound advic

CHURCH/STATE SEPARATION

(21) Adam Jacobs states his case:

Adam Jacobs
51 Clifton Ave., Apt. C-508
Newark, New Jersey 07104

December 17, 1988

Mr. Stephen W. Townsend
Clerk, New Jersey Supreme Court
Hughes Justice Complex
CN 970
Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Dear Mr. Townsend:

The three undersigned individuals are recently admitted members of the New Jersey Bar (1987). We are writing to express our objection to the use of the words "in the year of our Lord" on the certificate to practice law issued by the New Jersey Supreme Court. As an agnostic, secular humanist, and atheist respectively, we are personally offended that the certificate indicates the date of conferral by making reference to and exalting (through capitalization of the word "Lord") a deity in which we do not believe.

It is customary in our profession to display one's bar certificate in one's place of business. For us to display these certificates would violate our rights of freedom of speech and of religion, because our names appear and are associated with a named deity in which we, as non-theists, do not believe. We find it particularly objectionable that a direct reference to a deity is made on a document conferred by a judicial body, since the judiciary, among all other legal institutions, should be most sensitive to maintaining religious neutrality on documents issued in its name.

Clearly, the date could be stated in a secular fashion simply as "nineteen hundred and eighty-seven." This date, though derived from the alleged historical birthdate of Jesus, could, if stated plainly, be fairly interpreted to mean "after the common era" (a.c.e.). This alternative differs significantly from the expressly religious character of the wordage currently used and satisfies the test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which requires the state to use the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state objective that burdens religious beliefs.

We propose a solution; namely, that all those attorneys already holding certificates containing the words "in the year of our Lord" be given the option, after personal notice, to exchange their existing certificates for newly issued versions denoting the date in the secular fashion described above. (Please see attached diploma from Rutgers University Law School for example of neutral wording.) Henceforth, however, all certificates would refer to the date only in secular form.

Please contact us if this suggestion is acceptable to you. If it is not, please write us with an explanation so that your position will be concisely stated in the event a legal remedy becomes necessary.

For an example of the United States Supreme Court's posture toward constitutional issues conceptually close to those raised here, please see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1976), where the Court held that the state of New Hampshire could not force its citizens to display its motto ("Live free or die") on the state's license plates.

Thank you for your kind and prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Adam Jacobs Ann Sorrel Charles Novins

cc: American Civil Liberties Union
The Bertrand Russell Society
The Ethical Cultural Society
Atheists United
Americans for Religious Liberty
American Humanist Association
Freedom From Religion Foundation
National Lawyers Guild
Free Inquiry
New Jersey Law Journal
Rutgers Law Record
Res Ipsa Loquitur - Seton Hall Law School

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL ARCHIVES

(22) In the beginning...or how it all began, as reported in *The Observer*, London, 31 March 1968, p.3, with thanks to HARRY RUJA:

Russell letters sold to Canada

by DONALD TRELFORD

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S vast collection of letters and papers has been sold for a world record sum to a university in Canada and will be leaving Britain in the next few weeks.

The deal was completed at Lord Russell's home, Penrhyndeudraeth, in North Wales, last week by Mr William Ready, librarian and Professor of Bibliography at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.

The price has not been disclosed, but is thought unlikely to have been less than £250,000—higher than the previous record reputedly paid for the papers of Trotsky and Yeats.

The Canadian bid was successful after more than a year's negotiations against powerful competition from universities, museums and foundations in the United States, Europe and the Far East. A number of oil-rich Arab sheikhs also showed some interest.

No firm British bid was included in the 30 finally considered, though a number of bodies, including the British Museum, made inquiries; they finally admitted they couldn't afford to compete.

Questions are likely to be asked in Parliament as to why this unique collection—which sheds rare light on the intellectual, political and literary life of Britain over the best part of a century—should be allowed to go overseas.

Part of the cost of the collection is being met by a grant from the Canada Council, equivalent to the Arts Council in Britain; the rest is coming from foundations and private donors in Ontario. The money will go to Lord Russell himself and not, it is stressed, to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

Negotiations have been conducted by Russell's literary agents, Continuum 1, at their third-floor office in Oxford Street, London, where it has taken a research team two years to catalogue the collection—which includes about 150,000 letters, manuscripts, tapes, journals, diaries and awards. Transporting the collection will involve complex cartage and insurance problems; it will probably be flown by Air Canada in sealed and boarded-steel containers in four consignments in the next five weeks.

Prolific

The collection is in four parts. The first includes the Amberley papers, the saga of the related Russell and Stanley families. The second has manuscripts of Russell's work in mathematics and philosophy. The third is his private correspondence with friends and writers such as Conrad, Lawrence, Forster, Eliot, Wells and Virginia Woolf. The political section comes last, containing voluminous mementoes of Russell's work for world peace, including personal correspondence with scientists and statesmen from Einstein to Ho Chi Minh.

The archives establish Russell's claim to be the century's most prolific correspondent: he has written at least one letter for every 30 hours of his life—he is 95—and the causes he has publicly espoused range from Dreyfus to Lee Harvey Oswald.

In the archive centre at McMaster University, his papers will join those of Gabriel Fielding, Anthony Burgess and the Wheat Board of Canada. McMaster is one of 14 State-supported universities in Ontario and has the only nuclear reactor in any Commonwealth seat of learning.

Professor Ready, biographer of Professor J. R. R. Tolkein, creator of the Hobbits, is a genial Welshman who joined the 'brain drain' himself 20 years ago after reading English at the University of Wales in Cardiff and Balliol College, Oxford. 'This is a great Commonwealth coup,' he said. 'I was conscious all the time of fierce American competition. I hope this will begin a trend to Canada away from the US. We cannot pursue serious research work in Canada without primary sources. The Russell papers will enrich Canada's resources for graduate work in many fields. Archival control of material of this kind is vital to our civilisation.

'Although the papers will be housed at McMaster, they will be available to scholars from all over the world. This freedom of access is written into the sale. It is a must, and I'd like to emphasise that.'

This is the most important collection ever to enter Canada, but it isn't Professor Ready's first scholastic coup. When he was at Milwaukee he acquired the Tolkein papers and at Stanford University he brought home a collection of the papers of Somerset Maugham

'It's a great game,' he says. 'I recently got hold of a remarkable collection of Roman studies in Leipzig, East Germany—and between ourselves, I hear there's an eleventh-century Boethius right here in London'

PHILOSOPHY

(23) BRS at APA, 1988. The announcement and an abstract:

The Bertrand Russell Society will present a panel on the philosophy of Bertrand Russll in conjunction with the Eastern Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C. This session will convene at 5:15 p.m. on Wednesday, December 28, 1988, in the Holmes room of the Sheraton-Washington Hotel. The program will consist of:

PAPER: "The Ontological Foundation of Russell's Theory of Modality". Jan Dejnozka

Commentator: Thomas Magnell, Smith College

Chair: David E. Johnson, United States Naval Academy

Abstract of
"THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF MODALITY"
by Jan Dejnozka

Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe four Parmenidean theories of being Russell held in his life: Literal in 1903; universal in 1912, timeless in 1914; transcendental in 1914-1948. The transcendental theory underlies the primary level of Russell's modal logic. In Part IV, I examine Rescher's view that Russell and modal logic did not mix.

DUES

(24) Your dues are overdue if you haven't yet renewed for 1989.

As you know, all dues were due on January 1st (except for new members who joined in December.)

The penalty for non-payment of renewal dues is drastic. It is, in fact, the ultimate penalty: extinction. We overheard this conversation: "What ever happened to WINKLER?" "He vanished. He has never been seen again." Obviously, Winkler became a non-person. Ugh!

Don't let it happen to you!

Use the MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL COUPON on the blue front page of this newsletter.Do it now...don't put it off!

Do it for yourself...and do it for us...we like having you as a menber!

Do it!

BRS AUTHORS

(25) A new book from Humanism's ----------> chief philosopher

N E W • B O O K • A V A I L A B L E • N O W

A Lifetime of Dissent

by Corliss Lamont

This collection of essays presents the views of a world-famous Humanist, philosopher and civil libertarian on the major issues of our time. Dr. Lamont has been a dissenter on most of the chief economic, political, philosophic and social issues that confront us. He also champions human rights, freedom of choice and the use of scientific method and reason, with an inspiring commitment to personal and political freedom, and to the happiness and survival of humanity. His suggestions for solutions to some of today's most pressing problems are eminently rational and sensible, and are set forth in no-nonsense prose.

- In "The Crime Against Cuba (1961) he condemns the CIA-sponsored invasion of that island under the Kennedy Administration.
- In "Vietnam: Corliss Lamont vs. Ambassador Lodge" (1967) he debates with Lodge the legality and morality of the war.
- "Adventures in Civil Liberties" (1967) describes Lamont's two most successful victories in the federal courts.
  In one he defeated Senator Joe McCarthy;
  in another he proved a federal censorship statute unconstitutional.

His decades-long effort to achieve better U.S.-Soviet understanding is of particular historical interest in view of the recently improved relations between the two countries.

Available from Prometheus Books, 700 E. Amherst St., Buffalo, NY 14215, or call toll free 800-421-0351. In N.Y. State call 716-837-2475. Price: $21.95 plus $2.25 for postage and handling. 414 pages. Hardcover.

(26) Hugh Moorhead has put together a fascinating book, *The Meaning of Life*. Here is how the publisher describes it:

> Great writers and thinkers of the 20th Century respond to the question, *What is the meaning or purpose of life?* 250 of them give their answers, including T. S. Eliot, Martin Gardner, Stephen Jay Gould, Joseph Heller, Margaret Mead, Ashley Montague, G. E. Moore, Reinhold Neibuhr, Karl Popper, Eleanor Roosevelt, Bertrand Russell, Dora Russell, Adlai Stevenson, Arnold Toynbee.
>
> Almost none of the responses has appeared in print before. Some handwritten inscriptions that are specially interesting are reproduced alongside the printed version.
>
> Hugh Moorhead is Professor of Philosophy at Northeastern Illinois University. Some time ago, he sent his copy of *Modern Man In Search Of A Soul* to its author, C. G. Jung, asking him to inscribe the book, and to comment on the core question. Jung honored his request. That was the beginning of a *thirty-five year* quest for more answers. And here they are, in this remarkable book.

20% discount to BRS members, says Hugh. List price 14.95. If you wish, he'll autograph it. Possible autographs: "To [your name]"; or "Best wishes to [your name]" ; or some suitable phrase that you suggest. To order, send 11.96 + 2.00, total 13.96, to Prof. Hugh Moorhead, 1350 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60610

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

(27) Ramon Suzara in the (Manilla) Sunday Times Magazine, 12/4/88, p.13:

What I want for Christmas

FOR THIS CHRISTMAS, I want those thousands of men, women and children outside in the streets of Manila seeking to survive under the most inhuman of conditions to be inside the churches, cathedrals, temples and chapels. If we refuse to love our neighbors, then we should let God love them instead! In the meantime, I want those streets swept and properly maintained and no longer to be used as garbage dumps for display as emblems of the kind of life we now have in the Philippines.

FOR this Christmas, I want school teachers and college professors to bring students in touch with the finest achievements of the human mind. To teach them HOW to think, and not WHAT to think. To make them appreciate that there is not only beauty, but also power in the mind that thinks. That there is more to freedom than just the freedom to enjoy stupidity. That the individual is not the end and the aim of his own being: outside the individual is his family, his country and the future of the nation under civ lization.

FOR this Christmas, I want the Philippines to compete with other smaller nations in the business of producing experts at raising not only pigs, chickens and cows, but also experts at raising children into becoming useful adults and upright citizens of the country. And then I want the Philippines to compete not with Korea the the manufacture of cars and trucks, but just to compete with Borneo in the construction of better roads and highways that could induce commuters to obey traffic rules and regulations in the Philippines.

FOR this Christmas, I want Congress to make more substantial changes for the Philippines than just changing the names of some national highways or of some municipalities. The entire nation has a lot of catching up to do, not only for a higher standard of thinking. Congress must realize that all of us were born ignorant but not stupid; we were made stupid by education in the Philippines. Indeed, the majority of us continue to live with stupid answers to questions we have not even asked!

FOR this Christmas, I want editors and writers of papers and magazines to publish more facts and information and not lies and misinformation. Without violence, sex is beautiful. But if we must write about killings worthy in the front page of our papers and magazines, we should not ignore the worst kind of killing that is happening every day in the schools, colleges, and universities: – the murder of the curious minds of the students.

FOR this Christmas, I want the Cardinal, the ministers and the evangelists to admit that they know nothing about God; that they know nothing about heaven or hell or the future of mankind; that they know nothing about the virtues of adding to human welfare and happiness. Indeed, they only know that there is order and harmony in the universe; but they know nothing about the disorder and disharmony created by so many kinds of religions. Why is it that everybody wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die?

FOR this Christmas, I want the Philippine Navy to fish for the civilians; I want the Philippine Air Force to fly civilians; and I want the Philippine Army to plant rice for the civilians. Do something nice for a change!

FOR this Christmas, I want the church to encourage the multitude in the practice of birth control and family planning. To preach the morality of contraception and not the morality of impregnation. What the Philippines desperately needs is not more in quantity, but more quality of life. Then perhaps, like many other culturally advanced smaller nations, we too can celebrate once a year the birth of social justice and the growth of common decency throughout the land. It is no longer sane to bless the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of poverty, misery and squalor.

FOR this Christmas, I want the born-again Christians to realize completely that wisdom is functional, not revelational. Everyone when they are born, fresh out of the uterus, is an atheist. No baby has any religion No baby is born as a Moslem, or a Jew, or a Baptist, or a Catholic, or a Hindu. They were born free and then indoctrinated. When they attain an age of intellectual maturity and they repudiate that indoctrination, they become "Born-Again Athe ists." They are back to the purity of their beginning before any of this dreadful theistic beliefs was put into their receptive, but indiscriminating, young and malleable. minds.

FOR this Christmas, I want the Philippines to be free – free from injustice, free from fear and ignorance, free from superstitution, and free from poverty. I want every single Filipino man, woman and child – the citizens of the Philippines – to live under common decency and enjoy the good life inspired by love and guided by knowledge. I want the Filipinos to have faith – faith in themselves, faith in the country, faith in human intelligence, and faith in human progress.

THESE will do for this Christmas. For next Christmas, I want more, much more MERRY CHRISTMAS! ◈ – Poch Suzara

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Mr. Suzara is a member of the Bertrand Russell Society (USA), an organization established to carry on the ideas and beliefs of the world renowned mathematician and philosopher.

(28) Vincent Dufaux Williams "just returned from Brazil [12/88] where I attended an anarcho-syndicalist congress. So you have an anarchist among you!"

HUMANISM

Diversity in beliefs sets Unitarian church apart

Denver Post Wire Services

NEW YORK — An old gag has it that Unitarian Universalists believe in "one God, at most."

"There's truth in that," says the Rev. William F. Schultz, the affable president of the distinctively open-minded denomination.

'Some say God is everything, in the bushes and stars, and some say he's not at all."

In fact, he adds, it's basically impossible to say just what beliefs the historically influential church holds, and that is one of the big challenges it faces.

Schultz

"We've always been creedless," he said in an interview. "We've always tried to be open to all sources of inspiration and not limited to any forms of it.

"While we've been global in our loyalties, we have not been effective in articulating a clear message that all Unitarian Universalists could affirm. That's one of our central tasks."

While relatively small, but with a recently growing membership of 179,000, the denomination has been at the forefront of such social causes as racial justice, women's rights, sheltering refugees and peace. In the United States, it has been the faith of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and Frank Lloyd Wright.

But with its wide-open religious perspective, the church has had a hard time specifying just what it believes.

Mixed responses

For example, Shultz offered mixed answers when asked if members hold such traditional religious beliefs as these:

Q: Do they believe in a God who cares about each person?

A: A few would. The majority would not believe in that kind of personal God.

Q: Life hereafter?

A: Most would not believe in a traditional hereafter. Perhaps a third would say they simply don't know. Some would say the scientific studies of death and dying point to some kind of on-going existence.

Q. Did God create the universe?

A. Some would say the universe had no discreet beginning, that it always existed, that it was not God-created. Few call God an individual, and most would say forces of evolution brought it into being.

Schultz, 38, a relaxed, genial Pennsylvanian with neatly trimmed beard and merry eyes, was elected to his post in 1985, one of the youngest heads of an American denomination.

The Unitarian Universalist Association, headquartered in Boston, draws on all major religions in its teachings — Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity and others, along with their different Scriptures.

While the denomination encompasses all that diversity of beliefs, along with humanism, Schultz said its membership generally affirms several broad concepts that are characteristic, namely:

- That history and the future are in human hands, an entirely human responsibility. "We do not believe in a God or fate that controls it."
- That there is no "supernatural" separate from nature, that "the natural world is interconnected and everything in the universe is dependent on everything else."
- "We do not believe that blessings come from the miraculous, but that they are hidden in the everyday, in the ordinary. To find the face of God, the emergence of the holy, look to the ordinary, the everyday."

Yet even using those words such as "God" and "holy" is not altogether acceptable to members, he said. "To some, those terms are great. But they're anathema to others."

He uses them, he said, "because they have some residual meaning."

Push for ties to Jesus

A minority wing, called the the Unitarian Universalist Christian Fellowship, works to get the denomination to identify clearly with Jesus as its central figure of guidance, publishing such needling questions as:

"So you want to be a Christian, but your church isn't?"

Schultz estimates that wing of the church makes up about 10 percent of members. He says the denomination as a whole honors Jesus as a "model for living" but not as divine. Other churches consider him both human and divine.

Under Schultz' leadership, the church has had a growth rate of 1 to 2 percent a year, the membership climbing from a low of 166,000 at the end of the 1970s to its present 179,000.

Schultz was born into the church, but he said few members are, only about 10 percent. About 90 percent were raised in other faiths.

(29) The Unitarians. From The Irreverent Review, Jane K. Conrad, Editor, POB 625, --------> Brighton, CO 80601. Originally from the Denver Post (7/9/88).

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(30)

RUSSELL SOCIETY LIBRARY
Tom Stanley, Librarian
Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088

Books for sale:

By Bertrand Russell:

Appeal to the American Conscience	$ 3.15	*
Authority and the Individual	3.75	+
The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I	16.00	H+
Vol. II	13.00	H+
Vol. III	11.00	H+
Education and the Social Order	4.25	+
Essays in Analysis, edited by Douglas Lackey	6.50	H
Has Man a Future?	8.00	H*
History of the World in Epitome	1.00	
In Praise of Idleness	3.75	+
The Impact of Science on Society	3.00	+
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth	6.00	+
Mortals and Others, edited by Harry Ruja	8.50	H+
My Philosophical Development	3.75	+
Political Ideals	3.75	+
Power: A New Social Analysis	5.50	
The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism	3.75	+
Principles of Social Reconstruction	3.75	+
Roads to Freedom	4.00	+
Sceptical Essays	4.25	+
The Scientific Outlook	5.50	

By Other Authors:

Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970	1.50	
Bertrand Russell and the Pacifists in the First World War by Jo Vellacott	10.50	H#
Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher by A.J. Ayer	2.25	+
Essays on Socialist Humanism in Honor of the Centenary of Bertrand Russell	4.00	*
	9.00	H
Into the Tenth Decade: A Tribute to Bertrand Russell	5.00	*
The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words	6.75	+
Mr. Wilson Speaks 'Frankly and Fearlessly' on Vietnam to B.R.	1.75	
The Tamarisk Tree, Vol. I by Dora Russell	5.50	H

H Cloth, otherwise paperback.
* Out-of-print. Available until present stock is exhausted.
+ The publisher's pricing on these titles has increased dramatically. The Autobiography volumes now list at $27.95; Unwin paperbacks sell for $7.95.
# New title. Publisher's price is $27.00

Prices are postpaid. Please send check or money-order, payable to the Bertrand Russell Society, to the Russell Society Library, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088.

Recent book donations:

155 Nightmares of Eminent Persons. John Tobin and Jean Anderson.
156 Principia Mathematica to *56. Jean Anderson.

Misc:

A videocassette of Humanism: Making Bigger Circles, produced by the American Humanist Association, is available for loan from the library. The 45 minute tape is narrated by Isaac Asimov and features Corliss Lamont, Donald Johanson, and Dana Andrews.

Books For Philosophers is an occasional catalog from Attic Owl Books, Box 1802, New Sharon, ME 04955. Rare, out of print, and collectable titles are offered. Mail order only.

Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Savage and Anderson, is scheduled for publcation in January. University of Minnesota Press. 29.50.

FINANCES

(31) Treasurer Dennis Darland reports on the year ending 12/31/88:

Bank balance on hand (12/31/87)			2287.31
Income: New members	1339.00		
Renewals	6301.18		
total dues	7640.18		
Contributions	192.50*		
Library sales and rentals	310.70		
Misc	37.25		
total income	8180.63	8180.63	
			10467.94
Expenditures: Information & Membership Committtees	4637.67		
Library expense	259.89		
Subscriptions to "Russell"	1946.00		
Meetings	800.00**		
Misc	1044.12***		
total spent	8687.68	8687.68	
Bank Balance on 12/31/88			1780.26

* Contributions are much higher than the 192.50 shown. Most contributions are mingled with dues. In 1989 contributions mingled with dues will be separated out.
** Meetings includes $300 deposit for 1989 meeting.
*** Includes $1000 contribution to Russell Editorial Project

NEWSLETTER MATTERS

(32) A 15 Year Index of Bertrand Russell Society newsletters has been prepared. It covers the first 15 years of the Society's existence, 1974 through 1988, Issues 1 through 60. It has over 2100 entries, on 40 pages. The first word of the first and last entries on each page appear at the top of the page. $7 postpaid (within the USA) from the newsletter. Or borrow it from our Library, $2 postage (within the USA). Postage outside the USA is higher. Newsletter and Library addresses are on Page 1, bottom.

HONORARY MEMBERS

(33) A. J. Ayer interviewed by Edward St. Aubyn for *The Tatler* (1/89), presumably in 1988.

Hot Ayer

Talking language, truth and logic: A.J. Ayer at home in the South of France, by EDWARD ST AUBYN

Oh God, this can't really be happening, I thought, as the glass slid further open. I had just told the taxi driver who was taking me to Heathrow that I was on my way to the South of France to interview England's most famous living philosopher. He leant back complacently, 'I'm a bit of a philosopher myself: I used to be a Buddhist. Mind you, most of these philosophers are ego-maniacs, aren't they? They put themselves above humanity and yet what are they writing about, eh? *Humanity*. I've met some of the *intelligentria*, and it's all an act, isn't it?'

The assumption that philosophy is about humanity is not one that could be made by someone who shared Freddie Ayer's view of its function. Common usage is not a reliable guide in this matter since 'being philosophical' about something denotes the ability not to think about it too much.

Ayer's first book *Language, Truth and Logic*, as Professor Ted Honderich has put it, 'rescued philosophy in the English language from a kind of maundering.' Another, *The Problem of Knowledge*, is the most elegantly enlightening of inquiries into its subject. A third, *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, establishes him as the evident successor to Bertrand Russell. He has recently given a new edge and panache to intellectual biography, most recently with his admirable *Thomas Paine*.

In Ayer's view philosophy is an activity devoted to solving problems of sense and of making sense, 'what we can know, how we can know it and what justification we have for our beliefs.' He still stands by Locke's account of the philosopher quoted in his first book, written when he was 24, 'To be an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge.' The apparent modesty of this ambition is made up for by the vehemence and clarity

with which Ayer has set about the task of 'clearing', and also by the conviction that 'the ground' is what everything else must rest on. As Ayer said to me during our discussion, 'Clearly I can't hold that I am the only conscious creature in the universe... This problem has worried me appallingly.'

Professor Sir Alfred Ayer, Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur and a member of the Order of Cyril and Methodius, first class (Bulgaria), was born in London in 1910. His father's family was Swiss and his grandfather was rector of the Academy of Neuchâtel. He is called Alfred after Alfred Rothschild for whom his father worked until the latter went bankrupt from speculation. Ayer's father was rescued by his father-in-law Mr Citroën, a Dutch Jew who had made a fortune in the manufacture of Minerva cars, and bought his son-in-law a partnership in a timber firm. Ayer went to prep school at Aston St Vincent, 'where they beat enough Greek and Latin into me to get a scholarship to Eton.' He went on to Christ Church where he became a lecturer in 1932. Gilbert Ryle, his old tutor, was responsible for sending him to attend the meetings of the Vienna Circle, as well as introducing him to Russell and Wittgenstein. During the war Ayer joined the Welsh Guards and worked for the S.O.E. – the 'cloak and dagger outfit'. He considers that the most dangerous point of the war for him came when he was taught poker by some goldminers in West Africa. Having studied the laws of probability, he won an enormous sum of money from them and thought they might kill him. In 1946 he was made Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College London and in 1959 he returned to Oxford to become the Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College. He has been married three times and has had three children: Valerie, who died in 1981, and Julian by his first wife Renée Lees; and Nicholas by his second wife, the American novelist and journalist Dee Wells (whom he intends to remarry). His third wife, Vanessa Lawson (Nigel Lawson's first wife), died in 1985.

Wittgenstein is reported to have remarked, 'The trouble with Freddie Ayer is that he's clever all the time.' The most obvious penalty of being clever all the time, apart from the constant need to ward off boredom with chess games, bridge problems, books, crossword puzzles and newspapers, has been his indifference to nature. He tells the story of Robert Kee driving him around to admire the 'lovely, lush, green scenery of Ireland'. When Ayer fell into a reverie, Robert asked him what he was thinking about. 'I admitted that I was wondering whether sheep think. He was absolutely furious and drove me back to the house.' Ayer thinks rapidly, reads rapidly, speaks rapidly and recently died rapidly, in hospital, only allotting four minutes to the experience before he revived. Since then there 'has been a kind of resurrection' and he has started to notice scenery for the first time. Driving from Avignon to his house at La Migoua he stopped on the mountain above La Ciotat 'And I suddenly looked out at the sea and thought "My God how beautiful this is" and for all these years, for 26 years, I had never really looked at it before.' These experiences have made him feel that life is richer, but not more mysterious. He is a born-again atheist who still feels that moral courage and the pursuit of pleasure do more justice to experience than optimistic and unverifiable statements about Reality.

Ayer has always worked well under the lime tree at La Migoua, the hamlet where he and Dee bought a farmhouse in 1962. The Ayers made a great impact on the local population when they confronted the mayor on his way down hill with a cortège of cars. Dee refused to back up saying that the road was full of holes. 'Madame,' said the mayor, 'as mayor of this commune I am responsible for the roads and I can assure you that they contain no holes.' While making this speech he stepped backwards into a hole and fell over. Ayer shouted, '*Espèce de collaborateur*!' out of the window. As an expert on the Resistance it was an insult that might well spring to his lips. During the war Ayer singlehandedly liberated St Tropez and then swept westward with a small army of his own, eventually reaching Bordeaux where the local Resistance asked his permission to kidnap de Gaulle. Ayer said he would be delighted to have him kidnapped. 'But what the hell are you going to do with him? Are you going to kill him? I can't authorise that... And so I saved de Gaulle's bacon. He never knew.'

On the evening that I arrived at La Migoua, Ayer was sitting under the lime tree playing chess. I was very hungry and Dee offered me something to eat. As I was about to bite into half a baguette, Ayer came through the beaded curtain, looked at me piercingly, and said, 'Have you got your homework?' I put down the bread and eagerly accepted a pink booklet called *The Meaning of Life*. Who wants to eat when they are holding the truth in their hands?

His most recent work, published this year, *The Meaning Of Life* touches on many of the characteristic themes of Ayer's work and makes them more accessible. Its central argument is that morality cannot be based on authority, whether human or divine. Morality has to be based on personal choice. The rejection of authority as a ground for moral action has not prevented Ayer from having strong moral views and acting on them vigorously. One outstanding example is his chairmanship of the Homosexual Law Reform Committee: he found the persecution of homosexuals unjust and the way in which they were driven underground sordid. One advantage he had for the job is that 'As a notorious heterosexual I could not be accused of feathering my own nest.' Ayer has had about 150 affairs in his life. He loves the company of women, except those who mug up on philosophy. He once thought he heard a woman say, 'I love you so,' when it turned out she had said, 'I love Rousseau.' He was not pleased.

Ayer was also roused to action by finding that the Provost and Fellows of Eton had passed a statute in 1960 stipulating that candidates for a scholarship must have British-born fathers. Had this statute existed in his day it would have excluded Ayer from College since his father was Swiss-born, but he realised that it had been introduced not to exclude the Swiss but to keep out Jews. Threatening to write to *The Times* he was asked by the Provost Sir Claude Elliot to meet him instead. The Provost admitted that it was an anti-semitic measure, complaining that Jews were 'clever in the wrong way'. When Ayer asked what this meant he said, 'Well, they wouldn't play the Wall Game.' I said 'I feel some responsibility in this matter, I'm not going to have my Jews discriminated against'''. He made a bargain with the Provost that he would not do anything publicly for a year, but insisted that the matter be raised again after a year, and reserved the right to lobby the Fellows. The Fellows proved useless, 'I have enormous contempt for people who have no public courage.' He was in despair when he met Sir Edward Boyle, who was minister of education at the time. Boyle was incredulous until he saw the correspondence with the Fellows, at which point he promised to take action. Ayer waited for a month and received a letter saying, 'I'm sorry for the long delay but Macmillan has been very busy. I could not get hold of him, but now I think you'll see something happen.' Three days later there was a headline in the *Evening Standard* saying that the Eton Provost had unwittingly passed an anti-semitic statute, but realising its effect, had repealed it.

Ayer's moral courage can overcome physical fear, as he demonstrated recently in New York where he was told at a party that Mike Tyson was upstairs raping a model. 'We can't have that,' he said, and forged upstairs only to find that Tyson was talking quietly to the model and that she was clearly delighted. Not having any grounds to intervene, but feeling that it would be ignominious to retreat, he said, 'Mr Tyson, you're the physical champion of the world and I am one of the intellectual champions. I think it's high time that we met.'

In *The Meaning of Life* Ayer's atheism is as buoyant as ever. He rejects belief in God because he regards it as nonsensical and undesirable: 'Whatever happens, the believer in the creator is going to say that that was what was intended. And just for this reason his hypothesis is vacuous.' Setting aside its vacuity he wonders what advantage there is for those who espouse it, 'Why should it matter to them that they followed a course which was not of their own choosing as a means to an end of which they are ignorant?' In our conversations he admitted that his rejection of metaphysics in *Language, Truth and Logic* was 'too brutal': metaphysicians have often used respectable arguments to reach their ridiculous conclusions. The vision he had while he was dead in hospital has also made him a little more 'wobbly' about the afterlife. In this vision he crossed a river and encountered a red light which controlled the universe. The red light had two principal assistants who, 'put space together like a jigsaw puzzle'. They had been doing their job poorly and Ayer realised that 'space was out of joint, the universe had gone awry and the laws of nature were not functioning properly.' He felt a great sense of responsibility to put this right, but could not communicate with the Lords of Space. Fortunately, there were also Ministers of Time in the vicinity and, 'Since we're in the days of Einstein, and Space and Time have become Space-Time, one four-dimensional continuum,' he knew that by adjusting Time he would be able to correct the flaw in Space. Before he could fulfil his task he was revived and woke feeling a great sense of frustration.

The extension of consciousness after death raises doubts about Hume's definition of personal identity as a 'bundle of perceptions'. In trying to perfect this theory Ayer found that he had to fall back on physical continuity. This would clearly mean that his vision was only evidence of mental activity continuing for a few minutes without its customary support from the body.

It would be evidence of a crisis in the brain and this is what Ayer takes it to be. Nevertheless the experience does complicate the relationship between the mind and the body and makes the remark of Wittgenstein's quoted in *The Meaning Of Life* seem less triumphantly logical, 'Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.' Unless death is defined as the absence of experience, then it would seem that Ayer has lived to experience death, since he talks of having been 'dead for four minutes'. Ayer still regards 'the soul' as a meaningless word which we have in the language along with other meaningless words like 'God'.

Can it be good for a man to have so much truck with meaninglessness, to have written so much about things that do not exist, and to have as a refrain running through his work the phrase 'literally nonsensical'? But then pointing out meaningless statements is a meaningful activity, just as recognising one's irrational feelings is a rational activity. For Ayer the recognition of these irrational forces is a first step towards dismissing them; people may have an 'emotional need' to believe in a transcendent reality, or a soul or a deity, but for him that emotional need is 'Never *never* more important than reason. I find it very unlikely that if I found out more about my unconscious motives it would bring me any closer to a solution of the problems I am interested in.' In fact, he thinks this knowledge would hamper him since in times of misfortune he experiences a suspension of self by working, leaving his intellect free to be as efficient as possible, 'A lot of my friends have said that I am almost schizophrenic, there are two people: A.J. Ayer who writes these books and Freddie Ayer, "The London Freddie Ayer" as Cyril Connolly called me.'

His lack of curiosity about himself does not altogether prevent Ayer from making connections of a psychological type. For instance, he attributes the feelings of invulnerability that he experienced when he disarmed a man in a café in Paris to something more primitive than the conviction that it was the right action to take, 'I felt carried away, just as when I play games I play with enormous intensity. I always play to win, that's part of my grandfather in me.' If he doesn't work he feels his grandfather 'looking over his shoulder' and he recognises that his grandfather's desire to form a 'prominent English family' devolved on to his grandchildren of whom he is the eldest. These sorts of insights do not of course stand in the way of calling personal identity a 'bundle of perceptions' since they are perceptions about the bundle – it is only a question of whether the bundle would be better tied if they were given priority.

There is a strain of argument in *The Meaning of Life* which reminds one that Ayer has long stood on the left in politics. It is his awareness of the fact that most people in the world are engaging in 'a losing struggle to achieve a tolerable standard of living'. He described himself to me as 'an English radical in the tradition of Tom Paine'. He thinks that 'Kinnock *is* a Welsh windbag' and despairs of seeing Mrs Thatcher unseated although he hates the 'ethos of the devil take the hindmost, and the purely commercial philistine attitude'. One of the aspects of this philistine attitude is that higher education has been under attack, especially departments like philosophy. The good philosophers who should be replacing Ayer's generation have gone to America.

In his autobiography Ayer says that he would be content to go down in history as Horatio to Bertrand Russell's Hamlet. This is an interesting choice since the most famous remark made to Horatio is, 'There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.' I do not want to attribute an unconscious frustration with the limits he has set himself to a man who does not think the premises of psychoanalysis are verifiable. In any case within those limits Ayer operates brilliantly.

Notwithstanding Wittgenstein's remark that Ayer is clever all the time, he has not yet mastered the philosophy of housekeeping. When he moved into a new house with his second wife Dee, she asked him to make a drink while she was unpacking. A few minutes later she heard him call forlornly from downstairs, 'Where do we keep the ice?' For some reason (if that is the word), we expect great thinkers to be absent-minded. Having tackled the problems of language, truth, logic, knowledge, and personal identity, it may not be too late for Ayer to find out where we keep the ice. □

NEW MEMBERS

(34) We welcome these new members:

MS. EVELYN BURTON /c/o COWLES,392 CENTRAL PK W./NY/NY/10025/ /
M. JACQUES C. CARBOU /5660, AV. DECELLES #104/MONTREAL, QUEBEC/ /CANADA/H3T 1W5
MR. CHARLES CARLINI /215 W. 94TH ST. #804/NY/NY/10025/ /
MS. PEGGY DOYLE-WALTERS /3811 ATKINS/CHEYENNE/WY/82007/ /
MR. JAMES DUNCAN/5129 GRAND AV./DES MOINES/IA/50312
MS. LINDA EGENDORF /P. O. BOX 646/WESTON/MA/02193/ /
MR. BRIAN FARR /4181 PICKWICK DRIVE/CONCORD/CA/94521/ /
MR. VICTOR J. FERNANDEZ /240 W. 65TH ST. APT.26E/NY/NY/10023/ /
MR. ADAM JOHN GRAHAM/P.O. BOX 760/CAMPBELLFORD/ONT./CANADA/K0L 1L0
MR. GERALD F. GRATTON /2839 NE HOYT ST./PORTLAND/OR/97232/ /
MR. RUSSELL L. GRAY/2332 EDGEWATER TERRACE/ TOPEKA/KS/66614
MR. RUSSELL GEORGE HANNEKEN /1033 HAMPTON DRIVE/MACEDONIA/OH/44056/ /
MR. DOUGLAS K. HINTON /2443 CALHOUN ST./METAIRIE/LA/70001-3025/ /
MR. KENNETH LLOYD /1317 N. BOLIVAR ST./DENTON/TX/76201/ /
MR. ALBERT W. MASON /1080 BERVILLE ROAD/ALLENTON/MI/48002-9205/ /
DR. DAVID J. MELTZ/4 BRIAR PATCH ROAD/NEWTON/NJ/07860
MS. DEBORA F. MELTZ/4 BRIAR PATCH ROAD/NEWTON/NJ/07860
MR. NATHAN MCKINLEY /4728 W. LAKE HARRIET PKWY./MINNEAPOLIS/MN/55410/ /
MS. CYNTHIA MEREDITH/160 DUDLEY DRIVE #555/ATHENS/GA/30606
MR. JAMES PATY /5 WAYSIDE LANE/BRIDGEPORT/WV/26330/ /
MS. KATHLEEN PATY /5 WAYSIDE LANE/BRIDGEPORT/WV/26330/ /
MR. JOHN F. RODGERS /11440 LINKS DRIVE/RESTON/VA/22090/ /
MS. NANETTE E. SCOFIELD/30 E. 62ND ST./NY/NY/10021
MS. R. SMITH/P.O. BOX 650508/VERO BEACH/FL/32965-0508
MS. SHEILA VON WEISE/1221 N. DEARBORN PKWY, 1005 S./CHICAGO/IL/60610
MS. KIMBERLY WHITAKER/110 HALSTON CIR APT C/HUNTSVILLE/AL/35805
MR. FRANK G. WISE /907 AVENUE D APT.2/DEL RIO/TX/78840/ /
MR. CHARLES ALLEN YODER /1376 COJUNTRYSIDE DRIVE/MILLSBORO/DE/19966/ /

OBITUARY

(35) Herb Vogt, we sadly report, died on December 5, 1988. A BRS member since 1975, he and Bette hardly ever missed an Annual Meeting. They attended the 1988 meeting at Fredonia, but, writes Bette, "he was in a great deal of discomfort most of the time. As you know, he was an avid reader of Bertrand Russell from the time he entered college and was looking for a living philosopher. Much of his own philosophy was influenced by what he had read. I know he would be pleased to have me give this check in his memory." He will indeed be remembered...with great pleasure. Some of us also remember his great jazz-piano-playing, at our Washington meeting (1985). Our thoughts are with Bette, whom we love.

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

36) Bob Davis imbibed some Greek and Roman culture in December. In his own words (excerpts):

Spent 5 days in Rome...most of the time in the Vatican. St. Peter's is amazing. Nothing prepared me for it. For the first time I appreciated the concept of the sublime; it really works at times. We went from the tombs below to the cupola on top. (We managed even to urinate on the roof. Not to worry; they have toilets up there.) We also went to an audience with the Pope. In the Sistine Chapel, we could see both the clean frescoes and the dirty ones; I am convinced cleaning is the right thing. Went to to the Colosseum, the Pantheon, the Circus Maximus, and other old ruins and early churches. I still have lots more to see there.

Spent a week in Greece. John [Lenz] was wonderful. He met us at the Airport, and got us a nice reasonable hotel near him. We went to a number of ruins in Athens, including, of course, the Acropolis. The ruins are great but you can keep modern Greece. I rented a car and we drove to Delphi, across the bay to the Peloponnesus, where we saw Tirens -- I fell off the battlements and bounced instead of broke. Mycenae and Epidaurus; all wonderful. Few tourists and no crowds; we saw Julius II's rooms painted by Raphael -- with no one else in the rooms.

The flight(s) home were tense, with $103 of course -- real security in Europe . Soldiers in the airports with automatic guns, fingers on the triggers. I hope it doesn't come to that here.

CONTRIBUTIONS

(37) We thank these early renewers who included a 1989 contribution in their dues payments. Greatly appreciated!

LOUIS K. ACHESON JR., AURORA ALMEIDA, JEAN ANDERSON, IRVING H. ANELLIS, JAY ARAGONA, DONG-IN BAE, DEBORAH BOHNERT, MICHAEL EMMET BRADY, POLLY COBB, WHITFIELD COBB, GLENNA STONE CRANFORD, PETER G. CRANFORD, ALICE L. DARLINGTON, ROBERT K. DAVIS, LEE EISLER, SEYMOUR GENSER, SUSAN J. GIROD, JEROLD J. HARTER, CHARLES W. HILL, DONALD W. JACKANICZ, ALLAN KRAMER, PAUL KURTZ, FRANCES MASON, HUGH MCVEIGH, ROBERT MERRIGAN, HUGH S. MOORHEAD, GLENN R. MOYER, SANDI A. MOYER, FRANK V. PAGE, HELEN PAGE, STEPHEN J. REINHARDT, BENITO REY, WILLIAM M. RIPLEY, MICHAEL J. ROCKLER, HARRY RUJA, WARREN ALLEN SMITH, RAMON CARTER SUZARA, JOHN R. TOBIN, CLIFFORD VALENTINE, ELEANOR VALENTINE, THOM WEIDLICH, CHARLES L. WEYAND, VINCENT DUFAUX WILLIAMS, RONALD H. YUCCAS.

Even in her late eighties, visitors to her remote Cornish home were astonished by her intellectual vigour. Her enthusiasm for her causes remained, and departing guests would leave with the words, "On with the women's revolution!" ringing in their ears.

She continued to speak at meetings of the peace movement. In 1983, at the age of 89, she led the London CND rally in a wheelchair, and earlier this year she took part in a demonstration outside the RAF base at St Mawgon in Cornwall.

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(39) From the NY Herald-Tribune (9/22/61, p.24):

What Lord Russell Thinks

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

It is regrettable that you chose to print an editorial castigating Bertrand Russell, this profound thinker who has for a very long time been more concerned with the cause of freedom and justice than most of his detractors, and whose unswerving passion for truth and reason has presented itself as an example to many who aspire to become truly civilized.

If you have not read Lord Russell's essay, "The Future of Mankind", may I suggest that you do so.

In it you will find the following statement: "True, I have heard men say that they would prefer the end of man to submission to the Soviet government, and doubtless in Russia there are those who would say the same about submission to Western Capitalism. But this is rhetoric with a bogus air of heroism. Although it must be regarded as unimaginative humbug, it is dangerous, because it makes men less energetic in seeking ways of avoiding the catastrophe that they pretend not to dread."

H. W. Clifford
East Orange, N.J.

Harry Clifford has been a BRS member since 1975.

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(40) The following appeared in the November 1974 issue of The Writer (pp. 137-8). Sent to us by Harry Ruja. The article was written by Lesley Conger.

WORDS FOR THEIR OWN SAKES

Somebody once wrote to Bertrand Russell and asked for the twenty words he liked most. Lord Russell replied with a list that he hoped the inquirer would not take very seriously, since it would "at another time . . . probably be quite different." Nevertheless, it is interesting to contemplate:

1. wind
2. health
3. golden
4. begrime
5. pilgrim
6. quagmire
7. diapason
8. alabaster
9. chrysoprase
10. astrolabe
11. apocalpytic [sic. ed.]
12. ineluctable
13. terraqueous
14. inspissated
15. incarnadine
16. sublinary
17. chorasmean
18. alembic
19. fulminate
20. ecstasy

It was good of Russell not to dismiss the question as absurd and unworthy of an answer. And it was also typical of him, as you will see if you care to consult the delightful book from which I got the list, *Dear Bertrand Russell*, edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils (Houghton Mifflin, 1969). Russell was a usually engaging, sometimes crusty, but always tireless correspondent; he even obliged another inquirer with his "favorite recipe," Lord John Russell's Pudding, which he admitted he had never tasted nor indeed laid eyes upon, but which he chose "from nepotal piety."

I like to think, however, that in sending on his list of favorite words Russell was not simply being obliging and pulling them out of the air at random, so to speak. Of course it doesn't make much *sense* to claim as a favorite word one you can hardly ever have had the opportunity of using (chrysoprase?), no more than to claim as a favorite recipe a pudding that's never passed your lips; nepotal piety may do for the pudding, but for the words - ? Ah, but who needs sensible reasons? If you are, to your bones marrow, a writer (and Russell was, as much as he was a mathematician and a philosopher), you love words that have beautiful auras of meaning (*wind, heath, golden*), you love words that are absolutely perfect for what they denote (*quagmire*!), you love words that roll around in your mouth like a lovely lemon sour ball (*ineluctable, apocalyptic*) - in short, you love words for their own sakes, and that's that.

My own list follows:

1. legerdemain
2. mist
3. abyss
4. pomegranate
5. columbine
6. grey (not gray)
7. poultice
8. splendid
9. luminous
10. cacophonous
11. theodolite
12. burnished
13. ephemeral
14. pebbles
15. lantern
16. filigree
17. mendicant
18. eucalyptus
19. lamplight
20. shadow

(A note on grey: Why grey and not gray? I'm not sure, but to me grey is a kitten, gray is a battleship.)

As you can see, my list is several intellectual cuts and about ten syllables below Russell's and contains, it seems to me, far more words of rather obviously pleasant connotations - as well as words that are simply the names of favorite things (*columbine, pomegranate, eucalyptus*). There are an inordinate number of words having to do with light and color: *grey, luminous, burnished, lamplight, lantern, shadow*: perhaps, by extension, even *splendid* and *mist* and *filigree*. But I don't know why *mendicant* is there, or *poultice*, and as for *theodolite*, I wouldn't recognize one if it came up and bit me. I just like the way the word sounds.

I can't defend *cacophonous*. It sounds awful. But then, it's supposed to.

No doubt an amateur psychologist could have a great time with Lord Russell's list - or with mine. or anyone's. Only two monosyllables - *hm-m*. And what kind of man would go for a word like *inspissated*? What trauma from childhood makes a man fond of a word like *begrime*? And why, indeed, would the notoriously nonreligious Russell have among his favorites the word *pilgrim*?

I had to look up several of Russell's words. I thought *chrysoprase* might have something to do with chrysalis, but it didn't - it's a kind of chalcedony (that's a nice word too). *Terraqueous* and *sublunary* I could figure out, and *diapason* is a stop on our pump-organ, but I hadn't the foggiest notion of *inspissated*, and as for *astrolabe* and *alembic*, I knew them only in the general way that I know my own *theodolite*. But I haven't even been able to find *chorasmean*. The closest I've gotten to it is Chorasmia, a province of ancient Persia, and I'm not sure that's close enough.

After much thought (and despite *inspissated*) I have concluded that there is a definite romantic element underlying Lord Russell's list. *Wind, heath, golden, pilgrim, alabaster, chrysoprase*, and - here's the clincher - *incarnadine*. When I saw that word on his list, I remembered instantly where I saw it for the first time in my life, some forty years ago (and, except for Lady Macbeth's "multitudinous seas incarnadine," never elsewhere until now), and I would be willing to bet that it was there that Bertrand Russell (in his moony adolescence) saw it, too, in the sixth verse of the *Rubáiyát of Omar Khaydám*: "And David's lips are lockt but in divine/ High-piping Pehlevi, with 'Wine! Wine! Wine!/ Red Wine! - the Nightingale cries to the Rose/ That sallow cheek of hers to incaradine." My evidence may seem flimsy, but I think my conclusion is, in a word, *ineluctable*.

My own list is of course a shameless wallowing in the romantic, exotic with pomegranates, delicate with columbines, all bathed in misty lamplight filtering through a filigree of eucalyptus leaves. *Cacophonous* and *poultice* may be inexplicable, but even mendicant is romantic if you compare it to panhandler, and obviously legerdemain is there because it makes me think of magic. For that's what they are - *splendid, luminous, magical* words - and I know no better final word on the subject than the final word on Russell's list: *ecstasy!*

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(41) PANEL DISCUSSIONS

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

PANEL ON RYAN'S BOOK ON

POLITICAL LIFE OF RUSSELL



The second panel discussion of the McMaster chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society will concern the recent book by Alan Ryan titled *Bertrand Russell: a Political Life*. The work was published in London by Allen Lane The Penguin Press (£16.95) and in New York by Hill and Wang (us$19.95).

Copies are available in Mills Library (B1649.R94R93) and in private hands.

The book has been the subject of a number of reviews that, above all, showed that the topic interested the reviewer. The Russell Archives have collected copies of reviews by John Campbell in the *T.L.S.* and by the 5th Earl Russell in *The London Review of Books*. Royden Harrison has written a review for a 1989 issue of *Russell*, which may be previewed in the Archives.

One needn't read far in the book before finding contentious statements. Consider the second sentence on p. 1: "His philosophical allegiances were no more stable than his emotional allegiances, and his political allegiances no more stable than either."

The panel is comprised of Kenneth Blackwell, Russell Archivist, and Louis Greenspan, Managing Editor of The Bertrand Russell Editorial Project. Richard Rempel will moderate the discussion. The audience is invited to participate.

Thurs., Oct. 27, at 1:30. UH-317.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

RUSSELL ON
CONTRADICTION



The latest panel discussion of the McMaster chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society will concern the seeming predilection of the early Russell for seeking contradictions.

It might (and probably will, on the panel) be argued that exposing contradictions is a standard philosophical activity, part of the process of evaluating hypotheses, and that he did this all his life, within and without philosophy. But the youthful Russell didn't rest content with finding contradictions. He used them, apparently, to ascend the scaffolding of his current metaphysical edifice. At the top he might decide to call them "antinomies" or even "paradoxes".

It has even been argued (and no doubt will be again, on the 24th), that Russell was only able to discover the Russell Paradox because of his habit of searching for, perhaps manufacturing, contradictions. But there's a snag. As a neo-Hegelian, he could do something creative with contradictions. (Or some of them--and what makes the distinction?) By the time of the discovery of The Contradiction, he was no longer an idealist. It seems that this antinomy functioned like any normal contradiction exposed in any philosophical hypothesis: it threw grave doubt upon the propositions under consideration--in this case, mathematics itself. The panelists will consider whether Russell dealt adequately with the paradox, and whether he could have succeeded as an idealist.

The panel is comprised of Nicholas Griffin (Philosophy, McMaster), Albert C. Lewis (late of the Russell Editorial Project), and Gregory H. Moore (Mathematics, McMaster). Kenneth Blackwell (Russell Archives) will moderate the discussion. The audience is invited to participate.

Thurs., Nov. 24 at 12:30. UH-317.

FOR SALE

(42) BRS member Tod Jones advertizes the following:
The Philosophical Filing System, based on an adaptation of subject-headings from Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan Publishing Co.), using standard 81/2" x 11" paper in binder. Send $15.00 to: Tod E. Jones, 109 S. Oak, Apt. B, Searcy, AR 72143

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(43) This is how the Academic American Encyclopedia tells it. (Dambury, CT: Grolier, Inc. 1980) From Harry Ruja.

Russell, Bertrand



Bertrand Russell, a seminal figure in the development of 20th-century philosophical thought, made major contributions in the areas of mathematics, logic, education, and social reform. Russell, who received the 1950 Nobel Prize for literature, endorsed the application of rationality to all aspects of thought and language. His early pacifism, which led to his imprisonment in 1918, evolved into a dedicated activism against nuclear armament, for which he was again briefly incarcerated in 1961.

One of the most influential philosophical thinkers of the 20th century, Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3d Earl Russell, b. Trelleck, Wales, May 18, 1872, d. Feb. 2, 1970, was a grandson of the 1st Earl Russell, who had twice been prime minister of Great Britain.

Life. Orphaned at three, Bertrand was reared by his puritanically religious but politically liberal paternal grandmother. He rebelled early against her rigid moral views, but her otherwise progressive beliefs influenced his later social thinking.

Russell was educated (1890-94) at Trinity College, Cambridge University, and remained there as a fellow (1895-1901) and lecturer (1910-16) until he was dismissed because of his active defense of unpopular causes such as socialism and his opposition to World War I. In 1918 he was imprisoned for his radical pacifism. Russell traveled, wrote, and lectured widely in Great Britain and the United States in the interwar period. On the death (1931) of his older brother he succeeded to the earldom. During the 1930s he modified his commitment to pacifism to acknowledge the necessity to oppose Nazi Germany. Reelected a fellow at Trinity in 1944, he resumed his pacifist stance in the postwar years and was especially vigorous in his denunciation of nuclear weapons. Russell founded the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (1958) and the Committee of 100 (1960) as his advocacy of civil disobedience became progressively stronger in the antinuclear movement. As a further outlet for his political views he participated (1964) in the organization of the Who Killed Kennedy Committee, questioning the findings of the Warren Commission concerning the assassination of U.S. president John F. Kennedy. Together with Jean Paul Sartre, he organized (1967) the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm, which was directed against the U.S. military effort in Vietnam.

In addition to his political involvements, Russell took an active interest in moral, educational, and religious issues. His religious views, as set forth in his book *Why I Am Not a Christian* (1927), were considered controversial by many. In 1931, Russell and his second wife (he married four times) founded the experimental Beacon Hill School, which influenced the founding of similarly progressive schools in England and the United States.

Throughout his life Russell was a prolific and highly regarded writer in many fields, ranging from logic and mathematics to politics to short works of fiction. In 1950 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. His private life was characterized by many disappointments and unsuccessful personal relationships, however. He scorned easy popularity with either right or left and exhibited an unbreakable faith in the power of human reason. Russell remained active and wrote extensively until his death at the age of 97. The most interesting account of his life is contained in his autobiography (3 vols., 1967-69).

Philosophical Views. Although he had many preoccupations, Russell's primary contribution lay in philosophy, most particularly in LOGIC and the theory of knowledge. His early philosophical views grew out of a concern to establish a vigorous logical foundation for mathematics, a concern that produced *Principles of Mathematics* (1903). Building on the work of Gottlob FREGE, Giuseppe PEANO, and others, Russell argued that arithmetic could be constructed from purely logical notions and the concepts of "class" and "successor." In *Principia Mathematica* (3 vols., 1910-13), written with Alfred North WHITEHEAD, this program was carried out in detail. Even when disagreeing with Russell, contemporary logicians and philosophers of mathematics acknowledge *Principia* to be the most important treatise on logic of the 20th century.

Russell used the rigorous methods of formal logic for a wide variety of problems. His "theory of descriptions" in particular has been called a model of philosophical reasoning. The argument concerns the meaning of referring to nonexistent objects, such as "the present king of France." Russell's solution is to say that the logical form of the statement is obscured by its grammatical form, and that analysis displays a description coupled with a false assertion of existence.

Russell was seriously concerned with the application of logical analysis to epistemological questions and attacked this problem by trying to break down human knowledge into minimum statements that were verifiable by empirical observation, reason, and logic. He was deeply convinced that all facts, objects, and relations were logically independent, both of one another and of our ability to know them, and that all knowledge is dependent on sense experience. With G. E. MOORE, his former pupil Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN, and others, Russell helped guide postwar British philosophy in a more positivist direction, focusing on the logical analysis of philosophical propositions and on the language of everyday life. Russell's basic position, which he first formulated in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), is referred to as logical atomism, by which he meant that all propositions (statements about experienced reality) can be broken down into the logically irreducible subpropositions and terms that constitute them. By combining and recombining these logically independent and discrete terms, we can describe reality as something that occurs at the point of such combinations, called the point event. Another aspect of this argument showed that the logical and grammatical meaning of sentences do not always coincide; Russell insisted that the logical meaning should take precedence.

Difficulties of analysis led Russell to give up many of the characteristic theses of logical atomism, and with his *Analysis of Mind* (1921) and *Analysis of Matter* (1926) he shifted to what has been called neutral monism. In this phase Russell combines a stringent empiricism with an optimistic view of the progress of science that leads to the conception of philosophy as a piecemeal analysis of the findings of science. His examination of the bases of scientific method culminated in *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* (1948).

Throughout his life Russell acknowledged difficulties in his positions and was ready to admit criticisms and modify his views. While ranging over an immense field, Russell demonstrated an openness to ideas, an aversion to dogma, and a rigor in analysis that more than justify his position, with Moore and Wittgenstein, as a fountainhead of 20th-century English and American philosophy. BRUCE O. BOSTON

Bibliography: Ayer, A. J., *Russell* (1972); Clark, R. W., *The Life of Bertrand Russell* (1975); Jager, Ronald, *The Development of Bertrand Rus-*

A PUB FOR THINKERS

(4:4) The following was sent to us by Steve Reinhardt (who suggested that we have our next annual meeting at the Beehive Pub!). The article appeared in the Nov. 7, 1988 issue of the New York Times.

Swindon Journal

The Thinker's Pub, With a Resident Philosopher

By SHEILA RULE
Special to The New York Times

SWINDON, England, Nov. 1 — In this former railway town, where coal smoke spirals from chimneys and mingles with autumn's chill, the convivial regulars at the Beehive Pub sometimes order another round over discussions of Plato, the nature of the universe and, well, just what it all means.

Their thoughts turned to such matters after Dr. Julius Tomin was hired as the pub's philosopher. Dr. Tomin, an exiled Czechoslovak dissident and scholar in classical Greek philosophy, gained international attention in the 1970's after philosophy seminars in his home in Prague were broken up by the police. The road that led him to the Beehive included back streets of virtual poverty in Oxford, a dead end at British welfare offices, collisions with British academics and freeways of unswerving commitment.

"We all ask the big why occasionally," said Noel Reilly, the owner of the Beehive. A mirthful man from Limerick in Ireland, Mr. Reilly created the philosophy position for Dr. Tomin after reading of his plight.

"I wanted to know why our society was willing to pauperize a man of such integrity," he said. "I thought I would do something about it."

500 at First Lecture

More than 500 people squeezed sardine-like onto the pub's old wooden floors, bar stools and plain benches last month — others reportedly tried to climb through windows — to hear Dr. Tomin's first lecture, titled "Time for Philosophy." A bit nervously at first, he used the talk to tell the audience about his life, in which knowledge, languages and philosophy provided paths to spiritual freedom. He described through jokes some hardships, including his years as a factory worker in Czechoslovakia.

"A trade unionist from France went to Czechoslovakia to observe the socialist system," he told the audience. "He returned and reported that people in Czechoslovakia officially are to work eight hours a day but they only work four. There is only one problem, he said. They are only paid for two hours."

The lecture was interrupted repeatedly by applause and laughter as round after round of beer and other beverages were consumed by the crowd. Under his contract, Dr. Tomin, 49 years old, is to give three lectures annually for three years at a salary of about $8,800 a year.

Stripped of Citizenship

At the pub in Swindon, 90 miles west of London, the philosopher said he was invited by Oxford and Cambridge universities in 1980 to give a series of lectures. He traveled to Oxford but said he soon "realized that I was not welcomed." He decided to return to Czechoslovakia, where he had been imprisoned for a total of 15 months as a youth for refusing to serve in the military and trying to leave the country illegally after being refused permission to emigrate. He had also clashed with the authorities as a signer of the 1977 Czech human rights charter.

Network Photographers/Mike Abrahams

Dr. Julius Tomin, left, the paid resident philosopher at the Beehive Pub in Swindon, England, with Noel Reilly, the owner of the establishment, who hired him.

The contract calls for three lectures a year. Salary: $8,800.

As he prepared to go home, the Czechoslovak authorities stripped him of his citizenship. He has been in Oxford ever since.

Dr. Tomin said Oxford had turned down his application for a teaching job. He says he believes he has been excluded from British academia largely because of differences in his view of Greek philosophers. His most controversial theory, that Plato's "Phaedrus" was the philosopher's first dialogue rather than a later one, has been rebuffed by other scholars.

Dr. Tomin accuses the academics of being unable to properly read and understand Greek.

"That's not an exaggeration but a total falsehood," said Dr. David Sedley, director of studies in classics at Christ's College, Cambridge. He is also editor of Classical Quarterly, a century-old journal on classical studies, which has published one paper by Dr. Tomin but turned down several others. "Every serious scholar working on Plato has a knowledge of Greek and reads Plato in original forms."

"In a way, he's trying to put the clock back to the traditional view taken by Plato's followers in later centuries in antiquity," he said. "They didn't have any of the historical perspectives on his development that we have nowadays."

Some scholars doubt that Dr. Tomin will be offered an academic post in Britain in his field, especially since, in recent years, at least six university philosophy departments have been closed. Nonetheless, the pub philosopher, who also reads in French, Latin, English, German and Slovak, continues to study, spending his days at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. His nights are spent alone in a tiny, cluttered room in the basement of an old house, where he keeps the milk for his tea cool on a window ledge.

After Dr. Tomin spent his savings, he lived for several months on welfare. But the authorities cut off the payments, saying that his research made him unavailable for work and that he had placed "unreasonable restrictions" on the type of job he would take.

Mr. Reilly, 42 years old, thought Mr. Tomin might just fit in at the Beehive, a 100-year-old pub that is the neighborhood living room for a diverse group of people.

When Mr. Reilly — a former officer in the Irish Army who has worked as a bartender in Manhattan, Yonkers and the Bronx — offered the philosopher a salaried job, it was not the first time that he had taken a chance. He said he once got drunk at a party in New York City in 1968 and decided to head for London. He had no money, but a man at the party offered "a lift" to London. The man was a steward on a trans-Atlantic liner, and Mr. Reilly became a stowaway. He was caught but a friend wired him fare money and he became, in his words, "a celebrity who was more entertained than entertaining all the way across the Atlantic."

Dr. Tomin said, "Noel has given me the essential help I need to progress to such a degree where I will be able to put Plato on an even higher academic level but also be able to talk about it in plain language to the nonspecialist."

(45) BR'S obituary in the *Manchester Guardian*, reprinted in the *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle*, (2/8/70, p. 43)...thanks to AL SECKEL:

The Last Late-Renaissance Humanist

Manchester Guardian

THE DEATH of Bertrand Russell last week at age 97 brings home a fact which has long been obscurely known—namely, that Russell's philosophical work, recent though it is, is already included in the philosophical canon. Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell—that is how the canon now runs. In other words there were not three British empiricists but five. From the point of view of the historian of ideas he represents the end of a tradition, not the beginning of one. In spite of the massive formal logical techniques which he developed, his work has ideologically no real part in strictly contemporary controversy. But Russell's place in intellectual history is also due, in large measure, to the inclusive and "classic" quality of his mind—a quality which is mirrored in the style of the best of the texts.

Russell, who had been ill with influenza, died at his home in Merionetshire, in North Wales. Russell's life, like his work, ran on classic or renaissance lines. He was a philosophic amateur, a delicate child, the third earl. He had four marriages; he took part in politics; he suffered fortunes as diverse as dismissal, imprisonment, the award of the Order of Merit, and world-wide acclaim.

The "scandalous" element in his social influence, as in that of Mill, stemmed not only from his inborn and Whig love of liberty, but also from his thirst for social justice. At every point in his career he desired to defend some category people who, through being denied justice and liberty, were being oppressed.

His socialism, feminism, pacifism; his crusade against nuclear weapons and for Britain's renunciation of them, his marital and educational unorthodoxy, anticlericalism, and, finally anti-Communism—which were in some ways inconsistent with one another—all sprang alike from this generosity of mind. They were pursued sometimes with a lack of balance which suggested a curious immaturity of political and social judgment. His final reputation will be enhanced when the memory of various culs-de-sac into which these causes led him has been obliterated. Bertrand Russell will then stand out more clearly than any other figure as the last late-renaissance scientific humanist of our time.

From the start of his undergraduate life at Cambridge he became an outstanding member of a brilliant company, the friendship of most of whom he retained throughout life. Thenceforward his biography, apart from his emotional development, is the history of the books he published and the enemies he made. After obtaining first-class honors at Cambridge both in mathematics and moral sciences—and, in 1894 serving for a few months as an honorary attache of the British Embassy in Paris—he became a prize fellow of Trinity in 1895. He published an "Essay on the Foundations of Geometry" in 1897, his book on "The Philosophy of Leibnitz" in 1900, and "The Principles of Mathematics" in 1903.

He was made a fellow of the Royal Society in 1908 and published his magnum opus "Principia Mathematica," in collaboration with A. N. Whitehead, in 1910. Two other books, now famous, quickly followed: "Problems of Philosophy" in 1911 and "Our Knowledge of the External World" in 1914. These, together with "Mysticism and Logic" (1918), "The Analysis of Mind" (1921), and "The Analysis of Matter" (1927), constitute the corpus of his best work. But much earlier, with the publication of "Principia Mathematica," his international reputation had become secure.

BERTRAND RUSSELL

In May, 1910, he had been appointed to a lectureship at Trinity and on its expiration, by a decision of the Council of Trinity of February, 1915, was to have become a Fellow. But early in 1916 he had written a pamphlet for the no conscription fellowship protesting against the severity of the sentence passed upon a conscientious objector, E. F. Everett: he was prosecuted and fined 100 pounds sterling, and a few weeks afterwards the Council of Trinity dismissed him from his lectureship.

In 1918 he was again prosecuted — this time more legally if not more justly, and sentenced to six months imprisonment, which he spent writing "an introduction to mathematical philosophy." In 1919, when the younger fellows who had been absent on war service returned to the college, a successful memorial was immediately presented for his reinstatement.

From that time public opinion turned increasingly in his favor.

He became a visiting professor at the University of Peking in 1920 and Turner Lecturer (a Trinity College award) in 1926. He received the Sylvester Medal of the Royal Society in 1932, and the DeMorgan medal of the London Mathematical Society in 1933. After that there was a slight pause in his honors until — just before he received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1950 — he was awarded the Order of Merit.

Intellectual Achievements

During the latter part of his life he wrote a large number of books (including his first novel at 80), but it is not upon that his logical and philosophical reputation mainly rests. It rests upon two exceptional intellectual achievements. The first was his large measure of success in deriving the whole of mathematics by rigorous methods from a few very simply logical principles: in proving as he said, that "logic was the youth of mathematics." The second was the substitution, in philosophy, of "logical constructions" for "inferred entities," such as that of substance. In both of these endeavors his object was the same: to bring exact and agreed techniques of thinking to bear upon intellectual fields in which all previous thinking had been emotionally tinged or philosophically vague. Thus he started an intellectual movement which was far larger than that with which, from the historian's point of view, he will be identified.

When we consider the new light which his methods brought to bear upon general notions, such as that of infinity, which had been traditionally considered ineffable, it is clear that there is no sphere of which we can say, a priori, that exact techniques of thinking cannot be applied to it. Even in spheres where he himself failed his giant shadow looms over us, urging us to further exploration.

Co-Existence

In November, 1957, he published in the "New Statesman" his "open letter to Eisenhower and Khrushchev," in which he declared that our supreme concern should be the continued existence of the human race, that the unrestricted diffusion of nuclear weapons should cease, that East and West should recognize their respective rights, and that their leaders should meet in a frank discussion of the conditions of co-existence.

At the beginning of 1958 the campaign for nuclear disarmament (superseding a previous organization, the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests) came into public view with Russell as its president. From this time onwards he became increasingly impelled by a sense of urgency.

More fundamentally, he rejected the whole theory of deterrence and the balance of terror by the moral argument that the risks involved in abandoning the nuclear race were not worth considering against the iniquity for possible mass extermination.

Committee of 100

In February, 1961, Russell led the Committee of 100's first sit-down on the pavements outside the Ministry of Defense; this was tolerated by the police, but when a bigger demonstration was planned for September in Parliament Square its leaders were summoned to be bound over to keep the peace. On refusal, Russell, with his wife and others, was given a week's imprisonment.

Russell's activities in the Committee of 100 later declined, and in the following year he resigned the presidency because he felt himself to be insufficiently in touch with the movement. Throughout his campaign to awaken the country to the nuclear danger, Russell recognized that relaxation of tension was a prerequisite of disarmament. He consistently advocated that research should be undertaken and remedies sought by bodies unconcerned with changing the balance of power, composed of representatives of both sides in the Cold War, along with neutrals. This line of thought led to the initiation of the long series of international scientific conferences, first held at Pugwash.

Role of Mediator

During the autumn of 1962, in the Cuban crisis and in the Sino-Indian frontier dispute, Russell himself took on the role of mediator.

In the long run, Russell looked to world government as the only guarantee of peace. In "Which Way to Peace?" (1936 he taught that the political condition for permanent peace is the existence of a single supreme world authority, possessed of irresistible force. Internationalism must first be established in the military sphere. This theme he returned to in "Has Man a Future?" (1961), and in "Unarmed Victory" (1963) which tells the story of the 1962 crises.

S. F. Sunday Examiner & Chronicle

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