

# 2024 Meeting Abstracts

The Bertrand Russell Society

David Blitz (Central Connecticut State University)

## The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell's Activities

A basic classification of Russell's philosophy includes (1) his contributions in five basic areas of philosophy: epistemology, ontology, axiology, and praxeology, with logic at the center. More generally, (2) his work can also be categorized under the headings: philosophy (subdivided as above), and political, professional, public and personal activities, each of these further subdivided. His writings can be classified (3) under the headings: books, booklets, chapters, articles, pamphlets, syllabi, leaflets, mimeos and publishers. Part of my presentation will be to demonstrate the second version of a timeline allowing the user to search for items in any of the above classifications and in selected cases directly access the pdf of a publication.

A further aspect of Russell's philosophy is (4) that of associated philosophers, including direct collaborators, and those who were influences on him and influenced by him, as well as his critique of opposing philosophies, and (5) relevant thinkers and actors (both sympathetic and opposed) in the areas of his political activities (eg: war and peace, social-political theory, human rights, international government). All of this has to be situated in relation to his times including (6) relevant events such as individual and world wars and developments in Britain and America. These further aspects contribute to a meta-philosophy of his activities, with philosophy construed as a multi-dimensional concept-map of Russell's life, times and work classified under the schemas sketched above.

Andy Bone (Bertrand Russell Research Centre/McMaster U.)

## Russell, Reparations and the Ruhr, 1923-24

For more than twenty months after French troops marched into Germany's industrial heartland in January 1923, European affairs were dominated by France's occupation of the Ruhr and the closely related question of Germany's reparations obligations to its wartime enemies. Russell frequently turned to the attendant international strife and the prospects for its resolution—notably in articles written for the Buenos Aires daily *La Nación* and in speaking to American audiences throughout his spring 1924 lecture tour. As he watched the crisis unfold, escalate and then abate, his regular commentaries touched on a number of vital issues: the burgeoning power of the United States, the foreign policy of Britain's first Labour Government, and the sometimes divergent pacifist and internationalist roads to peace—both of which political paths Russell considered taking.

## Christopher Devlin Brown (Xiamen University)

### What does Russellian physicalism require?

Russellian physicalism is an answer to the hard problem of consciousness which typically says that consciousness is (i) not identical to nor dependent upon fundamentally mental properties, (ii) scientifically inscrutable, which means that it is not something we can grasp through scientific inquiry, and (iii) ultimately categorical, which means that it is not identical to nor dependent upon only structural, dynamical or relational properties. However, not everyone agrees on what Russellian physicalism is minimally committed to. Specifically, there has been discussion concerning whether Russellian physicalism additionally requires that fundamental categorical properties are capable of grounding non-fundamental categorical properties which are non-phenomenal—thereby adding a necessary condition on Russellian physicalism—and whether Russellian physicalism really requires the scientific inscrutability of categorical properties—thereby removing an above-mentioned necessary condition from Russellian physicalism. I argue that the proper articulation of Russellian physicalism should embrace the strongest requirements available—requiring both grounding of non-phenomenal categorical properties in fundamental categorical properties and the scientific inscrutability of consciousness-relevant categorical properties—if the view is to both be consistent with the motivations behind physicalism and be capable of answering anti-physicalist challenges in a way which will be fully satisfactory to non-physicalists.

## James Connelly (Trent University)

### On the Role of PM in the Demise of TK

Levine (2013) has criticized three interrelated interpretive theses concerning the syntax and semantics of PM which he sees as originating in the work of Landini, Stevens, and Klement. The first of these theses is that in PM, propositions should be understood as closed sentences, and constituents of these propositions, along with propositional functions abstracted from them, should be understood as linguistic items. While quantification over individuals should be understood as objectual on this reading, quantification over propositional functions should be understood as substitutional. The second of these theses is that in PM, Russell is committed to the existence of atomic, but not molecular or general complexes. Allegedly, this is implicit in the recursive definition of truth and falsehood Russell provides in the context of offering a ramified theory of types. (see PM, 42). The third of these theses is that, at the time of authoring PM, Russell remains committed to the unrestricted entity variable, and to the idea that universals are on a logical and ontological par with particulars and thus within the range of the unrestricted entity variable.

If Levine is correct to think that interpreters of PM should reject these three theses, however, this would undermine the logical interpretation of Wittgenstein's critique of Russell's MRTJ, and of the role this critique played in the demise of TK. This is because, for reasons detailed in the paper, the logical interpretation presupposes that the first and third theses are correct as interpretations of PM, and that Russell continued to adhere to each in TK as well. (According to the logical interpretation, Russell's position is ambivalent in TK, if not PM, with respect to thesis

two.) In this paper I will argue, in defense of the logical interpretation, that Levine is mistaken to reject the first and third interpretive theses. Indeed, Russell's accordance with both theses, in each of PM and TK, played a crucial role in generating the 'paralysis' he experienced in response to Wittgenstein's objection.

## Jahnabi Deka (Gauhati University)

### Man's Place in the Universe: Tracing a Russellian Account

The central concern of Russell's book *An Outline of Philosophy* is to investigate into man's relation to the universe in so far as philosophy has to teach on this subject without extraneous help. However, this Russellian concern finds relevant place in his other write ups too. The present paper attempts to explore Russell's understanding of man's place in the universe and it seeks to examine as to how philosophy helps one understand that.

## Scott Dixon (Lawrence University)

### Russellian Positionalism

There is a tension in the work of Bertrand Russell concerning his views about the nature of relations. In *Principles of Mathematics* (1903: sections 94–95 and 218–19), he endorses directionalism, the view that relations are fundamentally directional, proceeding from one relatum to the other, and that all relations have converses, which necessarily apply in the opposite order. The fact that non-symmetric relations can apply in more ways than symmetric relations is explained by the fact that non-symmetric relations are distinct from their converses while symmetric relations are their own converses. Loving, for example, can apply to Abelard and Eloise in two ways because it is distinct from its converse, being loved by, and so loving can proceed from Abelard to Eloise with being loved by doing the reverse or being loved by can proceed from Abelard to Eloise with loving doing the reverse. Being next to, on the other hand, being its own converse, can only both proceed from Abelard to Eloise and to Abelard from Eloise in any application of it to those two individuals. In *Theory of Knowledge* (1913: 123–24) however, Russell appears to adopt positionalism. In the contemporary literature on relations, directionalism is typically contrasted with neutral views of relations, which reject the idea that relations are fundamentally directional, and explain the difference between non-symmetric and symmetric relations in other ways. A type of neutral view, positionalism explains their difference in terms of the the number of positions they have; a non-symmetric relation has two positions, which can be filled by two objects in two ways, while a symmetric relations has only one, which can be filled by two objects in only one way. The difference between Russell's remarks in *Principles* and *Theory* is naturally interpreted as a change in his views about the nature of relations.

I argue that we cannot conclude that Russell changed his view, as a positionalist view like the one he discusses in *Theory* can be /reduced/ to his directionalism. Given the necessary connection that holds between the application conditions of each relation  $R$  and its converse  $R'$ ,  $R$  and  $R'$  can together be conceived as a "cluster" with certain fixed positions in it. One position

will be the place that  $R$  proceeds from and  $R'$  proceeds to, while the other is the place that  $R$  proceeds to and  $R'$  proceeds from. The positions of a non-symmetric relation, on this construal, are discernible and distinct. One position of the cluster consisting of loving and being loved by is a place that loving proceeds from and being loved by proceeds to, whereas the other is a place that loving proceeds to and being loved by proceeds from. The positions are, therefore, distinct. The positions of a symmetric relation, on the other hand, are indiscernible. Each of the two positions of the relational complex comprising being next to and its converse (itself) is a place that being next to proceeds from /and/ proceeds to. Russell (1913: 123) appears to identify the indiscernible positions of a symmetric relation, but due to considerations involving the symmetries of arity greater than two, they must be regarded as distinct. Still, Russell described his views primarily (though admittedly not exclusively—see 1913: 124) in terms of binary relations, and so we should be cautious when interpreting the evolution of his views about relations as a conscious change of position. Whatever Russell thought, it is illuminating to see that, contrary to the prevailing contemporary picture, directionalism and positionalism do not stand in opposition to one another, but can be understood as providing descriptions of different levels of a singular metaphysical theory of relations.

## David Alexandre Ellwood (Pugwash Council)

### The Challenge of Artificial Intelligence: Will we forget our humanity and remember the rest?

Bertrand Russell cared deeply about the world and its future evolution, and his work continues to inspire because it speaks so clearly to our common humanity. What concerns might Russell have about the current revolution in artificial intelligence? At its heart this revolution is not based on human understanding, but instead feeds off human knowledge and an all encompassing surveillance of human activity. We will briefly survey this new technology and attempt to encourage discussion among Russellians about its ramifications. Particularly worrying is the current race to outsource our cognitive labour to machines and the effect this may have on contemporary society.

## Ethan Huffaker and Landon D. C. Elkind (Western Kentucky University)

### Close reconstructions of proofs in the quantificational logic of Principia Mathematica

Principia Mathematica is both famous and infamous for its symbolism. It famously intimidates casual and even scholarly readers by its frequent use of formalization in stating and proving theorems. It is no understatement to say there are more logic symbols than English words in the work. It infamously only provides proof sketches and not complete step-by-step proofs. So despite its reputation for rigor, logicians have long criticized Principia for falling short of modern standards for logic proofs.

Here we go some way to rebutting longstanding allegations that Principia lacked rigor. To do

this, we reconstructed from the text's proof sketch complete step-by-step proofs of the 126 propositions in the beginning of Principia's quantificational logic (theses that use the logical words "all" and "some"), or Chapters 9-11 of the book. We found that an impressively small raw number of extra steps were omitted from otherwise nearly complete proof sketches. Further, we found that the omitted steps were generally applications of definitions or of the basic rule of inference called modus ponens. So with few exceptions, the proof sketches in Chapters 9-10 of Principia from which we are to construct step-by-step proofs fully meets modern standards of rigor.

## Kevin Klement (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

### Open Source in Academic Philosophy: The Fregeifier, Open Typesetting, Logic, and Beyond

Many academics have little knowledge of the many open source tools which could not only be useful for their work as is, but can be adapted, modified and combined to create even more powerful tools. Partly as a result of these, open access publishing has never been more feasible than it is today, and many of the barriers people imagine can be overcome. Besides these general themes, this talk will introduce a few of my open source projects, which could be used as case studies, including: (1) The Amazing Fregeifier, a set of tools for including complex and idiosyncratic mathematical and logical notation, such as Frege's Begriffsschrift notation and historically accurate Russell/Whitehead notation, leveraging LaTeX packages such as `grundgesetze` (Marcus Rossberg) and `principia` (Landon Elkind), in documents of various kinds, (2) the Open Guide typesetting framework, already in use by the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, allowing JHAP to distribute articles in additional and more accessible formats than was possible previously, and which I am proposing to be used for an Open Guide to Bertrand Russell's Philosophy (3) LogicPenguin, a framework for logic exercises with customizable deductive systems and notation, which integrates with LMSes such as Canvas and Moodle.

## Gregory Landini (University of Iowa)

### A Neo Russellian Solution to all Gettier Problems

This paper offers a new and very simple solution which promises to resolve all Gettier problems for the definition of Knowledge as (fully) justified, true, belief. The new solution is influenced by Russell's own suggested solution when he anticipated the Gettier problems in his 1912 book *The Problems of Philosophy*. Russell's approach was to maintain that there must be no inference from a false premise. My approach is to reject the inference from 's is justified that p and (p>q)' to the conclusion that 's is justified that q.' The proper inference is to the conclusion that 's is justified that p and (p>q) and q'. My approach requires that we accept that, since relevant premises are improperly dropped, justification does not distribute over 'and'. The question of which premises are relevant (not to be dropped) takes us back to Russell's original approach.

## Sherrie Lyons (Independent Scholar)

### JBS Haldane and Bertrand Russell: Between Daedalus and Icarus

In 1923 JBS Haldane gave a lecture to the Heretics club at Cambridge entitled *Daedalus or The Science of the Future*. The following year Bertrand Russell responded with *Icarus or The Future of Science*. This talk is part of a project which places genetic engineering in the larger context of the history of science and technology. The manuscript critically examines the idea of a technological fix, specifically a “genetic fix” for many global problems. Haldane was amazingly prescient in many of his predictions, particularly in regard to biology and the new field of genetics in which he was a leading figure. In *Daedalus*, he reminded us that the desire to harness and control nature is very ancient. In Greek mythology Daedalus was an inventor and had fashioned wings out of feathers and bees wax for himself and his son Icarus. Haldane presented a rather disconcerting view of eugenics and genetic manipulation and warned that if progress in science was not accompanied by progress in our ethical views, misuse was inevitable. But overall Haldane was optimistic about science. Russell did not share Haldane’s hopeful view of science to promote human happiness. “Science is not a substitution for virtue. . . Technical scientific knowledge does not make men sensible in their aims [and] science has not given man more self-control, more kindness, or more power of discounting their powers.” Haldane claimed that Daedalus was the first scientific worker who was not concerned with the gods. We may not be concerned with insulting the gods of ancient Greek mythology, but there is a wisdom in these tales. Many a Greek hero met his downfall being guilty of hubris. Daedalus warned Icarus not to fly too close to the sun, but Icarus ignored him and the beeswax acting as glue melted. Icarus fell into the sea and drowned. In these two essays both Haldane and Russell warn us of the dangers as geneticists continue to be guilty of hubris in their belief that they can perfect and control nature.

## Moises Macias Bustos (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

### The Russellian Logical Atomist Approach to Logical Ideology: In Defense of Expressive Paucity

The aim of this talk is to flesh out a position in current debates in metametaphysics defended initially by Bertrand Russell in his Logical Atomism lectures, his Logical Atomism (1924) paper and a number of other works: namely, that the only fundamental structure is logical structure and that metaphysical essences or necessities are either no such things or can be seen to be logical necessities upon analysis (Landini, 1998; Landini, 2010). In formulating metaphysical theories about anything it is inevitable that we will presuppose primitive, undefined notions and assumptions which are not part of the ontology, in the sense of corresponding to objects, properties or relations within the theory’s domain, but instead are required for even formulating it. Those primitive notions and assumptions in any theory we can characterize as the ideology of the theory (Quine, 1951; Cowling, 2019). Importantly, arguments such as Newman’s Theorem (Newman, 1928) show that metaphysics of science, if it aims to be non-trivial, must have more fine-grained goals than truth, it must be faithful to the world’s real structure. How can a theory’s fundamental ideology help us secure truth and fidelity?

Peter Finocchiaro (2020) discusses the argument that the less a theory says the less likely it is to be in the wrong, in connection with ideological simplicity and truth. He finds the argument flawed, for metaphysics has the aim of not only safeguarding us from error, but delivering a true, accurate and faithful picture of reality, which he calls the Fidelity requirement. Unbeknownst to Finocchiaro a sort of argument for expressive paucity was first put forward by Bertrand Russell (1924) as a reason to believe in the logical atomist research program summarized in his principle of scientific philosophizing, specifically that most metaphysically structured objects are logical constructions. Such a principle, I argue, forces us to the conclusion that sui generis ideology can be dispensed with in favor of logical ideology e.g., there are no arithmetic primitives, only logical primitives and vis a vis for primitives in physics. Finocchiaro calls his version of the argument "the argument from expressive paucity", his conclusion is that this is indeed a different argument from the argument for truth but still flawed.

It is best to avoid abundant ideological structure to safeguard from error, but logical structure cannot be avoided. Why? First, whatever can be thought has logical structure; second, inference requires logical structure, even probabilistic inference; third, if there are facts or propositions they have a logical structure; fourth; if any facts are entailed or independent from other facts that involves logical structure and lastly, logical structure is just general structure so anything at all as logical structure. The Russellian logical atomist believes in so-called Ramseyan humility as an epistemic principle of true metaphysics (should be called Russellian humility, since Ramsey learned the view from him). We can at least know that the world must contain some logical structure, for reasons such as the above, but we cannot know that it contains any further structure. Furthermore, knowledge of the world's fundamental metaphysical structure, logical structure, is general and informative enough for the Russellian, it is a metaphysical knowledge we can aspire to. This view should also strive to accommodate that according to the Russellian view we do have knowledge of at least one qualitative structure - phenomenal structure (Russell, 1927; Russell, 1948; Newman, 1928). I will argue that Russell's logical atomism as a philosophical research program is bolstered by taking the ideology of the higher order logic of Principia Mathematica as fundamental ideology and that the Russellian programs of logical constructions and structural realism can be seen as applications to these commitments that are able to recover structural truths that also preserve fidelity, in Finocchiaro's sense. To do so I will offer textual evidence from Russell's philosophical works and offer up a picture consistent with that evidence according to which the logical atomist thesis should be understood as the thesis that the only joint-carving ideology involves higher order logic and fundamental properties or universals.

## Gülberk Koç Maclean (Mount Royal University)

### How Far Would Russell Go in Defense of His Beliefs?

In an interview in 1964\*, when asked if he would die for his beliefs, Russell replied: "Of course not. After all, I might be wrong". A witty response, as one would expect from Russell. It shows a deep commitment to fallibilism, that we cannot be certain of the truth of any of our knowledge claims, and therefore should not either take our own lives, or persecute others, based on the seeming certainty of our convictions. Russell maintains that even though all of our beliefs come with a degree of probability, and none with certainty, we should not refrain from action; but act

on beliefs which are mostly likely to be true – unless that action involves taking a life: “If it comes to burning somebody at the stake for not believing it, then it is worthwhile to remember that after all he may be right, and it is not worthwhile to persecute him” (Essays in Skepticism, p. 85).

Interestingly though, in another interview, with Martin Jones and Clive Bell (1963?), Russell is ready to die for his beliefs, in particular for the cause of nuclear disarmament. He said: “If I could influence opinion deeply by being martyred for the idea of nuclear disarmament, rather than just giving speeches about it in Trafalgar Square, I would be quite prepared to do so”. Is that because he realized that there was in fact a belief he could be certain about? Or was there a limit to his fallibilism all along? Alternatively, is it that Russell acknowledged that he could be wrong about the nuclear arms race constituting a danger for the human race, but given that he was getting very close to the end of his life, he thought it would be worthwhile to sacrifice his own life for a belief whose truth he was not certain about?

\* The 1964 interview is attributed in several sources to Leonard Lyons, The New York Post, 23 June 1964. But I haven't been able to confirm it yet.

## Tim Madigan (St. John Fisher University)

### The Origins of the Bertrand Russell Society

Using the Lee Eisler Archives, found at the Center for Inquiry, I will explore how the Bertrand Russell Society came to be, and its founding by “Twelve Apostles” from different backgrounds who were interested in commemorating Russell’s varied interests and multifaceted life.

## Nicholas Francis Marshall (McMaster University)

### The Activity of Judgement: A Relevance Condition of Inclusion in Russell’s MRTJ

This paper argues that the version of Bertrand Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ) which appears in Theory of Knowledge carries a presupposition which has gone underappreciated by modern commentators, his student and critic Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Russell himself. The presupposition is that objects which are included in a cognitive complex appear under the guise of descriptive content regarding these objects, limited to descriptors upon which the truth of the judgment turns. Other descriptors of these objects are not unified in the complex, despite Russell’s insistence that the objects of judgment are the real, external objects themselves. This paper explores this suggestion of what I call a relevance condition of inclusion, by examining Russell’s commitments in Theory of Knowledge, as well as his other writings circa 1913. Its conclusion is twofold: that there is a relevance condition of inclusion which limits the resolution of the constituents of judgments in the MRTJ, and that appreciation of this fact highlights a way in which some classic objections to the MRTJ can be evaded.



## Dan O'Leary (Independent)

### BRACERS-SNA for the PM Years – Preliminary Report

BRACERS contains records associated with BR's correspondence. Social Network Analysis, SNA, helps understand the relationships between people in a social setting, in this instance correspondence with a primary focus on BR and PM. BR participated in many social networks; this project defines a PM Network based on the BRACERS description of the correspondence. The PM Years, for this project, is the time from BR's attendance at the 1900 International Congress of Philosophy in Paris until the 1910 publication of *Principia Mathematica* Vol. I, 1st Edition.

The project has three phases. The first phase uses the BRACERS records to identify correspondents, the PM Network, related to logic, mathematics, or philosophy with a potential bearing on PM. This phase analyzes the records including frequency counts, time series graphs, the "form of letter", and creates maps using BR's address codes. The second phase applies social network analysis to the PM Network and includes graphs and centrality measures. The third phase reviews the content of selected correspondence to identify influences on BR and PM. The presentation reports on completion of the first phase and progress on the second. The third phase has not yet started.

## Michael Paskaru (Tilburg University)

### Russell Style Questions

How can Russell's philosophy help the experimental philosopher and the psychologist ask better questions? I claim this can be done by unpacking Russell's *The Relation of Sense-data to Physics* (1914). Specifically, I argue that experimental philosophy, similar to psychology, has a problem: it lacks a correlation between the behaviors studied and the phenomena around them. To argue that Russell can help ask better questions, I first unpack the paper focusing on Russell's problem. Then I discuss how it applies by turning a question into Russell style.

Only a one-way road exists between contributions to the objects physics studies exists, but the object contributes nothing back, which therefore leaves the correlation absent and verification non-existent—"molecules have no color, atoms make no noise, electrons have no taste" (Russell, 1914, 113). Our own contribution, which Russell refers to as "sense-data", is seen as a product or function of the physical objects physics studies. The object comes first and sense-data after, but this is not possible for Russell, as these objects are unseen. To circumvent sense-data's inability, Russell focuses on verification. Verification is possible if the physical objects (like the invisible electron) are exhibited as products of sense-data whereby the sense-data comes first followed by the physical object. I argue that a similar parallel is seen in human behaviour with the same unruly characteristics as sense-data. Namely, I claim that behaviour is exhibited as products of phenomena. When this or that circumstance or event happens in the world, variables are manipulated and so on. But verification is only possible if these variables themselves are seen as products of behavior. To therefore form an example of a Russell style question, I take the following: "Is the behaviour of being hypocritical a function of the phenomenon of fear?" and apply the same formula that Russell does: "Is the phenomenon of fear a function of the behaviour

of being hypocritical?" I claim that the second question is more fruitful because it shifts the focus from observing behavior as a product of phenomena, to examining phenomena as a product of behaviour. People who are defined as hypocritical are then theoretically assigned various fearful conditions to see if such hypocritical behaviour persists. Only this way would the behaviour of hypocrisy be understood, by mirroring Russell's approach of prioritizing verification through the exhibition of physical objects as products of sense-data.

## Charles Pigden (University of Otago)

### Paradoxum Stoicorum: Bertrand Russell meets Marcus Aurelius

When discussing stoicism in the person of Marcus Aurelius, Russell develops a paradox. According to the Stoics happiness consists solely in doing good. Thus Marcus Aurelius tried to find happiness in promoting prosperity, fostering justice and protecting the Empire from the barbarian hordes. But since happiness consist solely in doing good, the good that he did did nobody else any good. Being raped, pillaged and murdered by barbarians would not have made the citizens of Rome less happy so long as they persisted in virtue. So in protecting them from being raped, pillaged and murdered, Marcus wasn't promoting their happiness. . Furthermore it would not have mattered if he had succeeded or failed. This suggests that there is something deeply wrong with Stoicism. Did the Stoics have an answer?

## Giovanni Ratti (University of Genoa)

### The Russell/Copleston Debate: The Final Round

In 1948, BBC Radio broadcasted a debate on the existence of God between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston (a Jesuit priest and philosopher). In their conversation, Russell and Copleston discuss three topics: the metaphysical argument (i.e., the argument from contingency), the meaning of religious experience, and the moral argument. While Russell is considered the winner in the first two "rounds" of the debate, Copleston is generally given the upper hand in the final round. In this paper, I will re-evaluate the latter part of the debate between Copleston and Russell, focusing in particular on the significance of the arguments Russell puts forward to refute Copleston's view.

Copleston's main argument against Russell is a *reductio ad hitlerum* based on the thesis that an expressivist metaethics is unable to distinguish an evil morality from a principled one. I will show that Copleston's argument is mistaken in that it mixes several aspects that should be analytically distinguished and is based on an inappropriate association of philosophical theses with highly undesirable social policy. Nonetheless, Copleston's argument seems to corner Russell. I will analyse the two argumentative moves that enabled Russell to escape this predicament: first, by considering the effects of an action as the main guide to "weighing" preferences; second, by reducing "ought talks" to "social education and sanction talks" thereby invalidating Copleston's much more immodest reconstruction of a "moral ought". Consequently, I will argue that Russell should be considered the winner in the last round of the debate as well.

## Tony Simpson (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation)

### Bertrand Russell: The Artist's Eye

Four exhibitions and sales of artworks helped raise funds for the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. The first took place at Woburn Abbey in May 1963, prior to the formal establishment of BRPF. Three more took place in 1972/73, following Russell's death. More than a thousand artists donated works. Edith Russell led the appeal for donations to mark Russell's centenary in 1972. The Russell Foundation retains some 500 works, some of which are being sold to raise funds for the renovation of Carn Voel, Russell's house in Cornwall. Russell himself responded enthusiastically to Ben Shahn's donation of several artworks depicting Frederick Douglass, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King. What does this collection and archive tell us about how artists in many parts of the world viewed BR?

## Michael D. Stevenson (Lakehead University)

### 'There is something fundamentally fine and clean about him': Charles Morris and His Relationship with Bertrand Russell

Charles Morris enjoyed a distinguished academic career as a philosopher and semiotician. Morris was greatly influenced by Bertrand Russell, and the two men corresponded frequently and met on several occasions between 1929 and 1944. This paper will examine their direct interactions and Morris's personal evaluations of Russell contained in the largely unexplored Charles Morris Collection held by the Institute for American Thought. These primary sources reveal the intellectual debt Morris owed to Russell and demonstrate the practical assistance he provided to his British counterpart, most notably in his efforts to help Russell secure an academic appointment at UCLA in 1939.

## Chad Trainer (Independent)

### Reflections on Russell Book

Reflections on Russell is a book contributing some original interpretations of thoughts of Bertrand Russell. Instead of dwelling on the purely mathematical logic which tends to be the focus of professional philosophers, it explores Russell's philosophy, especially his philosophy of science and religion. It features some original interpretations of Bertrand Russell's views and it counters some competing interpretations of his philosophy.

Russell could be labeled both a probabilist and empiricist, albeit with critical qualifications. He never left the Pythagorean/Platonic worldview entirely behind. He preferred Spinoza over Locke, and believed that many sciences simply begged questions rather than prove philosophic tenets. Although Bertrand rejected spiritualistic metaphysics, he was able to identify some value in George Berkeley's philosophy. This book shows that Russell developed a philosophy incorporating atheism and spirituality.

## Sheila Turcon (McMaster University)

### Russell on Trial

In this illustrated presentation I will talk about my visit to London in August 2023. You will see photographs of the four justice buildings in which Russell was tried in 1916, 1918, and 1961, as well as Brixton Prison where Russell served time in 1918 and 1961. Although Russell's biographers have all mentioned these trials, none go into detail. Using newspaper reports I will describe the charges, who attended these trials, the lawyers and judges involved, and how these trials were reported.

The buildings I visited were the Mansion House, the London City Guildhall, Bow Street Police Court which is now the Nomad hotel, and the Middlesex Guildhall which is now the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is open for tours so I took one. Brixton Prison now has a restaurant—Tony Simpson and I had lunch there. Tony took a few photos of the exterior from outside the walls.

## Russell Wahl (Idaho State University)

### Should we take Freedom and Organization seriously?

Ray Monk remarked that *Freedom and Organization* (1934) “could hardly be regarded as a serious work of scholarly history.” In this paper I discuss *Freedom and Organization* with respect to this assessment, seeing where one might well come to Monk's conclusion, as well as where his judgment seems mistaken. Monk's major complaint is that there is a heavy emphasis on personal anecdotes and a lack of original historical research. While it is true that much of the first and last two sections rely mostly on secondary sources, the large second part, “The March of the Mind” contains much work with primary texts, and some of the theses argued for are original with Russell. I examine several reviews published at the time, and while some are critical, they do not suggest the work was seen as unoriginal or amateurish. In fact, most are quite positive.

## David E White (St. John Fisher University)

### Russell Saves

“To save the world requires faith and courage: faith in reason, and courage to proclaim what reason shows to be true. It is not a hopeless task to save the world, but, it will never be achieved by those who allow themselves to think it hopeless.” ~Russell & Russell

Bertie, Dora and many other philosophers have seen a parallel between the social cement that holds a society together and the tangled lines of argumentation that are constitutive of philosophical discourse. When we work at philosophy we are working on ourselves, and while we are encouraged to think for ourselves, we ought not to think by ourselves.