The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.* 1500 Johns Road Augusta Georgia 30904

RUSSELL SOCIETY NEWS
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(1) Annual Meeting location switched (2). 2 BR BBC broadcasts (9). "Guided Tour" performed (14). A Jesuit on BR (15). Time to nominate Directors (29). '82 dues, last call (30). Hemlock (35). Voice of Reason (37). Index is on the last page. An asterisk in the left column indicates a request.

ANNUAL MEETING 1982

(2) Los Angeles replaces Claremont. We have changed the place but not the date: June 25-27. The place is the Sheraton Townhouse (also called Sheraton West), 2961 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90010. When writing "Reservations" there, to reserve your room, mention BRS to get the discount. Single room $59, double $69 (before discount). If you want to share a double room, let Bob Davis know; he will team you up with another member. In that case, if yours is a name that does not indicate your sex — like Pat or Lee — indicate it. If you want lodging that costs less than the Sheraton, write Bob,and he will tell you what's available. The Saturday evening banquet costs $17.50 and includes table wine.Please send Bob your check for $17.50. We have to tell the Sheraton several days in advance how many will attend the banquet; it will be helpful if you send Bob your $17.50 check sooner rather than later. To get there take the Mid-Wilshire Hotel Bus from Los Angeles Airport, which lets you off at the Sheraton door. The meeting starts Friday June 25th at 8 P.M. and ends Sunday about noon.Bob's address: 2501 Lake View Avenue, Los Angeles,CA 90039. We hope to see many of you there! For more, see (43).

RECENT EVENTS

(3) National Summit Conference on Religious Freedom and the Secular State was held in NYC on March 27th. BOB DAVIS and LEE EISLER attended as delegates from the BRS.

There were sessions on religion in the public schools (school prayer), book banning (library censorship), creationism, morality in a secular society, and infringements on sexual privacy.

Two organizations sponsored the Conference. The two had decided to combine when they discovered that their aims were virtually identical. One of them,The Center for Moral Democracy, was organized by the New York Society for Ethical Culture — which is associated with the American Humanist Association — "for freedom, tolerance and diversity in moral, religious and intellectual life." The other, The Voice of Reason, was formed by The Society for Humanistic Judaism, to defend the Secular State, Personal Freedom, and Free Inquiry. Moral Democracy and Voice of Reason,now combined, will be known as Voice of Reason.

We asked Rabbi Sherwin Wine — founder of the Society for Humanistic Judaism — how a rabbi could be part of a movement that shunned the supernatural. He replied that he loved the Jewish traditions in which he has grown up — he viewed them as cultural — and he also loved the ideals of humanism, and he found no difficulty in combining them.

For more about the Society for Humanistic Judaism, see (36). For more aobut the Voice of Reason, see (37).

Next day (March 28th) the meeting was open to the public. Speakers included polymath Isaac Asimov, Dorothy Samuels (Executive Director of the ACLU), and a representative of Planned Parenthood.

It was all well worth attending.

For another report on the National Summit Conference, see (4).

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*Russell Society News, a quarterly (Lee Eisler, Editor): RD 1, Box 409, Coopersburg, PA 18036
BRS Library: Jack Ragsdale, BRS Co-Librarian, 4461 23rd St., San Francisco, CA 94114

REPORTS FROM OFFICERS

(4) President Robert K. Davis reports:

My major activity during the past quarter was attending the second Humanist Summit Conference, with Lee Eisler, in NYC, March 27th and 28th. The meeting was sponsored by the Ethical Culture Society and we met in their building on Central Park West. 29 organizations with over 60 delegates attended. These groups are humanistically oriented, and share the distinction of being targets of the so-called Moral Majority. We were there to hear reports on the religious right, and to share ideas on programs of action. On Sunday, the 28th, the meeting was public, with Isaac ASimov among the guest speakers. He gave a witty speech.

I was asked to sit in on the founding of the new Voice of Reason, on Monday (the 29th). This is envisaged as a nation-wide grass roots organization, to monitor and oppose the religious right. It will monitor local political issues and races, and keep an eye on efforts to ban books in schools or libraries, or to insert "scientific creationism" into science courses. We had a productive meeting, and worked out rules of organization, a proposed budget, preliminary financing, and hired a National Director, Ed Doer.(formerly with "Americans United for Separation of Church and State.") We adopted a "Declaration of Religious, Intellectual and Personal Freedom." Eight of us attended this meeting:Philosopher Paul Kurtz (who has been called,"Mr. Secular Humanism"), and representatives of the American Humanist Association, the Ethical Culture Society, and the Society for Humanistic Judaism. Sherwin Wine— founder of the Society for Humanistic Judaism — is an atheist rabbi, dynamic, charismatic. He started the Voice of Reason in Michigan. Meanwhile, the Ethical Culture people had started a similar group in New York, which they called "Moral Democracy". Our meeting merged the 2 groups, under the name,"Voice of Reason". A network already exists in several states. A public meeting is to be held in Washington, DC in May.Los Angeles Ethical Culture Leader Gerald Larue and I are to organize a West Coast conference for this fall, probably in October .

Membership in the Voice of Reason costs $20 per year. To join or for information,write Voice of Reason, Box 16, Franklin, MI 48025.

Next day I attended Humanist Philosopher (and BRS member) Corliss Lamont's 80th birthday party at O'Neal's Restaurant, hosted by the Emergency Committee on Civil Liberties. It was most enjoyable, and I was able to talk informally with people from the previous weekend — Paul Kurtz, Steven Fenichell (AHA Treasurer), Ed Wilson (a founder and Director Emeritus of the AHA) — as well as with Dr. Lamont. People from many groups that Lamont has been involved with over the years attended, all kinds of people,from poets to lawyers. There were speeches, a birthday cake, and the presentation of a handsome red vest. ThenLamont sang songs while the M.C.— the lawyer who represented Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case — also wearing a red vest, did a soft shoe routine.

Later in the week I dined with BRS Director Jack Cowles, and also attended Warren Smith's Saturday cocktail hour at his Variety Studios. We discussed business in both cases, but as always seems to be the case when BRS members meet, there were a lot of common interests to talk about besides BR and the BRS.

On a more serious note, I have been thinking all winter that the humanists ought to make contact with the Soviet block in the spirit of detente to organize a non-governmental exchange. I had hoped to discuss this at the weekend Conference but was able to do so only informally. I have been corresponding with Dora Russell, Karl Popper, Paul Kurtz and Corliss Lamont about it. The best place to launch such a proposal would be at this summer's International Humanist Conference in Germany. Unfortunately the bad U.S. economy will probably prevent me from going as it has crippled my business; this is not a good time for me to undertake a rather expensive trip. I have some other avenues to explore, and hope to report more positive developments in the future.

I discussed several publishing projects with Paul Kurtz — one of whose hats is as head of Prometheus Press. Dora Russell had written that her recently completed magnum opus on the machine age — gestating for 60 years — was not being published, as it was too controversial. I suggested it to Promotheus, and they are interested. Also Dora's second volume of autobiography "Tamarisk Tree II" has not been published in the USA. This too is being considered. It is especially important as an educational and feminist document. I also proposed that Prometheus publish, in a very inexpensive format, 3 essays by BR:"Why I Am Not A Christian", "What Is An Agnostic?" and "What I believe". The first two are extremely effective discussions of religion, and the last is a positive statement of what a free-thinker can believe. This might involve our guaranteeing a minimum purchase; if so, I would ask members to consider buying 10 or 20 copies each, to distribute as gifts, etc. But first, details, including price, must be worked out.

Plans for the annual meeting are coming along, and I expect it to be an interesting one. I have programs lined up on the Moral Majority and nuclear war.

(5) Secretary Don Jackaniz reports:

As amended in June 1981, the BRS Bylaws state that the agenda for the Annual Membership Meeting is to be prepared by the President, and the agenda for the Annual Board of Directors Meeting is to be prepared by the Chairman of the Board of Directors. The amended Bylaws further state that items for these agenda may be proposed in writing by any BRS member to the President and the Chairman respectively.

In accordance with these provisions, as BRS Secretary and Board of Directors Secretary, I would like to remind all members about the June 25-27 Annual Membership Meeting and the Annual Board of Directors Meeting. Any agenda proposals should be forwarded as specified above as soon as possible *

The BRS Bylaws also state that at least 30 days notice must be given should Bylaw amendments be proposed at a BRS meeting. The same 30-day notice is also required for amendments to the Board of Directors Bylaws. This then is notice that Bylaw amendments will be considered at both Meetings.

REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES

(6) Membership Committee (Lee Eisler, Chairman, Jacqueline Berthon-Payon, Co-Chairman):

Last issue we listed the publications in which BRS ads will appear during 1982 (RSN33-9). Please note several changes.Eliminate SATURDAY REVIEW; it was our 2nd most expensive publication last year, and rates have just gone up 30%. Eliminate ATLANTIC MONTHLY after June; they have just nearly doubled their rates. Add COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, a bi-monthly.

(7a) Science Committee (Alex Dely, Chairman):

The Futility and Dangers of Nerve Gas Weapons

Possibly the most dangerous and unnecessary feature of President Reagan's record defense budget is a request of $30 million to resume biochemical nerve gas production. The Pentagon plans to produce 20,000 binary nerve gas artillary shells a month. Further plans call for production of chemical warheads for the ground-launched cruise missile. The total cost of the biochemical weapons program will be between $3 and $6 billion by 1985.

In May 1980 the U.S. Senate approved $20 million for the Pine Bluff Arsenal (Arkansas) chemical weapons plant. The proposed binary weapons contain two separated non-toxic agents; in flight, they mix to form deadly nerve gas. Binary weapons are designed to kill by disrupting the nervous system and paralyzing the respiratory system. Death comes within minutes.

World condemnation of the senseless killing caused by poison gases during World War I led to the 1925 Geneva protocol, which prevents first use of poisonous gases in war. In 1969 Nixon ordered a moratorium on U.S. chemical weapons production, which became the basis for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention outlawing development, possession and production of "germ weapons". By February 1981 U.S. negotiations with the U.S.S.R. had proceeded to a draft agreement prohibiting possession of chemical weapons, destructions of existing stocks within 10 years, and international on-site inspections.

Since then, prompted by alleged chemical weapon use by the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, the Reagan Adminstration has let the talks lapse.

Arguments against new chemical weapons production:

1) The U.S. stockpile still consists of almost 7,000 tons of lethal agents. The U.S. General Accouting Office found, in a 1977 audit, that deterioration is occurring (due to Army deglect) only in the nerve gas rockets, not in the artillery shells. No new production is needed, as we can now blanket over 9,000 square miles with lethal agents.

2) True deterrence requires that the U.S. and NATO augment their defensive capabilities. (Adequate protective equipment is decisive in a biochemical conflict.) Since biochemical warfare is so insidious -- concealed vials could be carried to enemy country and let loose in water supplies or dispersed over crops! -- new production will lead to a new mutual weapons build-up and further insecurity.

3) Binary chemical weapons have little military value: they have never been field-tested. More importantly, Warsaw Pact forces are already well equipped to function in a chemically contaminated environment. Civilians would be the main victims. The chemical weapons program diverts attention from strategically more useful NATO capabilities, such as conventional weapons, training and protective gear.

4) The utility of these weapons, in any conflict with Russia, depends on their deployment in Europe. To blunt European protest (for various reasons), these weapons would require 2 full weeks of airlift time from U.S. storage sites to European battlefields. By then however the main advantage of chemical warfare would be lost.

5) Chemical weapons cause indiscriminate destruction of people and food/water supplies. New production will undermine the stability of NATO even more.

6) By producing nerve gas weapons, the U.S. will lose the moral leverage over Russia in our ideological battle to win over Africa, South America and Asia.

Action urgently needed:

Chemical weapons votes in the U.S. Senate have only been narrowly lost: 46-47 in 1980, 48-50 in 1981.

Once again, Senator Hart of Colorado has introduced Senate Bill 2078, an amendment to the Defense Department Authorization Bill, to eliminate the the $30 million for chemical weapons production.

It has bipartisan support,and critical votes will occur between April 12 and May 15

As of now, Sen. Goldwater favors renewed biochemical weapons production. Sen. De Concini is undecided and swayable with pressure from Arizonians. This happens to be the situation in Arizona.

Please write your two Senators requesting support for S.B. 2078. Write Sen Gary Hart, expressing your support for his S.B. 2078. The address for all Senators is: (name of Senator),U.S. Senate, Washington,DC 20510. Write the editor of your newspaper, and request editorials against chemical weapons production. Ask groups you belong to to pass resolutions condeming new nerve gas production.

For more information, please contact me at the UA Physics Dept.,Tucson, AZ 85721.

(7b) More about nerve gas, from The Russell Committee Against Chemical Weapons, Nottingham, England , which presumably is an offshoot of The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, also of Nottingham,England. This appeared in World Press Review, April 1982, p. 54:

Military Affairs

Russell Committee

The Nerve Gas Renaissance

The controversial return of the 'death cloud'

STEVEN ROSE — JULIAN PERRY ROBINSON
ALASTAIR HAY — SEAN MURPHY

Steven Rose is professor and Sean Murphy a lecturer in biochemistry at Britain's Open University; Alastair Hay teaches chemical pathology at Leeds University; Julian Perry-Robinson does research at the University of Sussex. This article is excerpted from "The Threat of Chemical Weapons," published by the Russell Committee Against Chemical Weapons, Nottingham, England.

Last year the U.S. Congress authorized $20 million toward a new binary nerve gas plant at Pine Bluff, Ark., and work began in October. This is the first part of a program estimated to cost an extraordinary $8 billion within the next five years.

The binaries are nerve gases so toxic that a milligram or so absorbed through the lungs or skin can kill within minutes or less, but are developed as two separate chemicals which, until mixed, are relatively harmless. These agents are to be packed in shells or bombs or as tips on missiles for use in the European theater. This means they must be stockpiled in Europe, and the U.S. assumes that a host country—probably Britain—will be found.

Hundreds of such compounds have been produced and considered for use as weapons. Today three are stockpiled: the German inventions Sarin and Soman (the so-called G agents) and, among the British and American agents, five times as toxic as the G agents, one in particular—VX. It is the principal nerve gas stockpiled in the U.S., although this may change with the new U.S. binary program.

The toxicity of these agents has led to novel ways of making and handling them. Instead of being placed as liquid in bombs or shells, the principal ingredients are stored in the shell, separated by a thin disc. Upon firing, this separating disc collapses and the reaction, yielding the toxic agent, takes place in the air.

The so-called binary weapons, which deposit their load when they reach the target, have been developed over the past decade, particularly in response to fears of accidents during manufacture, stockpiling, or transportation of the nerve gases—and as a response to environmentalists' concerns. However, any military use of binaries would be identical to that of the other nerve gases.

Richard Gardner-Picture Group

Nerve gas gear—"pressure on NATO."

Nerve gases have general effects on the nervous system. If the compounds block or mimic key nerve pathways in the brain or spinal cord they will incapacitate the victim. They can be absorbed into the body through the skin, airways, or mouth; symptoms include intense sweating, constriction of the airways to the lungs, filling of the lungs with mucus, vomiting, defecation, paralysis, and respiratory failure.

About a thousandth of a gram is enough to kill—fifty times more deadly than phosgene or cyanide. Acute nerve-gas poisoning produces death within minutes, but small doses from short exposures can accumulate in the body because the gas is broken down by the liver only slowly; death can be a prolonged process.

One U.S. Army agent known as BZ, dispersed in aerosol form, interferes with heart contraction and with nerve pathways in the brain. Its symptoms are increased heart rate, dry skin, blurred vision, disorientation, loss of coordination, stupor, and amnesia. Generally the result is random and undisciplined behavior that lasts for two to four days.

The argument for stockpiling nerve gas in Europe goes that, although law and custom may prevent our using the weapons, we know that our enemies are less scrupulous, so we need the weapons to deter their use. Over 1958-69 declared American policy on chemical weapons was of "no first-use" but no such restriction was in the policy guidance issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to U.S. military commands. In 1959-63 the U.S. Congress quadrupled its chemical warfare appropriations. The still-continuing Soviet buildup of chemical warfare capabilities dates to this period.

The American joint chiefs believe that if chemical weapons were introduced into a European war nerve gas would soon be used by both sides at a rate approaching 2,000 tons a day. Computer simulation of such a war shows chemical casualties conservatively estimated in the millions because of the secondary effects of nerve gas blown downwind of battle zones to highly populated areas. Because civilians will have little protection, the ratio of noncombatant casualties will likely average 20 to 1.

NATO now has no retaliatory chemical warfare capability, although in West Germany the Americans maintain stocks of their own nerve gas. Indeed, there are sufficient differences among the chemical warfare policies of member states to inhibit the creation of a unified NATO policy. Now that the U.S. is proceeding on chemical rearmament, pressure on NATO is intensifying.

The Americans evidently expect the safety features of their binary munitions to undercut domestic political opposition. The reports of chemical warfare from Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, albeit unverified, have also encouraged support.

A great quantity of American armament is already in Britain, so it is conceivable that nerve gas is included. This has been denied by Washington, but rumors persist—most recently the allegations concerning U.S. facilities at Caerwent. It is unclear whether legal safeguards exist to prevent the Americans from shipping or flying in stocks without prior British approval. ■

Jan. 28

(Thank you, BOB DAVIS)

(7c) * Two more papers from Alex Dely. We will lend them on request:

(1) CIVIL DEFENSE, AN UPDATED POLICY ANALYSIS. 19 pages.
(2) DEPT. OF DEFENSE INFLUENCE IN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH. 16 pages. This was presented on April 10th as part of Ground Zero Week observances at the University of Arizona.

PHILOSOPHERS' CORNER

(8) BRS Philosophy Committee Chairman Ed Hopkins reports:

Papers have started to come in for the December 1982 BRS session at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division). People who wish to be considered as commentators should get * in touch with Ed. Note his new address: 5713 Chinquapin Parkway (C), Baltimore, MD 21239.

BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

(9a) Two talks over BBC radio, given by BR in 1949, were later published by the Beacon Press (Boston), in 1951, in the volume The Western Tradition.

TOM STANLEY — to whom we are indebted for this item — found the following in Clark on BR's radio work:

"Of all the many speakers I handled I would put Bertie among the most professional," says Ronald Lewin of the B.B.C. "His scripts were always immaculately composed to exactly the right length and written in a style which absolutely fitted his way of speaking. He was completely docile in rehearsal and never struck attitudes or made difficulties as many lesser individuals used to do. But then, his scripts were always so perfect that very little rehearsal was necessary." The Life of Bertrand Russell by Ronald W. Clark (NY:Knopf,1976) p.496.

(9b) Talk #1:

SCEPTICISM AND TOLERANCE

by

Bertrand Russell

THERE is at the present time a wide-spread belief that those nations and individuals that remain rational and cool and (within common-sense limits) sceptical, cannot hope for success when they are brought into contact with systems of widely held and fanatically believed dogma. This view is especially common among the sceptics themselves, who are apt to suffer from a kind of fascinated immobility when confronted with the glare of powerful but intellectually limited sectarians. I do not think that history bears out this view of the powerlessness of moderate and limited scientific belief when engaged in conflict with fanaticism; in fact, the exact contrary is nearer to the moral to be drawn from the past. Let us glance at a few illustrations of this theme.

The Generals who commanded Roman armies in the days when the Roman Empire was most rapidly expanding were for the most part Epicurean sceptics. Their motives were the crudest possible: to plunder the gold reserve of temples, keeping half and distributing the other half among their soldiers; to destroy cities which were commercial rivals of Rome; and so on. The later Romans, pagan and Christian alike, were sunk in superstition; they became increasingly fanatical down to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and every increase of fanaticism brought fresh defeat.

The same sort of thing is true of the Mohammedans. In the great days of their early conquests, their leaders were sceptics, who had at first opposed the Prophet's new sect, and only joined it when they saw that there was money in it. This sceptical attitude lasted all through the great days of the Caliphate; when fanaticism began to prevail, loss of military power came with it.

In the sixteenth century, the most fanatical of the Great Powers was Spain. In spite of every advantage—a brave and warlike population, a superb geographical position, and all the resources of the Indies—Spanish power collapsed. The Jews and Moors, the most industrious and civilized inhabitants of the Peninsula, were expelled, to the great detriment of the State. Holland was lost through unwillingness to practise toleration. After the long fruitless devastation of the wars of religion, when the Peace of Westphalia and the collapse of the English Puritans had shown that no extremists could win, the greatest share of wealth and power came to Dutch and English Latitudinarians. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, by transferring useful industries from France to England, prepared the way for French defeat in the Seven Years' War.

At no stage in this long history was victory correlated with fanaticism.

The most recent history shows that in this respect there is no change. The British entered the second world war as a heavy duty, by no means in the spirit of a crusade. The Russians and Americans were goaded into self-defence by unprovoked attacks. Only the Nazis were inspired by fanaticism, and their fanaticism contributed not a little to their downfall. After victory, the Allies were surprised to find how little progress the Germans had made towards the construction of atomic bombs. This was largely because they would not employ physicists who were Jews or Anti-Nazis. Their fanaticism also greatly stimulated the resistance movement in conquered territories. I think there can

be no doubt that if their rulers had been more rational, they would have won the war, since they would not have attacked Russia or encouraged the Japanese to attack America.

Those who hold that fanaticism can only be defeated by a rival fanaticism cannot appeal to facts in support of their opinion. Victory in modern war depends primarily upon natural resources, industrial and scientific skill, and shrewdness in those who determine policy. Of these requisites, skill and shrewdness are not so likely to be found among fanatics as among men whose outlook is more nearly scientific. Fanatics are unwilling to accept scientific discoveries made by their enemies, and therefore soon fall behind those whose outlook is more cosmopolitan.

Some of those who fear that fanaticism is irresistible do so because they regard complete scepticism as the only alternative. The desirable alternative is not to be sceptical but to be scientific. The sceptic says "nothing can be known"; he is a dogmatist, though a negative one. His creed, we must admit, is paralysing, and a nation which accepts it is doomed to defeat, since it cannot adduce adequate motives for self-defence. But the scientific attitude is quite different. It does not say "knowledge is impossible", but "knowledge is difficult". As against the dogmatist, it holds that nothing can count as knowledge until it has been submitted to the tests that science has shown to be useful, and even then it may require correction in the light of fresh evidence. As against the sceptic, it holds that what has emerged from a scientific scrutiny is more likely to be true than what has not, and that in many cases this likelihood is almost certainty; in any event, it is the best hypothesis to accept in practice. The dogmatist accepts one hypothesis regardless of the evidence; the sceptic rejects all hypotheses regardless of the evidence. Both are irrational. The rational man accepts the most probable hypothesis for the time being, while continuing to look for new evidence to confirm or confute it. It is by acting in this way that man has acquired his power over nature, and that the scientific nations have acquired their power over the rest of mankind.

The difference between a rational man and a dogmatist is not that the latter has beliefs while the former has none. The difference is as to the grounds of the beliefs and the way in which they are held. The rational man is prepared to give reasons for his beliefs, and these reasons, except as regards values, are ultimately derived from observation of facts. He will admit that his reasons are not absolutely conclusive, and that new facts may necessitate new beliefs. But he will be prepared to act upon a high degree of probability as vigorously as the dogmatist acts upon what he holds to be certainty. He has, moreover, one great advantage over the dogmatist. When the dogmatist is shown to be wrong—for example, by defeat in war—he suffers a *total* defeat which can never befall the rational man, who has always admitted that he may be mistaken. Nothing can be more hopeless than a population of disillusioned bigots, who have lost the capacity to be rational, and have no longer any outlet but despair for their irrationality. Such a population has no power of self-direction, and little willingness to accept again the kind of direction from without which has been found to lead astray. The springs of action are dried up, and nothing remains but listless drifting. This is part of the price that has to be paid for indulgence in collective hysteria.

I do not wish to suggest that a man who is scientific to the right extent will be devoid of emotion. Science can deal only with means, not with ends; the ends must be supplied by feeling. For my part, there are certain things that I value; I should mention especially intelligence, kindliness, and self-respect. Science cannot prove that these things are good; it can only show how, assuming them to be good, they are to be obtained. To believe in these or any other ultimate values without giving a reason for doing so is not irrational, since the matter is not one for rational argument. All rational argument requires premises, without which it cannot start. In matters of fact, the premises come from perception; in matters of value, from feeling. Much of the wide-spread prejudice against the rational comes from failure to realize that rationality is only concerned with what can be proved, not with what proofs have to assume. A man is not unscientific because of his ultimate ends, but because of mistakes as to how to achieve them. Hitler was unscientific because the destruction of Germany, which was what he achieved, was no part of his purpose. To be rational or scientific is only one among virtues; no sane man would pretend that it is the whole of virtue.

Tolerance, as a practical maxim, has two sources: on the one hand, the realization that we may be mistaken; on the other hand, a belief that free discussion will promote the view we favour. This latter opinion must be held by anyone whose opinions are formed on rational grounds. Dogmatists, on the contrary, fear that free discussion would show their beliefs to be groundless, and that is why they always favour censorship. The Western world has learnt tolerance with difficulty, partly by realizing the usefulness of science, which bigots tried to crush. Experience has shown that tolerance and free discussion promote intellectual progress, social cohesion, prosperity, and success in war. I see no reason to suppose that this is going to be any less true in the future than it has been up to the present day. Fanaticisms come and go, and those of our time, like earlier ones, will perish through practical refutation. Tolerance and the scientific spirit are among the greatest of human achievements, and I see no reason to think that we are in process of losing them, or that those who retain them are thereby in any degree weakened in whatever struggle may lie ahead.

(9c) **Talk #2:**

NATURE AND ORIGIN OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD

by

Bertrand Russell

SCIENCE, like most things, was gradual in its beginnings, and it was not until the seventeenth century that it began to acquire a decisive position. It has since grown to be the most distinctive characteristic of our age; for good or evil, it is what makes our age different from antiquity and the medieval centuries.

Science may be defined as the discovery of causal laws by means of observation and experiment—laws which are more valued when they are quantitative than when they are merely qualitative. Mathematics, which does not require observation, owes its first considerable development to the Greeks, but the only observational study in which the Greeks were proficient was astronomy, where there are very obvious uniformities and much can be done by pure geometry. It was not until Galileo that a way was found of dealing with motions that are not uniform and not periodic. Before his time men sought laws

of stability; but in modern times laws of change have been what science has mainly wished to find. And ever since Bacon science has been valued, not only, or even chiefly, as pure knowledge, but as a source of power—power over inanimate nature, power over plants and animals, and now, at last, power over human communities.

Science is a product of Europe. The only exception of importance that I can think of is the Babylonian discovery that eclipses could be predicted. A very few nations—Italy, France, the Low Countries, Britain, and Germany—contributed quite 90 per cent. of the great discoverers. Poland contributed Copernicus, Russia contributed Mendeleeff and Pavlov, but on the whole the share of Eastern Europe has not been a large one. Within Western Europe, as may be seen from a map showing the birth-places of eminent men of science, there has been a correlation with commerce and industry. But commerce does not necessarily lead to science. It did not do so among the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and the Arabs, though they studied science of a sort, made no discoveries in any way comparable to those of Western Europe since 1600. I do not think that seventeenth-century science can be regarded as an inevitable outcome of social and economic conditions; the existence of individuals possessed of very rare abilities was also necessary. Why they should have been born there and then cannot be explained in scientific terms by means of our present knowledge. It certainly does not have a racial explanation, as may be seen from the fact that many of the best men of science have been Jews, who though living in Western Europe are not of course of West European stock.

The importance of the economic conditions which attended the beginnings of modern science has been so much emphasized that the intellectual conditions have tended to be overlooked. Let us spend a few moments in considering scientific method in itself, apart from the social environment that promoted it.

The essential matter is an intimate association of hypothesis and observation. The Greeks were fruitful in hypotheses, but deficient in observation. Aristotle, for example, thought that women have fewer teeth than men, which he could not have thought if he had had a proper respect for observation. Francis Bacon, on the other hand, overestimated the mere collecting of facts, supposing that this, if carried far enough, would of itself give rise to fruitful hypotheses. But there are so many facts, and so many ways of arranging facts, that no one can collect facts usefully except under the stimulus of some hypothesis to which they are relevant. Throughout any scientific investigation, even from the very beginning, generalizing hypotheses must exist in the mind of the investigator to determine the direction of his observations. The hypotheses must, however, continually change and develop as new facts prove the old hypotheses to be inadequate.

It is commonly said that the framing of hypotheses is the most difficult step in scientific investigation, and perhaps this is true of men who have undergone a thorough education in science. But viewed historically it would seem that respect for fact is more difficult for the human mind than the invention of remarkable theories. It is still believed by a large percentage of the inhabitants of this country that people born in May are specially liable to corns, that the moon affects the weather, and that it is dangerous to see the new moon through glass. None of those who hold these theories think it necessary to verify them. Aristotle's physics, as interpreted by medieval commentators, supplied a number of admirable theories, which covered the ground much more adequately than Galileo could do. There was nothing against the theories except that they were not in accordance with the facts, but this objection struck Galileo's Aristotelian adversaries as frivolous. And when he discovered Jupiter's moons their existence was denied, on the ground that the number of the heavenly bodies must be seven. I think, therefore, that in the beginning the respect for fact demanded by science is more difficult even than the framing of what may prove good hypotheses. And the hypotheses that prove good are very seldom such as commend themselves to our initial prejudices.

As against Bacon, the history of science seems to show that even the worst hypothesis is better than none. The beginnings of chemistry were dominated by the search for the philosopher's stone and for means of turning base metals into gold. This search supplied an essential element in scientific method which was absent in astronomy—I mean *experiment* as opposed to passive observation. If the medieval alchemists had not had extravagant hopes, they would not have had the patience to accumulate gradually a great mass of facts which could only become known by the artificial creation of conditions not spontaneously produced by nature. This work, which the Arabs took over from Alexandria and the Christians from the Arabs, supplied much detailed knowledge, but did not yield anything scientifically systematic until the time of Lavoisier and Priestley at the end of the eighteenth century. And it was not until our own day that the diversity of chemical elements was fitted into an unitary theory, and that the transmutation of elements became a practical possibility—with consequences that, if not controlled, threaten disaster to mankind.

The prejudices against scientific investigation of facts has been strongest where human beings are concerned. Throughout the middle ages anatomy was hampered by a rooted objection to dissection of corpses. Vesalius, who was Court physician to Charles V and Philip II, ventured, under the protection of royal favour, to defy this prejudice. But his enemies accused him of having dissected a body while still alive, and he was sentenced, as a penance, to a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. During his return he was shipwrecked and died of exposure. In China, not many years ago, a French surgeon, who had been invited to found a medical school, demanded corpses for dissection. He was told that to cut up corpses would be an impiety, but that he could operate instead upon living criminals. These two opposite stories both illustrate the obstacles to a scientific outlook.

Western Europeans, and men in the New World whose ancestors, whatever their racial origin, had lived in Western Europe, had for about three centuries a virtual monopoly of science, and acquired thereby a supremacy throughout the world such as neither they nor anyone else had possessed at any earlier time. This monopoly, of course, could not last for ever. Although the Japanese challenge proved unsuccessful, European dominion in Asia is disappearing, and we may expect a growth of Asiatic science as a result of political independence. Now that scientific method has been developed, a great deal can be achieved without the genius that was necessary in the pioneers. Any man possessed of patience and fair abilities and the necessary equipment can, nowadays, be pretty sure to find out *something*, and it may happen to be something of great importance. I do not think that Mendel's work required any very extraordinary gifts, and yet the Mendelien theory of heredity is transforming scientific agriculture and stock-breeding, and probably will in time considerably alter the congenital character of human beings. The more

science advances, the easier it becomes to make new discoveries; that is why the rapidity of scientific progress has been continually increasing since the seventeenth century.

Science has been victorious over the prejudices that opposed its progress, because it has conferred power, and especially power in war. Archimedes, almost the only *experimental* scientist among the Greeks, was useful in the defence of Syracuse. Leonardo da Vinci was employed by the Duke of Milan because he understood the science of fortification. Galileo, similarly, was supported by the Grand Duke of Tuscany because his researches on projectiles showed how to make artillery more effective. In the French Revolution French men of science played a vital part in the defence of their country against its many enemies. In the recent war it was scientific superiority that secured the final defeat of Japan. For such reasons, there is now little active opposition to scientific technique and scientific methods of investigation.

But power without wisdom is dangerous, and what our age needs is wisdom even more than knowledge. Given wisdom, the power conferred by science can bring a new degree of well-being to all mankind; without wisdom, it can bring only destruction.

BR ON ISRAEL

(10) A 1943 article by BR, as reported in the "Jewish Post" (Winnipeg, Canada), December 1981:

Bertrand Russell Supported Zionism

Noted British philosopher Bertrand Russell, (1872-1970) was a strong supporter of the creation of a Jewish State following World War II, even though he generally opposed nationalism strongly and viewed states as being the embodiment of nationalistic aspirations, according to Dina Porat, a lecturer at Tel Aviv University's Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies.

In an article entitled "The Role of the Jewish State in Helping to Create a Better World," in the publication The New Palestine in 1943, Russell wrote: "In a dangerous and largely hostile world, it is essential to Jews to have some country which is theirs, some region where they are not suspected aliens, some State which embodies what is distinctive in their culture."

Regarding control of immigration to the Jewish State, a subject which posed great problems for Great Britain, Russell suggested that "the Jewish authorities ought to have a free hand as regards immigration of Jews . . . What I have in mind is an international agreement that any Jew, anywhere, if he wishes to settle in Palestine, shall be granted permission to do so if the recognized Jewish authorities approve . . . This amounts to saying that every Jew should be eligible for citizenship of the Zionist State, and that only Jews should be the judge of his fitness."

Russell envisioned a Zionist State that would be "autonomous as regards its internal affairs," but foresaw the political and military struggles with Israel's Arab neighbors that would result from the creation of a Jewish State.

Russell wrote: "There may be no way of reconciling the actual Palestinian Arabs to the influx of an alien population into what is, after all, their country, but the important thing is that any grievances they may feel should not be taken up by the Mohammedan world, and made the basis of a general hostility to Europeans, including European Jews . . . As for the future, we live in an age when every kind of national, racial, and religious bigotry is on the increase, and it must, I fear, be thought likely that the Muslim world will share the general revival of fanaticism. This will mean that the Jews of Palestine will need constant military protection, over and above what they can themselves supply in the way of self-defense."

Russell also saw the Jewish State as a watch dog against antisemitism bringing information pertaining to antisemitic acts before an international tribunal. He saw the Jewish State as a champion of world peace, since, Russell wrote, "for now, as in the time of the Crusades, they are made the scapegoat when war breaks out." He believed the creation of the Jewish State would, chiefly, be a means of putting an end to antisemitism, and to that end, the Zionist State, if it were "enlightened and liberal" could "make contributions which will be of inestimable value and will command the respect of the world."

The article was discovered by Dina Porat in the files of Yitzhak Greenbaum, chairman of the United Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem during World War II. The TAU lecturer is doing doctoral research on the Jewish Agency's role in rescue operations of Jews during the Holocaust.

"Here was a world-famous authority, understanding and sympathetic, raising a clear voice for a brighter future for the Jews in their own state," Dina Porat comments in her introduction of the article, which appeared in Zionism, a quarterly magazine published by the Chaim Weizmann Institute for Zionist Research of **The Chaim Rosenberg School of Jewish Studies at TAU.**

(Thank you, RICK SHORE)

ABOUT BERTRAND RUSSELL

(11) BR's favorite hymn, as a boy:

Weary of Earth and Laden with my Sin

Weary of earth and laden with my sin,
I look at heaven and long to enter in;
But there no evil thing may find a home,
And yet I hear a voice that bids me "Come".

So vile I am, how dare I hope to stand
In the pure glory of that holy land?
Before the whiteness of that throne appear?
Yet there are hands stretched out to draw me near.

The while I fain would tread the heavenly way,
Evil is evil with me day by day;
Yet on mine ears the gracious tidings fall,
"Repent, confess, thou shall be loosed from all."

It is the voice of Jesus that I hear,
His are the hands stretched out to draw me near;
And his the Blood that can for all atone,
And set me faultless there before the throne.

O great Absolver, grant my soul may wear
The lowliest garb of penitence and prayer,
That in the Father's court my gracious dress
May be the garment of Thy righteousness.

Yea, Thou wilt answer for me, righteous Lord;
Thine all the merits, mine the great reward;
Thine the sharp thorns, and mine the golden crown;
Mine the life won, and Thine the life laid down.

Naught can I bring, dear Lord, for all I owe,
Yet let my full heart what it can bestow;
Like Mary's gift, let my devotion prove,
Forgiven greatly, how I greatly love.

(Thank you, DAVID HART)

BR BROADCAST

(12) "Science and Values", BR's essay, was read over Pacifica Foundation's FM Station KPFK (North Hollywood, CA) on March 3rd, on "Science Connection", a program conducted by Steve and Vera Kilston. Steve did the reading, and called the 1951 essay remarkably relevant to 1982. "Then the phones were open for listener response, and there was much spin-off from Russell's essay," reports JOHN TOBIN. (Thank you, John.)

The essay, originally included in The Impact of Science on Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), is included in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, edited by Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961, pp.635-646).

BR QUOTED

(13) In stone. We met someone at the March 27th National Summit Conference (3) in NYC whose face lit up when we mentioned that we were from the Bertrand Russell Society. The reason: there is a BR quotation on her husband's tombstone:

The great use of a life is to spend it for something that outlasts it.

* Does anyone know the source of this quotation?

BR CELEBRATED

(14 "Guided Tour", Act II, was presented in NYC on April 5-6. We were there. You can see Act I (we recommend it) on November 8-9 -- dates you may wish to note on your calendar. The following is from their program:

THE OPEN BOOK is a non-profit performing ensemble recognized by the IRS and New York State Charities Commission as an organization dedicated to presenting new and little-known literature to the public in an intimate style that focuses primarily on the word rather than the setting. Its sponsors include producer-playwright Jay Broad; novelist Mary Higgins Clark; actor-director José Ferrer; actor-producer Beverly Penberthy, and educator-librarian Dr. O. B. Hardison,Jr., Director of the Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, DC

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S GUIDED TOUR OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH was originally commissioned as a one-man show by the late actor-singer Robert Rounseville. Portions of it were staged by him at Western Washington State University and Deerfield Academy. The complete script is a two-act program. Act I will be presented by THE OPEN BOOK as part of the Library and Museum of the Performing Arts 4 P.M. concert series in this theatre on Monday and Tuesday, November 8-9, 1982.

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S GUIDED TOUR OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH is the only authorized dramatization of the writings of the late Lord Russell. It is performed with the permission of the joint copyright owners, Marvin Kaye and The Bertrand Russell Estate, being expressly authorized by Edith, Countess Russell; George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., publishers, and The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

The New York Public Library at Lincoln Center

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THE OPEN BOOK

presents

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S
GUIDED TOUR OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH

(ACT II ONLY)

by Marvin Kaye

Monday, April 5, 1982
Tuesday, April 6, 1982

4:00 P.M.

Admission Free

The use of cameras in this theatre is not allowed.

Free tickets may be obtained at the Amsterdam Avenue entrance on the day of the event. For evening programs apply in person after 4:00 p.m.; after 12 noon on Saturdays. For 4:00 o'clock programs, apply after 3:00 p.m.

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S GUIDED TOUR OF
INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH (ACT II only)

Derived from the works of Bertrand Russell
Dramatized and directed by Marvin Kaye

THE ENSEMBLE (in alphabetical order)
BILL BONHAM, BEVERLY FITE, SARALEE KAYE,
JUNE MILLER, TOBY SANDERS

Understudy for men's roles: Marvin Kaye
Understudy for women's roles: Nancy Temple

(THE OPEN BOOK's style is an amalgam of traditional staging and reader's theatre. No attempt is made to fully characterize, costume or "make-up" any role; the emphasis, rather, is on the author's words and ideas. Thus, below, the identifications do not reflect the total range of any ensemble member, but are merely for convenience in identifying who is who).

PROGRAM SEQUENCE

On Education	Bill Bonham (at blackboard) and full ensemble
On Sex and Marriage	Saralee Kaye, June Miller, Toby Sanders
Mr. Bowdler's Nightmare	Bill Bonham (Spiffkins) Beverly Fite (Mrs. Bowdler) June Miller (Narrator) Toby Sanders (Mr. Bowdler)
On Old Age	Bill Bonham
On Religion	Bill Bonham, Toby Sanders and full ensemble
On Comets	Full ensemble
On the Future of Mankind	Full ensemble

BILL BONHAM, co-founder, is on the faculty of Manhattan Community College. Specialist in communications skills, he has taught and directed at NYU, Pace, Murray State University and the College of the Virgin Islands.

*BEVERLY FITE recently played Aunt Eller in an acclaimed production of Oklahoma!, seen in various Midwestern cities. She has sung, acted and danced on Broadway, on all major TV networks, and in city clubs. She is featured on the Columbia cast album, Pal Joey.

*MARVIN KAYE, co-founder, is a novelist, playwright and director. His eleven novels include Bullets for Macbeth (Dutton), The Incredible Umbrella and (with Parke Godwin) The Masters of Solitude (Doubleday). He teaches an advanced writing workshop at NYU

SARALEE KAYE is co-editor (with Marvin Kaye) of a Nelson Doubleday anthology of ghost stories. A former teacher, she is an actor and sometime magician's assistant (AGVA). She has special training in voice-overs for TV.

*JUNE MILLER appears regularly in TV commercial, daytime dramas, in print advertising and theatrical films. She has played leading roles in regional theatres throughout America.

*TOBY SANDERS is a mime, clown and magician, and has written a definitive text on the clowning art. A student of Katherine Sergava at HB Studio, he has taught physical comedy in New York and elsewhere.

*NANCY TEMPLE is a leading soprano with Light Opera of Manhattan and the Manhattan Savoyards, and is a member of the New York City Opera. Her singing career has included solo appearances with the Denver Symphony and other orchestras, and she has acted extensively in summer stock and dinner theatre.

*Appearing through the courtesy of Actors' Equity Association.

ASSESSMENTS OF BR

(15) A Jesuit on BR. We don't normally come across writings by professors at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, and we can't say we seek them out -- it's a bias we have -- so we are especially indebted to JOSEPH WILKINSON for suggesting that we see what Frederick Copleston, S.J. had to say about BR.



A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME VIII
BENTHAM TO RUSSELL

BY
FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J.
Professor at the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome and at Heythrop College

THE NEWMAN PRESS
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1966

The title page (size reduced)

Here is a large sampling, from the 3rd of 3 chapters on BR, dealing with BR's ethical views (pp. 471-477):

CHAPTER XXI

BERTRAND RUSSELL (3)

Introductory remarks—Russell's earlier moral philosophy and the influence of Moore—Instinct, mind and spirit—The relation of the judgment of value to desire—Social science and power—Russell's attitude towards religion—The nature of philosophy as conceived by Russell—Some brief critical comments.

1. WE have been concerned so far with the more abstract aspects of Russell's philosophy. But we noted that his first book was on *German Social Democracy* (1896). And concomitantly with or in the intervals between his publications on mathematics, logic, the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of science and so on he has produced a spate of books and articles on ethical, social and political topics. At the 1948 International Philosophical Congress at Amsterdam a Communist professor from Prague took it upon himself to refer to Russell as an example of an ivory-tower philosopher. But whatever one's estimate may be of Russell's ideas in this or that field of inquiry and reflection, this particular judgment was patently absurd. For Russell has not only written on matters of practical concern but also actively campaigned in favour of his ideas. His imprisonment towards the close of the First World War has already been mentioned. During the Second World War he found himself in sympathy with the struggle against the Nazis, and after the war, when the Communists were staging take-overs in a number of countries, he vehemently criticized some of the more unpleasant aspects of Communist policy and conduct. In other words, his utterances were for once in tune with the official attitude in his own country. And in 1949 he received the Order of Merit from King George VI.[1] In more recent years he has not only campaigned for the introduction of a system of world-government but also sponsored the movement for nuclear disarmament. In fact[2] he carried his sponsorship to the extent of taking a personal part in the movement of civil disobedience. And as he refused to pay the imposed fine, this activity earned him a week or so in gaol.[2] Thus even at a very advanced age Russell has continued to battle on behalf of the welfare of humanity, as he sees it. And the charge of 'ivory-tower philosopher' is obviously singularly inappropriate.

[1] I do not mean to imply, of course, that this high honour was not a tribute to Russell's eminence as a philosopher.

[2] The short period was passed in the prison infirmary, it is only fair to add, not in the usual conditions of prison life.

In the following section, however, we shall be concerned with the more theoretical aspects of Russell's ethical and political thought. To the general public he is, of course, best known for his writing on concrete issues. But it would be out of place in a history of philosophy to discuss Russell's opinions about, say, sex[1] or nuclear disarmament, especially as he himself does not regard discussion of such concrete issues as pertaining to philosophy in a strict sense.

2. The first chapter in *Philosophical Essays* (1910) is entitled 'The Elements of Ethics' and represents a conflation of an article on determinism and morals which appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* in 1908 and of two articles on ethics which appeared in 1910 in the February and May issues of the *New Quarterly*. At this period Russell maintained that ethics aims at discovering true propositions about virtuous and vicious conduct, and that it is a science. If we ask why we ought to perform certain actions, we eventually arrive at basic propositions which cannot themselves be proved. But this is not a feature peculiar to ethics, and it does not weaken its claim to be a science.

Now, if we ask for reasons why we ought to perform certain actions and not to perform others, the answer generally refers to

consequences. And if we assume that an action is right because it produces good consequences or leads to the attainment of a good, it is clear that some things at any rate must be good in themselves. Not all things can be good. If they were, we could not distinguish between right and wrong actions. And some things may be considered good as means to something else. But we cannot do without the concept of things which are intrinsically good, possessing the property of goodness 'quite independently of our opinion on the subject, or of our wishes or other people's'.[2] True, people often have different opinions about what is good. And it may be difficult to decide between these opinions. But it does not follow from this that there is nothing which *is* good. Indeed, '*good* and *bad* are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as *round* and *square* do'.[1]

[1] We may remark in passing that in 1940 Russell's appointment to the College of the City of New York was cancelled because of his views on marriage and sexual conduct. True, he was given a chair at the Barnes Foundation, Philadelphia, but this appointment lasted only until 1943. The New York episode led to a good deal of acrid controversy, on which the present writer does not feel called upon to pass any comment.
[2] *Philosophical Essays*, p. 10.

Though goodness is an objective property of certain things, it is indefinable. It cannot therefore be identified with, say, the pleasant. That which gives pleasure may be good. But, if it is, this is because it possesses, over and above pleasantness, the indefinable quality of goodness. 'Good' no more means 'pleasant' than it means 'existent'.

Now if we assume that goodness is an intrinsic, indefinable property of certain things, it can be perceived only immediately. And the judgment in which this perception is expressed will be insusceptible of proof. The question arises, therefore, whether differences between such judgments do not weaken or even entirely undermine the thesis that there can be knowledge of what is good. Russell obviously does not deny that there have been and are different judgments about what things are good and bad. At the same time such differences, in his opinion, are neither so great nor so widespread as to compel us to relinquish the idea of moral knowledge. In fact, genuine differences between the judgments of different people in regard to intrinsic goodness and badness 'are, I believe, very rare indeed'.[2] Where they exist, the only remedy is to take a closer look.

In Russell's view genuine differences of opinion arise not so much in regard to intrinsic goodness and badness as in regard to the rightness and wrongness of actions. For an action is objectively right 'when, of all that are possible, it is the one which will probably have the best results'.[3] And it is obvious that people may come to different conclusions about means, even when they are in agreement about ends. In these circumstances the moral agent will act in accordance with the judgment at which he arrives after the amount of reflection which is appropriate in the given case.

The thesis that goodness is an intrinsic, indefinable property of certain things, together with the subordination of the concepts of right and obligation to the concept of the good, obviously show the influence of Russell's friend, G. E. Moore. And this influence persists, to some extent at least, in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916). Russell is here mainly concerned with social and political themes; and he tells us that he did not write the book in his capacity as a philosopher. But when he says that 'I consider the best life that which is most built on creative impulses'[1] and explains that what he means by creative impulses are those which aim at bringing into existence good or valuable things such as knowledge, art and goodwill, his point of view is certainly in harmony with that of Moore.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 11. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 53. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

3. At the same time, though there is certainly no explicit recantation in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* of the views which Russell took over from Moore, we can perhaps see in certain aspects of what he says the manifestation of a tendency to make good and bad relative to desire. In any case there is a marked tendency to interpret morality in the light of anthropology, of a certain doctrine about human nature. I do not mean to imply that this is necessarily a bad thing. I mean rather that Russell is moving away from a purely Moorean point of view in ethics.

'All human activity', Russell agrees, 'springs from two sources: impulse and desire.'[1] As he goes on to say that the suppression of impulse by purposes, desires and will means the suppression of vitality, one's natural tendency is to think that he is talking about conscious desire. But the desire which lies at the basis of human activity is presumably in the first instance unconscious desire. And in *The Analysis of Mind* Russell insists, under the influence of psycho-analytic theory, that 'all primitive desire is unconscious'.[2]

The expression of natural impulse is in itself a good thing because men possess 'a central principle of growth, an instinctive urgency leading them in a certain direction, as trees seek the light'.[4] But this approval of natural impulse, which sometimes puts us in mind of Rousseau, stands in need of qualification. If we follow natural impulse alone, we remain in bondage to it, and we cannot control our environment in a constructive manner. It is mind, impersonal objective thought, which exercises a critical function in regard to impulse and instinct and enables us to decide what impulses need to be suppressed or diverted because they conflict with other impulses or because the environment makes it impossible or undesirable to satisfy them. It is also mind which enables us to control our environment to a certain extent in a constructive manner. So while he insists on the principles of 'vitality', Russell does not give a blanket approval to impulse.

We have seen that Russell attributes human activities to two sources, impulse and desire. Later on he attributes it to 'instinct, mind and spirit'.[1] Instinct is the source of vitality, while mind exercises a critical function in regard to instinct. Spirit is the principle of impersonal feelings and enables us to transcend the search for purely personal satisfaction by feeling the same interest in other people's joys and sorrows as in our own, by caring about the happiness of the human race as a whole and by serving ends which are in some sense supra-human, such as truth or beauty or, in the case of religious people, God.

[1] *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 5.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 12. [3] P. 76.
[4] *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 24.

Perhaps we can adopt the suggestion of Professor J. Buchler[2] that for Russell impulse and desire are the basic modes of initial stimulus, while instinct, mind and spirit are the categories under which human activities as we know them can be classified. In any case Russell obviously has in mind a progressive integration of desires and impulses under the control of mind, both in the individual and in society. At the same time he insists on the function of spirit, considered as the capacity for impersonal feeling. For 'if life is to be fully human it must serve some end which seems, in some sense, outside human life'.[3]

4. Even if in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* Russell retained, though with some misgiving, the Moorean idea that we can have intuitive knowledge of intrinsic goodness and badness, he did not retain the idea very long. For example, after having remarked in a popular essay, *What I Believe* (1925), that the good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge, he explains that he is not referring to ethical knowledge. For 'I do not think there is, strictly speaking, such a thing as ethical knowledge'.[4] Ethics is distinguished from science by desire rather than by any special form of knowledge. 'Certain ends are desired, and right conduct is what conduces to them.'[5] Similarly, in *An Outline of Philosophy* (1927) Russell explicitly says that he has abandoned Moore's theory of goodness as an indefinable intrinsic quality, and he refers to the influence on his mind in this respect of Santayana's *Winds of Doctrine* (1926). He now holds that good and bad are 'derivative from desire'.[6] Language is, of course, a social phenomenon, and, generally speaking, we learn to apply the word 'good' to the things desired by the social group to which we belong. But 'primarily, we call something "good" when we desire it, and "bad" when we have an aversion from it'.[7]

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 205.
[2] In *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, edited by P. A. Schilpp, p. 524.
[3] *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 245. [4] P. 37. [5] P. 40.
[6] *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 238. [7] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

To say nothing more than this, however, would be to give an over-simplified account of Russell's ethical position. In the first place the utilitarian element in his earlier ethical ideas, an element common to him and to Moore, has remained unchanged. That is to say, he has continued to regard as right those actions which produce good consequences and as wrong those actions which produce bad consequences. And in this restricted field knowledge is possible. For example, if two men agree that a certain end X is desirable and so good, they can perfectly well argue about which possible action or series of actions is most likely to attain this end. And in principle they can come to an agreed conclusion representing probable knowledge.[1] But though the

context would be ethical, the knowledge attained would not be in any way specifically different from knowledge of the appropriate means for attaining a certain end in a non-ethical context. In other words it would not be a case of a peculiar kind of knowledge called 'ethical' or 'moral'.

When we turn, however, from an examination of the appropriate means for attaining a certain end to value-judgments about ends themselves, the situation is different. We have seen that Russell once maintained that differences of opinion about values are not so great as to make it unreasonable to hold that we can and do have immediate knowledge of intrinsic goodness and badness, ethical intuition in other words. But he abandoned this view and came to the conclusion that a difference of opinion about values is basically 'one of tastes, not one as to any objective truth'.[2] If, for instance, a man tells me that cruelty is a good thing,[3] I can, of course, agree with him in the sense of pointing out the practical consequences of such a judgment. But if he still stands by his judgment, even when he realizes what it 'means', I can give him no theoretical proof that cruelty is wrong. Any 'argument' that I may employ is really a persuasive device designed to change the man's desires. And if it is unsuccessful there is no more to be said. Obviously, if someone professes to deduce a certain value-judgment from other value-judgments and one thinks that the alleged deduction is logically erroneous, one can point this out. And if a man meant by '*X* is good' no more than that *X* has certain empirical consequences, we could argue about whether *X* does or does not tend in practice to produce these effects. For this would be a purely empirical matter. But the man would not be likely to say, even in this case, '*X* is good' unless he approved of the consequences; and his approval would express a desire or taste. In the long run, therefore, we ultimately reach a point where theoretical proof and disproof no longer have a role to play.

[1] It would not be certain or demonstrative knowledge. But neither is scientific knowledge certain knowledge.
[2] *Religion and Science* (1935), p. 238.
[3] The statement 'I think that cruelty is good' or 'I approve of cruelty' would be an ordinary empirical statement, relating to a psychological fact. 'Cruelty is good', however, is a value-judgment.

The matter can be clarified in this way. Russell may have sometimes expressed himself in such a way as to imply that in his opinion judgments of value are a matter of purely personal taste, without involving other people in any way. But this is certainly not his considered opinion. In his view judgments of value are really in the optative mood. To say '*X* is good' is to say 'would that everyone desired *X*', and to say '*y* is bad' is to say 'would that everyone felt an aversion from *y*'.[1] And if this analysis is accepted, it is obvious that 'cruelty is bad', when taken as meaning 'would that everyone had an aversion from cruelty', is no more describable as true or false than 'would that everyone appreciated good claret'. Hence there can be no question of proving that the judgment 'cruelty is bad' is true or false.

Obviously, Russell is perfectly aware that there is a sense in which it is true to say that it does not matter much if a man appreciates good wine or not, whereas it may matter very much whether people approve of cruelty or not. But he would regard these practical considerations as irrelevant to the purely philosophical question of the correct analysis of the value-judgment. If I say 'cruelty is bad', I shall obviously do anything which lies in my power to see that education, for example, is not so conducted as to encourage the belief that cruelty is admirable. But if I accept Russell's analysis of the value-judgment, I must admit that my own evaluation of cruelty is not theoretically provable.

Now, Russell has sometimes been criticized for giving vehement expression to his own moral convictions, as though this were inconsistent with his analysis of the value-judgment. But he can make, and has made, the obvious retort that as in his opinion judgments of value express desires, and as he himself has strong desires, there is no inconsistency in giving them vehement expression. And this reply seems to be quite valid, as far as it goes.

[1] In his *Replies to Criticism* Russell says: 'I do not think that an ethical judgment *merely* expresses a desire; I agree with Kant that it must have an element of universality'. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, edited by P. A. Schilpp, p. 722.

This is the final paragraph (p.494). Note how, in the last 2 sentences, Copleston's feelings as a Catholic collide — if that's the word — with his feelings as an Englishman.

> It is thus difficult to classify Russell in an unambiguous manner, for example as an 'empiricist' or as a 'scientific humanist'. But why should we wish to do so? After all, he is Bertrand Russell, a distinct individual and not simply a member of a class. And if in his old age he has become, as it were, a national institution, this is due not simply to his philosophical writing but also to his complex and forceful personality, aristocrat, philosopher, democrat and campaigner for causes in one. It is indeed natural that those of us who hold firm beliefs which are very different from his and which he has attacked, should deplore certain aspects of his influence. But this should not blind one to the fact that Russell is one of the most remarkable Englishmen of the century.

Clark mentions "...the mutual respect felt by the two men, exemplified by Copleston's summary of Russell in his History of Philosophy and by Russell's observation that 'one can criticize Copleston for having become a Jesuit, but not for the detailed consequences of being one.'" The Life of Bertrand Russell by Ronald W. Clark (New York: Knopf, 1976, p. 497)

Here are the first 2 paragraphs of the Epilogue (p. 497):

WE have seen that though Bertrand Russell has often expressed very sceptical views about the philosopher's ability to provide us with definite knowledge about the world and though he has certainly little sympathy with any philosopher who claims that his particular system represents final and definitive truth, he has always looked on philosophy as motivated by the desire to understand the world and man's relation to it. Even if in practice philosophy can provide only 'a way of looking at the results of empirical inquiry, a frame-work, as it were, to gather the findings of science into some sort of order',[1] this idea, as put forward by Russell, presupposes that science has given us new ways of seeing the world, new concepts which the philosopher has to take as a point of departure. The scope of his achievement may be limited, but it is the world with which he is ultimately concerned.

In an important sense G. E. Moore was much closer to being a revolutionary. He did not indeed lay down any restrictive dogmas about the nature and scope of philosophy. But, as we have seen, he devoted himself in practice exclusively to analysis as he understood it. And the effect of his example was to encourage the belief that philosophy is primarily concerned with analysis of meaning, that is, with language. True, Russell developed logical analysis and was often concerned with language; but he was concerned with much else besides. Both men, of course, directed attention, in their different ways, to analysis. But it was Moore rather than Russell who seems to us, on looking back, to be the herald, by force of example rather than by explicit theory, of the view that the primary task of the philosopher is the analysis of ordinary language.

[1] *Wisdom of the West*, p. 311.

RELIGION

(16) Creationists certified as biology teachers. From The Washington Post (4/9/82, p. B1):

Virginia Approves Biology Program At Falwell College

By Michael Isikoff
Washington Post Staff Writer

RICHMOND, April 7—A Christian college headed by the Rev. Jerry Falwell won approval today from a state education committee to have graduates of its biology program, who are taught "the scientific basis for biblical creationism," certified as teachers in Virginia public schools.

If the state Board of Education upholds the decision this summer, it apparently would be the first time Virginia has granted teaching accreditation to a fundamentalist school that includes creationist theory in its curriculum, according to several state educators.

Spokesmen for the Falwell school, Liberty Baptist College in Lynchburg, which has been seeking accreditation for the last three years, immediately hailed the advisory panel's 8-to-1 vote as a major victory for the "academic freedom" of like-minded Christian colleges to teach alternatives to the standard Darwinian theory of man's evolution.

But a biology professor who served on the panel and opposed the recommendation termed it an endorsement of "intellectual garbage."

"This is exactly what I expected given the political climate of the state and the power and prestige of the television gospel," said Dr. William Jones, professor of biology at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, the panel's lone dissenter. "It's giving them [Liberty Baptist] legitimacy to do a lot of things. Their students now have access to the classrooms where they can use the pulpit of the biology lecturn to preach creationist theory."

Other state educators, however, said the ramifications of the approval would not be extensive, because it is not teachers but local school boards that determine what is taught in public schools.

"This is not going to allow their teachers to go into the classrooms with a Bible under their belt," said Roger S. Schrock, state coordinator of the teacher certification program.

The dispute over Liberty Baptist's biology program turned a normally routine procedure for teacher certification into an emotionally charged debate that touched on the fundamental question about the origin of life. Sitting at a conference table cluttered with biology, zoology and other science textbooks, Jones argued there was no scientific basis to the "biblical theology" that man was created through divine intervention.

"Who knows how long these [biblical] stories went around the campfires of the nomadic?" he asked. If Liberty Baptist students are to be certified to teach in the public schools, he said, then the public "has a right to expect that we do not deal in voodoo."

Jones was repeatedly challenged by Terry Weaver, 36, a self-described "divine creationist" and chairman of the Liberty Baptist biology department. Weaver said he holds a doctorate in microbiology from Ohio State University. "In science we deal with that which is observable and testable," he said. "But nobody has ever demonstrated that something nonliving became living. That's not science, that's dogma."

The immediate issue was whether Liberty Baptist, a school of about 3,000 students founded by Falwell in 1971, would have its curriculum approved under a state program that would make its graduates automatically eligible for certification in Virginia secondary schools. Approval also would qualify Liberty Baptist graduates to teach in about 35 other states.

To win certification, a school's program must be evaluated by an advisory "visiting committee" of teachers and college professors to determine whether it meets state educational standards.

After the committee inspected Liberty Baptist last fall, it voted to endorse the school's curriculum in seven subjects. It held up approval of its biology program, in part because of statements in the school's catalogue by Falwell, the school's chancellor.

"Liberty Baptist College is a miracle school," Falwell wrote. "Our prayer is that God will help us equip young people who with strength of character and commitment to the absolute truths of the Word of God will go out to shake this world for God."

The catalogue lists five objectives for its natural science and mathematics programs. One is "to give the student a greater appreciation of the omnipotence and omniscience of God through a study of His creation." Another is "to show the scientific basis for biblical creationism."

Critics questioned how such objectives could be reconciled with state instruction requirements in biology, earth science and general science. Weaver said that while instructing its students in creationism, Liberty Baptist also taught standard evolutionary biology. "We are going to give both sides of this important question on the origin of life an equal hearing," he said.

Because Liberty Baptist teaches evolutionary biology, the committee decided to approve the program. Weaver called the decision "a victory for everyone who wants to keep universities as an open forum for debate .... It protects the right of everyone to present an opinion that may or may not agree with that of the state."

NEWS ABOUT MEMBERS

(17) Len Cleavelin, who has been studying law at the University of Chicago, will be married on July 31st — a few days after he takes his bar exams. The lady is Judith Anne Givideh, also from the University of Chicago, with a B.A. in Human Behavior and Institutions. Len has a commission in the U. S. Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps. In December the couple will move to California; Len will report to the Naval Legal Service Branch Office in Long Beach. The wedding takes place at 7 P.M. in the Joseph Bond Chapel on the University of Chicago campus. Judith is not only joining Len in holy wedlock; she is also joining the BRS, we are very pleased to report.

(18) Francisco Giron B. is a Salvadorean, currently in Germany, enrolled at Hamburg University. 30 years of age, he is a person of considerable culture and many interests. He writes:

* I am quite concerned about the war in my country. I am interested in corresponding with other members of the Society to get opinions on the situation in El Salvador (Nicaragua)...and in particular, to get answers to the following questions: a) What do you think is happening in El Salvador? b) What causes the war? c) What are possible solutions to the conflict? d) What should a Salvadorean do to help solve the problem?

I ask this in the spirit of Bertrand Russell, of avoiding unnecessary human suffering.

His address: Preystr. 20/2000 Hamburg 60/West Germany.

(19) Joseph Nechvatal's 8' x 10' Mural With Sound Track, "The End of the World", was presented at Empire Salon/2nd Story Books (527 N. Charles St., Baltimore) by Desire Productions/Balti Media, March 5th through March 19th.

(20) Herb & Betty Vogt: "Off to Near East (Holy Land), Cairo and Athens in May. 84th Infantry Division in Hot Springs in August. (Herb is a U.S. Army Major, retired.) Vogt family reunion in New London, Connecticut; Arno is the oldest of 50 of us. We may just make it to Scripps." We hope they do.

NEW MEMBERS

(21) We warmly welcome these new members:

ARTHUR L. DE MUNITIZ/4121 Wilshire Blvd. (506)/Los Angeles, CA 90010
BINDU T. DESAI,M.D./221 South Oak Park Av./Oak Park, IL 60302
WAYNE K. FRANK/1455 Maple Drive/Pittsburgh, PA 15227
JAMES A. HALSTED, M.D./34 Spring St./Amherst, MA 01002
ANN JEPSON/167 Mimosa Drive/Dayton, OH 45459

JON LEIZMAN/St. John's College/Annapolis, MD 21404
SCOTT MILLER/140 Ocean Parkway (5B)/Brooklyn, NY 11218
RICHARD W. PYLE/475 Sherwood Drive (305)/Sausalito, CA 94965
NATHAN U. SALMON/Dept. of Philosophy/University of California/Riverside, CA 92521
DAVID SHULMAN/7 Arnold Av./Somerville, MA 02143

VAUGHN C. & DOLORES J. STERLING/15615 Hilliard Road/Lakewood, OH 44107
JOYCE R. STRASSBERG/664 Radcliffe Av./Pacific Palisades, CA 90272
PROF. ROLAND N. STROMBERG/7033 Fairchild Circle/Fox Point, WI 53217
ROY L. TWIDDY/PO Box 138/Coinjock,NC 27923
NORMAN VEVE/G.P.O. Box G-1960/San Juan, PR 00936

MARK WEBER/229 Pueblo Drive/Salinas, CA 93906
HOBART F. WRIGHT/Route 2, Box 38/Rural Retreat, VA 24368

NEW ADDRESSES & OTHER CHANGES

(22) When something is underlined, only the underlined part is new (or corrected).

DEBRA ALMROTH/2803 SE Clinton/Portland, OR 97202
MICHAEL BALYEAT/2321 Dwight Way (102)/Berkeley, CA 94705
ADAM PAUL BANNER/Baddat Caddesi no 64/Maltepe-Kartal, Istanbul/Turkey
THOMAS BARKER/Peace Corps/Box 1412/Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
MARY JO BLASCOVICH/86 Spencer Av./Lancaster, PA 17603

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JOHN J. DE MOTT/9614 Orizaba Av./Downey, CA 90240
FRANCISCO GIRON B./Preystr. 20/2000 Hamburg 60/West Germany
RANDY GLEASON/Route #1/Utica, IL 61373
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CONNIE HOBBS-SUNDAY/446 E. Pastime (25)/Tucson, AZ 85705
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DONALD E. M. HYLTON/9602 Mines Av./Pico Rivera, CA 90660
IRENE S. KAUFMAN/3724 29th Av. W./Seattle, WA 98199

KENNETH J. MYLOTT/1832 Jackson Bluff Rd. (B-5)/Tallahassee, FL 32304
STANLEY R. ORDO, awaiting information
FREDERIKA B. PHILLIPS/2712 Ordway St. NW (1)/Washington, DC 20008
CONRAD RUSSELL/History Dept./Yale University/New Haven, CT 06520
GREGORY J. SCAMMELL/Colonial Crest/Markland Road/Lafayette, NY 13084

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BOOK REVIEWS

(23) The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interaction by Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles (Springer International, 597 pp.) as reviewed in The New York Review of Books (11/8/79):

Does Mind Matter?

The Self and Its Brain:
An Argument for Interactionism
by Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles.
Springer International, 597 pp., $17.90

P.B. Medawar

"What is mind?"—no matter
"What is matter?"—never mind

(from *Punch* magazine, 1885)

That thinking is something which goes on in the brain is a proposition to which we all assent unless we are being deliberately "difficult" about so commonplace a belief. Yet the evidence that it does so is very circumstantial and indirect, and some philosophers have expressed doubts about the matter. Mind, they have argued, is not a "thing" for which a place can be allocated. But from a commonsensical point of view the evidence that makes us think of the brain as the seat of thinking and as the fountain of voluntary action is too persuasive to be dismissed.

The book that prompts these reflections gives us an opportunity to eavesdrop upon an extended dialogue between Karl Popper, whom many regard as the world's foremost living philosopher, and John Eccles, the Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist. Between them they try to clarify a problem that neither thinks is likely to be wholly solved: the problem of the relationship between mind and the various physical performances of the nervous system.

It is a problem upon which two extreme views have been held: at one extreme, that Mind is a thing apart which cannot be said to be in any way embodied—for mind belongs to a quite different "semantic category" from nerve impulses and the like. At the other extreme is the uncompromising materialism that is embodied in Charles Darwin's question: "Why is thought being a secretion of brain more wonderful than gravity a property of matter?"[1] Without going to the other extreme, as Darwin did, I feel confident that the dismissive "category" argument is principally a defense by orthodox philosophers against what they have interpreted as another attempted usurpation of their subject matter by those pesky scientists. It is a poor argument anyway: heredity and high molecular weight polymers also belong to different semantic categories; nevertheless genetic memory is physically embodied in the order of the nucleotides which, strung together, form the giant polymer deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). I shall try now to explain the notion of a semantic category.

Consider a sentence such as "the cat sat on the mat" and imagine a blank, to be filled in arbitrarily, in place of the word "cat." Clearly we could substitute the word "dog," "mouse," or—meaningfully, though implausibly and perhaps mistakenly—"elephant." On the other hand we could not substitute "foreign exchange deficit," which would not be just erroneous or unlikely, but downright meaningless because it belongs to a different semantic category. Some philosophers, led by Gilbert Ryle, take the view that thinking, willing, and other such acts of mind belong to a different semantic category from nerve impulses and other traffic of the brain. To attribute an act of mind to something that goes on in the brain—or to say that a state of mind has no physical effects on the brain—is thus a category blunder as elementary as to say that "the case for proportional representation sat on the mat."

After the publication of Gilbert Ryle's *Concept of Mind* mention of categories and "category mistakes" became painfully common. I don't think, though, that many who used the term really understood what a "semantic category mistake" was or that they would have been able to give tongue to whatever vague conception of it they may have had. Probably they took Ryle on trust, though to be sure the "category mistakes" to which Ryle refers are in reality simply mistakes—quite straightforward and easily understandable mistakes, too, such as anyone might make.

One example of what Ryle calls a category mistake comes to mind: he envisages a foreigner in Oxford who is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, and administrative offices, and then asks where the university is—thus making the elementary category blunder of confusing an abstract pedagogic entity, the university, with a piece of ground occupied by bricks and mortar. But this is not a semantic category mistake—it is simply a mistake—one that might easily be made by Americans used to the idea that universities are real material objects situated on a campus—as many American universities at least as good as Oxford are. Popper has criticized Ryle's argument in detail elsewhere than in this volume[2] and I agree that there is nothing in the concept of semantic category mistakes which prohibits our thinking that states or acts of mind can exercise physical effects.

Although Popper's and Eccles's opinions differ in several important ways—Eccles believes in God and the supernatural but Popper does not—they share much common ground. Both feel that the materialist "debunking" of man has gone far enough, and neither goes along with "the current intellectual fashions that belittle science and the other great human achievements."

It is characteristic of Popper's style of thinking that in repudiating materialism he should acknowledge the great inspiration it has been to science and point out that the leading materialist philosophers "from Democritus and Lucretius to Herbert Feigl and Anthony Quinton" were often great humanists and fighters for freedom and enlightenment. He points out, however, that even at a physical level the "essentialist" theory of matter—that matter is neither capable of further explanation nor in need of it—has been superseded in recent years by *explanatory* theories of matter. Modern physics, Popper declares, undermines the essentialist theory of matter: "there is no essence which is the persisting carrier or possessor of the properties or qualities of a thing." Now that the universe has come to be thought of as a theater of interacting events or processes, "the physical theory of matter may be said to be no longer materialist." La Mettrie's notion of man as a machine has in recent years undergone a similar transformation: biological materialism transcended itself with the recognition that evolutionary changes of matter have taken such a turn as to lead to self-awareness and purposive behavior.

The notions of emergence and of creativity play an important part in Popper's thinking. A clue to understanding Popper's use of these ideas is that he regards man as part of the universe. Man is creative, *ergo* the universe is creative. Popper reasons:

> With the emergence of man, the creativity of the universe has, I think, become obvious. For man has created a new objective world, the world of the products of the human mind, a world of myths, of fairy tales and scientific theories, of poetry and art and music.

Popper, who argued the case for the objective existence of this world in his *Objective Knowledge* (1972), calls this "World 3," in contradistinction to the physical World 1 and the subjective or psychological World 2 (see below).

> The existence of the great and unquestionably creative works of art and of science shows the creativity of man, and with it of the universe that has created man.

Popper's principal argument—in my opinion completely convincing—turns upon his acceptance of the notion of "emergence." Let us follow Popper in schematizing the hierarchy of what the natural world is made of in the form of a table starting at the top with, say, political and ecosystems and ending at the bottom with subatomic particles, or whatever the lowest analytical level may be.

(12) Level of ecosystems
(11) Level of populations of many-celled animals
(10) Level of metazoa and multicellular plants
(9) Level of tissues and organs (and of sponges?)
(8) Level of populations of unicellular organisms
(7) Level of cells and of unicellular organisms
(6) Level of organelles (and perhaps of viruses)
(5) Liquids and solids (crystals)
(4) Molecules
(3) Atoms
(2) Elementary particles
(1) Sub-elementary particles
(0) Unknown: sub-sub-elementary particles?

We can see by inspection that there is a progressive enrichment of empirical content at each level as we go from bottom to top; we can see also that new properties and characteristics "emerge" as we ascend: sexuality and fear for example emerge at a biological level. Moreover every statement that is true and meaningful at one level is also true at every level above it: it is a truth of politics no less than of chemistry that $NaOH + HCl = NaCl + H_2O$.

"Reductionism" is the ambition, valid as a research program, to interpret higher levels in terms of lower levels—to interpret sociology in the language and with the concepts that apply to the behavior of individuals, to interpret biology according to the laws of chemistry, and chemistry according to the laws of physics. Reductionism has been a highly successful research stratagem: it is the way of interpreting the world that makes it easiest to see how, if need be, the world might be changed. On the other hand, the ambition it embodies may be impossible to fulfill: thus it is merely silly to say that political concepts such as proportional representation or the "foreign exchange deficit" can be "interpreted in terms of" physics and chemistry. But it should be possible to say this if the axiom of reducibility were unconditionally true, because the phrase "interpretable in terms of..." indicates a transitive relationship—i.e., if A can be interpreted in terms of B and B in terms of C then A can be interpreted in terms of C.

In the light of these concepts Popper thinks the most reasonable view of consciousness is that it is an emergent property which has arisen under selective pressures and is not therefore the result of an intervention by any psychic force or other supernatural agency.

In his discussion of objections to this theory of emergence it seems to me that Popper (though he mentions it) might have elaborated upon F.A. von Hayek's point that our knowledge of the working of the brain must always be incomplete because brain function is both the subject of the investigation and the means by which it is investigated. In much the same way and for somewhat similar reasons a painter can never com-

[1] Quotation from Stephen J. Gould's admirable essays *Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History* (Norton, 1977)

[2] See *Conjectures and Refutations* (Basic Books, 1963), Chapter 13.

plete a painting which includes the painter himself painting the picture *and* the canvas upon which he is working. Popper uses this example to illustrate the cognate limitation that is embodied in Goedel's Theorem, which applies for example to the attempt to demonstrate by deduction that a vast deductive system such as that of *Principia Mathematica* (which Joergen Joergensen described as a "deductive theory of deduction") is free from self-contradictions. To describe a system fully we must be able to stand outside it: it is hopeless if we are part of it ourselves.

Popper is well known to believe in the "real" existence of a world—which he calls World 2—of states of mind such as awareness, consciousness, anxiety, embarrassment, etc. Popper is an interactionist moreover: he believes that World 2 interacts with the ordinary world of physical objects and events, called World 1. My own favorite illustration of the truth that World 2 and World 1 interact is blushing, a state of affairs in which a mental state—embarrassment—brings about the closure of arteriovenous anastomoses of the skin of the face, thus flooding the capillaries with blood: the existence of this interaction is not a solution of the brain/mind problem so much as a challenge to seek and appraise relevant evidence, discuss alternative views, and look for causal connections.

As I have said, there is another real world too, Popper believes: the world of the products of the human mind—the world of theories, hypotheses, stories, myths, arguments, and so on. The interactionist position is clearly supported by the self-evidence of the interaction between Worlds 2 and 1; but in spite of these interactions World 1 is a closed world: physical processes can be and must be explained and understood by physical theories, whether or not these self-sufficient physical processes are in some way linked to World 2. A simple solution of the body/mind problem is that which Popper describes as "radical physicalism," according to which mental processes and states of mind do not exist: only physical states of the brain can be said to do so. The other extreme—panpsychism—contends that nothing else exists: "the stuff of the world is mind-stuff" (it was once said), of which matter is some kind of exterior manifestation. Popper finds grave objections to this view.

Eccles's section of the joint work begins by recounting the greatest triumph of the cell theory: the notion that—unlikely though it seemed at first—the nervous system has a cellular structure; and by means of clear descriptions and diagrams Eccles describes the localizations of sensory and motor functions and faculties in the brain.

Although Eccles's account of the matter has the authoritative tone and expertness to be expected in a scientist of his distinction, it is not philosophically sophisticated (there is no consideration, for example, of the Kantian coloration of much modern sensory physiology). At the same time, his opinions have a bluff straightforwardness too often shunned by the philosophers of mind:

> When thought leads to action, I am constrained, as a neuroscientist, to conjecture that in some way my thinking changes the operative patterns of neuronal activities in my brain. Thinking thus eventually comes to control the discharges of impulses from the pryamidal cells of my motor cortex...and so eventually the contractions of my muscles, and the behavioral patterns stemming therefrom.

Eccles takes the view that a certain part of the brain—e.g., the cerebellum—is responsible for the normal execution of a physiological performance which can be shown to go wrong when that part is damaged or otherwise interfered with. Geneticists take much the same view about genes: if a mutant gene is responsible for the failure to synthesize a particular enzyme such as phenylalanine hydroxylase then the normal (i.e., non-mutant) counterpart of that gene is automatically taken to be the one that is reponsible for the normal synthesis of the enzyme. These habits of thought are so deeply ingrained that any attempt to criticize their logic will probably be ignored; besides, they may be right.

The most original and illuminating part of this book is without doubt the long section occupied by the dialogue between the two authors. It is a very special pleasure to read this grave and measured discussion, each man learning from the other and both above all else anxious to get at the truth of the difficult matters they discuss. There is nothing quite like it in any other philosophic work of comparable stature.

My only criticism of the dialogue as dialogue is that the natural friendliness and good manners of the participants may have inclined both of them to declare that they are more closely in agreement with each other than they really are—particularly over the role of sensory information in our knowledge: Popper attaches more importance than Eccles does to the role of expectation, predisposition, and the interpretative element generally in the way in which we turn sensation into sense.

Both authors believe in the reality of the existence of the state of consciousness and both believe it to be an emergent property; as to whether lower animals enjoy conscious states, both agree that the existence of degrees of consciousness even in human beings is very relevant. At the same time, I was surprised by Eccles's skepticism of the tool-making capabilities of chimpanzees, the evidence for which I think convincing. Popper for his part regards tool-making as an advanced manifestation of a faculty to be found in all living organisms: "that living organisms in a sense select and fashion their own environment."

In the outcome the authors agree on the interactionist position: that acts and states of mind can exercise physical effects and that the physiological activities of the brain can affect the mind. Both believe that physiological research will progressively deepen our knowledge of this interaction, even if the problem is not likely to be completely solved.

Among the most attractive features of this book are the authors' lack of dogmatism and their determination from the beginning not to dismiss the brain/mind problem as a nonproblem or as a pseudo problem—by declaring for example that "brain" and "mind" are different categories and that never the twain shall meet. "Semantic categories" have been something of a nuisance in philosophy, because their existence—and they do exist—has more often been used to evade problems than to solve them.

The very substantial merits I have called attention to will probably be judged to outweigh the occurrence of a misprint on p. 562.

In evaluating the interactionist position we may legitimately retreat into a pragmatic stronghold: the concept works and leads to fruitful ideas and actions. Here is the part of the brain that has to do with speech; there, with sound. Stimulate the hypothalamus here there or elsewhere and the subject will feel enraged, elated, or ravenously hungry, as the case may be. There is nothing more offensive in the idea that these faculties or states of mind have a material basis than in the idea that the optic nerve has to do with sight and the auditory with sound. Such notions as these make sense of the behavioral consequences of damage to the central nervous system, and put us in the way of finding out what we can do about them.

Even if we never know exactly how brain and mind interact the interactionist position is methodologically a most fruitful one: as time goes on natural and contrived experiments will progressively enrich our understanding of the physical basis of mind—very likely in ways that will be medically useful, so that in spite of the disillusioned dialogue with which this article began it will one day certainly become true to say that what mind is *does* matter.

(24) **Ludwig Wittgenstein:Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees (Totowa, NJ:Rowman and Littlefield, 235 pp.), as reviewed in the Boston Globe (9/9/81)p. 60, by Robert Taylor of the Globe Staff:**

"I believe he considered it more important to be free of all trace of vanity than to achieve a great reputation in philosophy," a pupil of Ludwig Wittgenstein recollects. Yet this same pupil also recalls Wittgenstein citing Kierkegaard's bitter parable about the effect of his writings: "He said he felt like the theater manager who runs on the stage to warn the audience of a fire. But they take his appearance as all part of the farce they are enjoying, and the louder he shouts the more they applaud."

This tantalizing, fragmentary, uneven yet hypnotic book collects some basic reminiscences about the most significant philosopher of our century: Hermine Wittgenstein's reminiscence written in June 1944 not intended for publication but as an attempt to preserve a family record at a time when it appeared all such records would be obliterated; the memoir of Fania Pascal, close friend and Wittgenstein's Russian teacher; of the late F.R. Leavis, his colleague at Cambridge; of John King, who took lecture notes in 1931-32; above all the conversations with Wittgenstein recorded in Boswell and Johnson vein by M. O'C. Drury, a remarkable man who came up to Cambridge intending to study theology and assume holy orders, and who spent the bulk of his career as the senior psychiatrist at St. Patrick's Hospital, Dublin.

Despite the fact that he founded (inadvertently) two schools of philosophic thought, Wittgenstein eschewed the history of philosophy – he never felt obliged to read Aristotle, for instance. Instead, he grappled intractable Truth with a tenacity that recalls Socrates. Like Socrates, the man was frequently absurd, but even his ties inspired respect, for in the tradition of the stage manager of Kierkegaard's anecdote, Wittgenstein sought to wake people up, to make them aware of the implications of language, of consciousness and (as he does in the lucid "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus," completed in a prisoner of war camp in World War I), of using the mind to transcend its own limitations.

Intriguing in this volume is the multiplicity of its viewpoints. Wittgenstein's sister is practical and down to earth, but no more so than Ludwig, whose passion for precise measurements was such that he decided to have a ceiling of a room raised three centimeters in order to conform to the plans of a house he designed, and which still stands in Vienna. Leavis views Wittgenstein as a colleague and continually apologizes for his own philosophic background; Drury's relations are those of a disciple until a sudden, unexpected shift reverses roles.

Are so many different views astonishing? Before becoming a philosopher, Wittgenstein was a mathematician, a musician (he carried a clarinet wrapped in an old sock), a mechanical engineer, a soldier, a grade school teacher, an architect, a sculptor, an aeronautical designer. Though he never graduated from college, he received a professorship at Cambridge, and he gave up that post in order to become a hospital porter. At Cambridge with its reverence for sartorial forms, Wittgenstein usually went tieless, wore a zippered suede jacket and scuffed brown shoes. Yet Leavis saw him as "a center of life, sentience and human responsibility," immensely superior to the blandly supercilious Bertrand Russell.

In these memories one finds startling trivia about Wittgenstein such as his addiction to the

American catchphrase, "let's case the joint," his admiration for Astaire and Rogers, his preference for Tristram Shandy as a comic novel over the vastly unfunny Don Quixote. But, more incisively, there are relevant insights, too. "Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different." Wittgenstein throughout exerts the magnetic spell of personality as engrossing as Samuel Johnson's.

(Thank you, GRAHAM ENTWISTLE)

BRS LIBRARY

(25) **Books for sale.**

---The following titles can be ordered from the BRS Library at the discounted prices shown.
---This list and prices are current as of May 1, 1982 and supersede previous lists and prices. From time to time market changes require title deletions, allow for title additions, and force price increases. But the discounts given provide considerable savings, especially for certain titles which are often difficult to locate.
---Prices include postage and other shipping costs.
---"H" indicates a hardbound edition. No notation indicates a paperbound edition.
---Prices shown are in U.S. funds. Please remit by check or money order, payable to The Bertrand Russell Society, in U.S. funds or the equivalent.
---Your order will be promptly filled, although occasionally an out of stock item may cause a brief shipment delay.
---Send orders to Jack Ragsdale; 4461 23rd St.; San Francisco, CA 94114; USA

By Bertrand Russell

AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL	$ 3.75
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BR (in one volume)	7.50
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BR, Volume I	16.00 H
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BR, Volume II	13.00 H
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BR, Volume III	11.00 H
EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER	4.25
GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY	9.00 H
HAS MAN A FUTURE?	8.00 H
HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN EPITOME	1.00
HUMAN SOCIETY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS	16.00 H
ICARUS OR THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE	3.00 H
THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY	2.75
IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS	2.75
AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH	16.00 H
AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH	6.00
JUSTICE IN WARTIME	8.00 H
MORTALS AND OTHERS, edited by Harry Ruja	14.00 H
MY PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT	2.75
AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY	16.00 H
POLITICAL IDEALS	3.75
THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF BOLSHEVISM	9.00 H
THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF BOLSHEVISM	3.75
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION	7.00 H
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION	3.75
THE PROSPECTS OF INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION, with Dora Russell	15.00 H
ROADS TO FREEDOM	4.00
SCEPTICAL ESSAYS	4.00
UNARMED VICTORY	11.00 H

By Other Authors

BERTRAND RUSSELL, 1872-1970	1.25
ESSAYS ON SOCIALIST HUMANISM IN HONOUR OF THE CENTENARY OF BR, edited by Ken Coates	9.00 H
ESSAYS ON SOCIALIST HUMANISM IN HONOUR OF THE CENTENARY OF BR, edited by Ken Coates	4.00
THE LIFE OF BR IN PICTURES AND HIS OWN WORDS	4.00
MR. WILSON SPEAKS 'FRANKLY AND FEARLESSLY' ON VIETNAM TO BR	1.25
NATIONAL FRONTIERS AND INTD. SCIENTIFIC CO-OP, by Z. A. Medvedev	4.00
SECRECY OF CORRESPONDENCE IS GUARANTEED BY LAW, by Z. A. Medvedev	3.50
THE TAMARISK TREE, MY SEARCH FOR LIBERTY AND LOVE, Volume I, by Dora Russell	5.00 H

(26) "Let Me Die Before I Wake" by Derek Humphry has been donated by HUGH MC VEIGH. It is a 102-page book published by Hemlock,"a society supporting active voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill." For more about Hemlock, see (35).

FINANCES/CONTRIBUTIONS

(27) Hat in hand.We have to remind you about a very boring subject: money. Not that we enjoy boring you, but the fact is, the money we collect in dues is not (yet) sufficient to pay our expenses. In 1981 dues covered only 2/3 of our operating costs; we depend on contributions to make up the deficit. We think that when we get about 200 more members, we'll be able to stand on our own feet, economically. And that will be great! For one thing, we won't have to bore you any more with appeals for money,like this one. So please bear with us...and share with us any money you can spare. Any amount from $1 up is welcome.Send it care of the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom. Thanks!

(28) We thank these members for their contributions during the past quarter: PETER CRANFORD, BOB DAVIS, LEE EISLER, CHARLES HILL, LLOYD & OPHELIA HOOPES, DON JACKANICZ, HARRY LARSON, JOHN LENZ, STEVE REINHARDT, GREG SCAMMEL ...and (of course!) KATHY FJERMEDAL.

ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

(29) Time to nominate Directors. Directors are elected for 3-year terms. The Bylaws call for a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 24 Directors. We currently have 21. If we elect 8 this year, that will bring the total up to 24, which is desirable.

Any member may nominate any other member to be a Director-Candidate.

If you wish to be a Candidate yourself, notify the Elections Committee, and someone will probably nominate you.

The duties of a Director are not burdensome. Directors are occasionally asked their opinion about something, by mail; and they are expected to make a reasonable effort to attend annual meetings.The cost of attending meetings is tax-deductible, for Directors.

We would like to have more than 8 names on the ballot, so as to give members a choice.

A brief statement about a Candidate should accompany a nomination. If you are volunteering, include a brief statement about yourself.

The next newsletter (RSN35, August) will contain a ballot with brief statements about the candidates.

// Directors whose terms expire this year are KEN BLACKWELL, JACK COWLES, LESTER DENONN, JOE NEILANDS, STEVE REINHARDT.

* To nominate someone -- or volunteer yourself -- write the Elections Committee, care of the newsletter (address on Page 1, bottom.)

MEMBERSHIP RENEWALS

(30) Last call for '82 dues. Renewals have been sluggish -- possibly because of the new January 1st due-date, possibly because we didn't enclose a colorful reminder, possibly because money is tight.

We said that if you hadn't sent your renewal by May 1st, we would have to consider you an ex-member and not send you this issue of the newsletter.

But we've had to change our mind because of the following predicament:

A large proportion of you who have not yet renewed will renew later on, when you get around to it. But if we wait till you renew before sending you the newsletter, we have to send it first class for 54¢ or 71¢ (depending on weight), instead of at the non-profit rate of about 6¢. Since there are a lot of you who haven't yet renewed, that adds up to a lot of postage.

// We had to decide whether to send you the newsletter now and save on postage, and risk the loss if you do not renew.

Sending it is a gamble. We win if you renew. We lose if you don't.

As is obvious, we chose to send you the newsletter now. Which means we're betting on you to renew. Don't let us down.

Dues (in U.S. dollars): regular $20, couple $25, student $10. Plus $7.50 outside the USA, Canada and Mexico.

Please mail dues to: 1982, RD 1, Box 409, Coopersburg, PA 18036

Thanks!

FOR SALE

(31) Members' Stationery. 8½ x 11,white. Across the top:"The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.* Bertrand Russell." On the bottom:"*Motto of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc." $5 postpaid for 90 sheets (weighs just under a pound, travels 3rd class,) Order from the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

(32) BR postcard. 4¼ x 6.Philippe Halsman's handsome 1958 photo of BR with pipe, 50¢ each + 25¢. RSN30-44 shows it slightly reduced in size. Order from the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

For BRS Library books for sale, see (25).

ABOUT OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

(33) American Atheists hold their annual convention " each year on the weekend closest to April 13th, to commemorate the birthdays of Thomas Jefferson, founder of our Nation, and Madalyn Murray O'Hair, founder of American Atheists." This year they held it in Washington, DC, on April 9-11. Scheduled speakers included Isaac Azimov, Ralph Ginsberg, and Albert Ellis.They publish "American Atheist" magazine, subscription $25. Membership costs $40 and includes the magazine. PO Box 2117,Austin, TX 78768.

(34) Croatian National Congress has sent us 7 pages alleging Yugoslav oppression of its Croatian minority, and listing 6 documents for sale, on that subject. We will lend the 7 pages on request to the newsletter, address on Page 1, bottom.

(35) Hemlock states its aims this way:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. HEMLOCK will seek to promote a climate of public opinion which is tolerant of the right of people who are terminally ill to end their own lives in a planned manner.

2. HEMLOCK does not encourage suicide for any primary emotional, traumatic, or financial reasons in the absence of terminal illness. It approves of the work of those involved in suicide prevention.

3. The final decision to terminate life is ultimately one's own. HEMLOCK believes this action, and most of all its timing, to be an extremely personal decision, wherever possible taken in concert with family and friends.

4. HEMLOCK speaks only to those people who have mutual sympathy with its goals. Views contrary to its own which are held by other religions and philosophies are respected.

OBJECTIVES

- Continuing a dialogue to raise public consciousness of active voluntary euthanasia through the news media, public meetings, and with the medical and legal professions, and others.
- Clarifying existing laws on suicide and assisted suicide.
- Publishing informational material to help members decide the manner and means of their death. (Members of three months' standing may order **Let Me Die Before I Wake**, the only guide to self-deliverance for the dying in the USA.)
- Issuing a quarterly newsletter to members providing up-to-date information on issues of dying and death.
- Participating in the international debate through membership of the World Federation of Right To Die Societies.

Hemlock's address: PO Box 66218, Los Angeles, CA 90066

(36) Society for Humanistic Judaism was founded in Detroit in 1969 "to promote the ideas and practices of Humanistic Judaism through the publication of educational materials, the organization of new congregations, and the training of leaders." Its leader and founder is Rabbi Sherwin Wine of The Birmingham Temple,Detroit. It is holding its 12th annual meeting in Washington,DC April 30, May 1-2,on the theme,"Jewish Roots of Jewish Humanism", about which it says:"There is a long-standing secular and humanistic tradition in Jewish history which stood in opposition to the established religious hierarchy and its supernaturalist doctrines. The values of human reason, human dignity, and human power are old Jewish values. It is important for us to understand the real Jewish roots." Membership in the Society includes a subscription to its excellent quarterly journal. Humanistic Judaism, 28611 West Twelve Mile Road, Farmington Hills, MI 48018.

(37) The Voice of Reason will attempt to counter the work of the Religious Right, and seeks members. Sherwin Wine is its National Spokesman. Here is how they put their case:

Who Speaks For The *Real* America?

Groups such as the Moral Majority and Christian Voice *claim* they do. But do they?

Advocates of the new Religious Right aim to impose their beliefs on everyone. They want *their* version of religion to limit *your* personal freedom.

They have:

- forced books off the shelves.
- substituted Bible teaching for science.
- smeared Congressional opponents.

Their agenda runs from blocking abortion and ERA to restoring prayer in the schools.

Their goal: to "alter" our constitution. Their interpretation of scriptures would determine what you can read, see and do.

Preserve the American Way

Our Founding Fathers knew from experience the dangers of enforced religious morality. They built into our Bill of Rights a wall between church and state... a wall now under siege by self-styled fundamentalists who insist they know how God wants the rest of us to act.

Our nation has spread the benefits of science and technology and opened doors of opportunity through untrammeled creative intelligence. Medicine... the arts... consumer conveniences — all are the products of free minds.

Progress, not regression to Puritanism, is the American Way.

The America you and your children will live in depends on the outcome of the struggle to preserve our traditions.

The Voice of Reason
P.O. Box 16
Franklin, Mi 48025

Where Do You Stand?

Do you believe that:

- You have the right and responsibility to make your own decisions?
- Your conscience, not someone else's beliefs, should be your guide?
- Women and men should have equal rights?
- What you do with your body is your business, not the government's or the church's?

If you agree, then yours is a voice of reason— the real voice of America.

What Can We Do?

The Voice of Reason, a nonprofit organization, is committed to keeping America progressive, free and rational. By uniting, our voices gain strength.

We can:

- Monitor school boards and legislatures.
- Alert each other through a newsletter.
- Work and lobby with like-minded groups.
- Spread the word among friends and neighbors.
- Train discussion leaders.
- Provide information on issues.

We can do all this and more— with your support.

We must get our message on radio and TV and in the print media. The evangelical right is heavily financed and has tremendous exposure. (Moral Majority's Jerry Falwell operates on a $75 million budget, appears on 324 stations with 50 million viewers, and even has his own zip code.)

A little of your time and/or money will go a long way.

Join The Voice of Reason. It may be the most reasonable investment you ever made.

Let's show them who is the *real* majority.

Yes! I Want to be a Voice of Reason.

Send me your newsletter. Here's my dues.

☐ $5.00 for student. ☐ $10 individual. ☐ $15 family. ☐ $25 supporting. ☐ $50 sustaining. ☐ $100 patron. $____ benefactor.

_____ I want to help. Tell me what I can do.

_____ I will organize a chapter in my area. Please send literature and instructions.

I can contribute the following talents and abilities: _____

Name: _____ Address: _____

Phone: _____

The Voice of Reason
P.O. Box 16
Franklin, Mi 48025

REPORTS FROM OFFICERS (CONTINUED)

(38) Treasurer Dennis J. Darland reports:

For the quarter ending 3/31/82:

Balance on hand (12/31/81)			1136.77
Income: 18 new members	325.00		
36 renewals	570.00		
Total dues	895.00		
Contributions	332.50		
Sale of RSN,books,etc	92.50		
Total income	1320.00	1320.00	
			2456.77
Expenditures: Membership & Information			
Committees	249.20		
52 "Russell" subscriptions	182.00		
BRS Library	55.66		
Bank charges	14.89		
Other	25.00		
Total spent	526.75	526.75	
Balance on hand (3/31/82)			1930.02

BOOK REVIEW (CONTINUED)

(39) Reviewer Medawar. In the review of the Popper-Eccles book (23), we neglected to include the brief descriptive paragraph about the reviewer, which The New York Review of Books always provides. Here it is:

P. B. Medawar won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1960. He was formerly director of the National Institute for Medical Research and is working on cancer research for the Medical Research Council in England. He is the author of Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought, The Hope of Progress, The Life Science (with J. S. Medawar), and Advice for a Young Scientist, just published.(1979)

THINKING OUT LOUD

(40a) 3 letters to The Guardian (England), one of which is by DORA RUSSELL. She sent the 3 to Bob Davis, who sent them to us. All 3 appeared under the heading, "When Philosophers should march Left, Right into the Market Place".

(40b) Letter of January 16th 1982 from Judith Scott:

I agree with Ian Flintoff (Letters 13 January) that most people want peace, harmony, and the extermination of poverty, hunger, and violence. I also agree with his observations that our economic and political system has failed to meet these desirable goals for most people.

As the answer to this problem, Mr Flintoff prescribes radical socialism. In theory he must be right because socialist ideology is premised on such values as peace, harmony and the eradication of poverty, hunger and violence. But in practice, any political system has to be operated by human beings with some sort of administrative machinery and both these factors make the leap from theory to practice very difficult.

Of course it is unfair to judge socialism in practice by evidence of its failures but unfortunately, that is the only empirical evidence we have.

If, therefore, we wish to see a socialist Britain, it is important to analyse why attempts to implement socialism elsewhere have failed to produce democratic societies in which the desirable side of human nature and its material well-being can flourish. In this respect the question of power, both political and economic, is absolutely fundamental. The problem lies in designing a system which ensures that the power is distributed equitably.

Mr. Flintoff says that in a socialist Britain "power will be given to the population," but he fails to explain how this is to be done. (Who, for example, feels that nationalized industries give power either to those who work in them or to the population which finances them?) Mr Flintoff also argues that "the institutions

of decision and administration must obey the common will." What is the common will? Doubtless the elites of Poland or El Salvador could provide a common answer.

To raise these questions is not to deny the attractions of socialist ideology nor, remotely, to defend the iniquities of capitalism. It is merely to point out, as Bryan Magee did, that good intentions are an insufficient guarantee of arriving at the desired destination.

If Britain is to become a democratic socialist state, it can do so only if those who believe in that ideology can convince the people of this country that they will not be exchanging one form of repression for another. Given the lack of empirical evidence to support the arguments for socialism, it is vital that those who wish to see it implemented here can explain precisely how such a system would operate politically, conomically, and administratively. Until that happens, most people, I suspect, will opt, albeit passively, for the devil they know.

(40c) Letter of January 16th 1982 from James Lund:

Ian Flintoff's letter (January 13) may be seen as exemplifying the political disposition described by Bryan Magee in his account of "good intentions" which may lead the extreme Left perhaps nowhere, perhaps to tyranny in the name of democracy. It shows no awareness that the evils created by injustice may enter into and override a political attempt to redress such injustice: insecurity, fear, resentment, envy, and the simple desire for revenge may prove stronger than wishes for the equality of freedom, justice and compassion.

Yet there is more to the exchange than this. Mr. Flintoff is surely right when he points out that Bryan Magee (Guardian Agenda, January 11) goes much too far in emphasizing the "unfathomable mystery" of human being. even if Mr Magee is moved to do so by the unforeseen consequences of good-wishers in politics, uninformed by the knowledge required to transform them into the actuality of good intentions.

Bryan Magee is a philosopher as well as a politician; among other activities in philosophy he was the organiser and presenter on television of Men of Ideas. This series of introductory discussions of the work of a number of recent and contemporary philosophers provoked surprisingly widespread, valuable discussion of the influence of philosophy in the world at large. Yet, significantly in the present context, it failed to provide any focus on what the late John MacMurray described as the emergent problem in the development of philosophy in this century.

This is the question of the logical form in which we think of ourselves in philosophy. MacMurray was concerned by the inadequacy and incoherence of the ideas of man in contemporary philosophy as conceptual frameworks within which to act and reflect in the context of contemporary experience and difficulties. These are ideas of man as either a relation of two disturbances, matter and mind, which is still predominant in much Anglo-American philosophy; or as an organism, integral to the order of nature.

In his Gifford Lectures, MacMurray began the task of working out a scheme of man as primarily an agent, a beginner and knower both in action and reflection, who is also a person who appears to be and is necessarily related to other agents.

Whatever judgment comes to be agreed as to the significance of this work, there is no doubt of the contemporary importance, both in philosophy and in the world at large, of the question of individual and communal identity, which gave rise to it. Arthur Koestler once observed that man is the only form of living being whose members slaughter on another in huge numbers in consequence of their differences of belief as to what they are and the way in which they should live.

It is some years now since Men of Ideas was first shown. Is there a possiblity, either in television, or perhaps in the pages of The Guardian, for some extended popular discussion of the question of human identity and the related question of the influence of natural science on philosophy?

Mr Magee touches on this issue when he maintains that there is a relation between the political philosophy of the extreme Left and "old-fashioned 19th Century scientism". Yet Men of Ideas did not touch on the dominance of philosophy by natural science throughout the modern age, which is evident in the matter, mind and organic concepts of man, fundamental to philosophy in this era.

The practical importance of such discussion in the deepening political divisions of the day appears self-evident. On the Right, there is an increasing emphasis upon the importance of human agency: the possibility of beginning and knowing in action, reaction, inherent in the uniqueness of the human agent. On the Left, there is increasing emphasis on the social being of man: the sharing of a like condition grounded both in a common form of organic being or nature, and in the sharing of common pursuits, not only in economic life but in all forms of action and reflection.

This is not an either/or but an and/and issue. Both understandings are valid Each is complementary to the other. They are and always will be in tension with each other. The tension is inherently creative, but it is being transformed into a destructive opposition, symptomatic of the underlying intellectual crisis of identity which it is the task of philosophy to try to resolve through a coherent synthesis.

What is wanted is public philosophical discussion of the issues and the possiblities of such a synthesis at a popular level — in the market place, so to speak.

(40d) Letter of February 1st 1982 from Dora Russell:

You ask for "Philosophers to march Left, Right into the market place" (Letters January 16). We already had one in Bertrand Russell, who delivered the first Reith lectures in 1948 on the very topic under discussion, the relation of the individual to society. His opening sentence reads:"The fundamental problem I propose to consider in these lectures is this: how can we combine that degree of individual initiative which is necessary to progress with the degree of social cohesion that is necessary for survival?"

Influenced by the immense advances of science, he had come to believe that the main purpose of modern philosophy was to interpret the findings of science and their consequences. But, as his History of Western Philosophy shows, he was well aware that traditional philosophy was the offshoot of religion and theology, plus Plato and Aristotle.

Russell's thought, however, lies within the Cartesion dualism of mind and matter, which glorified the objective, impartial intellect and has made mathematics and mechanism central to our social and economic system. Science is revered like a religion but science cannot teach us the values by which to live. Neither can the traditional religions, which deliberately placed man and his faculties outside the world of organic life, regarding everything animal as sinful and obscene.

It is significant that, in the series of modern thinkers directed by Mr Magee, there was only one woman, Iris Murdoch. The fact is that, while they may study philosophy because it is an academic subject, for a great many women, technical philosophy is no more than a masculine intellectual parlour game.

Mary Midgley's innovations in her book Beast and Man are a breath of fresh air. Mr. Koestler is to be congratulated on being perhaps the first male to admit that man the animal has been consistently destroying his own species, a practice known and deplored by women for many centuries, without power to end it. Religions and ideologies are the motive power of this destruction.

Raymond Aron, in his course of lectures on industrial civilization, remarks that having lost all former criteria of how to live, industrialism has not yet evolved a consensus of belief. In this the glib politicans will not help us. A really fundamental study of life in all its forms is called for, to seek reason why and how it is worth while and possible for mankind to live in harmony on this planet.

In common no doubt with many others, I have been trying to wrestle with this problem of the machine-age.

* * * * * * * *

Brian Magee's 15 TV interviews with philosophers have been transcribed and appear in book form, in Men of Ideas (New York: The Viking Press, 1979).

BOOK REVIEWS (CONTINUED)

(41) The Philosophy of Humanism by Corliss Lamont (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1982), reviewed by Bob Davis:

We have all gotten used to hearing attacks by the Religious Radical Right on various aspects of what is essentially modernism.They really seem to reject modern life in general in favor of their own fundamental and "Biblical" values. Their code word for modernism is "humanism" or "secular humanism", and it is used as broadly and sloppily by them as "communist" was used 30 years ago. In this usage the Right has been quite fortunate, by dumb luck I suspect. "Humanism" is really quite a vague term. In lower case, humanism stands for modernism. Those who do not understand the modern world and are frustrated by it can blame women's rights, abortion, unruly children, nasty Russians, gay rights,etc., on humanism. In addition, there is a small philosophic (some say religious) Humanist movement (with a capital H) that can be pointed to and used as a whipping boy.

Humanists have made things unnecessarily easy for the Right. Many Humanists don't seem to have a clear idea of what Humanism is. Consequently they are not prepared to defend Humanism against attacks and turn things around, carrying the battle to the Right -- which is what ought to be done. I am often surprised, at Humanist meetings, by how little feel for Humanism many in attendance have.

Fortunately this conditions can be corrected. Humanism has some very effective exponents -- Russell not least, and a number of strong figures operating today. Two of the foremost, or perhaps I should say, the two foremost, are 2 BRS members: Corliss Lamont and Paul Kurtz. Lamont has written a classic book,The Philosophy of Humanism. It was written over 30 years ago, and has had several revisions.

That this book provides a clear and effective explanation of Humanism is indicated by the fact that Rev. Tim LaHaye, co-founder of the "Moral Majority", quotes it 36 times in his 1980 The Battle for the Mind, as evidence of how wicked Humanism is. In consequence, Dr. Lamont has just had published the new 6th edition, with a new introduction,"Exposing the Moral Majority."

The Philosophy of Humanism is both history and philosophy. The text was developed over a 13-year period, during which Lamont gave a course on naturalistic humanism at Columbia University. As a result, it is very thorough; points are worked out in detail,alternatives and objections are discussed. Not a paragraph

is obscure. I consider this the best of Lamont's many books. I rank it with Russell's popular works for style, clarity and discussion of complex questions.

The opening chapters provide a definition of Humanism, and describe types of humanism and the wide variety of people and beliefs that the term "humanist" can refer to. A considerable amount of history is provided. Lamont traces the roots of humanism to the ancient Greeks, Hebrews and others...to the Renaissance humanists...to Spinoza...and continues into the 20th Century.

The principal part of the book deals with philosophic aspects and issues of humanism. Lamont discusses Humanism's Theory of the Universe, including such topics as the role of science, existence, nature, knowledge, ethics, happiness. For the layman, the presentation of these subjects is refreshingly clear, devoid of technical terms and inflated writing that obscures so much in philosophy.

For many, however,the intellectual aspects of Humanism are secondary, the feel for life and human happiness being more important. Much of the latter half of the book addresses these aspects. Lamont has always had strong feelings for nature and poetry, and the two are both well represented. I particularly recommend the poem on death on page 180.

I cannot find, in The Philosophy of Humanism, anything with which I disagree. Some Russell scholars may wish to reject his hopelessly American discussion of "Truth"; others may adopt a more Popperian view of science. But that would not affect the substance of the book.

In sum, this is a valuable book. I was glad to re-read it after some years, especially in the light of today's political climate. If you can't find it at a local bookstore, you may order it from the publisher, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.,250 Park Avenue South,New York,NY 10003. $15.95 cloth,$9.95 paper.

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(42)

ANNUAL MEETING (CONTINUED)

(43) Tentative program. As we said in the last issue (RSN33-8b), Al Seckel will give a talk on Russell and the Cuban Missile Crisis, drawing on published and unpublished sources. Dr. Gerald Larue will discuss the "Moral Majority". There may also be some or all of the following: a film dealing with BR's position on nuclear war, a talk or panel on disarmament, the celebrated Norman Lear film on the "Moral Majority", a talk or panel on BR and the 1980s ("New Hopes for a Changing World" revisited). Dan Wray plans to film parts of the meeting and interviews with members; a documentary film may result. The '82 BRS Award will be announced.
