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ASSESSMENTS OF RUSSELL

"Bertrand Russell: Liberalism, Science and Religion" by Charles L. Bowden. Reprinted with permission from Religious Humanism (Winter 1984), with thanks to its Editor, Paul Beattie, and to STEVE MARAGIDES, who let us know about it.

Bertrand Russell lived ninety-seven years and wrote and spoke for about seventy of those years. The scope of his writings was vast and the changes of some of his philosophical views over time were considerable. Nevertheless, certain of his positions have an enduring and consistent relevance to a scientifically compatible religious life. Even though Russell eschewed ties with formal religion, many of his writings were either on the subject of religion, or were pertinent to it from a liberal, humanistic perspective.

Russell always placed liberalism in a political framework, set off by a sociocultural background. He viewed most civilizations as inexorably passing through phases. An initial rigid, superstitious political system gradually relaxes, with a consequent period of creativity and optimism, balanced by the remaining best features of the original social order. As the old traditions and mores crumble, disorder ensues, to be followed by a new dogmatic political system. The attitude of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless oscillation: "The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community."[1]

This article is dedicated to the memory of Wade Richmond, 1966-1984.

Russell observed that liberalism was inherently tied to commerce, especially across countries:

> The reasons for the connection of commerce with Liberalism are obvious. Trade brings men into contact with tribal customs different from their own, and in so doing destroys the dogmatism of the untravelled. The relation of buyer and seller is one of negotiation between two parties who are both free; it is most profitable when the buyer or seller is able to understand the point of view of the other party.
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> The Liberal creed, in practice, is one of live-and-let-die, of toleration and freedom so far as public order permits, of moderation and absence of fanaticism in political programmes. Even democracy, when it becomes fanatical, as it did among Rousseau's disciples in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal; indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible, as appeared in England under Cromwell and in France under Robespierre. The genuine Liberal does not say "this is true," he says "I am inclined to think that under present circumstances this opinion is probably the best." And it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense that he will advocate democracy.[2]

Russell was an outstanding interpreter and critic of philosophers and science, and of the dynamic interrelationships between the two. Aristotle is an example. Aristotles' metaphysics, Russell tells us, may roughly be described as Plato diluted by common sense. Russell's dealing with Aristotle's famous doctrine of the golden mean illustrates his wit and acerbity. Aristotle asserts that every virtue is a mean between two extremes, each of which is a vice. Aristotle seeks to prove this tenet by examining various virtues. Courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness; proper pride between vanity and humility; and so on. Russell points out a number of characteristics, such as truthfulness, that do not fit this model. He then comments that there was once a mayor who had adopted Aristotle's doctrine. At the end of his term of office, he made a speech saying that he had endeavored to steer the narrow line between partiality on the one hand and impartiality on the other:

> I conclude that the Aristotelian doctrines with which we have been concerned in the chapter are wholly false, with the exception of the formal theory of the syllogism, which is unimportant. Any person in the present day who wishes to learn logic will be wasting his time if he reads Aristotle or any of his disciples. None the less, Aristotle's logical writings show great ability, and would have been useful to mankind if they had appeared at a time when intellectual originality was still active. Unfortunately, they appeared at the very end of the creative period of Greek thought, and therefore came to be accepted as authoritative. By the time that logical originality revived, a reign of two thousand years had made Aristotle very difficult to dethrone. Throughout modern times, practically every advance in science, in logic, or in philosophy has had to be made in the teeth of the opposition from Aristotle's disciples.[3]

Russell's handling of comparative religion is effective largely because he sets his analysis in historical context. In his discourse on St. Thomas Aquinas, Russell points out that Aquinas's sharp and clear use of reason is time and again insincere, since he already knows what he believes to be the truth before he begins to philosophize. As an example, Aquinas advocates the indissolubility of marriage on two bases: (1) that the father is useful in education of the children because he is more rational than the mother; (2) he is the stronger parent, and thus better able to inflict punishment. Russell comments that a modern educator could readily refute each of these arguments, but a follower of Aquinas would not likely cease to believe in the position, because the real foundations for the belief are not the ones alleged.

Russell wrote incisively on science, especially physics and astronomy. Much of this appeals to me because it deals with a major issue of our times: how do we convey what the scientific method is and familiarize the nonscientist with some of the workings of science and technology? In this century perhaps only Jacob Bronowski has addressed this issue with near equal effectiveness. Russell reminds us that in 300 B.C. the Greeks recognized that the earth revolved around the sun. The shadow that fell upon this understanding until the Renaissance was in many ways a political one. Russell writes:

> Two great men of the time, Archimedes and Apollonius, complete the list of first-rate Greek mathematicians . . . after these two men, though respectable work continued to be done, the great age ended. Under the Roman domination the Greeks lost the self-confidence that belongs to political liberty, and in losing it acquired a paralyzing respect for their predecessors. The Roman soldier who killed Archimedes was a symbol of the death of original thought that Rome caused throughout the Hellenic world.[4]

The Copernican hypothesis that finally appeared in the seventeenth century had, Russell reminds us, not the merit of truth, but of simplicity: "In view of the relativity of motion, no question of truth is involved."

A related development of the seventeenth century involved Galileo. At the time it was thought, even by educated persons, that a projectile fired horizontally would move horizontally in a straight line for a while, gradually lose its speed, then finally and suddenly fall vertically. Galileo showed that, apart from the resistance of air, horizontal velocity would remain constant, in ac-

cordance with the law of inertia. To this would be added a vertical velocity, according to the law of falling bodies. A simple calculation shows that the consequent course is a parabola. This is an example of a principle of dynamics that proved immensely fruitful, namely, that when several forces act simultaneously, the effect is as if each acted in turn.

But the story doesn't simply end there as an educational exercise. The philosophical consequences of this and similar scientific work of the seventeenth century were profound. Animism was removed from the laws of physics. Movement had been thought a sign of life, and Aristotle's unmoved movers were considered the ultimate source of all motion in the universe. All this was changed by Newton's first law of motion. As the projectile story indicates, lifeless matter, once set in motion, will continue to move forever unless stopped by some external cause. Another change resulting from developments in the seventeenth century was man's place in the universe. Anyone might still believe that the heavens exist to declare the glory of God, but no one could let that belief get in the way of an astronomical calculation.

The triumphs of science revived human pride. The ancient world and the Middle Ages had been obsessed with a sense of sin. To be humble before God was both right and prudent, for God would punish pride. It had been believed that only greater and greater humility would avert such calamities. It became impossible to remain abjectly humble when people were achieving such triumphs. As for damnation, surely the creator of so vast a universe had something better to do than think of sending men to hell for minute theological errors.

Russell liked Heraclitus, Machiavelli, Spinoza, and Locke. If there is a common thread that holds them together, it is this: that each drew comparatively modest conclusions after a broad survey of many facts, in contradistinction to the many philosophers who build a vast edifice upon a pinpoint of logical principle.

Russell's own philosophical effort seems to me too much a creature of his times and his efforts to deal with them. Indeed, his remarkable familiarity with the past seems fuelled by his efforts to escape his own unhappy present. He was reared in near solitary confinement in a dank, dark country manor house. He persisted in his implacable opposition to war and armaments even when he was, in the eyes of many of his supporters, wrong. His lecherous sexuality contributed to the unhappiness of his first three marriages.

What I return to most often among Russell's myriad writings are his observations on the conduct of our daily lives:

> A good way of ridding yourself of certain kinds of dogmatism is to become aware of opinions held in social circles different from your own. When I was young, I lived much outside my own country—in France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. I found this very profitable in diminishing the intensity of insular prejudice. If you cannot travel, seek out people with whom you disagree, and read a newspaper belonging to a party that is not yours. If the people and the newspaper seem mad, perverse, and wicked, remind yourself that you seem so to them. In this opinion both parties may be right, but they cannot both be wrong. This reflection should generate a certain caution.
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> Be very wary of opinions that flatter your self-esteem. Both men and women, nine times out of ten, are firmly convinced of the superior excellence of their own sex. There is abundant evidence on both sides. If you are a man, you can point out that most poets and men of science are male; if you are a woman, you can retort that so are most criminals. The question is inherently insoluble, but self-esteem conceals this from most people.[3]

Time and again Russell poked fun at intellectual rubbish:

> There is a certain attitude about the application of science to human life with which I have some sympathy, though I do not, in the last analysis, agree with it. It is the attitude of those who dread what is "unnatural." Rousseau is, of course, the great protagonist of this view in Europe. In Asia, Lao-Tze has set it forth even more persuasively, and 2,400 years sooner. I think there is a mixture of truth and falsehood in the admiration of "nature," which it is important to disentangle. To begin with, what is "natural"? Roughly speaking, any thing to which the speaker was accustomed in childhood. Lao-Tze objects to roads and carriages and boats, all of which were probably unknown in the village where he was born. Rousseau has got used to these things, and does not regard them against nature. But he would no doubt have thundered against railways if he had lived to see them. Clothes and cooking are too ancient to be denounced by most of the apostles of nature, though they all object to new fashions in either. Birth control is thought wicked by people who tolerate celibacy, because the former is a new violation of nature and the latter an ancient one.[4]

He also spoke about the importance of optimism, political tranquility, and public wealth: "The Victorian Age, for all its humbug, was a period of rapid progress, because men were dominated by hope rather than fear. If we are again to have progress, we must again be dominated by hope."[5]

Russell was a heroic figure, not at all fully likeable, in some small way because he lived so long. Yet, his description of the stages of a person's life merits our reflection and serves as a fitting close:

> In an old man who has known human joys and sorrows, and has achieved whatever work was in him to do, the fear of death is somewhat abject and ignoble. The best way to overcome it—so at least it seems to me—is to make your interests gradually wider and more impersonal, until bit by bit the walls of the ego recede, and your life becomes increasingly merged in the universal life. An individual human existence should be like a river—small at first, narrowly contained within its banks, and rushing passionately past boulders and over waterfalls. Gradually the river grows wider, the banks recede, the waters flow more quietly, and in the end, without any visible break, they become merged in the sea, and painlessly lose their individual being. The man who, in old age, can see his life in this way, will not suffer from the fear of death, since the things he cares for will continue. And if, with the decay of vitality, weariness increases, the thought of rest will not be unwelcome. The wise man should wish to die while still at work, knowing that others will carry on what he can no longer do, and content in the thought that what was possible has been done.[8]

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1. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. xxiii.
2. Russell, *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), p. 463.
3. Ibid., p. 202.
4. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 217.
5. Russell, *Basic Writings*, pp. 95-96.
6. Ibid., p. 388.
7. Ibid., p. 385.
8. Russell, *New Hopes for a Changing World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951), p. 205.

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(3)

PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA

Said Russell to Alfred North Whitehead
"Your discourses in prose are quite blighted.
Use the logic and rules
Of mathematics as tools,
And your reasonng's wrongs will be righted."

Edward C. Devereux

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(4) Our thanks to HERB & BETTY VOGT for the following:

APRIL 20 1967 THE LISTENER

The influence of Bertrand Russell

a broadcast discussion

Stuart Hampshire *is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and the author of 'Thought and Action', 'Freedom of the Individual', etc.*

Norman St John-Stevas, Q.C. *was formerly on the staff of 'The Economist'. His publications include 'Life, Death and the Law' and 'Law and Morals'*

Baroness Stocks *has served on various government committees. She is Vice-Chancellor of Liverpool University. Her publications include 'The Industrial State' and 'History of the Workers' Educational Association'*

Robert Kee, *who was chairman of this discussion, is the author of 'A Crowd is Not Company', 'A Sign of the Times', etc.*

Robert Kee: I hope we may be able to make some sort of assessment of the value of Bertrand Russell's amazing life and I think in talking of the man who has always insisted so admirably on frankness between human beings, we need have no fear of speaking frankly. Stuart Hampshire, how important would you say Bertrand Russell has been as a philosopher?

Stuart Hampshire: I think that without possible question he is one of the three or four greatest philosophers writing in the English language in this century; he stands in the line of tradition of British empiricism which goes back to Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. He has two distinct aspects as a great philosopher. In part he invented and developed the beginning of mathematical logic in a modern sense and with a modern range. He was not alone in this field, but he was the central figure. Secondly, in respect of theory of knowledge and the traditional problems of philosophy, he has set the questions which other philosophers have discussed; other philosophers who might be thought of as his peers, such as Moore and Wittgenstein, defined their position in relation to him, and I think this is true of the whole English-speaking world. He is a great philosopher who has contributed specific technical inventions within philosophy which are permanent acquisitions of knowledge. Lastly, he has set the example and provided the material on which others work. I don't think it could possibly be disputed that he is a great thinker.

A great popularizer

Norman St John-Stevas: I would add that apart from being a great thinker and a great technical philosopher, he is a great popularizer as well; I suppose one of the philosophic works most widely read in England is his *History of Western Philosophy*. I think what he has besides his technical brilliance and original thought is this ability to communicate. He has a vivid gift for putting over to a lay audience general philosophic notions.

Kee: We are coming on to the interesting question of whether or not his influence as a public figure has been proportionate to his academic influence. What do you think about that, Lady Stocks?

Lady Stocks: I think it has, partly because he is, as Mr St John-Stevas said, a popularizer. I am no philosopher, but when I read his essay on *A Free Man's Worship* I felt that here was something I could understand and that illustrates his whole attitude to life. I can't think why people described him as an atheist. His attitude appears to me to be religious—agnostic, but certainly not atheist.

Kee: But has he really influenced the way in which our society has developed?

St John-Stevas: I don't think that he has had a particularly profound effect on the public life of our times. People are fascinated by his personality, by his honesty, but his ideas strike many people as being slightly mad, and I think that the place he will be accorded in history, leaving aside the philosophic contribution, is in the gallery of great English eccentrics.

The bane of loneliness

Hampshire: I think that his gift for communicating with a wide public, which is evident both in his writing and his broadcasting, arises from a deep feature of his own character which he has remarked on in his autobiography; namely, what he calls the bane of solitude and loneliness. For him, philosophy was always a matter of finding the meaning of life and overcoming this sense of loneliness

which he felt as a child, and this is for most people the psychological root of an interest in philosophical questions, a sense of 'can I not find what is the meaning of life or the purpose for which we're here?'. Lady Stocks has just said that he is in a certain sense a religious man; if this means somebody who raises that kind of question, then it is evident that he is, even though he denies the existence of God. But I would prefer to call this a genuine philosophical temperament. He gives an example to people of clear, free thought which they find encouraging, even where the conclusions at which he arrives are unconvincing. So I think that he has in that way had a great influence.

One other point that I would like to make concerns what he said about Soviet Communism very early, when there was a strong disposition among persons of his point of view, radical thinkers in general, naturally enough to sympathize. He saw what others have come to acknowledge, the brutality which was somehow built into the system from the beginning, and very courageously stated this in a vivid form, I think in 1921. This seems to me to have been the only occasion on which one can say that he had a very great influence.

Kee: What about all the great causes and the crusades with which he has identified himself, such as the emancipation of women, radical reform of sexual attitudes? Have these in fact taken place because of him or simply contemporaneously with his thought?

Lady Stocks: My first memory of him was as a great feminist, working with his first wife and with the whole movement of women's emancipation; I think that was part of his inheritance of Victorian Whig Liberalism. If you read the Amberley letters, you find he didn't know his parents, he had no opportunity to do so, but there is a great deal of his parents in him, both of them: their rather sceptical attitude and their tremendous belief in equality. They were fundamentally democratic and he inherited that, and I think that he did give a real sort of academic respectability to the movement of women's emancipation. He sacrificed quite a lot for it; he hated by-elections and politics and canvassing and all that sort of thing, but he did it in a good cause.

Prophetic role in public life

St John-Stevas: His role in public life, it seems to me, has been a prophetic one. He has not, I think, been endowed by nature with what Walter Bagehot calls the prowling faculties which are essential if you are going to have political influence on men; you have to make whole series of compromises which he himself was never in fact willing to make. This gives him a great strength, in that he has always allowed himself to be himself, which no politician in fact can do; you can only allow yourself to be yourself to a certain extent.

Lady Stocks: There was his interesting deviation between the wars, on free education, and in that I think he was a leader. He and his second wife, Dora, wrote books on education, in fact they put it into practice, they actually ran a school. It may be that that was in harmony with other movements in education—J. H. Badley's and in its extreme form, of course, A. S. Neill's—but his books on education did have a considerable influence. They cease to have it because I think the educational world has digested as much of that as it wants, in fact a little too much.

St John-Stevas: He suggested that undergraduates should have childless marriages—that is one of the things I remember about his contributions to education—to help them in their studies. Don't you think that is typical of the sort of idea he threw out and which really has had no influence at all?

Lady Stocks: I'd like to think it hadn't. But he had a very unhappy, frustrating childhood; he was, I should think, very much inhibited in the early part of his life sexually, and it was not until much later, after his first marriage had broken down, that he began to find what he describes as 'ecstasy' in love; but the astonishing thing is that though it may have produced moments of ecstasy—undoubtedly it really did, to judge from his own accounts of it and those of his second wife—it did not produce the solace of his loneliness, which continued, according to himself, until the very end of his life, when apparently he has found a relationship which meets his need.

St John-Stevas: But what a very odd conception of love that is.

Lady Stocks: It is, to my mind.

St John-Stevas: It all seems to me to be defined in very personal, rather selfish terms, because as I see the essence of love it is something quite different, it's caring for other people. One may be moved by ecstasy to do certain things, and ecstasy is very nice if it happens to come along, but I don't think that's the essence of love at all; at least, it wouldn't be my idea of love.

Lady Stocks: It isn't mine. Love may have that element of ecstasy in it, in the case of two married people, but it does involve also a kind of permanent mutual trust which we sometimes see when married people grow old together in perfect contentment with one another. He doesn't seem to have experienced that. I think in a way as a lover he was a failure. He made at least two women very unhappy.

Kee: Aren't we really expecting too much of a professional philosopher if we expect him to be one in this other sense, of knowing all about love and being able to explain it to us?

Lady Stocks: I wouldn't have expected it of a great philosopher, but he does claim it himself.

Hampshire: No, I don't think he does claim that at all. What I think he does is hold open the field of debate and suggest that all these issues, which are treated as ones which cannot be intellectually considered, can be intellectually considered. There are some, Lawrence is one, who are shocked by discussing the emotions in his intellectual terms at all. There are others who are shocked by the degree of self-revelation which occurs in Russell's *Autobiography* and the degree of frankness that he shows in portraying his own relations with his wife and with others. But no one can doubt there's an absence of triviality about his discussion of these things—he may be mistaken but it is clear that this openness gives him a role which no one else in our time has had. It is significant, for example, that he says in his *Autobiography* how much he despises Bernard Shaw, because of his vanity: he felt Shaw played with these issues. With Russell there is a possibility of public discussion at a deep level of issues about which people consider one cannot think clearly. This is his real public influence. I agree that he has had no great influence on practical politics, and that for the simple reason that he has never undertaken political analysis: in current discussions of the Vietnam war, where I agree to some degree with his conclusion, he never analyses the forces that are at work and why we are in this situation.

Ineffectual in public affairs

Kee: He does, however, claim very specifically to be taken seriously in public affairs. He said somewhere in this *Autobiography* that after 'Principia Mathematica' he abandoned mathematics and philosophy for international affairs, as if this was going to be his serious work. It seems odd if a man of such undoubtedly enormous intellect should turn out to be so ineffectual in public affairs.

St John-Stevas: I don't find that odd at all. One would expect somebody who had made his main business philosophy to be ineffectual in public affairs. One wouldn't expect him in fact even to want to take part in public affairs What is interesting about Lord Russell is that he obviously does passionately want to take part in public affairs and it is this passion that has driven him on; but I don't think he is taken seriously in English public and political affairs. I don't think people in the House of Commons, for example, are asking themselves 'What has Bertrand Russell said?' He may have influence as a manifestation of conscience as such. He may also have influence in a negative way in that he may be used by other people for their own purposes—the Russians for example—but I don't think he could possibly lay any tenable claim to having profound political influence in our times.

Hampshire: But ought we to assume that philosophers are out of place in public affairs? I mean Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Locke, most of the great philosophers, [redacted] and so on, have simultaneously concerned themselves with ultimate moral issues and public affairs. It's hard to see how these two could fall apart.

St John-Stevas: They haven't been very successful in their participation in public affairs. If I may take [redacted] for example, I think it was a great mistake of his to enter parliament; he had no influence in parliament in practical affairs, and it merely distracted him from doing the things which he was good at, which was advancing his own philosophy and thinking.

Mill

Lady Stocks: But he did write a book [redacted]. When I re-read that book I think it's really in a way the last word on the conception of political and social liberty. I mean today I think it is a text-book.

On Liberty

St John-Stevas: Well, could you point to a comparable book which Bertrand Russell had written which you put in that category?

Lady Stocks: No, I can't.

St John-Stevas: Could you, Stuart Hampshire?

Hampshire: No. I don't think Russell has ever quite attained that kind of intimacy with politics, and I agree that he has the type of intellect which greatly over-simplifies political problems. When he turns to considering specific issues he presumes that you can become certain about them in a kind of way that you can become certain about mathematical problems or propositions of logic. For example, in the 'Face to Face' interview, when John Freeman suggests there is something rather odd about his view on the atomic bomb*, he says: 'Well, it's consistent with my other views'; and to introduce here only this logical notion of consistency seemed to me to show somehow a lack of real political thinking.

Kee: Perhaps that is why he is virtually ineffectual in public affairs; perhaps you can't operate there with precise surgical analysis on every single issue, as you do in philosophy.

St John-Stevas: He has not brought that to his political life at all, and I think, in so far as his political activities have influenced men politically, I quite agree with Stuart Hampshire, it's because they are not something that is coming out of the top of his head, they are coming from his nature, and the contradictions in his nature—which I suppose one could say are explained in this book, going back to his lonely childhood. I think it is precisely because they are a reflection of his nature that they do fascinate people and move people; this is the impact of personality on personality. Where he in fact brings in his logic, you get these mad ideas like a preventive war against Russia.

Hampshire: The first book he ever wrote, which was the first course of lectures at the London School of Economics is called *German Social Democracy*, which has the best early discussion of Marxist theory in the English language. The second book was on *Foundations*

* The suggestion he made in the late 'forties that the U.S. should threaten Russia with nuclear attack to deter her from developing her own nuclear weapons.

of Geometry. We should get it all wrong if we gave the impression somehow that he was a great philosopher who turned to politics: the two have always been equally deep in his nature. Russell has never been academic; he has not been confined in a university, except for very short periods; and this gives him, as it were, a de-institutionalized setting, which enables him to speak as a human being to great numbers of persons, and they may not agree, but they feel that this is a dignified phenomenon which offers hope.

Lady Stocks: One thing that I think endears him to the normal young intellectual, is that he can get tremendously het-up about a cause, and say what to many of us appear rather foolish things.

A master of communication

St John-Stevas: And he is, of course, a master of communication, isn't he? Although he feels passionately, the passion is contained within a very controlled literary form. Listening to him broadcast one is moved by the beauty of the language and the precision of the language, as much as by anything else.

Hampshire: He has a rather superstitious attitude to the power of argument and the power of words, in the sense that in the *Autobiography* he explains, for example, the failure of his first marriage, or the point of breakdown, in terms of propositions that he came to believe about his wife and about her relation to her mother and so on. You feel that his own emotions are already built into the argument; this is very rare in people.

Kee: There is one very strange thing, isn't there, in this *Autobiography*, and that is the contrast between the serenity of the way in which he is talking about his life and the actual emotional turmoil he is often describing. He is constantly saying in clear, precise, subdued tones that he went through an appalling emotional experience. He describes the failure of his first marriage, for instance, in almost horrifyingly clipped and dry tones, which are often very amusing.

Lady Stocks: But he analyses the faults he finds in his wife.

St John-Stevas: Of course he has reached a degree of peace and serenity, and therefore I suppose he is looking back on experience which almost perhaps belonged to another person, which he himself has in fact transcended. But I think also he is saved, to a great extent, from being in fact destroyed by these passions and emotions by a sense of proportion which comes out very much in his sense of humour. He is in fact capable of laughing at himself as well as at other people; this sharp and malicious sense of humour which he has is a very real part of him and has formed a regulator in his life which is of great value.

Kee: D. H. Lawrence, of course, found his pacifism psychologically very suspect. He wrote to Russell: 'You are simply full of repressed desires which have become savage and anti-social, and they come out in this sheep's clothing of peace propaganda'. Do you think there is anything in that?

Lady Stocks: No, I really don't give weight to anything D. H. Lawrence said about anybody: he was a curious, tortured, pathological creature. He never had the sort of intellectual contacts that Russell had; he didn't know what they were like.

St John-Stevas: I think it is merely a piece of Freudian invective.

Hampshire: I should like to say something in favour of Lawrence: there is a truth, I think, here, that Russell does in his *Autobiography* and elsewhere sometimes describe himself as descending among ordinary mortals in a slightly godlike way. There is a description of him staying in a hotel in which he comments, writing to somebody, on the other people in the hotel, very much as if he had alighted among ordinary men. There is a sort of paradox here, because he is marvellous at addressing ordinary men and ordinary men like there to be godlike figures. Lawrence pointed to his cerebral way of talking about the emotions; Lawrence is perfectly right that one cannot so talk truthfully about them, as we have rather suspected over Russell's description of his marriage. One has a feeling the truth can't be like this; that you cannot put emotional relationships into these witty, short sentences; and that this is a kind of Spinozistic or godlike view of oneself which he has to some extent.

St John-Stevas: And he does say himself, doesn't he, that he can't identify with the people supporting the causes he believes in: that again I think is an expression of this intense individuality, which cuts him off from other men and therefore doesn't make him an effective political leader of men.

Lady Stocks: I think that was in a way intellectual honesty: lots of people feel like that when they go into popular causes with less intellectually distinguished people than themselves.

St John-Stevas: Where I think he has been significant is in the third part of the *credo* he gives in the prologue of the *Autobiography*, his compassion, his pity. This is a strain of feeling which can be pushed out of ordinary day-to-day politics, and the fact that he does feel so strongly about these issues—he feels compassionately for the people suffering in Vietnam—is a very useful contribution, reminding people that what is being involved here in these political conflicts are the sufferings of ordinary men and women.

Lady Stocks: I think that is his greatest contribution, and it comes out very clearly in that first volume of his *Autobiography*. I have in mind particularly a series of letters he wrote to an American woman friend who had lost her dearest friend and companion and fellow-worker. His letters to her were so superbly understanding, compassionate. He really feels as she feels, and I think he has

that capacity. I think that is where his great influence today lies with the young. They may not agree with sitting down outside the American Embassy and much that he says about President Johnson, or whatever it may be, but they do feel that here is an old man, nearing the end of his life, who cares tremendously about them and the world that they will live in and that he will not live to see.

St John-Stevas: I think that is true, and I am tremendously attracted by this unquenchable optimism. This is what young people see. Also, if I may put a further gloss on what Lady Stocks has said, I think they are attracted by him because he is such an iconoclast. Young people like someone who is throwing bricks at idols, particularly when it's an old thrower who can give the throwing some respectability.

Hampshire: Yes, but the throwing of the bricks and the iconoclasm has at the back a certain pessimism as well, not only optimism, which gives it a depth and genuineness to which people respond. In his broadcasts you can hear that it is not the kind of iconoclasm of a bright man who has bright thoughts on current issues. Far from it: there is a sense that it is extremely difficult to maintain any tolerable form of human life. I think he has always felt this very strongly.

St John-Stevas: One of the great losses of the future will be if it becomes impossible to produce another person like Russell: he is a whig through and through, and he is one of the great justifications for whiggery.

Hampshire: I think his greatness is just in showing what a human being can do: his marvellous energy and intellectual invention have few parallels at all in our century.

THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT

(5) From the New York Times, 1/2/88, p. 23:

'Elephant Repellent'

By John A. Osmundsen

"Thank heaven for nuclear weapons," Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain seems to say every time she reminds us that Europe has been free of war for the past 40 years, attributing that circumstance, erroneously and without substantiation, to the existence of nuclear weapons.

The same canard is promulgated by the columnist George Will and other conservatives and also by many liberals and arms-control experts who would like nothing better, in their heart of hearts, than to see the world completely free of nuclear weapons but know that that's not possible. Another canard.

What's important about getting these things right is that if allowed to persist such misapprehensions could gravely influence the next summit meeting on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

Take the first canard, a porous syllogism at best. There has been no war in Europe in the 40 years that nuclear weapons have been around; therefore, nuclear weapons have prevented war. That, however, bears a disturbing resemblance to the argument used by a Brooklynite who, when asked why he called a purple powder that he sprinkled around his house "elephant repellent," replied, "Well, you don't see any elephants around here, do you?"

To sense the poverty of the nukes-prevent-war-in-Europe argument, one need only notice that they have not prevented wars elsewhere. And none was ever used even where they might have turned the tide (South Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan) without risking nuclear retaliation to the potential users' homelands. Why?

The reason is simply that the expansion and growth of nuclear warfare, if it breaks out, cannot be deliberately limited or controlled; virtually every military expert who has played a computerized nuclear war game has expressed astonishment at how fast things got out of control, some saying they were never able to

Addressing canards of the nuclear age.

prevent it from running away to totality. Thus, any use of nuclear weapons risks ending in global holocaust, and that means that there is no way at all of ever rationally justifying their use.

Thus, if there is no sane or sensible way of using nuclear weapons without putting humanity at risk — and there is none, as all nuclear-war experts know in their bones, whether or not they will openly acknowledge this perplexing truth even to themselves — then nuclear weapons can't be used. And if they can't be used, then they cannot have prevented war in Europe for the past 40 years.

That still leaves 40 years of peace in Europe to account for. If not nukes — the rational equivalent of elephant repellent — then what explains it?

Could it be that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact haven't gone to war simply because they haven't wanted to, because there has been no reason to do so, because there is every reason not to do so, because there has been nothing to be gained and much to be lost, irrespective of the real though minimal risk that things might escalate — but only accidentally — into the nuclear realm? It certainly couldn't be otherwise.

This brings up canard No. 2 — that nuclear disarmament is not possible. Well, if no use whatever of nuclear weapons can ever be justified rationally, why not just get rid of them? Because, the canardiologists say, you can't ever be sure someone won't hold some back, and there's always the threat of nuclear terrorism, say, from an Iran or a Pakistan.

That argument, however, does not address the rational unusability of nukes, nor does it acknowledge the vast range of very persuasive non-nuclear modes of deterrence (including chemical and biological) that could, if necessary, be used to render intolerable punishment for a nuclear attack by a mindless despot or a maniac.

The bottom line is that there is no use for nukes, their very existence threatens all humanity as nothing ever has before and they can be eliminated from the face of the earth, as President Reagan often says is his fondest dream. All we have to do is shoot down all the canards of folly and start thinking clearly about getting, as they say, our real duckpins all in a row. □

John A. Osmundsen is writing a book that deals with paradoxes of the nuclear age.

(6) The San Diego Union ran this New York Times News Service item "about the time of our June meeting," says JIM MCWILLIAMS, who sent it to us:

MIT post-nuclear outlook is grim

New York Times News Service

NEW YORK — In a major challenge to the government's position on the long-term effects of nuclear war, a new study concludes that a limited attack on the United States, involving only 1 percent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, could set off a collapse of the U.S. economy that would last for decades.

Federal officials say that the study is flawed and that recovery from even large attacks could take place in years, not decades.

The study, by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology said an attack aimed only at liquid fuels and their distribution points could cripple transportation, energy production and key industries, damaging the nation's economy so thoroughly that most of the population would die of starvation in months.

The survivors, it said, would be reduced to "near-medieval levels of existence" for decades.

However, the Soviet Union is even more vulnerable, the study added.

MIT's study, titled "Nuclear Crash," was based on four years of computer simulations of nuclear attacks and their consequences.

The computer instructions used were a modification of a model originally developed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which plans relief measures for war and natural disasters. The prevailing government view is based more on experts' analysis than on computer models.

Dr. Kosta Tsipis, senior author of the study and

Continued from A-21

director of MIT's Program in Science and Technology for International Security, said: "The usual assumption is that the economy recovers. But this program shows it will not recover even 25 to 30 years after an attack."

Officials with the federal agency faulted the MIT study. Paul K. Krueger, the agency's assistant associate director for mobilization resources, said he had not seen the study but that the underlying set of computer instructions, supplied to the agency in 1980 by a government contractor, was abandoned in 1984 after "a lot of criticism from other government departments that it was unrealistic."

Tsipis said the computer model had been tested extensively for accuracy at MIT and improved with the aid of its creators. He said the government had abandoned the model because its results conflicted with the government's public positions.

Krueger vigorously denied this.

The 136-page study reached these conclusions:

- The economy would be unable to "shake off" the effects of an attack on petroleum supplies. At best the nation could regain about a third of its productivity over a quarter-century.
- The Soviet Union would be no better off than the United States and could be more vulnerable to long-lasting effects from a nuclear attack because its petroleum industry is more concentrated.
- The superpowers could achieve the goal of deterring attacks with drastically fewer nuclear arms.
- President Reagan's plan for a defense against enemy missiles might not protect the nation from lasting economic collapse even if the defense prevented 99 percent of incoming warheads from reaching their targets.
- Civil defense measures would be largely futile.

The government's position through several administrations has been that either superpower would recover from nuclear attacks consisting of several hundred nuclear weapons.

In 1982, Thomas K. Jones, deputy undersecretary of defense for strategic and theater nuclear forces, was quoted as saying the United States could fully recover from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in two to four years.

"If there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it," he said, referring to simple fallout shelters dug in the ground. Jones left the Pentagon in 1985.

Jim thinks the BRS ought to have an award "for guys like Jones. We should award him a shovel to cover himself up with." The BRS Dumbell Award?

(7) Seismic Data Show 117 Secret U.S. Atom Tests was the headline on a front page story in the New York Times on 1/17/88. The tests took place during the past 25 years. The figures resulted from an analysis of seismic data about earth tremors that has been publicly available for years. It came from the Natural Resources Defense Council, "widely recognized as having extensive expertise in seismic studies. It recently participated with Soviet scientists in monitoring American and Soviet nuclear test sites."

The report was part of the proceedings at the International Scientific Symposium on a Nuclear Test Ban, held in Las Vegas on January 15-16. The Symposium was a project of the Council on Economic Priorities, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Natural Resources Defense Council, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Sierra Club, and Union of Concerned Scientists.

"The findings could potentially shift moderates in Congress to accept a test ban, since it suggests that even the smallest tests could be detected," said Representative Edward J. Markey.

HUMANISM

(8) Music Critic's highest compliment. After hearing the Bach Choir of Bethlehem sing Bach's B-Minor Mass, Music Critic David A Reed, of the Bethlehem Globe-Times, had this to say:

> Hearing such devotional music sung with such dedication easily puts this secular humanist into a willing state of suspension of disbelief.

PUGWASH

(9) 30th Birthday. From The Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 7/11/87. p.25, with thanks to JOHN LENZ:

Pugwash Thinkers celebrate 30th year

By ISABELLE TIBBLES
Truro Bureau

PUGWASH — Nine scientists from around the world met Friday at Thinker's Lodge, Pugwash, for a three-day informal conference to review the past, present and future of the Pugwash movement.

The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs began 30 years ago when scientists realized the potential danger of nuclear developments. The aim of the first and subsequent conferences was to appraise dangers arising from the development of weapons and to prevent a nuclear war.

"We were worried, particularly because the hydrogen bomb was just released," said Joseph Rotblat, professor emeritus of physics at the University of London, England.

Prof. Rotblat is the "father" of the Pugwash conferences, said Mrs. Cyrus Eaton, widow of Cyrus Eaton, a Nova Scotia-born Cleveland industrialist who sponsored the Pugwash conference.

Prof. Rotblat, one of the original conference participants in 1957, worked on the atom bomb during the Second World War.

"We felt responsible to a large extent for creating man's destiny. ... We wanted to help the rest of the world and prevent a catastrophe."

But, he said, 30 years later the human race in still in danger but on a different scale. "Therefore our main objective has not been achieved."

"(But) We have survived 30 years without nuclear war and we believe to a certain extent this is due to our efforts."

Prof. Rotblat said one result of the Pugwash Conferences is that leaders and decision makers have been educated "that neither side can win a nuclear war — it would be suicidal."

He said future dangers have changed in part from past dangers and "inadvertent nuclear war," is now the main concern.

"We must eliminate nuclear weapons all together and this can't be done overnight. This is still the task for Pugwash after 30 years."

About 2,400 scientists from 84 countries participate in various Pugwash conferences and over the years 7,000 scientists have taken part in various workshops focusing on the survival of human kind.

A formal meeting will be held from September 1 to 6 in Austria and about 200 people will participate.

From the Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 8/12/87, Voice of the People (Letters to the Editor) page:

Russell's idea

To The Editor:

Sir, — I have been sent a clipping of the story on the Pugwash Thinkers by Isabelle Tibbles, in your issue of July 11, 1987, page 25.

It's a pretty good story, but it does omit one thing that might be thought relevant: the name of the person who initiated the Pugwash Conferences, the person whose idea it was (in 1957) to have a Pugwash Conference in the first place. That was Bertrand Russell.

This does not detract in any way from the great part played by Professor Rotblat. In your story, Mrs. Eaton calls Professor Rotblat "the father" of the Pugwash Conferences. I suggest that the father was Russell, and Rotblat the midwife who made it all come out right. This society has the highest regard for Professor Rotblat. It awarded him its 1983 Bertrand Russell Society Award. Here are excerpts from the 1983 press release on that award:

"The 1983 Bertrand Russell Society Award has gone to Joseph Rotblat, nuclear physicist, anti-nuclear advocate, Secretary General of the Pugwash Conferences for the first 17 years (1957-1973) ... and currently active on the Executive Committee, also Chairman of the British Pugwash Group."

The Pugwash Conferences were a breakthrough in East-West relations. They brought scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain together for the first time to discuss the nuclear peril. The conferences led to the SALT talks and to the partial Test Ban Treaty, that banned tests above ground. (1963). As Bertrand Russell said, "...it showed that real cooperation could be achieved among scientists of extremely divergent ideologies and apparently opposing scientific, as well as other, views."

The conferences were Russell's idea. But Russell was 85 and in poor health, unable to attend the first conference (in Pugwash, Nova Scotia). As a result, it was Joseph Rotblat who organized it, as well as the following 22 Pugwash Conferences.

The award citation reads: "For presiding at the birth of the Pugwash Conferences, and nurturing their growth, to develop areas of agreement between East and West so as to diminish the nuclear peril."

In Bertrand Russell's eyes, Professor Rotblat "... can have few rivals in courage and integrity ... If ever the nuclear peril and allied evils are eradicated and international affairs are straightened out, his name should stand very high among its heroes."

LEE EISLER
Vice-President, Information
The Bertrand Russell Society
RD 1, Box 409
Coopersburg, Pa.

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(10) Kate finds a parallel. From the New York Post, 1/21/76, with thanks to HARRY RUJA:

Love and Genius

From "My Father Bertrand Russell" by Katharine Tait (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 202 pp., $8.95).

When I studied Goethe, in college, the professor taught us to connect each creative burst with a new love affair: Goethe drew the life of his poetry from his loves, then moved on and left them. Sometimes I think my father was like that. Perhaps it is a characteristic of great men, who must follow their gift regardless of consequences. And he says himself: "I have known no woman to whom the claims of intellect were as absolute as they are to me, and wherever intellect intervened, I have found that the sympathy I sought in love was apt to fail."

PHILOSOPHY

(11) Philosophical dispute gets 3 columns on the front page of the New York Times!, 12/29/87:

Philosophical Rift: A Tale of Two Approaches

By RICHARD BERNSTEIN

Charles Sherover, who teaches philosophy at Hunter College, speaks in a sort of paradox about certain other philosophers. All too often, he says, those who were accepted into the ranks of the philosophers in America were not what he calls "philosophically inclined."

"You're much more likely to find philosophically inclined people outside of philosophy," Professor Sherover said, "because if you are philosophically inclined, you've probably been excluded."

Dr. Sherover's paradox, vehemently rejected by his targets, well reflects an argument taking place among American philosophers, sowing discord within the ranks of the 6,000 or so members of the American Philosophical Association, a group that rarely makes headlines but is, presumably, engaged in the task of examining the very foundations of Western thought.

Charles Sherover
Hunter College
"You're much more likely to find philosophically inclined people outside of philosophy, because if you are philosophically inclined, you've probably been excluded."

The New York Times/ Angel Franco

The New York Times

Ruth Barcan Marcus
Yale University
"It's not just fake history, it isn't even history," she said of the pluralists' version of philosophy's changes. "The tradition up to Kant was analytical. It was one of addressing questions in a careful way and giving reasons for one's point of view."

Bogged Down in Logic

Some philosophers like Professor Sherover, already organized into a group whose members call themselves pluralists, met in Cambridge, Mass., last month and formed a new organization, The Society of Philosophers in America, to combat what they believe is the control over the field exercised by what they see as a highly technical subspeciality, the Anglo-American analytical school.

Underlying the pluralists' activities is the belief that philosophy, bogged down in a stress on logic, language, and empirical data, has lost its vocation of addressing the big questions asked by perplexed mankind: what is being? Is reality what our senses perceive? Does the universe have purpose?

Instead, the pluralists maintain, philosophy has come to mimic the sciences, striving to attain new clarity over what the big questions mean, with the result that philosophy has departed from the sort of informed speculation that gave it its appeal over the centuries.

The analysts themselves not only disagree with this conclusion, but some dismiss the way the pluralists pose the problem. They deny, for example, that there is even such a thing these days as an analytic school, and they claim that their own work, even if sometimes highly technical, marks a continuation of more than 2,000 years of rigorous

The dispute among philosophers is not the sort of thing that heats up public emotions, although it echoes disputes in other fields. Economics is one example where higher and higher degrees of specialization have alienated not only members of the public but some specialists as well. Philosophy, moreover, even if no longer followed as avidly by nonphilosophers as it was in centuries past, does provide the foundation of many other disciplines, establishing grounds for judging ethical principles and claims to know the truth.

In this sense, underlying the position of Dr. Sherover and his allies is their concern, rejected by their opponents, that philosophy itself has drifted from the center of intellectual life to a technical periphery, with the result that Western civilization has been impoverished.

"The problem arises when it comes down to saying that a certain way of

Continued on Page A15, Column 1

Philosophical Turmoil: A Tale of Two Approaches

Continued From Page A1

doing philosophy is the only way, and if you don't do it that way you don't do it at all," John E. Smith, a professor at Yale and a Sherover ally, said of what he views as the analysts' domination of the field.

"Tillich," Professor Smith went on, referring to Paul Tillich, the theologian, "said that you can put up no trespassing signs, but that doesn't stop people from trying to answer the great questions in any way they can." In short, Professor Smith is saying, if the philosophers fail to do philosophy, others, perhaps untrained in the major traditions, will. "People are going to look for answers whether the analysts like it or not."

Attempt to Restore Legitimacy

The pluralists' meeting in Cambridge last month marked a new step in a quarrel that has been marinating for nearly a decade, ever since they founded their first organization, known as the Committee for Pluralism in Philosophy in the late 1970's. Their purpose, as they explain it, was not to create a new orthodoxy, but merely to restore legitimacy to the several schools of thought obscured by what they regarded as the analysts' domination of the major academic departments.

But, the argument pitting the pluralists against the analysts goes back much further, at least until early this century when philosophy took a major turning, originally in Vienna. That is where the school of logical positivism, the ancestor of the Anglo-American analytical school took form. The new line of thought, originated and developed by the likes of Rudolph Carnap, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and centered eventually in England, put a stress on logic and the methods of science, dismissing earlier philosophy as portentious verbiage.

Metaphysics Is Attacked

This group held that the age-old metaphysical questions were meaningless, since an analysis of the language used to frame them showed them to be nonsensical. Earlier philosophers' statements about ethics and morality, for example, were only expressions of the philosophers' emotions or opinions; they had no grounding in logic or empirical fact. In other words, metaphysics, which had been the philosophical motor for two millenia, was meaningless.

Some see philosophy framed by logic and language; others still pursue the big questions

"What the analysts said really was that the classical questions of philosophy were really questions about language," Arthur Danto, a professor of philosophy at Columbia University, said. "The idea was that there was a frontier that you could drive back by an ever more refined linguistic analysis."

A recent issue of Harvard Magazine gave an example of this sort of thing drawn from Willard Van Orman Quine, considered by many to be the current titan of American philosophy. The question was one of the big ones in metaphysics — the definition of being. Professor Quine's Anglo-American analytical answer: "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" — a difficult concept to explain briefly.

Disdained as Airy and Fuzzy

Professor Smith, Professor Sherover, and others dismiss this sort of thing as a bright but empty game played by the dreaded SMAG, the Singleminded Analytical Group, and they promote a return to the more freewheeling, literary traditions of Europe, where Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre provided a more soulful alternative to the analysts' brainy but dry logic. Many of the anti-analysts refer to themselves as Continentals. They in turn are disdained by some of the analysts as fuzzy, airy, ignorant of the empirical data, and more attached to feeling than to thought.

But here it becomes complicated, in particular because some philosophers dismiss the idea that there is a genuine intellectual quarrel taking place, or even that pluralists' definition of the issue is accurate. At Yale, for example, Ruth Barcan Marcus, cited by many of the pluralists as a major champion of the analytic school, denies that hard-core analysts exist these days, or that the philosophical establishment has ceased asking the big questions.

"It's not just fake history, it isn't even history," she said, speaking of the pluralists' version of philosophy's changes. "The tradition up to Kant was analytical. It was one of addressing questions in a careful way and giving reasons for one's point of view.

"There was also a close connection between philosophy and science," she said, dismissing a common pluralists' charge that the analysts, whether they exist as a category or not, pretentiously mimic the sciences. "Plato's Academy bore the inscription 'Those who have not studied mathematics shall not enter here.' Leibnitz invented the calculus. Spinoza wrote up his Ethics like geometry. Nobody is more analytical than Descartes. They had tremendously high standards of clarity and a healthy regard for good reasons."

Who Are the Nitpickers?

What's more, Professor Marcus went on, the pluralists are beating a straw horse, because, while logical positivism, with its stress on the meaning of words, may have had its day and still exerts its clarifying influence, the analytical approach itself has become far more multifaceted than before. The pluralists complain of dry, empty nitpicking, she said, but they cannot identify any of the nitpickers by name because they do not exist.

"I'll tell you what the issue is," she said. "There are some people whose notion about philosophy is that it is something that you do. There's some issue — knowledge, truth, the meaning of good — and they try to answer philosophical questions about it. Then there are a whole lot of other people who write about other philosophers, who interpret their work. A lot of the people who call themselves pluralists are interested in studying other people's work."

Professor Marcus's point is that the prestige departments — such as those at Berkeley, Harvard and Princeton — hired from the group that "does philosophy" leaving the resentful others on the sidelines, from where they have mounted a political counter attack.

Indeed, one result of the dispute is that philosophers group themselves behind their favored candidates for office in the American Philosophical Association, which is holding its annual meeting in New York this week. When caucasing and voting is not taking place, there is still time to discuss such weighty matters as epistemology in the age of neurosurgery and conceptions of causality.

The pluralists, by good organizing have, since 1980, gotten some of their candidates elected to the presidency of the association and this has led to some complaints about sheer numerical majorities dominating the profession rather than standards of scholarly excellence. The pluralists, however, are unrepentent.

"The feeling was," Professor Sherover said, "that analytical philosophy had taken control of philosophy and the only way to counter that was by a political counter-offensive."

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

(12) Adam Jacobs, who recently disrobed in public (RSN56-17), is having some fun with a Fully Certified Guarantee. ---------->

It was inspired, he says, by a line in BR's "Why I Am Not A Christian".

With Rutgers School of Law behind him, he is now an Attorney at Law, and Law Clerk to a judge in New Jersy.



ANNUAL MEETING (1988)

(13) Marvin Kohl, BRS President, is in charge of the Meeting, and provides the following information:

The Bertrand Russell Society Annual Conference
SUNY at Fredonia, Fredonia New York, June 17-19, 1988

HAPPINESS AND THE IMPORTANT THINGS IN LIFE

A. Tentative Program

Friday, June 17

4-6pm	Registration
5-6:30	Dinner
7:30	Welcome and Presentation of 1988 Book Award
8-9:45	Panel: Defining Happiness
9:45	Tea and Coffee
10:00	Board of Directors Meeting

Saturday, June 18

7:30-8:45	Breakfast
9:30-10:45	Paper: Kenneth Blackwell, McMaster University, "Russell's Theory of Happiness"
10:45	Tea and Coffee
11-12:15	General Meeting
12:30-1:45	Lunch
2-3:15	Paper
3:15	Tea and Coffee
3:30-5:45	Panel: Conditions of Happiness
5:45-6:45	Red Hackle Hour
7:00	Banquet
8:00	Presentation of 1988 Achievement Award Paul Kurtz, SUNY at Buffalo, "The Meaning of Life"

Sunday, June 19

7:30	Breakfast
9:30	Paper
10:30	Paper
11:30	Tea and Coffee
11:45	Paper or Panel

B. Fredonia: A Geo Brief

The State University of New York College at Fredonia is located within the village of Fredonia in the heart of northern Chautaqua County at Exit 59 of the New York State Thruway, halfway between Buffalo, NY and Erie, PA. This largely residential village is distinguished by beautiful tree-lined avenues, the warmth of its citizens, and a deeply-rooted history. The neighboring city of Dunkirk is located on the shores of Lake Erie.

The campus is about 50 miles from the Buffalo Airport. Rental cars are available, but there is no direct bus service from the airport. A van service can be arranged at a modest fee, if there is sufficient interest and a reasonable focus of arrivals and departures.

The area is a glorious place to vacation at this time of year. It has a number of attractions. Lake Erie (1/2 mile away) offers opportunities for swimming, fishing, and boating. Although the Nationally-known Chautauqua Institution does not begin its full program of plays, operas, concerts, and lectures until June 25, it will be open for visitors and there may be a pre-season concert. The Ontario, Canada cities of Toronto and Niagara Falls are just a few hours away and Buffalo, the "City of Good Neighbors," boasts such fine facilites as the nationally-known Albright Knox Art Gallery and the Kleinhans Music Hall, home of the Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra.

Please let me know if you have any special needs or interests.

-----> TO MAKE A RESERVATION FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING, USE THE REGISTRATION FORM ON THE LAST PAGE <-----

THE NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT

(14) Anti-Nuclear, with chorus and orchestra, reviewed by WARREN SMITH:

Trinity Mass," by James Yannatos, a requiem mass conducted by the composer with the Harvard-Radcliffe Orchestra [Sonory Publications, 9 Stearns St., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, $10.—a 90-minute cassette].

No, the "trinity" of the title is not a theological reference. Trinity was J. Robert Oppenheimer's code name for the first atomic bomb test in the New Mexico desert. The present orchestral work with libretto is a forceful, artistic plea for the immediate international reduction of weapons.

The pacifistic work was written in 1983 by James Yannatos, of Harvard's Department of Music. In 1986 it was performed first at Harvard, then at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City.

Fans of Bertrand Russell will be favorably impressed by the 33 sources which Prof. Yannatos uses for the libretto of his requiem mass. These include, for example, anti-war observations from 1990 B.C. (by the King of Heracleopolis); Biblical quotations; Aztec, Seneca, and Winnebago sayings; a Negro spiritual; words of Hiroshima survivors; quotes from Churchill, Eisenhower, T. S. Eliot, Kazantzakis, and Roethke; a World War II Air Force bombadier; and expressions from scientists working on the Atom Bomb in Los Alamos.

The non-musician will find the work a pleasant cerebral collage of atonality and inspiringly complex musicianship. The libretto itself is a compilation well worth the cost of the cassette.

The musician will wish he had attended the Harvard premiere or what must have been a memorable performance in the New York City cathedral, with Jason Robards as narrator.

First off, the Harvard-Radcliffe orchestra masterfully performs the work. The premiere also included the following: the Harvard-Radcliffe Collegium Musicum; the Radcliffe Choral Society; the Harvard Glee Club; the Bach Back Bay Chorale; and the Youth Pro Musica (in New York, the Brooklyn Boys' Chorus). Narrator is Robert J. Lurtsema, and featured singers, all top-rate, are Lucy Shelton, Milagro Vargas, Jon Humphrey, Sanford Sylvan, and Robert Honeysucker.

The prologue, with American Indian references to the beauty of nature, is followed by a "day of wrath" with an ironic use of Beethoven's 9th Symphony combined with reflections on war and Hiroshima. Part 3, a "credo in reduxio ad absurdum," features children singing about the cold, old men "with their fingers on the button." Part 4, "Sanctus," combines a Negro spiritual's message about "when the stars begin to fall" with a Winnebago saying, "Holy Mother Earth,/The trees and all nature/Are witnesses/Of your thoughts and deeds." Part 5, the epilogue, uses Biblical quotations along with a paraphrase of Einstein's 1931 address to the California Institute of Technology. In every way, the music stands out as a major selection, not just an accompaniment for a libretto.

No reference is made to Russell, but it can safely be stated that he would have agreed with the composer-conductor's theme of pacifism. The stature of the music he certainly would have recognized and enjoyed, also. Although the work has been played on WBAI and other classical radio stations, it deserves a wide international audience. Society members might well request their local stations to play the work, recommending that the cassette be purchased if it is not in their library. Or members might well contribute such a cassette to their favorite station.

Bertrand Russell Society members would do well to be present whenever and wherever the work is next performed. Meanwhile, I can think of no similar composition with quite so broad a scope as well as so noble a purpose.

Warren signs his review as President of Variety Recording Studio, more fully identified by this letterhead:

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PHILOSOPHY?

(15) Applied Philosophy (Wall Street version) in the New York Times of 1/13/88, p D2:

Economic Scene | Leonard Silk

Learning Caution The Hard Way

LONDON

ALTHOUGH the London stock market remains "jittery and skittish," as one highly placed Government economist put it yesterday, there is a growing belief on London's Wall Street that the danger of another market crash is receding. That belief was strengthened by the ability of equity markets here and around the world to withstand the shock of last Friday's plunge in the New York stock market, when the Dow industrials fell 140 points.

"We had our fingers crossed," said Ian Harwood, chief economist of S. G. Warburg & Company, an investment bank, "but, thank heavens, there was no rerun of Black Monday."

Why not? First, Mr. Harwood said, because this time there was little fear that the Fed would raise interest rates. "Before the October crash," he added, "there was deep anxiety that the Federal Reserve would hike rates, raising the specter of recession." This time the Bank of England, most other European banks, the Bank of Japan and the Fed all stepped in to support the dollar, with no threat of higher interest rates.

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Second, Mr. Harwood said, the big institutional investors decided that stocks were no longer overvalued as they had been before the October crash. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus put it about 500 B.C., you never swim in the same river twice — and it is a different market now from what it was before Oct. 19.

Indeed, an American economist, M. Louise Curley, a consultant to Scudder, Stevens & Clark, investment advisers, turns to a different philosopher



Nicolae Asciu

to explain why the markets have not repeated the Oct. 19 crash. She finds a hint in the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), specifically in his Categorical Imperative. In Kant's murky formulation, the Categorical Imperative states: "Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a general law." This may be translated as: Never adopt a principle of action that you would not be prepared to see everyone else adopt.

The Presidential commission that investigated the Black Monday market collapse, headed by Nicholas F. Brady, has stressed the role that program trading played in causing the market to plunge by a record amount. But institutions have now presumably learned that, acting in their individual self-interest, they can be severely damaged when other institutions act as they did.

Rational self-interest dictates that they stop behaving in such a short-sighted way — that is, in the mistaken belief that they can operate in isolation from other institutional investors with similar programmed strategies for buying futures and selling stocks at their current prices.

The Categorical Imperative implies that different rules of behavior must be found in their own and the general interest. The British may have a better fix on those principles, because the British Broadcasting Corporation has run a television series on "The Great Philosophers," including Kant. As Geoffrey Warnock, principal of Hertford College of Oxford University, expressed it on the air, Kant sought to show that the "essential requirements of morality are really built into the concept of rationality itself." Any rational being, Kant declared, has to recognize those requirements as binding.

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But is the stock market rational? It may take further punishment before the market players recognize that their self-interests are bound up in the common interest. The sharp fall in the Dow Jones industrial average in New York on Friday, without a sign of outside cause, may imply that the Kantian lesson has not yet been learned. But Monday suggested that the big institutions in New York and around the world are still learning.

The experts in London feel that the markets are learning caution the hard way.

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, in their seminal book "The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior," have given Kant's lesson modern form. They demonstrated that the individual economic actor must recognize that he is involved in a multi-player or multi-firm game, in which the actions of others can make his own play self-destructive if he does not anticipate what others will do. The individual player, they counsel, needs to find a strategy that maximizes his gains while minimizing his risks. The learning process required to master "mini-max" strategy is painfully proceeding in London, New York and other financial capitals.

RATIONALITY

(16) Hemlock gives drug dosage table "only for the information of members of the National Hemlock Society for possible self-delverance from a future terminal illness and used in conjunction with the material found in the book, 'Let Me Die Before I Wake'." "Keep this document in a secure, private place".

The table gives the generic names, trade names, lethal dose, and the toxicity of 18 drugs, as well as the quantity needed.

There are a number of footnotes, and advice such as this: "If you are considering taking your life because you are unhappy, cannot cope, or are confused, please do not use this table, but contact a Crisis Intervention Center or Suicide Prevention Center. Look in the telephone book, etc."

Membership in the National Hemlock Society is $20 a year, $15 for low-income persons over 60. PO Box 66218, Los Angeles, CA 90066-0218.

NEWSLETTER MATTERS

(17) Back Issues of Russell Society News are available, and for sale, at $7.50 for any year (includes USA postage.) No charge for borrowing; borrower pays USA postage both ways, $3.75 for any year. Foreign postage is higher in both cases. Order from the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

RELIGION

(18) "Politics in the Name of God", from the Christian Science Monitor, 11/4/87, or Bad News for Freethinkers, with thanks to JOHN TOBIN:

GLOBAL PHENOMENON

POLITICS IN THE NAME OF GOD

By Robin Wright
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

THE political activism of diverse and disparate religions, an increasingly influential factor worldwide, is taking shape as a broad and enduring phenomenon in the late 20th century.

The emergence of religion in politics is a coincidental trend, and far from cohesive. Among various movements – such as resurgent Islam, liberation theology, fundamentalist Judaism, and Sikh activism – there are more differences than similarities in flash points, tactics, and goals.

Yet the trend is evolving in similar ways and over some similar issues that suggest common themes with long-term consequences, according to a cross section of sociologists, political analysts, regional specialists, clergymen, and psychologists interviewed. Among the similarities:

• Many of the movements, which generally grew up around intellectuals, theologians, or activist cells on the fringe of politics, are now moving into the mainstream, even though they remain in the minority.

"By the 1980s, it had begun to look as though a revival of religion, one with important implications for political life, was under way everywhere," said Harvard Divinity School theologian Harvey Cox in his book "Religion in the Secular City."

"Today," he added in an interview, "it's a tidal movement, and it's not going to go away."

Even in the United States, religion has penetrated into mainstream politics. The evangelical vote is now part of presidential campaign lingo. And for the first time, both parties have clergymen – Republican Pat Robertson and Democrat Jesse Jackson – who are major contenders for the presidency.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood became the largest legal opposition party in last April's legislative elections. In Brazil, 34 evangelical congressmen are campaigning to prevent the new constitution from listing Roman Catholicism as the state religion.

• Many movements, initially prominent mainly because of their opposition activities, are gaining greater legitimacy by diversifying roles and institutionalizing their movements, often in constructive ways.

With US funding, a Polish church group is planning a $10 million agricultural project to help private farms update machinery and finance water and sewage projects in villages. Islamic groups in Egypt now provide social services, such as good-quality education, at little or no cost to families.

Catholic "base communities" in Nicaragua provide self-help economic projects as well as Bible study, while US evangelicals have reportedly established 19 schools serving 13,000 children in El Salvador.

As religious groups further entrench their roles in the political and social system, several are in the process of ensuring they will be long-term players. Specialists interviewed almost unanimously agreed that religion will be an increasingly important force in politics well into the next century.

• Religious movements are increasingly bold in challenging both left- and right-wing regimes as well as democracies. In Tibet, Buddhist monks led protests in September against Chinese communist rule. The protests disintegrated into the province's worst rioting since a 1959 nationalist uprising.

In the Philippines and Haiti, the Catholic clergy played major roles in the February 1986 overthrows of two notorious right-wing dictators. Under the latest Central American peace plan, the Salvadorean government's talks with rebels are held under church auspices. In Nicaragua, Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo heads the National Reconciliation Commission that will oversee compliance with the plan.

Both superpowers have been cowed by Islamic *mujahideen* (holy warriors) who are ready to die to rid their lands of outside influence. The US withdrew its Marines and special envoys in 1984 under pressure from Lebanese Shia. For eight years, Soviet troops have been bogged down in Afghanistan in a seemingly unwinnable war against predominantly Sunni zealots.

The result is that religious components, which do not neatly fit either rightist or leftist labels, have added a volatile new dimension to the modern political spectrum.

• Though the US and Soviet Union both have politicized religious movements, the trend is most vibrant in the developing world – the more than 100 nations ranging from thriving newly industrialized states to impoverished countries, most of which have been independent only since World War II.

As elsewhere, religious activism in the third world has been played out in different ways and on diverse issues. But among young or underdeveloped nations, it also serves a similar need to establish an independent identity, a factor that will be examined further in this series. Activism is now even widespread in unlikely places, and it is often not limited to a single faith.

In Asia, Singaporean politics has recently been stirred by leftist Catholic, fundamentalist, Protestant, and Islamic groups. Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka have been at the forefront of demonstrations since July to protest a peace treaty orchestrated by India. Indonesia is reportedly now expressing concern about a political overspill from Malaysia's Islamic resurgence.

In Africa, Angola's Marxist regime is being challenged by a fledgling Christian revival. In historically Catholic Latin America, evangelical Protestant groups, whose message and motive are staunchly anticommunist, now claim 20 percent of Honduras's population and a wide following among Nicaragua's contra rebels.

• Though each movement is still most active in local issues, many are also challenging the era's dominant political and economic themes, including the current emphasis on a bipolar world carved up between superpowers, and on modernization – combining secularism and science – as the most effective channels to human progress.

INDEED, the conflict between modernity and morality is a particularly prevalent common denominator, analysts say. "Modern scholarship tends to see zealotry as a retrogression into primitivism," said Dr. Ashis Nandy, a social theorist at New Delhi's Center for the Study of Developing Societies. "On close look it turns out to be a byproduct of modernity."

That does not mean that the devout of any faith, including Iran's ranking mullahs, are anti-modern. It instead signifies a challenge to the status quo and to the current era's priorities.

Many religious activists "hold that the underlying malaise of today's world stems from its loss of faith. They complain that secularity, fed by mindless gadgetry and tasteless urban hypertrophy, has made our lives trivial and vacuous and our world a wilderness of hollow men, lacking depth of transcendence," Mr. Cox explained.

In the US, for example, the revival emerged against the backdrop of the '60s counterculture, a period marked by student rebellions, increased drug use, soaring divorce rates, and campaigns to legalize abortion. The sense of national might and right was also shattered by the Vietnam war. "In this climate of perceived moral collapse, a new politicized fundamentalism arose to meet the national challenge," said Wade Clark Roof, a University of Massachusetts sociologist, in his book "Prophetic Religions and Politics."

In the third world, modernizing has also become synonymous with Westernizing, or imitation that ignores or challenges ancient cultures. Technological or scientific advancement became subtly interwoven with acceptance of foreign codes of conduct and morality, both with a secular veneer.

In Iran, the Shah was toppled in part because of his attempts to mold Persia, one of the oldest civilizations, into a third-world version of a Western industrialized nation, from the way people dressed to the type of development planned. Ayatollah Khomeini referred to it as "Westoxication."

Asked in 1986 by Time magazine what the US did best, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda said, "You have developed your science and technology in an admirable way, but I am not sure that you use these wonderful achievements in this . . . field in the interest of man, as God wants us to do."

Brown University sociologist Paget Henry commented: "Religion contributes a powerful antidote to the assault of Westernization and modernization on peripheral societies."

Religion's emergence as a powerful political force has thus generally grown out of social and political uncertainty when governments or societies have failed to provide acceptable or workable solutions. In several areas where religion is a growing force, the political climate is ripe for transition.

DURING the transition, religion can play three roles. First, the continuum of various faiths, which have survived centuries and outlived hundreds of political dynasties, provides ideals by which to determine goals. Second, religions offer alternatives, either for action or for systems of government.

Third, religion can offer physical or psychological sanctuary, particularly where legitimate opposition is banned. In one-party states or dictatorships, the church, mosque, temple, and synagogue often become the last refuge for those seeking a better secular life.

All major monotheistic religions preach equality and justice, making them natural allies in opposing tyranny. They also usually have the resources, facilities, and infrastructure with which to organize. Religions, untainted by failure in the modern era, have thus supplied a context through which to pursue and, in some cases, fight for alternative ways of life.

In tracing the trend, another striking feature is the similarity in the evolution and timing. In most cases, the seeds for religion's larger role in politics were sown in the 1960s.

In the 1970s, the movements picked up steam, but began to fragment over tactics and goals. Comparatively moderate fundamentalists began to be supplanted by extremists, or religious activists joined forces with revolutionary movements. Both were evident in an explosion of militancy, particularly in the third world, at the decade's end.

While politicized religions remain minority movements in all regions, their numbers often belie their impact. For, in the 1980s, they have become among the most energetic and dynamic players in world politics.

Robin Wright is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

POLITICS

(19) Laird Wilcox -- who in 1987 published "Guide to the American Left" and "Guide to the Americanb Right", $24.95 each, postpaid -- provides this background on himself:

The Wilcox Collection
of Contemporary Political Movements

Laird Wilcox, editor of the directories and bibliographies listed above, is founder of the WILCOX COLLECTION ON CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL MOVEMENTS in Kenneth Spencer Research Library at the University of Kansas. The WILCOX COLLECTION, established in 1965, occupies over 1,500 feet of shelf space and contains some 5,400 books and pamphlets, 4,100 serial titles, 500 audio tapes and files on over 7,500 organizations on the American Left and the American Right. Included are advertisements, broadsheets, posters, flyers, correspondence and catalogs. The collection is housed in temperature and humidity controlled conditions and is regularly used by scholars and researchers. Laird Wilcox is active in civil liberties causes, edits CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW, and is a frequent speaker and guest lecturer.

We admire his Newsletter #9. Here it is:

What is Political Extremism?

By Laird Wilcox

Extremism Defined!
Content versus Style!
Problems of Objectivity!
Human Fallibility!
Traits of Extremists!
The Common Thread!

Roger Scruton, in the **Dictionary Of Political Thought** (Hill & Wang, New York, 1982) defines "extremism" as:

"A vague term, which can mean:

1. Taking a political idea to its limits, regardless of 'unfortunate' repercussions, impracticalities, arguments and feelings to the contrary, and with the intention not only to confront, but also to eliminate opposition.
2. Intolerance towards all views other than one's own.
3. Adoption of means to political ends which show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others."

This is a very fair definition and it reflects my experience that "extremism" is essentially more an issue of **style** than of **content**. In the twenty-five years that I have been investigating political groups of the left and right, I have found that many people can hold very radical or unorthodox political views and still present them in a reasonable, rational and non-dogmatic manner. On the other hand, I have met people whose style was shrill, uncompromising and distinctly authoritarian although their views were relatively conventional, or at least within the political mainstream. The latter demonstrated a starkly extremist mentality while the former demonstrated only ideological unorthodoxy, which is hardly to be feared in a free society such as our own.

I don't mean to imply that content is entirely irrelevant. People who tend to adopt the extremist style most often champion causes and adopt ideologies that are essentially "fringe" positions on the political spectrum. Advocacy of "fringe" positions, however, gives our society the variety and vitality it needs to function as an open democracy, to discuss and debate all aspects of an issue and to deal with problems we may otherwise have a tendency to ignore. I think this is the proper role of radical movements, left and right. The extremist style is another issue altogether, however, in that it seriously hampers our understanding of important issues, it muddies the waters of discourse with invective, fanaticism and hatred, and it impairs our ability to make intelligent, well-informed choices based on a comprehensive survey of all the facts and all points of view.

Another, perhaps more popular, definition of "extremism" is that it represents points of view we strongly disagree with, advocated by someone we dislike intensely, whose interests are contrary to our own!! In point of fact, political ideologues often attempt definitions of extremism which specifically condemn the views of their opponents and critics while leaving their own relatively untouched, or which are otherwise biased toward certain views but not others. To be fair, a definition must be equally applicable across the entire political spectrum.

The terms "extremist" and "extremism" are often used irresponsibly as epithets, "devilwords" to curse or condemn opponents and critics with! I find, however, that the extremist style is not the monopoly of any sector of the political spectrum. It is just as common on the "left" as it is on the "right," and sometimes it shows up in the political "center" as well. Other belief systems, such as religions, often adopt an extremist style, too.

TRAITS OF "EXTREMISTS":

In analyzing the rhetoric and literature of several hundred "fringe" and militant "special interest" groups I have identified several specific traits that tend to represent the extremist style. I would caution you with the admonition, however, that we are all fallible and anyone, without bad intentions, may resort to some of these devices

from time to time. But with bonafide extremists these lapses are not occasional and the following traits are an habitual and established part of their repertoire. The late Robert Kennedy, in **The Pursuit Of Justice** (1964), said: "What is objectionable, what is dangerous about extremists is not that they are extreme, but that they are intolerant. The evil is not what they say about their cause, but what they say about their opponents."

1. **Character Assassination.** Extremists often attack the character of an opponent or critic rather than deal with the facts and issues he raises or debate the points of his arguments. They will question his motives, qualifications, past associations, values, personality, mental health and so on as a diversion from the issues under consideration.

2. **Name calling and labeling.** Extremists are quick to resort to epithets (racist, subversive, pervert, hatemonger, nut, crackpot, degenerate, Un-American, Anti-Semite, Red, Commie, Nazi, Kook, etc.) to label and condemn an opponent in order to divert attention from his arguments and to discourage others from hearing him out.

3. **Irresponsible sweeping generalizations.** Extremists tend to make sweeping claims or judgements on little or no evidence, and they have a tendency to confuse similarity with sameness. That is, they assume that because two (or more) things are alike in **some** respects they must be alike in **all** respects! Analogy is a treacherous form of logic and its potential for distortion and false conclusions even when the premises are basically correct is enormous.

4. **Inadequate proof for assertions.** Extremists tend to be very fuzzy on what constitutes proof for their assertions. They also tend to get caught up in logical fallacies, such as **post hoc ergo propter hoc** (assuming that a prior event explains a subsequent occurance simply because of their "before" and "after" relationship). They tend to project "wished for" conclusions and to exaggerate the significance of information which confirms their prejudices and to derogate or ignore information which contradicts them.

5. **Advocacy of double standards.** Extremists tend to judge themselves in terms of their intentions, which they tend to view generously, and others by their acts, which they tend to view very critically. They would like you to accept their assertions on faith but they demand proof for yours. They also tend to engage in "special pleading" on behalf of their group, because of some special status, past association or present disadvantage.

6. Extremists tend to **view their opponents and critics as essentially evil.** Their enemies hold opposing views because they are **bad** people; immoral, dishonest, unscrupulous, mean-spirited, bigoted, cruel, etc., and not merely because they may simply disagree, see the matter differently, have competing interests or are perhaps even mistaken!

7. Extremists tend to have a **Manichean worldview.** That is, they tend to see the world in terms of absolutes of **good** and **evil**, for them or against them, with no middle ground or intermediate positions. All issues are ultimately **moral** issues of **right** and **wrong** or desperate issues of survival. Every event and development is seen as potentially pivotal in the clash of forces. Their slogan tends to be "he who is not with me is against me!"

8. Extremists very often **advocate some degree of censorship and repression** of their opponents and critics. This may range from an active campaign to keep them from media access and a public hearing, as in the case of blacklisting, banning or "quarantining" dissident spokesmen, or actually lobbying for repressive legislation against speaking, teaching or instructing the "forbidden" information. They may attempt to keep certain books out of stores or off of library shelves or card catalogs, discourage advertising with threats of reprisals, keep spokesmen for offending views off the [illegible] Extremists would prefer that you listen only to their point of view and discourage objective comparisons.

9. Extremists tend to **identify themselves in terms of who their enemies are**, who they hate and who hates them! Accordingly, they often become emotionally bound to their enemies, who are often competing extremists on the opposite pole of the ideological spectrum or perhaps dissidents from their own camp. They tend to emulate their enemies in certain respects, adopting the same style and tactics to a certain degree. Even "anti-extremist" groups often exhibit the extremist style in this regard, especially with respect to censorship and repression of dissent.

10. Extremists are given to **argument by intimidation.** That is, they frame their arguments in such a way as to intimidate others into accepting their premises and conclusions. To disagree with them, they imply, is to ally oneself with the devil or give aid and comfort to the "bad guys." This ploy allows them to define the parameters of debate, cut off troublesome or embarrassing lines of argument, and keep their opponents on the defensive.

11. **Wide use of slogans, buzzwords and thought-stopping cliches.** For many extremists simple slogans substitute for more complex abstractions in spite of a high level of intelligence and sophistication. Shortcuts in thinking and reasoning matters out seem to be necessary in order to appease their prejudices and to avoid troublesome facts and embarrassing counter-arguments. Buzzwords and cliches are commonplace in the extremist reportoire.

12. **Doomsday thinking.** Extremists often predict dire or catastrophic consequences from a situation or from failure to follow a specific course, and they exhibit a kind of "crisis-mindedness." It can be a Communist takeover, a Nazi revival, nuclear war, currency collapse, worldwide famine, drought, earthquakes, floods or the wrath of God. Whatever it is, it's just around the corner unless we follow their program and listen to their special insights!

13. Extremists often **claim some kind of moral or other superiority over others.** Most obvious are claims of general racial superiority -- a master race, for example. Less obvious are claims of ennoblement because of alleged victimhood, a special relationship with God, membership in a special "elite" or revolutionary vanguard. They also take great offense when one is "insensitive" enough to dispute these claims or challenge their authority.

14. Extremists tend to believe that **it's OK to do bad things in the service of a "good" cause.** They may deliberately lie, distort, misquote, slander or libel their opponents and critics, or advocate censorship or repression in "special cases" involving their enemies. This is done with no remorse as long as it's useful in defeating the Commies or the fascists (or whoever)! Defeating an "enemy" becomes an **all encompassing goal to which other values are subordinate.** With extremists, the **ends often justify the means.**

15. Extremists tend to **place great value on emotional responses.** They have a reverence for propaganda, which they may call education or consciousness-raising. Consequently, they tend to drape themselves and their cause in a flag of patriotism, a banner of righteousness or a shroud of victimhood! Their crusades against "enemies" may invoke images of the swastika, the hammer and sickle or some other symbol, as the case may be. In each instance the symbol represents an extremely odious concept in terms of their ideological premises. This ploy attempts to invoke an uncritical gut-level sympathy and acceptance of their position which discourages thoughtful examination of their premises and the conclusions which they claim necessarily derive from them.

16. Some extremists, particularly those involved in "cults" or religious movements, including but hardly limited to, fundamentalist evangelical Christians, militant Zionist Jews, members of the numerous "new age" groups and the followers of certain "gurus," claim some kind of **supernatural, mystical or divinely-inspired rationale** for their beliefs and actions. Their willingness to force their will upon others, censor and silence opponents and critics, and in some cases to actively persecute certain individuals or groups, is **ordained by God!** This is surprisingly effective because many people, when confronted by this claim, are reluctant to challange it because it represents "religious belief" or because of the sacred cow status certain religions have for some people.

THE COMMON THREAD

Extremist traits tend to have three things in common:

1. They represent some attempt to **distort reality** for themselves and others.

2. They try to **discourage critical examination** of their beliefs, either by false logic, rhetorical trickery or some kind of intimidation.

3. They represent an attempt to **act out private, personal grudges or rationalize the pursuit of special interests** in the name of the public welfare.

CAUTION!

Remember, human beings are imperfect and fallible. Even a rational, honest, well-intentioned person may resort to some of these traits from time to time. Everyone has strong feelings about some issues and anyone can get excited and "blow off" once in awhile. Most of us still retain our basic common sense, respect for facts and good will toward others. The difference between most of us and the bonafide extremist is that these traits are, once again, **an habitual and established part of their reportoire.** Extremists believe they're doing the **right thing** when they exhibit the extremist style in the service of their cause!

ONE FINAL NOTE!

The truth of a proposition cannot be inferred merely from the manner in which arguments in its behalf are presented, from the fact that its adversaries censor and harass their opponents, or because they commit any other act or combination of acts suggested in this essay. Ultimately, the truth of any proposition rests on the evidence for it. To impeach a proposition merely because it is advocated by obvious "extremists" is to dismiss it ad **hominem**, that is, because of **who** proposes it. The fact is that "extremists" are sometimes correct -- sometimes **very** correct -- because they often deal with the **hot** issues, the controversial issues many people choose to avoid. So, before you perfunctorily write somebody of as an "extremist" and close your eyes and ears to his message, take a look at his evidence. It just might be that he's on to something!

The **WILCOX REPORT NEWSLETTER** is published irregularly by Laird Wilcox, PO Box 2047, Olathe, KS 66061. Subscriptions are $15.00 for ten issues.

PLAY REVIEW

(20) Turing. BOB DAVIS reports:

In November I was in New York for a few days and one of the things I did was attend, with a friend, the new English play, "Breaking the Code" starring Derek Jacobi (of "I, Claudius" fame). I thought a little review for the RSN was in order. BR is mentioned once in the play, although that is not the reason for this review.

The play is based on a book that came out a few years ago, called "Alan Turing and the Enigma Machine". It combined a lot of discussion of mathematics, philosophy, and computers. Turing is considered to be the inventor of computers. He is also the man who broke the German Enigma code in WWII, and therefore one of the most important individuals involved in Britain's survival and Germany's defeat. He was also a homosexual at a particularly harsh time to be one. Worse probably is that his sexual activity crossed class lines, which in Britain was, and still is, a serious breach of the social code. Had he stayed in Cambridge, he probably would have been all right, but he moved to the University of Manchester. In Manchester he was tried for his behavior, and put on a drug rehabilitation program (one result of which was that he grew breasts). Finally, in 1954, he committed suicide by eating an apple dipped in cyanide. (His favorite movie had been "Snow White".)

The play explains this story. It melds his personal story with ideas of math and philosophy and the invention of the computer. The main reason I mention it for Russellites is the unusual play of ideas in the script and, most importantly, the fact that ideas and thinking are good and interesting in themselves. One reason it succeeds is that it is a very good script, written by someone who makes ideas and the love of ideas come to life in everyday words. Even in a Broadway theatre, this intellectualizing, for want of a better description, held the crowd and got an enthusiastic response. (I must admit there were three gentlemen behind us who were grousing about no entertainment in the play, and left at intermission, presumably in search of a little T & A elsewhere.)

The other reason this play held the crowd was the powerful acting of Jacobi. He really seemed to be into this role and became Alan Turing. He so seemed to be in love with ideas that the audience went along with him and seemed to fall in love with ideas too.

Afterwards we went backstage and met Jacobi, which was a real treat. Since Wittgenstein was mentioned repeatedly in the play, I told Jacobi naughty stories about him as gotten from the notorious biography by W. W. Bartly III. Jacobi seemed to enjoy them immensely, telling me that I had "informed the performance for tomorrow".

So if you're in New York, I recommend this play; after all, I helped "to inform it".

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

(21) Hugh McVeigh has been laboring mightily to make his free-thought group, The Free Inquirers, prosper. If you live anywhere near him, and want to find out more, get in touch with Hugh at 122 Spring Street, Albany, NY 12203.

BOOK REVIEW

(22) A hatchet-job on A. J. Ayer. Ayer's "Wittgenstein", reviewed by Arthur C. Danto, who teaches philosophy at Columbia University. From the Washington Post's Book World, 8/18/85, p.1, with thanks to DON JACKANICZ.

A. J. Ayer earned an early notoriety through a polemical and abrasive essay in analytical philosophy, his "Language, Truth and Logic" of 1936. Though he later patronized this as very much a young man's book, Ayer remains, half a century later, largely committed to its once incendiary thesis: that metaphysics is is nonsense; that propositions are meaningful only if verifiable through sense experience; that, though nonsense by this severe criterion, moral propositions have a kind of "emotive meaning" in that they express the feelings of those who utter them; and that philosophy has no task beyond elucidating the language and concepts of the natural sciences. His writings have brought him onsiderable respect in the form of important professorships at London and Oxford, as well as a knighthood. And they are throughout marked, as is this book, by an unfailing acuity and lucidity, an engaging urbanity and a wry wit, but also, it is perhaps not too harsh to add, an unmistakable philistinism. Sir Alfred is numb to any writing he finds exotic, mystical, religious, or -- well -- metaphysical. This means, in the present book especially, that a certain class of utterances distinctive of its subject is ruled out by him as oracular nonsense.

The subject of this book, Ludwig Wittgenstein, is by common recognition one of the great philosophical thinkers of this century and perhaps of any century. Ayer, however, restrained his enthusiasm for Wittgenstein —"My admiration for him falls short of idolatry" -- places him nevertheless "second only to Bertrand Russell among the philosophers of the Twentieth Century." One would be hard pressed to identify more than two or three others as belonging to this restricted set —Heidegger certainly, Sartre probably, Dewey possibly -- for philosophical genius remains rare even in a period in which philosophical competence can seldom have been higher or attained by so many. The literature on Wittgenstein, whether direct as commentary, or indirect, as must be virtually everything written in English by philosophers since his work became known, is simply immense. And Ayer is as considerable a philosopher as any who have applied themselves to describing what Wittgenstein achieved as a thinker. Yet he is less qualified than many, in part through temperament, but also in part because he holds strong views on a good many of the issues to which Wittgenstein addressed himself, and which he feels constrained to defend against him.

"Language, Truth and Logic" derived from certain views taken up from Wittgenstein by the Logical Positive school of philosophy to which Ayer belonged. And a central tenet of Ayer's theory of knowledge, the existence of private languages, was singled out for attack in a celebrated section of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations". This book has, in consequence of its author's relationship with his subject, an air of setting the record straight, of taking Wittgenstein's thoughts up one by one, testing them against Ayer's own philosophical views, to see, on balance, how many survive and how many are simply wrong. In a way, it reads like a tutor's extended remarks on the papers of an immensely gifted but lamentably erratic pupil. The soul of Wittgenstein is screened out by this format.

Wittgenstein's writings fall into two main periods, with the central texts of each devoted to aspects of the philosophy of language. The "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus" of 1922 ought to show how language must be if it is to represent the world, and how the world must be if language is to represent it, as well as the limits of the sayable. The "Philosophical Investigations", published posthumously in 1953, rejects the picture of language as representational completely, contending that languages go with certain forms of life, and that meaning is a matter of use, of what those who belong to a form of life do with the sentences they understand. But each of the books also expresses certain powerful, one might say mystical, intuitions, about the deepest concerns of the self. The two main works are written in radically different styles: the "Tractatus" sets down seven theses,together with remarks and observations of varying degrees of importance, and each is given a kind of numerical value. The "Investigations" is composed of a sequence of brief dialogs between the narrator and an intimately addressed objector. There is scarcely a line in either book which is not dense with philosophical excitement, poetry, urgency and passion. And the thoughts expressed are at times so unusual, so powerful and unexpected as to leave the reader stunned. To be sure, the writing is often obscure, and often wrong when it is clear, but no study of Wittgenstein for a general audience can be adequate that does not convey an intense philosophical personality thinking at the limits of thought about those limits. Totting up scores and misses is not the way to do this.

Readers will enjoy the deft and amusing biographical sketch with which Ayer's book opens. They will profit from the concluding essay on Wittgenstein's influence, which is charmingly parochial, like a piece of family history, since Ayer writes from personal experience about those, himself included, who actually knew this fierce and original man. One can never seriously disrecommend a book by A. J. Ayer, but this one will be of primary interest to those who are interested in him, and are anxious to know what his views on specific theses of Wittgenstein are. But this means that readers not conversant with the recent history of theories of meaning, truth and knowledge, will find the discussion distant and abstract. If one wants to know about Wittgenstein, then better simply to read him. One will get quickly lost, but in compensation, one will be moved and exalted. Perhaps the time to take this book up is when one is lost; but he pays a price for putting oneself in Professor Ayer's hands, and the sense of having found one's way may be an illusion. He himself is not always right, but sorting out the right from wrong belongs to the further literature of the subject.

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MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS

(25) 300. On January 11th, 1988, CHARLES SLOAN enrolled as a new member. That was a significant event for the BRS because Charles became the 300th member. Never before has the BRS achieved a current membership list of 300. We like to think it won't stop at 300. No reason why it should.

BOOK REVIEWS

(26) The World As I Found It" by Bruce Duffy -- which is mainly about Wittgenstein, but also brings in Russell and Moore -- was reviewed last issue (RSN56) by four reviewers. Two of our members reacted to the book; one of them knew Russell intimately: his daughter, Kate.

Kate Tait writes:

Having read in Russell Society News several favourable reviews of Bruce Duffy's book, "The World As I Found It", I feel I must write to tell you that it is an ATROCIOUS book, the worst kind of mixture of fact and fiction, jumbling together real facts and writings with the inventions of the author's hideous mind. He does not hesitate to attribute to these great men mean actions, petty emotions, and shallow thoughts quite unworthy of them; not that they were faultless, far from it, but their faults were not the ones Duffy imagines. As I feared, the reviewers take as true the inventions as well as the facts, enabling them to have a comfortably condescending view of these after all too human men. Yet it is not their imperfections that I mind so much; it is the ugliness of the ones he ascribes to them, and the triviality of the thoughts he puts into their heads. Do urge your reader not to buy the book.

Steve Reinhardt writes:

"I bought the book in August, when I heard it discussed on National Public Radio. To put it mildly, I did not care for the book. Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein were presented, not as characters, but caricatures lacking any depth and subtlety. It would be interesting to learn how other members feel."

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Readers, you have been warned!

FINANCES/MONEY MATTERS

(27) Treasurer's Report for the year ending 12/31/87:

Bank balance on hand (12/31/86)				953
Income:	New members	1722		
	Renewals	5906		
	total dues	7628		
	Contributions	127*		
	Library sales and rentals	355		
	Misc	149		
	total income	8259		8259
				9212
Expenditures:	Information & Membership Committees	2745		
	Library expense	218		
	Subscriptions to "Russell"	2247		
	Meeting	237		
	Misc	100		
	total spent	5547		5547
Payment of 1986 liability				1327
Bank balance on 12/31/87				2338

*The 127 shown above is not a true measure of contributions; it is far too low. Most donations are made in the form of dues payments that are higher than "regular" dues. EG, a Sustaining Member, who pays $50 in dues, is actually making a $20 contribution, which is not reflected in the 127 figure.

DUES

(28) Last Call for Dues. Do you know what happens to people who don't pay their renewal dues? They become Non-Persons. They vanish. They are gone. Ugh! We won't labor the point. We think you got the message. Act now.

MEMBERS CONTRIBUTE

(29) We thank GREGORY LANDINI and HERB LANSDELL for their contributions during the latter half of 1987...and the following early renewers who included their 1988 contributions in their dues payments: LOU ACHESON, JAY ARAGONA, DONG-IN BAE, MICHAEL BRADY, POLLY & WHITFIELD COBB, ANGELO D'ALESSIO, BOB DAVIS, RONALD EDWARDS, LEE EISLER, WILLIAM FIELDING, ARTTIE GOMEZ, DONALD GREEN, CHARLES HILL, DON JACKANICZ, RICHARD JOHNSON, HERB LANSDELL,GLADYS LEITHAUSER, JOHN LENZ, MARTIN LIPIN, GLENN & SANDRA MOYER, NICK PACINO, STEVE REINHARDT, MICHAEL ROCKLER, HARRY RUJA, WARREN SMITH, JOHN TOBIN, HERB & BETTY VOGT, DEWEY WALLACE, MICHAEL WEBER, CHARLES WEYAND, and VINCENT WILLIAMS. You are indeed helping, all of you.

FINANCES

(30) Peter Cranford has been thinking about our money problem -- the problem of building up a substantial bundle of cash, which will make our long-term survival as an organization more likely. He is not setting down specifics; rather, he is suggesting concepts. He writes:

> You might consider setting up a special money fund whose sole purpose would be to generate more money, and to do this ad infinitum - in pyramid fashion. Emory University has just done this to the point where it rivals Harvard and Texas [in endowment]. Just to ask for it may not be strong enough. Perhaps you might examine the packets James Roosevelt sends out. He justifies his requests to the elderly in long and effective letters. You might use seed money to develop a mailing list of those most apt to contribute.

We thank Peter for his suggestions, and will see what we can do with them.

Ladies and Gentlemen: start thinking!

Harder!

BOOK REVIEW

(31) Volume 8. A technical paper for people who don't like technical papers. That's how we think of IRVING ANELLIS's superbly written review of Volume 8 of McMaster Editorial Project's "The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell." Even though you probably won't understand all of it, we think you'll be pleased with what you do understand. Here it is:

THE LOGICO-LINGUISTIC TURN - RUSSELL'S REVOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY:
A Review of John G. Slater (editor), Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 1914-19, Volume 8, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, London, Allen & Unwin, 1986; xl + 418 pp.

Technical philosophy has, since its inception with the ancients, undergone a number of revolutionary changes, both with regard to its subject-matter and its methodology. These words, and the words which follow, may be controversial; but the profound changes which Russell's work contributed to philosophy and the philosophical method in the twentieth century are universally acknowledged, and constitute a revolution in philosophy.

Ancient philosophy was fundamentally metaphysical in its interests and speculative and rationalistic (i.e. syllogistic or Aristotelian) in its methodology. In this sense, ancient philosophy extened well into the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. During the Renaissance, natural philosophy or physics broke away from speculative philosophy and became an empirical and mathematical science in the hands of Galileo, Newton, and others. The philosopher of science in the age of the Renaissance was Francis Bacon. However, it was Descartes who turned the revolution in technical philosophy in the seventeenth century. Under the leadership of Descartes, philosophy became fundamentally epistemological in its interests and psychological or phenomenalistic in its corresponding methodology, depending upon whether one was an idealist or an empiricist.

From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, mathematical logic emerged as a new branch of mathematics, beginning with the work of Boole, Peirce, Schröder and others in algebraic logic, and, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the development of axiomatic presentations of quantification theory pioneered by Frege, Peano, and Russell. These two trends in logic were united by Whitehead and Russell in their Principia Mathematica, and modern mathematical logic, or "logistic" as it was first called, came into existence. With the new mathematical logic in place, philosophers acquired a new and powerful tool for investigation. Mathematical logic acquired the status of an "ideal language" because of its analytical power to grammatically parse propositions into function and argument rather than into subject and predicate whenever the complexity of the structure of propositions required this exceptionally deep level of dissection. At the same time, mathematical logic incorporated the old classical syllogistic with its subject-predicate structure, as a fragment which would likewise be available as a tool of dissection. Russell was the first of the modern or twentieth-century philosophers, and he undertook, as such, to employ logical or linguistic analysis to his subjects. The papers in this volume represent his first precipitous steps. The work of the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and of various other sympathetic philosopher-scientists to develop and use logical and linguistic analysis for the investigation of the logical structure of experience, of physical reality, and even of language itself, would follow a decade later, in the later years of the 1920s.

During the period in which the papers in this volume were written, the Principia was already just in place, and Russell undertook the arduous struggle to develop a scientific philosophy whose methodological tool would be the grammar of linguistic and logical analysis. The title essay in this collection is Russell's most famous and exemplary piece in which a detailed exposition of logic forms a prelude to a rather brief discussion of the logical analysis of problems of metaphysics (making a nice anticipation of Carnap's proclamation of "The elimination of metaphysics through the logistic analysis of language").

Philosophical problems once were rather inelegantly described to me as a bowl of spaghetti; so intertwined are the strands that one cannot pick up one strand without picking up the whole. Mathematics is commonly described as a pyramid in which more advanced fields of mathematics are built upon lower mathematics, algebra on arithmetic, analysis on algebra and geometry, etc.. We can express these concepts in more modern terminology, less colorful but more elegant, in terms of parallel processing and linear processing. In a description of the scientific philosophy which uses mathematical logic and linguistic analysis as tools, both of these similies apply at once.

Russell's earliest and most preeminent concerns, after completion of his work on the foundations of geometry (1896) were with / physic in particular with the physics of solid mechanics, with special attention to the geometric foundations of Newtonian dynamics and the motions of rigid bodies. In the years immediately after completion of the Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, Russell explorsa the possibility of making a transition from geometry to physics, through the intermediacy of a "transition from geometry to dynamics" (see My Philosophical Development, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959, pp. 44-45, for example). His goal was to establish in physics the same kind of certainty that had traditionally been associated with geometry. After a visit to the Cavendish laboratory where he studied the work of James Clerk Maxwell on gas kinetics and electrodynamics, Russell reflected, in a letter to Philip Jourdain that "what is philosophically interesting in the principles of dynamics belongs to problems of logic and arithmetic" (Letter to P. E. B. Jourdain of 15 April 1910; quoted p. 132, in I. Grattan-Guinness, Dear Russell - Dear Jourdain, London, Duckworth, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977). Russell's aim was to develop an axiomatic presentation of physics in terms of a small number of physical primitives. His goal was not unlike that of David Hilbert, who, having provided an axiomatization of geometry general enough to accomodate both Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean geometries, sought next to provide an axiomatization of physics (Hilbert's sixth problem, the mathematical treatment of the axioms of physics, with work in foundations of geometry having suggested the need "to treat...by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which mathematics plays an important part; first of all, the theory of probability and mechanics"). Important work towards this goal began in the mid-1930s, some thirty-five years after the problem was first stated by Hilbert in 1900; the first notable success being the axiomatization of quantum mechanics by the development by Birkhoff and von Neumann of a quantum logic. The next steps occurred in the 1950s, when mathematicians such as Wightman turned their attention to the axiomatization of quantum field theory, and Anellis in the late 1970s showed that quantum logic was a one-dimensional model for an n-dimensional spacetime calculus for the Riemann-Minkowski 4-dimensional manifold. In the first decade of the twentieth century, both Russell and Hilbert, who followed the same path in their identification of the problem of the axiomatization of physics, found that their logical tools were not yet sufficiently developed for such an enterprise. Both men were led, having once formulated the problem, to development of mathematical logic as an axiomatic system, and to attempt to use their new logic as the foundation for the construction of all of mathematics. Thus it was that in 1910, Russell, with the assistance of Whitehead, undertook work on the Principia.

In 1913, after completing work on the three-volume Principia, Russell resumed his "search for a starting-point which would permit him to begin translating some of the propositions of physics into the symbols of mathematical logic" (pp. xii-xiii, "Introduction" of the present volume). The search was found to lead in turn to questions about philosophical and scientific methodology and about knowledge of the physical world in general and of matter in terms of sense-data in particular. This is the underlying theme of the works collected, in Part I of the present volume, under the heading "Theory of Knowledge and Philosophical Method." All of the pieces included here, among them the well-known article of 1914 on "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics", have previously been published.

The "problem of matter" for Russell was "the usual way of referring to the problem of providing philosophical foundations for physics" (p. xi, this volume). In consequence of the revision of the problem as an attempt to provide an axiomatization of physics, the "problem of matter" evolved into "the search for a logical construction from...particular facts of sense and general logical truths; ...and [from] specific memories and the testimonials of others" (p. xv); in other words a logical construction, in the sense of Carnap, of the world on the basis of sensory experience of material reality (logische Aufbau der Welt). This is the root of Russell's work on sense-data. This work led to Russell's work on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" as an attempt to explore the logical foundations of epistemology and to give a logico-linguistic analysis of meaning, and to his work on an analysis of mind as a study of the structure of knowledge and belief, with a logico-linguistic analysis of propositions as semantic carriers of meaning, and with behavioral psychology as a scientific form of psychology based upon sense-data (sensations and events) as alternative to neutral monism as the Jamesian doctrine that the "stuff" of the universe, organized in one way by a certain set of laws of causality, yields matter, and in another way by a different set of causal laws, yields mind, and that there is, therefore, no consciousness.

Part III of the present volume is given over entirely to Russell's 1918 Monist papers on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism". The papers collected in Part IV under the heading "Towards the Analysis of Mind", includes the well-known paper of 1919 "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean". With the exception of nine "Manuscript Notes" written in 1919 and several of the appendices, all of the pieces found in this volume have previously been published. These include the several book reviews, collected in Part II, on a number of widely scattered philosophical topics, technical and popular, written by Russell for various magazines and journals between 1913 and 1919. Of these reviews, the one on Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" of 1918 is of especial interest, if for no other reason than that Kemp Smith's monumental volume remains to this day an essential and vital tool of Kant scholarship.

Like all of the books in this series of Russell's Collected Papers, the present volume contains all of the apparatus that are making this series the serious critical edition that it is becoming, including the careful textual notes and helpful annotations, as well as the Russellian "Chronology", the informative "Introduction" and "Headnotes" that present the historical setting for the papers in the volume. A scholarly edition is not a critical edition, however. A critical edition differs, I submit, from a scholarly edition only in that the former admits a greater leeway in the intrusion of interpretation within the context of the setting of the historical stage. The author of the "Introduction" to this volume seems to this reviewer to have come dangerously close to crossing the very thin line between interpretation and historical stage-setting, in particular in connection with the discussion of the impact which Wittgenstein's criticisms of the first draft of Russell's Theory of Knowledge had on Russell's "re-thinking of logical atomism" (pp. xvi-xx). But that may be more a matter of opinion than of fact.

More interesting and fruitful of discussion in regards interpretation is the question of what kind of mathematician Russell might have made - good, bad, indifferent - had he continued his technical work in mathematics and mathematical logic after completing work on the Principia rather than turning to philosophy. This is a question which arose in the wake of Nicholas Griffin's talk on "Russell at Cambridge, 1890-93: Russell's Mathematical Education" during the Special Session on Bertrand Russell at the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics meeting (Abstract #13, p. 5, SCHPM/CSHPM 13th Annual Meeting, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ont., May 25-27, 1987, Programme), in which Griffin explored Russell's studies as a background and explanation for Russell's "early misadventures in the philosophy of mathematics." In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Russell wrote (p. 166 of this volume; also quoted p. xxiii) that the confusion of symbols with the things for which they stand "is especially likely in very abstract studies such as philosophical logic, because the subject-matter that you are supposed to be thinking of is so exceedingly difficult and elusive that any person who has ever tried to think about it knows you do not think about it except perhaps once in six months for half a minute. The rest of the time you think about the symbols, because they are tangible, but the thing you are supposed to be thinking about is fearfully difficult and one does not often manage to think about it. The really good philosopher is the one who does once in six months think about it for a minute. Bad philosophers never do." If Russell's description here of the "good philosopher" is meant to be self-referential, then I suggest that Russell would not have made a very good mathematician, if Hadamard's thesis, that mathematicians mentally picture mathematical objects and their relations with other mathematical objects, rather than, in the creative stages, manipulate the symbols for these objects. The role of symbols arises later, in the effort to express and communicate one's mathematical ideas. Indeed, it has become almost a truism recently that one major reason why it is so difficult for the creative mathematician to teach mathematics to the verbally-oriented student and equally so difficult for the non-mathematical student to learn mathematics is that the mathematician can "see the mathematical concept with great clarity but cannot express it in plain English," since "mathematical concepts...may prove to be...only imperfectly translatable into spoken or written English" (Charles A. Weiner, "Mathematicians and the Laws of Natural Selection", Chronicle of Higher Education, 11 Feb., 1987, p. 43). For such a mathematician, the symbolic representation is a natural and comfortable intermediate between the conceptualization and the natural language communication of the concept. Thus, if Russell found it more difficult to operate with mathematical objects or concepts than with their symbolic representations, then he was already at some disadvantage. This may perhaps also partially explain why Russell, after completing his work on the Principia, took a philosophical turn on his way to - or away from - work on the axiomatization of physics, while Hilbert and his colleagues, even before completing their work in foundations of mathematics, turned their attention to the foundations of physics and why the mathematical heirs of Hilbert, particularly Birkhoff and von Neumann among them, made important progress in the axiomatization of physics.

Many of Russell's "early misadventures in mathematical philosophy" occurred in 1896 and 1897, when Russell made his first attempts to understand Cantorian set theory. When in June 1983 this reviewer reported, at an American Mathematical Society conference on Axiomatic Set Theory, on Russell's first inglorious attempts to understand Cantorian set theory (published as I. H. Anellis, "Russell's Earliest Reactions to Cantorian Set Theory, 1896-1900," in J. E. Baumgartner, D. A. Martin, S. Shelah (editors), Axiomatic Set Theory, Contemporary Mathematics 31 (1984), 1-11), many of those present suggested, in view of Russell's misunderstandings, that perhaps those of his works of the period which remained unpublished - and which are bound for inclusion in volume two of the Collected Papers - should best be left unpublished. Further discussion led to the concession that publication, after all, would be worthwhile, first of all for the value of the historical record and secondly as an example of the lesson that, with patient and diligent work, one could refine and improve one's understanding of difficult concepts of logic, and even become a leader in the field. In the case of an excellent critical edition such as we are being provided by the Russell Editorial Project, as exemplified in the present volume, these arguments in favor of publication carry even greater weight.

The present volume, however, is far from perfect, and thus there are a number of perhaps minor points which a reviewer is duty-bound to make. Thus, for example, we must note that the name "Windeband" on p. 404 of the "Bibliographical Index" should be "Windelband"; and for the sake of consistency, "Alexander, S." and "Lossky, N. O." in the bibliographical index should have been rendered "Alexander, Samuel" and "Lossky, Nikolai" respectively, since all of the other authors whose names are listed are designated by their given names following their family names. More subtle but also more serious is a statement in the headnote to appendix IV, which contains the text of a letter of Nathalie A. Duddington addressed to Russell, to which Russell referred in the text of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (p. 222; see the annotation on p. 352). In the headnote to Duddington's "Letter on Existence" of 1918, it is said that "her letters reveal that she regarded herself as something of an expert on the minds of the Russians" (p. 329). The tone of this statement, even despite the editorial recognition of Duddington as an advocate of the work of the Russian philosopher N. O. Lossky, suggests that the editor is sceptical of Duddington's self-proclaimed expertise. It must be noted, however, despite the editor's apparent scepticism, that Western students of Russian literary history owe an important debt to Duddington for her translations into English of many Russian literary classics, including such relatively obscure works as Goncharov's Oblomov, a work well-known in Russia but almost totally ignored in the West.

NEWSLETTER MATTERS

(32) A 14-Year Index of Bertrand Russell Society newsletters, covering the first 14 years of the Society's existence, 1974 through 1957, has been put together. It runs to over 30 pages, has nearly 1800 entries. Buy it from the newsletter, $5 postpaid (within the USA.) Borrow it from the Library, $2 for postage (within the USA.) Newsletter and Library addresses are on Page 1, bottom. Postage outside the USA is higher.

RUSSELL SOCIETY LIBRARY
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(33) Books for sale:

By Bertrand Russell:

Appeal to the American Conscience	$ 2.25	
Authority and the Individual	3.75	
The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I	16.00	H
Vol. II	13.00	H
Vol. III	11.00	H
Education and the Social Order	4.25	
Essays in Analysis, edited by Douglas Lackey	6.50	H
Has Man a Future?	8.00	H
History of the World in Epitome	1.00	
In Praise of Idleness	3.75	
The Impact of Science on Society	3.00	
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth	6.00	
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Mortals and Others, edited by Harry Ruja	8.50	H
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Power: A New Social Analysis	5.50	
The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism	3.75	
Principles of Social Reconstruction	3.75	
Roads to Freedom	4.00	
Sceptical Essays	4.25	
The Scientific Outlook	5.50	

By Other Authors:

Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970	1.50	
Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume, edited by George Roberts	10.95	H
Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher by A.J. Ayer	2.25	
Essays on Socialist Humanism in Honor of the Centenary of Bertrand Russell	4.00	
	9.00	H
The Incompatible Prophecies: Bertrand Russell on Science and Liberty by Louis Greenspan	4.00	
Into the Tenth Decade: A Tribute to Bertrand Russell	3.25	
The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words	4.75	
Mr. Wilson Speaks 'Frankly and Fearlessly' on Vietnam to B.R.	1.50	
The Tamarisk Tree, Vol. I by Dora Russell	5.25	H

Prices are postpaid. Books are paperback unless otherwise indicated. Please send check or money-order, payable to the Bertrand Russell Society.

New books to lend:

136. Abstracts of papers read at the 18th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy. Moscow, 1987 5pps. Irving Anellis.
137. Death, Depression and Creativity: A Psychobiological Approach to Bertrand Russell and Bertrand Russell's "The Pilgrimage of Life" and Mourning by Andrew Brink. Offprints 36pps. The Author.
138. The Rhetorical Approach of Bertrand Russell: A Study in Method by Donna Weimer. M.A. thesis 1983 189pps. The Author.

Forthcoming:

A new and expanded edition of An Atheist's Bertrand Russell will be issued by the American Atheist Press in early 1988. Andrew Brink expects to have published a book incorporating all of his recent articles on Russell in 1988. The title will be Bertrand Russell: the Psychobiography of a Moralist.

Misc.:

Thanks to Al Seckel, our 16mm film Bertrand Russell Discusses Philosophy is now available on a VHS videocassette. We are also indebted to Al for an additional copy of his Bertrand Russell on Ethics, Sex, and Marriage.

Mortals and Others, edited by Harry Ruja, is again available from the library at a substantial discount. The volume is a selection of the essays Russell wrote for the New York American between 1931 and 1935. Allen & Unwin 1975 176pps. $8.50 PP.

Videotapes to lend:

Videocassettes may be borrowed for $4 per cassette. Canadian members should direct their orders to Rick Shore, 3410 Peter Street, Apt. 305, Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9C 1J3.

260 Donahue Interviews Gore Vidal. Also, a Jonathon Miller Interview.
261 Steve Allen's "Meeting of the Minds". (Bertrand Russell, Thomas Jefferson, St Augustine, Empress Theodora)
262 BBC's "The Lifeand Times of Bertrand Russell". Produced by the BBC as part of Russell's 90th birthday celebration. A documentary, it uses a biographical format which concentrates on the threat of nuclear war and Russell's work to prevent such folly. Includes interviews with Russell and several prominent British intellectuals.

NBC's "Bertrand Russell". Interviewed by Romney Wheeler, Russell deals with autobiographical, philosophical, and political topics.

263 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews. Five short television interviews: "Bertrand Russell Discusses Happiness", "Bertrand Russell Discusses Philosophy", "Bertrand Russell Discusses Power", "Bertrand Russell Discusses the Role of the Individual", and "Bertrand Russell Discusses Mankind's Future".
264 BBC's "Bertie and the Bomb". A documentary about Russell's last years and his involvement with the early years of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Interviews with friends and contemporaries.
265 "Bertrand Russell". A lecture by Professor Giovanni Costigan of the University of Washington. An introduction to Russell's life and work.
266 The 'People For' Story'.
267 CBC "Close-Up" Interview. Interviewed by Elaine Grand, Russell discusses his childhood, the threat of nuclear war, Einstein, the emancipation of women and his religious views.

BOOK REVIEW

(34) "The Devil and Dr. Barnes" by Howard Greenfield in the Washingtoo Post (1/17/88).

[In the foreword to his "History of Western Philosopohy", Russell wrote, "This book owes its existence to Dr. Albert. C. Barnes, having been originally designed and partly delivered as lectures at the Barnes Foundation in Pennsylvania." Barnes fired Russell in 1940. Russell sued for breach of contract, and won. Barnes then published a pamphlet in his own defense, to tell why he fired Russell. The pamphlet is reproduced in RSN42-35.]

The review (with thanks to DON JACKANICZ):

By Carlin Romano

WHAT SHOULD we make of collectors? To be sure, our attitudes depend partly on what they collect. According to the *Guinness Book of World Records*, Helge Friholm of Soborg, Denmark owns 44,217 bottle caps, with no rivals in sight.

Fanatics of this sort usually drive one to speculation about the collecting impulse itself. Was Freud right that adult hoarding grows out of the child's delight in resisting toilet training? Should all sociopathic collectors be sentenced to classes in recycling? Whatever our conclusions, we tend to regard such people, fondly, as gentle crackpots.

Not so the "collector" who gets to put "art" before that word. Here a different figure jumps to mind. The cagey investor. The cultivated gallery sleuth. The enlightened patron.

Carlin Romano is the literary editor of The Philadelphia Inquirer.

Philadelphia's Dr. Albert C. Barnes (1872-1951) may best be remembered as America's missing link between the crackpot and connoisseur classes of collectors. Founder of the world-famous Barnes Foundation collection of modern art in Merion, Pa., the irascible former chemist came to acquire an almost equally widespread reputation for rudeness, eccentricity and paranoia.

In a tempestuous lifetime, he managed to acquire some 200 Renoirs, nearly 100 Cézannes, 60-odd Matisses and many other illustrious works. At the same time, he successfully estranged Bertrand Russell, T.S. Eliot, Alfred Stieglitz and other cultural giants while fighting lifetime feuds with powerful institutions like the University of Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia Museum of Art.

Writing in *The Devil and Dr. Barnes* 36 years after his subject's death, Howard Greenfeld, best-known for biographies of Puccini and Caruso, realizes that many of his subject's firefights now count as historical minutiae. What remains is a peculiar personality and idiosyncratic institution, and Greenfeld offers a balanced account of Barnes' career, conceding to him his achievements while castigating him for his boorishness.

Like previous biographers, Greenfeld attributes much of Barnes' angry, domineering personality to his destiny as an outsider forever trying to be an insider, a self-made "thruster" frustrated by his inability to dent Philadelphia's old-money, Main Line cultural institutions. Born to a lower-middle class family in the Philadelphia neighborhood that later produced *Rocky*, Barnes graduated from the University of Pennsylvania's medical school at 20, then struck it rich through the co-development of Argyrol, a medical antiseptic.

By 1910, with his business running smoothly, Barnes turned to collecting art. His first purchases came with the help of a high school friend and painter, William Glackens, who in 1912 headed to Paris with $20,000 of Barnes' money to buy new work. Over the next few decades, many other artists and dealers would become Barnes' sidemen, but never more than that. Barnes soon established a reputation as a decisive, indefatigable gallery and studio crawler. In time, his shrewdness in acquiring Impressionist and post-Impressionist masterpieces made him the foremost American collector of modern art—a French magazine dubbed him the "Medici of the New World."

To house his growing collection, he set up the Foundation in 1925 (four years before the Museum of Modern Art) as an "educational institution," not a museum. Barnes appointed philosopher John Dewey—one of the few friends he never alienated—his director of education. For decades Barnes would call upon Dewey's prestige to bolster his projects, and Barnes needed the backup support, because his crudeness and dogmatism gradually repelled many journalists, critics,

dealers, academics and museum officials.

As a collector, Barnes often embodied the ugly American businessman. Gertrude Stein complained that he would "literally wave his cheque book in the air." He bragged about bargains and crowed over owning "the old masters of the future."

As a pedagogue, Barnes vehemently opposed historical and biographical approaches to art, as well as the treatment of art as a plaything and diversion for socialites—he permitted no receptions at the Foundation. Fond of formalist theories of art such as those of critic Roger Fry, Barnes drew on them in his own books, which included *The Art in Painting* (1925). Teachers at the Barnes Foundation had to follow the party line.

Perhaps least popular was Barnes' behavior as owner of one of the world's great private collections—he proved himself a whimsical, nasty, grudge-holding administrator. He refused to lend paintings for exhibitions and enjoyed denying access to critics and scholars while admitting untutored working people. According to Greenfeld, young James Michener three times failed to gain entrance when he wrote to Barnes as a Swarthmore student, but won an invitation when he posed as a Pittsburgh steelworker. It took legal action by the state to open the collection to the public for several days a week.

THROUGHOUT his life, Barnes could detect a slight—real or imagined—a mile away. He usually responded with belligerence. When *The Saturday Evening Post* ran an article entitled "The Terrible-Tempered Dr. Barnes" in 1942, Barnes rode up and down the Main Line, ripping down advertising posters for the series and inserting a seven-page rebuttal into issues on sale.

Greenfeld also offers many examples of Barnes' notorious venom as a letter-writer. To R. Sturgis Ingersoll, a Philadelphia Museum of Art trustee, he wrote, "I was already familiar with your reputation in Paris as a boob to whom the dealers could sell any worthless picture so long as it bore the name of a well-known artist." When Le Corbusier sent a friendly letter to Barnes, it was returned unopened, "with the word 'merde,' written in large letters on the envelope."

In the end, Barnes the outsider made sure he would remain so. He amended the Foundation bylaws to guarantee that none of the Philadelphia-area institutions he resented—among them its art museum—would ever win control of the Foundation after his death.

According to Greenfeld, both the world-class philosophers who played a major role in Barnes' life, Dewey and Bertrand Russell, analyzed him identically—as proprietor of a massive "inferiority complex." Greenfeld's portrait helps frame the irony of this formalist connoisseur who veered too close to the crackpot side of his obsession. We wind up remembering not what Barnes collected, but what he brought with him to the chase. ■

RENEWAL HONOR ROLL

(35) Once again a new record has been set for early renewals.127 members paid their 1988 dues before January 1st, 1988. We thank these early birds for getting the membership-renewal-process off to a good start. Here they are: LOU ACHESON, IRTISHAD AHMAD, J. M. ALTIERI, JEAN ANDERSON, TRUMAN ANDERSON, JAY ARAGONA, DONG-IN BAE, ADAM PAUL BANNER, CHERYL BASCOM, WALTER BAUMGARTNER, VIVIAN BENTON-RUBEL, JACQUELINE BERTHON-PAYON, HOWARD BLAIR, MICHAEL BRADY, JAMES BUXTON, ROBERT CANTERBURY, POLLY COBB, WHITFIELD COBB, JACK COWLES, GLENNA CRANFORD, PETER CRANFORD, JIM CURTIS, ANGELO D'ALESSIO, BOB DAVIS, PAUL DOUDNA, PRADEEP DUBEY, BEVERLEY EARLES, RONALD EDWARDS, LEE EISLER, BRENDA FREEDMAN, FRANK GALLO, ALEJANDRO GARCIADIEGO, SEYMOUR GENSER, MARY GIBBONS, ARTTIE GOMEZ, CHARLES GREEN, DONALD GREEN, ROSS GUFFY, JOHN HARPER, DON HERNANDEZ, LYLA HERNANDEZ, ROBERT HICKS, CHARLES HILL, MARK HOGAN, JAMES HOOPES, OPHELIA HOOPES, TING-FU HUNG, ARVO IHALAINEN, DON JACKANICZ, JOHN JACKANICZ, TED JACKANICZ, SHIRLEY JESPERSEN, RICHARD JOHNSON, LARRY JUDKINS, KENT KLATZKIN, KEN KORBIN, PAUL KORNACKI, HENRY KRAUS, PAUL KUNTZ, PAUL KURTZ, HERB LANSDELL, GLADYS LEITHAUSER, JOHN LENZ, WALTER LESSING, ARTHUR LEWIS, MARTIN LIPIN, DON LOEB, PAUL LOGEMAN, JONATHAN LUKIN, CHARLES MAGISTRO, STEVE MARAGIDES, LESLIE MARENCHIN, WILLIAM MCKENZIE-GOODRICH, HUGH MCVEIGH, JIM MCWILLIAMS, STEVE MOLENAAR, BRIAN MOLSTAD, GLENN MOYER, SANDRA MOYER, MARK OAKFORD, JACK OTT, NICK PACINO, PAUL PFALZNER, RAY PONTIER, NAGABHUSHANA REDDY, STEVE REINHARDT, DON ROBERTS, JOHN ROCKFELLOW, MICHAEL ROCKLER, HARRY RUJA, CHERIE RUPPE, SIGRID SAAL, NATHAN SALMON, GREGORY SCAMMELL, JOHN SCHWENK, JOANNA SERVATIUS, ARSHAD SHERIF, JOHN SHOSKY, MIRON SKY, WARREN SMITH, JOHN SONNTAG, PHILIP STANDER, ROGER STANKE, TOM STANLEY, RAMON SUZARA, SHOHIG TERZIAN, JOHN TOBIN, LLOYD TREFETHEN, HENRY VAN DYKE, WALTER VANNINI, FERNANDO VARGAS, BETTY VOGT, HERB VOGT, RUSSELL WAHL, DEWEY WALLACE, JR., MICHAEL WEBER, TOM WEIDLICH, DONNA WEIMER, EDWARD WEISMAN, CHARLES WEYAND, CALVIN WICHERN, JOHN WILHELM, RICHARD WILK, VINCENT WILLIAMS, JAMES WOODROW, BILL YOUNG, RONALD YUCCAS.

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