


THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

August, 1995

No. 87



Bertrand Russell Society
c/o Michael J. Rockler
529 14th St., NW, Suite 1125
Washington, DC 20045

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Newsletter of The Bertrand Russell Society

August, 1995

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FROM THE EDITOR

Michael J. Rockler

Welcome to the new *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*! This publication replaces the Society newsletter which you have been receiving quarterly as part of your membership fees. The *BRS Quarterly* will continue to inform members about the society, describe current Russell scholarship and provide information about many Russell related topics. In addition to continuing the fine traditions established by Lee Eisler and continued by Don Jackanicz, it is my hope that this publication will offer members substantive and original articles about Bertrand Russell.

In this issue you find an article by Mamata Barua -- an Indian scholar who has recently passed away. Two papers given at the Russell Society meeting-- one by James Alouf and one by Peter Stone--are also included. John Shosky, newly elected vice president of BRS, has provided a book review of John Slater's recent book on Russell.

In order for this publication to be effective, it needs your support and submissions. Members of the Society are encouraged to provide essays for publication in future issues. Articles should be five hundred to two thousand words in length. They can examine any aspect of Russell's life, work, and scholarship which might be of interest to members. As both Lee and Don know, it is difficult to produce a quarterly publication without considerable assistance from members of the Society. So send me material. I am sure there are members who have always wanted to publish on Russell but have never felt comfortable doing so. This new forum is your opportunity to see your ideas about Russell appear in print.

I hope you like the new version of our quarterly publication. Let me hear from you with comments as well as with articles. I intend also to publish letters to the editor if I receive them.

The annual meeting was an enjoyable experience for everyone in attendance. I have received much positive feedback. It was a pleasure to hear the many interesting papers that were presented.

Paul O'Grady, a young scholar from Ireland, received the paper prize and was able to attend the meeting and present his paper. Ken Blackwell accepted the Book award and described his thirty year experience of compiling the Russell bibliography with Harry Ruja. Thus the conference had a nice international flavor to it.

The BRS award was given to Zero Population Growth and accepted on the organization's behalf by Brian Dixon (who is the Director of Government Relations for ZPG).

The Columbia Inn was a pleasant setting; hopefully all future BRS meetings will take place in hotel rather than dormitory settings. The new BRS President, John Lenz, is already planning next years meeting which will be held in Madison, New Jersey. Plan now to attend the annual gathering and partake in excellent Russell scholarship and warm fellowship.

Through the generosity of Don Jackanicz, the participants set a new record for drinking Red Hackle. Don will be happy to provide details to anyone who is interested.

FROM THE PRESIDENT

John R. Lenz, President, The Bertrand Russell Society

Recently I participated in the "First International Conference on Human Behavior and the Meaning of Modern Humanism," held in the stunning setting of Delphi, Greece on June 14-17, 1995. BRS members Tim Madigan, Paul Kurtz, and Christos and Alice Tzanetakos helped enliven the event. The conference was called to define the meaning and directions of humanism.

The opening papers in this conference were theoretical and historical. It was only a matter of time before someone rose up and objected that this was all too airy for him: he was an administrator and man of action. Then, one night, a fairly large earthquake hit not far away. As we sat listening to talks the next day, Greek television broadcast reports of people trying to save friends and even complete strangers from under the debris of collapsed buildings. One couldn't help wondering, who are the true humanists, we or they?

Humanists need not be philosophers, but humanists and philosophers share certain traits. By nature they are self-conscious and critical about almost everything they do, and how and why they do it. Some call this an occupational hazard, while others (like myself) find it admirable. Thoughts do influence action and attention to one certainly need not, and should not, preclude the other. Who teaches this better than Russell?

Russell was the model of an engaged intellectual in this century. He was a "passionate skeptic," as Alan Wood depicted him, "perhaps the last public sage" in the words of Caroline Moorehead. He insisted that unpleasant aspects of human behavior will not change unless societies re-examine whole systems of belief and thought. This idea, now a truism, was a premise of the Delphi conference. When we witness apocalyptic cults in the grip of ancient myths planning mass destruction, or fundamentalist dogmas becoming mainstream both here and abroad, we see the power of ideas in perverted form. Skeptics and critical thinkers, Russell fearlessly demonstrated, must not lack the conviction to engage the critical issues and to recognize the power of ideas and their consequences.

Thus, while it may not be enough to assuage feelings of guilt or helplessness in times of real crises, I couldn't help feeling that at Delphi we were still doing something of potential long-term usefulness. As an academic, I usually must think this way, anyway, but I take comfort from the belief that Russell would agree.

Similar questions have entered the Bertrand Russell Society. We are not a society of action, and most certainly not a political group, but we discuss how best to honor Russell's legacy. In this way, the BRS constantly defines itself, as it needs to do. In the past, some have spoken about giving our annual BRS award to an individual of action rather than a scholar, to someone who, like Russell, "made a difference." The suggestion was in Russell's spirit, but (I remember my surprise) would Russell deny that the writing of books was useful "action"? More recently, we have debated, from the other side, whether the BRS should beware of identifying itself (specifically in connection with the granting of honorary memberships) with anyone too political.

We aren't all interested in humanism or philosophy or social activism, but we all share an admiration for Russell, a public intellectual. We do need to think how we can foster our goal of promoting knowledge of Russell's life and work.

What would you like us to do? I encourage all members to write to myself or Michael Rockler. Please share ideas and information about new writings, events and activities.

LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Several leadership changes in the Bertrand Russell Society occurred at the annual meeting held in Columbia, Maryland. Michael J. Rockler was elected chair of the board of directors. Don Jackanicz continues as secretary.

John Lenz is the new president of the society while John Shosky is the new vice president. The board reaffirmed Lee Eisler's position as vice president/information emeritus. Dennis Darland continues as treasurer of the society.

Marvin Kohl and John Shosky join David Johnson on the philosopher's committee. John will chair the committee. Don Jackanicz replaces Gladys Leithauser as chair of the book committee.

The November issue will contain a ballot for election to the board. Please send any nominations for board members to Michael Rockler.

MINUTES OF THE 1995 BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY ANNUAL MEETING Donald W. Jackanicz, Secretary

The 1995 Annual Meeting of The Bertrand Russell Society was held at The Columbia Inn Hotel and Conference Center, 10207 Wincopin Circle, Columbia, Maryland 21044, U.S.A., June 30 - July 2. Except as noted, all events took place in Ellicott Room on the ground floor.

FRIDAY, JUNE 30, 1995

The meeting was called to order at 7:30 p.m. by President Michael Rockler, who offered general remarks of welcome and orientation. Book Award Committee Chair Gladys Leithauser then presented the 1995 BRS Book Award to Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja for *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*. After accepting the award on behalf of Mr. Ruja, who was unable to attend, and himself, Mr. Blackwell spoke at length about this great three volume work and the years of scholarly effort leading to its recent publication. The meeting was recessed at 9:00 p.m. The Board of Directors meeting was then held. (Refer to the separate Board minutes.)

SATURDAY, JULY 1, 1995

President Rockler reconvened the meeting at 9:10 a.m. In addition to Society members, five students from President Rockler's university class attended the morning session as guests. John Shosky made a presentation titled "Multiculturalism, Authenticity, and Enlightened Self-Interest: Bertrand Russell and the Quest for Political Recognition." Following a short break, President Rockler spoke on "Russell and Education: Russell's Debt to Locke."

The annual Society Business meeting was then held, beginning at 11:15 a.m. President Rockler introduced John Lenz and John Shosky, who respectively had been elected the new President and Vice President by the Board of Directors the previous night. President Lenz thanked President Rockler for having organized a fine meeting. Secretary Donald Jackanicz then moved that the reading of last year's annual meeting minutes be suspended; his motion was seconded by Mr. Blackwell and was unanimously accepted. Mr. Jackanicz gave a brief oral report concerning the previous night's Board meeting. Treasurer Dennis Darland reported that the Treasury's fund balance was U.S. \$3,533.16. David Johnson moved that the Treasurer's report be accepted; his motion was seconded by Mr. Rockler and unanimously accepted. Discussion turned to three topics: BRS participation in the Eastern, Midwest, and Western Division annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association; how e-mail can be used to promote the BRS and for communication between members; and how to increase membership through advertising strategy and a revival of the Information and Membership Committee. Next considered was this series of honorary membership advisory nominations, which would require affirmative Board of Directors action before honorary membership may be offered:

Nominations by Mr. Blackwell, seconded by Mr. Jackanicz:

- Kenneth Coates. Yes 14, No 1, Abstain 1.
- Elizabeth Eames. Yes 16, No 0, Abstain 0.
- Nelson Mandela. Yes 7, No 7, Abstain 2.
- Willard Van Orman Quine. Yes 16, No 0, Abstain 0.
- Michael Foote. Yes 6, No 6, Abstain 5.

Nominations by Mr. Shosky, seconded by Mr. Madigan and Carl Westman:

- Paul Kurtz. Yes 16, No 0, Abstain 1.
- Antony Flew. Yes 15, No 0, Abstain 2.

Lastly Mr. Blackwell discussed the fundraising work of the Bertrand Russell Editorial Project and the mailing recently sent to all BRS members. In accordance with Stephen Reinhardt's motion that was seconded by Mr. Madigan, the Society Business Meeting was adjourned (and the overall meeting was recessed) at 12:55 p.m.

Following a luncheon break, the meeting was reconvened at 2:15 p.m. Mr. Madigan made a presentation, "Russell and Dewey on Inquiry." Following a short break, Paul O'Grady, a lecturer at Trinity College, Dublin and winner of the 1995 Paper Prize Contest, read his paper. "The Russellian Roots of Naturalized Epistemology." The meeting was recessed at 4:30 p.m.

The Red Hackle Hour and Banquet were held in a lounge and dining area outside the Ellicott Room beginning at 5:30 p.m. At the Banquet, past President Rockler introduced Brian Dixon, Director of Government Relations for Zero Population Growth (ZPG), who accepted the 1995 BRS Award on behalf of ZPG. Expressing appreciation for the award, Mr. Dixon spoke about ZPG's efforts through the years and current problems challenging his organization. The Banquet ended at 9:15 p.m.

SUNDAY, JULY 2, 1995

The meeting was reconvened by President Lenz at 9:00 a.m. James Alouf made a presentation, "Bertrand Russell as Teacher Educator." After a short break,

a final presentation titled "Problems of Power in Russell's Politics," was made by Perter Stone. Following words of farewell from President Lenz and Past President Rockler, the meeting was adjourned at 11:58 a.m.

MINUTES OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING

June 30, 1995

Donald W. Jackanicz, Secretary

The 1995 annual meeting of the Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society was held at The Columbia Inn Hotel and Conference Center, 10207 Wincopin Circle, Columbia, Maryland 21044, U.S.A. on Friday, June 30, 1995. The meeting began in the Ellicott Room on the ground floor. However, after about one hour, it was necessary to relocate the meeting to Secretary Donald W. Jackanicz's hotel room, Room 319. The following directors were present: Kenneth Blackwell, Dennis J. Darland, Linda Egendorf, Lee Eisler, Donald W. Jackanicz, Gladys Leithauser, John R. Lenz, Tim Madigan, Stephen J. Reinhardt, Michael J. Rockler, John E. Shosky.

In the absence of Chairman Marvin Kohl, Secretary Jackanicz called the meeting to order at 9:05 p.m. and explained that Chairman Kohl had asked Kenneth Blackwell to chair the meeting.

The first order of business was the election of Board and Society officers. For Chairman of the Board of Directors, Mr. Madigan nominated Michael J. Rockler, and Mr. Darland nominated Marvin Kohl. The secret ballot vote was as follows: Mr. Rockler - 7, Mr. Kohl - 3. Mr. Lenz then moved that Marvin Kohl be recognized and thanked for six years of service as Chairman; this motion was unanimously accepted. For the following positions, these officers were nominated by the individuals in parentheses and were elected by acclamation:

- Society President: John R. Lenz (Mr. Jackanicz)
- Society Vice President: John E. Shosky (Mr. Lenz)
- Society Vice President/Information Emeritus: Lee Eisler (Mr. Jackanicz)
- Board and Society Secretary: Donald W. Jackanicz (Mr. Rockler)
- Society Treasurer: Dennis J. Darland (Mr. Rockler)

Mr. Madigan moved that Mr. Rockler and Mr. Jackanicz respectively fill the unexpired Board terms of the late Jack Cowles and Paul Arthur Schilpp; this motion was unanimously accepted.

Discussion turned to the location of the next two annual meetings. Mr. Rockler moved that President Lenz be permitted to decide the 1996 annual meeting site and date; this motion was unanimously accepted. President Lenz then explained that he would work toward holding the 1996 annual meeting on the campus of Drew University, Madison, New Jersey. Mr. Rockler next moved that the 1997 annual meeting be held in conjunction with the joint meeting of Free Inquiry and the Humanist Association of Canada; this motion was unanimously accepted. Mr. Rockler explained that the 1997 annual meeting site would probably be either Toronto or Montreal.

Secretary Jackanicz submitted the report of the committee formed at the 1994 Board meeting to make recommendations about possible new honorary membership nominations. (This report had been mailed to board members on May 24, 1995.) Following discussion, Mr. Rockler moved that all the names listed in the report be laid on the table and a new committee be formed to present five names for nomination at the next annual Board meeting and that the new committee's chairman be appointed by the Board Chairman. The vote on this motion was: Yes - 3, No - 3, Abstain - 3.

On other matters, Secretary Jackanicz read selections from Chandrakala Padia's recent letter describing activities of the Benaras Chapter in India. President Lenz reported that the editor of *Free Thought Observer* had asked for permission to quote *Russell Society News* material in his publication. President Lenz then explained how he will work on developing a World Wide Web home page for promoting the Society. Mr. Rockler reported he will begin editing *Russell Society News* with the August 1995 issue and described some of his plans for a new format. Mr. Jackanicz inquired about plans for continued Society participation in annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). It was informally agreed that Vice President Shosky and David Johnson would work together on promoting the Society through APA activities, if possible with the assistance of Marvin Kohl. President Lenz moved that a letter of thanks be sent to Ray Monk and the University of Southampton for sponsoring the July 14-16, 1995 "Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy" conference; this motion was unanimously accepted.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:58 p.m.

BRS LIBRARY

The Society library sells and lends books, audiotapes, videotapes, and other materials by and about Russell. Please direct library inquiries and requests to Tom Stanley, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088 (tom.stanley@infoport.com).

Books for sale H-Cloth, otherwise paperback. Prices are postpaid. Please send check or money order (U.S. funds only) payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society" to tom Stanley.

By Bertrand Russell:

| | | |
|---|---------------------|--------|
| Appeal to the American Conscience | Spokesman | \$3.50 |
| Authority and the Individual | Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Has Man a Future? | Allen & Unwin | H 8.00 |
| History of the World in Epitome | Spokesman | 1.00 |
| In Praise of Idleness | Routledge | 8.95 |
| My Philosophical Development | Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Political Ideal | Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Power: A New Social Analysis | Routledge | 8.95 |
| Principles of Social Reconstruction | Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Skeptical Essays | Routledge | 8.95 |

By Other Authors:

| | | |
|--|---------------------------|----------|
| Bertrand Russell by John Slater | Thoemmes Press | \$19.00 |
| Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970 | Spokesman | 1.50 |
| Bertrand Russell's America, Vol. 2, 1945-1970 edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils | South End Press | 9.95 |
| Liberty and Social Transformation: A Study in Bertrand Russell's Political Thought by Chandrakala Padia | Heritage Publishers | H. 11.50 |
| The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words, edited by Christopher Farley and David Hodgson | Spokesman | 10.95 |
| The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I, The Private Years (1884-1914) by Nicholas Griffin | Houghton-Mifflin | H. 17.50 |

Audio cassettes in the lending library

Speeches:

| | |
|-----|--|
| 200 | Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech. 1950 45' |
| 201 | "Mind and Matter." 1950 52' |
| 202 | "Bertrand Russell in Australia." 1950 55' Four ABC broadcasts: "Guest of Honor", "The World as I See It", "What Hope for Man?" and "My Philosophy of Life". |
| 203 | "Living in an Atomic Age." 1951 90' Six BBC broadcasts: "Present Perplexities", "Obsolete Ideas", "The Modern Mastery of Nature", "The Limits of Human Power", "Conflict and Unification" and "The Achievement of Harmony". |
| 204 | "Life Without Fear." 1951 34' |
| 205 | "Portrait from Memory: Whitehead." BBC 1952 15' |
| 206 | "Man's Peril." BBC 1954 15' |
| 207 | Russell-Einstein Manifesto. 1955 30' |
| 208 | "The World and the Observer," BBC 1958 30' |
| 209 | Kalinga Prize Press Conference and Acceptance Speech. 1958 48' Includes five minute interview of January 24, 1958. |
| 210 | "Address to the CND." 1959 30' |

- 211 "The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore." BBC 1959 42'
Interviews with Russell, Leonard Woolf, Morton White and John Wisdom.
212 Address to the Verkeley Vietnam Teach-In. 1965 14'
213 "Appeal to the American Conscience." 1966 29'

Interviews, debates:

- 225 "Is Security Increasing?" NBC 1939 30'
226 Russell-Copleston Debate on the Existence of god. BBC 1948 20'
227 "The Attack on Academic Freedom in Britain and America." NBC 1952 30'
228 "Bertrand Russell' Romney Wheeler Interview. NBC 1952 30'
229 "Face to Face." John Freeman Interview. BBC 1959 30'
230 "Bertrand Russell Speaking." 1959 52'
Interviews by Woodrow Wyatt on philosophy, taboo morality, religion, and fanaticism.
231 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (I). 1959 52'
On the role of the individual, happiness, power, and the future of mankind.
1959 52' 232 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (II). 1959 52'
On nationalism, Great Britain, communism and capitalism, war and pacifism and the H-bomb
233 "Close-Up." Elaine Grand Interview. CBC 1959 30'
234 "Speaking Personally: Bertrand Russell." John Chamndos Interview
1961 90'
235 David Susskind Interview. 1962 90'
236 Studs Terkel Interview. SFMT 1962 39'
237 "On Nuclear Morality." Michael tiger Interview. 1962 32'
238 Interview on Vietnam. CBC 1965 10'
239 Merv Griffin Interview. 1965 24'

Lectures, broadcasts:

- 250 "Bertrand Russell." Rev. Paul Beattie. 1975 15'
251 "Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher." A.J. Ayer. BBC 1980 15'
252 "Bertrand Russell." 1986 Professor Giovanni Costigan. 100'
253 "Portrait of the Philosopher as Father." Katherine Tait. (In German) 30'
254 "Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Education." William Hare. 15'
255 "Bertrand Russell's Pacifist Stance in World War I." CFMU-FM 1992 30'
256 "Russell vs. Dewey on Education." 1992 115'
With Michael Rockler, Tim Madigan and John Novak.
257 "A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic" by Darren Staloff. 1994 40'

Documentaries:

- 275 "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell." 1962 40'
276 Beatrice Webb on the Russells / Russell on the Webbs. 1966 35'
277 "Sound Portrait of Bertrand Russell." NPR dramatization. 1980 60'
278 "Bertrand Russell: A Reassessment." BBC 1980 43'
279 "Bertie and the Bomb." Soundtrack of BBC television program. 1984 40'

Miscellaneous:

- 300 "The Conscience of Wisdom." CBC 1962 62'
301 "Sinfonia Contra Timore" by Graham Whettam. Dedicated to Russell.
1972 27'

**REPORT OF A SEMINAR HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES
OF THE BENARAS CHAPTER OF THE
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
Subject: "Crisis of Indian Democracy"**

Date: May 10, 1995

Venue: Faculty Lounge, Law School, B.H.U.

The Benaras Chapter of the BRS, USA organised a seminar on 10th May, 1995. Prof. R.S. Sharma, a renowned literary critic and professor of English literature was the chief speaker. Prof. D.N. Mishra, Vice Chancellor, Benaras Hindu University, presided over the function in the first half of the seminar and then, in the later half, Prof. P.D. Kaushik, Head, dept. of political science presided over the function. Dr. Chandrakala Padia, Director, Benaras Chapter of the BRS conducted proceedings of the seminar. Dr. Anuradha Bannerjee and Dr. Aruna Mukhopadhyay acted as rapporteurs.

The seminar started at 9 a.m. In the beginning Dr. Chandrakala Padia welcomed all the participants which included professors, journalists, scientists, engineers, doctors and students. Then she introduced the audience with the aims and objectives of the society, its achievements, and its future plans to promote Russellian scholarship. After this she introduced the theme of the seminar. In this context she highlighted the contribution of Bertrand Russell in promoting democracy at both national and international level. Since Russell was opposed to all kinds of dogmatism, fanaticism and religious fundamentalism, he can be treated as one of the greatest democrats of the world. Moreover, he was amongst those few thinkers who were sensitive to the needs and aspirations of developing nations. His views on industrial democracy, creative impulses, world peace, nuclear disarmament, tolerance, economic imperialism, capitalism, environmental degradation etc. are very relevant for the Third World Countries.

After these initial remarks about the society and Russell's contribution to democracy, she introduced the subject of the seminar: How Indian democracy was at the crossroads, where on the one hand democratic norms were deeply rooted in Indian psyche, culture and institution, on the other hand the politicians and sycophants were determined to strike at its very root. This dilemma can only be resolved when the intellectuals give a serious thought to the entire problem and restore its past glory.

Dr. D.P. Varma, professor of law at B.H.U. then introduced Prof. R.S. Sharma to the audience.

Prof. Sharma first paid rich tributes to Bertrand Russell. He found Russell's two articles entitled 'What is Democracy?' and 'A Scientific Plea for Democracy' very relevant in understanding the meaning and significance of democracy in the present world. He found Russell's views very relevant to the modern writers, thinkers and circumstances. Russell pleaded for democracy, for it can only restore the dignity of human being and scientific way of life. Every man has the right to be free. The crisis of Indian democracy is that this very dignity of the individual is being impaired. A common man's right to participate in the democratic procedure is at stake. Freedom has become the privilege of a few politicians, bureaucrats,

capitalists and corrupt officials. As a result democracy is being exploited to serve the interests of religious leaders, caste mongers, fundamentalists and politicians. However, democracy once delineated from its aims and objectives, can be more dangerous than a military form of government, Prof. Sharma warned the audience.

The basic questions, therefore, is how to redress Indian society from the present evils of democracy. Prof. Sharma came forward with some constructive suggestions. First, the constitution should be reformed in such a way that no person can play with its sanctity. Second, free and fair elections must be ensured. Those found guilty of violating electoral laws should be severely punished. Muscle power and money power should be curtailed to a great extent. Third, a presidential form of government should be introduced in place of parliamentary form of government. A presidential form of government will provide true leadership to the country and thus would be able to check corruption. Fourth, deep commitment to democratic norms and values is required. Today the civilisation is wounded and most of the intellectuals, bureaucrats and professors have become merely salaried class people with no commitment to people or country. This salaried culture of leading lives only for yourself has to be tarnished. And here one can take inspiration from persons like Bertrand Russell..

Prof. Sharma's speech generated heated discussion on the subject. Most of the scholars objected to his plea for adopting a presidential form of government. Many other constructive suggestions and recommendations were also given. Prof. Surinder Jetley, dept. of sociology and also Director, Centre for Women Studies, B.H.U. referred to some serious prevailing dichotomies in the Indian democratic system. According to her, no constitutional provision or structural changes can ensure democracy in the country unless an awareness is created in the people for democratic norms and values. Prof. R.C. Sharma, Director Bharat Kala Bhawan said that most of the democratic governments in India are minority governments where majority of the people remain unrepresented. We must see to it that more and more people participate in the elections and a truly representative government comes into existence. Dr. Ashok Kaul, dept. of sociology pointed out the inconsistencies present in the Indian social structure. A successful democracy calls for removing these contradictions of the society.

Prof. R.R. Tripathi, ex Dean, Faculty of Social Science felt that the failure of democracy lies in the lack of commitment to democratic values. The so-called intellectuals have forgotten their responsibilities and have merely become a salaried class. Dr. V.K. Agrawal, a famous neuro surgeon emphasised the need for being conscious about one's own duties and responsibilities.

Prof. Nalini Pant, dept. of political science emphatically favoured electoral reforms in the country. Dr. D.D. Nanda of the same department criticised the growing politicisation of judiciary and high percentage of reservation for the schedule caste and schedule tribe.

Dr. Anil Jain, dept. of economics threw light on the economic impediments to the functioning of Indian democracy. A free liberal economy is very dangerous to the economic prosperity of the country. Dr. Kiran Burman, dept. of economics warned against the invasion of the multinationals. Dr. Madhuri Svivastara of the same department also pointed out the inconsistent emphases of political leaders who on one hand talk about globalisation and liberalisation and on the

other hand introduce reservation. Dr. Durg Singh Chauhan drew attention to the misuse of power by the politicians resulting into the separatists' demands in different parts of the country. Regional autonomy and freedom of groups should only be supported to the extent it does not come in the way of national integration.

Dr. D.P. Varma, law school, said that the basic problem of democracy in India is that of democratic culture and values. A successful democracy calls for three things -- discipline, consent and negotiation. This is only possible when people effectively participate in the democratic process of the country. Prof. Shambhoo Nath Pandey, Head, dept. of Hindi, observed that illiteracy is the root cause for the failure of democracy. Prof. Kanlakar Mishra, Head, dept. of philosophy, said that democracy is not merely an end in itself. It is merely an instrument to attain higher values. Therefore, more emphasis should be laid on attaining higher values such as creativity, love, peace and liberty. This was said in the true spirit of Russell.

Dr. Chandrakala Padia said that a blind following of the western model is inimical to the development of the Third World Countries. There is a strong need to evolve 'need based indigenous model' which may establish close links between political system and civil society, values and structure, rights and duties, and above all democratic structure and democratic process.

In his presidential address Prof. D.N. Mishra, Vice Chancellor, Benaras Hindu University, held intelligencia responsible for the failure of democracy in the country. A farmer and an artisan of the country was more liberal and adaptable to change, he claimed. Intellectuals have become more sycophants and status conscious people. In the opinion of Prof. Mishra, Russell was one of the greatest democrats of the century as he had the courage to accept his 'wrongs' and reject his old convictions in favour of the newly discovered facts. Prof. P.D. Kaushik, laid emphasis on creating apolitical culture where voters recognise the importance of their vote and remain unaffected by cheap tactics of the politicians for getting the voters' support.

In the end Dr. Chadrakal Padia thanked the chief speaker, the chief guest and other participants. The seminar was attended by about eight scholars who almost represented different faculties, colleges and universities. In the end Dr. D.P. Varma thanked Dr. Padia for taking pains to arrange such a grand seminar.

Russell on "Power" by Peter Stone

A good working definition of the term "power" remains elusive in the social sciences. Such a definition would have to meet three criteria. It would have to be clear and precise. It would have to accord with the intuitive, everyday sense in which people use the term. And it would have to be useful. In particular, a good definition of "power" would lend itself easily to social criticism. That is, it would allow for critical judgements about political and social institutions.

Bertrand Russell discussed the concept of "power" in two of his many books -- Power: A New Social Analysis and The Prospects of Industrial Civilization (the latter of which he coauthored with his second wife, Dora). His popular writings rarely lacked for intuition; moreover, a concern for social criticism informed all of his political thought. Unfortunately, Russell rarely offers clear or precise definitions of terms such as "power;" and when he does, the links between his definitions and his broader project of social criticism are often unclear. Nonetheless, Russell was on the right track, and with some modifications, Russell's definitions can prove useful for social criticism without abandoning clarity or precision.

In Power, Russell provides his most famous definition of power -- the "production of intended effects" (p. 35). A person has the power to do something if he can cause something to happen when he so chooses. Power can be measured; "given two men with similar desires, if one achieves all the desires that the other achieves, and also others, he has more power than the other" (p. 35). However, the power to do things requires power over things. In a complex interdependent society, this means having power over people. Social critics are generally more concerned with power "over" than with power "to;" Russell's own social criticisms rely more on the former aspect of power than the latter. And so while this definition captures much of what people mean by "power," it does not fit very well with Russell's own critical project.

In The prospects of Industrial Civilization, Russell offers another definition of "power;" here, however, he explicitly talks about what it means to have power "over" someone. He writes that "Power may be defined as the ability to cause people to act as we wish, when they would have acted otherwise but for the effects of our desires" (p. 190). This suggests the following definition:

A person (call him X) has power over another person (call her Y) if and only if X can cause Y to act according to his wishes, given that Y would have acted otherwise had X not acted.

Unfortunately, this definition implies that X's power depends upon his desires. If X wants Y to do something, and X can act so as to induce y to do it, X has power over Y. But if X didn't want y to perform that act, then X does not have power over Y, even if X still could induce y to perform the act if he so chose. Intuitively, if X can make Y act in a certain manner, he has power over Y regardless of his desires. A revised definition might capture this, as follows:

X has power over Y if and only if X can cause Y to act in a particular manner if X so chooses, given that Y would have acted otherwise and X not acted.

Like the power to do things, power over people can be measured. If some person (call her Z) can make Y perform all of the acts that Z can, and some more acts as well, then Z has more power over Y and X does.

This definition suggests a critical distinction between having power over someone and using power over someone. If X has a gun, he might be able to rob a bank. If he did so, he would be using power over Y, the bank teller. But even if X is a nice guy who would never dream about robbing Y's bank, he still has the power to rob the bank, as well as power over Y. In any event, when X uses his power over Y, a power relation exists between X and Y.

X requires some means if he is to have power over Y -- a weapon, money, a good argument, etc. And the means used by X matter; it makes a difference whether X uses a gun or gentle persuasion to change Y's behavior. With another modification, the definition of power offered here can explicitly take into account the means used by X.

X has power over Y if and only if: 1) X has a resource; 2) X knows this; and 3) X can use this resource to make y act in a particular manner if X she chooses, given that Y would have acted differently had X not so acted.

The chief virtue of this definition is that provides an excellent vantage point for social criticism. A social critic can compare power relations according to the means used, ranking these means according to some standard. Power relations that involve undesirable means can then become targets of social action.

Russell himself recognized the importance of classifying power relations according to their means. In The Prospects of Industrial Civilization, he distinguishes between "force" and "persuasion." The first category includes power relations involving physical force, as well as threats and offers; while the second includes religious authority and propaganda. But the second category also includes power relations in which reason is the means at work. Throughout his life, Russell believed in the value of reason, and so he granted reason a privileged status. If power relations must exist, according to Russell, it would be best if they relief on reason.

A clear understanding of the concept of "power" can be of great assistance in formulating social criticism. Russell's writings on "power" are of great assistance in reaching this understanding.

Bertrand Russell's Approach to Religion by Mrs. Mamata Barua

[Following is a short extract from one of the chapters of a draft Mrs. Mamata Barua wrote out in 1993 on Bertrand Russell. Unfortunately, owing to her sudden and unexpected death her Ph.D. dissertation -- Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Man: A Study of Russell's Humanism -- which was to be submitted at Viswabharati University could not reach the final stage. We take immense pleasure in bringing to light the Scholastic Research work of Mamata Baruah. We acknowledge our gratitude to Prof. Bhaben Barua for rendering the courtesy on behalf of his wife. Ed.]

Russell's writings on religion can be divided into two groups. One group, which consists generally of some of his pre-First World War writings, reveals on the whole a positive attitude towards the subject of religion. To this group belongs his "Greek Exercises", which was written during his adolescent years (1888-89), *The Study of Mathematics* (1903), *The Essence of Religion* (1912), *Mysticism and Logic* (1914), "Religion and Church", which constitutes the seventh chapter of *The Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916) and a novel called *The Perplexities of John Forstice* (1913) which remained unpublished during Russell's lifetime (1872-1970).

The second group of Russell's writings on religion is mostly of a polemical character and it includes such essays as "What I believe" (1925), "Why I am not a Christian?" (1927), "Has Religion Made useful Contributions to Civilization?" (1930), "Can Religion Cure Our Troubles?" - all published in the collection "Why I am not a Christian", edited by Paul Edwards and published in 1957. Another essay of the same character, "Will Religious Faith Cure Our Troubles?" Was published as the seventh chapter of his book *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (1954). In these writings Russell emerges as strong critic of the tradition of religion.

In course of our discussion we shall however find that all that is only a part of Russell's total attitude towards religion which is not as destructive as it may appear at times to many readers. He denounced only the harmful effects of the tradition of religion and not its positive essence. This was indicated by Russell himself in his Reply of Criticism. In response to E.S. Brightman's "Russell's Philosophy of Religion", Russell wrote there the following words:

"What makes my attitude towards religion complex is that, although I consider some form of personal religion highly desirable and feel many people unsatisfactory through the lack of it, I cannot accept the theology of any well-known religion, and I incline to think that most churches at most times have done more harm than good"¹

In that context², Russell also showed the central significance of the chapter on religion which he had written for *The Principles of Social Reconstruction*. We may consequently take that chapter as a guidance in our exploration of the nature of Russell's "own personal religion."

Russell believed that human nature is divisible into three elements; namely, instinct, mind and spirit. The life of instinct includes all that man shares with the lower animals; the life of mind is the life of the pursuit of knowledge. It is from spirit that religion comes and derives its impersonal force³. but if religion is to be "a living or a real support to the spirit" it is to be "freed from the incubus of a

professional priesthood" and "carried on by men who have their occupations during the week". Since these men "know the everyday world" they are "not likely to fall into a remote morality which no one regards as applicable to common life"⁴. It is therefore necessary to dissociate religion from professional priesthood.

The life of the spirit centres round 'impersonal feeling' which helps us in 'renunciation' of personal desires and sharing the joys and sorrows of others. "Reverence and worship, the sense of an obligation to mankind, the feeling of imperativeness and acting under orders which traditional religion has interpreted as Divine inspiration, all belong to the life of the spirit. "Russell says further that beyond these points there is also "a sense of mystery", which is revealed in religion:

"And deeper than all these lies the sense of a mystery half revealed, of a hidden wisdom and glory, of a transfiguring vision in which common things lose their solid importance and become a thin veil behind which the ultimate truth of the world is dimly seen. It is such feelings that are the source of religion, and if they were to die most of what is best would vanish out of life."⁵

Instinct, mind and spirit are each a help to the others. All must grow together. The life of spirit does not ignore the demands of instinct and mind, which together foster the growth of individuality in man. Russell says --

"The life of the spirit demands readiness for renunciation when occasion arises, but is in its essence as positive and as capable of enriching individual existence as mind instinct are. It brings with it the joy of vision, of the mystery of profundity of the world, of the contemplation of life, and above all the joy of universal love."⁶

There is another passage which is also remarkable and it shows Russell's devotion to truth. There he says:

"Better the world should perish than that I or any other human being should believe a lie -- this is religion of thought, in whose scorching flames the dross of the world is being burnt away."⁷

Earlier in his *Study of Mathematics* published in 1902 Russell had shown love of truth as the chief of the 'austere virtues.'⁸

It was in such a spirit that Russell offered his critique of man's slavery to traditional religion. If we are eager for real spiritual progress we will have to discard much in that tradition. That was Russell's view.

"The first and greatest change that is required is to establish a morality of initiative, not a morality of submission, a morality of hope rather than fear . . . The world is our world and it rests with us to make a heaven or a hell . . . the religious life that we must seek will not be one of occasional solemnity and superstitious prohibitions, it will not be sad or ascetic, it will concern itself little with rules of conduct. It will be inspired by a vision of what human life may be, and will be happy with the joy of creation, living in a large free world of initiative and hope."

To replace the stagnant life of asceticism and "negative sinlessness" with the free life of Initiative and hope is the true role of religion in our life.⁹ It will also liberate us from the 'prison-house' of mundane and personal cares.¹⁰

The impersonal feeling, which is the centre of life of the spirit, is described in a solemn language in the concluding chapter of *Principles of social Reconstruction*:

"The world has need of a philosophy, or a religion, which will promote life. But in order to promote life it is necessary to value something other than mere life. . . some end which is impersonal and above mankind, such as god or truth or beauty. Those who best promote life do not have life for their purpose. They aim rather at what seems like a gradual incarnation, a bringing into our human existence of something eternal, something that appears to imagination to live in a heaven remote from strife and failure and the devouring jaws of Time. Contact with this eternal life -- even if it be only a world of our imagining -- brings a strength and a fundamental peace which cannot be wholly destroyed by the struggles and apparent failures of our temporal life. It is this happy contemplation of what is eternal that Spinoza calls the intellectual love of god. To those who have once known it, it is the key to wisdom."¹¹

Russell's view of religion, which also found such expressions, not unexpectedly made E.S. Brightman write, "Such genuinely religious ideas and experiences reveal a side of Russell that is unsuspected by many of his readers."¹²

As in *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, in his other writing on religion, Russell was concerned with the dignity, worth and possibilities of human life. In this context another memorable passage is found in *Collected papers of Bertrand Russell*:¹²

"Religion is the passionate determination that human life is to be capable of importance, that value and excellence are to be at least in the same rank with the great facts of Nature - the heavens, the march of Time and Destiny. Religion is the feeling of triviality of life . . . To assert religion is to believe that virtue is momentous, that human greatness is truly great, and that it is possible for man to achieve an existence which shall have significance . . . for the greatness of littleness of our lives are largely in our own control, and by stern resolution almost any achievement becomes possible.

Religion then is concerned with human life, but is not the same thing as morality. Religion is not the good life, but a certain attitude towards the good life."¹³

Taking all these ideas expressed by Russell himself as the deeper region of his philosophy of religion we may try to trace its development from his early life onwards.

(II)

In "My Mental Development", a piece of writing contained in *Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Russell informs us that at the age of 'fourteen or fifteen' he became 'passionately interested in religion.' This interest, as we find it, was of a rather argumentative or polemical kind. As he explained it, he set to examine the arguments for free will, immortality and God and abandoned them successively.¹⁴

This dissatisfaction with religion grew out of Russell's impatience with the strict moral code and the Church dogmas which had been imparted to him

mostly by his orthodox grandmother. "The atmosphere in the house was one of Puritan piety and austerity . . . Only virtue was prized, virtue at the expense of intellect, health, happiness, and every mundane good."¹⁵

The young Russell rebelled against that ideal of religion, 'first in the name of intellect', and sought to examine the basic doctrines of Christianity with the principles of science he was beginning to learn. He also started to write down his doubts and perplexities in Greek letters. Thus came out his "Greek Exercises."

"In finding reasons for belief in God", he wrote there, "I shall take account of scientific arguments" and by "scientific arguments" he meant arguments based on reason and logic.¹⁶

Russell's biographer Ronald W. Clark wrote that "two days after his sixteenth birthday" Russell put on record "the ideas from which his devout agnosticism was to emerge." That young Russell is heard in these words:

"I should like to believe in my people's religion, which was just what I could wish, but alas, it is impossible. I have really no religion, for my god, being a spirit shown merely by reason to exist, his properties utterly unknown, is no help to my life. I have not the parson's comfortable doctrine, that every good action has its reward and every sin is forgiven. My whole religion is this: do every duty, and expect no reward for it, either here or hereafter."

Side by side with this attitude toward Christianity, a strong impulse towards nature-worship also manifested itself in his writings. Kenneth Blackwell quotes a passage from "Greek Exercises" that reveals a "pantheistic outlook". That passage contains such sentences:

"Here in indeed lies the beauty of nature, and the comfort it can afford when the spirit is vexed with doubt, when peace seems a thing never more to bless the soul; then the blessed influence of the stars or the moon descends like balm upon the soul . . . In human handiwork perfection can never be attained; in nature, perfection appears at every turn, manifesting the perfect soul of the creator."¹⁷

Thus in "Greek Exercises" Russell was wavering between belief and unbelief, between faith in the doctrines he learned from his grandmother and an understanding of the modern scientific doctrines. "The search for truth has shattered most of my old beliefs, and has made me commit what are probably sins."¹⁸

By the time he joined Cambridge, these ideas became a source of distress to him. Kirk wills observes that the distress was not so much caused by his rejection of traditional Christian doctrines as by his growing concern with "the larger issues involved in those questions . . . issues of human worth and purpose, individual responsibility and moral value."¹⁹ These issues were always closely connected with his more mature years.

In his *Autobiography* Russell has given a description of his acquisition of a 'mystic insight' . . . the influence of which, he says, 'has always remained with me'¹⁹. This experience needs to be given a due weightage in the discussion of Russell's philosophy of religion.

During 1900-1910 Russell was absorbed in writing *Principia Mathematica* with A.N. Whitehead. Early in 1901, one evening he found Mrs. Whitehead suffering from intense pain owing to a heart attack. At that moment Russell was overtaken by "what religious people call 'conversion' -- a sort of mystic illumination." During those 'five minutes' he felt that the loveliness of human soul is unbearable,

war is to be abhorred, harshness in education and use of force in all human relations are to be avoided and experienced a desire almost as profound as that of Buddha to find some philosophy which would make human life endurable."²⁰

Russell wrote that the outcome of this experience was his "A Free Man's Worship" (1903). In the same year (1903), Russell wrote a letter to Lowes Dickinson and it contains a passage which shows the spirit in which Russell came to accept religion.

"But what we have to do, and what privately we do, is to treat the religious instinct with profound respect . . . and above all to insist upon preserving the seriousness of the religious attitude and its habit of asking ultimate questions."²²

To treat the religious instinct with profound interest and seriousness was an attitude which lay embedded in the deeper layer of Russell's philosophy of religion.

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BERTRAND RUSSELL'S MODEL FOR TEACHER EDUCATION

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Above all, every educator who is engaged in an attempt to make the best of the students to whom he speaks must regard himself as the servant of truth and not of this or that political or sectarian interest. Truth is a shining goddess, always veiled, always distant, never wholly approachable, but worthy of all the devotion of which the human spirit is capable.

Bertrand Russell, Fact and Fiction, "University Education," p. 156

Bertrand Russell was one of the foremost minds of the 20th Century. As a philosopher and mathematician, he left us a legacy of ideas that span the length and breadth of human imagination. Many of those ideas are devoted to education, politics, and teaching. The purpose of this paper is to describe Russell's approach to teacher education by looking at Russell's description of the functions of a teacher and to respond to his model in light of recent reform attempts in teacher education. Many of his ideas about teacher education originate with negative reactions to his own educational experiences and with his experiences as a parent and teacher at Beacon Hill School. Beacon Hill was founded in collaboration with his second wife, Dora Russell, to create a new kind of school where Russell's children, their classmates and teachers were free to explore their natural interests in a spontaneous, creative fashion. State schools were responsible for teaching nationalism, militarism, patriotism, and conformity to the status quo, in Russell's estimation, and therefore were not capable of developing a sense of "intellectual independence" in students, or their teachers. The Russells clearly felt that it was their responsibility to provide an alternative to the indoctrination of government-run schools. Although Russell ultimately considered the school a failure, it was a major influence in the on-going development of his educational theory and practice.

This combination of roles as parent, teacher, and school administrator also convinced Russell that skepticism must be an essential product of schooling. Russell writes of teaching:

The profession has a great and honourable tradition, extending from the dawn of history until recent times, but any teacher in the modern world who allows himself to be inspired by the ideals of his predecessors is likely to be made sharply aware that it is not his function to teach what he thinks, but to instill such beliefs and prejudices as are thought useful by his employers.

"The Functions of a Teacher," p. 124.

For Russell, modern educators are precluded from the search for the shining veiled goddess of Truth because government seek to perpetuate falsehood through schooling. Teachers, as loyal civil servants, are not free to teach what they think. They are required to teach what the government prescribes. In the *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, written together with Dora, the Russells comment:

The governors of the world believe, and have always believed, that virtue can only be taught by teaching falsehood, and that any man who knew the truth would be wicked. I disbelieve this, absolutely and entirely. I believe that love of truth is the basis of real virtue, and that virtue based on lies can only do harm. (p. 252)

How can virtue be taught by educators fettered by the guardians of falsehood, especially when "the teacher has become, in the vast majority of cases, a civil servant obliged to carry out the behests of men who have not his learning, who have no experience of dealing with the young, and whose only attitude towards education is that of the propagandist?" (The Functions of a Teacher, p. 125) Russell's clear response to his question is his firm commitment to skepticism as the primary means of educating teacher and students alike. As he stated in his introduction to *Sceptical Essays*:

I wish to propose for the reader's favorable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition where there is no ground whatever for supporting it . . . (p. 11)

He continues in *Sceptical Essays* by suggesting teaching strategies that help students to think critically about important issues through careful examination of the evidence. He writes:

If there is to be toleration in the world, one of the things taught in schools must be the habit of weighing evidence, and the practice of not giving full assent to propositions which there is no reason to believe true. For example, the art of reading newspapers should be taught. The schoolmaster should select some incident which happened a good many years ago, and roused political passions in its day. He should then read to the school-children what was said by newspapers on one side, what was said by those on the other, and some impartial account of what really happened. He should show how, from the biased account of either side, a practised reader could infer what really happened, and he should make them understand that everything in the newspapers is more or less untrue. The cynical scepticism which would result from this teaching would make children in later life immune from those appeals to idealism by which decent people are induced to further the schemes of scoundrels. (p. 126)

Teachers in a democratic society have the responsibility to inspire and require critical thinking in their students and Russell has supplied teaching strategies to describe and support his contention that skepticism is essential to the prospective teacher.

Russell also argues that the spirit of skepticism and the process of rational discourse discourages those dogmatists who seek to dominate the culture with their competing versions of the truth. The teacher's function is to instill in her students "the habit of impartial inquiry," based upon her own "readiness to do justice to all sides" through her own scientific investigation. Teachers are the guardians of the search for truth and the teaching strategies that they utilize in their classrooms are essential to development of a thinking citizenry.

Not only must teachers practice skepticism and rational inquiry, they must also be the protectors of civilization, not in the physical sense, but in the mental

sense. Civilization is "a matter partly of knowledge, partly of emotion." By knowledge of civilization, Russell means that teachers must possess a sense of their places in the cosmos, not as a damper to human spirit but rather as an incentive to "enlarge the minds that contemplates it." From the emotional side, a similar kind of broad perspective is essential so that the teacher understands the many positive contributions to humanity that outweigh the cruelty and oppression that one would also find in the record of human history. If the teacher is a repository of cultural awareness, Russell is convinced that the teacher will convey this awareness to his students. Feelings must also go beyond cultural awareness to interpersonal relations in the classroom. For Russell, teachers can not be effective unless they have genuine feelings of affection for their students and a genuine desire to teach what they feel is valuable. All education, then, is the acquisition of knowledge tempered by love. The teacher's love of his students prevents the destructive use of punishment and cruelty that thwart what is good in his students. Cruelty represses the natural pursuit of happiness and replaces it with envy, a vice that distorts the natural energy and vigor of the student, twisting the development of the person toward unhappiness. Teachers robbed of happiness themselves in childhood or youth may visit the same fate upon their students.

One such example of distortion that creates unhappiness in the lives of students is the idea that teaching an unrealistic picture of the world prevents cynicism because the real world would be far too horrible or shocking for the students to withstand. Russell argues that if teachers "aim at training initiative without diminishing its strength," the knowledge of good in the world, coupled with scientific study will produce no such effect. In fact, the search for truth would only be invigorated in those who understand the status quo. Lying to the young, as Russell would put it, is morally indefensible under any circumstances since they have no way to verify what they have been told. Teachers do not protect their students from cynicism, they encourage its formation in adults who ultimately realize that they were never told the truth or were never shown how to find out what the truth really is. Teachers must trained to inquire, to investigate for themselves so that they may show their students the process of thinking independently. Appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of civilization, skeptical inquiry, and love of students are requisite functions for a teacher. The initiative and curiosity of the teacher focuses his students upon the same habits of mind, the same critical thinking ability that he demonstrates on a daily basis in his classroom.

Finally, Russell wants teachers to combat parochialism engendered by rampant nationalism and ethnocentrism. In fact, he believes "tolerance that springs from an endeavor to understand those who are different from ourselves" is essential to the survival of democracy. The teacher, as guardian of civilized culture, must combat such ignorance no matter what its manifestation may be. Ultimately, Russell blames much of the closedmindedness of a culture upon the tendency of the government to use schools and teachers for maximizing an ethnocentrism. He calls for more freedom for teachers, "more opportunities of self-determination, more independence from the interference of bureaucrats and bigots." He could not be more accurate. The teacher can only function properly where she feels free from "outside authority." If there are no opportunities for free expression, especially in classrooms, Russell believes that democracy and all that is best in man will be crushed.

Is teacher education up to the challenge that Russell describes? It would seem that teachers and teacher education are still heavily regulated by State governments through licensure requirements, both entry and renewal. It seems highly unlikely, therefore, to expect a sudden change in the political climate to support freedom of thought for teachers or teacher education. Tenure, for instance, was initially conceived as a way to provide academic freedom for teachers but recent attacks on tenure have eroded this freedom by allowing teachers or college professors to be "downsized" out of a school district or college position, tenured or not! Tenure remains, however, the most important means of providing teachers at all levels solemn measure of protection from the vagaries of the political marketplace. Teacher education, especially because State governments control licensure regulations and entry into the profession, will always be subject to State control Politics and education are inextricably linked in this fashion. For teacher education, it means that State governments mandate what the teacher education curriculum must look like. How much independent thinking can we expect from teachers whose preparation is governed by State mandate? The answer is not as bleak as one might think.

Russell's approach to teacher education stresses the need for teachers to be skeptics. Teachers must know how to model skepticism for their students by being skeptical thinkers themselves and by utilizing teaching strategies that encourage students to weigh evidence and think for themselves. Teacher education, then, is not just a matter of imparting a set of uniform skills that every prospective teacher must master. It is the function of teacher education to provide the democratic community with teachers trained in skepticism, with teachers whose characters are imbued with a spirit of inquiry, with teachers whose love of learning and culture are unmistakable. Teacher educators everywhere owe a debt to Bertrand Russell for his clear understanding of the purpose of education in a democratic society and for his commitment to skepticism as the primary means of searching for the veiled goddess of Truth.

BOOK REVIEW

by John Shosky
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John G. Slater. Bertrand Russell. Preface by Ray Monk. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1994. 171 pages.

This is the first in a series of "Bristol Introductions", which will offer, according to the book jacket, "short original texts that aim to present challenging perspectives on philosophical themes, using non-technical language." If this is the goal, then Slater's Bertrand Russell is a most appropriate beginning, written by one of his most encyclopedic students, John Slater of the University of Toronto. Bertrand Russell is a cogent, accessible, well-crafted, and scholarly addition to Russell commentary. I highly recommend it to all those interested in Russell's philosophical, political, and social contributions. In particular, I urge members of the Russell Society to buy it, read it, give it to friends and colleagues, assign it for classes, and cite it in talks about Russell. This is the book that will explain to people why Russell was an admirable, noble, compassionate, and visionary thinker.

Frankly, Russell himself would have surely loved this book. The material covers virtually all major areas of Russell's wide-ranging thought. Ray Monk, who is himself preparing a much-anticipated volume on Russell, humorously refers to Bertrand Russell as a "guidebook of a vast and little-explored country . . . one of the best and most reliable guidebooks available." While Slater claims that there is little in this short volume that is original, the quality and clarity of this survey makes it a remarkable achievement. Others who have tried to present short surveys of Russell's work (Ayer, Gottschalk, and others) have had to pick and choose, emphasizing one aspect of Russell's thought over others. Of course, in 171 pages Slater had to do the same, with thirteen chapters on Russell's life, logic and foundations of mathematics, scientific method in philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, religious views, political theory, political activism, study of history, views on education, and achievements. But one feels that Slater's book has balance and perspective, making it a more approachable effort than Clark's monumental biography or Moorehead's lite version.

Of course, given Russell's output and range of interests, few will be thoroughly satisfied with this introduction. That is as it should be -- an introduction should stimulate readers to go back to the original texts. Personally, I would have liked to see more discussion of Russell's contributions to logic and epistemology. In this respect few would argue that this book will displace the technical philosophical analysis on Russell's work by Jager, Eames, Sainsbury, Pears, Griffin, or other philosophers. But one aspect of this book that deserves much praise is the last chapter's evaluation of Russell's scientific approach to philosophy and social/political issues, and his reliance on logical analysis as a progressive methodology. This is an important assessment -- one that should receive more study and cannot be over-estimated in terms of Russell scholarship. Those who argue that Russell constantly changed his philosophy often forget that his methodological approach did not vary, and that analytical methodology is perhaps Russell's (and Moore's) most important contribution to intellectual history. As Slater argues,

Russell favors unity of method in his philosophical work, not unity of results. Slater observes that "In Russell's opinion, simply to adopt a position and forever after defend it would have been to abandon the scientific method, and, hence, the search for truth." Given Russell's "adventurous" mind, consistency of result would have been impossible. But knowing how to generate progressive results took genius, fore-sight, and courage.

This book is now available in the United States. I purchased my copy in Blackwell's in Oxford because the UK version came out almost a year ago. However, Bertrand Russell should now be obtainable in any major book store or through a special order. If additional information is needed, Thoemmes Books can be reached at 11 Great George Street, Bristol BS1 5RR, England, United Kingdom. Their phone number is 0117 929-1377 and the fax number is 0117 922-1918. Please be aware that the city code for the telephone may have changed in the recent reconfiguration in the UK. The ISBN for the paperback is 1 85506 346 8 and for hardback 1 85506 347 6.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

November, 1995

No. 88



Bertrand Russell Society
c/o Michael J. Rockler
529 14th St., NW, Suite 1125
Washington, DC 20045

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The Bertrand Russell Society

3802 North Kenneth Avenue, Chicago, IL 60641-2814, U.S.A.

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

Michael J. Rockler
529 14th Street, NW
Suite 1125
Washington, DC 20045

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of The Bertrand Russell Society

November, 1995

No. 88

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From the Editor
Michael J. Rockler

I recently read Alan Ryan's John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism. In this volume Ryan provides readers with an in depth examination, analysis and summary of Dewey's work. In under four hundred pages, he offers many new perspectives on Dewey's life.

Alan Ryan is no stranger to members of the Bertrand Russell Society. His previous book, Bertrand Russell: A Political Life, received the Bertrand Russell Society book award a few years ago. Ryan participated in the annual meeting and added much to the proceedings by his presence.

The current issue of Free Inquiry contains a special section--'Russell Remembered'--commemorating the 25th anniversary of Russell's death. Ryan is one of the contributors to this publication.

Reading Ryan's book on Dewey points up again for me some of the interesting differences between John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. Both of these intellectual giants wrote about education, democracy, religion and nationalism. In each of these areas they differed in many ways.

Dewey can be viewed as the great exponent of process in education. For him, process was the most significant part of education--learning was primarily to be based on experience in ways that were meaningful to children. Progressive education emphasized learning by doing and for Dewey doing was the most important component of the equation.

Russell also recognized the importance of experiential education and he too can be viewed as a progressive educator (particularly in ways in which his school--Beacon Hill--was influenced by Dora Russell). But Russell was much more committed to the importance of content than was Dewey. Russell believed that process was important but the process had to focus on some clearly defined objective.

Dewey can be viewed as the great modern philosopher of democracy. He believed profoundly in collaborative life. Russell, I believe, had a more realistic view of the limits of democracy than did Dewey. He understood the possibility of the tyranny of the majority--even as he was imprisoned twice in his lifetime for holding unpopular views. While committed to democratic life, Russell urged us to be wary of the "herd instinct" which could lead to disastrous consequences. Russell's grandmother introduced him to the biblical passage that says "Do not follow a multitude to do evil." This phrase remained a guiding principle for all of Russell's life.

The differences between Dewey and Russell with regard to religion have been described many times. Dewey never totally abandoned his New England religious perspectives and must be ultimately labeled a religious humanist. Russell on the other hand was clearly a member of the great pantheon of secular humanist philosophers.

Ryan makes the convincing case that Dewey was a nationalist who wanted to achieve a melting pot in the United States by creating a fully national culture. Russell, on the other hand, was a citizen of the world believing in internationalism and attempting to promote it throughout his long life. Dewey's narrow nationalism was appalling to Russell.

In this issue we reprint an essay from Free Inquiry by John Novak entitled "Why I am not a Russellian." Novak is an officer of the John Dewey Society. His view of Russell from the perspective of a committed Deweyian makes for interesting reading.

The first issue of the new Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly has been well received. I appreciate the many positive comments I have heard. In order to continue to produce a quarterly every editor must depend on the readers for help. Please send me articles or other material for future issues. My predecessors, Lee Eisler and Don Jackanicz, knew that the input from members was critical. This continues to be true. Please submit material for the next issue.

From the President

John R. Lenz, President, The Bertrand Russell Society

With this issue of the Quarterly you are receiving initial notice of our 1996 annual meeting. We will meet here at Drew University in Madison, New Jersey, on the weekend of May 3-5, 1996. It's not too early (as I've learned) to begin planning.

After talking with several people, we've decided to try an earlier date than usual for the 1996 meeting. I see several advantages in meeting here while school is still in session. We have an opportunity to promote awareness of Russell among a university community. Students and faculty will be able to attend. We also hope to attract new speakers and visitors from the greater New York area.

Drew is a lovely, wooded campus, located only 30 minutes from Newark International Airport and easily accessible (in about one hour) from New York City by train or bus. Bertrand Russell Society sessions will be held in an historic neo-Classical mansion, Mead Hall, built in 1836. We will provide transportation to and from the Madison Hotel; this is a grand, fairly luxurious hotel located 1-1/2 miles from campus. (We are able to take advantage of the Drew rate for rooms there--nearly half of the usual). For those with physical limitations, or financial need, we also have reserved the guest apartment (with three bedrooms) on campus.

Nearby Morristown is home to a statue of Thomas Paine. In fact, Bertrand Russell, as a member and once Honorary President of the Thomas Paine Foundation, helped to erect it. (Perhaps someone would like to talk on the fascination British humanists have with Paine?)

We're arranging an interesting meeting. James Birx (a contributor to Free Inquiry magazine) will speak on "Russell and Evolution." Michael Rockler will lead a workshop on a work of Russell's fiction (to be distributed to all who register). Don Jackanicz plans to speak on Bertie's interests in art. John Shosky and Tim Madigan should return with their unique offerings. Tom Stanley has supplied a videotape of Russell's 1960 interviews with the BBC (published as *Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind*). We're waiting to hear from some new people who would add interesting perspectives; I'll announce these in the next Quarterly. And, of course, please help to spread the word about our Prizes for Papers, one for undergraduates and one for graduate students' John Shosky (at American University) runs this program.

The Annual Meeting provides a unique opportunity for us to come together, express our shared values and interests, see old friends and meet new ones. I hope you will consider attending and encourage your friends in the New York area to visit, too. Please call or e-mail me with any questions or suggestions: 201-408-3275 or jlenz@drew.edu.

P.S. Congratulations to Jan Eisler on being elected (over stiff competition) to the Board of Directors of the American Humanist Association!

And thanks to Tom Stanley for setting up a preliminary Bertrand Russell Society home page on the World Wide Web (Bertie would have approved of the move into this frontier): <http://freenet.buffalo.edu/~bk553>.

E-mail addresses: We are compiling a list of e-mail addresses of our members. If you would like your e-mail address to be included please send it to jlentz@drew.edu.

Bylaws of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.

Article 1. Name

The name of this organization shall be The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. It may also be referred to as "the Society" or "the BRS".

Article 2. Aims

The aims of this Society are: (1) to promote interest in the life and work of Bertrand Russell; (2) to bring together persons interested in any aspect of the foregoing; (3) to promote causes that Russell championed.

Article 3. Motto

The Society's motto shall be Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

Article 4. Power and Authority

Ultimate authority resides in the Members. The Members elect the Directors. The Directors elect the Officers. The Officers make decisions and take action.

Article 5. Membership

Section 1. General. Membership in the Society shall be open to all persons and organizations interested in Bertrand Russell and the Society's activities. Types of membership shall be: Individual, Couple, Student, Limited Income, Life, Organization, and Honorary. Dues shall be set by the Board of Directors, and are to be paid annually. Life members shall pay dues only once in an amount set by the Board. Honorary members pay no dues. Life and Honorary memberships are for life unless terminated for cause, as specified hereafter.

Section 2. Individual Membership. Individual Membership shall be available to all persons.

Section 3. Couple Membership. Couple Membership shall be available to two persons sharing the same mail address. Each person shall have one vote; two mail ballots shall be sent, but only one copy of other Society mailings.

Section 4. Student Membership. Student membership shall be open to any student enrolled in an educational institution and who is less than 25 years old.

Section 5. Limited Income Membership. Limited Income Membership shall be available to a person who, as the name implies, is living on a limited income.

Section 6. Life Membership. Life Membership can be conferred on any person who meets the minimum dues set by the Board of Directors for Life Membership.

Section 7. Honorary Membership. Honorary Membership may be conferred on a person who has been nominated by a member and approved by two-thirds of the Directors voting, after having met one or more of the following conditions: (1) is a member of Bertrand Russell's family; (2) had worked closely with Russell in an important way; (3) has made a distinctive contribution to Russell scholarship; (4) has acted in support of a cause or idea that Russell championed; (5) has promoted awareness of Russell or of Russell's work; (6) has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of Russell. Honorary Members have the same rights and responsibilities as Individual Members, but they pay no dues.

Section 8. Organization Membership. Membership of organizations--such as libraries, associations, corporations--is available upon payment of dues and approval of the President. Dues shall be higher than for a Couple. Organizations may not vote or be on the Board. Only one copy of Society mailings shall be sent.

Section 9. Conditions of Membership. Application for membership shall be made in writing, submitting name, address, and correct amount of dues. The Board may refuse an application, in which case the President must notify the applicant within 30 days, stating why the application was turned down.

Membership terminates when a member fails to pay dues, resigns, dies, or is expelled.

Any member--including Life or Honorary--may be expelled for seriously obstructing the Society's business, misappropriating the Society's name or funds or acting in a way that discredits the Society. The expulsion procedure consists of five steps:

Step 1. A formal expulsion proposal shall be presented in writing to the Board by any member.

Step 2. The Board shall examine the evidence. If a majority of the Board Members voting decides, either by mail ballot or at a meeting, that expulsion may be appropriate, the matter will be submitted to, and decided by, the members. This shall be done by mail, or at an Annual Meeting if one is scheduled within two months.

If it is to be done by mail:

Step 3. The case against the member shall be presented in the next newsletter or by a special mailing.

Step 4. In the following newsletter, or in a second special mailing, the accused member shall present a defense against the charge. A ballot shall be included in the second newsletter or second special mailing, so that members can vote on whether to expel.

If the expulsion process takes place at an Annual Meeting:

Step 4. The equivalent of Steps 3 and 4 shall be followed, that is, the case against the member shall be presented, after which the accused shall present his defense; and then the members present shall vote on whether to expel.

The President shall notify the accused member as soon as the result of the vote is known.

Article 6. The Board of Directors

Section 1. Responsibilities. The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") shall be responsible for Society affairs and policy, and shall elect the Officers. The Board shall be subject to these Bylaws and to the Bylaws of The Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.

Section 2. Constitution. The Board shall consist of not less than six nor more than 24 members. Society Officers are ex-officio members of the Board. Elected and ex-officio Board Members shall have the same rights and responsibilities.

Members may nominate candidates for the Board, or volunteer to be nominated as candidates. Directors are elected to three-year terms that start on January 1 of the following year; one-third are elected every year. Directors may be reelected. If a Director dies, resigns, or is expelled, the Board may fill the unexpired term with any member.

Article 7. Officers

Section 1. General. The Society shall have the following Officers: President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Secretary. There may also be other Vice Presidents whose duties shall be specified by the Board. Officers shall be at least 18 years old and shall have been members for at least one year. They shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. An Officer's term of office lasts until the next election of Officers, the following year. No one shall hold more than one Office at a time, except that the same person shall be Secretary of the Society and Secretary of the Board. An Officer may be removed or suspended by a majority of the Board members voting. An Officer may resign by notifying the Chairman of Board in writing. If an Office becomes vacant, the Board shall elect a successor to fill the unexpired term. If an Officer is temporarily unable to serve, the Board may elect a temporary replacement.

Section 2. The President. The President shall be the Chief Executive Officer, coordinating the work of other Officers and Committees. Other Officers and Committee Chairmen shall consult the President about their activities, and submit a written report on their activities to him one month before the Annual Meeting, with a copy to the Chairman. The President

shall promptly inform the Chairman of any major decisions. After the Board has selected the site and time of the next Annual Meeting, or of a Special Meeting, the President shall be responsible for making all Meeting arrangements, including compiling the Meeting's agenda. The President shall chair the Meeting. The President shall report regularly, through the Bertrand Russell Society newsletter.

Section 3. The Vice President. The Vice President becomes President if the President's Office become vacant, and assumes the office temporarily if the vacancy is temporary. The Vice President shall assist the President as requested.

Section 4. The Secretary. The Secretary shall: (1) record the minutes of Society and Board meetings; (2) handle Society and Board correspondence; (3) maintain a permanent file of Society and Board meetings, Officers' and Committee Chairmen's reports, newsletters, correspondence; (4) maintain a permanent record of Society and Board decisions, rules, motions made and carried; (5) have custody of Society's corporate seal.

Section 5. The Treasurer. The Treasurer shall: (1) keep records of money received and spent; (2) safeguard Society funds; (3) invest funds, with Board approval; (4) submit an annual budget to the Board; (5) submit quarterly and annual reports, for publication in the Bertrand Russell Society newsletter.

Section 6. Other Vice Presidents. The Office of "Vice President/ . . ." may be created and filled by the Board. There is no connection between this Office and that of the Vice President.

Article 8. Committees

Section 1. General. There shall be standing (permanent) and ad hoc (temporary) Committees. Each shall have a Chairman, and may have a Co-Chairman and other members. A member may serve on, or chair, more than one Committee. Committee Chairmen shall consult with the President about their activities, and describe them in a written report to the President one month before the Annual Meeting, with a copy to the Chairman.

Section 2. Committees. The Board shall establish standing and ad hoc Committees, and appoint their Chairmen who, in turn, appoint Committee Members. Each Committee shall provide the Secretary with a written statement of Committee aims and procedures.

Article 9. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Meetings. The Society shall hold an Annual Meeting, at a time and site determined by the Board and in time to give the members at least two month's notice of the Meeting. As to time: it should suit the convenience of as many members as possible. As to site: it should be either

(a) near locations of special interest to the Bertrand Russell Society, or (b) near population centers having many members. Any member may propose agenda items, in writing, to the President, in advance of the Meeting. At Meetings, items may be added to the agenda with approval of the majority of the members present. Six members constitute a quorum.

Section 2. Special Meetings. Any member may write to the Chairman requesting a Special Meeting, claiming that an emergency exists requiring immediate action. The Chairman shall decide whether the request merits consideration by the Board; if it does, the Chairman shall promptly inform the Board, which shall decide, within three weeks, by mail ballot, whether, when and where to hold a Special meeting. The Special Meeting shall be held no later than six weeks after the Chairman's initial receipt of the request. The Chairman shall announce the Special Meeting to all members by letter, as soon as possible. A quorum shall consist of the members present.

Section 3. Board of Directors Meetings. The Board shall hold its Annual Meeting during the Society's Annual Meeting and at the same site. The Board may also hold Special Meetings, in accordance with its now By-laws. Board Meetings shall be open to Society members.

Article 10. Publications

Section 1. Newsletter. The Society shall publish a newsletter at regular intervals.

Section 2. Other Publications. The Society may authorize other publications.

Article 11. Voting

Section 1. General. All members, other than Organization Members, shall be entitled to vote. All votes shall have equal value. Members may vote by proxy. In contests of more than two candidates or choices, a plurality shall be sufficient.

Section 2. Voting by Mail. Voting may be by mail. Ballots shall be sent to all eligible members, either in the Bertrand Russell Society newsletter or by special mailing. The deadline for the return of ballots shall be not less than three weeks from the date ballots are mailed by first class mail, not less than four weeks if mailed third class. Ballots must go first class to Canada and Mexico, and by airmail to other foreign countries. Mail ballots shall be tallied by the Elections Committee, and verified by the Secretary. Ballots for the Board's voting by mail shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary; the Chairman may designate a substitute for the Secretary.

Article 12. Amendments to these Bylaws

Section 1. Voting to Amend at a Meeting. These Bylaws may be amended at a Society Meeting by a majority vote of those members present and voting.

Section 2. Voting to Amend by Mail. These Bylaws may also be amended by mail ballot. The proposed changes, with supporting arguments, will appear in the Bertrand Russell Society newsletter or a special mailing. In the following Bertrand Russell Society newsletter or second special mailing, other views, including opposing views, will appear, along with a mail ballot. To pass, the Amendment must be approved by a majority of the ballots cast.

Bylaws of the Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.

Article 1. Responsibilities and Obligations

The board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") has these responsibilities: (1) to set policy for the Society's affairs, and (2) to elect officers of the Society and of the Board. The Board has these obligations: to be governed by these Bylaws and by the Society's Bylaws.

Article 2. Membership

Membership shall be in accord with Article 5 of the Society's Bylaws.

Article 3. Officers

Section 1. The Chairman. The Chairman shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Chairman's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Chairman may be reelected. The Chairman presides at Board Meetings, and rules on procedure.

If the Chairman is absent, the Directors may elect an Acting Chairman. If the office of Chairman is vacant, the Directors shall elect a new Chairman as soon as possible, at an Annual or Special Meeting or by mail ballot. The votes shall be tallied by the Acting Chairman and verified by the Secretary. The Chairman may be removed from office by a majority of Directors present and voting at a meeting, with the Secretary presiding.

Section 2. The Secretary. The Secretary shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Secretary's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Secretary may be reelected. The Secretary of the Board and the Secretary of the Society shall be the same person. If the Secretary is absent from a Meeting, the Chairman shall appoint an Acting Secretary.

Article 4. Voting

Voting shall be in accord with Article 11 of the Society's Bylaws, except as follows: the Chairman's vote counts as one except in a tie, when it counts as two.

Article 5. Committees

Committees may be created by the Board, to perform Board functions, and shall follow Board instructions.

Article 6. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Board Meeting. The Board shall meet annually, at some time during a Society Annual Meeting, and at the same site. Society Members may attend Board Meetings.

Section 2. Special Board Meetings. A Special Board Meeting shall be called by the Chairman when at least three Directors request it, stating the purpose. In choosing the time and site, the Chairman shall aim to achieve the largest possible attendance by Directors.

Section 3. Agenda. The Agenda for Board Meetings shall be prepared by the Chairman. Additions to the Agenda may be made by any Director, with the concurrence of the Chairman.

Section 4. Quorum. The quorum for any Board Meetings is three Directors.

Article 7. Amendments to Board Bylaws

Any Director may propose an amendment.

At an Annual or Special Meeting, a majority vote of the Directors present and voting shall carry the proposed amendment.

When an amendment is proposed by the Chairman, in writing, between Meetings, the Chairman shall decide whether to hold the proposal for the next Meeting or put it to an earlier vote by mail. For voting by mail, the Chairman shall promptly notify the Directors by a special mailing of the proposed amendment, with supporting arguments, requesting opposing arguments by 21 days after the date of mailing. Thereafter, the Chairman shall mail the opposing arguments, and a ballot, to the Directors, with a voting deadline of 21 days after the date of mailing. The votes shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary, who shall notify the Directors of the outcome.

Bertrand Russell Society Business

The following pages contain Society business that need your attention. Each page may be xeroxed and sent to the appropriate address.

SOCIETY BUSINESS INCLUDES:

- 1) Membership Renewal
- 2) Board of Directors Election Ballot
- 3) Registration for the Annual Meeting
(please note the change in the dates of the Annual Meeting)
- 4) Call for Papers

**ATTENTION, PLEASE
BRS Dues Are Due January 1, 1996**

Everyone's Bertrand Russell Society renewal dues are due January 1, 1996. The January 1st due-date applies to all members, including first-year members (excepting those who joined in the final quarter, i.e. October/November/December 1995).

The 1996 dues schedule in U.S. dollars: Regular Individual, \$35. Regular Couple (two persons at the same address), \$40. Student or Limited Income Individual, \$20. Limited Income Couple, \$25. Plus \$10 for any membership outside the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico. Plus \$4 for any membership in Canada or Mexico.

Please remember that the BRS's financial condition is a continuing concern. There is no immediate financial crisis. But neither is there, as yet, the solid financial foundation that long-term survival requires. We ask those members who can afford to, to make an extra contribution when renewing membership by choosing one of the special membership categories on the renewal coupon below.

Please mail dues, payable to "Bertrand Russell Society" in U.S. dollars, to Bertrand Russell Society; c/o Dennis Darland, 1965 Winding Hills Drive, #1304, Davenport, IA 52807.

Thank you for renewing and for your contributions. And thank you for renewing early.

RENEWAL COUPON

I am glad to be an early renewer, to ease the renewal process for the BRS. And I hope to see the BRS continue to thrive for a long time to come. I have looked over the membership categories below, and chosen one that is right for my circumstances.

I have checked my membership category and, if applicable, my foreign mailing category.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Student, \$20 | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Limited Income, Individual, \$20 | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Limited Income, Couple, \$25 | <input type="checkbox"/> Plus \$10 if outside U.S.A. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Regular Individual, \$35 | Canada, and Mexico |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Regular Couple, \$40 | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Contributor, \$40 | <input type="checkbox"/> Plus \$4 if in Canada or if |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sustainer, \$50 | in Mexico |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sponsor, \$100 and up | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Patron, \$250 and up | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Benefactor, \$500 and up | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Life Member, \$1000 and up | |

I enclose my dues, in U.S. dollars, payable to "Bertrand Russell Society."

Name _____ Date _____

Address _____

**BOARD OF DIRECTORS BALLOT
Vote for Eight
(3 Year Term January 1, 1996 - December 31, 1998)**

James Alouf _____

Linda Egendorf _____

Donald Jackanicz _____

Marvin Kohl _____

Tim Madigan _____

Michael Rockler _____

Warren Allen Smith _____

Ramon Suzara _____

Thom Weidlich _____

Return To: Donald Jackanicz
Bertrand Russell Society - Secretary
3802 North Kenneth Avenue
Chicago, IL 60641

Please return by December 15, 1995

**Register Early for
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY'S
ANNUAL MEETING, 1996:
"The Humanism of Bertrand Russell"**

- Dates:** Friday, May 3 to Sunday, May 5, 1996
- Place:** Drew University, Madison, New Jersey. Easily accessible from Newark International Airport and New York City. A map and directions will be included with the February Quarterly.
- Lodging:** The Madison Hotel, Morristown, NJ. Reserve your rooms directly with them. We enjoy the special rate for Drew University; this is to be set shortly and is expected to be about \$79 per room (single or double). Call them at: 201-285-1800 (fax 201-540-8566), and tell them you are with the Drew party reserved by John Lenz (they don't know Russell, unfortunately; the meeting is being co-sponsored by Drew's Depts. of Classics and Philosophy). We will provide transportation from the hotel, on the same street as the school, 1-1/2 miles away.
For those with physical limitations, or financial need, we also have a three-bedroom guest-apartment on campus; contact John Lenz.
- Information:** Contact John Lenz at 201-408-3275 or jlenz@drew.edu.
- To register:** The registration fee of \$75 per person includes the banquet on Saturday night, the Red Hackle hour, coffee and snacks, a copy of the text for the workshop, and all other activities and fees.
- Name:** _____
- Address:** _____
- Phone or e-mail:** _____

Please make out checks to John Lenz and send to:
John R. Lenz, 38-B Loantaka Way, Madison, NJ 07940.

Call for Papers
(Deadline: March 1, 1996):
Prizes for Papers Program of the Bertrand Russell Society

The Bertrand Russell Society is offering PRIZES FOR PAPERS for the fourth consecutive year. We award two prizes annually for the best new papers, one by an undergraduate and one by a "young professional" (graduate student, junior professor, or non-academic).

The Prize-winners will present their papers at the Society's next Annual Meeting, to be held at Drew University in Madison, NJ, May 3-5, 1996. All expenses will be paid, including travel, lodging, and meals. (Winners from outside North America will receive a portion of their airfare.) Each Prize also includes a first-year membership in The Bertrand Russell Society. This includes subscriptions to The Bertrand Russell Society quarterly and to the semi-annual academic journal, Russell, published by the Russell Archives at McMaster University.

Papers can be on any aspect of Russell's life, work, or influence. They must be suitable for presentation to a general audience. They may be broad or narrow in scope and in any of the many fields that interested Russell: logic, mathematics, ethics, history, politics, religion, education, peace, nuclear war, history of ideas, etc., etc., or on Russell's relations with his contemporaries.

Papers should be designed for a presentation of 30 to 40 minutes, that is, about 15 double-spaced pages of text. Submit a complete or nearly complete paper, not an abstract. State that you would, if chosen, attend the 1996 Annual Meeting. Those who have previously appeared on an Annual Meeting program are not eligible.

Submit your paper by MARCH 1, 1996 to Prof. John Shosky, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, The American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016-8056. Phone: 703-660-9279; fax: 703-660-9871.

Report by John Shosky
Department of Philosophy and Religion
The American University
on the
"Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy"
Conference
University of Southampton -- United Kingdom
July 14-16, 1995

Several members of the society have urged me to write a report on this summer's Russell conference at the University of Southampton. OK, here goes.

Entitled, "Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy", the conference was a superbly organized event drawing participants from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Greece, Israel, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The organizer was Ray Monk, author of the well-received Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. Evidently motivated by his research on an up-coming two volume philosophical biography of Russell, Monk scheduled an all star line-up of speakers -- each distinguished in Russellian studies and each well-versed in Russell's early work.

In fact, this conference was another reminder that the renaissance in Russellian scholarship has been propelled by new discoveries in the Russell of 1899 through 1910, in large measure energized by the work of Peter Hylton, Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra, and, especially, Nick Griffin. The attendance of all three at this event speaks well for Monk's organizational and persuasive abilities.

The conference began on Friday evening, July 14, with a fine presentation by Louis Greenspan of McMaster University, speaking about "Russell on the Philosophical Canon". I was very impressed with this lecture. Greenspan spoke of the excellent scholarship often found in the Russell's A History of Western Philosophy, a much-maligned book. Greenspan and I spoke afterwards about the need for a more balanced view of this book, and I applaud his courage in defending what many people would regard as nothing more than a propaganda piece for empiricism (I've even heard worse descriptions).

After dinner, there was a choice of two sessions. The decision on which to attend was agonizing. I passed up Ivor Grattan-Guinness of Middlesex University speaking on "Where is the Mathematics in Logicism", even though I admire him enormously. However, I felt this might be my only chance to hear Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra of Valencia University. He spoke on "Russell's Perilous Journey from Atomism to Holism",

displaying a broad understanding of Russell's use of methodology and a strong sympathy of the difficulties encountered by Russell on his philosophical quest. I must add that Professor Rodriguez-Consuegra was very modest about his scholarship. However, he is a fine student of Russell. He is also the vanguard of a renewed interest of Russell on the European continent.

The next day, Saturday, July 15, began with a stunning presentation by Peter Hylton of the University of Illinois. Discussing "Concepts and Propositions", he took his audience on a whirl-wind survey of Russell's work on meaning and propositions. I wish I could tell you more. But I had a hard time following the paper due to my own deficiencies in scholarship. This was a paradigm example of a great conference paper and an equally impressive presentation. When he was finished I made a vow to re-double my own work back at American University because Professor Hylton is setting a fast pace.

Again, a choice followed: either Anthony Palmer of the University of Southampton speaking on "the Complex Problem" or Harold Noonan of the University of Birmingham discussing "The Gray's Elegy Argument -- and Others". I chose the latter because of the recent plethora of journal articles on the Gray's Elegy argument in On Denoting. Also, I had just finished teaching a graduate class at American on the "origins of Analytical Philosophy", where we covered On Denoting in some detail. But I learned in Noonan's presentation that my students and I had only scratched the surface, especially given the complexity of the "Gray's Elegy" example, and its distinctive nature compared to other examples in On Denoting offered by Russell.

Again, another choice -- Greg Landini of the University of Iowa on "Will the Real Principia Please Stand Up: Reflections on the Formal Logic of Principia Mathematica" or Anthony Grayling of Birkbeck College, Oxford, on "Complex Symbols, Meanings and Facts". And, again an utterly tragic choice. I very much wanted to hear both speakers on these topics. After much useless debate I simply decided to walk into the nearest room and hear whomever was speaking. This turned out to be Professor Grayling, the author of an up-coming book on Russell in the Past Masters Series. He was brilliant, outlining Russell's early positions on logic and language. His new book promises to be a valuable contribution. I only hope that I get to hear Landini at another time.

My evolving decision rules on speakers was again tested by a choice between C.W. Kilmister of Kings College, London, addressing "A Certain Knowledge? Russell's Mathematics and Logical Analysis" or Charles Pigden from the University of Otago in New Zealand speaking about "Russell on Ethics". Pigden is evidently well-known for his prolific analysis of Russell on the information highway. I can believe the fantastic stories I heard,

because in discussion after the papers he displayed an encyclopedic knowledge about Russell and all things connected with Russell, i.e., reviews of his books, responses to his articles, etc. In this case, however, logic won out over morality, and I went to hear Professor Kilmister. He carefully demonstrated Russell's mathematical and logical development, linking it into the instruction Russell received in his student days. Kilmister may have received the ultimate one-up--manship conference medal with his explanation of a mathematical paradox that forced Grattan-Guinness to exclaim, "I've never heard of that before." One sign of a good lecture is when Griffin and Grattan-Guinness are both taking notes. Kilmister kept their pens moving.

After a reception hosted by the Southampton Philosophy Department, a Gala Dinner followed, featuring Russell's daughter Katharine Tait as speaker. She was gracious, delightful, and genuinely pleased that all of us cared so much about her father's work.

Then, after dinner, Mark Sainsbury of Kings College, London, and Stewart Candish of the University of Western Australia presented a symposium on "Russell's Theories of Judgment". This symposium was great, with fresh insight on Russell's troublesome, persistent difficulties in his attempts to define, explain, and analyze our beliefs.

I must confess that I visited the many pubs that outline the Southampton campus that evening. As I enjoyed this hospitality and local brew of each establishment, I marvelled at the commitment and talent of each speaker. These presentations were motivating, but they were also humbling. There are a lot of great minds working on Russell, and these outstanding presentations demonstrate that careful research can still add vastly to Russell scholarship. And I must add that, for me, Russell is often best understood after a beer or two (legal and appropriate hours of consumption only).

The last day, Sunday, July 16, featured two presentations back-to-back: Nick Griffin of McMaster tackling "On Denoting Concepts" and Ray Monk of the University of Southampton concluding with "What is Analytical Philosophy?". Both speakers are well-known to the readers of the Russell Quarterly and need no introduction from me. Their lectures were an appropriate and resounding exclamation point at the end of the conference.

OK, I know -- you wished you were there. Well, again, thanks to Monk, you can be. Ray has arranged for publication of all of the conference papers. I do not know who the publisher is, although I suspect it will probably be Routledge or Thoemmes Press. However, you might look for this publication in a few months. It should be part of any serious library on Russell.

One important note: Almost every presentation I heard contained references to the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. The Russell

editorial project is re-invigorating and re-defining Russellian studies. A scholar cannot be on the cutting-edge of Russell's contributions to philosophy without a careful grounding in the published volumes of the Collected Papers. I returned home determined to cough-up the big bucks to buy those volumes which I do not possess, because, as expensive as they have become, the Collected Papers are indispensable. The new three volume A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell by Blackwell, Ruja, and Turcon is also a must.

Russell Society President John Lenz wrote a congratulatory letter to Monk, expressing the pleasure of the society with this important, historic conference.

Personally, I was honored to attend. I hope someday we can offer a similar conference on this side of the Atlantic, and that the society will be one of the sponsors. If so, I suggest that we do not schedule two presentations at the same time. Those kinds of decisions even Russell couldn't comfortably adjudicate.

Corliss Lamont (1902-1995)

Corliss Lamont died on Wednesday, April 26 at the age of 93. Lamont was a true contemporary Russellian. He was an author, teacher and humanist philosopher. During the ignoble period of McCarthyism in the United States, Lamont stood steadfastly against the redbaiting hysteria that engulfed the country. Like Russell, Lamont never followed a multitude to do evil.

Lamont's career spanned much of the twentieth century. He wrote sixteen books and hundreds of pamphlets on subjects related to humanism and civil liberties. Lamont taught at Harvard as well as at Cornell and Columbia. He also served as a director of the American Civil Liberties Union for more than two decades. He opposed the Vietnam war and ran twice for the United States Senate.

In his 1981 autobiography, Yes to Life, he wrote:

My final word is that in the battles that confront us today for America's freedom and welfare, our chief aim as public-spirited citizens must be neither to avoid trouble, nor to stay out of jail, nor even to preserve our lives, but to keep on fighting for our fundamental principles and ideas.

The Philosophy of Humanism, published in 1949, remains a standard text for understanding the humanist perspective. Other books include: The Illusion of Immortality (1935) and The Peoples of the Soviet Union (1946).

The New York Times concluded its obituary of Corliss Lamont with the following paragraphs:

Corliss Lamont was born on May 28, 1902 in Englewood, N.J., where he grew up near the summit of the Palisades overlooking the Hudson River and Manhattan. He graduated from Phillips Exeter in 1920 and from Harvard in 1924 with a bachelor's degree and high honors. After a year at Oxford University in England, he became a philosophy lecturer at Columbia in 1932, earned a doctor of philosophy degree there.

Dr. Lamont's 1928 marriage to Margaret Hayes Irish, a writer who was co-author of his first book on the Soviet Union, "Russia Day by Day," (1933) ended in divorce. His second wife, Helen Lamb who he married in 1962, died in 1975. His third wife, Beth Keehner, who he married in 1986, survives him.

In the Fall, 1995 issue of Free Inquiry, Paul Kurtz writes:

Corliss Lamont was an heroic defender of the philosophy of humanism. He was a secular and not a

religious humanist. He believed that one could live the authentic life here and now without deity; and that this was possible through the use of reason and science.

Corliss Lamont honored the Bertrand Russell Society by participating in an annual meeting. His life represents some of the highest values espoused by Bertrand Russell. He will truly be missed by the skeptical and rational community.

The Enduring Impact of Corliss Lamont

by

Shohig Sherry Terzian

Corliss Lamont was an American original yet a Renaissance man of scholarship and action. From childhood on, he said Yes to Life. His widespread empathies and international interests are explored with zest. In a study of American eminence, he is categorized as the firebrand stepson of JP Morgan & Co.! (WHO; the Story of Who's WHO in America, by Cedric A. Larson, 1958).

The similarities between Corliss Lamont and Bertrand Russell are striking. They were among the elite by birthright, coming from the upper classes and supported by inherited wealth which they both utilized to back their affirmation of life. And they both were inveterate and indefatigable letter writers.

Dr. Lamont considered Russell to be the world's leading representative of the Humanist philosophy which he espoused. He called Russell a modern Socrates, continually challenging the shibboleths of Establishments. At one time, Russell received both moral and financial support from Lamont for his expose of crimes in Vietnam. Incidentally, long before McNamara's revelations, Corliss Lamont was vindicated when his Harvard classmate, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, attested that the U.S. erred in participating in that conflict.

Philosopher George Santayana was another favorite of Dr. Lamont's (and mine, too!) His exchange of letters with Santayana began in 1935 and continued well into the last year of Santayana's life in September, 1952. In a basic pamphlet entitled "The Enduring Impact of George Santayana," Dr. Lamont describes his visits with GS in Rome at the Convent of the Blue Sisters near the Colosseum. I often relive these meetings between the two for I had occasion to retrace his steps walking up the narrow cobblestoned Via Santo Stefano Romao to the outside gate of the Convent. I happened to be in Rome in October, 1986 participating in the international conference of the World Psychiatric Association. I had a hard time trying to locate the exact location of the Convent but I was determined to pay my respects to GS. We shared a table in a modest restaurant near our hotel, the Cicerone, with two kindly priests. Both knew exactly where it was and gave us specific directions in getting to our destination.

We were greeted by a kindly Sister who had taken care of GS during his final year. She was elated when I told her that GS had mentioned the gracious Sisters who were looking after his welfare. Is it any wonder that I often reread Dr. Lamont's "Enduring Impact of George Santayana"?

Each time I feel as though Dr. Lamont followed in GS's footsteps with his own enduring impact which will continue to serve as an inspiration to us all.

Dr. Lamont also edited and contributed to Dialogues on GS and helped initiate the GS collection at Columbia University. He ranked Russell and Santayana as two of the 20th century's most readable philosophers. I surely regret that circumstances prevented me from accepting his kind invitation for lunch at the onset of our correspondence. I know that I would have fallen under his spell!

Russell on the Design Argument for God's Existence by Matthew McKeon

In *God And The New Cosmology*,¹ M.A. Corey argues that recent cosmological research suggests that the universe was designed for human existence. He believes that the Design Argument for God's existence, buttressed by the physical evidence, provides a solid basis for natural theology. In a nutshell, physicists have discovered further complex cosmological requirements for the existence of human beings. These discoveries, coupled with the high improbability of the life-supporting characteristics of the universe occurring by chance, demand an explanation. Corey argues that the best explanation is that the universe was created by a designer for the purpose of evolving human beings.

Corey refers to one of Russell's criticisms of the Design Argument in *Science and Religion*. In this paper, I seek to show that Corey misrepresents Russell's remarks, and in so doing fails to countenance Russell's criticism of the Design Argument which is relevant to Corey's position.

Corey acknowledges that one problem with any version of the Design Argument is, ". . . the tremendous amount of time it took after the Big Bang for humans to appear and to rise to any degree of significance on this planet."² The following comments by Russell are offered as a representative formulation of the problem.

Why should the best things in the history of the world [such as life and mind] come late rather than early? Would not the reverse order have done just as well? . . . Before the Copernican revolution, it was natural to suppose that God's purposes were specially concerned with the earth, but now this has become an unpalatable hypothesis. If the purpose of the Cosmos is to evolve mind, we must regard it as rather incompetent in having produced so little in such a long time.³

These remarks are a part of Russell's critique, in *Science and Religion*, of a pantheistic view of the creator. Briefly, Russell characterizes the pantheistic creator as one that is, "not external to the universe, but is merely the universe considered as a whole. There cannot therefore be an act of creation, but there is a kind of creative force *in* the universe, which causes it to develop according to a plan which this creative force may be said to have in mind throughout the process."⁴ If the plan is to create human life, then the fact that the evolutionary process took approximately 15 billion years suggests that this "creative force" is fairly inept. Corey's rebuttal to this objection is based on a new cosmological understanding of the universe.

There is a minimum cosmological time that it takes to produce a world where intelligent life forms can develop

through normal evolutionary pathways. These evolutionary pathways are themselves divided into three separate cosmic epochs: 1) an initial stellar synthesis epoch, wherein the heavier organic elements upon which life depends, such as carbon, oxygen, and iron, are synthesized deep within stellar interiors over approximately 10 billion years of time, 2) an intermediate epoch, wherein these heavier elements are spewed into space by huge supernova explosions, and are then allowed to crystallize into concrete solar systems, and 3) a final biosynthesis epoch, wherein life gradually evolves into progressively more complex forms over billions of years of organic evolution.

When the minimum times for these major cosmic epochs are calculated, we find that the minimum age for the development of intelligent life is approximately 15 billion years, which is also the estimated age of our present universe. If anything, the age of the universe can be used as evidence for . . . the existence of a Grand Designer for the following reason: if the evolution of the universe were merely a random event, one would never expect it to happen just as soon as it possibly could.⁵

Assuming for the sake of argument that this is correct, the rebuttal seems to meet the difficulty Russell points to in the cited passage from *Religion and Science*. However, Corey's rebuttal is besides the point since Russell's remarks are aimed at a pantheistic view of the creator and Corey does not subscribe to this view. Corey believes that God is a personal being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and "the most sublime of all realities."⁶ Russell's criticism of the Design Argument as a defense for the existence of this type of creator can be found a few pages earlier in *Religion and Science*.

A man who desires a house cannot, except in the Arabian Nights, have it rise before him as a result of his mere wish; time and labor must be expended before his wish can be gratified. But Omnipotence is a subject to no such limitations. If God really thinks well of the human race. . . , why not proceed, as in Genesis, to create man at once?⁷

The difficulty of explaining the necessity of evolution of *any temporal length* in the plans of a designer who is at least omnipotent and omniscient is a common theme of Russell's criticism of the Design Argument in his writings on God and religion. For example, in *The Value of Free Thought*, Russell writes,

Design implies the necessity of using means, which does not exist for omnipotence. When we desire a house, we

have to go through the labor of building it, but Aladdin's genie could cause a palace to exist by magic. The long process of evolution might be necessary to a divine Artificer who found matter already in existence, and had to struggle to bring order out of chaos. But to the God of Genesis and of orthodox theology no such laborious process was needed; no gradual process, no adaptation of means to ends, was required by a being who could say: Let there be light, and there was light. The vast astronomical ages before life existed may have been inevitable for a finite Deity working in a reluctant material, but for Omnipotence they would have been a gratuitous waste of time.⁸

Furthermore, as Russell notes, there is nothing known about the universe that rules out that God is not omnipotent and must struggle against the forces of nature to carry out His plans. I believe that Russell exposes a central problem with using the Design Argument to ground belief in the existence of a creator. At best, the argument establishes the existence of a creator who is greatly more powerful and intelligent than ourselves. But such power and intelligence may fall short of omnipotence and omniscience. The argument says even less about the degree of benevolence of the designer.⁹ What features of the universe provide compelling evidence for the existence of the creator as depicted by Corey?

In sum, granting for the sake of argument that cosmological evidence confirms that (1) it would take a universe as old as our own just to evolve human beings, it follows that (2) the age of our universe is perfectly compatible with the existence of a creator only if, as acknowledged by Corey¹⁰, (3) life must evolve through natural evolutionary pathways. The gist of the criticism in *Religion and Science*, missed by Corey, is that (3) seems false if the creator is omnipotent, and so (1) is not a good reason for thinking that (2) is true on Corey's understanding of the creator. I think that Russell would accept (2) on the view of a non-omnipotent creator, but perhaps he would stress that the age and the structure of the universe is compatible with the existence of a creator unworthy of devotion and worship.

¹M.A. Corey, *God And The New Cosmology*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1993).

²Ibid, 233.

³Bertrand Russell, *Science and Religion*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935) 221 and 227.

⁴Ibid, 200.

⁵Op. cit. note 1, 55-56. Corey cites John Barrow and Frank Tipler, *The Anthropic Cosmological Principle*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 385.

⁶Ibid, 256, and 237.

⁷Op. cit. note 3, 203.

⁸Bertrand Russell, "The Value of Free Thought" in *Bertrand Russell on God and Religion*, ed. by Al Seckel (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986) 239-269, 258.

⁹Ibid 261.

¹⁰Op. cit. note 1, 234.

Bertrand Russell Rejected Religion

by Larry Judkins

I am often asked how I came to be an atheist.

Actually, my atheism was the result of a very gradual evolution rather than a sudden conversion. Throughout my childhood and especially my teen years, I slowly but steadily became more and more skeptical of orthodox religion in general, and Christianity in particular.

I was 19 years old when I finally crossed the imaginary line separating an extremely liberal (and vague) form of religious belief from unbelief, and became a true atheist. This was the result of reading a collection of essays in a book titled *Why I Am Not a Christian* by the philosopher Bertrand Russell.

At the time, the essays of Lord Russell (he was an English lord) were the most radical--and rational--words I had ever read on the subject of religion. Of course, in the 19 years since that time, I have read countless books and essays that make *Why I Am Not a Christian* seem mild by comparison.

Nevertheless, I am still in complete agreement with Lord Russell's basic outlook concerning religion as expressed in *Why I Am Not a Christian*--specifically, that "all the great religions of the world . . . [are] both untrue and harmful." Like Lord Russell, I regard religion "as a disease born of fear and as a source of untold misery to the human race."

Unfortunately, there is one area of Lord Russell's philosophy of religion in which he was very inconsistent: Lord Russell sometimes referred to himself as an agnostic and sometimes as an atheist.

He freely admitted that he was confused as to which term more accurately represented his views. One such confession of uncertainty can be found in the essay, "Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic?" in the book *Bertrand Russell on God and Religion*.

Another such confession can be found in *Dear Bertrand Russell: A Selection of His Correspondence with the General Public*. On page 5 is a letter to Lord Russell asking him whether he considers himself an atheist or an agnostic.

In response, Lord Russell wrote, "I do not wonder that you. . . are in doubt as to whether to call me an atheist or an agnostic as I am myself in doubt upon this point and call myself sometimes the one and sometimes the other. I think that in philosophical strictness at the level where one doubts the existence of material objects and holds that the world may have existed for only five minutes, I ought to call myself an agnostic; but, for all practical purposes, I am an atheist. I do not think the existence of the Christian God any more probable than the existence of the Gods Olympus or Vahalla . . ."

Lord Russell's confusion upon this matter stemmed from the fact that he misunderstood the true nature of atheism and incorrectly perceived agnosticism to be a "middle ground" between atheism and theism. According to Lord Russell in his essay "What Is an Agnostic?" (*Bertrand Russell on God and Religion*), "A atheist, like a Christian, holds that we *can* know whether or not there is a God. The Christian holds that we can know there is a God; the atheist, that we can know there is not."

Lord Russell continued. "The agnostic suspends judgment, saying that there are not sufficient grounds either for affirmation or for denial." Therefore, an agnostic is neither an atheist nor a theist.

The problem with this is that very few atheists maintain that an atheist is one who knows that God does not exist. Instead, they define an atheist as one who lacks belief in the existence of God.

Belief, of course, is altogether different from knowledge. Since everyone must either have a belief in God or lack such belief, all agnostics must also be either atheists or theists.

Bertrand Russell, who readily admitted that he did not know whether or not a God exists, was clearly an agnostic. However, he was also clearly an atheist, since it is obvious that he lacked belief in the existence of God.

Bertrand Russell was born on May 18, 1872. During his long life (he died February 2, 1970), he wrote dozens of books and composed literally hundreds of shorter works. In 1950, he won the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Those interested in studying the intellectual objections to religion would do well to begin with the works of Lord Russell mentioned above.

Larry Judkins is a resident of Orlando and longtime member of the Bertrand Russell Society.

Why I Am Not a Russellian

by John M. Novak

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Bertrand Russell is certainly an important humanist. As a philosopher, social activist, and educator he has been an inspiring figure, willing to take strong stands and pay the consequences for being a freethinker in a world in which expressive freedom and penetrating thought were usually only linked rhetorically. I still turn to his essays for insights, humor, incisive comments, food for thought--and am seldom disappointed. However, in spite of my admiration for Russellian intellect, prose, and life stance, I find that his humanism does not run deep enough and his approach to education and society is more idiosyncratic than substantive. Allow me to briefly elaborate.

As I see it, a humanist is someone who realizes we cannot escape the human perspective and so tries to savor, understand, and better this human outlook. This humanist perspective can be stated this way: Since we cannot isolate ourselves from human experiences, how can we get more out of them? Russell certainly was able to savor human experiences and was committed to clearly denouncing that which he felt got in the way of human betterment. However, in my estimation, he succumbs to a subtle transcendental temptation in his understanding of the human perspective. Quite simply, at some basic level, Russell thinks that humans have immaculate receptions of knowledge--immediate knowledge of atomistic aspects of reality.¹ These atomistic perceptions are thus the foundation for certain knowledge. This enables Russell and others who hold this view to have a type of incisive certainty and cut to the bone on some basic knowledge issues.

As appealing as this claim for foundational certainty is, there is another point of view. That is, that life is messier and that human perception does not have this privileged access to knowledge; knowledge claims regarding the empirical world are always inferential. In actuality, all knowledge is mediated, that is, constructed from some perspective within problematic situations. Thus, experience is always occurring in some context and must be filtered through some perspective to become knowledge.

This constructed view of knowledge doesn't mean that there isn't a reality "out there," only that we do not have direct knowledge of the "out there." The defensible contracts we make with the "out there" and call knowledge are always mediated, partial, and from a certain perspective. This not "New Age--you make your own reality," but rather a fundamental realization that the knowledge we have is not immediate, immaculate, or immune from bias. My objection to Russell is that his view of the immediate knowledge claim of certain types of experiences misses the actual human process

of knowledge-making, and thus diminishes a deeper understanding of the human perspective and, ultimately, human possibilities.

In the realms of the social and the educational, Russell engaged in a variety of progressive projects. In spite of his vigor and courage, however, I do not see how this activity in these areas connected with his work in philosophy.² As I see it, Russell saw philosophy as purer than the activities of everyday life. When engaging in the impurities of life, he tended to follow some personal intuitions and passions. As powerful as these were, they are of limited use to others in trying to construct a principled social and educational philosophy. Intuitions and passions need to be heavily supplemented to deal with social and educational complexities. Russell's rather narrow work in philoso-supplement.

Bertrand Russell supplies a courageous and energetic supplement to a self-correcting humanist perspective. He provides some spicy food for thought that is good in doses, but cannot serve as a steady diet. I'd invite him to my house to occasionally prepare a meal and help clean out the refrigerator, but not to plan my life-long philosophical menu.

Notes

1. This point is made in great detail in *Dewey*, by J.E. Tiles (London: Routledge, 1988) and more recently by Tom Burke in *Dewey's New Logic: A Reply to Russell* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
2. I am not alone in my perception of Russell's philosophy being irrelevant or at odds with his politics. Alan Ryan, author of *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*, makes this same point in *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1995).

John Novak is professor of education at Brock University in St. Catharines Ontario and editor of *Insights*, the newsletter of the John Dewey Society.

BRS LIBRARY

The Society library sells and lends books, audiotapes, videotapes, and other materials by and about Russell. Please direct library inquiries and requests to Tom Stanley, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088 (tom.stanley@infoport.com).

Books for sale H-Cloth, otherwise paperback. Prices are postpaid. Please send check or money order (U.S. funds only) payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society" to Tom Stanley.

By Bertrand Russell:

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|---|---------------------|--------|
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By Other Authors:

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|---|-----------------------|----------|
| Bertrand Russell by John Slater | Thoemmes Press | \$19.00 |
| Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970 | Spokesman..... | 1.50 |
| Bertrand Russell's America, Vol. 2, 1945-1970 edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils | South End Press | 9.95 |
| Liberty and Social Transformation: A Study in Bertrand Russell's Political Thought by Chandrakala Padia | Heritage Publishers | H. 11.50 |
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The library has a small supply of Caroline Moorehead's **BERTRAND RUSSELL: A LIFE**--for sale for \$14.00 (postage paid)

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- 204 "Life Without Fear." 1951 34'
- 205 "Portrait from Memory: Whitehead." BBC 1952 15'
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- 207 Russell-Einstein Manifesto. 1955 30'
- 208 "The World and the Observer," BBC 1958 30'
- 209 Kalinga Prize Press Conference and Acceptance Speech. 1958 48'
Includes five minute interview of January 24, 1958.
- 210 "Address to the CND." 1959 30'
- 211 "The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore." BBC 1959 42'
Interviews with Russell, Leonard Woolf, Morton White and John Wisdom.
- 212 Address to the Verkeley Vietnam Teach-In. 1965 14'
- 213 "Appeal to the American Conscience." 1966 29'

Interviews, debates:

- 225 "Is Security Increasing?" NBC 1939 30'
- 226 Russell-Copleston Debate on the Existence of god. BBC 1948 20'
- 227 "The Attack on Academic Freedom in Britain and America." NBC 1952 30'
- 228 "Bertrand Russell' Romney Wheeler Interview. NBC 1952 30'
- 229 "Face to Face." John Freeman Interview. BBC 1959 30'
- 230 "Bertrand Russell Speaking." 1959 52'
Interviews by Woodrow Wyatt on philosophy, taboo morality, religion, and fanaticism.
- 231 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (I). 1959 52'
On the role of the individual, happiness, power, and the future of mankind. 1959 52'
- 232 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (II). 1959 52'
On nationalism, Great Britain, communism and capitalism, war and pacifism and the H-bomb
- 233 "Close-Up." Elaine Grand Interview. CBC 1959 30'
- 234 "Speaking Personally: Bertrand Russell." John Chamndos Interview 1961 90'
- 235 David Susskind Interview. 1962 90'
- 236 Studs Terkel Interview. SFMT 1962 39'
- 237 "On Nuclear Morality." Michael tiger Interview. 1962 32'
- 238 Interview on Vietnam. CBC 1965 10'
- 239 Merv Griffin Interview. 1965 24'

Lectures, broadcasts:

- 250 "Bertrand Russell." Rev. Paul Beattie. 1975 15'
- 251 "Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher." A.J. Ayer. BBC 1980 15'
- 252 "Bertrand Russell." 1986 Professor Giovanni Costigan. 100'

- 253 "Portrait of the Philosopher as Father." Katherine Tait. (In German) 30'
- 254 "Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Education." William Hare. 15'
- 255 "Bertrand Russell's Pacifist Stance in World War I." CFMU-FM 1992 30'
- 256 "Russell vs. Dewey on Education." 1992 115'
With Michael Rockler, Tim Madigan and John Novak.
- 257 "A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic" by Darren Staloff. 1994 40'

Documentaries:

- 275 "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell." 1962 40'
- 276 Beatrice Webb on the Russells / Russell on the Webbs. 1966 35'
- 277 "Sound Portrait of Bertrand Russell." NPR dramatization. 1980 60'
- 278 "Bertrand Russell: A Reassessment." BBC 1980 43'
- 279 "Bertie and the Bomb." Soundtrack of BBC television program. 1984 40'

Miscellaneous:

- 300 "The Conscience of Wisdom." CBC 1962 62'
- 301 "Sinfonia Contra Timore" by Graham Whettam. Dedicated to Russell. 1972 27'

Library News

What I Believe: 3 Complete Essays on Religion--by Bertrand Russell was released by Audio Editions (1-800-231-4261) in September. The selections are "What I Believe", "Why I Am Not A Christian" and "A Free Man's Worship". 2 Hrs. 25'. The reader is Terrence Hardiman. ISBN 15727001, \$16.95. A copy is in the lending library.


Religion and Science--by Russell was released in 1994 by Audio Scholar (1-800-282-1225). The two hour and ten minute abridgement is read by David Chase. ISBN 187955715, \$17.95. A copy is in the library.

The publication of the Thoemmes Press edition--My Father, Bertrand Russell--has been put on hold until next March to coincide with the release of the first volume of Ray Monk's Russell biography.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February, 1996

No. 89



Bertrand Russell Society
c/o Michael J. Rockler
529 14th St., NW, Suite 1125
Washington, DC 20045

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The Bertrand Russell Society

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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* is published in February, May, August and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

Michael J. Rockler
529 14th Street, NW
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Washington, DC 20045

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of The Bertrand Russell Society

February, 1996

No. 89

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Bertrand Russell Society Business

The following pages contain Society business that need your attention. Each page may be xeroxed and sent to the appropriate address.

SOCIETY BUSINESS INCLUDES:

- 1) Membership Renewal
- 2) Registration for the Annual Meeting
(please note the change in the dates of the Annual Meeting)
- 3) Call for Papers
- 4) Tentative Program for the Annual Meeting

PLEASE NOTE:

- A) It is now time to renew your membership. Please complete the enclosed form and return it to Dennis Darland.
- B) If you receive a damaged copy of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, let us know and we will replace it.

**Bertrand Russell Society
1996 Membership Renewal Coupon**

This is the final notice to renew BRS membership for 1996,

If you have already renewed for 1996 or have joined the BRS in 1996, please again accept our thanks for participating in the BRS.

But if you have not yet renewed your membership for 1996 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for this first time -- please mail this coupon with your payment TODAY. Thanks!

Please mail your coupon and payment to BRS Treasurer Dennis Darland at:

Dennis Darland
1965 winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the one that is right for my circumstances. I enclose my 1996 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society."

- Individual \$35
- Couple \$40
- Student \$20
- Limited Income Individual \$20
- Limited Income Couple \$25
- Contributor \$50 and up
- Sustainer \$75 and up
- Sponsor \$100 and up
- Patron \$250 and up
- Benefactor \$500 and up
- Life Member \$1000 and up
- Organization Membership \$50

- PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico
- PLUS \$4 if in Canada or Mexico

Name _____ Date _____

Address _____

Register NOW for
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY'S
ANNUAL MEETING, 1996:
"The Humanism of Bertrand Russell"

Dates: Friday, May 3 to Sunday, May 5, 1996

Place: Drew University, Madison, New Jersey. Easily accessible from Newark International Airport and New York City.

Lodging: The Madison Hotel, Morristown, NJ. Reserve your rooms directly with them. We enjoy the special rate for Drew University; this is to be set shortly and is expected to be about \$75 per room (single or double). Call them at: 201-285-1800 (fax 201-540-8566), and tell them you are with the Drew party reserved by John Lenz (they don't know Russell, unfortunately; the meeting is being co-sponsored by Drew's Depts. of Classics and Philosophy). We will provide transportation from the hotel, on the same street as the school, 1-1/2 miles away.

For those with physical limitations, or financial need, we also have a three-bedroom guest-apartment on campus; contact John Lenz.

Information: Contact John Lenz at 201-408-3275 or jlenz@drew.edu.

To register: The registration fee of \$75 per person includes the banquet on Saturday night, the Red Hackle hour, coffee and snacks, a copy of the text for the workshop, and all other activities and fees. A single day fee is available. Contact John Lenz.

Name: _____

Address: _____

Phone or e-mail: _____

Please make out checks to John Lenz and send to:
John R. Lenz, 38-B Loantaka Way, Madison, NJ 07940.

**The Bertrand Russell Society
23rd Annual Meeting and Conference
Friday, May 3 - Sunday, May 5, 1996
Drew University, Madison, NJ and the Madison Hotel**

"The Humanism of Bertrand Russell":
Preliminary Program as of January 1996

FRIDAY, MAY 3

4:00 - 5:30 Registration
5:30 - 7:00 Dinner (on your own)
7:00 - 7:15 Welcome Remarks
7:15 - 8:30 Award of the 1996 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award
and the 1996 Bertrand Russell Society Award
8:30 - Meeting of the Board of Directors

SATURDAY, MAY 4

8:00 - 9:00 Registration
9:00 - 10:00 James Birx (Canisius College), "Russell and Evolution"
(introduced by Tim Madigan)
10:00 - 10:15 Coffee
10:15 - 11:15 John Shosky (American University), "Philosophy
and Politics"
11:15 - 11:30 Break
11:30 - 12:30 (another talk on philosophy by an outside speaker)
12:30 - 2:00 Lunch (on your own)
2:00 - 3:00 David Rodier (American University), "Russell's Plato"
(introduced by John Shosky)
3:00 - 3:15 Coffee
3:15 - 4:15 Tim Madigan (Free Inquiry), "Russell's Humanism"
4:15 - 5:30 Free Time
5:30 - 7:00 Red Hackle Hour
7:00 - Banquet
Performance of a one-man show by Trevor Banks as
Bertie Russell

SUNDAY, MAY 5

8:00 - 9:00 Registration
9:00 - 10:15 Presentation(s) by 1996 Winner(s) of Prizes for Papers
(chairing: John Shosky)
10:15 - 10:30 Coffee
10:30 - 11:30 Workshop on Russell's Fiction conducted by Michael
Rockler (copies of short stories will be sent to all
who pre-register)
11:30 - 12:30 Business Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society
12:30 Closing

**Call for Papers
(Deadline: March 1, 1996):**

Prizes for Papers Program of the Bertrand Russell Society

The Bertrand Russell Society is offering PRIZES FOR PAPERS for the fourth consecutive year. We award two prizes annually for the best new papers, one by an undergraduate and one by a "young professional" (graduate student, junior professor, or non-academic).

The Prize-winners will present their papers at the Society's next Annual Meeting, to be held at Drew University in Madison, NJ, May 3-5, 1996. All expenses will be paid, including travel, lodging, and meals. (Winners from outside North America will receive a portion of their airfare.) Each Prize also includes a first-year membership in The Bertrand Russell Society. This includes subscriptions to The Bertrand Russell Society quarterly and to the semi-annual academic journal, *Russell*, published by the Russell Archives at McMaster University.

Papers can be on any aspect of Russell's life, work, or influence. They must be suitable for presentation to a general audience. They may be broad or narrow in scope and in any of the many fields that interested Russell: logic, mathematics, ethics, history, politics, religion, education, peace, nuclear war, history of ideas, etc., etc., or on Russell's relations with his contemporaries.

Papers should be designed for a presentation of 30 to 40 minutes, that is, about 15 double-spaced pages of text. Submit a complete or nearly complete paper, not an abstract. State that you would, if chosen, attend the 1996 Annual Meeting. Those who have previously appeared on an Annual Meeting program are not eligible.

Submit your paper by MARCH 1, 1996 to Prof. John Shosky, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, The American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016-8056. Phone: 703-660-9279; fax: 703-660-9871.

**From the Editor
Michael J. Rockler**

Bertrand Russell received the Nobel prize for literature in 1950 for his popular writings including such books as *Marriage and Morals* and *The Conquest of Happiness*. Russell referred to these books as "potboilers" and wrote them because he needed the income. They were all well received by the general public and much that is contained in these volumes remains valuable in perhaps more significant ways today than the mathematical work he did with Whitehead.

Russell did not begin to publish fiction until after 1950; his works have been collected in a volume entitled *The Collected Stories of Bertrand Russell* which was originally published by Simon and Shuster in 1972. These stories are often considered to be the least impressive writings authored by Russell.

At the next annual meeting of the Society, I will be conducting a workshop on some of Russell's fiction. I had read some of these stories before and in preparation for the workshop, I have now read all of them. I personally found them very enjoyable. They are, after all, writings by Bertrand Russell and they contain profound ideas.

The novella, "Zahtopolk" is a superb story which can be read as a precursor to Margaret Atwood's novel, *The Handmaid's Tale*. "The Theologians Nightmare" (which is reprinted in this issue of the Quarterly) is an excellent parody on religion which seems to be a companion piece to the essay, "Why I am Not A Christian." "The Infra-rediscope" helps delineate Russell's long standing views on skepticism.

Persons interested in Russell's work who have not read his fiction will be delighted to discover yet another side of Russell's wit and profundity. The stories are well worth reading and studying. I will select two or three of these stories for the workshop that I will present at the meeting. "The Theologian's Nightmare" will be one of them.

Elsewhere in this issue of the quarterly is a form on which you can register for the meeting. As you know by now, the meeting will be earlier this year -- May 3 to May 5. Please register today so that planning for the meeting can proceed in an orderly fashion. As always I urge you to attend the annual meeting and join in a pleasant weekend of Russell study and socializing. I look forward to seeing all of you in New Jersey. Don Jackanicz assures me that his supply of Red Hackle is not depleted.

If you have not done so, please send in your 1996 dues. BRS depends entirely on dues and contributions for its income. Only through your continued support can we maintain the society. Please help to continue the tradition that is now more than twenty years old and renew today.

Once more I would like to make a plea for contributions for the Quarterly. Why not write an original essay on any aspect of Russell's work which is between 500 and 1500 words in length and submit it for publication? You will enjoy being a part of a future *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*. Relevant book reviews and movie reviews are also welcomed. We will also be glad to publish your letters to the editor.

From the President

John R. Lenz, President, The Bertrand Russell Society

1996 Annual Meeting: As I write this (literally, and I mean "literally" literally), I am making plans for our 23rd annual meeting. Included in this issue is a preliminary program (we're still talking to a few other people about the possibility of their participating; full details will be sent to those who pre-register). I urge all who can make a trip to this beautiful area to join us on May 3-5, 1996 here in Madison, New Jersey, for this affirmation of our shared interests and values. The meeting will feature new speakers, a variety of topics and approaches, and presentations in different formats, including a one-man show and a workshop. This made me think about Bertrand Russell's continuing appearance and transformation in various media I have come across recently.

A vicarious Nobel Prize: Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences were honored with the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. See "Pugwash and Russell's Legacy" later in this issue.

Russell in political science: On November 10, 1995, I attended a session on Russell's political thought at the meetings of the Northeastern Political Science Association held in Newark, New Jersey. Speakers included Alan Ryan, who called Russell "the last great radical" in the tradition of Thomas Paine. The papers will appear in a forthcoming special issue of the journal, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, devoted to Russell.

Anti-Russell propaganda: Two egregious articles do not deserve mentioning, except in the interests of documenting misinformation. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. (remember him?), published "How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man," in *Fidelio* (Washington, D.C., Fall 1994). *Culture Wars* magazine (a right wing Catholic journal out of South Bend, Indiana), for November 1995, includes "Bertrand Russell and the Culture of Death" by David Peterson ("teaches in Chicago"). Both are unbelievable, irresponsible, delusional fantasies. I thank Tim Madigan for sending me the latter one and I thank his Free Inquiry magazine, and all who actually read Russell, for preserving sanity.

A new reference work: The new book, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, contains an excellent article on Russell by BRS member Nick Griffin and David B. Martens.

Internet: "Check out" the Russell Archives' home page at www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm. This includes a link to the BRS home page designed by Tom Stanley.

Letters to the BRS: I cherish notes I have received over the past few years from people who have written in for information about the BRS. Here are some excerpts: "I am extremely interested in any organization

that has this great person's name in it"; "I am very excited to learn there is an organization for my favorite author"; "My son Russell (guess who he was named after) . . ."; "I have found a philosophical home for my free-thinking and a refuge from my closet apostasy"; "Bertrand Russell is my hero!"; "This is a necessary and beautiful idea."

In the movies: Before Carrington, Tom and Viv, and Wittgenstein - Russell's on the margins of a distinct fashion here--was *Taxi Driver* (1976, directed by Martin Scorsese, written by Paul Schrader). One cab-driver rambles on to another about the meaning of life. When challenged, he responds: "It's not Bertrand Russell, but what do you want, I'm a cabbie, you know? What do I know?"

Finally, Membership again: Please renew and keep the Society and Russell's visions alive! "What do I know?" But I do know this is an important ideal to perpetrate. "It's not Bertrand Russell (himself), but it's close!

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND EDUCATION:

Katherine Tait's Critique

Michael J. Rockler

Bertrand Russell's writings on education as well as his founding of Beacon Hill School with Dora Russell make it legitimate to label Russell as an educational theorist whose conceptions of schooling remain viable today. Russell's views on skepticism in education, for example, could truly lead to improvement in contemporary curriculum if they were implemented.

Katherine Tait, Bertrand Russell's second child, has written critically of her father as an educator. In her book, *My Father Bertrand Russell* (published in 1975 by Harcourt Brace Javonovich and soon to be reprinted by Thoemes Press), she identifies many problems with Russell's educational practice as it affected her life. Thus there appears to be a contradiction between Russell as an educational theorist and Russell as parent-educator.

Some of Russell's most important contributions to education include the following:

1. Russell wanted an educational system that would produce highly skeptical students.
2. Russell wanted schools to encourage the development of rational thinking. Increased use of reason would mitigate against indoctrination in patriotism and militarism.
3. Russell believed that schools should be institutions of free inquiry which encouraged the scientific temper.
4. In his writings, Russell provided specific suggestions with regard to school curriculum: The course of studies should contain reading, writing and arithmetic, accomplished while the child was young. Children should study history and geography as well as literature. Schooling ought to provide pupils with knowledge about mathematics and considerable study of science. Understanding these subjects was a necessary component of living in the modern world. Russell favored the teaching of modern languages instead of Latin and Greek.

How effectively did Russell apply his theories to the parenting of his own children? What sort of parent-educator was Russell? How well did he apply his views to the school that he and Dora founded at Beacon Hill? Katherine Tait's book offers some possible answers to these questions.

Tait writes that she and her brother John were fortunate in that Bertrand and Dora were the experts to whom others turned to for advice. But then she becomes critical:

John and I were fortunate that our parents were the experts to whom others came; less fortunate in the type of modern knowl-

edge they acquired, that early behaviorism whose clockwork efficiency embittered the infancy of so many of my generation. (p. 59, HBJ edition)

Russell, Tait claims, believed that children whose needs have been met on schedule should be left to cry or they would become tyrannical. This is, of course, consistent with the perspective of conditioning. Behaviorism had its origin in the work of the Russian psychologist Pavlov who trained dogs to salivate at the sound of bells paired with the arrival of food. When the food was removed, the dog learned to salivate at the sound of the bell.

Russell himself speaks critically of this paradigm in *Marriage and Morals* when he objects to how bears are trained to dance. He writes:

. . . Education has been conceived too much on the analogy of the training of dancing bears. Everyone knows how dancing bears are trained. They are put on a hot floor, which compels them to dance because their toes are burnt if they remain in contact with it. While this is done, a certain tune is played to them. After a time the tune suffices to make them dance, without the hot floor. So it is with children. While a child is conscious of his sexual organ, grown-ups scold him. In the end, such consciousness brings up a thought of their scolding and makes him dance to their tune . . . (Liveright Paperback edition, 1970, p. 277)

Marriage and Morals was published in 1929 and reflects Russell's growing commitment to a more psychoanalytic vision of education. At the birth of his first child in 1921, however, Russell still maintained the behavioral outlook which had become the organizing paradigm of psychology.

Tait also argues that a major precept of Russell's was the need to instill self-reliance in the child. She states that this often left her feeling hurt and abandoned. She recognized that self-reliance was important to Russell because he did not want John and Katherine to be overly dependent on their parents. He worried about their ability to survive on their own if he and Dora were to die.

This is an interesting point--reminiscent of the kind of psychobiography written by Andrew Brink which has been rejected by many scholars of Russell. Still the point is well taken. As Russell felt uncomfortable without his parents, he did not want to leave his children in the same situation. This might have been compounded for him by the fact that in 1921 (when John was born) Russell was nearly fifty years old.

Tait suggests that perhaps her father was not the behaviorist he seemed to be in his first book on education. While he may have believed that the proper conditioning of children would result in their becoming "the right kind of people," he did not believe that he himself was the

product of conditioning. Tait concedes that had Russell been fully committed to behaviorism, he and Dora would not have become the educational innovators that they did become.

Tait believes that Bertrand Russell valued intelligence and virtue above happiness. He did not minimize happiness but, Tait argues, saw it as means to an end. Children who grew up happy could make a greater contribution to ending the ills of society.

Tait writes that Russell was not a failure as a parent. Almost all that is good in her, she says, she owes to her father. "But," she concludes, "he wasn't a hundred per-cent success either."

Katherine writes of the Beacon Hill School as a place where she and John lost their childhood happiness in exchange for a fantastic education. With warmth and enthusiasm she tells of learning history from her father in his tower room where Russell wrote and where he taught the children of Beacon Hill history.

Tait describes how the children in the school were to have absolute freedom of inquiry. The young learners were encouraged to express their natural curiosity. Russell believed that children's questions should be answered truthfully. He wanted the pupils to acquire an interest in learning and a habit of seeking the truth.

For Tait, there was a sad side to Beacon Hill. She came to believe that she had no more claim on Bertrand and Dora than did the other children at the school. This caused her to feel alienated from her parents; she lacked a sense of connection to a home.

Tait concludes that emotionally Beacon Hill was a bad experience for all of the Russells. She and John felt that they were adrift in a hostile world because they could not go to their parents for help. Ultimately, of course, the marriage of their parents also floundered at the school.

Tait ends her reminiscences about Beacon Hill on a positive note. While the school was an emotional disaster, it was intellectually outstanding. She writes that "I learned more, with greater pleasure in those years than I have learned anywhere since."

How does one respond to Katherine Tait's critique? Her criticism cannot be ignored nor can it simply be dismissed as inaccurate. Russell's parenting affected Tait in her most formative years. Her perceptions and reactions certainly have some validity.

There is an interesting development in Russell as educator that can be noted here. In *Education and the Good Life*, Russell adopted behaviorism as an educational theory. His second book, *Education and the Social Order*, is one in which the commitment to behaviorism is clearly weakened. The psychoanalytic perspective of Freud is in much greater evidence. What can account for this movement from essentially a behavioral perspective to one that is much more psychoanalytic?

Two events may have caused this change. First, Russell had two children in this period. John was born in 1921 and Katherine two years later. While Russell draws on examples from raising his own children in his first book, he had not, in fact, had much experience with them while the manuscript was being written. The other event that occurred between books was the opening of Beacon Hill School in 1927. Having two children and operating a school forced Russell to come to terms with his educational theory in a more concrete, less theoretical manner.

In 1920, Russell was enamored by the simplicity of behavioral theory. His initial response to behaviorism was positive and he described it in his writings and applied it to raising of his children as well as to the school that he and Dora founded.

But reality intruded. Behaviorism is not simply a limited theory for education, it is a false paradigm. Accumulating research on the brain (information to which Russell had no access) continues to build a stronger case against the behavioral model. Russell, in trying to apply the theory, recognized its inadequacies and ultimately gave it up. But this was too late for John and Katherine. Some of her most telling criticism can be seen in Russell's attempt to apply a model which he ultimately discarded.

Tait felt uncomfortable with her father's attempt to instill self-reliance in her and in John. This may have its source in Russell's fear that his children would be orphaned. This has already been discussed. However, it should also be noted that curriculum for Russell was based on four aims. These four aims were designed to develop character. Russell's desire to foster self-reliance, as seen by his daughter, can also be seen as part of his concern for the development of courage.

Courage has two parts. The first Russell defines as the absence of fear. The second aspect of courage is the ability to understand one's own limits. Russell writes in *Education and the Good Life*:

. . . Thus the perfection of courage is found in the man of many interests, who feels his ego to be but a small part of the world, not through despising himself, but through valuing much that is not himself . . . Such courage is positive and instinctive, not negative and repressive . . . (Boni and Liveright edition, 1926, p. 69).

Thus while Katherine Tait describes the aim of self-reliance in a psychobiographical way (whether she knows it or not), it can also be viewed as a central tenet of Russell's educational theory. Seen this way, it becomes one of the many aspects of life in which parents strive to facilitate the development of their offspring in what they believe to be the best interest of their children.

Katherine argues that ultimately Russell was not a failure as a parent but that he was not one hundred percent of a success either. This does not seem so harsh. Most parents would probably be content to have their children evaluate them in a manner no worse than this.

Katherine Tait points out that free inquiry and skepticism were hallmarks of Beacon Hill. These values too are found in Russell's writings and were consistently applied by him and Dora at the school. The experience at Beacon Hill must be seen as an extension of Russell not only as an educator but as a parent. His success at the school adds to his achievement as a father.

In the end Beacon Hill failed Katherine because Russell had difficulty separating his role as a parent from his role as a teacher-administrator. He finally opted for a more distant stance with his children (as perceived by Katherine) and as a result, she felt alienated from him as well as from Dora.

This criticism has some validity. Certainly it accurately reflects how Katherine felt about Beacon Hill. Still, what were Russell's options? Had he sent her to a traditional school, rather than organizing Beacon Hill, he would have doomed her to attending schools in which he saw grave limits. He did his best to provide her (and John) with an education that would enable her to fully realize her potential. He did so at great cost financially and emotionally.

Still, Beacon Hill is not the end of the story. Bertrand Russell continued to be Katherine's parent educator for the remainder of his life. One can recognize that he continued to grow in the role; ultimately he was a successful parent in her terms and in his own.

Some of his limits may have come about because he was nearly fifty when he began to have children. Some resulted from the fact that by the time of the birth of his children, Russell already belonged to the ages in a way that left him not completely available to his children or to the rest of his family. Russell did the best he could under the circumstances. No more can be asked of any parent.

Pugwash and Russell's Legacy

by
John R. Lenz

In October, 1995, the Nobel Peace Prize for 1995 was awarded to Dr. Joseph Rotblat and (jointly) the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs "for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to eliminate such arms."

Rotblat was an associate of Bertrand Russell's, who is regarded as a founding-father of the Pugwash movement which began in 1957. What exactly was Russell's role in Pugwash? News reports (the few I saw) made no mention of Russell (who died in 1970) in describing Pugwash. Yet the award of the Nobel Peace Prize constitutes, in some sense, an important recognition of his legacy, and of a cause he championed throughout the last twenty-five years of his life (beginning in 1945 and most intensively from 1949 to 1962). Therefore, I wish to sketch some history of Pugwash and especially of Russell's role in it.

The Pugwash Conferences (I will explain the name) began in 1957 with the goal of bringing together scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain to work for peace and mutual understanding. The immediate motivation was the call to world scientists embodied in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955.

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955)

Russell in his *Autobiography* (Vol. III, p. 74) tells the wonderful story of how he had (in 1955) written up a statement calling for joint action among scientists "of both capitalist and communist ideologies" and left it with Einstein for his approval. He was "shattered" when on his flight from Rome to Paris the pilot announced the news of Einstein's death. But at his hotel in Paris he found a letter from Einstein with his agreement. Russell loved to tell stories as if great events were the products of marvelous accidents (Volume I of his *Autobiography* contains at least three noteworthy examples of this in his private life). In reality, of course, both the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and the Pugwash movement shared deeper causes.

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto called for scientists from both sides to unite to act upon governments to renounce nuclear weapons with a view towards the abolition of war itself. (This Manifesto is printed in *Has Man a Future?*, pp. 55-60. It is now available over the Internet through Pugwash's home page; a better copy is accessible through the home page of the Russell Archives.) It speaks passionately of the grave threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the danger that scientific knowledge will be put to harmful uses. The signers speak "not as members of this or that nation,

continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt . . . All, equally, are in peril. We have to learn to think in a new way . . . Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?"

The statement concludes with a ringing Russellian appeal (reminiscent of "A Free Man's Worship"): "We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death."

This conclusion Russell repeated from an earlier speech, his famous BBC broadcast, later called "Man's Peril" (it is included in his book, *Portraits from Memory*, 1956). It was probably not a coincidence that this evoking of "a new Paradise," a new salvation for Man in the face of his destruction, had come in that Christmas-season broadcast of December 23, 1954. (Erich Fromm movingly characterizes Russell as a prophet and a priest.) In then drafting a public plea he was (he says) inspired by the response to his radio warning, on which he based what is known as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. Initially eleven well-known scientists signed the declaration, including Russell, Einstein, Linus Pauling (who was a honorary member of the BRS), and Dr. Joseph Rotblat, an emigre physicist from Poland who worked in London. Russell and Rotblat had first met when they appeared on television to comment on H-Bomb tests (Moorehead, p. 473).

Background of the Manifesto: Russell and Rotblat from 1945 to 1955

Let me now digress to outline Rotblat's background, and some more of Russell's, before returning to 1955 when they leagued together.

Rotblat had done some work on the U.S. atomic Bomb project at Los Alamos, New Mexico, but resigned in late 1944 when he learned of the failure of the German bomb project. Thereupon U.S. intelligence accused him of being a Soviet spy. This is but the first example of a government not getting the message he and others came to promote; any expressions of non-hostility were suspect.

Around the same time (still glancing retrospectively) Russell entered upon his career of fighting nuclear weapons with his speech in the House of Lords on November 28, 1945 (later published in *Has Man a Future?*, pp. 19-24). Here he called for the creation of an international body to control atomic power as a necessary step towards the abolition of war. His prose lacks the fire he commanded in 1954 (quoted above): "either war stops or else the whole of civilized mankind stops" (except, he says interestingly, for "people who will be . . . unscientific . . ."). Russell sounds

tentative here, perhaps because he actually addresses a governing body. Usually he makes his appeal to mankind or his scientific peers. Pugwash ultimately develops his somewhat technocratic premise that scientists know best because they, unlike government, ideally work for the good of mankind, and that governments will listen to the most eminent scientists, especially when (according to good scientific method) they agree and reason compels assent. (More importantly, Pugwash also embodies his life-long ideal that scientists cannot remain aloof from human and social values).

Russell at this time also develops themes that had preoccupied him in the First World War: the abolition of war and the reform of government and human desires. Perhaps this explains Lackey's disapproving comment (p. 245) that nowhere in Russell's writings has he found any moral condemnation of the actual use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Certainly Russell's record is not untainted. From 1945 to 1949, he employed a tactic of anti-Soviet rhetoric, claiming to prefer war to Soviet domination (Lackey, pp. 245-6; Clark, chapter 19). To his later embarrassment, he proposed a policy of threatening the Soviets with a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Ryan notes (p. 186), ". . . unlike theorists of the just war (traditionally), he did not think that it was wicked to threaten what it would be wicked to do" (p. 186). Yet Russell insisted that to pursue his goals he was in fact once prepared to use atomic weapons against the Soviets (as he says in a 1959 BBC interview published in *The Listener*, March 19, 1959, quoted by Clark, pp. 528-9 and Lackey, p. 246, n. 8)

Thus, although Russell spoke out forcefully in 1945, his anti-nuclear crusade really entered a new phase in 1949, after the Soviets exploded a bomb of their own. It is worth remembering, to put his own immense contributions in perspective, that other movements of scientists were active in the late 1940's. Russell did not work in isolation. In September 1945, a group of British scientists (for example) involved in developing the Bomb advised the government that "the advent of this new weapon of destruction ought to be the signal for renewed efforts to achieve lasting world peace." (Wittner, p. 89).

At that time Joseph Rotblat played a leading role in organizing a group of British scientists as a counterpart to the Federation of American Scientists. In February, 1946, British scientists discussed with Americans "the need for an international movement of scientists" (in the words of Wittner, p. 89). The British group, called Atomic Scientists' Association, arose in spring 1946. In 1947 and 1948, Rotblat organized an "Atomic Train" exhibition which toured England. He has also noted that the very first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations was for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The idea of world government (adumbrated by Russell in the House of Lords speech) also had many supporters at the time, with their slogan of "one world or none." After reading many works focused on one monumental figure like Russell, it comes as a surprise to learn that "By far the most effective leader of the British movement for world government was Henry Osborne, a handsome, dynamic young engineer" and Labour MP (Wittner, p. 93).

Rotblat spoke up on 1951 when a member "urged very strongly that the (Atomic Scientists') Association should refrain altogether from expressing views on political matters." To its discredit the group cowed to the "respectable" position that "Scientists wishing to express political views should join frankly political organizations." (Wittner, pp. 316 and 407, n. 20). Part of Russell's enduring greatness is that he always abhorred this type of stance. According to B. Feinberg, the American and British groups (named above) held conversations in 1953 and 1954 regarding international cooperation (Feinberg, p. 241). Then came (and this account returns to) the force of Russell's Christmas broadcast of December 23, 1954 and its follow-up in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. He was a powerful voice who rallied scientists to their moral obligations to humanity.

The Origins of Pugwash

For the launching of the Manifesto Bertrand Russell hired Caxton Hall, the same site where he had delivered his lectures on Principles of Social Reconstruction in early 1916 (Clark, pp. 268 and 542). It is curious to note that the American edition of that World War I book is entitled *Why Men Fight: A Method of Abolishing the International Duel* (1917).

Russell engaged Dr. Joseph Rotblat, one of its signers, to chair the press conference, a major event, on July 9, 1955. He later praised Rotblat in the course of castigating others who refused to become involved: "He can have few rivals in the courage and integrity and complete self-abnegation with which he has given up his own career . . . to devote himself to combatting the nuclear peril as well as other, allied evils. If ever these evils are eradicated and international affairs are straightened out, his name should stand very high indeed among the heroes." (We can only enjoy a mixed celebration, when the second part of this conditional sentence is happening without the first. This is from Russell's *Autobiography* III, pp. 77-78; a nice photograph of the two men together in 1962 appears opposite p. 113 in the British edition.)

Why "Pugwash"? A conference was first planned by Nehru for India, but this was postponed due to the outbreak of the Suez crisis. An offer by Aristotle Onassis to finance a meeting at Monaco was rejected. Cyrus Eaton, an industrialist in America, intervened. Eaton had been a trustee of the University of Chicago and had known Russell (a visiting professor

there) in 1938. He provided financial support for the conference of scientists to meet in his hometown of Pugwash, Nova Scotia. Eaton later helped bring the Russell Archives to his old school, McMaster University. International cooperation and scholarship benefited from these two instances of his patriotism and good taste in philosophy.

Eaton (1972, p. 4) and others ascribe the leading role in Pugwash's founding to Russell. To sum up that role, Pugwash resulted from an impetus that was broader than Russell himself, but it regards the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 as its founding or charter document. Its inclusion of both Western and Communist members marked a particular advance and a brave demonstration of the independence of free minds.

Russell himself was not able to attend the first conference (in July 1957) due to ill health. He did speak at Pugwash Conferences in 1958 and 1962, but attended none after 1962 (partly because he became pre-occupied with U.S. policy and Vietnam). He served as their President for a time but resigned in 1967, by which time "The Conferences had become a great disappointment to him" (Davies, p. 197). In his Autobiography he sounds fairly cool towards the Pugwash movement and even characterizes its chief advantage as a social one through the meeting of scientists from different countries (III, p. 85; see pp. 84-87). But he kept up with Pugwash and corresponded with Rotblat through at least November 1966; the Russell Archives contain a host of material of use to future researchers (see the list of archival material, for Pugwash alone, in Feinberg 1967, pp. 241-248), and a future volume of his Collected Papers will contain Russell's many relevant writings.

Prospects

All interested should look up the home page of Pugwash or that of Student Pugwash USA on the World Wide Web. Pugwash reports that "The organization has focused its most recent efforts on environmental, energy and Third World issues." These are all understandable as part of Russell's overarching problem, "The idea of an international order" (I.F. Stone, p. 23).

The 45th Pugwash Conference was held in Hiroshima in July, 1995. Here and in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech of December 10, 1995, entitled "Remember Your Humanity," Joseph Rotblat invokes the Russell-Einstein Manifesto as the founding document of Pugwash (quoting it four times, besides his title). (This speech is available through the Pugwash Conferences home page, but in a poor uncorrected scanned-in copy, providing a bad example of the uses of technology.)

Parts of this speech are memorable. Like Russell, Rotblat urges engagement: "... the ivory tower was finally demolished by the Hiroshima bomb . . . I appeal to my fellow scientists to remember their responsibility

to humanity." He asserts that "a war-free world is not Utopian." All people must develop "a new loyalty: loyalty to mankind. . . . We have to become world citizens. . . . In many ways we are becoming like one family." He twice echoes Russell's words, "Remember your humanity and forget the rest," concluding (in further Russellian language) that survival in a world free of war can be achieved "by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than by compulsion . . . Above all, remember your humanity." These words resound, to my ear, with Russell's legacy.

Unfortunately, prejudice continues to haunt such noble thoughts. The report of the Nobel Prize in *The New York Times* (October 14, 1995) quoted an inane American view that Pugwash members were "dupes" of the Soviets. This was answered in a letter (October 18) but it is clear that cold war rhetoric persists. This charge goes back to a 1960 report of the Senate Internal Security Committee that accused Western scientists of being misled, but it represents the age-old obstinacy Russell fought against his whole life. (See Russell's acute satire of this in *Has Man a Future?*, pp. 66-68.) Although I would not myself defend world government, the fact that the American West contains groups armed against the threat of this perceived conspiracy gives little short-time hope for humanity.

Is it saddening, or cheering (or both) to read on a preserved Sumerian tablet from c. 2500 B.C. the enjoinder of a father to his son, "Look to your humanity"? Remembering this, I cannot myself agree with the belief, expressed by Rotblat, that "any rationale for having nuclear weapons disappeared" with the collapse of Soviet communism. That idea itself seems like Cold War thinking. The end of the Cold War did not, of course, end war and human conflict (any more than it ended ideology). As long as any country has an atomic bomb, others will want one. Russell knew that they could be used for bullying. Most troubling is Rotblat's reminder that "nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented." Indeed, in Russell's words, "A new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive." We must learn to think differently than mankind has usually thought. Yet remain humane. Science is full of paradoxes.

Joseph Rotblat, by the way, also received the Bertrand Russell Society Award in 1983. We're happy that we preceded the Nobel committee by twelve years but not that Russell's and his messages of humanity still need strong advocates to be heard.

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The Theologian's Nightmare Bertrand Russell

(Reprinted from *Fact and Fiction* p. 190-193.
Published by Routledge in 1994. Reprinted with permission.)

The eminent theologian, Dr. Thaddeus, dreamt that he died and pursued his course towards heaven. His studies had prepared him and he had no difficulty in finding the way. He knocked at the door of heaven, and was met with a closer scrutiny than he expected. "I ask admission," he said, "because I was a good man and devoted my life to the glory of God." "Man?" said the janitor, "What is that? And how could such a funny creature as you are do anything to promote the glory of God?" Dr. Thaddeus was astonished. "You surely cannot be ignorant of man. You must be aware that man is the supreme work of the Creator." "As to that," said the janitor, "I am sorry to hurt your feelings, but what you're saying is news to me. I doubt if anybody up here has ever heard of this thing you call "man". However, since you seem distressed, you shall have a chance of consulting our librarian."

The librarian, a globular being with a thousand eyes and one mouth, bent some of his eyes on Dr. Thaddeus. "What is this?" he asked of the janitor. "This," replied the janitor, "says that it is a member of a species called "man", which lives in a place called "Earth". It has some odd notion that the Creator takes a special interest in this place and this species. I thought perhaps you could enlighten it." "Well," said the librarian kindly to the theologian, "perhaps you can tell me where this place is that you call "Earth". "Oh," said the theologian, "it's part of the Solar System." "And what is the Solar System?" asked the librarian. "Oh," said the theologian, somewhat disconcerted, "my province was Sacred Knowledge, but the question that you are asking belongs to profane knowledge. However, I have learnt enough from astrolomical friends to be able to tell you that the Solar System is part of the Milky Way." "And what is the Milky Way?" asked the librarian. "Oh, the Milky Way is one of the Galaxies, of which, I am told, there are some hundred million." "Well, well," said the librarian, "you could hardly expect me to remember one out of so many. But I do remember to have heard the word "galaxy" before. In fact, I believe that one of our sub-librarians specializes in galaxies. Let us send for him and see whether he can help."

After no very long time, the galactic sub-librarian made his appearance. In shape, he was a dodecahedron. It was clear that at one time his surface had been bright, but the dust of the shelves had rendered him dim

and opaque. The librarian explained to him that Dr. Thaddeus, in endeavouring to account for his origin, had mentioned galaxies, and it was hoped that information could be obtained from the galactic section of the library. 'Well,' said the sub-librarian, 'I suppose it might become possible in time but as there are a hundred million galaxies, and each has a volume to itself, it takes some time to find any particular volume. Which is it that this odd molecule desires?' 'It is the one called "The Milky Way",' Dr. Thaddeus falteringly replied. 'All right,' said the sub-librarian, 'I will find it if I can.'

Some three weeks later, he returned, explaining that the extraordinary efficient card-index in the galactic section of the library had enabled them to locate the galaxy as number XQ 321,762. 'We have employed,' he said 'all the five thousand clerks in the galactic section on this search. Perhaps you would like to see the clerk who is specially concerned with the galaxy in question' The clerk was sent for and turned out to be an octohedron with an eye in each face and a mouth in one of them. He was surprised and dazed to find himself in such a glittering region, away from the shadowy limbo of his shelves. Pulling himself together, he asked, rather shyly, 'What is it you wish to know about my galaxy?' Dr. Thaddeus spoke up: 'What I want is to know about the Solar System, a collection of heavenly bodies revolving about one of the stars in your galaxy. The star about which they revolve about is called "the Sun".' 'Humph,' said the librarian of the Milky Way, 'it was hard enough to hit upon the right galaxy, but to hit upon the right star in the galaxy is far more difficult. I know that there are about three hundred billion stars in the galaxy, but I have no knowledge, myself, that would distinguish one of them from another. I believe, however, that at one time a list of the whole three hundred billion was demanded by the Administration and that it is still stored in the basement. If you think it worth while, I will engage special labour from the Other Place to search for this particular star.'

It was agreed that, since the question had arisen and since Dr. Thaddeus was evidently suffering some distress, this might be the wisest course.

Several years later, a very weary and dispirited tetrahedron presented himself before the galactic sub-librarian. 'I have,' he said, 'at last discovered the particular star concerning which inquiries have been made, but I am quite at a loss to imagine why it has aroused any special interest. It closely resembles a great many other stars in the same galaxy. It is of average size and temperature, and is surrounded by very much smaller bodies called "planets". After minute investigation, I discovered that some, at least, of these planets have parasites, and I think that this thing which has been making inquiries must be one of them.'

At this point, Dr. Thaddeus burst out in a passionate and indignant lament: "Why, oh why, did the Creator conceal from us poor inhabitants of Earth that it was not we who prompted Him to create the Heavens? Throughout my long life, I have served Him diligently, believing that He would notice my service and reward me with Eternal Bliss. And now, it seems that He was not even aware that I existed. You tell me that I am an infinitesimal animalacule on a tiny body revolving around an insignificant member of a collection of three hundred billion stars, which is only one of many millions of such collections. I cannot bear it, and can no longer adore my Creator.' 'Very well,' said the janitor, 'then you can go to the Other Place.'

Here the theologian awoke. 'The power of Satan over our sleeping imagination is terrifying,' he muttered.

Drama Review Warren Allen Smith

Outing Wittgenstein by Fred Newman. Performed at the Castillo Theatre, 500 Greenwich Street, New York City, 16 June - 30 July 1995.

Wittgenstein, once called "the Elvis of philosophy," was Bertrand Russell's secretary for a time. He was so handy he could build a house whereas Russell could not make a cup of tea. It has been generally known, and Russell knew, that Wittgenstein was a homosexual. Now, in an off-Broadway play, Wittgenstein -- whose work influenced the Vienna Circle of logical positivists -- has been outed dramatically in a two-act play by Fred Newman.

Newman depicts Wittgenstein, in the first act, as one who does not believe in any metaphysical system or in God. Using nineteen characters, Newman explains how Ludwig's last name starts with a "V": sound and describes his family (e.g., his millionaire steel industrialist father, the one-armed brother for whom Ravel wrote a composition for one hand; and Gretl, who helped arrange Freud's escape to England). Newman generally covers his scientific, mathematical, and philosophic successes, using video screens to provide aural and visual descriptions of what is being covered.

To avoid being overly cerebral the action takes place on a live talkshow, "This Is Your Death," in which eminent people are brought back to relate their story (Diane Hudock, a stunning TV hostess, explains how she is able to manage such a dramatic possibility). Hitler (played weakly by Charles Battersby) wafts back, but Wittgenstein (performed well by Dave DeChristopher) challenges him and says they have nothing in common. Carmen Miranda (humorously enacted by Michele Carlo) dances back, and Wittgenstein gushes his love for her. (In real life, Wittgenstein wolfed down cream doughnuts while watching John Wayne films, refused to wear a tie, whistled entire concertos, furnished his rooms with deckchairs, and built a house, designing every window and door, every window lock and radiator, and allowing no baseboards, carpets, curtains, or chandeliers.) Bertrand Russell (impersonated weakly by Dan Friedman) enters royally, pipe in hand, and the two argue a few pedantically philosophic points. (When he was Russell's secretary, he used to pace in agitated silence, like a wild beast, for hours up and down his room. "Are you thinking about logic or your sins?" Russell once asked. "Both," replied Ludwig, then continued his pacing.) When Wittgenstein's alter ego (John Carroll, who steals the show with his ebullience) appears, Ludwig is embarrassed at having to admit his homosexuality. Yes, there were all those rough young men ready to cater to him sexually. And, yes, he did live with a lover in England. (For some reason, a few scholars still deny this part of his psyche.)

The second act is zany and metaphysical. It involves the Planet Wittgenstein, which Ludwig somehow invented and in which gender is not a feature of one's identity, everyone is gay, and everyone is a philosopher. The message: Homosexuality is not a choice. It is a biological fact. Without gays, life on Earth would be boring, as boring as Heaven, Newman explains.

Interviewed afterwards, both Wittgenstein and Russell admitted they are but actors, not students of philosophy. Neither claimed having deeply researched the characters they portrayed. Miranda was astonished to learn from her interviewer that the lady with the fruity hats had died in her 40s, that her pianist's wife was so jealous of the two she insisted upon being hired as wardrobe girl, a task which turned out to be horticulturally attiring.

It is now time to out the author. From 1985 on he used the New Alliance Party, which he helped form, as his pulpit. That party, which ran the far-to-the-left Ms. Leonara Fulani for various office's is now defunct, having merged in 1994 with the Patriot Party, which was aligned with Lyndon La Rouché. To the present writer, Mr. Friedman (Russell) innocently revealed that the International Center for Human Development, which houses the Castillo theatre, has a database of 400,000 names. He denied that Ms. Fulani has any connection, despite the fact that her books are being touted and sold. Nor did he know that Newman's 1992, *Dead as a Jew*, blamed Jews "for the suffering of minorities and for their own suffering during the Holocaust."

Abraham H. Foxman, the national director of Anti-Defamation League, has now provided the latest intelligence about Newman. In November, Newman signed an advertisement advising Jews to repudiate their leaders and embrace Nation of Islam Minister Louis Farrakhan. Newman's newly formed group? "Jews for Farrakhan."

Book Review by John Shosky
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The American University

Paul J. Hager. *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy*. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series. Dordrecht: Kluwar Academic Publishers, 1994. 195 pages. ISBN 0-7923-2688-1.

There has been a renaissance in Russellian scholarship, led by Peter Hylton, Nicholas Griffin, and Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra. You can now add Paul Hager to that list. A member of the faculty of education at Sidney's University of Technology, Hager has produced a much-needed demonstration of the constancy in Russell's philosophical methodology. While not as elegant or weighty as Hylton or Griffin, or as specialized as Rodriguez-Consuegra, Hager makes a very convincing case for the constancy of Russell's progressive approach to philosophical issues. Hager claims that "This book represents the first detailed attempt to trace the fundamental unity that lies within all of Russell's philosophical work, as well as the reasons behind those limited orderly changes that did, in fact, occur within it . . . Thus, the main thesis of the book is that there is a lot more continuity in Russell's philosophy than has usually been acknowledged, and that the major changes that do occur are much more orderly than Russell's reputation for erratically changing his views allows" (pp. xi-xii).

Hager maintains that, while more work needs to be done in explaining Russell's use of analysis, "the central role of relations in Russell's philosophy has received even less attention than analysis, with the same inconclusive results" (p.2). For Hager, Russell's use of analysis is a "fundamental device" and "an appreciation of the importance of analysis and relations requires an elucidation of the close links between them . . . analysis typically proliferates relations" (p.3). Once the link between analysis and relations is established, Hager examines Russell's empiricism, finding that changes in Russell's views on space and time "altered his ideas on relations, thereby altering his philosophy as a whole" (p. 3).

So, roughly, the book is split into a discussion of analysis and relations, on the one hand, Russell's views on space and time, on the other. Thirteen chapters are divided into two parts. An introduction highlights the goals and findings of the book. In Part One, "Analysis and Relations -- The Key to Continuity in Russell's Philosophy," Hager presents chapters on "Russellian Analysis in Mathematical Philosophy", "Russellian Analysis in General Philosophy", "A Systematic Account of Russellian Analysis", "Relations in Mathematical Philosophy", "Relations in General Philosophy", "Logical Constructions and Relations", and the "Distinctiveness of

of Russellian Analysis". In Part Two, "Theories of Space and Time -- the Key to Change in Russell's Philosophy", Hager explores the "Impact of Russell's Philosophical predecessors", "Space and Time in the Platonist Phase", "Space and Time in the Empiricist Phase", and "Space and time in the Modified Empiricist Phase (1919 Onwards)". A conclusion and bibliography follow. By the end of the book, Hager shows that the two parts of the book "reinforce and compliment one another" (p. 179). Russell's use of analysis is constant, but changes in his empirical views account for the differences in his philosophical results.

Hager includes a generous helping of passages from Russell to carefully document this continuity. These passages make this text part exposition, part source-book. Therefore, the book becomes both a useful guide to Russell's methodology and a detailed dictionary of vital philosophical quotations. In addition, Hager provides an array of diagrams, charts, lists, and other graphics to clearly illuminate his central findings in almost every chapter.

I found Hager's work on Russell to be impressive and insightful. His explanation of Russell's use of analysis is fascinating and cogent. But I am disappointed in some of the choices made by Hager, and the singular focus of the book. I agree with his examination of Russell's empiricism, but I would not regard space and time as the illuminating concepts. Rather, I would have devoted more time to Russell's empiricist project as a whole (especially his views on sense data, universals, and logical atomism), and more carefully examined the link between a "scientific method in philosophy" and philosophical analysis. But most of all, I would integrate many more of Russell's critics and their objections to Russell's views. This book offers Russell almost in a vacuum, with very little cross-referencing or mention of contemporary comments on Russell's work. Hager, quite rightly, sees Russell as his own worst critic. Yet, Russell had considerable constructive (and destructive) criticism from Moore, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Hardy, Godel, and several generations of philosophers at Oxford, not to mention Russell's critics on the European continent and in American universities. Surely these dialogues influenced Russell to some extent. I also would have liked to see a more vigorous defense of Russell against Dewey, who is mentioned just once (only in terms of an attack made by Russell).

Despite these additions, which would have made the book much stronger, I highly recommend *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy* to all members of the society. Hager gives us a useful discussion of methodology and a valuable source book of Russell's views on doing philosophy well.

One warning: it is expensive. I paid \$99 for my copy, which I purchased directly from Kluwar. However, I found the book well worth the extravagant price.

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Bertrand Russell's America, Vol. 2, 1945-1970 edited by Barry Feinberg
and Ronald Kasrils South End Press 9.95
Liberty and Social Transformation: A Study in Bertrand Russell's
Political Thought by Chandrakala Padia Heritage Publishers H. 11.50
The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words, edited by
Christopher Farley and David Hodgson. Spokesman 10.95
The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I, The Private Years
(1884-1914) by Nicholas Griffin Houghton-Mifflin .. H. 17.50
The library has a small supply of Caroline Moorehead's BERTRAND
RUSSELL: A LIFE--for sale for \$14.00 (postage paid)

Audio cassettes in the lending library

Speeches:

- 200 Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech. 1950 45'
201 "Mind and Matter." 1950 52'
202 "Bertrand Russell in Australia." 1950 55'
Four ABC broadcasts: "Guest of Honor", "The World as I See It",
"What Hope for Man?" and "My Philosophy of Life".
203 "Living in an Atomic Age." 1951 90'
Six BBC broadcasts: "Present Perplexities", "Obsolete Ideas", "The
Modern Mastery of Nature", "The Limits of Human Power", "Con
flict and Unification" and "The Achievement of Harmony".

- 204 "Life Without Fear." 1951 34'
- 205 "Portrait from Memory: Whitehead." BBC 1952 15'
- 206 "Man's Peril." BBC 1954 15'
- 207 Russell-Einstein Manifesto. 1955 30'
- 208 "The World and the Observer," BBC 1958 30'
- 209 Kalinga Prize Press Conference and Acceptance Speech. 1958 48'
Includes five minute interview of January 24, 1958.
- 210 "Address to the CND." 1959 30'
- 211 "The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore." BBC 1959 42'
Interviews with Russell, Leonard Woolf, Morton White and John Wisdom.
- 212 Address to the Berkeley Vietnam Teach-In. 1965 14'
- 213 "Appeal to the American Conscience." 1966 29'

Interviews, debates:

- 225 "Is Security Increasing?" NBC 1939 30'
- 226 Russell-Copleston Debate on the Existence of God. BBC 1948 20'
- 227 "The Attack on Academic Freedom in Britain and America." NBC 1952 30'
- 228 "Bertrand Russell' Romney Wheeler Interview. NBC 1952 30'
- 229 "Face to Face." John Freeman Interview. BBC 1959 30'
- 230 "Bertrand Russell Speaking." 1959 52'
Interviews by Woodrow Wyatt on philosophy, taboo morality, religion, and fanaticism.
- 231 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (I). 1959 52'
On the role of the individual, happiness, power, and the future of mankind. 1959 52'
- 232 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (II). 1959 52'
On nationalism, Great Britain, communism and capitalism, war and pacifism and the H-bomb
- 233 "Close-Up." Elaine Grand Interview. CBC 1959 30'
- 234 "Speaking Personally: Bertrand Russell." John Chamndos Interview 1961 90'
- 235 David Susskind Interview. 1962 90'
- 236 Studs Terkel Interview. SFMT 1962 39'
- 237 "On Nuclear Morality." Michael Tiger Interview. 1962 32'
- 238 Interview on Vietnam. CBC 1965 10'
- 239 Merv Griffin Interview. 1965 24'

Lectures, broadcasts:

- 250 "Bertrand Russell." Rev. Paul Beattie. 1975 15'
- 251 "Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher." A.J. Ayer. BBC 1980 15'
- 252 "Bertrand Russell." 1986 Professor Giovanni Costigan. 100'

- 253 "Portrait of the Philosopher as Father." Katherine Tait. (In German) 30'
- 254 "Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Education." William Hare. 15'
- 255 "Bertrand Russell's Pacifist Stance in World War I." CFMU-FM 1992 30'
- 256 "Russell vs. Dewey on Education." 1992 115'
With Michael Rockler, Tim Madigan and John Novak.
- 257 "A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic" by Darren Staloff. 1994 40'

Documentaries:

- 275 "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell." 1962 40'
- 276 Beatrice Webb on the Russells / Russell on the Webbs. 1966 35'
- 277 "Sound Portrait of Bertrand Russell." NPR dramatization. 1980 60'
- 278 "Bertrand Russell: A Reassessment." BBC 1980 43'
- 279 "Bertie and the Bomb." Soundtrack of BBC television program. 1984 40'

Miscellaneous:

- 300 "The Conscience of Wisdom." CBC 1962 62'
- 301 "Sinfonia Contra Timore" by Graham Whettam. Dedicated to Russell. 1972 27'

Library News

What I Believe: 3 Complete Essays on Religion--by Bertrand Russell was released by Audio Editions (1-800-231-4261) in September. The selections are "What I Believe", "Why I Am Not A Christian" and "A Free Man's Worship". 2 Hrs. 25'. The reader is Terrence Hardiman. ISBN 15727001, \$16.95. A copy is in the lending library.

Religion and Science--by Russell was released in 1994 by Audio Scholar (1-800-282-1225). The two hour and ten minute abridgement is read by David Chase. ISBN 187955715, \$17.95. A copy is in the library.

The publication of the Thoemmes Press edition--My Father, Bertrand Russell--has been put on hold until next March to coincide with the release of the first volume of Ray Monk's Russell biography.

The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell: The Development of an Aristocratic Liberalism by Philip Ironside was published by the Cambridge University Press in January. ISBN 0-521-47383-7. A copy is in the library.

The Principles of Mathematics will be reissued by Liveright in February. ISGN 0-393-31404-9 \$17.95 paper.

Russell by A.C. Graylight will be published by Oxford University Press in February. ISBN: 019287683X \$7.95 paper.

Two paperback reprints were issued by Spokesman in late 1995: Portraits from Memory (ISBN: 085124582X at 9.99 pounds) and The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (ISBN: 0851245412 at 7.99 pounds).

Ray Monk's A Life of Bertrand Russell is scheduled for publication in November, 1996. \$35.00.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May, 1996

No. 90



Bertrand Russell Society
c/o Michael J. Rockler
529 14th St., NW, Suite 1125
Washington, DC 20045

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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

Michael J. Rockler
529 14th Street, NW
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Washington, DC 20045

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of The Bertrand Russell Society

May, 1996

No. 90

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Bertrand Russell Society Business

The following pages contain Society business that need your attention.

SOCIETY BUSINESS INCLUDES:

- 1) Membership Renewal (If you have not yet renewed for 1996)
- 2) Treasurer's Report
- 3) Books available for sale from the BRS Library

PLEASE NOTE:

- A) It is now time to renew your membership. Please complete the enclosed form and return it to Dennis Darland.
- B) If you receive a damaged copy of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, let us know and we will replace it.
- C) Contributions of articles and letters are welcome. Please send them to the editor.

**Bertrand Russell Society
1996 Membership Renewal Coupon**

URGENT!

If you have already renewed for 1996 or have joined the BRS in 1996, please again accept our thanks for participating in the BRS.

But if you have not yet renewed your membership for 1996 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- please mail this coupon with your payment TODAY. Thanks!

Please mail your coupon and payment to BRS Treasurer Dennis Darland at:

Dennis Darland
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Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the one that is right for my circumstances. I enclose my 1996 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society."

- Individual \$35
- Couple \$40
- Student \$20
- Limited Income Individual \$20
- Limited Income Couple \$25
- Contributor \$50 and up
- Sustainer \$75 and up
- Sponsor \$100 and up
- Patron \$250 and up
- Benefactor \$500 and up
- Life Member \$1000 and up
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
Cash Flow Report
1/1/96 Through 3/31/96
Compiled by Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer

| | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| 4/5/96 | | |
| BRS-Bank, Cash, CC Accounts | | |
| | Category Description | 1/1/96- 3/31/96 |
| | Balance 12/31/96 | 1,430.95 |
| INFLOWS | | |
| Contributions: | | |
| | Contrib-BRS | 425.00 |
| | Total Contributions | 425.00 |
| Dues: | | |
| | New Members | 533.00 |
| | Renewals | 2,294.00 |
| | Total Dues | 2,827.00 |
| | Int Inc. | 1.65 |
| | Library Inc | 113.25 |
| | TOTAL INFLOWS | 3,366.90 |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| | Library Exp | 67.89 |
| | Newsletter | 1,400.00 |
| | Other Exp | 369.54 |
| | TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 1,837.43 |
| | OVERALL TOTAL | 1,529.47 |
| | BALANCE 3/31/96 | 2,960.42 |

Library Report

The Society library sells and lends books, audiotapes, videotapes, and other materials by and about Russell. Please direct BRS library inquiries and requests to Tom Stanley, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088. (ck71@freenet.carleton.ca)

Books for sale H-Cloth, otherwise paperback. Prices are postpaid. Please send check or money order (U.S. funds only), payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society" to Tom Stanley.

BY BERTRAND RUSSELL:

| | |
|---|--------|
| Appeal to the American Conscience Spokesman | \$3.50 |
| Authority and the Individual Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Has Man a Future? Allen & Unwin H | \$8.00 |
| History of the World in Epitome Spokesman | 1.00 |
| In Praise of Idleness Routledge | 8.95 |
| My Philosophical Development Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Political Ideals Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Power: A New Social Analysis Routledge | 8.95 |
| Principles of Social Reconstruction Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Sceptical Essays Routledge | 8.95 |

BY OTHER AUTHORS:

| | |
|--|---------|
| Bertrand Russell: A Life by Caroline Moorehead H | \$14.00 |
| Bertrand Russell by John Slater Thoemmes Press | 19.00 |
| Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970 Spokesman | 1.50 |
| Bertrand Russell's America, Vol. 2, 1945-1970, edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils South End Press | 9.95 |
| The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words, edited by Christopher Farley and David Hodgson Spokesman | 10.95 |
| The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I, The Private Years (1884-1914) by Nicholas Griffin Houghton-Mifflin | H 17.50 |

From the Editor Michael J. Rockler

Over the past several years John Novak (who edits *Insights* for the John Dewey Society) and I have engaged in a number of debates on issues relating to differences between John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. At the 1994 BRS meeting that was held in Toronto as part of the Humanist coalition, we debated "Russell versus Dewey on Religion." In June at a meeting of the Canadian Learned Societies--which will be held in St. Catherines Ontario--Novak and I will debate the topic "Dewey versus Russell on Democracy."

In preparation for this debate I have recently reread Russell's *Power* which was first published in 1938 and was reissued by Routledge in 1992.

As always it is a pleasure to reread one of Russell's many popular books. And as usual, this book has relevance for the contemporary world.

Russell argues in this volume that the fundamental concept in the social sciences is the notion of power. He suggests that the concept of power in the social sciences is equivalent to the concept of energy in physics.

Russell goes on to identify several kinds of power including priestly power, kingly power, economic power, revolutionary power and what he calls "naked" power. This latter is the ability to force one's will on another.

Generally, I believe that Russell, in *Power*, offers a much more sophisticated view of democracy than does Dewey in *Democracy And Education*. Russell writes, for example,:

... One of the advantages of democracy, from the governmental point of view, is that it makes the average citizen easier to deceive, since he regards the government as his government. Opposition to a war which is not swiftly successful arises much less readily in a democracy than under any other form of constitution. In a democracy, a majority can only turn against the government by first admitting to themselves that they were mistaken in formerly thinking well of their chosen leaders, which is difficult and unpleasant. (p. 96)

BR's understanding of democracy offers a different perspective than Dewey's because Russell appreciated and accepted the limits of democracy in ways which probably have seemed heretical to Dewey.

Russell demonstrates still another limit when he writes:

... The members of the government have more power than the others, even if they are democratically elected; and so do officials appointed by a democratically elected government. The larger the organization, the greater the power of the executive.

Thus every increase in the size of organizations increases inequalities of power by simultaneously diminishing the independence of ordinary members and enlarging the scope of the initiative of the government. (p. 108)

Russell addressed problems of democracy in other writings as well. In several books he spoke of the danger of the "herd instinct" which can subvert democracy and which in his case led to his being imprisoned twice by democratic governments.

I am looking forward to my upcoming debate with John Novak on a program that will include Tim Madigan -- editor of *Free Inquiry* and a member of the BRS board.

Certainly John Dewey contributed much to an intellectual understanding of the modern world. But often his ideas are less clear than are those of Russell. I believe that Russell was usually more incisive than Dewey; certainly BR was a better writer. *Power* is an example of Russell's clear thinking and clear writing.

Six New Society Honorary Members Don Jackanicz

In March 1996, the Board of Directors of the Bertrand Russell Society voted to offer honorary Society membership to six persons: Ken Coates, Elizabeth R. Eames, Antony Flew, Michael Foot, Paul Kurtz, and Willard van Orman Quine. Each has accepted honorary membership for which the Society is grateful. Our new honorary members join the ranks of these other honorary members: Bertrand Russell's daughter, Katherine Russell Tait; Bertrand Russell's son, Conrad Russell; philosopher Paul Edwards; and philosopher D. F. Pears. Deceased honorary members are Bertrand Russell's second wife, Dora Black Russell; Bertrand Russell's son, John Russell; philosopher Alfred Ayer; Russell bibliographer Lester E. Denonn; scientist Linus Pauling; philosopher Karl Popper; and Philosopher Paul Arthur Schilpp.

The Society's Bylaws provide the following about honorary membership:

Honorary Membership may be conferred on a person who has been nominated by a member and approved by two-thirds of the Directors voting, after having met one or more of the following conditions: (1) is a member of Bertrand Russell's family; (2) had worked closely with Russell in an important way; (3) has made a distinctive contribution to Russell scholarship; (4) has acted in support of a cause or idea that Russell championed; (5) has promoted awareness of Russell or of Russell's work; (6) has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of Russell. Honorary Members have the same rights and responsibilities as Individual Members, but they pay no dues.

The Board's decision, in accord with the Bylaw's provisions, recognizes the distinctive and diverse contributions each new honorary member has made in both Russell-related affairs and the wider world. Here are brief biographical sketches about these new honorary members. Society members are encouraged to learn more about them by reading their own numerical publications and articles about them in reference works.

Ken Coates. Born in Britain in 1930 and residing now in Matlock, Derbyshire, Mr. Coates has been a Member of the European Parliament since 1989. A former coal miner, he has been very much involved in the study of poverty, industrial relations, and disarmament. Since 1980 he has taught at the University of Nottingham, most recently as a Special Professor in Adult Education. Mr. Coates has been active in the programs of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, including as editor of the Foundation's publication, The Spokesman, and in connection with Russell's protests against

nuclear weapons in the 1960s. His publications include Industrial Democracy in Great Britain, Trade Unions in Britain, Heresies, and Think Globally, Act Locally. In his article, "Bertrand Russell and Industrial Democracy," in Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970, Mr. Coates wrote, "Bertrand Russell will rightly be remembered for many different contributions to human knowledge, to civilized thought."

Elizabeth R. Eames. A Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University, Ms. Eames has authored two monographs about Russell - Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge (1969) and Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with His Contemporaries (1989). In collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell, Ms. Eames was the editor of Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, which was the seventh volume of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (1984). She resides in Carbondale, Illinois and, before her honorary membership, had been a Society member for many years.

Antony Flew. Philosopher Antony Flew, born in 1923 has held numerous academic positions, including those at Oxford University, the University of Aberdeen, and the University of Keele. He has been an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading since 1983. Mr. Flew has been a leader in organizations such as the Rationalist Press Association and the voluntary Euthanasia Society. His numerous books include Hume's Philosophy of Belief, God and Philosophy, The Presumption of Atheism, and Dictionary of Philosophy. Among his most noteworthy articles is "Immortality" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. His forthcoming volume, Philosophical Papers, edited by Society Vice President John Shosky, will include an essay titled "Russell's Judgement on Bolshevism." Mr. Flew resides in Reading.

Michael Foot. British journalist and politician Michael Foot was born in 1913 and attended Oxford university. During the 1930s through 1960s, he held various writing and editorial positions in newspapers including the Evening Standard. Mr. Foot has been a Member of Parliament from 1945 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1992. His Labour Party posts have included being Leader of the House of Commons, 1976-1979 and 1980-1983. Among his books are Aneurin Bevan, Loyalists and Loners, and most recently a major study of H.G. Wells. Mr. Foot, who resides in London, has over the years espoused many of Russell's political and social views in the national political arena.

Paul Kurtz. Born in 1925 and educated at New York University and Columbia University, Paul Kurtz resides in Buffalo where he is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York. His other academic posts have included those at Vassar College, New School for Social Research, and Union College. Since 1970 Mr. Kurtz has been president of publishing firm Prometheus Books, and since 1980 he has

been editor of Free Inquiry and chairman of the Council for Democratic and Secular Humanism. His many publications include In Defense of Secular Humanism, Eupraxophy: Living Without Religion, Exuberance: A Philosophy of Happiness, and The New Skepticism. Mr. Kurtz received the Bertrand Russell Society Award in 1988 for his varied humanist efforts. Before his honorary membership, he was a Society member.

Willard van Orman Quine. One of the foremost philosophers of our century, Willard van Orman Quine was born in 1908 and is primarily identified with his many years of teaching at Harvard University. He is now an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Harvard and resides in Boston. Mr. Quine's celebrated books include A System of Logistic, From a Logical point of View, Word and Object, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, and The Logic of Sequences. He was the subject of Volume 18 of The Library of Living Philosophers, in part edited by the Society Honorary member Paul Arthur Schilpp, i.e. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine. He is the recipient of the 1996 Bertrand Russell Society Award for his great body of philosophical work inspired by Russell. In his letter accepting honorary membership, Mr. Quine wrote, "Russell meant much to me, and I have much valued the contribution of your Society in keeping his work and his image before us."

On John Novak's Reasons for Not Being A Russellian by Paul Hager

According to John Novak (*Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, No. 88, November 1995), Russell held that humans have "immaculate receptions", i.e. "immediate knowledge of atomistic aspects of reality", which serve as the "foundation for certain knowledge". On this basis, for reasons not made entirely clear in Novak's article, Russell's humanist credentials are thereby found wanting. Russell's alleged foundational certainty is claimed to have robbed him of "a deeper understanding of the human perspective".

However the major difficulty for Novak's argument is that Russell was never a proponent of the foundationalist position ascribed to him. Interestingly, as support for his saddling of Russell with the "immaculate receptions" position, Novak references not Russell, nor even scholarly work focused on Russell, but, rather, he cites books by Tiles and Burke on Dewey! Now I acknowledge that both of these are fine books on Dewey, but equally they are poor books in the sections that discuss Russell¹. They are poor guides to Russell because, quite simply, they misrepresent rather than illuminate his works.

The shortcomings of Novak's interpretation become clear from a consideration of Russell's method of philosophising, which he consistently applied throughout his post-idealist career. The method, which has not been well understood, has two parts. Firstly, philosophical analysis proceeds backwards from a given body of knowledge (the "results") to its premisses, and, secondly, it proceeds forwards from the premisses to a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge. Russell often referred (confusingly) to the first stage of philosophical analysis simply as "analysis", in contrast to the second stage which he called "synthesis". While the first stage was seen as being the most philosophical, both were nonetheless essential to philosophical analysis. Russell consistently adhered to this two directional view of analysis throughout his career.²

Whether applied to mathematical philosophy or philosophy more broadly, Russell repeatedly emphasised three important characteristics of his method of analysis. All of them pose problems for Novak's account. The three characteristics are:

(i) *ANALYSIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE FINAL*. This applies in several ways. Not only is analysis never final in the sense that new premisses may be discovered in relation to which existing premisses are results, but also there is the ever present possibility of alternative sets of premisses for the same results. In the former case, further stages of analysis in no way invalidate earlier ones. As Russell repeatedly emphasises, no error will flow from

taking complex objects to be simple at one level of analysis, as long as it is not assumed that such objects are incapable of further analysis. In the latter case, to ask what are the minimum premisses for a given set of results "is a technical question and it has no unique answer".³ Hence, one important task for philosophy is to devise alternative sets of premisses.

The first characteristic of analysis casts severe doubt on the Novak interpretation of Russell. On his account, analysis should stop at the certain knowledge of atomistic aspects of reality, i.e. at the secure foundations. Difficulties for Novak multiply as the other characteristics of analysis are considered.

(ii) *ANALYSIS ENLARGES THE DOMAINS OF PARTICULAR SUBJECTS*. The current science (say) on which analysis is practised changes as the subject itself evolves. Formerly tentative premisses for a science later become a part of that science. As the frontier is extended, territory that once belonged to philosophy becomes exact enough for incorporation into science. Thus "every advance in knowledge robs philosophy of some problems which formerly it had. . ."⁴. In terms of Russellian analysis, yesterday's premisses become tomorrow's results from which a new generation of philosophers will start the backwards journey of analysis. Thus the philosophy/science distinction "is one, not in the subject matter, but in the state of mind of the investigator."⁵ It remains for philosophy to move to the new frontier. Hence Russell's description of philosophy as occupying the "No Man's Land" between "theology and science"⁶ and the maxim that "science is what you more or less know and philosophy is what you do not know".⁷ Novak's certain premisses would provide a bedrock foundation as a barrier to further inquiry back beyond these premisses. This is clearly not what Russell had in mind.

(iii) *ANALYSIS LEADS TO PREMISES THAT ARE DECREASINGLY SELF-EVIDENT*. Russell made this point emphatically:

"When pure mathematics is organized as a deductive system. . . it becomes obvious that, if we are to believe in the truth of pure mathematics, it cannot be solely because we believe in the truth of the set of premisses. Some of the premisses are much less obvious than some of their consequences, and are believed chiefly because of their consequences. This will be found to be always the case when a science is arranged as a deductive system. It is not the logically simplest propositions of the system that are the most obvious, or that provide the chief art of our reasons for believing in the system. With the empirical sciences this is evident. Electro-dynamics, for example, can be concentrated into Maxwell's equations, but these equations are believed because of the observed truth of certain of their logical consequences.

Exactly the same thing happens in the pure realm of logic; the logically first principles of logic, -- at least some of them -- are to be believed, not on their own account, but on account of their consequences."⁸

Likewise "[i]n mathematics, the greatest degree of self-evidence is usually not to be found quite at the beginning, but at some later point; hence the early deductions, until they reach this point, give reasons rather for believing the premisses because true consequences follow them, than for believing the consequences because they follow from the premisses."⁹

The decreasing self-evidence of the premisses has ontological implications. According to Russell the current premisses provide our best guide to the nature of the most fundamental entities, hence, e.g., his replacement of common sense physical objects by sense-data and events. The decreasing self-evidence of the premisses was also the basis of Russell's vintage statement that "the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end up with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it".¹⁰ This decreasing self-evidence of the premisses, coupled with the earlier claim that there may be alternative premisses from which the same given set of results is deducible, is the basis of Russell's characteristic open-mindedness about the finality or otherwise of his philosophical views at any given stage. Once again, Novak's foundational certainty is notable by its absence from these non-foundationalist sentiments. Indeed, Russell insists that though the

"... demand for certainty is ... natural ... [it] is nevertheless an intellectual vice ... What philosophy should dissipate is *certainty*, whether of knowledge or of ignorance ... all our knowledge is, in a greater or less degree, uncertain and vague. ..."¹¹

Because, firstly, the premisses become decreasingly self-evident as knowledge advances, and secondly, alternative sets of premisses are always a possibility, Russell holds that both science and the philosophy offer "successive approximations to the truth", rather than certainty.¹² We are inevitably reminded here of Popper's swamp analogy for knowledge. Thus, far from being a hardline foundationist, Russell was in fact developing fallibilism in advance of Popper.

So Novak's argument against Russell's humanism, based on his alleged foundationalist epistemology, fails. What sort of epistemological position does Novak claim to be conducive to the kind of deep humanism that he favours? He provides some of its general features in the second half of his article. It may surprise Novak, but I think that Russell's work is broadly in agreement with these features. Certainly Russell agrees that knowledge is a human construction. (Amongst other things his method of analysis is an account of that construction process). He also agrees that there is a reality "out there" of which our knowledge is inescapably inferential.

However, Russell, like Dewey, emphasises that humans too are part of this world "out there". Thus human perceptions and the like, as natural occurrences, are part of what needs to be accounted for in any satisfactory theory of the world. Russell simply required that human empirical experience should be consistent with our theories of the nature of the world. Novak's "immaculate receptions" are not so much knowledge in Russell but "hard data" which our wider theories need to explain. That Russell's fallibilism extended even to human empirical experience is evident from his later serious consideration of the theory that properties might really be particulars. Thus Russell's understanding of the nature of perceptual experience evolved and was not marked by the dogmatism implied in Novak's term "immaculate receptions".

Perhaps where Novak really parts company with Russell lies in their views of the scope and significance of human knowledge. Russell thinks that human knowledge is constructed and hence very limited. As he repeatedly states, 'what physics tells us is very little'. However, he also thinks that physics is the soundest knowledge that we have. Though inescapably inferential, physics offers our best account of the world. According to physics, the world is immeasurably immense with humans consigned to a small role when viewed from the cosmic scale. For Russell, the same applies to the knowledge that humans construct:

"Cosmically and casually, knowledge is an unimportant feature of the universe; a science which omitted to mention its occurrence might, from an impersonal point of view, suffer only from a very trivial imperfection".¹³

By contrast, Novak's article suggests that he places human knowledge construction firmly at the centre of his universe. Is this the real source of his dissatisfaction with Russell's humanism?

It seems then that Novak's differences with Russell have nothing to do with foundationalism at all. Rather the problem lies in the fact that Russell sees humans beings and their minimal knowledge as a small feature of something very much bigger. By contrast, Novak's constructivism limits him very much to the realm of the human. (One is reminded of Russell's "cosmic impiety" charge against Dewey). But if this is so, I cannot see how it would follow that Russell was any less of a humanist.

¹ See my review of Burke forthcoming in *Studies in Philosophy and Education*. There is something distinctly odd about a pair of secondary sources on Dewey being quoted as sufficient authorities to refute Russell. How impressed would John Novak be if two secondary sources on Russell were cited as sufficient to show the alleged fatal defect in Dewey's thought?

² Detailed argument for this claim, and for the pervasiveness of the three characteristics of analysis discussed below, is given in P. Hager *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994).

³ Russell *My Philosophical Development* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975), p. 162.

- ⁴ Russell *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 243.
- ⁵ Russell *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 1.
- ⁶ Russell *History of Western Philosophy* (London & Unwin, 1971), p. 13.
- ⁷ Russell *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 243.
- ⁸ Russell "Logical Atomism" in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* Vol. 9 (London: Unwin Hman, 1988), pp. 163-4.
- ⁹ Russell and Whitehead *Principia Mathematica* 3 Vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925-27, p. v.
- ¹⁰ Russell *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 172.
- ¹¹ Russell "Philosophy for Laymen" in *Unpopular Essays* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), pp. 32-3.
- ¹² Russell *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 789.
- ¹³ Russell *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 9.

Bertrand Russell: Meditations on "The Modern Nightmare" Gladys Garner Leithauser

Bertrand Russell, a thinker at the forefront of twentieth-century mathematics and philosophy, is also a significant literary figure. His career as a writer spans half a dozen decades and a broad spectrum of subjects, from highly technical expositions through popularizing works on science to spirited commentaries on social and ethical issues.

When the new century was just beginning, Russell opened a claim to fields beyond logic and his most trusted mode of exposition, the analytical. He published several "lyrical" essays, such as the poetic "On History," the romantic "The Study of Mathematics," and the rhetorically enterprising "A Free Man's Worship," now a classic of modernist expression. The third, in particular, although he later felt it to be overwritten, attracted so much enthusiasm, even on an international scale, that Russell began to see a role for himself as a modern man of letters.

By the close of World War I, Russell was consciously pursuing this role, winning new readers among the general public by the good sense and moral force in such books as Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916) and by the clarity and wit of his style. As the role developed in the next decades, it often took on the overtones of the secular prophet. To replace the figure of the venerable Victorian sage, a modern observer and guide needed familiarity with the outlook and content of science. Russell's achievements in high mathematics and his expositions such as Our Knowledge of the External World as a field for Scientific Method in Philosophy (1914) underscored his credibility as a spokesman for the era. But it was his expanded efforts to discuss social and political issues and the institutions and organizations impinging on them that culminated at mid-century in honors: In 1950 he received both the Order of Merit and the Nobel Prize for Literature; the second cited his "writing in which he champions humanitarian causes and freedom of thought."

Following the awards, Russell began a different phase: the writing of fiction. Now past the age of eighty, he produced three volumes of short stories. While the fiction is no match for the prodigious accomplishments in other fields, it offers an intriguing demonstration of his effort to present "the truth of vision" as well as the "truth of science." In the stories, Russell found a way to work with materials outside the strictly rational and logically secure: doubts, fears, intuitions, and the range of human emotions. Describing his creative process, he states:

The writing of these stories was a great release of my hitherto unexpressed feelings and of thoughts which could not be stated

without mention of fears that had no rational basis. . . I found it possible to express in this fictional form dangers that would have been deemed silly while only a few men recognized them . . . In this way it was possible to warn of dangers which might or might not occur in the near future. (*Autobiography*, III, 1967; 31-32).

Thus we see why the plots in Russell's fiction become intellectual constructions that increasingly express the fear he called "the modern nightmare" (*Fact and Fiction*, 1961; 227). This dreadful visitation is the inchoate realization that modern humankind is determining a course that may lead to self-destruction. Russell's fiction conveys the ambivalent message that our age sways between destruction and new definitions of progress for humanity.

In his fictional presentation of this danger, Russell revealed himself in the vanguard of a philosophical shift in our culture's attitude toward science. Even among scientists and enthusiasts, doubts of our course and our methodology became evident. In the same years that Russell turned to fiction to presage his fears, for example, writers such as Robert Heinlein, Isaac Asimov, and Arthur Clarke began careers that would change and shape much of modern science fiction. They chose not to imply the utopianism that had characterized society's general disposition toward science and led to the early "Golden Age" of science fiction. Instead, their approach warned of the misuse of science while often portraying human beings using scientific principles in positive applications that defeated misuses. These tales often led readers to claim that science fiction writers "see more" than the scientists; as we have seen, Russell's claim was not that he could "see more" but that he could "say more" in the genre. As ambivalent as these contemporaries, Russell makes plain the allure of scientific investigation while recognizing its limits and rearing its excesses.

The shadowing by caution and dread in his fiction contrasts with a brightening of his outlook evidenced in the non-fiction which he was simultaneously writing: one of his most optimistic books, *New Hopes for a Changing World* (1952). Despite the onset of the Korean War in 1950, Russell, like many in the West, found reassurance in the fact that a world organization, the United Nations, for the first time in history, had acted against an aggressor and also in the promise that recent technological advances might counter population increases with a new plenty. Further, he enjoyed the heightened personal happiness of his fourth and final marriage and, to use his own jocular word, the "respectability" of the two great writing awards.

Still, underneath his conscious intention to present a positive prospect and greater optimism, Russell felt the pressure of frightening speculations. The perfecting of the hydrogen bomb haunted him, and the stressful

differences between the United States and the Soviet Union burdened him long before they intensified into the Cold War and culminated in the Cuban missile crisis.

Moreover, to counter criticism that he had largely ignored ethics in his philosophical writings, Russell undertook *Society in Ethics and Politics* (1954), only to discover what he called "the impossibility of reconciling ethical feelings with ethical doctrines. In the depth of my mind," he writes, "this dark frustration brooded constantly. I tried to intersperse lighter matters into my thought, especially by writing stories which contained an element of fantasy" (*Autobiography*, III; 30).

Thus we see Russell's work in the Fifties and Sixties, in both the philosophical and the creative fields, as struggling with warring themes: the enlarging hopes of humanity versus its deepening perils, both intensified by the advances of science. It is hardly surprising that many of his stories verge toward science fiction, which he can base on ways to gain perspective on humanity's present and future. Even the semi-autographical novella "The Perplexities of John Forstice," long unpublished, sets a scientific tone by presenting the protagonist as a physicist, a man who, like Russell, is an abstract thinker -- a consistent choice when we recall that Russell at the time of writing the story was establishing himself as an interpreter for the scientific method.

Russell's two most substantial stories fit into the genre of science fiction in different ways. Probably the most successful of all his stories, "Satan in the Suburbs," coherently interweaves many themes in a subtle and complex way. Although the central figure, Dr. Mallako, is the familiar one of the evil scientists, Russell gives him freshness, creating a character who may be only an eccentric psychiatrist in practice in the suburbs, or an advocate of the cult of irrationality who has become a nightmare figure for the obsessed narrator, or, indeed, a true devil-figure, lending a metaphysical meaning to the story, whatever the conscious intention of the rationalistic author.

This story seems reminiscent of E.T.A. Hoffman's fantastic *Tales*, which successfully merge levels of explanation and channel the supernatural not science. Russell as a modern philosopher does not wish to deal metaphysically with the origin of evil as part of a system, but here he is able to deal with it vigorously as an artistic matter, leaving the reader to choose whether evil springs from the substrata of the consciousness of the characters or from the realm of the supernatural. In looking at the story with its three spheres--reality, the dream world, or absolute truth-- we perhaps find our study best repaid by a focus on the psychological, that is, on the dream world in its aspect of "nightmare." The story reflects Russell's

deep interest in the concealed forces of the unconscious, his fear of the irrational; the "bad dreams" is the release of irrationality into the community.

In creating Dr. Mallako, Russell successfully integrates the three spheres of possible meaning into one symbolic figure, one of the keys to the story's success. Whichever of the three we choose to explain his ambiguous nature, Dr. Mallako remains truly sinister; there is nothing in him of the Mephistophelean figure that Russell elsewhere suggests can, as the adversarial Spirit of Negation, allow humanity the possibility of working toward some good.

We see the second substantial use of science fiction in Russell's story "Zahatopolk," a novella that treats the theme of suppressive influence on individuals by rigid institutions of society. The theme first became significant for Russell's work in Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916), which grew out of a series of lectures planned with D.H. Lawrence. Russell's enthusiasm for the joint project with Lawrence soon diminished, and the lectures and book when ready were Russell's authorship alone. But one effect of Lawrence's influence may have lingered: the Aztec mythology of his The Plumed Serpent (1926), a book which contributed to our symbolic knowledge of reality.

In developing a theme reminiscent of his brief association with Lawrence, Russell may have found himself thinking of the Indian cultures of the Americas as suitable for his new work (and of a possible parody); he sets it in the "restored hall of the Incas at Cuzco." The time is forty centuries into the future; the society is one of world domination based on "the innate superiority of the Red Man." The society, rigid and static, has dogmatized its mythic views.

One lone, protesting person, Diotima, stands against authority. By her refusal to become the "bride" of the god Zahatopolk, she brings on herself a terrible capital punishment, burning at the stake. By forcing events towards her own execution, Diotima achieves the traditional martyr's death. She thus underscores the relation to Socrates already suggested by her name, an allusion to the woman from Mantinea who, in the Symposium, was Socrates's instructor, engaging him in discussion of the nature of the ideal. The Diotima of "Zahatopolk" similarly leads the young male protagonist, Thomas, toward thought of the ideal.

As Diotima's thinking develops, she comes to consider the powerful myths that shape Zahatopolkian society as sources of "ugliness and horror," and she becomes an instructor in the way to live without myths--in short, a guide for the modern age.

The challenge Russell's story offers to system and organization is to both religion and science. He satirizes mythologizers here. We see first

the College of Indoctrination, where the speaker is professor Driuzdustages, lecturing his students on history. Looking back on our age--for his culture it is "the ages of darkness"--he shows himself to be a leader who inhabits a dry, boring mental world. Unable to inspire, to be source of new ideas, he is pompous, elitist, silly, the caricature of a don. A Red Man who leads his fellow citizens, he is a racist whose beliefs have made him proud but intellectually sterile. Thus a target of the satire seems to be also the mythopoeic tendency whenever it contributes to racism and nationalism.

Professor Driuzdustages and his society have fallen victim to the practice that turns myths into gods. But the story is also a warning against the myth-making potentialities of science, the attitude that turns its benefits into "miracles", its achievements into myth. We find two Sacred Mountains in the story, one bearing a deadly fungus, the other, a radioactive dust. The fungus suggests germ warfare, for immunization becomes possible, while the second suggests the fallout from atomic and hydrogen bombs. Russell does not intend his science fiction to promote the myth of a world necessarily made better through science.

"Zahatopolk" is a rich, complex story in which I have barely touched on a few themes. As we watch Diotima pass on her questioning, dialectical methodology to Thomas we see him become, of course, a "doubting Thomas." The idea that doubt is essential to our process of inquiry is surely Russell's message, evidenced by Diotima's passing on the mantle of rational thinking to Thomas at her death. As she does so, she causes his collapse into unconsciousness, followed by his awakening into a raised consciousness. For one moment, Thomas's doubt has been transformed into a mystic experience, an epiphany in the story much like the one Russell experienced at witnessing the suffering of Mrs. Whitehead. Through this transfer of spiritual fire, Thomas has become able to act, but the passion to do so has originated in doubt.

This event is not the end of the story. The remaining sections illustrate Russell's theme that society must have an ongoing dialectic in our relationship to myth: We must guard against our tendency to allow a view to become a mythos. In promoting this theme, Russell is engaging in dialogue with such writers as T.S. Eliot and Thomas Mann, with their endeavors to preserve old cultures. He wants the alive, the progressive, the evolutionary. But he also warns that science and technology have the potentiality to become the new gods and myths.

In making himself a spokesman for and interpreter of science, Russell tried various forms of expression. When doubt of its purposes and methods arose, he tried creative writing to present his misgivings and anxieties. Of the various forms of fiction he experimented with, the little "Nightmares of Eminent Persons" seem to me his satiric forte. The skillful design

of this little form--which I think Russell can claim as original--is apparent as soon as one tries explication. Like a rich poem, each "Nightmare" requires more space for explanation than the clever little work occupies in its entirety.

Russell completed and published a dozen "Nightmares." Each involves a dream sequence, set into a frame of waking reality. Thus each gives an opportunity to combine reality with fantasy. In addition, some employ science fiction, as in "Dean Acheson's Nightmare." The format lends itself easily to political satire, as in "Stalin's Nightmare" or "Eisenhower's Nightmare," giving Russell a brief, effective way to comment on topical issues. And it allows a statement on human "types," as in "The Mathematician's Nightmare," illustrating in a playful, yet empathetic way the oddities, frailties, vanities, and concerns of varying members of the human race.

Together, the "Nightmares" allow Russell to pursue his interest in the forces of the unconscious and his fear that the forces may lead to irrational acts that endanger humankind; to lampoon notions that he holds to be ridiculous; and to create a variety of fanciful situations that allow him to present the dual perspective of his characteristic, ironic vision. In the large sense, they display Russell's optimism: the ability to treat the anxieties and fears of our time with creativity and wit.

The Quotable Bertrand Russell

Edited by Lee Eisler

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Lee Eisler used a question and answer format to highlight Bertrand Russell's views on many topics. The topics were selected by Lee and he wrote the questions. The answers are direct quotes from Russell, taken from his writings.

AGGRESSION

What happened when our aggressive impulses are ignored?

People who live a life which is unnatural beyond a point are likely to be filled with envy, malice and all uncharitableness. They may develop strains of cruelty, or, on the other hand, they may so completely lose all joy in life that they have no longer any capacity for effort.

This latter result has been observed among savages brought suddenly in contact with modern civilization.

Anthropologists have described how Papuan head hunters, deprived by white authority of their habitual sport, lose all zest, and are no longer able to be interested in anything.

I do not wish to infer that they should be allowed to go on hunting heads, but I do mean that it would have been worthwhile if psychologists had taken some trouble to find some innocent substitute activity.

Civilized man everywhere is, to some degree, in the position of Papuan victims of virtue.

We have all kinds of aggressive impulses, and also creative impulses, which society forbids us to indulge, and the alternative that it supplies in the shape of football matches and all-in wrestling are hardly adequate.

Anyone who hopes that in time it may be possible to abolish war should give serious thought to the problem of satisfying harmlessly the instincts that we inherit from long generations of savages.

for my part I find sufficient outlet in detective stories, where I alternately identify myself with the murderer and the huntsman-detective, but I know that there are those for whom this vicarious outlet is too mild, and for them something stronger should be provided.

AMERICA

In what way was America important during the nineteenth century?

America remained a land of promise for lovers of freedom.

Even Byron, at a moment when he was disgusted with Napoleon

for not committing suicide, wrote an eloquent stanza in praise of Washington.

Admiration of America as the land of democracy survived through the greater part of the nineteenth century.

Richard Cobden, who was in most respects the opposite of a romantic, cherished illusions about the United States, when admirers presented him with a large sum of money: he invested it in the Illinois Central Railroad and lost every penny.

When my parents visited America in 1867, it still had for them a halo of romance.

This survived even for me through Walt Whitman, whose house was the first place I visited when I went to America. (FF 17)

How did Andrew Jackson change the American presidency?

American democracy underwent a great transformation when Andrew Jackson became president.

Until his time, presidents had been cultivated gentlemen, mostly with a settled position as landowners.

Andrew Jackson represented a rebellion against these men on the part of pioneers and immigrants.

He did not like culture and was suspicious of educated men since they understood things that puzzled him.

This element of hostility to culture had persisted in American democracy ever since, and has made it difficult for America to make the best use of its experts.

What was the result in America of electing state judges?

In America, when people in Jackson's time became conscious of this danger [of judges who thwarted the popular will], they decided that state judges, though not federal judges, should be elected.

This remedy, however, proved worse than the disease.

It increased the power of the political boss who had secured the election of his favorites to judgeships and could be tolerably certain that his favorites would decide cases as he wished, and not in accordance with the law.

In fact, the political boss acquired a position not wholly unlike that of the Greek tyrant.

There was, however, an important difference.

It was possible to remedy the evil by wholly constitutional methods without the need of revolution or assassination.

ARISTOTLE

What were Aristotle's innovations? His merits and demerits?

In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways: with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors.

In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous. For his demerits, however, his successors are more responsible than he is.

He came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal.

Toward the end of this long period his authority had become almost as unquestioned as that of the Church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress.

Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine; in logic, this is still true at the present day.

But it would have been at least as disastrous if any of his predecessors (except perhaps Democritus) had acquired equal authority.

To do him justice, we must, to begin with, forget his excessive posthumous fame, and the equally excessive posthumous condemnation to which it led.

At about the age of eighteen, Aristotle came to Athens and became a pupil of Plato; he remained in the academy for nearly twenty years, until the death of Plato in 348-47 B.C.

Aristotle, as a philosopher, is in many ways very different from all his predecessors.

He is the first to write like a professor: his treatises are systematic, his discussions are divided into heads, he is a professional teacher, not an inspired prophet.

His work is critical, careful, pedestrian, without any trace of Bacchic enthusiasm.

The Orphic elements in Plato are watered down in Aristotle, and mixed with a strong dose of common sense; where he is Platonic, one feels that his natural temperament has been overpowered by the teaching to which he has been subjected.

He is not passionate, or in any sense religious.

The errors of his predecessors were the glorious errors of youth attempting the impossible; his errors are those of age which cannot free itself from habitual prejudices. He is best in detail and in criticism; he fails in large construction, for lack of fundamental clarity Titanic fire.

What is Russell's advice to students studying logic?

Logic was practically invented by Aristotle.

For nearly two thousand years, his authority in logic was unquestioned.

To this day teachers in Catholic educational institutions are not allowed to admit that his logic has defects, and any non-Catholic who criticizes it incurs the bitter hostility of the Roman Church.

I once ventured to do so on the radio, and the organizers who had invited me were inundated with protests against the broadcasting of such heretical doctrines.

Undue respect for Aristotle, however, is not confined to Catholic institutions.

In most universities, the beginner in logic is still taught the doctrine of the syllogism, which is useless and complicated, and an obstacle to a sound understanding of logic.

If you wish to become a logician, there is one piece of advice that I cannot urge too strongly, and that is, DO NOT learn the traditional formal logic.

In Aristotle's day, it was a creditable effort, but so was Ptolemaic astronomy. To teach either in the present day is a ridiculous piece of anti-quarianism.

How should Aristotelian logic be viewed today?

Aristotle's influence, which was very great in many different fields, was greatest of all in logic.

In late antiquity, when Plato was still supreme in metaphysics, Aristotle was the recognized authority in logic, and he retained this position throughout the Middle Ages.

Even at the present day, all Catholic teachers of philosophy and many others still obstinately reject the discoveries of modern logic, and adhere with strange tenacity to a system which is as definitely antiquated as Ptolemaic astronomy.

This makes it difficult to do historical justice to Aristotle. His present-day influence is so inimical to clear thinking that it is hard to remember how great an advance he made upon all his predecessor (including Plato), or how admirable his logical work would still seem if it had been a stage in continual progress, instead of being (as in fact is was) a dead end, followed by over two thousand years of stagnation.

Aristotle is still, especially in logic, a battleground, and cannot be treated in a purely historical spirit.

[We will not go into Russell's analysis of Aristotle's logic (on pp. 196-202); it is quite technical. Here is his conclusion (on p. 202):]

I conclude that the Aristotelian doctrines with which we have been concerned are wholly false, with the exception of the formal theory of the syllogism, which is unimportant.

Any person in the present day who wishes to learn logic will be wasting his time if he reads Aristotle or any of his disciples.

Nonetheless, Aristotle's logical writings show great ability, and would have been useful to mankind if they had appeared at a time when intellectual originality was still active.

Unfortunately they appeared at the very end of the creative period of Greek thought, and therefore came to be accepted as authoritative.

By the time that logical originality revived, a reign of two thousand years made Aristotle very difficult to dethrone. Throughout modern times, practically every advance in science, in logic, or in philosophy has had to be made in the teeth of the opposition from Aristotle's disciples.

How much was Alexander influenced by his tutor, Aristotle?

A great deal of nonsense has been written about Aristotle and Alexander, because, as both were great men, and Aristotle was Alexander's tutor, it is supposed that the tutor must have greatly influenced the pupil.

Hegel goes so far as to say that Alexander's career shows the value of philosophy, since his practical wisdom may be attributed to his teacher.

In fact there is not the faintest evidence that Aristotle had any effect at all on Alexander, who hated his father, and was rebellious against everyone whom his father set in authority over him.

There are certain letters professing to be from Alexander to Aristotle, but they are generally considered spurious.

In fact the two men ignored each other.

While Alexander was conquering the East, Aristotle continued to write treatises on politics which never mentioned what was taking place, but discussed minutely the constitutions of various cities which were not longer important.

It is a mistake to suppose that great men who are contemporaries are likely to be quick to recognize each other's greatness; the opposite happens much more frequently.

Why did Aristotle call man a rational animal?

His reason for this view was one which does not now seem very impressive; it was that some people can do sums.

It is in virtue of the intellect that man is a rational animal.

The intellect is shown in various ways, but most emphatically by mastery of arithmetic.

The Greek system of numerals was very bad, so that the multiplication table was quite difficult, and complicated calculations could be made only by very clever people.

Nowadays, however, calculating machines do sums better than even the cleverest people.

As arithmetic has grown easier, it has come to be less respected.

Why did Russell call Aristotle one of philosophy's misfortunes?

He came at the of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal.

Toward the end of this long period his authority had become almost as unquestioned as that of the church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress.

Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine; in logic, this is still true at the present day.

Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy by Paul Hager Reviewed by John Laurent

EDITOR'S NOTE: Paul Hager has received the 1996 Book Award. A review of his book appeared in BRS Quarterly 89. This is a second review by John Laurent--Reprinted from CAMPUS REVIEW with permission.

Curiously, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), who is described in a book published in Australia in the 1960s (J. Stephens, *Ten Articulate Men*) as "considered by some to be the greatest logician since Aristotle", seems to have become little more than an important historical figure in philosophical circles.

Certainly he is not often quoted today in books on philosophy of science, possibly because of what would now be regarded as his somewhat naive, rather Victorian, view of the subject.

There is no denying, as Hager acknowledges in this attractively produced and very readable volume, Russell's "belief in science as the best source of truth", and that for Russell "one had to begin [philosophical discussion] with actual scientific results".

But as Hager shows, Russell's position was more sophisticated than has hitherto been recognised. What Russell meant by "best" could be described as *the best that we have*, given the limitation of the human mind. Our brain and perceptual apparatus have evolved in certain ways given their physiological capacities and environmental pressure, and 'science' is that knowledge which this equipment allows.

As Russell once put it in *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*: "We have not the means of ascertaining how things appear from places not surrounded by brain and nerves and sense organs, because we cannot leave the body. . . What the mind adds to sensibilia, in fact, is merely awareness; everything else is physical or physiological."

Nevertheless, Russell believed that we can have some confidence in our view of the world around us, and to some extent beyond it, and as Hager shows, Russell's arguments here, seemingly paradoxically, owed a great deal to the German idealist philosopher Kant.

For Kant, our conceptions of space and time were *a priori*, and had a "transcendental" origin--that is they came from God. Russell agreed that these "categories" of thought seemed to be built in, but he rejected Kant's explanation.

Russell believed that the human mind was as much a product of the physical universe as any other phenomenon, and was bound to be shaped by the forces that produced it; and it followed that human *knowledge* ulti-

mately had the same origins. As Russell expressed it: "Cosmically and casually, knowledge is an unimportant feature of the universe."

Russell believed that he was thus able to dethrone 'man' from the centre of things in Kantian Idealism. As Hager quotes Russell's *My Philosophical Development*: "I reverse the process which has been common in philosophy since Kant . . . [and which] tends to give to knowing a cosmic importance which it by no means deserves, and thus prepares the philosophical student for the belief that mind has some kind of supremacy over the non-mental universe, or even that the non-mental universe is nothing but a nightmare dreamt by mind in its un-philosophical moments."

Russell, then, was no solipsist; and if mind was a product of the physical universe, rather than the reverse, we can place some reliance on our perceptions.

Kant's weakness, Russell argued in *History of Western Philosophy*, was that he allows "that the mind orders the raw material of sensation, but never thinks it necessary to say why it orders it as it does and not otherwise". The answer must be, according to Russell, that the way things are ordered in the mind more or less corresponds to the order of things in reality--that is, the external source of mental sensations--since survival in the material world requires such a match.

One is reminded of one of H.G. Well's characters' remarks in *The Soul of a Bishop* (1917): "There must be a measure of truth in our illusions, a working measure of truth, otherwise the creature would smash itself up and put an end to itself."

On questions of "ultimate" truth, however, Russell did not feel such confidence. The problem for him here was that he could not see how it could be given to humans to have access to such knowledge (since, presumably, it need not be built into our brains for everyday needs). Similarly, cosmological theories, for Russell, had their limitations and were subject to constant revision for the same reasons.


Russell was, in fact, acutely aware of this difficulty--as Hager convincingly demonstrates--since such theories tended to change frequently and dramatically during Russell's lifetime. Thus, Russell's view of Einstein's theory of relativity, which created problems for his reformulation of the Kantian position, was finally that the theory "does not affect the space and time of [everyday] perception" (*Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*).

By contrast, Russell was convinced that the human presence in the universe was "insignificant", and that "the great processes of nebular and stellar evolution proceed according to laws in which mind play no part". Presumably, Russell would also have been profoundly out of sympathy with Paul Davies and others views concerning the universe as a reflection of "the mind of God" (unless in the most figurative sense).

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Newsletter of The Bertrand Russell Society

August, 1996

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The Bertrand Russell Society

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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

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From the Editor Michael J. Rockler

With This issue of the *Bertrand Russell Quarterly*, I begin my second year as editor. The new format for the *Quarterly* has been well received; I have been encouraged by the many positive comments I have received from members. The number of submissions has also been increasing and we have published articles by many Russell scholars including Paul Hager, John Shosky, Gladys Leithauser and many others. I look forward to this second year as your editor and as the continuing chair of Bertrand Russell Society Board of directors. This year has certainly been an interesting and productive one for the Society.

In May the Bertrand Russell Society had its annual meeting at Drew University where President John Lenz teaches classics. Those who participated found the experience a worthwhile one; it was a very successful meeting. Attendance numbered more than fifty persons which made it one of the largest BRS meetings conducted over the last several years. Persons who attended the meeting enjoyed a variety of presentations on many aspects of the life and work of Bertrand Russell. This issue includes the secretary's report on the meeting which provides a detailed description of the event.

Next year's annual meeting will be held in late May, 1997 and will be a joint meeting with Canadian and American humanists. It will be similar to the large and successful gathering that was held in Toronto in 1994. The meeting will be held at the Center for Inquiry in Buffalo, New York. This facility, recently completed, is an important place for humanists and it is certainly an appropriate meeting place for those interested in the work and life of Bertrand Russell.

The Center for Inquiry is the editorial headquarters of *Free Inquiry* and it contains an extensive library of humanist materials. Several years ago Lee Eisler, Vice President Emeritus of BRS, donated his Russell library to the Center.

Hamilton, Ontario is only about thirty minutes by car from Buffalo and thus persons attending the meeting can visit the Russell Archives located at McMaster University in Hamilton. It is also only a very short drive from Buffalo to Niagara Falls.

All in all the 1997 annual meeting will provide all those who attend with a variety of valuable experiences. I hope that everyone can join us next May for our second joint meeting with the Humanists at the Center for Inquiry. You should begin to make your plans now.

One more reminder. Please submit articles and letters for publication to the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*. Everyone is welcome to send material. I look forward to hearing from you and I hope to see everyone in Buffalo in 1997.

NOTE: Nominations are now being accepted for The Board of Directors election that will be held in November. Send nominations to Michael J. Rockler, Board Chair.

From the President
John R. Lenz, President, BRS
jlenz@drew.edu

I thoroughly enjoyed our annual Russell pilgrimage in May and thank all who contributed to it. These annual meetings fulfill one of the most important functions of the Bertrand Russell Society, when like-minded individuals congregate to renew their interests and acquaintances. In all some fifty persons attended the sessions and social events. This mixture of "love and knowledge" and Red Hackle contributes significantly, as Russell thought, to the good life.

The word "pilgrimage" reminds me of Russell's imaginative writings of 1902-03 with this title. At that time he envisioned "the notion of the Pilgrimage to the Mountain of Truth" (see *The Collected papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 12, p. 31). Luckily, he largely abandoned this quest and developed his own remarkable variety of sensible skepticism. This spirit was present at our conference and could even be used to debunk a hagiography of Russell himself.

It was refreshing to learn from James Birx that Russell, who perhaps underestimated the implications of evolution, did not master and anticipate *everything* in the modern science of his time. In many ways Russell must be understood against a late Victorian background. (In attendance at Drew was also BRS member Stefan Andersson, author of the book, *In Quest of Certainty* about Russell's development up to 1903). On the other hand, David Rodier argued that Russell was more up-to-date on research about Plato (for his *History of Western Philosophy*) than is usually thought.

Russell's imaginative fiction of the 1950s (presented by Michael Rockler with progressive and democratic techniques), likewise, was felt to be intriguing but drew a mixed reaction. Trevor Banks (who later metamorphosed into Bertie) reminded us that Russell made some embarrassingly "unquotable" utterances. Ray Monk's controversial new biography met with shocked disbelief, providing a topic of discussion for next year's meeting.

Overall, the various papers showed how Russell's writings continue to speak to us on many subjects. John Shosky showed the usefulness of the approach outlined in the 1946 essay "Philosophy and Politics." Laurie Thomas applied Russell's liberal vigilance to question modern journalism. Prize-winners Brian Rookey and Gideon Makin provided new explanations of Russell's seminal papers in logic. Alan Ryan presented a rich comparison of Russell and Dewey on "cosmic piety and impiety," and Tim Madigan invoked Russell's legacy to humanism. And BRS member Ray Perkins shows that Russell's spirit of inquiry is alive and well with his recent book, *Logic and Mr. Limbaugh* (Open Court, 1995).

The success of this conference bodes well for our next annual meeting, to be held in conjunction with the Council for Secular Humanism (formerly CODESH) and the Humanist Association of Canada, and tentatively scheduled to meet at the Center for Inquiry in Buffalo, NY on the Weekend of May 30-June 1, 1997. Several speakers are already lined up!

In June, the Center for Inquiry held a conference on pseudo-science about which two articles have appeared in *The New York Times*. Also in the news--by the way--it was recently reported that 1996 BRS Award recipient W.V.O. Quine received a "12th annual Kyoto Prize, Japan's richest award given by a private foundation . . . often called the Nobel Prizes of Japan."

As for myself, I have been busy in enlarging the BRS Home Page on the World Wide Web, which was created by Tom Stanley. Did you know that Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle all have web sites of their own? At our site you will find links to these as well as a number of texts by and about Russell that are available electronically. One day more of the corpus will be available in this convenient, searchable form. BRS members can help by making available (that is, typing or scanning in) works by Russell that are out of copyright. More generally, our presence on the Web helps to fulfill our important mission of disseminating information about Russell and interest in his works. The requests I regularly receive, as well as the enthusiasm displayed at our recent gathering and the steady stream of new books about Russell, both praiseworthy and critical, keep me confident that he speaks to the present and the future.

Speaking about future . . . I have been reading Russell's writings relevant to the theme of my upcoming Fall course on Utopias. Was Russell utopian? What do you think? I will share my thoughts on this--well next time. In the meantime, please e-mail me, check out the BRS Web site at <http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html> and, as always, tell us what else you would like to see the BRS do.

Letter from Elizabeth Eames

512 Orchard Drive
Carbondale, IL 62901

May 2, 1996

Dear Professor Jackanicz,

It was gracious of the Bertrand Russell Society to make me an honorary member -- I am afraid I cannot often be useful to the society, but I am wondering if the society could help me out on a matter. When my Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge was about to go out of print I retained a number of copies, and I would like to make them available to the members of the society for the price only of packaging and mailing. I wonder if you could have inserted in the Bertrand Russell News an offer to mail a copy to any member who wished one for the price of \$4.00 to the U.S., \$5.00 (U.S.) to Canada?

I would very much appreciate your help in the matter.

With best wishes,
Elizabeth R. Eames

Letter from Dr. Chandrakala Padia

Reader in Political Science
New G/7, Hyderabad Colony,
B.H.U. Campus,
Varanasi - 221 005,
India

April 22, 1996

Prof. Michael J. Rockler
529 14th Street, NW, Suite 1125
Washington, DC 20045, USA

Dear Professor Rockler,

I must congratulate you for bringing out the Russell Newsletter so well. Everyone appreciates it here. I am writing you this letter to inform you that Bertrand Russell Society is doing very well here. After our last seminar on "Indian Democracy", we could arrange two more discussions. One was on Metaphors of Education held on 23-9-1995. A complete copy of the paper delivered and the discussion followed is being enclosed for publication in the forthcoming copy of your newsletter. In this one day seminar most of the commentators highlighted the role of Bertrand Russell in promoting the true meaning of education.

The second talk was delivered by Prof. Constance Jones of America who delivered a talk on Unity and Diversity: five Phases of the dissemination of Hindu thought in the U.S. A detailed report of this talk and following discussions shall also be sent to you very soon.

I take this opportunity to wish you all the best for 1996 Annual conference of the Bertrand Russell Society. The subject is very relevant and I could have contributed if I were in U.S.A. Kindly make an appeal to the members of the Russell Society to donate books to the Benaras Chapter of the Russell Society. Because of this chapter, a number of students are taking keen interest in the writings of the Russell. Kindly remember me to everyone there and convey our deep sense of admiration for your sustained interest in the works and life of this great philosopher, whom we regard as one of the greatest humanists of the 20th Century.

Thanking you and with warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,
Chandrakala Padia

Minutes of the 1996 Bertrand Russell Society Annual Meeting Donald W. Jackanicz, Secretary

The Annual Meeting of The Bertrand Russell Society was held May 3-5 at Mead Hall, Drew University, Madison, New Jersey and at The Madison Hotel, 1 Convent road, Morristown, New Jersey, U.S.A..

Friday, May 3, 1996

All meeting events on this date took place in Mead Hall.

The meeting was called to order at 7:30 p.m. by President John R. Lenz, who welcomed those assembled and provided an overview of the meeting. Book Award Committee Chairperson Donald Jackanicz presented the 1996 BRS Book Award to Paul J. Hager for his Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy. Thomas Magnell then presented the 1996 BRS Award to Willard Van Orman quine. (As Messrs. Hager and Quine were unable to attend, their award plaques are to be mailed to them.) The meeting was recessed at 8:05 p.m. The Board of directors meeting was then held. (Refer to the separate Board minutes.)

Saturday, May 4, 1996

All meeting events on this date took place in Mead Hall, except that the Red Hackle Hour and the Banquet were held at The Madison Hotel.

President Lenz reconvened the meeting at 9:15 a.m. The following paper presentations were made during the morning session: H. James Birx, "Russell and Evolution"; John Shosky, "Philosophy and Politics"; and Tim Madigan, "Russell's Humanism". To begin the afternoon session, Michael Rockler offered a "Workshop of Russell's Fiction" in which three works ("Cranks", "Zahatopolk", and "The Theologian's Nightmare") were examined. The following paper presentations also were made during the afternoon session: David Rodier, "Russell's Plato"; and Alan Ryan, "Cosmic Piety and Impiety in Russell and Dewey". The meeting was recessed at 4:35 p.m.

The Red Hackle Hour and Banquet were held from 5:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., respectively in the Convent Suite and the Madison Suite. At the end of the Banquet, Trevor Banks appeared as Russell in a well-received performance of some forty minutes.

Sunday, May 5, 1996

All meeting events on this date took place in Mead Hall.

The meeting was reconvened by President Lenz at 9:00 a.m. the following paper presentations were made: Brian Rookey, "What is Meaning?" (1996 Recipient of the Prize for an Undergraduate Paper); Laurie E. Thomas, "Bertrand Russell and the Liberal Media" (1996 Runner-up for the Prize for an Undergraduate Paper); and Gidon Makin, "Some Relevant Misconceptions Concerning the theory of Descriptions" (1996 Recipient of the prize for a Graduate Paper).

President Lenz then opened the annual Society Business Meeting. He announced (1) Christos Tzanetakos is planning a combined meeting of American humanist, Atheist, and freethinker groups to be held in 2000 somewhere in the United States, (2) the BRS will be listed in the Conference of Philosophical Societies's directory for a \$10 fee, (3) Carl Westmann will work on sending BRS advertisements and other mailings to humanist groups, and (4) member Ray Perkins's new book, *Logic and Mr. Limbaugh* (Open Court, 1995), has appeared. Secretary Donald Jackanicz summarized events at the May 3 Board of Directors meeting and reported on the acceptance of honorary membership by Ken Coates, Elizabeth R. Eames, Michael Foot, Antony Flew, Paul Kurtz, and Willard Van Orman Quine. Peter Stone then proposed that honorary membership be offered to Noam Chomsky. Following discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Stone would send a formal nomination letter to the Board of Directors Chairman. Tom Stanley's recent work on a BRS homepage was praised, and it was announced that the homepage will be moved from Mr. Stanley's computer account to that of President Lenz.

Following words of farewell from President Lenz, the meeting was adjourned at 12:40 p.m.

**Minutes of the Bertrand Russell Society
Board of Directors Meeting
May 3, 1996**

Donald W. Jackanicz, Secretary

The 1996 Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society was held at Mead hall on the campus of Drew University, Madison, New Jersey, U.S.A. on Friday, May 3, 1996. The meeting was called to order at 8:05 p.m. by Chair Michael J. Rockler. The following directors were present: Kenneth Blackwell, Dennis J. Darland, Lee Eisler, Donald W. Jackanicz, Robert T. James, John R. Lenz, Stephen J. Reinhardt, Michael J. Rockler, John E. Shosky, and Thom Weidlich. Several non-Board members were also present.

The first order of business was the election of Board and Society officers. As follows, each incumbent (nominated by the persons shown in parentheses) was unanimously reelected:

- Board Chairman: Michael J. Rockler (Mr. Jackanicz)
- Board and Society Secretary: Donald W. Jackanicz (Mr. Lenz)
- Society President: John R. Lenz (Mr. Weidlich)
- Society Vice President: John E. Shosky (Mrs. Lenz)
- Society Vice President/Information Emeritus: Lee Eisler (Mr. Jackanicz)
- Society Treasurer: Dennis J. Darland (Mr. Lenz)

Treasurer Dennis J. Darland then reported that the Treasury balance is \$2,819.92 (\$2,450.43 checking, \$369.49 savings) and that there are 181 paying members (including regular, student, limited income, and life members, but omitting honorary, Benares Chapter, and Philippine Chapter members).

Discussion turned to the site of the next two annual meetings. As agreed upon at the 1995 Board meeting, it was confirmed that the next annual meeting will be held in June or July 1997 at an Ontario, Canada location (e.g. Niagara Falls or Toronto) in conjunction with the joint meeting of Free Inquiry and the Humanist Association of Canada. Concerning the 1998 annual meeting site, to bring the meeting to a central North American location, Mr. Rockler proposed Chicago and Mr. Blackwell suggested an unspecified Nebraska site. Non-Board member Jan Eisler discussed her recent work with Florida freethinker groups and volunteered to help plan a Tampa or central Florida meeting. The vote was Tampa or central Florida--6, Chicago--1, not voting -- 3. (there was no formal motion for the Nebraska site).

Other matters considered included the following: (1) As David Johnson has resigned from the Philosophers' Committee, Mr. Shosky will undertake more Committee work, such as reviving the BRS session at the American Philosophical Association/Eastern Division's annual December meetings. (2) Mr. Rockler and Mr. Lenz will ask Sheila Turcon to head the Book Award Committee. (3) A strategy must be created to increase and retain membership. Methods suggested were a prominent insert in the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, a review of advertising policy, new fundraising techniques, a revival of the Membership Committee with the chairperson to do substantial work, and contacting the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation about possible cooperation. (4) the membership pamphlet and application form will be reedited. (5) Non-Board member Peter Stone suggested offering honorary membership to Noam Chomsky. It was agreed that Mr. Stone would discuss this matter at the May 5 Society Business Meeting. (6) Mr. Lenz proposed organizing a Bylaws Committee. Mr. Blackwell, Mr. Lenz, and Mr. Reinhardt volunteered to serve on the Committee.

The meeting was adjourned at 9:54 p.m.

Photos From The 1996 Annual Meeting Banquet



Bertrand Russell Speaks



The Effects of Red Hackle



Good Food and Friendship



Enjoying the Program



Enjoying the Hackle!



Vice President Emeritus and Friends



Some Special Guests



Allan Ryan Recommending Bertie's Favorite Drink

**Words No Object for
Willard van Orman Quine
Thomas Magnell
Chair, Dept. of Philosophy, Drew University**

**REMARKS ON PRESENTING THE BRS AWARD
TO WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE**

Willard van Orman Quine is widely regarded as a prominent representative of analytic philosophy, though this is a questionable description, since he is perhaps best known for his critique of the notion of analyticity. His work ranges over mathematical logic, philosophical logic, ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. He is the author of over a dozen books, including *Word and Object*, *From a Logical Point of View*, *Methods of Logic*, *Mathematical Logic*, *The Ways of Paradox*, *Selected Logic Papers*, and *Ontological Relativity*. Several of these books are in fact collections of papers. And much of his most important work has been in the form of papers: "Truth by Convention," "On What There Is," "Reference and Modality," "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," "On Frege's Way Out," "Epistemology Naturalized," and his most celebrated paper, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Quine's works are the stuff of serious philosophy, not withstanding remarks of Mc X and Bernard J. Ortcutt.

Quine has done most of his work while at Harvard. He was there first as a graduate student, then as one of the first fellows in the Society of Fellows, and later as an Instructor and professor of various ranks for the better part of half a century.

Quine is a fitting recipient of the Bertrand Russell Society Award. Russell and Quine knew each other and had mutual respect for each other. Quine's interest in mathematical logic was spurred on by *Principia Mathematica*. Russell set the problems and provided the canvas for Quine to draw on. Quine has written of Russell that in the first two-thirds of the century, "his philosophical influence, direct and indirect, over this long period has been unequalled."¹ Quine's comment is quite correct.

Russell's admiration of Quine is evident in a riposte to Peter Strawson's "On Referring." If he is unfairly dismissive of Strawson, he makes his feelings clear:

I am at a loss to understand Mr. Strawson's position on the subject of names. When he is writing about me, he says: "There are no logically proper names and there are no descriptions (in this sense)" (page 26). But when he is writing about Quine, in *Mind*, October 1956, he takes a quite different line. Quine has a theory

that names are unnecessary and can always be replaced by descriptions. This theory shocks Mr. Strawson for reasons which, to me, remain obscure. However, I will leave the defense of Quine to Quine, who is quite capable of looking after himself.²

As far as I know, Russell never wrote similarly about any other American philosopher, though he did once write in similar vein about A.J. Ayer. I might add that throughout his life, Ayer maintained a high view of Quine that he had formed back in the Vienna Circle days. Russell, Ayer, and Quine form a twentieth-century triumvirate of clear, no-nonsense, urbane philosophers.

Quine's work, like Russell's, is durable--as is Quine himself. He is approaching his eighty-eighth birthday, having been born June 25, 1908. I am sure that with this award, go our best wishes to Van on his natal day. I must confess an added sentiment here, since June 25 is my birthday as well. If I may indulge in just a few more words, let me say:

To Ayer Humean;

To Russell, with paradox divine.

But Quine is mighty fine.

Gavagai!

¹ W.V. Quine, "Russell's Ontological Development," in *Theories and Things* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981) p. 73.

² Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1959), p. 240.

"Metaphors of Education"

Dr. Harikesh Singh

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Bertrand Russell, an outstanding mathematician and philosopher of the 20th century while authoring his "Unpopular Essays" wrote an essay with the caption "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish". Here he wrote:

"Man is a rational animal - So at least I have been told. Throughout a long life, I have looked diligently for evidence in favour of this statement, but so far I have not had the good fortune to come across it, though I have searched in many countries spread over three continents. On the contrary I have seen the world plunging continually further into madness. I have seen great nations, formerly leaders of civilization, led astray by preachers of bombastic nonsense. I have seen cruelty, persecution, and superstition increasing by leaps and bounds, until we have almost reached the point where praise or rationality is held to make a man as an old fogey regrettably surviving from a bygone age. All this is depressing, but gloom is a useless emotion. In the past with more attention than I had formerly given to it, and have found, as Erasmus found, that folly is perennial and yet the human race has survived (Unpopular Essays, p. 70)".

In every society, follies of various types have been prevalent. But human intellect has also been simultaneously searching out alternatives in the forms of remedies of these follies. Hence, from Aristotle to Aurobindo, all the noble philosophers of the world have been incessantly trying to lead humanity towards a better superior state of survival. In the same way, many concepts are being delineated in a more rational manner so as to enrich them with better perspectives. 'Education' is the only conceptual instrument which serves this phenomenal purpose, but due to so many irrational factors, this term itself has been used so loosely that it sometimes loses its significance. Now there is an urgent need to reconceptualise its metaphors.

'Education' and 'Humanity' always have been complementary to each other. Since the inception of mankind, education has remained to be an inseparable part of evolution. In future also, both will remain co-existent. Along the passage of decades, centuries and millenia, terms acquire a large area of connotation and synonyms, metaphors or connections get attached to certain terms. It has happened with the term education also. At present more than a dozen metaphors of education are in prevalence. The vividness of the metaphors loses the precision of the conceptual clarity of any term and the same has again occurred with the concept of education.

Conceptual discrepancies sometimes lead to grave misconceptions which cause irreparable loss. Hence, it is a challenge before the academicians to analyse a concept threadbare and arrive at logically sound conclusions.

The prevalent metaphors of education, which are frequently used, are instructions, training, indoctrination, regimentation, admonition, adjudication, teaching, learning etc. Now, let us examine the etymology of the term 'Education' itself and evaluate the appropriateness of these metaphors in relation to conceptual viability of education. 'Educare' and 'Educere' both etymological origins of 'Education' are the combination of two Latin Original Words 'E' and 'Duco' which mean 'from within' and 'lead out' respectively. Etymologically, it is clear that education is that which optimizes the innate capabilities. Hence, the most fundamental metaphor of education presupposes that possibilities are already there in the individual at the time of conception or birth what we are doing or we have to do, is to provide conducive environment for the fullest realisation of those inherent capabilities.

The other presupposition that every child at the time of birth is having a mind which is 'tabula rasa' (clean slate), is also admissible to the extent that the adult society, should only draw desirable sketches and not absurdities on it. Leaving the cultural and national contexts aside, we must analyse the conceptual misnomers, objectively. Education is not less than 'conscientisation' in its ultimate purposes or finalities or internalities. Rest of the purposes like literacy, functional numeracy, skill learning and its training, cramming, cognition, conation, employability and subservience to state, are secondary in nature. Due to so many false explanations we have admitted these purposes of education as the ultimate ones, and hence, the most fundamental concepts of the term education have either been degenerated or lowered down. Not only this, all the time we teach formally that education as an organised enterprise is the sub-system of social system. But there is much urgency to define education phenomenally that it is a superprocess.

'Conscientisation' is attained through phenominal components like identification, clarification, awareness, commitment and sacrifice for the values. This is the real purpose of education. Hence, the champions of the world religions have churned out the norms, values and ideals for the humankind. In this process of crystallisation of ideals, the conscientisational instrumentality or functionality of education is realisation and the height of the purpose of education are safeguarded. Even quality of survival of humankind and humanity is ensured properly. It also justifies the claim of human beings to have the nomenclature 'Homo Sapiens' (animals of rationality). Now the natural intelligence of human beings has evolved superior artificial intelligence (super computers etc.). Hence there is a threat to the

sensitivity of human race and its axiological superiority. It is only the uniqueness of the combination of 'head' and 'heart' of human beings that has classified us as 'Homo Sapiens'.

'Intellect' is always secondary and 'intuition' is primary. A proper synthesis of intellect and 'intuition' may give rise to the most acceptable model of 'conscientisation' which may further prove to be the best model for the modern man. The formal institutions of education do have certain inbuilt limitations and, hence, such institutions through their prototype pedagogy and curricula cannot instill values among the learners. What is required is that value oriented teachers can only inspire the children, adolescents and adults to inculcate faith in values and sense of sacrifice for the sake of values. This stage of being educated may enrich us with the proper insight of discriminating between the do's and don't's of our speech, action and thought. Conclusively, it may be said that axiologically conscientised individuals are the properly educated individuals, and only such individuals are the real assets of a nation or society.

The challenge of scrutinising the concepts and further reconceptualising them is ultimately on the shoulders of the intellectuals of the world. The scientific temper of the intellectuals, or better to say, of the intelligentsia can only benefit us in pondering over this issue. When the metaphors will get momentum and usage, then fallacies may reach the level of antidirectionality. It has happened with education in some societies and, therefore, the catholic thinkers have voiced slogans like 'descholoring', 'school is dead', 'compulsory mideducation' etc. Such movements with negative terminologies are the superior metaphors of education. If education is to be saved from any weaknesses, it is very essential that metaphorical rectification is accomplished so as to revive our own faith in the intrinsic worth of the phenomenon of education. The cardinality and subtlety of education need to be reinterpreted and consequently reconceptualised.

Bertrand Russell had also speculated likewise while writing 'Ideas That Have Helped Mankind' in his popular book "Unpopular Essays". Russell wrote "There should be some among my readers who would like to see the human race survive, it may be worthwhile considering the stock or moral ideas that great men have put into the world and that might, if listened to, secure happiness instead of misery for the mass of mankind (Unpopular Essays, p. 124)". This proposition is also a solicited version of conscientisation of individuals through education.

Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude
Ray Monk, Jonathan Cape, London, 1996, 680 pages.

BOOK REVIEW

by Stefan Andersson

Ray Monk has through his much praised biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein established himself as one of the great biographers of this century. He has now completed the first part of a biography of Bertrand Russell. It covers the years from his birth 1872 to 1921, when he returned from China, married Dora Black, became a parent for the first time at age forty-nine, and commenced his career as a freelance philosopher and writer. At this point Russell had lived half of his life.

Monk's book can on the one hand be compared to earlier biographies of Russell by Ronald W. Clark (1975) and Caroline Moorehead (1992), and on the other hand to his own biography of Wittgenstein. Russell and Wittgenstein are two of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. They had a great influence on each other, which now, through Monk's eyes, can be seen from both person's perspectives.

The most important difference between Monk's biography of Russell and earlier ones is that Monk, with a solid background in philosophy, has the ability to combine a description of Russell's life with an analysis of his philosophical development. Monk has also found an overall theme, which makes his psychological analyses of Russell's complicated emotional life seem, in most cases, well-grounded and convincing. This theme is indicated in the title of the book "The Spirit of Solitude". Monk has tried to knit together the three passions of Russell's life, which he talks about in the prologue of the autobiography: "the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind".

Clark and Moorehead have, by practically neglecting Russell's search for knowledge and certainty, failed to see the tension between this passion and the two others and therefore also failed to notice all three of them were attempts to cure one fundamental problem; his deep sense of isolation and loneliness, which, according to Monk, was linked to his fear of mental illness. Russell tried, according to Monk, to cure his sense of solitariness by establishing contact with something outside himself; another person, humanity at large, or the external world. In this context Monk could have quoted another crucial passage of Russell's *Autobiography*, where he says that "human affection is to me at bottom an attempt to escape from the vain search for God".

Russell is today hardly known for his attempts to come to grips with the traditional Christian conception of God as a person in some sense, but no one can read Monk's biography without noticing how often Russell

in his letters expresses a wish to reach a religious understanding of life. For a while he found comfort in, what Spinoza called "the intellectual love of God", but in the long run Spinoza's god turned out to be too abstract to have any real practical influence on his daily life.

The backbone of Monk's book consists to a large degree of quotations from Russell's letters to the different women he had relationships with. Monk says in the introduction that he is "aware that the personality thus revealed is one that many will find repellent, but it has not been my aim to present him in an unfavourable light". He goes on to mention things for which he admires Russell greatly: his intelligence, his commitment to philosophical clarity and rigour, and his dedication to the causes of social justice and international peace. He poses the challenge to those, who like himself, admire Russell to understand how his good qualities could coexist "with a sometimes quite chilling coldness to those close to him, and a disturbing capacity for deep and dark hatreds." This is a challenge indeed, but Monk's treatment of Russell also challenges his own statement that he is an admirer of Russell.

Monk ends the introduction by saying that "When Russell told Ottoline that the character in fiction with which he felt most 'intimate' was Dostoyevsky's Rogojin - the sinister, embittered murderer of *The Idiot*, consumed by hatred, disappointment and jealousy - he was, I think, revealing something crucially important in understanding his own character." What Monk hopes to have shown is how Russell possibly could have seen himself in this light. "If the portrait that results is less attractive than those previously drawn, it is also, I hope, more complex and interesting, and, I believe, more accurate." Monk's portrait is definitely less attractive than earlier ones. In some ways it is more interesting, but I doubt that it is more accurate.

The epigraph to Monk's book is a quotation from *The Idiot*, and it is a good one if one sees in Russell a person whose life was dominated by the struggle to find faith in God: "How grimly Rogojin had spoken that morning about 'losing his faith'. That man must be suffering terribly . . . Rogojin wasn't just a passionate soul, he was a warrior; he wanted to bring back his lost faith by force. He felt an agonising need for it now . . . Yes! To believe in something! In someone!"

However, the Rogojin in this epigraph has little to do with the sinister, embittered murderer consumed by hatred, disappointment and jealousy that Monk talks about. It is true that Russell sometimes was tormented by jealousy and sometimes even felt murderous impulses, but these were not feelings that dominated his life. On the whole he was a loving and caring person, who suffered deeply from the pain he inflicted on others. If there was any feeling besides love that can be said to have dominated his life, it was the need to believe in some transcendent value or being. Monk's

biography really shows this, which makes it hard to understand why he does not emphasize this side of Russell rather than the ones he highlights.

Monk has done a good job describing Russell's childhood and adolescence, but he only devotes ten pages to his undergraduate years at Trinity College. In the next chapter he shows how Russell was influenced by McTaggart's conception of love and how it fitted in with his understanding of religion at the time. Then he goes on to show how Russell came under the influence of Spinoza, after having read Sir Frederick Pollock's book *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, and how Russell identified Spinoza's God with the 'Absolute' of McTaggart's neo-Hegelianism.

It is in the fourth chapter that one starts to get the feeling that Monk does not particularly like Russell as a person. He tries to convince the reader that Russell did not care very much about his newly wedded wife and he uses the 'Self-Appreciation' that Russell wrote for the *Golden Urn* in the spring of 1897 to prove his case. He takes Russell's silence concerning the death of his grandmother as an indication of his impassability. Because Monk has not found an entry in Russell's diary or a letter expressing his feelings concerning his grandmother's death, does not prove that Russell at this time was a cold and insensitive person.

In the following chapter Monk describes the development of Russell's "religion of sorrow", his discovery of the paradox and his deteriorating relationship with Alys. The two first are well done, but his moralizing over Russell's dying love to Alys is tedious. Russell found himself stuck in an awful situation, but Monk shows little sympathy for his attempts to deal with it.

The years Russell spent on preparing *Principia Mathematica* get 27 uninspired pages, and it seems that Monk is just waiting for Russell to meet Lady Ottoline Morrell. The first six months of their love-affair receives 30 pages. Monk does a good job in describing how Russell's love for her had a religious dimension. He also brings out Russell's complicated relationship to God, which is revealed when at the height of love he is faced with the possibility of having cancer. Russell later wrote to Ottoline "my first reaction was to congratulate the Deity on having got me after all just as happiness seemed in sight. I suppose that in some underground part of me I believed in a Deity whose pleasure consists of ingenious torture." This is not the only time Russell hints at that he somehow believed in the existence of a wicked God.

When Ottoline enters the scene, we are on page 200 and Russell is just about to turn 39. The following ten years get 400 pages many of which are filled with quotations from letters he wrote to Ottoline. There is no doubt that she was an important person in his life and she brought out emotions in him that otherwise might have remained dormant, but by relying so heavily on the letters to Ottoline, Monk gives the impression that

Russell had nothing else to do than to think about religion and sex. In one letter he writes "Turbulent, restless, inwardly raging - I shall always be - hungry for your God and blaspheming him. I could pour forth a flood of worship - the longing for religion is at times almost unbearably strong." It might seem strange that his hunger for God decreased as his interest in Ottoline declined; maybe his hunger for God was not so deep and pure after all? However, Monk never seems to doubt the sincerity of Russell's religious yearnings, and I think rightly so.

While Russell was courting Ottoline, another person entered his life who would have a great influence on him and his philosophical thinking. Russell was 39 and Ludwig Wittgenstein 22 when they met for the first time. Wittgenstein had come to Cambridge with the intention of learning mathematical logic from Russell, who soon realized that his new student was very talented. They were both interested in the question how to define logic. One might think that Russell should know the answer to this question, since he and Whitehead had tried to show that mathematics could be deduced from logic. But things were more complicated than that and Russell hoped that Wittgenstein would come up with a satisfactory answer. The outcome of Wittgenstein's investigations did not turn out to be what Russell had hoped for, but this was not clear to Russell at the time.

They also had other interests in common, religion being one of them, but it turned out that their approaches to this subject were so different that after a while, they decided not to talk about it. When Wittgenstein had read Russell's essay "The Essence of Religion" he came to him and told him how much he hated it. Russell's idea of religion and mysticism was influenced by Pythagoras and Spinoza, Wittgenstein had a completely different understanding of the topic.

The second part of Monk's biography covers the years from the outbreak of the First World War to 1921. During these years Russell tried to maintain his relationship with Ottoline at the same time as he had affairs with Helen Dudley, Irene Cooper-Willis, Vivien Eliot, Constance Malleon and finally Dora Black. What caused much of Russell's problems during these years was his wish to find a woman with whom he could have legitimate children. Ottoline did not want to divorce her husband and she did not want to have another child with Russell. Helen Dudley would probably have born him a child with great pleasure, but when he returned from his trip to the United States, he had lost interest in her. This put him in an awkward situation when she showed up in England believing he wanted to marry her. Russell's way of handling the situation is nothing he was proud of. Monk knows this, but shows no mercy.

Ottoline, realizing how badly Russell needed a woman he could truly fall in love with, tried to act as a match-maker. However, not much came out of Russell's relationship with Irene Cooper-Willis. Then Russell

had an affair of a different kind with D.H. Lawrence. Together they started to work on a new religion that would replace the old one. Russell's version appeared in his lectures on the principles of social reconstruction, which were later published as a book. Monk's treatment of their failed collaboration is interesting.

Monk then goes on to Russell's affair with Vivien Eliot and makes a big case of having shown, to his satisfaction, that Russell had a sexual relationship with her and that it had negative effects on her sanity and that he later tried to cover up the whole story. I do not think it is fair to accuse Russell of causing either Vivien Eliot's or Helen Dudley's mental illnesses; they were both mentally unstable when he met them and her certainly had good intentions in both cases. How their lives would have developed if they had never run into Russell is impossible to say.

At the same time as Russell was having an affair with Vivien, he met another married woman with whom he really fell in love and whom probably would have married, if she had agreed to have children with him. Constance Malleon was a young, strikingly attractive aristocratic actress, who was known to most by her stage name "Colette O'Neil". They met in September 1916 and they soon became lovers. In his letters to her he expressed his passionate search for "something transfigured and infinite - the beatific vision - God - I do not find it, I do not think it is to be found - but the love of it is my life - it's like passionate love for a ghost." The war had not killed his religious yearnings, but seeing how the name of God was misused by both sides, made him realize that not much good could come out of organized forms of religion.

For a while Russell had at least three relationships going on at the same time. Monk does not miss the opportunity to show how Russell tried to make the best out of the situation by all means available for a man trapped by his own wish for love and children. Russell does not come out as a very honest man, but anyone who has been in a similar situation knows that it is not an easy one. There is nothing wrong with Monk's ambition to tell the truth concerning Russell's twists and turns, what I do mind is his lack of empathy for Russell's predicament.

There is much that is new and good in Monk's book, but I think he would have gained much if he had spent less time on Russell's complicated love life, refrained from moralizing, and put more emphasis on Russell's intellectual and political achievements. His book has already received a number of positive reviews, but I agree with Galen Strawson that the main problem with Monk's book is one of hostility and that he "lacks the sympathy essential to biographical intelligence, as he did not when he wrote his outstanding biography of Wittgenstein." (Independent On Sunday, 14 April, 1966).

Monk has responded to Strawson's review and denies that he has been hostile and claims that he has only been truthful. Concerning Strawson's comparisons of the relative moral defects and virtues of Russell and Wittgenstein, Monk claims that he has no position on the subject: "It is not my concern to make a morally comparative evaluation of the two, and nothing in my book suggests otherwise." (Independent One Sunday, 21 April, 1966).

It seems to me that Monk wants the best of two worlds; there is nothing wrong with preferring Wittgenstein to Russell as a philosopher and a human being, but I find it hard to understand why Monk tries to deny what is quite obvious to anyone who has read both of his biographies. I am very impressed by Monk's achievements and not at all hostile to him because he has shown that Russell was far from a saint, but I would lie if I tried to deny that I think he has failed to hide his true feelings about Russell. Some things do not have to be said; they simply show themselves.

Stefan Andersson is presently in Toronto and at the Bertrand Russell Archives. Thanks to Ken Blackwell who showed me his review-file with Strawson's review and Monk's reply.

BOOK REVIEW
Russell by A.C. Grayling
Reviewed by John Shosky
Department of Philosophy and Religion
The American University

A.C. Grayling. *Russell*. Oxford university Press, 1996. 115 pages.
ISBN 0-19-287-683-X.

If you want a full account of Russell's life and achievements, you will probably look for Monk's new book. But if you are in the market for a brief introduction to Russell, then I recommend Grayling's book on Russell. This is the contribution for the Past Masters Series, which has presented short assessments of major religious and intellectual figures for the past two decades.

The choice of biographer is admirable: Grayling is Lecturer in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, London, and Senior Research Fellow at St. Anne's College, Oxford. Perhaps best known for his previous contribution on Wittgenstein within this series, Grayling is one of the few scholars to have demonstrated deep sympathetic and reasonably *impartial* scholarship on both Russell and Wittgenstein, placing him in a select class with Monk, Pears, and Ayer.

As with each edition of the Past Masters Series, the book begins with a brief accounting of Russell's life and work. Then Grayling proceeds to cover Russell's legacy in logic, philosophy, science, politics and society. More specifically, Grayling alights on all the major touchstones: the rejection of idealism, foundations of mathematics, theory of descriptions, theory of types, sense data, logical atomism, neutral monism, embrace of science, ethics, practical morality, educational views, political writings, and anti-war actions. Finally, the book ends with an assessment of Russell's influence.

Grayling was asked to do all of this in approximately 100 pages -- an impossible task. In addition, there was the specter of John Slater's similar book, published two years ago by Thoemmes Press. But Grayling deserves high marks for a job well done. Russell's long and varied life, vast influences, and lasting relevances beg for massive volumes of careful documentation and endless speculation. Even the mammoth undertakings by Ronald Clark and Monk are said to leave out important material. I suspect that Russell's story can only be coherently told by choosing and consuming rich slices of his history, which will unfortunately tell us more about the

author's choices than about Russell. Each book on Russell then becomes an idiosyncratic tale, revealing the author's preferences and intentions by using Russell as the historical backdrop. Put another way, we are discovering many Russells, each a reflection of the prior views and bias of the authors. Given the weight of material, and without meaning to sound like a refugee from a graduate "lit crit" class, this simply can't be helped.

Therefore, *Russell* is a book that loudly invites second-guessing "what ifs", and "you should haves". I know that I would have preferred more of a discussion about Russell and Wittgenstein's mutual influences on each other, more about Russell's interactions with Dewey, and much more about Russell's sympathy with logical positivism. I would surely have preferred less of Grayling's over-enthusiastic praise of Russell's socialism and anti-war efforts. Stylistically, I would have asked for less overlap and continuous restatement throughout the text (once is enough in a small book). I should have insisted that the poor writing and editing of chapter one on Russell's life and work be corrected -- the sentences often read like talking points and the word "called" is overused to the point of severe distraction.

But there is much to praise about this book. I am greatly impressed by the flow of the writing in the remainder of the book. The discussion of the theory of types is most insightful, especially the later links to Ryle. The explanations of Russell's atomism, realism, and reliance on logic are important to philosophy. I also admired the obvious risks that Grayling took, emphasizing Russell's work on the mind/body problem, the use of postulates in Russell's later scientific work, and Russell's writings on education. The discussion of four books in the text is very interesting: *The Foundations of Mathematics*, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, *Power*, and *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. In particular, Grayling's excellent use of the second chapter of *Our Knowledge of the External World*, "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy", is the highlight of the book, showing how that chapter links Russell's logical and epistemological enterprise tightly together, and demonstrating the power of analytical philosophy, the use of Ockham's Razor, and Russell's atomistic metaphysics. As well, the chapter on Russell's influence is a courageous, daring, and clear statement of Russell's profound importance as an intellectual figure. Grayling argues that in modern philosophy, Russell is "practically its wallpaper." I agree with him that the complete history of the twentieth century cannot be told without significant reference to Russell. For Grayling, Russell is "an epic figure," in the same company as Aristotle, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein.

I suspect that this will be a controversial book by those who take notice of it. I also suspect that for political, personal, or prejudicial reasons some Russell scholars will take no notice of it at all. But this is a vital book on Russell. Along with Monk's great work, this book ushers in a new age of mainstream reacceptance of Russell. Grayling is correct in noting that the

ascendancy of Wittgenstein has now come and gone, and it is time to give Russell his due as a first rank philosophical figure. This book is an attempt to provide an honest account of Russell, showing that Russell is the major philosophical figure of the last century.

I highly recommend this book. It would be a useful text in almost any philosophical setting. It is accessible for novice and advanced students of Russell. It is a readable, thoughtful, cogent, and remarkable effort by a great scholar. This book will take its rightful place alongside the brilliant introductory texts by Ayer and Slater.

BRS LIBRARY

The Society library sells and lends books, audiotapes, videotapes, and other materials by and about Russell. Please direct library inquiries and requests to Tom Stanley, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088 (tom.stanley@infoport.com).

Books for sale H-Cloth, otherwise paperback. Prices are postpaid. Please send check or money order (U.S. funds only) payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society" to Tom Stanley.

By Bertrand Russell:

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| Appeal to the American Conscience | Spokesman | \$3.50 |
| Authority and the Individual | Unwin-Hyman | 7.95 |
| Has Man a Future? | Allen & Unwin | H 8.00 |
| History of the World in Epitome | Spokesman | 1.00 |
| In Praise of Idleness | Routledge | 8.95 |
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| Power: A New Social Analysis | Routledge | 8.95 |
| Skeptical Essays | Routledge | 8.95 |

By Other Authors:

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| Bertrand Russell by John Slater | Thoemmes Press | \$19.00 |
| Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970 | Spokesman | 1.50 |
| Bertrand Russell's America, Vol. 2, 1945-1970 edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils | South End Press | 9.95 |
| Liberty and Social Transformation: A Study in Bertrand Russell's Political Thought by Chandrakala Padia | Heritage Publishers H. | 11.50 |
| The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words, edited by Christopher Farley and David Hodgson . | Spokesman | 10.95 |
| The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I, The Private Years (1884-1914) by Nicholas Griffin | Houghton-Mifflin .. | H. 17.50 |

The library has a small supply of Caroline Moorehead's BERTRAND RUSSELL: A LIFE--for sale for \$14.00 (postage paid)

Audio cassettes in the lending library

Speeches:

- 200 Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech. 1950 45'
 201 "Mind and Matter." 1950 52'
 202 "Bertrand Russell in Australia." 1950 55'
 Four ABC broadcasts: "Guest of Honor", "The World as I See It", "What Hope for Man?" and "My Philosophy of Life".
 203 "Living in an Atomic Age." 1951 90'
 Six BBC broadcasts: "Present Perplexities", "Obsolete Ideas", "The Modern Mastery of Nature", "The Limits of Human Power", "Conflict and Unification" and "The Achievement of Harmony".

- 204 "Life Without Fear." 1951 34'
 205 "Portrait from Memory: Whitehead." BBC 1952 15'
 206 "Man's Peril." BBC 1954 15'
 207 Russell-Einstein Manifesto. 1955 30'
 208 "The World and the Observer," BBC 1958 30'
 209 Kalinga Prize Press Conference and Acceptance Speech. 1958 48'
 Includes five minute interview of January 24, 1958.
 210 "Address to the CND." 1959 30'
 211 "The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore." BBC 1959 42'
 Interviews with Russell, Leonard Woolf, Morton White and John Wisdom.
 212 Address to the Berkeley Vietnam Teach-In. 1965 14'
 213 "Appeal to the American Conscience." 1966 29'

Interviews, debates:

- 225 "Is Security Increasing?" NBC 1939 30'
 226 Russell-Copleston Debate on the Existence of god. BBC 1948 20'
 227 "The Attack on Academic Freedom in Britain and America." NBC 1952 30'
 228 "Bertrand Russell' Romney Wheeler Interview. NBC 1952 30'
 229 "Face to Face." John Freeman Interview. BBC 1959 30'
 230 "Bertrand Russell Speaking." 1959 52'
 Interviews by Woodrow Wyatt on philosophy, taboo morality, religion, and fanaticism.
 231 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (I). 1959 52'
 On the role of the individual, happiness, power, and the future of mankind. 1959 52'
 232 Woodrow Wyatt Interviews (II). 1959 52'
 On nationalism, Great Britain, communism and capitalism, war and pacifism and the H-bomb
 233 "Close-Up." Elaine Grand Interview. CBC 1959 30'
 234 "Speaking Personally: Bertrand Russell." John Chamndos Interview 1961 90'
 235 David Susskind Interview. 1962 90'
 236 Studs Terkel Interview. SFMT 1962 39'
 237 "On Nuclear Morality." Michael Tiger Interview. 1962 32'
 238 Interview on Vietnam. CBC 1965 10'
 239 Merv Griffin Interview. 1965 24'

Lectures, broadcasts:

- 250 "Bertrand Russell." Rev. Paul Beattie. 1975 15'
 251 "Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher." A.J. Ayer. BBC 1980 15'
 252 "Bertrand Russell." 1986 Professor Giovanni Costigan. 100'

- 253 "Portrait of the Philosopher as Father." Katherine Tait. (In German) 30'
- 254 "Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Education." William Hare. 15'
- 255 "Bertrand Russell's Pacifist Stance in World War I." CFMU-FM 1992 30'
- 256 "Russell vs. Dewey on Education." 1992 115'
With Michael Rockler, Tim Madigan and John Novak.
- 257 "A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic" by Darren Staloff. 1994 40'

Documentaries:

- 275 "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell." 1962 40'
- 276 Beatrice Webb on the Russells / Russell on the Webbs. 1966 35'
- 277 "Sound Portrait of Bertrand Russell." NPR dramatization. 1980 60'
- 278 "Bertrand Russell: A Reassessment." BBC 1980 43'
- 279 "Bertie and the Bomb." Soundtrack of BBC television program. 1984 40'

Miscellaneous:

- 300 "The Conscience of Wisdom." CBC 1962 62'
- 301 "Sinfonia Contra Timore" by Graham Whettam. Dedicated to Russell. 1972 27'

Additions to the Lending Library

Bertrand Russell: the Spirit of Solitude by Ray Monk. London: Jonathan Cape
Russell by A.C. Grayling. NY: Oxford University Press.
My Father, Bertrand Russell by Katharine Tait. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.

Thoemmes titles can be ordered from Books International, P.O. Box 605, Herndon, VA (1-703-435-7064). *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy* will be available soon.


THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

November, 1996

No. 92



Time to Renew!
Membership Application Inside

Bertrand Russell Society
c/o Michael J. Rockler
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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russells work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inpired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

Michael J. Rockler
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

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Bertrand Russell Society Business

The following pages contain Society business that need your attention. Each page may be xeroxed and sent to the appropriate address.

SOCIETY BUSINESS INCLUDES:

- 1) Membership Renewal
- 2) Board of Directors Election Ballot
- 3) Note From Peter Stone
- 4) New Honorary Member - - Noam Chomsky
- 5) Note From Tim Madigan
- 6) From the Library

BOARD OF DIRECTORS BALLOT

Vote for Eight
(3 Year Term January 1, 1997 - December 31, 1999)

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Return To: Donald Jackanicz
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Please return by December 30, 1996

ATTENTION, PLEASE

BRS Dues Are Due January 1, 1997

Everyone's Bertrand Russell society renewal dues are due January 1, 1997. The January 1st due-date applies to all members, including first-year members (excepting those who joined in the final quarter, i.e. October/November/December 1996).

The 1997 dues schedule in U.S. Dollars: Regular Individual, \$35. Regular Couple (two persons at the same address), \$40. Student or Limited Income Individual, \$20. Limited Income Couple, \$25. **Plus \$10 for any membership outside the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico. Plus \$4 for any membership in Canada or Mexico.**

Please remember that the BRS's financial condition is a continuing concern. There is no immediate financial crisis. But neither is there, as yet, the solid financial foundation that long-term survival requires. We ask those members who can afford to, to make an extra contribution when renewing membership by choosing one of the special membership categories on the renewal coupon below.

Please mail dues, payable to "Bertrand Russell Society" in U.S. Dollars, to Bertrand Russell Society; c/o Dennis Darland, 1965 Winding Hills Drive, #1304, Davenport, IA 52807.

Thank you for renewing and for your contributions. And thank you for renewing early.

RENEWAL COUPON

I am glad to be an early renewer, to ease the renewal process for the BRS. And I hope to see the BRS continue to thrive for a long time to come. I have looked over the membership categories below, and chosen one that is right for my circumstances.

I have checked my membership category And, if applicable, my foreign mailing category.

- Student, \$20
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- Life Member, \$1000 and up
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- Contributor, \$40
- Sponsor, \$100 and up
- Benefactor, \$500 and up

I enclose my dues, in U.S. Dollars, payable to "Bertrand Russell Society."

Name _____ Date _____

Address _____

NOTE FROM PETER STONE

Dear Michael,

I wanted to let you know that Gerry Wildenberg, David White, and I are starting a Bertrand Russell discussion group in Rochester. The group is called the Greater Rochester Russell Set, and will meet monthly. At a meeting, we will either discuss some work by Russell, or else talk about some topic relating to Russell.

Would you mind mentioning this group in the newsletter? The group meets on the second Tuesday of each month, starting on Nov. 12, at Park Avenue Books and Espresso, 370 Park Ave. Rochester. At the Nov. 12 meeting we will discuss _ Marriage and Morals_; at the Dec. 10 meeting we will discuss _ Why I am Not a Christian_. Interested people should contact me by phone at 716-325-3459, or by e-mail at <prse@troi.cc.rochester.edu>. And of course, we'd be happy to plug the BRS as well.

If it's too late to make the next newsletter, I'll let you know what we'll be doing in future months later on.

Thanks a lot.

Peter Stone

NOAM CHOMSKY ACCEPTS HONORARY SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP

The BRS is pleased to announce that Noam Chomsky has accepted honorary Society membership. In his August 12, 1996 letter to the BRS, Dr. Chomsky wrote:

I was, needless to say, very pleased and honored to receive the offer of an honorary membership in the BRS, and am delighted to accept.

By I suppose no accident, the second quote from Russell on the back of the [BRS] brochure graces my office, with a marvelous picture, so I've been looking at it almost every day for many years.

The Russell quotation referred to is: "Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind."

For a recent brief, yet substantial, article on Dr. Chomsky's thought, see "Chomsky, Noam" in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich, editor (1995), pp. 132-133. Among Dr. Chomsky's many writings are Syntactic Structures (1957), Language and Mind (1968), Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use (1986), and Determining Democracy (1992). Of special interest to students of Russell is Dr. Chomsky's Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (1971), being a slightly revised version of his two Russell Lectures, given in 1971 at Trinity College, Cambridge, titled "On Interpreting the World" and "On Changing the World."

We welcome Dr. Chomsky and hope that he may be able to attend one or more of our future annual meetings.

NOTE FROM TIM MADIGAN

Last night I met again with BRS member Gerry Wildenberg, professor of mathematics at St. John Fisher College (relax - although once a Catholic school, it's been secularized!). He is starting a Bertrand Russell Book Discussion group. The first meeting will be on Tuesday, Nov. 12 at 7:15 p.m., at the Park Avenue Books and Espresso in Rochester, NY. The discussion will be on "Marriage and Morals." The next meeting will be on Tuesday, Dec. 10, and will discuss "Why I Am Not A Christian." I plan to attend these meetings and spread the good word about them. This would also make a nice item for the newsletter - we should be encouraging more such meetings.

NOTE FROM THE LIBRARY TOM STANLEY

Please change my e-mail address in the librarian's report to: tjstanle@freenet.calgary.ab.ca. Thanks

I have only this item for the News:

New and forthcoming:

Mortals and Others: Russell's American Essays 1931-1935, edited by Harry Ruja. Routledge paperback \$16.95. A copy is in the lending library.

Understanding Principia and Tractatus: Russell and Wittgenstein Revisited by A.P. Rao. International Scholars Publications \$49.95.

The Bertrand Russell Society Library Box 434 Wilder, VT 05088
Visit our website: www.ncf.carleton.ca/~ck714

FROM THE EDITOR

Michael J. Rockler

The breadth of Bertrand Russell's scholarly work in part reflects the fact that Russell lived almost one hundred years and pursued many different interests during his long lifetime. One can begin the study of Russell from a variety of vantage points—my own interest began with an exposure to Russell's views on science and religion and ultimately came to include his works on education as well as his approach to fiction.

Since the last issue of the *Quarterly*, I have read two books which make the breadth and depth of this unique scholar clear. *Philosophical Essays* was published by Russell in 1910 and is a relatively technical book. It includes BR's early position on ethics, an essay on history, and a strong critique of pragmatism and William James. This volume demonstrates a first rate mind at work—it is Bertrand Russell in the prime of his intellectual life taking on a powerful philosophical system advocated by William James and John Dewey among others.

Russell's writing can be elegant. Note the following passage from "On History" in *Philosophical Essays*:

On the banks of the river of Time, the sad procession of human generations is marching slowly to the grave; in the quiet country of the Past, the march is ended, the tired wanderers rest, and all their weeping is hushed.

It is this kind of writing which led ultimately to the awarding of the Nobel Prize for literature to Russell.

A second book I have recently read is a collection of Russell's correspondence with the general public edited by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils and published in 1969 by Houghton Mifflin. This book contains delightful letters organized around many of Russell's lifetime interests.

There is a facsimile reproduction from one Paul Altman, six years old, who thanks Russell for all he has done and invites him to tea if Russell should ever come to Oxford. Russell replies:

Dear Paul Altman:

Thank you for your very nice letter which I am especially glad to have because it encourages me to keep on working. I wish that I could have tea with you but I do not expect to come to Oxford. If I do come, I will let you know.

With love and warmest good wishes,

from
Bertrand Russell

Russell's letters to people on religion, peace, youth and old age, and philosophy are enjoyable to read and stand in sharp contrast to the more technical writing in *Philosophical Essays*. Yet both volumes, published 59 years apart, are indicative of the varied intellectual and political career of this significant figure.

Reminder: Plan now to attend the annual meeting which will be held as a joint gathering with Canadian and American Humanists. The meeting will be held in Buffalo, New York from May 31 to June 2, 1997. Mark your calendars now for this special BRS event.

RUSSELL'S GROWING CRITICISM OF KANT'S IMPACT ON PHILOSOPHY

Paul Hager
University of Technology, Sydney

Russell's estimate of the worth of Kant's contribution to philosophy declined sharply during the course of his philosophical writings. The early idealist phase began with a defense of a Kantian theory of geometry which takes account of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. Then the remainder of the idealist phase represented a shift from Kant to Hegelian dialectic (*My Philosophical Development*, p.31). It was the rejection of idealism, however, which set Russell into sustained opposition to Kant. Initially this opposition was tempered by a willingness to point out the merits in Kant's work. So while the doctrines of the 1903 *Principles of Mathematics* are "on almost every point of mathematical theory, diametrically opposed to those of Kant" (p. 456) and erroneous philosophical understandings of the infinitesimal Calculus, for example, are traced to an "undue mysticism inherited from Kant" (p.326), nevertheless Russell is at pains to stress Kant's virtues. Thus he is credited with having first called attention to the logical importance of asymmetrical relations" (p. 227) and with rendering in a precise form the contradictions belonging to the notion of the infinite then current (p. 355). In addition, the Russell of *Principles of Mathematics* shared the Kantian view that mathematical knowledge is both synthetic and *a priori*, whilst, in opposition to Kant, putting logic in the same category as well (p. 457).

In the 1912 *Problems of Philosophy* Russell maintains this even-handed approach, insisting that although Kant is generally regarded as the greatest of the modern philosophers . . .", nonetheless the validity of his many metaphysical results as to the nature of the world . . . may well be doubted" (p. 82). Perhaps inspired by the description of Kant as yonder *sophistical philistine*, who was *so bad a mathematician*", in a letter sent to him by George Cantor in September 1911 (*The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, pp. 226-28), Russell's respect for Kant quickly declined in the succeeding years. So on more than one occasion in 1914 he lambasted Kant for being unusually ignorant of psychology" (*Our Knowledge of the External World*, First Edition, p. 112).¹ However, it is with the 1927 *Outline of Philosophy* that Russell's vituperation of Kant could be said to have gotten into full stride. There we are told that

Kant deluged the philosophic world with muddle and mystery, from which it is only now beginning to emerge. Kant has the reputation of being the greatest of modern philosophers, but to my mind he was a mere misfortune.(p. 64)²

This level of pungency was thereafter the norm. In the 1946 *History of Western Philosophy*, after disagreeing with the general estimate that has Kant as the greatest of "the modern philosophers," Russell says of him that

Hume, by his criticism of the concept of causality, awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers so at least he says, but the awakening was only temporary, and he soon invented a soporific which enabled him to sleep again.(pp. 677-8)

In the 1950's Kant is portrayed as the generator of "a new set of fallacies" ("Philosophy's Ulterior Motives" in *Unpopular Essays*, p. 53). Alan Wood reports on the effect at this time of "Kant's allegation of a subjective element in mathematics" on Russell, with his "yearning for absolutely certain impersonal knowledge":

. . . the tone of his voice can only be described as one of disgust, like a Fundamentalist confronted with the suggestion that Moses had made up the Ten Commandments himself. Kant made me sick

(*My Philosophical Development*, pp. 192-3).

Interestingly, on the page following the above report, Wood suggests that Russell's career as a philosopher can be "briefly and crudely" summed up in the slogan "From Kant to Kant". Given the trend we have noted in the preceding series of quotations, it is no surprise to find Russell himself firmly repudiating Wood's suggestion. (*My Philosophical Development*, 194)³

No doubt a variety of explanations could be proposed for Kant's steady fall from favor with Russell. It might be suggested, for example, that the younger Russell would have more reason to be wary of intemperately attacking one of the acknowledged greats of the philosophical tradition than would the older Russell, by then securely established as a leading philosopher of the early twentieth century. Then there is the well known fact that Russell, especially from the 1920's onwards, often wrote with an eye to possible sales to remedy his recurring financial difficulties. Outrageous attacks on sacred cows would clearly fit the bill here. Probably there is some truth in both of these suggestions. Nonetheless, I suggest that the inexorable decline in Russell's estimation of Kant stems largely from considerations that are more directly philosophical. In brief I suggest that from the start of his revolt into pluralism, Russell viewed his own philosophy as providing a superior alternative to the tradition derived from Kant. Initially optimistic about the likely success of this

venture, Russell's high hopes were gradually dimmed for a couple of main reasons. Firstly, the development of a coherent philosophical position that corrected (what he saw as) Kant's mistakes proved to be more difficult than expected. the various phases of Russell's pluralism can each be viewed as new attempts to answer Kant. In each case there were compelling reasons for abandoning the existing position and developing a new one. These changes were actually more orderly and less drastic than has been commonly claimed. However, the perception of frequent erratic changes of mind was not conducive to winning support for the newer position from other philosophers. This gives us the second main reason for Russell's early optimism being dashed. From being a major influence in the early decades of his pluralism, Russell had the mortification of seeing his place in contemporary philosophy slip to the stage where he was no longer a significant part of the mainstream. This in turn put him in the rather anomalous position of having to advance his current unpopular views against critics who were still assiduously defending his earlier views, views that he had long seen good reason to discard.² Thus providing a viable and widely accepted alternative to Kant proved much more difficult and frustrating than Russell had originally anticipated.

Invitation to readers:

Are there other major instances of Russell denigrating Kant?

Are there other more plausible explanations of Russell's deteriorating estimate of Kant's work?

¹See also p. 116 and "The Relation of Sense Data to Physics" in *Mysticism and Logic*, p.113.

²See also pp. 192 and 198.

³Russell's response is in a footnote that he himself inserted in Wood's work.

⁴A prime example of this is the paper by J. Feibleman in the Schilpp volume on Russell (1944. On this issue, see Russell's response in the Schilpp volume (p. 686).

"CONVERSATION WITH FLEW"

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In 1995, the Bertrand Russell Society asked Anthony Flew, professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Reading, to become an honorary member. Flew may be best known to BRS members for his brilliant essay "Russell's Judgment on Bolshevism", published in the *Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume*, edited by George W. Roberts, Allen and Unwin, 1979. Like Russell, to whom he has been compared in more than one review, Flew has popularized philosophy, using economic, and social controversies. Like Russell, Flew is also a well-known and vocal humanist. He graciously accepted our invitation. Flew is a most appropriate, prominent, and respected addition to our society.

Last July I visited Anthony Flew in Reading. Over lunch and a few pints of bitter at "The Monk's Retreat", we discussed many topics, including Russell's influence at Oxford during the late 1940s. Michael Dummett and others have argued that Russell was vilified at Oxford during this period, primarily because he was a foil for the linguistic movement. (See "Oxford Philosophy," in *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Harvard, 1978). Flew remembers it differently. Flew was in Oxford during part of the period analyzed by Dummett — 1946-1949. Flew first attended St. John's College, Oxford, as an undergraduate from January to June, 1942, but he did not study any philosophy at that time. His service in World War II January, 1946, taking final exams for his undergraduate degree in 1948, supervised by Golbert Ryle until December, 1948. In January of the 1949, Flew became a lecturer at Christ Church, Oxford. During the late 1940's, he also attended a weekly gathering of philosophers who met with J.L. Austin. Others who joined Austin's "Saturday Mornings" included J.O. Urmson, A.D. Woozley, and Isaiah Berlin. (For another description of these gatherings, see Berlin's "J.L. Austin and the Early Beginnings of Oxford Philosophy," *Personal Impressions*, Penguin, 1982).

Dummett repeats a charge often heard: that Oxford ignored Russell and the analytical movement. But this charge appears somewhat suspect; after all, A.J. Ayer came out of Oxford greatly impressed by Russell and Russell himself gave lectures in Oxford during 1938, which were later published as *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*.

Perhaps Dummett is correct, but only in describing the views of some of the older dons. Much of the animosity against Russell was evidently among philosophers who were directly assaulted by Russell's work: Cook Wilson, H.W.B. Joseph, perhaps R.G. Collingwood, and others. In Flew's recollection, Ryle and Austin were most respectful of Russell; and Ryle admired him enormously. Flew remembers Ryle as quite taken with Russell, as were many philosophers in Oxford (See Ryle's speech to the Aristotelian Society upon Russell's death, reprinted in the Roberts volume). Philosophy students with any interest in the discipline were expected to have read *Problems of Philosophy* immediately upon arrival (Flew had devoured it even before attending Oxford). Three books by Russell were regularly read and discussed in Oxford: *Principles of Mathematics*, portions of *Principia Mathematica*, and *Our Knowledge of the External World*. Ryle supervised Flew's reading of *Analysis of Mind*, which Ryle felt was a much better book than any of Russell's writings on matter. In fact, Flew remembers Ryle as very enthusiastic about *Analysis of Mind*, some portions of which were influential in Ryle's great work, *The Concept of Mind*. Many students also read chapters of *History of Western Philosophy*, which had just been published in 1945. Flew and Ryle both viewed the book as uneven — good where Russell seemed interested in the material (Leibniz, Hume, Rousseau, Mill, and the last chapter on analytical philosophy) and disgraceful on matters of little interest to him (the scholastics, Kant, and Hegel).

Flew has heard of only one meeting between Ryle and Russell. Ryle told Flew that he had bumped into Russell and shared dinner together on a train. They seem to have got on famously. One of them said that John Locke had invented common sense. The other added, "And ever afterwards only Englishmen have had it!" Some may believe that Russell did not particularly like Ryle, using comments found in *My Philosophical Development* for evidence. But Flew believes that they both enjoyed their conversation, and that Russell's disappointment in linguistic philosophy was not a personal reaction to Ryle.

I asked Flew about Russell's legacy. He felt that Russell's work in logic and epistemology will always be relevant. For Flew, *Principia Mathematica* is Russell's great achievement. In epistemology, Flew believes that students will probably find Hume more important. Hume is the source of much of Russell's work. Russell may even be viewed historically, in Flew's opinion, as "a first-rate neo-Humean." In morality and politics, Flew believes Russell's work has had its effect and much of what he said is now part of our culture. In terms of theology, "Why I am not a Christian" or "Free Man's Worship" will probably continue to be influential

through republication in anthologies. Yet, for Flew, one of Russell's lasting contributions to philosophy is his writing style, which achieved an unparalleled clarity, providing a model for philosophical progress. Russell taught us that philosophers should clearly state their positions, methodologies, and findings, so other philosophers can understand them.

Flew also told me that he thinks Russell offers great insight for philosophers in developing countries, where more and more educated people are looking to "spread out" in their thinking. Russell will speak in a fresh voice to millions of people who hope to find new ideas, original viewpoints, and intellectual honesty. This is why Flew believes the BRS is growing in places like India and the Philippines.

Flew is pleased to be a part of the BRS. He is looking forward to receiving the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*. Flew is also continuing his own work in philosophy, which is a life-long tribute to the inspiration of Russell, Ryle, Austin, and others forty years ago in Oxford

THE MADMAN'S SPEECH

by Tim Madigan

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TOWER OF BABBLE

During my teen years, I was an ardent reader of *The Catholic Digest*. I particularly enjoyed a feature known as "The Open Door", which described the process by which converts had come to choose the Catholic religion as their vessel to salvation. This helped to reaffirm me in my own faith: if people were freely *choosing* to join rather than simply following what they'd been taught since childhood, that made the teachings all the more plausible. I never expected that I would soon be walking out of that open door the converts were so eagerly rushing into.

I think it is too little noted how influential converts often are to a religion, ideology or political cause. They tend to bring with them an enthusiasm and drive which can fire up those who'd been born into the system and never thought very deeply about it. Christianity surely wouldn't have gotten off the ground if Saul hadn't converted into Paul. One of the strengths of humanism is that it is a haven for individuals who have chosen to leave the indoctrination of their childhood. Yet there is still something to the old saying reputed to the Jesuits: "Give me a child at an early age and it is mine for life." We tend to bring to our new outlook presuppositions from the past.

This tendency is amusingly described in an article found in Bertrand Russell's classic book *Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related subjects* (Simon and Schuster, 1957). Entitled "On Catholic and Protestant Skeptics," and written originally in 1928, it states that "Any person who has had much contact with free-thinking people of different countries and diverse antecedents must have been struck by the remarkable difference between those of Catholic and Protestant origin, however much they may imagine that they have thrown off the theology that they were taught in youth" (p. 118). He goes on to describe the "Protestant" freethinkers as being obsessed with a strict advocacy of duty and moral fervor. The Utilitarian thinkers Jeremy Bentham and James and John Stuart Mill, for instance, while maintaining that pleasure is the goal of life, remained Puritanical and self-denying throughout their lives. He writes that a "Protestant freethinker would have been capable of deciding in the abstract in favor of free love, and nevertheless living all his days a life of strict celibacy." "Catholic" freethinkers, on the other hand, having been taught from birth that theirs is the one true church and that they should accept no substitutes, are much more prone to become full-blooded hedonists, tossing out the baby of duty along with the bath water of dogma. "The chief distinction that

One notices," Russell adds, "is that in the Protestant type departure from tradition is primarily intellectual, whereas in the Catholic type it is primarily practical. The typical Protestant freethinker has not the slightest desire to do anything of which his neighbors disapprove apart from the advocacy of heretical opinions" (p. 124).

One can see the twinkle in Lord Russell's eye as he wrote these lines. As a good logician, he recognized the problems of over generalizing, and he himself, while raised as a Protestant, certainly pursued a rather hedonistic life-styles at times, as his most recent biography attests (Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: the Spirit of Solitude*, 1996). Still, I think he's touched on an important point, one which may help explain the controversies that often rage *within* humanist movements. Freethinkers raised within Protestant traditions took their protests one step further than most, denying such tenets as the existence of any God at all. Yet they were still in accord with such Protestant virtues as opposition to authority, non-conformism and radical individualism. Almost all Protestant congregations came about because they split off from an already established church. Freethinkers raised as Catholics, on the other hand, had a greater tendency to be anti-clerical, exuberantly chanting Voltaire's call to "Crush the infamous thing." To them, there is but one true Church, and even *it* isn't true.

Of course, these attitudes have been changing. In recent times, there is much more interaction between Catholicism and Protestantism - witness the rather bizarre spectacle of Pat Robertson and Ralph Reed singing the high praises of Mother Teresa. And the Catholic church in the United States has been aptly described as this country's largest Protestant congregation. No doubt John Paul II would ruefully agree!

Russell's essay also helps one to understand better the dynamics of the humanist movement. Like a contemporary tower of Babel, it welcomes in people who've fled from all manners of belief systems. In my travels across the United States organizing humanist groups, I've come across former Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, Methodists, Greek Orthodox, and pre- and post-Vatican II Catholics. And I've met with former members of Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and other non-Christian religions. There are sizable numbers of Jewish freethinkers, who debate amongst themselves over whether or not Judaism is a religion, and whether doubting the existence of God also entails giving up keeping kosher. In addition, there are many people within the humanist movement who were not raised as members of any religion, and who consider themselves to be modern-day Alices in Wonderland, shaking their heads at the curious beliefs that motivate so many of their contemporaries.

Such a mingling of different traditions adds to the health of the humanist movement, just as such "Open Door" policies keep other

movements supplied with fresh blood. Yet unlike most of these, humanism is forthright in welcoming new directions and challenges. Former Mormons within our midst, for instance, have stressed the need to develop community support among humanists along the lines of that which they had previously experienced. In his article, Russell wisely pointed out that "It is a mistake to suppose that the admirable consequences achieved in the first moment of breakdown can continue indefinitely" (p. 125). How we use and channel this energy is important. And while humanism might be a Tower of Babel - or more aptly Babble, as those who've attended any humanist conference can confirm - it does have a *lingua franca* through which all members can converse: the shared notion that only humans working together can solve the problems that beset us. No deity will save us. Metaphysical differences should not separate us into warring camps, nor should differing traditions keep us from emphasizing our common humanity. With all due respect to Robert Schuller, *ours* is the real tower of power.

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE LIBERAL MEDIA

By Laurie Endicott Thomas

In the August 1995 issue of the *BRS Quarterly*, James L. Alouf quoted Bertrand Russell's *Sceptical Essays*, in which Russell argued that the teaching of newspaper reading should be taught that students should be brought to the understanding that "everything in the newspapers is more or less untrue." I have never worked for a newspaper, but I have had the privilege of working for a peer-reviewed scientific journal. This kind of publication represents the pinnacle of integrity as far as commercial media are concerned. Nevertheless, advertisers have some influence even in this kind of forum. I imagine that publications whose mission is entirely commercial would be subject to even greater pressures.

From my own experience, and from my courses of economics, I developed the suspicion that the commercial media do have a bias; but I expected to find that their bias would be commercial, not "liberal" (whatever "liberal" means). All the complaints by self-styled "conservatives" in the press and over the airwaves that the "liberals" dominate the media seem invalid by self-reference. Why is it that everyone seems to know the term *feminazi*, but few heard the term *Afro-Saxon*?

If "liberals" really do dominate the media, why is it that conservatives like Thomas Sowell get plenty of column space in the commercial media while dissidents like Bell Hooks get none? Why can I hear Rush Limbaugh over the radio but no democratic socialist balance? We heard plenty about purported defects of Marxists economic theory after the "fall of communism," but I do not recall any Marxists being given an opportunity to give their point of view. I have lived among humans all my life, and I find it implausible that any person or group is absolutely right (or absolutely wrong) about absolutely everything. Besides, if Marxism really is transparently foolish, what would be the harm in letting the Marxists have their say?

To enable students to understand the nature of the press, Bertrand Russell recommended asking students to read conflicting newspaper accounts of the same historical event. To this curriculum, I would add some personal accounts by journalists and a theoretical model developed by a finance professor and a linguist.

George Seldes died in the summer of 1995 at the age of 104. He began his career as a newspaperman in Pittsburgh in 1909. He knew Mussolini back when the future Duce was just a newspaperman, and Seldes achieved the distinction of being the first foreign journalist expelled from Italy by the Fascists. In *Freedom of the Press* [1935], Seldes recounts how he originally viewed journalism as a calling but was told bluntly on his first day of work that it is a form of prostitution.

Bertrand Russell gave a clear definition of power; Seldes explained how power is applied in the newspaper business. Tactics ranged from refusal of editors to run stories that irritated major advertisers to the deployment of Pittsburgh policemen to attack newsboys hawking New York papers that carried a story suppressed in the Pittsburgh papers.

Freedom of the Press focused mostly on the decisions of individual newspaper editors. *Witness to a Century* [1987] provides more of a view of the national media as a whole. Seldes realized early in the game that papers from other cities often published stories that were suppressed in Pittsburgh. Seldes went on to publish a periodical called *In Fact*, which published stories submitted by reporters whose own papers refused to run them.

Often, however, the people who had wanted various stories suppressed had power that extended beyond their hometown. Seldes details how tools ranging from mail carriers to Congressional witch hunters were deployed to suppress *In Fact*.

Just in case one retains the notion that magazines are somehow "liberal" even when it has become clear that newspapers are not, Seldes tells the tale of *Ken*, which was to be the only general interest publication to be even "one step left of center." Seldes explains how it came to pass that *Ken* never took any steps at all.

Russell had suggested assigning the reading of conflicting newspaper accounts of an event that had aroused passions in its day, along with "some impartial account of what really happened." I am at a loss to come up with any impartial accounts of anything that has aroused passions, but I can think of a literary classic that shows how everything that the newspapers were saying could be more or less untrue: George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia*, which describes his experiences in the Spanish Civil War.

Was Orwell impartial?

I have tried to write objectively about the Barcelona fighting, though obviously, no one can be completely objective on a question of this kind. One is practically obliged to take sides, and it must be clear which side I am on. [Orwell fought in the P.O.U.M.] I warn everyone against my bias, and I warn everyone against my mistakes. Still, I have done my best to be honest.

Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *1984* were assigned reading when I was a teenager, and the lesson that I was supposed to derive from them was that Communism is bad. Foolish me, I derived the lessons that lying is bad, that self-deception is no better, and that the power to distort truth is accompanied by the power to get away with murder. I am not surprised that my teachers never mentioned *Homage to Catalonia*. From that book,

I derived the lesson that like the United States, the Soviet Union was more concerned about its national interests than about the well-being of anti-revolutionary or reform movements in other countries. Orwell explained that

The whole of Comintern policy is now subordinated (excusably, considering the world situation) to the defence of the U.S.S.R., which depends on a system of military alliances. In particular, the U.S.S.R. is in alliance with France, a capitalist-imperialist country. The alliance is of little use to Russia unless French capitalism is strong, therefore Communist policy in France has got to be anti-revolutionary. This means not only that the French Communists now march behind the tricolour and sing the Marseillaise, but, what is more important, that they have had to drop all effective agitation in the French colonies (pp. 56-57).

If Communist policy can be antirevolutionary, then the term *Communist* is meaningless. People who were in favor of a revolution regardless of its effect on the U.S.S.R. and its allies were accused of a polymorphous heresy called "Trotskyism."

A Spanish literary critic noted that the only passage that was suppressed in the 1970 Spanish edition of *Homage to Catalonia* was the one that explained that Franco had not wished to establish fascism but rather to reestablish feudalism—that Franco's movement was a military uprising by the aristocracy and the Church.²

After explaining the party lines of the various groups involved in the Spanish war, Orwell reviewed what the newspapers said about the conflict. He concluded that

One of the dreariest effects of this war has been to teach me that the Left-wing press is every bit as spurious and dishonest as that of the Right. [He noted that the Manchester Guardian was an exception.] . . .

As far as the journalistic part of it went, this war was a racket like all other wars. But there was this difference, that whereas the journalists usually reserve their most murderous invective for the enemy, in this case, as time went on, the Communists and the P.O.U.M. came to write more bitterly about one another than about the Fascists. . . . I grasped that the Communists and Liberals had set their faces against allowing the revolution to go forward; I did not grasp that they might be capable of swinging it back. (pp. 65-66)

Orwell added that

The thing for which the Communists were working was not to postpone the Spanish revolution till a more suitable time, but to make sure that it never happened. . . . Please note that I am saying

nothing against the rank-and-file Communist, least of all against the thousands of Communists who died heroically round Madrid. But those were not the men who were directing party policy. As for the people higher up, it is inconceivable that they were not acting with their eyes open. (pp. 67-68)

From the accounts of Seldes and Orwell, it becomes clear that the commercial press sometimes supports a line consistent with the needs of a government, even where the government is not exerting direct control over the publication. A clear description of the underlying mechanisms can be found in *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* by Edward S. Herman (a professor of finance at the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania) and Noam Chomsky (a professor with the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy of Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

Herman and Chomsky propose a "propaganda model" of the media. Their critique of the media is not a "conspiracy theory" but an analysis of market forces. Their conclusions are somewhat reminiscent of the "spontaneous order" that Libertarians tell me can emerge from free markets, except that the order is not something that an ordinary citizen would consider desirable.

Leaders of the media claim that their news choices rest on unbiased professional and objective criteria, and they have the support for this contention in the intellectual community. If, however, the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and think about, and to "manage" public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how the system works is at serious odds with reality. (p. xi)

Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model focuses on [the] inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public. (p. 2)

Herman and Chomsky outline a set of interconnected news "filters": (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved

by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism. Herman and Chomsky show how these filters work by comparing the media treatment of "worthy" and "unworthy" victims. For example, the media devoted considerable attention to a Polish priest who was murdered in 1984 by policemen who were quickly apprehended, tried and jailed. In contrast, they paid little attention to 100 prominent Latin American religious martyrs killed by U.S.-backed "security" forces, non of the members of which were tried or even arrested. Herman and Chomsky also compared "legitimizing" versus "meaningless" Third World elections. According to the propaganda model, the spectrum of permissible debate in the media is bounded by the tactical options being considered by powerful elites. Criticism of an imaginary "liberal bias" is a means of establishing the lefthand margin of this spectrum. In *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*, Chomsky provides further discussion of implications of the propaganda model:

In short, the major media-particularly the elite media that set the agenda that others generally follow-are corporations "selling" privileged audiences to other businesses. It would hardly come as a surprise if the picture of the world they present were to reflect the perspectives and interests of the sellers, the buyers, and the product. Concentration of ownership of the media is high and increasing. Furthermore, those who occupy managerial positions in the media, or gain status within them as commentators, belong to the same privileged elites, and might be expected to share the perceptions, aspirations, and attitudes of their associates, reflecting their own class interests as well. Journalists entering this system are unlikely to make their way unless they conform to these ideological pressures, generally by internalizing the values; it is not easy to say one thing and believe another, and those who fail to conform will tend to be weeded out by familiar mechanisms. (p. 8)

Chomsky also discusses how Bertrand Russell fared at the hands of the "liberal" press. Precisely because Chomsky's account is not worshipful, it emphasizes that Russell was an admirable human being:

Another relevant case is that of Bertrand Russell. Then well into his eighties, Russell had the courage and integrity to condemn the Vietnam war and its mounting atrocities when this was unfashionable, and to warn of what lay ahead. In retrospect, his commentary stands up well, certainly as compared to the falsehoods, evasions, and apologetics of the time, and it is a model of probity and restraint in comparison to standard condemnations of official enemies, as has been documented beyond serious question. Some of Russell's comments, however, were unjust,

exaggerated, and incorrect. To criticize these statements would have been appropriate. What happened, however, was different. Russell became an object of contempt and obloquy; one would be hard put to find a word in his defense against the venom of the commissars. The denunciations were only heightened by Russell's willingness to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience in protest against the nuclear arms race, unlike others who shared his perceptions about unlike others who shared his perceptions about the threat but contented themselves with occasional sage comments, then retreated to their work and personal lives. The attacks are not, of course, a reaction to Russell's errors and excesses. Rather, to the fact that he stood virtually alone against the herd and dared to tell truths that were then, and remain now, unacceptable, exposing by his example the behavior of those who chose the normal path of submissiveness to the state and support for its violence. (pp. 159-160)

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1. Edward S. Herman showed that between 1980 and 1991, the New York Times, Washington Post, and Philadelphia Inquirer published 11 articles or opened pieces by Black rightists Thomas Sowell, Shelby Steele, and Walter Williams, 15 articles or op/ed pieces about them, and 30 reviews of their work. In comparison, these papers published nothing by or about Black leftists Bell Hooks, Manning Marable, or Cornel West. (Herman, Edward S.: *Triumph of the Market: Essays on Economics, Politics, and The Media*. Boston, South End Press, 1995.)
2. Escobar, Julia: *E1 Hombre Que No Se Quiso Callar*, in Orwell: 1984: Reflections Desde 1984. Madrid, Seleccion Austral, 1984.

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RUSSELL AND THE ORIGINS OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Book review by John Shosky
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Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Edited and Introduced by Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996.

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This year there will be a lot of discussion of Ray Monk's *Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* and A.C. Greyling's *Russell*, both which are mighty and worthy additions to the critical corpus. But any serious student of Russell cannot -- must not -- overlook what may be the best book about Bertie this year, *Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. This is a collection of essays from last year's Southampton Conference. Included are essays by Monk, Nick Griffin, Peter Hylton, Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra, A.C. Greyling, C.M. Kilmeister, Gregory Landini, Charles Pigden and Louis Greenspan. I strongly urge society members to buy it, read it, and discuss it. This is the cutting-edge of Russell Studies.

This set of essays also will be rightly compared to the several fine collections that are standard fare in Russell scholarship, such as George Robert's *Bertrand Russell: Memorial Essays*, J.E. Thomas and Ken Blackwell's *Russell in Review* or C. Wade Savage and C. Anthony Anderson's *Rereading Russell*. In my view, the Robert's volume is the best of the previous lot, and Monk and Palmer's effort is easily of equal value. My intuition is that *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy* will be read with great interest for many generations to come.

Frankly, each individual essay is destined to become a landmark on its issue, whether it is Landini's brilliant (as always) examination of *Principia Mathematica*, Griffin's powerful analysis of Russell's early use of denoting concepts, Greenspan's persuasive look at the *History of Western Philosophy*, or Noonan's fascinating logical excavation of the "Gray's Elegy" argument "On Denoting." I have discussed most of these papers earlier in my conference report, found in *Russell*, No. 88, November, 1995, pp. 20-30. I will try to avoid redundancy in this review, so I will not cover each and every paper in depth.

But perhaps no essay is more important for contemporary philosophy than Monk's "What is Analytical Philosophy?" Here Monk makes devastating counterattack against Michael Dummett's claim that Analytical Philosophy was a European movement, having nothing to do with Russell and G.E. Moore, and that Gottlob Frege is really its

inspiration. In fact, Monk shows that, for Dummett to be correct, Russell wouldn't be considered an analytical philosopher at all. Dummett argues that analytical philosophy is founded upon philosophy of language, and Russell did not see himself as that kind of philosopher (even though he contributed to many of the logical and linguistic issues that are the grist of any philosophy of language enterprise). With all due respect to Dummett, Monk sets the record straight: logical analysis began with Russell and Moore's attempt to break philosophical problems down into their individual components and provide a rigorous assessment of philosophical problems under this "logical microscope." That is the true starting point for this movement. Of course, Frege is a key figure; I readily understand the power of Dummett's claim because last year I taught a seminar on Frege, so the evidence is still fresh in my own memory. However, Monk doesn't sound a false chord in his discussion. Rather, he is refreshingly candid and impatient, sweeping away Dummett's claims with a tidal wave of historical and philosophical evidence. In the end, Russell and Moore remain the revolutionaries that forced an analytical turn in twentieth century philosophy.

I also found Kilmeister's essay of great contemporary interest, particularly the last third. The issue is whether or not Russell's work in mathematics and logical analysis is of any lasting value. Kilmeister doubts whether Russell has shown that technical advances in logic actually "solve" philosophical problems. I have heard such scepticism from other scholars and from my own students. Russell, of course, would point to the theory of descriptions and the theory of types as clear-cut cases of success. But Kilmeister argues that since Kurt Godel's 1931 paper on incompleteness, there has been no "real convincing example of the power of symbolic reasoning." Now, is this due to lack of ability by philosophers or an inherent limitation in logic itself? That is the question that should stimulate much controversy and debate. In my own view, Russell is correct to think that logic can clarify problems or eliminate them (see the beginning of "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy"). The great escalation and explication of logical systems in this century shows much technical prowess. Perhaps we now need to show more prowess in applying that logic to philosophical problems. Then we will know if Kilmeister's doubts are well grounded. He also favorably acknowledges Russell's use of definition and his use of abstraction. In Kilmeister's view, this triad--symbolic, definition and abstraction--are Russell's "main contribution to the analytic tradition." Whether one agrees with the essay or not, this is a much-needed evaluation of Russell's methodology and his contention that analytic philosophy can generate progress in philosophy.

Pigden's essay on Russell as a "neglected ethicist" is a big surprise. He notes that "Russell is often underrated as a moral philoso

phy," and indeed he is. But Pigden digs deep into Russell's early philosophy years, relying heavily on the *Russell's Collected Papers*, letters and interaction with Moore. Pigden proves--let me emphasize that--"proves"--Russell was a tremendous influence on Moore (and vice versa), and that Russell had very important, formative views on ethics.

Finally, let me add that Hylton's essay on Russell's use of analysis in examining the nature of proportions is a paradigm case of how to do philosophical history. When I heard it at the conference I was in awe, and left motivated to redouble my efforts. Upon reading it now, I can't help but feel that this is an instant classic in Russell Studies. I will refrain from any attempt to critique it, because I am still studying it.

The essay by Candish, Sainsbury, Palmer, Rodriguez-Consuegra and Grayling are also very, very well-done. Each deserves careful attention.

One question: where is the conference lecture by Ivor Grattan-Guinness? Surely some explanation is required.

Also, one comment: it would have been a good idea to mention the fine discussion at the conference, or even include some of it. Grattan-Guinness, Griffin, Pigden, Paul Hager, Stuart Brown and many other participants offered valuable insights with questions and comments. It is a shame that these are now lost.


So, yes, I highly recommend this collection of fine essays. If you want to be in the thick of contemporary discussion of Russell, and ahead of the curve in your thinking and scholarship, devour these essays as soon as possible, and keep coming back to them.

The cost should not be to much of a problem. Fortunately, the paperback is quite reasonably priced in Great Britain (under twelve pounds at Foyles in London). In the United States it is being offered through Thoemmes Press, Books International Inc., P.O. Box 605, Herndon, VA20172 (phone 703-661-1586/fax 703-661-1501) for \$29.95 in paperback and 78.00 in hardback. I don't know the cost in Canada, Mexico the EC, the Philippines, or India. But my guess is that it will cost much less than comparable academic textbooks. Access to the book may be difficult. But it would appear that Thoemmes Press has made this book a high priority. You can probably purchase it directly from the press (telephone in the United Kingdom is 0771-9291377 and fax 0017-922-1918), or have you local bookstore arrange to do it for you. But don't let any obstacle keep you from getting this most important, vital resource.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February, 1997

No. 93



Bertrand Russell Society
c/o Michael J. Rockler
529 14th St., NW, Suite 1125
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The Bertrand Russell Society

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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

February, 1997

No. 93

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Bertrand Russell Society Business

The following pages contain Society business that need your attention. Each page may be xeroxed and sent to the appropriate address.

SOCIETY BUSINESS INCLUDES:

- 1) Membership Renewal
- 2) Registration for the Annual Meeting
- 3) Tentative Program for the Annual Meeting

PLEASE NOTE

- A) It is now time to renew your membership. Please complete the enclosed form and return it to Dennis Darland.
- B) If you receive a damaged copy of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, let us know and we will replace it.

Bertrand Russell Society 1997 Membership Renewal Coupon

This is the final notice to renew BRS membership for 1997.

If you have already renewed for 1997 or have joined the BRS in 1997, please again accept our thanks for participating in the BRS.

But if you have not yet renewed your membership for 1997 — or if you would like to join the BRS for this first time — please mail this coupon with your payment TODAY. Thanks!

Please mail your coupon and payment to BRS Treasurer Dennis Darland at:

Dennis Darland
1965 Winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the one that is right for my circumstances. I enclose my 1997 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society."

- Individual \$35
- Couple \$40
- Student \$20
- Limited Income Individual \$20
- Limited Income Couple \$25
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- Sustainer \$75 and up
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- Life Member \$1000 and up
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PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico

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Name _____ Date _____
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Registration Information: BRS 1997 Annual Meeting

"HUMANISM: THE NEXT GENERATION"

the First Annual

CAMPUS FREETHOUGHT ALLIANCE CONFERENCE

Friday, May 30 to Sunday, June 1, 1997

at the Center for Inquiry, Amherst, New York

This exciting event will focus on ways to promote the cause of humanism among all generations, but particularly those of college age. There will be workshops, hands-on presentations, poster sessions, and cultural events. This conference will be co-sponsored by the Council for Secular Humanism, the Humanist Association of Canada, and the Bertrand Russell Society.

[] YES! I (we) will attend "Humanism: The Next Generation"

[] Registration(s) for ___ person(s) \$75US/\$100/CDN each \$ _____

[] Friday Luncheon for ___ person(s) \$22US/\$28CDN each \$ _____

[] Friday Night Trip to Niagara Falls, Ontario for ___ person(s) \$50US/\$65CDN each \$ _____

[] Saturday Banquet for ___ person(s) at \$35US/\$46CDN each \$ _____

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Residents of the United States, please make checks payable to FREE INQUIRY, Box 664, Amherst, NY 14226. To charge by phone call 1-800-458-1366 or FAX to 1-716-636-1733. For residents of Canada, please make cheques payable to the Humanist Association of Canada, PO Box 3736, Station C, Ottawa, Ontario, K1Y 4J8. For further details, contact Tim Madigan at 1-716-636-7571 (e-mail: TIMMADIGAN@AOL.COM).

Hotel Information — Mention "Free Inquiry Conference" for these special conference rates at the **Buffalo Marriott Hotel**, 1340 Millersport Highway, Amherst, NY (716) 689-6900. **\$84 Single/Double**. Includes complimentary Airport Shuttle. **Red Roof Inn**, I-290 and Millersport Hwy N., Amherst, NY 1-800-843-7663. **\$69 Single/\$79 Double**. Ask for Block Number B104000365. **Hampton Inn**, 10 Flint Road, Amherst, NY (716) 689-4414. **\$65 Single/Double**. Includes complimentary Airport Shuttle and Continental Breakfast. **Super Eight Motel**, 1 Flint Road, Amherst, NY (716) 688-0811. **\$49 Single/\$52 Double**. **Motel 6**, 400 Maple Road, Amherst, NY (716) 834-2231. **\$36 Single/\$42 Double**.

Annual Meeting—Preliminary Program

The 24th annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society will be held on the weekend of May 30-June 1, 1997, at the Center for Inquiry in the Buffalo suburb of Amherst, NY. This year we will meet in conjunction with the Council for Secular Humanism, the Humanist Association of Canada, and the Campus Freethought Alliance.

For more on this, see "Letter from the President" and the separate registration form, both in this issue.

The meeting proves to be a rich one and the BRS will participate in a wide range of activities. Here is the program (to date) the BRS will present as part of this large gathering.

Meeting of the BRS Board of Directors

Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society

Red Hackle Hour (prior to the banquet on Saturday)

Debate: Michael Rockler (BRS) and John Novak: Russell vs. Dewey on Democracy.

Talks:

Jim Alouf, "Bertrand Russell and the Teaching of History."

Stefan Andersson, "Russell's Personal Religion: Did He Have One?"

John Lenz, "Bertrand Russell's Utopian Hopes for the Future."

John Shosky, "Russell as Philosophical Partner."

Peter Stone, "Russell's Political Thought: What's Ethics Got to Do with It?"

A paper by the 1997 winner of the BRS undergraduate paper prize.

From The Editor

Michael J. Rockler

I recently read Banesh Hoffman's biography of Albert Einstein. Like Russell, Einstein led a fascinating life, one which makes for interesting and valuable reading.

Einstein died in 1955 at the age of 76. In 1955 John Dewey had been gone for three years and Russell was to continue to live for another fifteen years until the age of 98. Thus all three of these intellectual giants were alive and worked during the same time period. Einstein helped to define modern physics. Dewey, among other achievements, helped to conceptualize modern education. Russell contributed to mathematics, logic, philosophy, education and linguistics among other pursuits.

All three of these men, often in concert, worked for world peace. Einstein and Russell composed a letter opposing atomic warfare which was made public shortly after Einstein died.

As I read Einstein's biography and reflected on his life, I thought about how rich a period of intellectual history was the first half of the twentieth century. There have also been other epochs when several brilliant intellects were contemporaries. Plato and Aristotle, for example, both lived and worked in Athens at the same time that some of history's greatest playwrights were producing timeless drama.

I wonder about our own times. As we approach the twenty-first century who today can we consider as intellectual giants on the same level of these men? I ask readers of BRSQ to respond to this question by way of a letter or even a short paper. I would be glad to publish any answers I receive; it would be interesting to see how persons who belong to BRS evaluate contemporary thinkers. Drop me a line in Washington, DC and I will publish your response in the next issue.

This issue of the Quarterly contains an index to the Newsletters edited by Don Jackanicz and Dennis Darland and to the Quarterlies which I have edited over the last two years. Beginning next year, there will be an annual index of the Quarterly. Hopefully, this will be helpful to scholars who wish to find material that was previously published. I would like to thank Don Jackanicz for preparing this index.

This year's annual meeting will be held in conjunction with *Free Inquiry* as well as with the Canadian humanists. The gathering will take place in Buffalo, New York at the Center for Inquiry which is only a short drive from Hamilton Ontario and the Russell Archives at McMaster University. This will be an interesting and rewarding meeting from May 31-June 2. I hope to see many BRS members there. I will be glad to join you in toast to Bertrand Russell over a glass of Red Hackle.

All of us who are interested in Russell studies are sorry to know that Ken Blackwell has retired from the Archives. He will continue to serve on the BRS board and to publish *russell*. We wish him well in his retirement and we know that he will continue to be a major contributor to Russell studies.

From the President

By John R. Lenz

It's time again to make plans for our upcoming annual meeting, the most pleasant event and the hub of the BRS year for both socializing and stimulation of thought. Our 24th consecutive annual meeting will be held on the weekend of May 30-June 1, 1997, at the Center for Inquiry in the Buffalo suburb of Amherst, NY.

The Center for Inquiry (located near the campus of SUNY—Buffalo) is a magnet for secular humanism. Founded by Paul Kurtz (a past recipient of the BRS Award), the Center is home to *Free Inquiry* magazine, the Council for Secular Humanism (formerly called CODESH), the International Academy of Humanism, and other related organizations; nearby is the home of Prometheus Books (also begun by Kurtz).

This year we will meet, as we did a few years ago in Toronto, in conjunction with the Council for Secular Humanism and the Humanist Association of Canada. BRS member Tim Maidgan has organized a large gathering around the theme of "Humanism: The Next Generation." The BRS is especially pleased to co-sponsor this humanist conclave, because it will serve as the first annual conference for the Campus Freethought Alliance.

The Campus Freethought Alliance consists of representatives from student clubs from colleges across the United States and Canada. This is a fairly new movement, whose importance I can attest to. At most colleges, it is easy to find representatives of various religious traditions, but no focus for atheists, agnostics, or other doubters, freethinkers or secular humanists. I myself was very pleased, a few years ago, to be one of the first two faculty co-sponsors of the new Atheist and Alliance Student Group at Texas A&M University. Believe me, such a group was really needed there, and not just for students! Since then I have seen that group go on to host the largest World Wide Web site devoted to freethought. (You can find links to this and other humanist Web sites at this address: <http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/humanism.html>.) Russell would surely endorse this harnessing of technology in the cause of freethinking.

The theme of "Humanism: The Next Generation" is also a very congenial one for the BRS. Alan Ryan (a lively speaker at last year's meeting) wrote of Russell, "He always believed that it was to be the young that we must look for salvation . . . it is on them that he pins his hopes . . ." (*Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*, 1988, pp. viii-ix).

At this meeting, the BRS will present two sessions of interesting papers and we will also participate in plenary sessions with the other

co-sponsors. We will conduct our usual meetings of the Board of Directors and of the Society, elect officers, award the 1997 BRS Award and Book Award, and, especially, enjoy our famous Red Hackle Hour.

Please see other pages in this issue for two other things: the preliminary BRS program and list of talks, and the registration form which gets sent directly to Buffalo. This includes full information about hotels in the area. They are all within walking distance, and a shuttle bus will run from these hotels to and from the meeting place.

As always, you can contact me at jlentz@drew.edu with any questions or comments.

I hope you do consider attending the meeting on May 30-June 1. The annual meeting is the best expression of our group's identity and purpose, when we gather to express our shared interests and values. This year, perhaps you will be curious as I am to visit a new facility created as a home for humanist and freethought groups around the world, and to welcome students, the future of humanism.

And, remember to "check out" the BRS home page at: <http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlentz/brs.html>. Here I have collected links to writings by Russell, the texts of articles about him, and related Web sites of Interest for philosophy and humanism, and you can also find information about subscribing to Russell-L, the worldwide electronic discussion group, via e-mail, devoted to Russell's work.

"Philosophy and Politics" A Discussion of Russell's Essay

by John Shosky
American University

In our universities, political parties, and cultural life, many people have found Russell to be a powerful, hopeful, and cogent voice of reason. Many readers are drawn by Russell's honesty, humanism, humor, and optimism. True, his examples may be dated. His belief that world government would harness greed and dissolve hatred now seems naive. His anti-religious venom, in my view, still seems too harsh an assessment (although somewhat close to the mark). But his vision of universal suffrage, better living conditions for poor and minority classes, expansion of educational opportunities, ending nationalistic imperialism, and fostering respect and tolerance among all people are messages of great relevance for our own time. Russell was an intellectual who was willing to engage in the political struggle, not merely study it. He had a global, not parochial, vision. He used his reason, credibility, and stature to fight for a new and better world.

While I personally admire his work in logic and epistemology enormously, and sometimes have little regard for some of his radical social commentary, I do find many of Russell's non-philosophical writings full of deep insight and great wisdom. Frankly, many readers of Russell only know him through his historical, political, or cultural writings, which often strike a responsive cord. Many, probably most, of the people drawn to the Russell Society are not as interested in "On Denoting" as in *New Hopes for a Changing World*.

For those who wish to further examine Russell's political and social commentary, I recommend his essay "Philosophy and Politics". This year is the fiftieth anniversary of "Philosophy and Politics", a lecture originally given at the Friends House, Euston Road, London, on October 23, 1946. The occasion was the Fourth Annual Lecture of the National Book League.

The timing of the lecture was most important. World War II had just ended. There were indications of a prolonged struggle between America and the Russian Empire. The British Empire was itself beginning to crumble. Those who had fought for peace, and those who were the victims of aggression, looked for a brighter future. It was a time of harsh realities, and hopeful optimism.

Russell evidently understood the need for a guiding philosophy in this rapidly changing environment. He began his lecture by noting that the British were different from other European people because they had a

contempt for philosophy, but actually had produced excellent philosophers. This contempt for philosophy was wise, and universal "Absolute Idea"; in other words, thought thinking about itself. History is a deterministic movement of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (being, nothing, becoming) which turns into a new thesis, and so on. Everything is "Geist" or Spirit. It is an idealistic, universal, systematic view of history. It is justified by the use of "logic", which in Hegel's hands becomes a historical movement, not a tool of reasoning. There is no room for science or choice, knowledge or freedom. Given Russell's empiricist bent and Hegel's perversion of logic, his assessment is extremely harsh. Russell finds that

Hegel's philosophy is so odd that one would not have expected him to be able to get sane men to accept it, but he did. He set out with so much obscurity that people thought it must be profound. It can quite easily be expounded lucidly in words of one syllable, but then its absurdity becomes obvious.

Marx, following Hegel, is used as the philosophical inspiration of the Soviet state, which is autocratic, repressive, and dogmatic. Worship of the State and its leaders is required. The Soviet State became, for Russell (and Popper) a modern example of Plato's ill-conceived brew of totalitarianism and philosophy.

Empiricism is the view that all knowledge about the world is to be found in the external world. Because our sense data is unreliable, and our inferences based on that data subject to change, empiricism borrows heavily from both skepticism and science: skepticism because we must continually question our justification for what we know, and science because the scientific methodology produces tentative results which may be revised as new information is obtained. Russell advocates empiricism as the philosophy best designed to produce social progress, individual respect, and democratic equality. Empiricism is not dogmatic; yet it is not entirely skeptical. Russell argues that

The Liberal creed, in practice, is one of live-and-let-live, of toleration and freedom as far as public order permit, of moderation and absence of fanaticism in political programmes. Even democracy, when it becomes fanatical, as it did among Rousseau's disciples in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal; indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible, as appeared in England under Cromwell and in France under Robespierre. The genuine Liberal does not say "this is true"; he says, "I am inclined to think that under present circumstances this opinion is probably the best". And it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense that he will advocate democracy.

Russell argues that the tentativeness of opinion, and the empowerment according to Russell, because bad philosophy is dangerous and destructive.

Russell found that the connection between philosophy and politics was less evident in Britain than in Continental Europe. Yet, throughout history philosophy had been intimately tied to politics: the Catholic Church with Aquinas (and Aristotle), the Soviet Union with Marx (and Hegel), and Nazi Germany with Kant (and Fichte, Hegel, and Heidegger) are but a few obvious examples. In Britain, the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, among others, produced a democratic liberalism that Russell champions in this essay. Russell's purpose is this: "I want to consider in this relation of philosophies to political systems as it has in fact existed, and to inquire how far it is a valid logical relation, and how far, even if not logical, it has a kind of psychological inevitability."

For Russell, philosophy is distinguishable from religion precisely because it does not look to authority, tradition, or dogma for justification. Philosophy is also not science, which tells us about the world. But an essential part of philosophy is that it tells us how we ought to live. Philosophy is not skepticism; it tries to uncover the nature of the world. Unfortunately, many philosophical world-pictures defy common sense, urging "injustice, cruelty, and opposition to progress." Such philosophical positions can lead to totalitarianism or authoritarianism.

One example is Plato's *Republic*, which is anti-democratic, oligarchic, and anti-scientific. In this book, the Platonic Socrates tries to convince his followers that philosophy and politics can be mutually beneficial to each other. Philosophy can demonstrate the wisdom of allowing a select few to make the decisions for the many. In turn, the proper political arrangements can create a more conducive environment for doing philosophy. In fact, one goal of the *Republic* was to obliterate enthusiasm for the atomists like Leucippus and Democritus, who were looking for an objective understanding of the world through a scientific methodology that rejected any use for a "philosopher-king". The atomists threatened the Socratic approach to philosophy (and hence, the political *quid pro quo* involved in the Socratic bargain) because of the rejection of the theory of eternal forms, knowable only through a mystical internal quest. So, the *Republic* found favor with Spartan militarism, asceticism, and socialism — all of which amounted to a rejection of the objective world. The *Republic* was a marriage of "aristocratic prejudice and 'divine philosophy'." Russell's verdict is entirely negative: "That Plato's *Republic* should have been admired, on its political side, by decent people, is perhaps the most astonishing example of literary snobbery in all history."

The use of Hegel and Marx also led to a polity that was anti-democratic and elitist. For Hegel, the objective world as we understand

it is false. Real Reality is a timeless, progressive, of each individual thinker, is the essence of the Liberal outlook. Dogma is unacceptable. Authoritarianism is unjustifiable. Universal systems of philosophy are mental mythology. The proper outlook is "half way between dogma and skepticism;" this is where Russell believes empiricism takes us.

However, the philosophy of tolerance and universal suffrage, which Russell refers to as "Liberal philosophy", is often seen as "too tamed and middle-aged." Many people want a dogma that can be pushed with "missionary activity and gives hope of a millennium brought about by conquest." In Russell's time, the threat of nuclear war was the most overt threat. But historically, academic and personal freedom, individual safety and security from government intrusion, and protection of property were also at risk from the conquistadors of philosophy who dogmatically pushed their philosophy with missionary zeal. The Inquisition, Auschwitz, and the Gulag are only three reminders that philosophers and politicians don't need nuclear weapons to destroy millions of lives.

So, "Philosophy and Politics" becomes an apology for democratic liberalism and empiricism — a view that underlines the importance of rational decision-making, human dignity, mutual tolerance, and openness to new ideas. Russell concludes by arguing that only such a view allows for scientific evidence for our beliefs and places human happiness above adherence to dogmatic doctrines. He warns us that

Our confused and difficult world needs various things if it is to escape disaster, and among these one of the most necessary is that, in the nations that still uphold Liberal beliefs, these beliefs should be whole-hearted and profound, not apologetic towards dogmatisms of the right or the left, but deeply persuaded of the value of liberty, scientific freedom, and mutual forbearance. For without these beliefs life on our politically divided but technically unified planet will hardly continue to be possible.

This essay contains a relevant message for our own time. As we struggle to fully empower our citizens in the United States, as Russia and other countries struggle to transplant democracy into their own politics, and as all people debate the limits of governmental, clerical, and personal power, Russell's advice is a vital contribution. Without empiricism and Liberal democracy, philosophy can be used to place power in the hands of a few. In a time where political tolerance is often viewed as a decadent weakness, prudent reason is regularly vilified by self-righteous zealots, and progressive science is seen by many as methodologically suspect, we would do well to remember the most oppressive threat we face — those who think they have all the answers.

"Philosophy and Politics" was published as a small bound pamphlet by the Cambridge University Press in 1947. It is reprinted as the opening essay in the collection *Unpopular Essays*, Simon and Schuster, 1950. I

also recommend the essay, "Philosophy and Politics" by A.J. Ayer, the Eleanor Rathbone Memorial Lecture given at Bristol University, 1965. It has been published as the last essay in *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Company, 1967. My recommendations would include "Philosophy and Politics," the last chapter of Antony Flew's *Philosophy: An Introduction*, published by Prometheus Press, 1980.

Russell and Kant

Nicholas Griffin
McMaster University

Paul Haber (*BRS Quarterly*, No. 92, Nov. 1996) appeals for further evidence of Russell's denigrating Kant. Russell's harsh criticisms of Kant were not the late development that Hager supposes, nor did they have to wait for Cantor's forthright dismissal of Kant as 'yonder sophisticated philistine' (in a letter to Russell of 1911). In fact, the passage from the *Outline of Philosophy* (p. 64) in which Russell credits Kant as a prime source of 'muddle and mystery' in philosophy and which Hager cites as the first of his really sharp criticisms of Kant, was clearly anticipated in the 1899-1900 draft of the *Principles of Mathematics* where he refers to Kantian intuition as 'that lazy limbo of mystery'.¹

At the same time, there is the astonishing remark in *My Philosophical Development* (p. 75) that Russell had originally thought of *Principia Mathematica* as a long parenthesis in the refutation of Kant. Obviously any philosopher who warranted such a refutation must be important and, while he might be a 'misfortune', could hardly be a 'mere misfortune' (as Russell had said in the *Outline*, p. 64).

Hager, however, seems to me to be wrong in his account of what Russell rejected in Kant's philosophy. It was not Russell's pluralism that made him anti-Kantian — after all, Kant was a pluralist too. It was Kant insistence upon intuition in mathematics and, with it, the view that mathematical items and hence mathematical propositions were, at least in part, the creation of the human mind. The evidence Hager cites — e.g. Alan Wood's description of Russell's disgust at Kant as 'like a Fundamentalist confronted with the suggestion that Moses had made up the Ten Commandments himself' (*My Philosophical Development*, p. 261) — bears out the idea that it was Kant's psychologism that Russell found so objectionable. Indeed, even in his most Kantian work, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (1897), Russell was concerned to despsychologize Kant — though with imperfect success as he came quickly to think.

Why, then, did Kant fall in Russell's estimation from being 'the greatest of modern philosophers' whose refutation warranted the writing

of *Principia Mathematica*, to being a 'mere misfortune'? Not, I think, because Russell had difficulty in establishing pluralism, still less because swinging attacks on Misfortunate Dead Philosophers had sales appeal to magazine editors. There might, however, be something in Hager's suggestion that the young Russell was unduly deferential to Kant — he was certainly more deferential than the equally youthful G.E. Moore was in his Fellowship Dissertation of 1898 which was (ostensibly) on Kant's ethics. The chief reason for Russell's later impatience with Kant, however, was surely because he felt the influence of Kantian psychologism had lingered on long after it ought to have done. A chief concern of Russell's here would be the use of Brouwer's intuitionist philosophy of mathematics which threatened everything Russell hoped to achieve in *Principia*.

¹ *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, vol. III, G. Moore (ed.), London & N.Y.: Routledge, 1983, p. 106. In the corresponding chapter of the published version of the book he describes it instead as a 'mass of unanalyzed prejudice' (*Principles of Mathematics*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1964; 1st edn., 1903, p. 260).

Carl Sagan, Rationalist and Humanist

One of the things I've always liked about Bertrand Russell is the fact that he lived to the ripe old age of 97, and remained a provocative figure right to the end of his days. Like Russell, Carl Sagan had a passion for popularizing science, and promoting critical thinking. But alas, unlike Russell, he died far too young at the early age of 62. There were dozens of obituaries written about this gifted and admired figure, but I was troubled to see that almost none of these mentioned that he was a humanist, skeptical of organized religion. He had long been a supporter and friend to the Council for Secular Humanism, and was a laureate of the Academy of Humanism. During his last few months, he was often asked if facing imminent death had altered his skepticism about an afterlife, and he remained forthright in declaring his lack of belief in any life beyond the grave. In an interview published in the April 14th *Buffalo News*, Sagan declared that his battle with myelodysplasia — a rare blood disease which ultimately killed him — has taught him to appreciate "the beauty and sweet poignancy of life, about the preciousness of friends and family, and about the transforming power of love." Sagan was a Russellian figure, using his celebrity status to educate the public on the importance of scientific literacy. His enthusiasm and personal charm will be deeply missed. He was true humanist, in all meanings of the term.

The following obituary appeared in the *Charleston Gazette*. Written by its editor, James Haught, it is, as far as I know, the only memorial to emphasize Sagan's humanism.

— Tim Madigan, Executive Editor, *Free Inquiry: The International Secular Humanist Magazine*

Battling demons of the mind

By James A. Haught

Sincere seekers of reliable knowledge lost a friend when Carl Sagan died too young at 62.

Like all good scientists, the brilliant Cornell astronomer spent his life pursuing secrets of nature, looking for facts that can be documented, tested, and retested.

Like some maturing thinkers, he decided late in life to escalate his criticism of mystical mumbo-jumbo into an all-out, no-holds-barred attack. His last book, *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark*, urged intelligent people to repudiate:

Astrology horoscopes, faith-healing, UFO "abductions," religious miracles, New Age occultism, fundamentalist "creationist," Tarot card reading, prayer, prophecy, palmistry, Transcendental Meditation, satanism, weeping statues, "channelling" of voices from the dead, holy

apparitions, extrasensory perception, belief in life after death, "dowsing," demonic possession, "magical powers" of crystals and pyramids, "psychic phenomena" etc., etc.

Sagan's farewell message was simple:

— Many people believe almost anything they're told, with no evidence, which makes them vulnerable to charlatans, crackpots and superstition.

— Only the scientific outlook, mixing skepticism and wonder, can give people a sensible grasp of reality.

He scorned supernatural aspects of religion. *The Demon-Haunted World* abounds with comments like these:

"If some good evidence for life after death were announced, I'd be eager to examine it; but it would have to real scientific data, not mere anecdote. . . Better the hard truth, I say, than the comforting fantasy." (p. 204)

"If you want to save your child from polio, you can pray or you can inoculate. . . Try science." (p. 30)

"Think of how many religious attempts to validate themselves with prophecy. Think of how many people rely on these prophecies, however vague, however unfulfilled, to support or prop up their beliefs. Yet has there ever been a religion with the prophetic accuracy and reliability of science? There isn't a religion on the planet that doesn't long for a comparable ability — precise, and repeatedly demonstrated before committed skeptics — to foretell future events. No other human institution comes close." (p. 30)

"Since World War II, Japan has spawned enormous numbers of new religions featuring the supernatural . . . In Thailand, diseases are treated with pills manufactured from pulverized sacred Scripture. 'Witches' are today being burned in South Africa. . . The worldwide TM [Transcendental Meditation] organization has an estimated valuation of \$3 billion. For a fee, they promise through meditation to be able to walk you through walls, to make you invisible, to enable you to fly," (p. 6)

"The so-called Shroud of Turin. . . is now suggested by carbon-14 dating to be not the death shroud of Jesus, but a pious hoax from the 14th century — a time when the manufacture of fraudulent religious relics was a thriving and profitable home handicraft industry." (p. 46)

Sagan quoted the Roman philosopher Lucretius:

"Nature. . . is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, without the meddling of gods." (p. 310)

And he quoted the Roman historian Polybius as saying the masses can be unruly, so "they must be filled with fears to keep them in order. The ancients did well, therefore, to invent gods and the belief in punishment after death." (p. 213)

Sagan recounted how the medieval church tortured and burned thousands of women on charges that they were witches who flew in the air, coupled with Satan, turned into animals, etc. He said "this legally and morally sanctioned mass murder" was advocated by great church fathers.

"In Italy, the Inquisition was condemning people to death until the end of the eighteenth century, and inquisitional torture was not abolished in the Catholic Church until 1816," he wrote. "The last bastion of support for the reality of witchcraft and the necessity of punishment has been the Christian churches." (p. 413)

The astronomer-author was equally scornful of New Age gurus, UFO buffs, seance "channelers" and others who tout mysterious beliefs without evidence.

He denounced the tendency among some groups, chiefly fundamentalists and marginal psychologists, to induce people falsely to "remember" satanic rituals or other non-existent events they supposedly experienced as children.

Sagan, a laureate in the International Academy of Humanism, had been a member of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal since its founding in 1976 by Dr. Paul Kurtz. The astronomer said CSICOP serves a valuable public purpose by offering the news media "the other side of the story" in response to supernatural declarations by "every levitation guru, visiting alien, channeler, and faith-healer. . . CSICOP represents a counterbalance, although not yet nearly a loud enough voice, to the pseudo-science gullibility that seems second nature to so much of the media." (p. 299)

Again and again in his last book, Sagan said wonders revealed by science are more awesome than any claim by mystics. He said children are "natural scientists" because they incessantly ask "Why is the moon round?" or "Why do we have toes?" or the like.

He urged youngsters be inculcated with the scientific spirit of searching for trustworthy evidence, or guide them through "the demon-haunted world." That's a noble wish for the young.

I'm a friend of Sagan's sister, Cari Greene, who donated bone marrow repeatedly in a desperate attempt to fend off his marrow disease. Through her, I watched the family's pain.

Although his unstoppable illness was cruel, I'll bet the wise scientist didn't personalize his misfortune, but saw it factually as part of the random lottery of life, which takes some victims early, some late.

Meanwhile, we who admired him can be grateful that his last act was a courageous battle against the many demons of the mind.

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
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May 1997

Quarterly

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

May 1997

No. 94

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FROM THE EDITOR

John E. Shosky, Ph.D.
American University

Please allow me to introduce myself as the new editor of the *BRS Quarterly*. I am pleased to be able to serve the society in this capacity. I look forward to providing you with information, comments, stories, and reviews concerning the life and thought of this century's greatest philosopher.

For past readers, the *Quarterly* has been a dramatic change from the old *Newsletter*. I personally approved of the new direction taken by Michael Rockler, immediate past editor, but I also found the *Newsletter* to be a warm and accessible link to other members. During my tenure as editor, I hope to combine the best of both approaches.

I have begun by commissioning a cover drawing by Iva Petkova, a talented and well-regarded animator and artist from Sophia, Bulgaria. She is the daughter of one of Bulgaria's most famous artists, Ilya Petkov. Iva's fine drawing will be a welcome addition to the Russell corpus. In order to indicate consistency over the four issues within each calendar year, I will use a commissioned work four times, changing the color of the *Quarterly* with each issue. So, in 1998, I will commission a new drawing for the year.

I ask you to fill out and return the membership profile. In future issues we will feature three profiles, highlighting the members of the BRS and the many reasons for making "Bertie" a part of our lives.

I have also added a video review to each issue. Here I have called upon the services of a longtime friend and movie critic, Clifford Henke. Cliff is not a professional movie critic. He is an opinionated, knowledgeable, thoughtful, and funny guy. This issue he has reviewed "Tom & Viv." In the next issue, he will take up "Carrington." I urge you to rent these movies because of their interest in Russell, his time, and his circle of friends. Each movie will be selected because of its topical relevance to Russell.

I would also like to increase the number of book reviews. This is vital for two reasons. First, the number of fine works on Russell is rapidly increasing, sure evidence of a "Russell Renaissance." Second, I believe it would serve a tremendous educational function if we could use these pages to share our thoughts on what we read. For example, I would be very interested to know what Nick Griffin thought of Grayling's recent survey of Russell, or what John Lenz has to say about Martha Nussbaum's work on literature and the law. We have a deep, powerful braintrust in the BRS -- hundreds of well-educated, compassionate, and intellectual activists. The *Quarterly* should be a forum for the exchange of ideas

-- a marketplace of the mind.

To assist me in gathering and editing materials, I have added two assistant editors: Robert Barnard and Catherine Kendig. Robert lives in Memphis and is finishing a Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Memphis. He is a former graduate student of mine at American University. I wanted to include Bob because he is unbelievably brilliant and on top of cutting-edge trends in philosophy. Catherine is also a former and very successful student at American, and is now beginning graduate study at King's College, University of London. Catherine has repeatedly worked with me in the past, producing minor miracle achievements in the most difficult and thankless circumstances. She will be well-placed to help us generate more interest in the BRS in the United Kingdom and Europe. I would like to find an assistant editor in Asia. Any ideas?

In the next issue I will offer an extensive report of the recent annual meeting. But here I will indicate that there were some changes in the constitution of our society officers. I stepped down as Vice President and was replaced by the energetic and gung-ho Jan Eisler. Longtime Secretary Don Jackanicz was succeeded by one of the greatest names in Russellian scholarship, Ken Blackwell. John Lenz remains President and Michael Rockler the Chairman of the Board. Lee Eisler is still Vice President/Information Emeritus and the always capable Dennis Darland still guards the treasury. The BRS is in good hands for the coming year.

I hope you enjoy the *Quarterly*.

John Shosky

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S NIGHTMARES

David F. T. Rodier, Ph.D.

American University

In the modern period certain political and ethical topics regularly have been discussed by philosophers in narrative prose as the examples of Thomas More, Francis Bacon and Cyrano de Bergerac readily show. In the Enlightenment while some writers like Dr. Johnson and Rousseau continued the use of the philosophic topics which were primarily ethical or political, others - most notably Voltaire - developed the philosophic tale as a vehicle for the treatment of other kinds of philosophic topics including metaphysics. Contemporary readers are

perhaps most familiar with Voltaire's Micromegas and Candide as examples of the philosophic prose tale which explores metaphysical issues; however, the genre of the philosophic tale has continued to be a significant vehicle into the twentieth century as the well-known instances of Luis Borges and Bertrand Russell show.

Unfortunately, Russell's various prose fictions have been underrated, and even largely ignored by even his more devoted readers. I think this neglect is largely unjustified. Perhaps the neglect is due to an unconscious but deep-seated prejudice against fiction. Although Russell's followers readily accept his strictures against Plato in the areas of mathematical and political philosophy, when it comes to judging the value of Russell's own works they seem to show an uneradicated Platonic prejudice against the makers of fictions, even if the maker in questions is their own favorite philosopher. It would be ironic if such an unacknowledged Platonism actually is the source of the belief that if Russell really is doing philosophy, then he should write technical philosophic tales.

This neglect of Russell's fiction cannot be due to their style. It is obviously the case that some twentieth-century philosophers have written tedious works of fiction in an attempt to make popular theories turgidly, but unclearly, developed in their prose treatises - the examples of J. P. Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir come immediately to mind. However, unlike these continental philosophers, Russell's fiction is as clearly written as his philosophy. His fiction exhibits the same brilliance of style and sharp wit which his readers have come to expect in any of his writings. So the neglect of Russell's fiction can only be due to its form. However, philosophers trained in the tradition of English philosophy should remember that there are other reasons for a philosopher to write fiction than the effort to secure a popular hearing for theories which are not presented intelligibly elsewhere. As David Hume reminds us:

Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious, that it scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so important, that it cannot be too often inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject, where the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept, and where the variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may appear neither tedious nor redundant.

Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so obscure and uncertain that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it - if it should be treated at all - seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation.¹

Among Russell's various fictions, Nightmares² stands out as a work which almost perfectly fits Hume's description. The topics of the Nightmares perfectly fit Hume's requirement. The majority of the philosophic topics treated, whether ethical or logical, are ones which Russell, at least, would regard as so obvious that they "scarcely admit of dispute." The philosophic precepts, as Russell presents them, are "neither tedious nor redundant" since each tale is carefully organized and sharply focused. Each "nightmare" is short - most running to only two or three pages. The individuals having the nightmares range from historical figures Mr. Bowdler, Stalin, Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, and Dr. Vulpes (who seems to be a thinly disguised Klaus Fuchs) to individuals creatively named by Russell but identified in the titles of the stories only by their occupations (the metaphysician, existentialist, mathematician, fisherman and theologian) to the Queen of Sheba and a psychoanalyst who remains anonymous. In terms of the philosophic issues presented, the nightmares may be grouped as dealing with (1) political philosophy (the nightmares of Eisenhower, Dean Acheson, and Dr. Southport Vulpes); (2) ethics (those of the Queen of Sheba, Mr. Bowdler, the psychoanalyst and Stalin); and (3) metaphysics or logic (the nightmares of the metaphysician, the existentialist, the mathematician and the theologian).

Each of the "nightmares" appears to have the same format: a specifically identified person has a dream in which his ruling passion is reflected in an exaggerated form and a philosophic point is made. This accords with Russell's own account of the tales:

The following 'Nightmares' might be called 'Signposts to Sanity'. Every isolated passion is, in isolation, insane' sanity may be defined as a synthesis of insanities. Every dominant passion generates a dominant fear, the fear of its nonfulfillment. Every dominant fear generates a nightmare, sometimes in the form of an explicit and conscious fanaticism, sometimes in a paralyzing timidity, sometimes in an unconscious or subconscious terror which finds expression only in dreams (p. 211).

However, a careful reading of these tales and an analysis of the specific differences in narrative structure reveals a rather more complex presentation than a simple condemnation of fanaticism or paralyzing timidity. The different narrative structures which Russell adopts in presenting the various nightmares allows him to make far more complex philosophic points than the simple recommendation of 'Signposts to Sanity'. The importance of narrative structure

can be seen by noting the different ways the various nightmares are narrated and the quite different ways in which the various tales are concluded. As we shall see, the differences in narrator and the differences in conclusion have quite different functions in understanding Russell's philosophic points and how he makes them in the various tales.

First of all, from a formal point of view, the narrator of the various nightmares differs. Of the twelve tales, five have a brief description of the character and then the dream is directly narrated. In five other stories, the entire tale is presented from the point of view of the omniscient narrator and the dream sequence is part of the tale. The remaining two tales have a brief introduction describing the protagonist and then the nightmare is repeated as it had been told to the narrator reminiscent of the earlier Platonic dialogues. The function of these different ways of presenting the nightmares seems to be used only to allow Russell to maintain the reader's interest in the narrative by varying what would otherwise be the too rigid formula which his introduction leads the reader to expect. The variation in narrators maintains the reader's interest and allows Russell to make his implicit but crucial philosophic points in a variety of ways.

The variation in the ending of each tale is of far greater importance. The way Russell concludes each tale has a philosophic rather than merely rhetorical significance. In nine of the twelve tales the narrators awake from their nightmares. Significantly, in three crucial tales the dream never ends. The difference is not a simple one of the narrators who awaken are to be seen as those who have learned the lesson of their nightmares. While some of the characters have profited by their dreams, others have not. Certainly the existentialist who abandons philosophy as he understood it, for what we must assume is to be a purely literary career, and the metaphysician, who reforms his language along Russellian logical lines, are completely changed by their nightmares. Perhaps even more significant is the mathematician who has his firm rejection of Platonic realism triumphantly vindicated by his nightmare. But other characters who awaken seem not to have profited at all by their experience. We are not at all sure what the Queen of Sheba has learned from her dream. The theologian entirely misses the point of his dream. Even more to the point is the case of Stalin. In the introduction we are told:

Stalin, after copious draughts of vodka mixed with red pepper, had fallen asleep in his chair. Molotov, Malenkov and Beria, with fingers on their lips, warned off intrusive domestics who might interfere with the great man's repose. While they guarded him, he had a dream . . . (p. 240)

The conclusion of the tale shows Stalin quite unchanged by his nightmare:

In a paroxysm of rage Stalin awoke. For a moment the rage continued and vented itself upon Molotov, Malenkov and Beria, who trembled and turned pale. But as the clouds of sleep cleared away, his rage evaporated, and he found contentment in a deep draught of vodka and red pepper. (p. 242)

But if the difference between the tales in which the dreamers awaken and the tales where the dream does not end are not to be explained in terms of whether or not the dreamers profit from their nightmares, then we must look elsewhere for the reason for the difference in endings. A clue may be found in the occupations of the dreamers. The dreamers who never awaken are: Mr. Bowdler, and unnamed psychoanalyst, and President Eisenhower. Unlike all the other characters in the collection these dreamers do not return to the normalcy of waking life. Dr. Bowdler dreams that his wife overhears the forbidden word "parthenogenesis" - a word which his censorship holds unsuited for a female ear. In the effort to discover the definition of this unknown word Mrs. Bowdler reads the unexpurgated version of Shakespeare. The result is that ultimately she is "seized with an ungovernable frenzy, and had to be taken to the asylum, shouting Shakespearean obscenities to the whole street as she was borne away. (p. 221)" The tale concludes with Mr. Bowdler "asking his Maker for what sin he was thus punished. Unlike you and me, he was unable to find the answer. (p. 221)"

In Eisenhower's nightmare McCarthy and Malenkov conclude a pact which established peace between the United States and the Soviet Union by dividing the world and imposing total control over the population and a total censorship of books and ideas. The result is an enduring peace and a new world order in which there "was much material comfort, but there was no art, no new thought, and little new science. Nuclear physics of course was wholly forbidden. All books dealing with it were burnt, and persons showing any knowledge of it were condemned to forced labour. Some misguided romantics looked back with regret to the centuries when there had been great individuals, but if they were prudent they kept their regret to themselves. (p. 247)"

"The Psychoanalyst's nightmare" is the most complex of the three tales in which the dreamer does not awaken. In it we are presented with a meeting of the "Limbo Rotary Club" attended by Hamlet, Lear, Macbeth, Othello, Mark Antony and Romeo. All have been successfully psychoanalyzed and now are not the characters which Shakespeare depicted but rather are normal well-adjusted Rotarians. As each tells how much better off he now is than he would have been

if he were the “maladjusted” figure Shakespeare presented, a bust of Shakespeare comments on the new, well-adjusted person with lines from the appropriate play. In the end we discover that the voice speaking through the bust of Shakespeare is that of the characters’ psychoanalyst who has been condemned to Hell to “remain imprisoned in an endless vortex of insane commonplace” for “preferring subservience to glory; for thinking better of servility than of splendour; for seeking smoothness rather than the lightning-flash; for fearing thunder so much that I preferred a damp unending drizzle” (p. 228).

The common thread which seems to be present in each of these stories is that the danger represented by the protagonist - sexual repression in the case of Mr. Bowdler, political regimentation in the case of Eisenhower, and imposition of a bland normalcy in the case of the psychoanalyst - all are very real tendencies in contemporary culture as Russell saw it. In these cases the nightmares were the waking reality. For this reason, those who dream these particular nightmares never awaken.

If I am correct in my analysis of the reason for the different ending in these three stories, I will have shown that Russell is making more philosophic points in these stories than may be immediately apparent. In doing this I will also have made at least a plausible case for reading Russell’s fiction as something other than works which merely repeat what Russell elsewhere states more “philosophically”. I may even have raised the suspicion that Russell’s fiction contains interesting developments and presentations of topics about which Russell felt deeply and reasoned cogently. At the very least I hope that I may have persuaded at least some of Russell’s readers that his fictional writings have been unjustly neglected.

¹ Hume, David *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* ed. Richard M. Popkin. (Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1980) p.1

² In my discussion I shall include all of the stories Russell wrote under this name rather than limiting myself to those published in the 1954 collection. I shall use the text and quote the pagination of Barry Feinberg’s *The Collected Stories of Bertrand Russell* (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1972)

RUSSELL’S PARADOX AND RUSSELL’S ERROR

David Rafferty

In *The Principles of Mathematics*, Bertrand Russell misstated the paradox that bears his name. Russell drew the proper conclusion from his flawed discussion, and he could have corrected the mistake simply by adding two words: “do not.” Nevertheless, the error should be noted to avoid any unnecessary confusion about an already complex topic.

Russell’s paradox arises from certain predicates, class-concepts, and classes. Although those special cases appear unobjectionable, Russell discovered that they lead to contradiction. Thus, one must conclude that the apparent predicate, class-concept, or class in question is not, in fact, a predicate, class-concept, or class. Russell stated the contradiction in terms of all three categories. The discussion of the contradiction in terms of classes bears the flaw. In section 101 of *Principles*, Russell wrote

[I]et us . . . attempt the exact statement of the contradiction itself. We have first the statement in terms of predicates, which has been given already. If x be a predicate, x may or may not be predicable of itself. Let us assume that “not-predicable of itself” is a predicate. Then to suppose either that this predicate is, or that it is not, predicable of itself, is self-contradictory. The conclusion, in this case, seems obvious: “not-predicable of oneself” is not a predicate.

Let us now state the same contradiction in terms of class-concepts. A class-concept may or may not be a term of its own extension. “Class-concept which is not a term of its own extent” appears to be a class-concept. But if it is a term of its own extension, it is a class-concept which is not a term of its own extension, and *vice versa*. Thus we must conclude, against appearances, that “class-concept which is not a term of its own extension” is not a class-concept.

In terms of classes the contradiction appears even more extraordinary. A class as one may be a term of itself as many. Thus the class of all classes is a class; the class of all the terms that are not men is not a man, and so on. Do all the classes that have this property form a class? If so, is it as one a member of

itself as many or not? If it is, then it is one of the classes which, as ones, are not members of themselves as many and *vice versa*. Thus we must conclude again that the classes which as ones are not members of themselves as many do not form a class -- or rather, that they do not form a class as one, for the argument cannot show that they do not form a class as many.¹

Let us now examine each formulation of the contradiction to discover Russell's error and its solution.

In section 101 of *Principles*, Russell first discussed the contradiction in terms of predicates. Russell described the contradiction in terms of predicates in two other places: section 78 of *Principles* and his first letter to Frege.² In all three cases, Russell considered predicates that are *not* predicable of themselves. Russell supposed that those predicates form a class with a defining predicate. He then asked whether or not that defining predicate itself belongs to the class. Both alternatives, Russell discovered, lead to self-contradiction. Russell concluded that the predicate "*not*-predicable of oneself" is not in fact a predicate.

Russell next considered the contradiction in terms of class-concepts. He reached a similar conclusion: "class-concept which is *not* a term of its own extension" is not a class-concept. The problematic predicate and class-concept he considered share the crucial feature, we can say, of being *not*-self-applicable: the predicate is *not* predicable of itself and the class-concept is *not* a member of its own extension.

Russell's third formulation of the contradiction is in terms of classes. He reached the same conclusion that an apparently unobjectionable entity, in this case a certain class, cannot be what it seems to be. Russell's exact words are important here. The seventh sentence of the third paragraph of section 101 states: "[t]hus we must conclude again that the classes which as ones are *not* members of themselves as many do not form a class -- or rather, that they do not form a class as one, for the argument cannot show that they do not form a class as many."^{3,4} The problematic case again has the feature of *non*-self-applicability. Russell's conclusion is absolutely correct. But the sentences leading up to this conclusion do not support it.

The second through sixth sentences of the third paragraph of section 101 state: "(2) A class as one may be a term of itself as many. (3) Thus the class of all classes is a class; the class of all the terms that are not men is not a man, and so on. (4) Do all the classes that have this property form a class? (5) If so, is it as one a member of itself as many or not? (6) If it is, then it is one of the classes which, as ones, are not members of themselves as many, and *vice versa*."⁵ The sixth sentence would be absolutely correct if it were about the class of classes that

are *not* members of themselves. But the sixth sentence is absolutely wrong because it is in fact about class of classes that *are* members of themselves.

The "it" that is the subject of the sixth sentence refers to the class of classes under consideration in sentence (4). But from sentences (2) and (3), it is clear that the class of classes in sentence (4) is the class of classes that *are* as one terms of themselves as many. For a moment, let us take Russell at his word and consider all of the classes that as one are terms of themselves as many (for example, the class of all classes is a class, and the class of all the terms that are not men is not a man). Imagine that all of the classes with that property form the class *w*. Is *w* as one a member of itself as many? If it is, then it is. If it is not, then it is not. That is not a contradiction. That is a tautology. The only thing paradoxical about that conclusion is that Russell did not reach it himself.

What is going on here? Clearly, Russell made an editorial error. Russell could have corrected the error by adding the words "do not" to the fourth sentence of the paragraph: "do all the classes that *do not* have this property form a class?" If he had done so, sentence (4) would have asked about the existence of the class of *non*-self-applicable classes, sentence (6) would have been correct, and the conclusion in sentence (7) would have followed.

Nothing that has been said here in any way detracts from the power or scope of Russell's paradox. Russell drew the correct conclusion about classes even in the flawed paragraph. And in many places, including elsewhere in *Principles* itself, he correctly explained the complicated reasoning leading to the conclusion. Hopefully, by pointing out and correcting a minor editorial error in the middle of a passage of some significance, this has helped fellow students who have also struggled to understand Russell's paradox.

¹ Russell, Bertrand. *The Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903), p. 102. The second edition has the same pagination.

² The two logicians corresponded for nearly a decade. All but two of their letters are published in: Gabriel, Gottfried, et al, eds., *Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102. Emphasis added.

⁴ Likewise, in his letter to Frege, Russell wrote that "there is no class of those classes which, are *not* members of themselves." See: Gabriel, Gottfried, et al, eds., *Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence* (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980) p. 131. Emphasis added.

⁵ Russell, Bertrand. *The Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903), p. 102.

THE CARL SAGAN MEMORIAL

Warren Allen Smith

An atheist's memorial service held in a cathedral? Yes, Carl Sagan's was held February 27th at New York City's Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine, the one featuring a statue of God (a bearded Caucasian with His arms outstretched) on the front facade. The former dean, James Parke Morton referred to "Carl the great atheist," and Sagan's non-theism was also cited by Harry H. Pritchett, the present dean, and Joan Brown Campbell, the general secretary of the National Council of Churches in the U.S.A.. The cathedral was chosen because of Sagan's record of having successfully worked with church leaders on environmental matters.

MIT physicist Philip Morrison, who is confined to an electric wheelchair, related how at the age of six Sagan had been told that you can always add one to a number, that Carl had tested this by laboriously writing all the numbers from one to 1,000, stopping only because he had to sleep.

Sagan's curiosity never diminished, for he went on to solve the mysteries of the high temperature of Venus (i.e., a massive greenhouse effect), the seasonal changes on Mars (i.e., windblown dust), and the reddish haze of Titan (i.e., complex organic molecules).

Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould, a member with Sagan of the International Academy of Humanism, remarked that unlike the Brooklyn garment worker's son who turned his eyes upward to the skies, he as a boy in Queens had turned his eyes downward to the ground. He added that the two New Yorkers had not known each other until much later. Ending an eloquent summary of how important Sagan had been to the entire scientific community, as well as the world's other peoples, Gould paraphrased Longfellow, saying Sagan had turned the spheres and left no hell below.

Roald Sagdeev, who had been Gorbachev's adviser and Director of the USSR's Space Research Institute, called Sagan a citizen of the world, one who was against the false promises of the Star Wars defense, and said "the Cold War was ended because of Carl Sagan and his friends."

Other speakers included Irwin Rediener, a pediatrician-friend who called attention to Carl's passion, humor, and forgiveness. Neil deGrasse Tyson, Director of New York City's Hayden Planetarium, told of Sagan's consideration when, as a young black college student, he had first gone to Cornell for an interview. Frank H. T. Rhodes, who had been President of Cornell University during much of the time Sagan headed Cornell's Laboratory for Planetary Studies, called Carl "a scientist but a humanist at heart," one who was comfortable with

philosophy.

One of Carl's daughters, Sasha, described how her father had taught logic, critical reasoning, and (to the large audience's amusement) the importance of questioning authority. Carl's son, Jeremy, said that his agnostic father was a warrior for the world, an avid anti-racist, an evolutionist rather than a creationist, and one who disapproved of anyone who masked ignorance by using jargon.

Carl's wife, Ann Druyan, Secretary of the Federation of American Scientists, told of his and her exuberance at having included an interstellar message along with Bach, Beethoven, and other music in two NASA Voyager spacecrafts now beyond the outer solar system. At a speed of 40,000 miles per hour, the objects are traveling in space and have a projected life of a billion years.

Vice-President Al Gore, noted that he the believer and Carl, the non-believer, had no problems whatsoever working together upon the behalf of Earth's environment. The two were instrumental in getting scientific and religious leaders to unite on issues of environmental protection. Carl had shown him we are no longer central to the universe, that therefore we must do something significant if "the blue dot" as seen from space is to flourish. Gore was both folksy and eloquent in relating his warm memories of Sagan.

The most eloquent of all, however, was Carl Sagan himself. A taped excerpt of his "Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space" resounded over the loudspeakers, reverberating throughout the nave, the transepts, the sacristy, the apse.

A LETTER FROM INDIA

Chandrakala Padia, Ph.D.

Dear Professor Rockler:

This makes us extremely happy to inform you that the B.R.S.B.C. held its annual conference on December 28, 1996 with immense zeal and fervour.

A number of celebrated intellectuals, journalist, dignitaries and students attended the meeting and took part in the succeeding question-answer session. The outstanding point which must be mentioned here is that a huge number of people who are not acquainted with Russell evinced a deep enthusiasm to hear the key address delivered by Dr. Arun Shourie, an internationally esteemed journalist

and scholar who has become a paradigm of commitment to human rights and justice.

The message conveyed by the eminent speaker on this occasion reiterated the value of selfless work for the suffering people in society. He stressed the need of fusing such acts of service with an intense sense of love and compassion. The need of the day is to volunteer one's entire capacity to social welfare even if one has to make the effort on a lonely path.

Mr. Shourie referred to the mode of action adopted by B. Russell and Mahatma Gandhi who have been identified as the lonely men of the century because of their effort to translate their revolutionary ideas into action with utmost sincerity.

Speaking on this occasion, the Speaker highlighted this acute hardship of the disabled and handicapped children in our world who needed our sympathy and help. In this context he cited some outstanding instances of the totally committed people serving the cause of spastic children almost single-handedly. The topic of his lecture was: "What a Lone Individual Can Do in India Today" and the speaker did full justice to it by stimulating the whole gathering.

I am sending herewith the bilingual newsletter published by Benaras Chapter along with other members have worked on this newsletter very hard. The cost of each copy is only \$3. I request you all to purchase as many copies as possible. This will help the Society in recovering the cost spent on publishing this newsletter. Since this newsletter is bilingual, it will reach a number of Hindi speaking people in India. Kindly order copies for other members.

I shall miss you all on the occasion of the annual conference. Kindly remember me to all the members present on this occasion. Also thank them for electing me one of the Directors of the Society. Let me give you some happy news! I have now joined as Professor. With love and warm personal regards,

Sincerely Yours,

Chandrakala Padia
Director, Bertrand Russell Society
Benaras Chapter
India

"Tom & Viv" (Miramax, 1995) LOST OPPORTUNITIES HERE: A Video Review Clifford Henke

Tom E.'s wife suffers from hormonal-induced fits of distemper that, in another era, were called "moral insanity." Didn't know about it before he married her. Does it matter? What to do about it now? Especially when she's hobbling his climb up the social ladder?

Such is the ethical dilemma posed in the engaging film "Tom & Viv," a film about the relationship - or, more accurately, non-relationship - between T. S. Eliot and his first wife, Vivienne Haigh-Wood. Unfortunately, the movie insufficiently addresses its interesting, profoundly promising story premise.

After all, the story is set in a time and place where great minds - Russell, the early century's great writers, et al - are asking great questions about great issues: war, liberty, social responsibility, equality. Russell, for instance, is merely a bit character in this drama, little said of his real relationship with Vivienne. Here, he is merely a mentor to Tom and friend, and a one-time landlord to them both.

Everything else, though, is first-rate. Willem Dafoe's portrait of arguably the twentieth century's greatest bard is beautiful; though even his voice uncannily gets the famous man, it is not caricature. Miranda Richardson is extraordinary as Viv (a performance for which she was nominated for an Academy Award), demonstrating the wit, charm, and breeding that must have attracted the real Eliot, as well as the tragic pain over decades coping with her disease. Director Brian Gilbert skillfully guides the drawing-room and pastoral pace between the actors that evokes what England in the first half of the century must have been like. Tim Dutton and Rosemary Harris, as the bride's feckless but genial brother and feckless but opinionated mother (the latter was also nominated for an Academy Award) are also on-target. So is the look, both in cinematography and set design.

A minor problem is Debbie Shelton's music. While the intimate, stately piano and chamber-orchestra pieces within the picture get the feel correctly, the composer misses an opportunity to set the emotional stage at both ends of the presentation, as both sets of credits roll. The swelling, stirring sounds of a fuller orchestra belie what this movie really is: An intimate portrait of tragedy between two people that can occur in a lifetime.

But the real problem with "Tom & Viv" is Michael Hastings' and Adrian Hodges' writing. Start with the title itself: Is this to be a jolly roll with two lovers? Like the contradictory opening overture, is this an ironic moniker of what is to come? Or did the writers or producer just give up on a better one? One will

never know, because the movie was based on Hastings' play of the same title. (Nowhere is it written, except in contracts, that the derivative work *has* to be titled the same.)

Of course this is symptomatic of more fundamental problems. Back to the original questions.

The movie's plot splendidly shifts its sympathies back and forth, pointing at various times throughout the story at the reasons for Tom and Viv's troubles: British turn-of-the-century society for not discussing "female troubles," Viv's parents, Viv, then Tom. But then there are scenes, though laden with tragic power, that let Tom off the hook as well, pointing to imperfect knowledge of medicine at any one time, and the recognition we all know -- that medicine's marvelous march toward successive discovery could have saved so many in the past.

But after what we already know, then what? That is the real lost opportunity here. What of an ethic that simply buries mentally loved ones when we all know that cures might later be found to reverse ugly but necessary past decisions -- especially in the fast-moving field of mental illness? Without giving the ending away, Tom refuses to answer that question for himself. But what of the others? Including Viv, who learns with us that her condition might have been treated sufficiently to free her from commitment to an asylum?

This is the ultimate problem with "Tom & Viv": The script illogically forgets Viv's active zest for life and societal recognition of her own talent and personality. It is simply inconsistent that she could be freed with science, then stand and wave as her visiting brother depart, stoically advising, "Chin up."

Oh, there is an explanation. She went through menopause? Feminists might have a field day with this one.

Boring is one sin this otherwise terrific movie does avoid committing. What keeps it from greatness are the ethical punches it pulls in the end. With so much terrific material at hand, and otherwise exquisitely executed, this lost opportunity is almost unforgivable.

LOGIC AND MR. LIMBAUGH BOOK REVIEW

John E. Shosky, Ph.D.

Ray Perkins, Jr. *Logic and Mr. Limbaugh*. Open Court, 1995. ISBN 0-8126-9294-2.

Critical thinking is one of the most important classes offered by our educational institutions. Yet, since the time of the Roman rhetoricians, it has been repeatedly characterized as a playground for the intellectual "nabobs" who never leave the ivory towers or for the children of rich nobles who have nothing better to do. Some see critical thinking as a survey of the verbal tricks used by politicians and lawyers.

But critical thinking is important for all of us -- one of the most important activities we can learn and practice. It is difficult. But as Russell once said: "Many people would rather die than think. In fact, they do."

Many philosophers have tried to make critical thinking fun, hoping that humor can transmit the immense value of good thinking. Over the years I have tried to find a book that will connect with students: Copi and Cohen, Flew, Damer, Soccio and Barry, Sainsbury, Churchill, Hughes, and many others. This year I tried Perkins, who is an active member of the BRS. I had mixed results.

Perkins found that students of argumentation relate well to the real-life arguments of daily discourse. He has also found that Rush Limbaugh has become an opinion-leader for millions of people, including a large number of college students. Perkins does not doubt Limbaugh's sincerity; but he does question his "logical correctness."

This book teaches the principles of good informal reasoning by using Limbaugh's influential and controversial comments to illustrate the nature and permutations of fallacious reasoning. Perkins begins with a chapter on "Basic Logic," followed by a great chapter on "How to Spot Fallacies." These two chapters are illustrations in applied logic, or rather, illogic. Then, in successive chapters, Perkins groups fallacious arguments used by Limbaugh against environmentalists, multiculturalists, animal rights activists, sex educators, the criminal justice system, the media, and liberals. The examples are usually humorous and the issues topical.

Perkins adds much discussion about each fallacy in action, with comments that are insightful, clever, and provocative. This is a very well-written book, which is rare in the critical thinking field. And, this is one critical thinking book that does not dummy up for students, but makes the material so accessible

that you are mistakenly deceived by its simplicity (which is a fallacy yet to be named -- perhaps the "simpleton's fallacy").

My students were put off by a few things. They didn't like Perkins repeatedly referring to his readers as "dittoheads." Maybe we lacked the necessary sense of humor, but I do think that joke was overdone. Also, the grouping of fallacies by political topic, rather than fallacy type, made the book seem repetitive. I'm not sure that it is repetitive, because Perkins illustrates a wide-range of fallacies. But there is quite a bit of overlap and this gives an appearance of covering much the same ground chapter after chapter. Finally, my students found it to be most valuable when read in conjunction with other books on informal reasoning (in our case Flew's magnificent *Thinking Straight* and Copi and Cohen's famous *Introduction to Logic*).

However, with these difficulties noted, I like the book very much. It made for some memorable and witty classroom discussions. Many of the students took the book home to share with their parents, and after Spring Break I received reports of the parental responses (mostly favorable). When was the last time students and parents talked about critical thinking over hamburgers or spaghetti?

Perkins provides a valuable service with this book: he brings logic to the people, challenging the sloppy thinking of our opinion-leaders, talk show hosts, and public gasbags. Good for Perkins! He makes philosophy, especially critical thinking, a dangerous, necessary, and eternally vigilant enterprise. I recommend *Logic and Mr. Limbaugh* as a good read, an important catalogue of common fallacies, and a public service to again warn us about the bad thinking that often shapes our world. I hope that all members of the BRS will add this work to their logical arsenal.



THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY Membership Profile

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John E. Shosky, Ph.D.
BRS Editor
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

E_MAIL: _____

First book of Russell's I read was _____

Last book of Russell's I read was _____

Favorite Russell Quotation: _____

Reason(s) for Joining BRS: _____

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life: _____

Additional Comments: _____

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
1997 Membership Renewal Form

This is the final notice to renew BRS membership for 1997.

- ☛ If you have already renewed for 1997 or have joined the BRS in 1997, please accept our thanks once again for participating in the BRS.
- ☛ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1997 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- please mail the form below along with the appropriate payment TODAY. Thanks!

Please mail this form and payment to: Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer
1965 Winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1997 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

- Individual \$35
- Student \$20
- Limited Income Couple \$25
- Sustainer \$75 and up
- Patron \$250 and up
- Life Member \$1,000 and up
- PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico
- PLUS \$4 if in Canada or Mexico
- Couple \$40
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- Contributor \$50 and up
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- Organization Membership \$50

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TREASURER'S REPORT
Dennis Darland

JANUARY 1, 1996 - DECEMBER 31, 1996 submitted March 17, 1997
BRS -- Bank, Cash, CC Accounts

BALANCE DECEMBER 31, 1995 \$ 1,430.95

INFLOWS:

| | | |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Contributions--BRS | \$ 462.00 | |
| Total Contributions | | 462.00 |
| Dues | | |
| New Members | 1,113.67 | |
| Renewals | 6,317.00 | |
| Total Dues | | 7,430.67 |
| Int. Inc. | | 5.96 |
| Library Inc. | | 142.20 |
| Meeting Inc. | | 75.00 |
| From Don Jackanicz | | <u>2,403.50</u> |
| Total Inflows | | \$10,519.33 |

OUTFLOWS:

| | | |
|------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| BRS Award | 730.00 | |
| Library Exp. | 67.89 | |
| Newsletter | 4,850.00 | |
| Other Exp. | 416.09 | |
| Russell Sub. | 4,887.50 | |
| Uncategorized Outflows | <u>25.00</u> | |
| Total Outflows | | \$10,976.48 |

OVERALL TOTAL: (\$ 457.15)

BALANCE DECEMBER 31, 1996 \$ 973.80


Notes: Liability to Don Jackanicz is \$2,403.50.

The Bertrand Russell Society

August 1997

Quarterly

No. 95



*Bertrand Russell Society
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The Bertrand Russell Society

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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John E. Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307

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The Bertrand Russell Society Annual Book Award

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

August 1997

No. 95

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FROM THE EDITOR
John E. Shosky
American University

This is my second issue as editor. Thanks to all those members who have helped make this issue possible. I especially welcome our those members who have just joined the Bertrand Russell Society.

Inside you will find a report about the last annual meeting by BRS President John Lenz.

There is a fascinating essay by Robert Barnard about Russell's relevance in a fast-growing field of philosophical interest: the issue of vagueness.

In addition, there is a report about Russell's influence on philosophy in Oxford from 1950 to the present, based on an interview with Rom Harre, Emeritus Fellow of Linacre College, Oxford, and former University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Science in Oxford.

Peter Stone presents his thoughts on "Intellectual Giants".

And, as always, a book review and a video review. This time we have a review of Volume 11 in the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. Cliff Henke has examined the video "Carrington". In the next issue he will look back several years to "Reds".

In this issue we have some new features. First, you will find "Russell News", which will present short notes about recently published books, upcoming publications, interesting journal articles, television programs, or other pieces of interesting Russell trivia. This is an attempt to capture some of the information that used to be a central part of the old newsletter, but slipped through the cracks in the quarterly format.

Second, there is a new section about membership profiles. Several BRS members have asked for information about others in the Society. In each upcoming issue we will include three or four profiles to indicate the scope and breadth of members and their interest in Russell. A blank membership profile is included. If you haven't filled one out, please take the time to give us some information.

I hope you enjoy this issue. Again, I commend the cover drawing by Bulgarian Iva Petkova. I have received numerous favorable comments about the drawing. In fact, I liked it so much that a framed copy now hangs in my office. I have asked Iva for a new drawing for next year's four issues. Remember, we are going to have the same drawing for one year's set of issues, distinguishing the individual four issues within the year by different colored paper on the

cover.

I must thank Kathryn Jo Ottman for her invaluable assistance in preparing the Quarterly for publication. She formatted the copy pages and provided much-needed advice. Thank you, Kathryn.

Catharine Kendig and Robert Barnard continue as assistant editors. I hope you enjoy the *Quarterly*.

**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY:
Conference Report
John Lenz, President**

The Bertrand Russell Society held its annual meeting on May 30-June 1 at the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, NY (outside Buffalo). This year we participated in a joint meeting of ourselves, the Humanist Association of Canada, and the Campus Freethought Alliance. The CFA represents student-groups at colleges and universities around the U.S. and Canada. It was wonderful to see such vitality among young people at this event entitled "Humanism: The Next Generation."

Several Russell-L subscribers were in attendance, among other BRS members. Here is a brief report of Russell-related events.

At the opening plenary session, the BRS President (myself) made short remarks about two messages "the good Lord" would send to us today (if spirits had e-mail): skepticism and hope. (By the way, I found a little known line of Russell's published for the first time in the "Bibliography" by Blackwell and Ruja: "... let us hope, for as yet there is no tax on hope.")

It was pleasing to see that two other speakers paid homage to Russell in the opening session. Derek Araujo, a student at Harvard, CFA President, and (we're proud to say) a BRS member, said Russell was a major influence on him. Jeff Lowder, President of Internet Infidels which maintains the Secular Web (this is fantastic! <http://www.infidels.org>), said that he was introduced to free thought in high school through reading "Why I Am Not a Christian" and "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish." He actually gave pride of place to BR among the people he thanked at the beginning of his talk! (It was fascinating to hear about and to see the uses to which e-mail and the WWW are being out--whether or not "Principia Mathematica," a book which almost no one has read, had anything to do with computers!)

Friday, a luncheon was held at the home of Prometheus Books (like the

Center for Inquiry, founded by Paul Kurtz). All walked away with books they purchased. By the way, in connection with the activities of this formidable group in Buffalo, it was noted that the first line of the new blockbuster film, "The Lost World" (the sequel to Jurassic Park; but I would be pained if this mention caused anyone to go to see the film) mentions their periodical, "Skeptical Inquirer."

At the afternoon session Tim Madigan of *Free Inquiry* magazine and the BRS hosted the BRS session.

Thomas Magnell (chair of Philosophy at Drew University -- my colleague here in Madison, New Jersey) spoke on "Present Concerns and Future Interests." Tom has published on this topic in various ethics journals (he edits the *Journal of Value Inquiry*) but we asked him to explain it to us in view of the theme of the conference. He distinguished between the "politically enfranchised" and the "politically unenfranchised" futures and argued that ignoring the interests of the latter (say, for the sake of argument and example only, the future after 100 years from now) entails a new form of bigotry, "temporal bigotry."

Michael Rockler (BRS Chairman and Professor at National-Louis University in Washington, D.C.) and John Novak (of Brock University and editor of the John Dewey Society newsletter) staged another in their series of "Russell vs. Dewey" debates. This one the 6th or so, addressed "Dewey vs. Russell on Democracy." Their wide-ranging critiques embraced much more than democracy. There was no clear-cult winner.

On Saturday, the morning plenary session heard outstanding reports from student organizers and activists, notably Adam Butler from Alabama who is rallying troops against the "10 commandments" judge (and the governor). We were moved by (among others) Ibn Warraq on "Why I Am Not a Muslim"--this is also the Russell-inspired title of his book from Prometheus. He told me that BR is a pervasive influence in that work and that he intends to join the BRS.

At lunch we were treated to another delightful and well-informed performance by the good Lord himself, personified by Trevor Banks of the Humanist Association of Canada. Trevor comes to look more like BR all the time.

The afternoon session included four papers: James Alouf (Sweet Briar College) spoke on "Russell and the Teaching of History." He had new things to say even after old timers noted that this was the third BRS talk on this popular topic in the past 16 or 17 years.

John Shosky (American University) addressed "Bertrand Russell on Power," particularly discussing the contemporary relevance of his thinking about organizations. He acknowledged work on the book *Power* presented to the BRS in previous years by Peter Stone.

Catherine Kendig, a graduate student at American University, read Victoria Patton's paper on "Russell's Theory of Judgment." This paper won the

1997 BRS student paper prize, but Victoria could not attend from University of Western Australia. She is a student of Stewart Candish. We will publish this paper in the *BRS Quarterly* (under the new editorship of John Shosky).

Peter Stone (Univ. of Rochester) gave a stimulating talk on "Russell's Political Thought: What's Ethics Got to Do with It?" He examined the unified theory of ethics and politics that Russell offered in one of his last works of political theory, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*. This theory is grounded in a theory of good very similar to utilitarianism. The primary difference is that Russell replaces "utility" with "desire satisfaction." Peter then examined both the coherence and the relevance of the theory of the good. While the conclusions he offers are rather preliminary, he believes that a coherent version of the theory runs the risk of irrelevancy. In other words, a coherent version of the theory might not be capable of providing guidance to a person as to how to act which any person (including Russell himself) might have reason to follow.

An annual highlight was the Red Hackle Hour preceding the banquet on Saturday night. Chairman Michael Rockier made some appropriate Russellian remarks in a brief after-dinner address.

On Sunday, the BRS conducted meetings of its Board and of the Society at which, among other things, it was resolved to plan a meeting for Tampa or St. Petersburg, Florida at the end of May 1998. That will be our 25th annual meeting. Jan Eisler will host this meeting.

The last official BRS presence at this joint gathering was when John Lenz was flattered to introduce Paul Kurtz for his valedictory address on "The Future of Humanism." Paul Kurtz (who is bouncing back from triple-bypass surgery) is a past recipient of the annual BRS Award for work in Russell's spirit.

It was a great pleasure as always to come together to express our shared values and interests. This event was largely organized by the indefatigable Tim Madigan of *Free Inquiry* magazine, whom we thank again along with the entire staff of the Center for Inquiry!

By the way, I should repeat that the BRS offers a half-price initial membership to anyone who attended this conference.

P.S. On a personal note, the presence of the CFA was a special delight to me. I was a founding faculty co-sponsor of the Agnostic and Atheist Student Group at Texas A&M University (where it was and still is sorely needed) and (anecdotes omitted) this group spawned the Internet Infidels now extremely ably run (elsewhere) by Jeff Lowder. (I knew my presence there was in line with some higher purpose . . .) Check out their mega-resource, the Secular web, at: <http://www.infidels.org>.

RUSSELL NEWS: Publications, etc.

➡ An article on Bertrand Russell ("Poor Bertie") appeared in *Radical Philosophy*, 81 (Jan./Feb. 1997). The article is inspired by the recent biography by Monk and Ironside's analysis of Russell's social thought.

➡ Indiana University has just published a book on Pierce: *Studies in the Logic of Charles Sanders Pierce*. It is edited by Nathan Houser, Don D. Roberts and James van Evra.

➡ Oxford University Press has just reissued Russell's *Religion and Science* with a new introduction by Michael Ruse.

➡ University of Chicago Press has published a book by William R. Everdell, *The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-Century Thought*. Among the moderns covered: Georg Cantor, Richard Dedekind, and Gottlob Frege. Chapter 12 is "Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology, Number, and the Fall of Logic, 1901."

➡ Carl Rollyson's *Rebecca West: A Life*, published by Scribner in 1996, contains a major letter from Russell to West about his attitude on H.G. Wells.

➡ American University Press in Beirut has published an introduction to Russell's thought by Ibrahim Najjar. Translated, the title is *Bertrand Russell: His Thought and Place in Contemporary Philosophy*. Najjar was awarded his M.A. in Russell Studies at McMaster.

➡ Routledge has reissued Russell's *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916), with a new introduction by Richard A. Rempel.

➡ Four upcoming titles concerning Russell are: Ivor Grattan-Guinness' *The Search for Mathematical Roots, 1870-1930*, Princeton University Press, 1998?; Charles Pigden's (ed) *Russell on Ethics*, Routledge, 1998?; Nick Griffin's (ed) *Companion to Russell*, Cambridge University Press, 1998?; and Louis Greenspan and Stefan Andersson's (eds) *Russell on Religion*, Routledge, 1998?

➡ The BBC recently ran a two-part biography on Bertrand Russell as part of their "Reputations" television series. The series is a popular collection of historical biographies.

➡ A recent trip to Warfield's secondhand book store in Oxford uncovered a chestnut: the April 1970 issue of *Mind* (Volume LXXIX, No. 314), the philosophical quarterly then edited by Gilbert Ryle. There is a frontpiece photograph commemorating the life of Bertrand Russell. The photo is by Allan Chappelow, taken in Russell's study at his home in North Wales.

RUSSELL ON VAGUENESS

Robert Barnard
University of Memphis

In recent years philosophers in the analytic tradition have been returning to an old and recurring problem: the *Sorites* paradox (from the Greek term for 'heap'). Today this paradox and related issues are considered under the general term 'vagueness'. The problem is basically this: If a pile of sand with 10,000 grains is a heap, and a pile of sand with only 1 grain is not a heap, then it stands to reason that there is a point between these extremes where by removing 1 grain of sand at a time from the former pile, the removal of 1 specific grain of sand will make the difference between the pile being a heap or not being a heap. However, there is no such point; there seems to be nothing about our concept of heap that tells us what that point of transition is. The attempt to proceed from the definite heap to the definite non-heap by means of small changes seems to erase the difference between the heap and the non-heap. Hence the paradox -- we lack a firm basis for asserting that a pile with 5,000 grains is a heap as opposed to a non-heap, and again have no reason not to assert both heap-ness and non-heap-ness of this pile, inviting contradiction. It is a curious problem, but upon further reflection we recognize that it is a common affliction: there are a large number of words which share this kind of indeterminacy.

In his 1923 paper *Vagueness*¹, Russell made one of the first attempts to resolve this problem in a manner informed by the then recent advances in formal logic. Accordingly, Russell's paper is often cited as a *locus classicus* in contemporary discussions of vagueness. Thus it seems apt that we should take the time to reexamine Russell's approach as a way of grounding our further speculation upon the issue. Therefore, I will both present and pose a problem for Russell's account of the nature of vagueness as a way of testing its theoretical mettle.

Russell argues that vagueness paradoxes form a species of philosophical puzzle which falls under the larger genus of problems associated with our use of symbolism. While the use of complex symbolism is unavoidable in abstract and philosophical reasoning, problems arise in those cases where features of these symbolic signs are attributed incorrectly and unconsciously to the things symbolized and signified. In the case of vagueness, when we expect ordinary language to exhibit the determinacy of quantified predicate logic. Casting the

problem as one of conceptual clarification, Russell notes: "I do not think that the study of principles of symbolism will yield any *positive* results in metaphysics, but I do think it will yield a great many negative results by enabling us to avoid fallacious inferences from symbols to things." Vagueness, for Russell, is an illustrative case study in the larger problematic of correct and incorrect symbolization.

Illustrative or not, vagueness is a problem. Russell argues that vagueness like precision is a feature of our representations. In ordinary practice, we represent objects and the world using symbolism which is inadequate to a logically rigorous carving up of the world, but which usually allows us to get by. Knowledge too can be vague, but again this vagueness is a feature of the way our knowledge is represented in the mind, and not a feature of what is known. This suggests that objects of knowledge must be determinate for Russell.

Russell also points out the distinguishing feature of vagueness: the presence of borderline cases. He illustrates this notion in terms of color recognition. The color red, for instance, falls within a continuum between what is certainly purple and what is certainly orange. Red appears when we remove blue gradually from purple, and disappears as we gradually add yellow to red. Borderline cases are those where a shade is not definitely red, and not definitely non-red. We experience this sense of doubt about whether to apply the term 'red', "not because we are ignorant of the meaning of the word 'red', but because it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially doubtful." Vagueness and borderline cases, therefore, occur when symbolism is imprecise. But this has the strange consequence of there being colors which are neither definitely red nor definitely not-red.

Our philosophically informed conception of how words work, following Frege, holds that the meaning of terms is tied, in at least some sense, to their intension and extension. What Russell is pointing to here, is that in the case of vague words and concepts, e.g. 'heap', 'bald', 'tall', 'red', and a million more, the intension underdetermines the extension of the word or concept, the extension of vague terms is not clear. And this has an important logical consequence: "The law of the excluded middle is true when precise symbols are employed, but it is not true when symbols are vague, as, in fact, all symbols are." Here Russell marks an important distinction between natural languages and the formal systems we employ in our attempts to order natural language. This brings Russell's thesis that the nature of vagueness is rooted in the nature of symbolism into sharp focus.

Consider the paradox of Elvis Vaguely, a hypothetical singer, who started his career a thin man, but gaining a pound at a time eventually became not-thin. Naturally we suppose that there was some point where he became heavy, and that this point corresponds to having gained of some specific amount of weight. But,

if we proceed by interrogating our representations of Elvis as each pound is gained, we find that our attempts at classification fail in borderline cases; there is no one point which we can confidently point to as THE transition point between the THIN Elvis and the NOT-THIN Elvis. Should we therefore say that there is no difference between the two Elvi? Assuredly not, surrender to paradox was never an option for Russell. Russell's usual approach to paradox, as in *Principia Mathematica* for example, would seem to require that we attempt to discern the logical form of the paradox. But this paradox is strange in that, if Russell is right, paradox is what results from the unconscious attempt to logically discipline our ordinary talk!

Let $H(10,000)$ designate a heap with 10,000 grains of sand. We also observe that piles with 9,999 or 9,998 or 9,997 grains are also heaps. The natural language term 'heap' has borderline cases, the logic of our predicate H therefore needs to include the principle that if $H(n)$ then $H(n-1)$. Starting with $H(10,000)$, 9,999 applications of this principles conclusion we get: if $H(1)$ then $H(0)$ (a pile with no sand is still a heap), and by seemingly unimpeachable reasoning! This is a classic formal paradox, where true premises and valid reasoning lead to false conclusions. But if Russell is right, the mistake is in the attempt to logically discipline the term 'heap', or any other vague term, and the solution is to leave the informal paradox alone. Logical thinking insists upon precise symbolism, ordinary language does not, and need not. Russell therefore is telling us, more or less, to *mind our p's and q's* (a familiar theme, though in this case we should try not to confuse our peas and queues with our p's and q's).

Let me now indicate the kind of vagueness which would be problematic for Russell's account. In more contemporary discussions of vagueness there is also a consideration of so-called vague objects. Paradigm cases of vague objects include clouds (where precisely is the edge of a cloud?) and mountains (where precisely is the base of a mountain?), though we might add things like metropolitan areas, or even tables (if we take modern accounts of wayward electrons seriously). Russell's view seems to be that objects cannot be vague, therefore if our language were a precise there would be no problem of vagueness. It would be an analytic truth, e.g. that 'Heap' means 'more than 765 grains', and that 'if $H(766)$ then $H(765)$ ' would be an obvious contradiction, indicating the rejection of borderline cases. Russell seems to agree with this when he writes that precise symbolism is, "not applicable to this terrestrial life, but only to an imagined celestial existence. Where, however, this celestial existence would differ from ours, so far as logic is concerned, would not be in the nature of what is known, but only in the accuracy of our knowledge," that is, in the precision of our representations. But in what sense would a precise representation of an "ideal cloud" be precise? Precision might follow from stipulation, but to represent a

vague object in a precise way would itself be to draw an inaccurate picture, suggesting (paradoxically) that precise representation may in some cases *require* vague symbolism. This suggests that an imprecise symbolism is capable of precise representation, which would be the denial of Russell's thesis. Further, any stipulation would beg the question of which limit to stipulate and how to justify one stipulated limit in contradistinction to other equally plausible alternatives.

But this is the nature of a true philosophical problem, its ability to resist solutions. While Russell's solution may not be the final word on vagueness, Russell's article is noteworthy for many reasons, not the least of which are the provocative claims he makes distancing logic and ordinary language and limiting the scope of the law of the excluded middle. From the standpoint those hunting for philosophical problems, vagueness is a worthy quarry--for just when it seems you have caught it in a logical net, it escapes to become a different but related problem in epistemology or ontology. In a way, philosophy would be poorer if the problems of vagueness were resolved, or to paraphrase Elvis Vaguely: "*Viva Las Vagueness!*"

1. Bertrand Russell, "Vagueness," *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, 1 (June 1923), pp. 84-92; reprinted in *Collected Papers*, vol. 9, pp. 147-154.

CONVERSATION WITH ROM HARRE

John E. Shosky
American University

In April 1997, I asked Rom Harre, Emeritus Fellow of Linacre College, Oxford, and former University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Science, to reflect upon Russell's influence at Oxford from 1950-1997. Harre is now a professor of psychology at Georgetown University, where he still lectures on Wittgenstein. Our conversation builds upon an earlier discussion with Antony Flew, who outlined Russell's influence in the 1940s. My goal is to capture the personal impressions of Russell and his influence upon some of the later generations of philosophers in Oxford and elsewhere.

While Flew found Russell was admired and often assigned reading, Harre

found the situation much different upon his own arrival at Oxford. Harre explained that "The intellectual climate at Oxford was chilly toward Russell. He was widely read but not widely admired. The orthodoxy was that, like Descartes, Russell was someone who made flagrant errors, the kind of errors that were interesting to undergraduates. So, *The Problems of Philosophy* was assigned to most philosophy students, but essentially so they could understand its weaknesses. It was used as a stalking horse."

One influential voice against Russell was Peter Strawson, who was Harre's tutor. Strawson shared Wittgenstein's view that Russell was not a great logician, in part because Russell did not understand the nature of logical truth. In addition, Strawson had engaged Russell's theory of descriptions in the now famous "On Referring", drawing Russell's vigorous, sometimes vindictive reply. Strawson's *An Introduction to Logical Theory* was directed against the kind of logic practiced by Russell, especially the discussions on logical truth, logical connectives and induction. As well, Strawson was at the forefront of the movement toward philosophical logic, which was often at odds with Russell's development of formal logic in *Principia Mathematica* and elsewhere.

Another voice that challenged Russell was J.L. Austin, who was also Harre's Supervisor. Austin thought that the entire sense-data view was "crazy -- not just wrong, but wrong headed in a serious way." At that time *Our Knowledge of the External World* was much read, and Harre also read *The Analysis of Mind* and *The Analysis of Matter* "on the quiet." Russell was a silent foil in Austin's seminars, in much the same way that Russell is the foil of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Of course, Austin's major target was A.J. Ayer, who "reproduced Russell's philosophical views." In 1953, Harre remembers Austin walking into a room of philosophy students, holding at arms length and with obvious displeasure Ayer's *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. Austin told them "I'm not going to argue with Professor Ayer, I'm going to shred him." And it was a "massacre." Austin was at the height of his powers, and the sense-data view was decimated in his seminars. For Harre, the atmosphere in Austin's lectures was electric, challenging fundamental, cardinal assumptions of philosophy. Harre and other students of Austin felt that they were hearing something historic and vital to the successful practice of philosophy.

Strawson and Austin represented a dominant strand in logic at Oxford, those who developed the discipline of philosophical logic. The subdominant strand was represented by William Kneale and Hao Wang. Most of the philosophers found themselves sharing some of the views of both strands. Kneale gave lectures, attended by Harre, that were later published as *The Development of Logic*, perhaps the best history of logic to date. In Kneale's classes, Russell's use of quantifiers, the theory of descriptions, the nature of

numbers, set paradoxes, and the theory of types were much discussed. Another supporter of Russell's was Hao Wang, who was considered a logical superstar. Wang spent a great amount of time examining and criticizing Russell's theory of types. For him, Russell "stood larger" than with other lecturers in Oxford. Wang used Russell extensively in his presentations. Wang offered extremely detailed lectures, writing countless equations on the blackboard while his students drank tea and tried to decipher the equations. Kneale and Wang were joined by Arthur Prior, who came to Oxford in the mid-1950s. His students worked through the first part of *Principia Mathematica*. Other logicians studied included Jan Lukasiewicz, Willard Quine, and Gerhard Gentzen. Prior gave the first systematic lectures in logic on modal logic.

During Harre's four decades at Oxford, the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein has become enormous. At that time, the *Tractatus* was often read as if it was in the Russellian tradition. Harre remembers that the *Tractatus* occupied a place right next to Russell's *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* on his bookshelf. All of that began to slowly change in the 1950s. Gilbert Ryle gave a seminar on the *Tractatus* every Thursday night (Harre still has the notes from these lectures, and he should publish them. Of interest, Ryle's book are now part of the Linacre College Library and his copies of the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* are much annotated). Ryle knew Wittgenstein rather well. He did not give a traditional Russellian reading of the *Tractatus* -- quite the opposite. Ryle's reading was, in large measure, an attempt to show how Wittgenstein differed from Russell. The now-standard reading of Wittgenstein, which shows the anti-Russellian tenor of the *Tractatus*, has become the "canon", thanks to the work at Oxford of David Pears, Peter Hacker, George Baker, and Harre.

However, *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* and *An Exposition on Leibniz* two books that were held in high admiration. In fact, lectures were given by Baker in Oxford during the last academic year on *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. Ryle gave lectures on this book in the 1950s, and it has held in higher regard than Russell's other logical works. This was the book that "pinned together" those who took Russell seriously as a logician (the subdominant strand) and those who did not (the dominant strand). The Leibniz book has been in constant use in Oxford. Harre has found it to be "absolutely superb."

Harre also got to know Russell personally as a neighbor in Wales. Harre was friendly with Rupert Crawshay-Williams (author of *Russell Remembered*) and others in the Russellian Welsh circle. Harre found Russell's last years to be very sad. Russell would come to lunches hosted by Crawshay-Williams and was willing to talk about philosophy, but he would mostly reflect on political issues, personalities, and his family. At that time he was under the influence of Ralph

Schoenman, who Harre believed had captured Russell and wanted him "to be pure", in the same way Wittgenstein wanted Russell to be pure. Schoenman most disapproved of Russell's reading materials, which included detective novels. Crawshaw-Williams would sneak up to Russell's house each morning and hide some detective thrillers behind the milk bottles. Russell would come out before Schoenman was awake and secure the novels. It was strange to see a Nobel prize winner hiding his reading from his secretary.

For Harre, Russell's legacy will be limited. His political and moral philosophy is already seriously dated. His work in logic, especially his work on set theoretical paradoxes and the theory of descriptions, will be studied for a long time to come. Harre predicted that "no matter where you start, the truth or falsity of self-referential propositions will be on the agenda." The theory of descriptions simply "has to be studied." In terms of Russell's general philosophy, Harre believes that Russell's influence will quickly wain. In terms of sense-data, Harre thinks H.H. Price and Ayer will be more widely read than Russell. Logical atomism will "not be taken seriously by the profession, giving way to the *Tractatus*."

In the future, Russell will probably be most remembered for his long life, his eccentricities, his collaboration with Whitehead and Wittgenstein, and, perhaps most importantly, his philosophical style. Russell brought enthusiasm and energy to philosophy, his relentless search for the truth. Harre predicts Russell will probably have several biographers in the future, because he knew important people (the Bloomsbury group, T.S. Eliot, and others) and was in the center of many of the historical movements of our century.

Russell has also been an inspirational figure for many people, becoming a beacon of rationality and hope. Russell inspired many philosophers, including Quine and Ayer. But he also inspired many non-philosophers to become more thoughtful and compassionate. While Harre believes that Russell's place in philosophy and logic may become minor in the years to come, his place in culture will probably remain a major contribution to future generations.

INTELLECTUAL GIANTS

Peter Stone

University of Rochester

In a recent issue of the *Quarterly* (February 1997), former Editor Michael Rockler asked readers to consider "who today can we consider as intellectual giants on the same level" as Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein -- two of the brightest lights of the early twentieth century. I would like to respond to Michael's query by pointing to two outstanding individuals whom I believe deserve to be ranked with Russell and Einstein. These two men--Noam Chomsky and Jurgen Habermas--both share Russell's passionate commitment to politics as well as his scientific curiosity and analytical rigor.

That I would suggest Noam Chomsky should come as no surprise to anyone who knows me. Chomsky has spent decades trying to explain the fundamental rules employed by the mind when a person learns a language. His claim that there are such rules --and his attempts to formulate them in such works as *Syntactic Structures* and *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* --have revolutionized the field of linguistics, transforming it from a more or less anthropological exercise in cataloging individual languages into a scientific field which promises to explain the nature of one of humanity's fundamental abilities (See *Introducing Chomsky* (Totem Books) for a good introduction to Chomsky's approach to this important field of study).

At the same time Chomsky has reconstructed the way people study language, he has contributed extensively to debates over U.S. foreign and domestic policy, earning himself praise from millions and scorn and abuse from individuals in power. Like Russell, he has produced many books on politics, including *American Power and the New Mandarins*, *On Power and Ideology*, *Deterring Democracy*, *Year 501*, and most recently *Power and Prospects*. Unlike Russell, Chomsky meticulously documents all of his conclusions, providing a treasury of resources upon which others can draw. Indeed, one reviewer took him to task for his "turgid" writing style because of his extensive documentation. That a social critic could be taken to task for backing up his arguments with facts is a sign of how low our current intellectual standards are, and how far Chomsky rises above these standards (See Milan Rai's book *Chomsky's Politics* (Verso) for a recent discussion of Chomsky's work as a social critic).

Many scholars and activists have attempted to draw links between Chomsky's linguistics and his politics. Chomsky himself is unsure how tight the

links are. But with Jurgen Habermas, social criticism and academic study are never too far apart. For years Habermas has been attempting to reconstruct the project of historical materialism. Whatever historical materialism's failings, it offers an explanation of social events with an eye to influencing those events. Inexplicably, few social theorists do this. They ignore the profound epistemological revolutions of the past century. Once one neglects a naive correspondence theory of truth, then the only realistic alternative is to judge the adequacies of social theories by their usefulness at fulfilling human purposes (See Eugene Meehan's excellent *Social Inquiry: Needs, Possibilities, Limits* (Chatham House) on this point). Otherwise, one constructs theories willy-nilly, and debate can get rather ethereal (an accurate description of more than one debate in political theory today).

Habermas' reconstruction of historical materialism shares many features with Chomsky's reconstruction of linguistics. Whereas Chomsky seeks the underlying rules that all competent language-users employ in forming grammatical sentences, Habermas investigates the conditions all language-users must meet if they are to employ language to reach understanding with others. In such works as *Communication and the Evolution of Society* and *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas has applied his theories about communication to the study of history, seeking to show what is happening to the public's ability to use reason in its affairs and how this ability might be rescued and expanded in the face of the threats posed to it by markets and bureaucracies. Here Habermas' project links up with Dewey's; his earliest extended work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, resembles in many ways Dewey's classic work of democratic theory, *The Public and its Problems*.

And Habermas has not remained in the ivory tower while conducting his immense task of theoretical reconstruction. He has engaged himself in some of the more important political debates within Germany today—debates in which the German New Right attempt to reconstruct history to the benefit of the Third Reich. In attempting to keep alive the horror which generations have felt towards the Nazis since WW II, Habermas' polemics make possible the maintenance and improvement of a democratic order in Germany.

Chomsky and Habermas both come from a long tradition of intellectuals, a tradition that included both Russell and Einstein. For them, whom intense academic study never precluded efforts to understand and change the world. Would that more intellectuals could combine their formidable academic work with social commitments. I hope that the next century witnesses the continuing vibrancy of this tradition.

“Carrington” (1995) UNENVIABLE LOVE SPLENDIDLY PORTRAYED: A Video Review Clifford Henke

I must confess a distaste for the point of view espoused by the protagonists in this film, but the film overpowers this natural urge to retreat with clever, often hilarious dialogue, wonderful performances and lush production values. On balance, I recommend “Carrington,” especially on video. More about that point later.

“Carrington” is not really in the conventional sense of plot and theme about Dora Carrington, the Bloomsbury-era artist. It is rather about the life of Lytton Strachey, the social satirist and trendsetter in England's post-Victorian era. Christopher Hampton's script (who also directed) is based on Michael Holroyd's biography of Strachey, and both derive much of their sparkling dialogue from Strachey's more personal writings. More to the point, however, is Jonathan Pryce's riveting portrayal of the celebrated man. In the best tradition of biographical acting, he gets Lytton's essence without caricature. Pryce demonstrates an enormous range in this demanding role, and why he has not found a mass audience beyond “Miss Saigon” and his luxury-car commercials in America is beyond me.

Pryce/Strachey is also the centerpiece of a detailed ensemble of supporting characters and the actors who breathe life into them, location, sets, and decor, all splendidly pulled together by director Hampton. He and production designer Caroline Amies even use Carrington's paintings in various stages of completion, some of which are real, some of which are doctored by Jane Gifford to match Pryce instead of the real Lytton. Denis Lenoir's photography and Michael Nyman's musical score are both up to this level of detail in enhancing the mood and illuminating these times. George Akers' editing drags a bit, but its pace is probably more due to the stately feel Hampton seems to have intended.

Regarding the ensemble, Virginia Woolf, Bertrand Russell and other luminaries of the time are even more obliquely referenced than in “Tom & Viv.” Yet their spirits, what the whole scene stood for, lives throughout this story.

Certainly first among the ensemble pieces is Emma Thompson's Dora Carrington. Thompson has always played a good wallflower, and she convincingly finds title role's motivation to be led around by the rather weird charisma of Pryce's Lytton here, as well. The best actors portray their subjects' inner conflicts without unintended inconsistency, and this feat towers

in realizing such complex characters as these.

Yet the complexities are what makes this movie both repugnant as well as interesting and, ultimately, rewarding. Hampton cleverly lays out all of the Bloomsbury enticements of free love (read sex), (well almost all: While quite certain in revealing Lytton's homosexuality, he is uncharacteristically squeamish in refraining from Carrington's encounters with other women, documented by Holroyd and others.) He traps you in their world: how fun it must have all been. And how possible this point of view seems at first. Yet without overtly changing sympathies, Hampton shifts ground. Carrington's and Lytton's lives and life together become hollow and lonely and eventually unsatisfactory.

This treatment becomes even more effective on video, for it is a different medium from film in one important respect that is especially pointed up by this movie. Both media are works in time, but with video, as with novels, the viewer can actively manage the time in which this story unfolds. There were times because of various distractions in my life but also out of momentary loss of interest when I simply shut off the machine. I then picked up the story often days later when the mood to watch struck again. With movies that have such measured pace and deep character transformation as these, such an active and leisurely departure from conventional viewing allows audiences to absorb more organically the characters' feelings and points of view -- allowing, in short, time to *think*. This just is not as possible for audiences in theaters for whom watching a movie is a passive, more controlled experience.

Finally, on his deathbed Lytton confesses in a demented outburst that despite his protests throughout he could only love Carrington. This revelation, and its exposure of the fraud that has transpired for the 20-odd years in life compressed into nearly two hours on screen before it, is enough to finish both her and Hampton's sympathies with the free-love point of view.

And from this viewer's vantage point, it is true love appropriately vindicated.

Last Philosophical Testament 1943-68: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL VOLUME 11 BOOK REVIEW

John E. Shosky

Bertrand Russell. *Last Philosophical Testament 1943-68: The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell Volume 11*. Edited by John G. Slater, with the assistance of Peter Kollner. London: Routledge, 1997. ISBN 0-415-09409-7. 878 pages. Approximately US \$185, Canadian \$259.

In later life, Russell was viewed by many critics as an historical relic, rather than as a contributing, active philosopher. He often complained that his later philosophical work was unjustifiably ignored. At a time when logical positivism, and then linguistic philosophy, dominated Angle-American thought, Russell was unfashionable. But this volume demonstrates that he was far from finished.

Last Philosophical Testament is a companion piece to Volume 10 of the *Collected Papers*, which covers the years 1927-42, also prepared by Slater and Kollner. Both works are part of the projected 30 volume edition of Russell's collected articles and other shorter written pieces, published and unpublished. About half of these volumes have been finished or are underway, with some volumes already available: Volumes 1-4 and 6-9 (Russell's philosophical writings through 1926), 12-14 (political writings from 1902 through 1918), and a three volume bibliography prepared by Ken Blackwell, Harry Ruja, and Sheila Turcon.

So far, 13 volumes have been finished and are available for purchase, with three more in progress, and the rest planned with completion dates by the end of 2007.

Volume 11 is sub-divided into eleven major parts. Part I concerns "Autobiographical and Self-Critical Writings." Here the editors include Russell's contributions to the *Library of Living Philosophers* volume on his work, as well as several essays about Russell's interest in philosophy. Some of these essays have been unpublished or very hard to get. One of them is quite good: "My Own Philosophy" of 1946, which contains a clear methodological statement of the power and promise of analytical philosophy.

Part II is a collection of Russell's writings on "Non-Demonstrative Inference." Many philosophers have found Russell's work on inference to be scandalous and bizarre. But Russell's views are more cogent than often painted by critics, especially when explained in a 1948 essay, "The Nature and Origin of Scientific Method." Russell the philosopher understood the importance of rational

inquiry and the need to leave philosophical propositions open for future examination. No scientific proposition was to be regarded as universally true. Russell the logician well-knew the limits of logic, and the need for rational, defensible starting points for any logical system. Deductive reasoning is attractive, but limited by the power and scope of the chosen beginning axioms. In this essay, Russell speaks with a clear, contemporary voice about philosophy's constant war against complete skepticism, and the difficulty of philosophical progress. Yet, piecemeal progress is possible, even if it is tentative, limited, and subject to future change.

Part III features Russell's comments on "Younger Philosophical Contemporaries," such as A.J. Ayer and Ludwig Wittgenstein. All but one of the essays in this section concern Ayer, whom in many ways was Russell's empiricist and ideological successor. Russell's now famous review of Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* is here, and bears re-reading. Russell was not a logical positivist, but he was the movement's Godfather. He had an obvious sympathy. But his delight was tempered by his understanding of the flaws in the verification principle, Ayer's reliance on phenomenalism, and the movement's heavy-handed rejection of metaphysics. Russell's analysis of logical positivism is a most cogent response, providing insight into both Russell and Ayer. A brief tribute to Wittgenstein, published in *Mind* in 1951, is included.

Part IV collects several papers on Russell's "Older Contemporaries." The essays include comments on Peirce, McTaggart, Santayana, Moore, and Nicod. But the three papers on Whitehead are a real treat, showing Russell's respect for his former collaborator and understanding of Whitehead's post-*Principia* philosophy.

The remaining seven sections contains papers on various philosophical or logical topics. Part V has papers on "Metaphysics and Epistemology." Part VI groups essays on "Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics" (including the powerful 1950 essay 'Is Mathematics Purely Linguistic'). Part VII concerns "Ethics and Politics." Part VIII is on John Stuart Mill. Part IX is Russell's "Critique of Religion." Part X gathers several essays on Albert Einstein. Part XI presents the harsh "Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy." Seven appendices are added, one of which is "Russell's Last Philosophical Writing" from 1968.

Scattered throughout the volume are headnote explanations by Slater and Kollner of historical or philosophical issues, such as Russell's reaction to logical positivism, interest in Mill, admiration for Einstein, or disgust with ordinary language philosophy. I found the headnotes to be most helpful, and urge a similar approach to upcoming volumes.

This is an extraordinary volume, highly recommended. This is an epic

effort, fulfilling the need for one work which captures Russell's later philosophical views. It convincingly documents the lasting value and merit of Russell's return to philosophy after a premature (and mistaken) retirement from serious philosophical work in 1927. In combination with volume 10, Slater and Kollner have provided an encyclopedic collection of Russell's shorter philosophical writings over a forty-year period. These two volumes fill a gigantic void in Russell scholarship.

A fair warning: the price of this volume is steep. It will dent the wallet. However, each volume of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* are indispensable to any serious student of Russell. When I attended the Russell Conference in Southampton two years ago, ("Russell and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy"), I realized these volumes of collected papers are extremely influential and important. They were the center-piece of almost every paper and discussion.

The Collected Papers are now the cutting-edge, and may become the final word. I congratulate Slater and Kollner on a job well-done, obviously motivated by admiration and respect for the subject, unlike some recent Russell commentators. Volume 11 in the *Collected Papers* is a worthy, well-presented, and compelling addition to the Russell corpus.

20th WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY to be held in Boston, August 19, 1997

The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy will be held in Boston on 10-16 August 1998. That's the first American one since 1927, so it may be a once in a lifetime event for many list members. The theme is broad: "Paideia: Philosophy Educating Humanity."

There is a call for papers 10 pages long (3000 words) typewritten, double spaced with a 20-line abstract, due September 1, 1997. My understanding is that papers which are accepted will also be published in "Proceedings of the Congress" if the author desires. If possible, papers should also be sent on 3.5 inch disks in ASCII.

Among the areas of interest to Russell scholars, papers may be in metaphysics, ontology, logic and philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, theoretical ethics, philosophy of values,

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

Membership Profiles

BRS members have asked for information about other members in the Society. Here are just a few profiles. If you haven't yet sent yours in, please take a few moments when you finish this issue of the *Quarterly* and send yours in.

Name: Whitfield Cobb, Ph.D.

Address: 800 Cupp Street
Blacksburg, VA 24060

e_mail: N/A

First book of Russell's I read was: *What I Believe*, soon followed by *Mysticism and Logic* (when I was 16).

Latest book of Russell's I read was: *Rereading from Skeptical Essays and Human Society in Ethics and Politics*.

Favorite Russell Quotation: The BRS motto. But 30 years before BRS was founded, our wedding vows and wedding rings included the phrase "... the inspiration of love and the guidance of knowledge..." And 45 years later, I quoted the complete sentence on the brochure I prepared for my wife's memorial service.

Reason for joining BRS: In 1978 (?) As soon as I heard there was a BRS, I needed no special reason to join. But I was pleased to learn that both professional philosophers and those who are not are welcomed as members.

Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: I joined the American Humanist Association.

Additional Comments: In 1951, I heard Russell speak on "Is Happiness Still Possible?"

Name: Theo Meijer

Address: P.O. Box 93
Abbotsford, B.C. Canada V2S 4N8

e_mail: theom@mindlink.bc.ca

First book of Russell's I read was: *Why I Am Not a Christian*.

Latest book of Russell's I read was: *Caroline Moorehead's biography of BR and Lee Eizler's The Quotable Bertrand Russell*.

Favorite Russell Quotation: "A good world needs knowledge, kindness, and courage; it does not need a regretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by the words uttered long ago by ignorant men."

Reason for joining BRS: To support an organization making BR's ideas more generally known.

Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: As a

humanist/agnostic/skeptic, BR's words are a source of ongoing support.

Name: Tim St. Vincent

Address: 276 Albion Street, #23
Wakefield, MA 01880

e_mail: N/A

First book of Russell's I read was: *Religion & Science*

Latest book of Russell's I read was: *Authority & the Individual*

Favorite Russell Quotation: "... utilitarianism, while it conceded no absolute 'rights' to the individual, gave the same weight to one man's happiness as to another's..." from *The Ancestry of Fascism*

Reason for joining BRS: None given.

Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: The idea that one should be compassionate, but also allow for self-interest, spontaneous expression, etc.

Additional Comments: In my opinion, the above mentioned quotation is tied for first place with other Russell quotes, such as the Russell Society motto. My above cited Russell quotation is relevant today because it provides an intellectual foundation for the idea that some forms of self-esteem/respect should be unconditional, i.e. not dependent on achievement, good grades, etc. A variation of the idea behind this quote is that not all good things in life are rewards for good behavior. (Not all bad things in life are punishments for bad behavior.) For example, a child who finds a dollar bill on the sidewalk should not turn it over to a friend who has better grades. Perhaps students should be temporarily shamed for goofing off in school (but not for lacking academic talent). But, at other times, teachers should point out that everyone has an equal right to non-reward goods (and an equal right to avoid non-punishment evils).

Name: Ruili Ye

Address: P.O. Box 683
New York, NY 10185

e_mail: rye@it.brooklyn.cuny.edu

First book of Russell's I read was: his *Autobiography*.

Latest book of Russell's I read was: *Mortals and Others*.

Favorite Russell Quotation: "I say people who feel that are showing a kind of cowardice, ... To say you can't face life without this or that." From *Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind*.

Reason for joining BRS: To be close to Bertie.

Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: (Seems to have absorbed too much to be able to distinguish his views from mine -- sorry, all mixed up!)

**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
Membership Profile Form**

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John E. Shosky
BRS Editor
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

E_MAIL: _____

First book of Russell's I read was _____

Last book of Russell's I read was _____

Favorite Russell Quotation: _____

Reason(s) for Joining BRS: _____

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life: _____

Additional Comments: _____

**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
1997 Membership Renewal Form**

This is the **final** notice to renew BRS membership for 1997.

- ☛ If you have already renewed for 1997 or have joined the BRS in 1997, please accept our thanks once again for participating in the BRS.
- ☛ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1997 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form below along with the appropriate payment TODAY.** Thanks!

Please mail this form and payment to:

Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer
1965 Winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1997 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

- Individual \$35
- Student \$20
- Limited Income Couple \$25
- Sustainer \$75 and up
- Patron \$250 and up
- Life Member \$1,000 and up
- PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico
- PLUS \$4 if in Canada or Mexico
- Couple \$40
- Limited Income Individual \$20
- Contributor \$50 and up
- Sponsor \$100 and up
- Benefactor \$500 and up
- Organization Membership \$50

NAME _____ DATE _____

ADDRESS _____


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The Bertrand Russell Society

November 1997

Quarterly

No. 96



*Bertrand Russell Society
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Alexandria, VA 22307*

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

November 1997

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FROM THE EDITOR
John Shosky
American University

We begin this issue with a report from the society president, John Lenz. He will announce the preliminary details of the Annual Bertrand Russell Society Conference, which will be held June 19-21 at the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida in St. Petersburg.

John's report will be followed by "Russell News", which is a column of short blurbs about Russell, works on Russell, society happenings, reports on members, general gossip, and other vital talking points for the informed and discerning society member. In my view, the standard of information one should strive for, in a Platonic sense, is Ken Blackwell, the guru of Russell trivia, realizing that Ken has a considerable head start on all of us.

I am pleased to draw your attention to an outstanding article in this issue, David Rodier's "Russell's Plato." Originally presented at the Russell Conference two years ago at Drew University, Rodier has further examined Russell's study of Plato and uncovered some important insights. For all of those who question Russell as a philosophical historian, this article should provide considerable evidence to the contrary. It also functions as a footnote to the discussion of the Popper/Russell view of Plato reported in the articles by Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Sir Karl Popper found in *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives*, New Series, Volume 12, Number 1, Summer, 1992.

A book review of P.M.S. Hacker's *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy* follows Rodier's article.

I also recommend Cliff Henke's outstanding review of "Reds", the epic movie of the life of Jack Reed, featuring Dora Russell and other contemporaries of Bertrand Russell as witnesses. In our next issue, Cliff will review a recent BBC production, "Coming Through," a television drama about the life of D. H. Lawrence, starring Kenneth Branagh and Helen Mirren. This is now out on video cassette in the United States.

As in the last issue, we will profile society members. A blank profile form is included, which should be used to help the society learn more about its membership. If you haven't filled out a form, please do and send it to me at 1806 Rollins Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22307, USA.

Finally, please note two important items: the 1998 membership renewal form and the call for nominations for the board of directors. Please fill both out and send them to Dennis Darland and Michael Rockler, respectively. The addresses are on the forms.

I hope you enjoy this issue. As always, I thank my associate editors, Katie Kendig and Bob Barnard, for their ideas and assistance. A special thanks goes to John Lenz, who has been a constant source of news and ideas, as well as support.



FROM THE PRESIDENT

John R. Lenz
Drew University

The Bertrand Russell Society exists to foster our shared interests, and our work manifests itself in two main ways: publication of this *Quarterly*, and the holding of our Annual Meeting with its presentations, awards, and social events. Nowadays, sponsorship of WWW home page and the Russell-L electronic discussion group (a mailing list) enable us to maintain a daily presence around the world. All these forums exist for the voices of all BRS members.

There is still nothing like the face-to-face interaction of the Annual Meeting, about to celebrate its 25th anniversary in St. Petersburg, Florida in June, 1998. Please see the preliminary report in this issue. We are working hard to stage a memorable and intellectually stimulating weekend. At the same time, we see this as a crucial opportunity to strengthen the BRS for the future. Anyone may present a paper, lead a discussion, or raise an issue. Please think about making a contribution yourself and contact me at jlenz@drew.edu if you would like to be on the program.



BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY CONFERENCE:

19-21 JUNE 1998
USF, St. Petersburg, Florida
John R. Lenz
Drew University

Plans are underway for the 25th (!) annual Bertrand Russell Society

meeting. We are planning to convene during the weekend of June 19-21, 1998, at the University of Southern Florida in St. Petersburg, Florida. Details on registering and lodging, directions and an updated program, will be included in the February *Quarterly*. We are grateful to Jan Loeb Eisler, Mitchell Haney and John Shosky for invaluable help in the preparation of what promises to be a memorable meeting.

Last year, our meeting was somewhat muted as we agreed to merge with the Humanist conference of the Center for Inquiry (although, certainly, it was a pleasure to meet new people and especially students). For 1998, we plan to offer a variety of talks and activities. Our theme is "New Directions in Russell Studies", and, as in the past, presentations will be multi-media: videos (the much discussed but not seen in the U.S. new BBC documentary on Russell's life), audio (Russell's radio debate with Copleston, which was excluded from the American edition of *Why I Am Not a Christian*), a panel discussion (on a controversial new portrait of Russell's life), as well as several presentations offering new angles on understanding Russell in all his complexity. The conference should be educational and stimulating.

At the same time, the Annual Meeting offers us a chance to raise issues of BRS policy and planning. All are encouraged to participate. PLEASE consider making a presentation. Let me know if you would like to share a paper or discussion with us on any topic.

The Tentative Program (more to come)

Discussion: the Russell of Ray Monk's new biography (with potential panelists Ken Blackwell, Nick Griffin, Mitchell Haney, and John Shosky).

Viewing of Russell interviews and documentaries: the new BBC documentary about Russell's life (not yet released in the U.S.) and the Russell-Copleston debate on the existence of God (audiotape with transcript).

Presenting Papers: Stefan Andersson (Lund, Sweden): "Bertrand Russell's Personal Religion"; Bob Barnard (Memphis): "Russell's Flirtation with Phenomenology"; John Lenz (Drew University): "Bertrand Russell as a Utopian Thinker"; Tim Madigan (*Free Inquiry*): humanist paper - to be announced; Michael Rockler (National-Louis University): "Freedom v. Authority in Education"; Jan Eisler (V.P., Russell Society): "Humanism in Florida and Beyond"; Trevor Banks: "The Dogmatism of a Rationalist"; and John Shosky (American University): "How Bertrand Russell Taught Symbolic Logic"

Workshop: on a short essay of Russell's

Summary of paper: by 1998 student winner of Prizes for Papers

BRS business: BRS Board of Directors Meeting; election of new officers; BRS Society Meeting; Announcement of 1998 BRS Award, BRS Book Award, and



RUSSELL NEWS: Publications, etc.

➤ Ray Monk has been awarded the prestigious 1997 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1996. Congratulations to Ray. This controversial book will be the subject of a panel discussion at the Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society in Tampa this June.

➤ There is a lengthy review of Monk and Tony Palmer's *Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy* by Jan Dejnozka in *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 18, No. 1 (1997), 49-54.

➤ Ken Blackwell has announced that the Russell Archives has obtained the first draft of Russell's essay, "Is a Permanent Peace Possible?" The final version was published in the *Atlantic Monthly* of March, 1915 and reprinted in *Justice in Wartime* and in Volume 13 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. The manuscript came from Elizabeth Perkins, who also sent 15 letters from Russell, all written between 1915 and 1919.

➤ Reports from Arabia. Look for three books in Arabic which have been reported to the Quarterly. One is by Ibrahim Najjar entitled *Bertrand Russell: His Thought and Place in Contemporary Philosophy*. This is an introduction to Russell, covering his life, work in logic, theory of knowledge, politics, and ethics. There is also a final chapter about Russell's relevance to the Arab world, with comparisons to Ibn Rushd and other contemporary Arab thinkers. The second book is entitled *Power: A Philosophical Analysis of Justice*. The author was not reported to the Quarterly. Also, check out a third text, Ibn Warruq's *Why I am not a Muslim*.

➤ John Shosky is scheduled to teach a graduate class on Russell and Wittgenstein at Charles University in Prague beginning in February, 1998. The syllabus lists the following topics for Russell: logic of relations, theory of descriptions, theory of types, Russell's paradox, and Russell's logical atomism. The seminar will also discuss works by Frege, Moore, Ramsey, and Ayer. Shosky will also teach a graduate seminar on the history of logic at Charles and a graduate seminar on modern deductive logic for the Department of Philosophy

in the Czech Academy of Sciences.

➤ Associate Editor Katie Kendig reports from the London School of Economics that she is taking a seminar on mathematical logic. She was asked to speak on Russell's theory of types.

➤ Mary Ann Cassar recently informed the Quarterly of the publication of *Interfaces*, a collection of essays on philosophy edited by Joe Friggieri and Salvino Busuttil. These essays were collected in honor of Peter Serracino Inglott, the recently retired head of the department of philosophy at the University of Malta. The ISBN number is 99909-2-017-6. The publisher is the University of Malta Press.

➤ Antony Flew, an honorary member, has recently published a second edition of *Darwinian Evolution* with Transaction Publishers of New Brunswick and London. The ISBN number is 1-56000-948-9. Originally published in 1984, this book is a study of the historical background of Darwin's ideas, the development of his theory, and the implications. In 1998, Rowman and Littlefield will publish a collection of Flew's *Philosophical Essays*, edited by and with an introduction from John Shosky. The collection contains two new essays by Flew, one concerning Oxford linguistic philosophy and the other an intellectual autobiography. The collection also contains "Russell's Judgement on Bolshevism", originally published in the Robert's collection, *Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume*.



RUSSELL'S PLATO David Rodier American University

Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy* is the last major work of the long period between his two Cambridge careers. The work is perhaps the most widely read of all of Russell's many publications but, despite its claim to importance in the Russellian *oeuvre*, the work is largely neglected, even by students of Russell. This paradox has been succinctly noted by Louis Greenspan:

. . . Russell's history is rarely to be found in the curricula of philosophy departments. It is still a popular success. It remains a favorite with Book Clubs, it is the book by a major philosopher most likely to be found in Airport bookstores, but

it has not become what he hoped it would become, the text of choice for professional philosophers (363).

Part of the disdain of professional philosophers for *A History of Western Philosophy* may actually be its deceptively popular appearance. The work lacks the usual scholarly apparatus. It has no bibliography. Quotations are not always identified in a way which would allow an easy checking of sources - or for that matter in a way that would encourage the general reader to go to the philosophic texts in question. When Russell does cite a work to support his views, it frequently is from scholarship that is at least a generation old. This appearance of absence of scholarship is further exacerbated, for the specialist at least, by Russell's own disarming claim of lack of expertise in most of his subject matter:

I owe a word of explanation and apology to specialists on any part of my enormous subject. It is obviously impossible to know as much about every philosopher as can be known about him by a man whose field is less wide; I have no doubt that every singly philosopher whom I have mentioned, with the exception of Leibniz, is better known to many men than to me (x).

In this paper I shall argue that at least in the case of Plato, Russell's disclaimer of expertise and his popularizing manner of presentation, conceal both a rather strong familiarity with recent scholarship and a willingness to use that scholarship for his own philosophic ends. To establish this let us begin by noting certain peculiarities about the section of *A History of Western Philosophy* which deals with Plato. Even a cursory reading of these chapters reveals two striking anomalies. The first is the length of the discussion of Plato. The six chapters Russell devotes to Plato present a much more extensive discussion than that given any other philosopher - or any other figure - he discusses in the work. Further, Russell's chapters on Plato contain a second anomaly. That is the fact that there is a complete absence of any scholarly apparatus throughout the entire discussion of Plato. In this paper I shall discuss both of these anomalies and then suggest reasons for each.

1.

Russell devotes a total of six chapters in the history to Plato. There are chapters on: Plato's Sources (Chapter 13), his utopia (Chapter 14), the theory of ideas (15), Plato's theory of immortality (16), his cosmogony (17) and his account of knowledge and perception (18). In terms of the Platonic dialogues

discussed we have the *Republic* (Chapters 14 and 15), the *Phaedo* and *Meno* (Chapter 16), the *Timaeus* (chapter 17), and the *Theaetetus* (Chapter 19). There are also brief references to the *Symposium* and the *Parmenides* - the latter being a very significant one for an estimate of Russell's familiarity with the Platonic scholarship of his time. In addition Russell discusses the *Apology* in Chapter 11 in the context of his discussion of Socrates. In sharp contrast to the six chapters devoted to Plato, Russell devotes only a chapter each to Kant, Hume, and even his own specialization, Leibniz.

An answer to the first anomaly - the length of time spent in discussing Plato - is apparently given by Russell himself:

Plato and Aristotle were the most influential of all philosophers, ancient, mediaeval, or modern; and of the two, it was Plato who had the greatest effect upon subsequent ages. I say this for two reasons: first, that Aristotle himself is the outcome of Plato; second, that Christian theology and philosophy, at any rate until the thirteenth century, was much more Platonic than Aristotelian. It is necessary, therefore, in a history of philosophic thought, to treat Plato, and to a lesser degree Aristotle, much more fully than any of their predecessors or successors (104).

In fact, as Greenspan has pointed out, the answer to the general question of the various length of discussion Russell devotes to the figures he covers is rather a bit more complicated. There are issues at work in the structuring of the discussion which Russell does not explicitly acknowledge. But a more detailed investigation of why Russell spends so much time on Plato can be presented after we discuss the second anomaly.

2.

The second anomaly is the absence on any scholarly documentation throughout the Plato chapters. In the majority of cases, Russell's discussions of major philosophers lack any references to the secondary literature. But in the chapters on Plato it is not just that Russell follows his common pattern of making no reference to any secondary discussions of the Platonic text. In the case of the other philosophers he discusses, Russell usually gives some sort of reference to the textual source. In these chapters on Plato, Russell gives a number of quotations from Plato but he does not give the Stephanus page numbers for any of the passages he quotes. In this respect Russell's quotations from Plato are sharply differentiated from his quotations from Aristotle in the immediately succeeding chapters. In the case of Aristotle the usual Bekker numbers are to be

found in the footnotes. In stark contrast there are no footnotes of any kind in the Plato chapters. The effect of this rhetorical strategy is that Russell forces the reader to look at Plato only through Russell's eyes. There are no counter interpretations of the Platonic text to contend with. In fact there is no way to check on the context or the text of the quotations. Plato exists for the reader only as Russell presents him.

In general, of course, Russell clearly wishes to present only his interpretation of the history of philosophy. He is not interested in presenting one among many competing narratives. For this reason the absence of any reference to the secondary literature which might present alternative interpretations of the philosophers Russell is discussing or alternative versions of the narrative of philosophy's history is to be expected. What is not so easily accounted for is Russell's exceptional choice in the chapters on Plato even to document the source of his quotations. This insistence that the only Plato the reader encounter is precisely the Plato Russell presents and that the reader's encounter with the Platonic corpus be limited to the quotations Russell presents needs to be explained. But such an explanation may well depend on the question of Russell's familiarity with contemporary Platonic scholarship. Certainly if Russell were to be presenting a highly idiosyncratic interpretation of Plato, then it would be in his interest to refuse to acknowledge competing readings of the Platonic text. It would also be in his best interest not to encourage the reader to look at the Platonic text to check on the plausibility of Russell's interpretation of Plato. However, I think that a careful glance at Russell's interpretation of Plato shows that Russell was quite aware of many of the changes in the interpretation of Plato which had happened in the period just before he wrote *A History of Western Philosophy* and that an alternative explanation of his failure to document the source of his Platonic quotations is required. After first investigating the evidence for Russell's knowledge of the then recent Platonic scholarship, I shall propose an alternative explanation of the absence of Stephanus page numbers in the Plato chapters.

3.

Russell's life spans one of the most significant periods in the development of Platonic studies. For the purposes of the study of the discussion of Plato in *A History of Western Philosophy* we might take 1892 - the date of the publication of the third edition of Benjamin Jowett's translation of Plato as a beginning point and 1939 - the date of Gilbert Ryle's publication in *Mind* of his article "*Plato's Parmenides*" as representative dates. The reason for choosing these two points is rather simple. The Jowett translation rapidly became (as it unfortunately has remained) the most widely used complete translation of Plato.

The Ryle article initiated discussions of the issue of Plato's intellectual development. The latter issue is, as I shall show, particularly important for deciding the question of Russell's familiarity with contemporary Platonic scholarship.

Nineteenth century philologists had made two enduring contributions to Platonic studies. The first was laying the foundation for the first modern critical edition of the Platonic *corpus sine* Henri Estienne's initial publication of the Greek text in 1578. This effort culminated in John Burnet's Oxford text of Plato which appeared 1900 through 1907. The second great achievement of nineteenth-century philologists was the establishment of a general consensus on the relative chronology of Plato's *Dialogues*.

After the publication of Burnet's edition of the Greek text there was a flourishing of Platonic scholarship - especially in the English speaking world. We can begin to assess Russell's familiarity with this scholarship by discussing his interpretations of three dialogues: the *Timaeus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Republic*. In his interpretation of the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides* we shall see that Russell shows an awareness of contemporary Platonic scholarship. In the case of the *Republic* he anticipates a major direction of later interpretation.

Russell's discussion of the *Timaeus* needs to be discussed only briefly. In terms of interpretation, Russell seems to be strongly influenced by A. E. Taylor's commentary and its insistence that in the *Timaeus* Plato is presenting what is essentially a Pythagorean view of the physical world. However, unlike Taylor, Russell believes the *Timaeus* is no mere exercise in historical recreation. Russell holds that the dialogue presents Plato's own beliefs. What is more significant than the details of his interpretation is the fact that Russell recognized the historical importance of the *Timaeus*. Although Russell is still firmly in the tradition of nineteenth century English interpretation in seeing the *Republic* as "Plato's most important dialogue (108)", he also recognizes that this phrase must be taken to mean philosophically important in our terms, and not that the *Republic* was necessarily the most important dialogue historically. On the contrary, Russell notes that the *Timaeus*, "... had more influence than anything else in Plato, which is curious, as it certainly contains more that is simple silly than is to be found in his other writings. As philosophy, it is unimportant, but historically it was so influential that it must be considered in some detail (143)". This claim about the dialogue's importance is repeated at the end of chapter 17: "The whole dialogue, as I said before, deserves to be studied because of its great influence on ancient and medieval thought; and this influence is not confined to what is least fantastic (148)."

When we turn to a discussion of Russell's interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides* it is important that we note the limitations of the achievements of

nineteenth century Platonic scholarship. As was noted earlier, one of the triumphs of nineteenth century Classical philologists was establishing the relative chronology of the Platonic dialogues. However, well into the twentieth century, Platonic scholars considered the relative chronology of the *Dialogues* as unimportant for the issue of interpreting Plato's philosophy. The dominant view was that Plato, unlike almost every other major philosopher, arrived at his core beliefs early and never significantly modified his views. In effect, the relative chronology of the *Dialogues* was not taken as having any real significance for the question of Plato's philosophical development. As late as 1933 Paul Shorey would publish *What Plato Said* and discuss each of the *Dialogues* without any indication that there might be any real development or change in Plato's philosophy. Lest it be thought that Shorey reflected a merely American point of view, one which perhaps was not up on current European scholarship, it should be noted that Werner Jaeger's pioneering *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* was published in 1923 and appeared in an English translation in 1934. This epoch making work depends for its major thesis about Aristotle's intellectual development on the assumption that Plato's philosophy was essentially static from the earliest to the latest dialogues.

After Ryle's 1939 article on the *Parmenides* the assumption of a static Platonic philosophy could no longer be asserted without qualification. Ryle's position that Plato developed philosophically from the middle to the late dialogues became the standard thesis. The only real issue was how radically did Plato modify his "Theory of Ideas" or even whether or not he ever held such a theory -- at least in the form that nineteenth and early twentieth-century scholars had confidently presented. When we turn to Russell's discussions of Plato's metaphysics and epistemology, we seem to have evidence that he does not subscribe to the view that Plato arrived at the basic elements of his position early in his career and continued to proclaim the same positions without any significant modification for the rest of his life.

Ryle's article not only raised the question of Plato's philosophic development. It also directed attention to a dialogue which was commonly held to be philosophically insignificant. Even as intense a platonic partisan as A. E. Taylor failed to see any philosophic importance in the *Parmenides*:

If this is the right way to understand the dialogue, and Plato seems to tell us that it is, it follows that the *Parmenides* is, all through, an elaborate *jeu d'esprit*, and that all interpretations based on taking it for anything else (including an earlier one by the present writer), are mistaken in principle. It equally follows that the ironical spirit of the work must not be forgotten in

dealing with isolated passages (351).

A little later Taylor remarks, "It would be taking Plato's metaphysical jest too gravely to make a minute examination of all the details of these bewildering arguments (361)."

In sharp contrast to Taylor, Russell says:

[Aristotle] advances against [the theory of] ideas a number of very good arguments, most of which are already found in Plato's *Parmenides*. The strongest argument is that of the 'third man': if a man is a man because he resembles the ideal man, there must be a still more ideal man to whom both ordinary men and the ideal man are similar (162).

Both the fact that Russell takes the arguments of the *Parmenides* against the theory of ideas seriously and the fact that he identifies of the "Third Man Argument" (an argument which his own difficulties with the paradox of self-predication might have made him especially sensitive) as the most telling argument, seem to show the influence of Ryle's article on the *Parmenides*. It is also interesting to note that on both points Russell here anticipates the direction of much Platonic scholarship in the decades after the publication of *A History of Western Philosophy*.

However, there is one very significant difference between Russell's treatment of the later Platonic *Dialogues* and that of much of the post 1939 scholarship. This is that Russell virtually ignores the issue of whether or not there is significant development in Plato's thought. Most recent scholarship on Plato has essentially accepted the modern logical criticism of the traditional Theory of Forms earlier scholars ascribed to Plato. But modern scholars have tended to insist that even if this theory might be characteristic of Plato's middle dialogues, it was radically criticized and perhaps even abandoned by Plato in the later dialogues. Russell admits, at least obliquely, that Plato did develop significant criticisms of the theory of ideas. Whether or not Russell also believed that Plato accepted these criticisms does not seem to be a significant issue for Russell. In fact, as we shall see later, it may be that Russell has very significant ideological reasons for not discussing the possibility of Plato's philosophic development. But before discussing this issue let us turn to Russell's discussion of the *Republic*.

4.

In the period after the publication of *A History of Western Philosophy* there was a bitter debate about Plato's political philosophy, especially as that

philosophy was presented in the *Republic*. Most often this debate is seen to be initiated by Sir Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* in 1945. What has not been appreciated is the fact that Russell himself anticipated the main lines of Popper's interpretation of Plato as the father of totalitarianism. In fact, Russell may be said to have initiated a re-evaluation of Plato's political theory that was at least as thoroughgoing and as radical as the Platonic scholars' general re-evaluation of the metaphysics and epistemology of the *Dialogues*.

When Plato became a staple of the English philosophical curriculum in the nineteenth-century, it was in the form of a Plato whose philosophy reached its culmination in the *Republic*. This view (which, incidentally, Russell endorses [108]) was not the standard one in Classical Antiquity or the Renaissance. The selection of the *Republic* as the more significant dialogue than either the *Timaeus* or the *Parmenides* was associated with the successful attempt to use Plato to legitimate a series of educational and political reforms. For our purposes here we may ignore the reasons for the prioritizing of the *Republic* in the Platonic Canon. What is important for our purposes is the way that the *Republic* was interpreted. On the whole, nineteenth and early twentieth-century English writers tended to view the Plato of the *Republic* as an anti-conservative Philosophical Radical and even a proper ancestor of the French Revolution. It may be true that the Plato of the *Republic* clearly did not have much use for *egalite*, but he certainly was, they thought, the philosopher of *fraternite* and of *liberte* - at least in Robespierre's sense of the latter term. Like the English Radicals, the Plato of the *Republic* saw little good in either private property or the (traditional) family. In the words of Sir Ernest Barker:

There is something French in Plato's mind, something of that pushing of a principle to its logical extremes, which distinguished Calvin in theology and Rousseau in politics . . . When we turn to Aristotle, it hardly seems fanciful to detect more of an English spirit of compromise . . . Where Plato turned Radical under the compulsion of the Idea, Aristotle has much sound Conservatism: he respects property, he sees good in the family. He recognizes the general 'laxity' of actual life, the impossibility of including man wholly within the pale of any scheme. He recognizes, above all, that a Government can only go so far as a people follows: 'the number of those who wish a State to continue must be greater than the number of those who wish the contrary'. This is a principle which Plato had not realized: he had forgotten (rather than despised) the people (162).

Even if Plato were not viewed as a Philosophic Radical, he was always viewed as an anti-conservative. If not quite a thorough-going advocate of democracy, Plato was held to be at the very least a trenchant critic of conservatism and aristocracy.

The view of Plato as anti-conservative continued to dominate English Platonic interpretation during the first part of the twentieth-century. A. E. Taylor and Francis M. Cornford, although disagreeing on many details of Platonic interpretation, were agreed in making Plato the patron of liberal society rather than just the source of the radical political tradition. Taylor consistently argued against an interpretation of the *Republic* which would make it the ancestor of the radicalism of the French Revolution. Taylor's Plato instead is the opponent of militarism and the advocate of an enlightened liberal elite controlling society by their expertise. Cornford goes even further in making Plato the patron of the liberal democratic order:

. . . Plato's thought, from first to last, was chiefly bent on the question of how society could be shaped so that man might realize the best that is in him. This is, above all, the theme of his central work, the *Republic* (xv).

. . . the author of the earliest Utopia in European literature confronts the modern reader with the ultimate problem of politics: how can the state be so ordered as to place effective control in the hands of men who understand that you cannot make either an individual or a society happy by making them richer or more powerful than their neighbours. So long as knowledge is valued as a means to power, and power as the means to wealth, the helm of the ship of state will be grasped by the ambitious man, whose Bible is Machiavelli's Prince or by the man of business, whose Bible is his profit and loss account. It is Plato's merit to have seen that this problem looms up, in every age, behind all the superficial arguments of political expedience (xxix).

Russell's view of Plato's political philosophy is in sharp contrast to the dominant stream of interpretation in either of its forms. He saw Plato neither as the father of Philosophical Radicalism nor as the patron of liberal society. For Russell, Plato was the precursor of twentieth-century totalitarianism. In many significant ways his Plato is the Plato of Sir Karl Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies* or of Gilbert Ryle's *Plato's Progress*. Russell emphasizes that by means of a definition of justice which is radically different from the modern one, Plato is able to have "inequalities of power and privilege without injustice (114)". He

further sees that the Platonic state must be totalitarian in its essence. More importantly, Russell shows what the achievements of Plato's ideal state better than Machiavelli's *Prince* or the modern man of business might attempt. For Russell, the accomplishments of Plato's Ideal State are,

... rather humdrum. It will achieve success in wars against roughly equal populations, and it will secure a livelihood for a certain small number of people. It will almost certainly produce no art or science, because of its rigidity; in this respect, as in others, it will be like Sparta. In spite of all the fine talk, skill in war and enough to eat is all that will be achieved. Plato had lived through famine and defeat in Athens; perhaps, subconsciously, he thought the avoidance of these evils the best that statesmanship could accomplish (115).

In depicting Plato's Ideal State as totalitarian and Plato as the godfather of twentieth-century totalitarian states, Russell was following up a line of criticism which had already appeared in his *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* which was published in 1920. In that work Russell observes,

Far closer than any historical parallel [sc. to the present Russian Government] is the parallel of Plato's *Republic*. The Communist Party corresponds to the guardians; the soldiers have about the same status in both; there is in Russia an attempt to deal with family life more or less as Plato suggested. I suppose it may be assumed that every teacher of Plato throughout the world abhors Bolshevism, and that every Bolshevik regards Plato as an antiquated *bourgeois*. Nevertheless, the parallel is extraordinarily exact between Plato's *Republic* and the regime which the better Bolsheviks are endeavouring to create (23).

5.

The results of our discussion may be summarized as follows. Russell's chapters on Plato in *A History of Western Philosophy* are anomalous in two respects: First, more space is devoted to a discussion of Plato than any other philosopher; second, unlike other chapters which contain at least a minimum of documentation, the Plato chapters are unique in giving no references, not even references to the source of the direct quotations from Plato. The answer to the first anomaly seems to be provided by Russell himself. Russell claims that, "it was Plato who had the greatest effect upon subsequent ages (104)". As to the second

anomaly, I hope that I have shown that the fact that Russell gives no reference to the secondary literature is not the result of his absence of familiarity with the contemporary Plato scholarship. Not only does Russell seem to be aware of the newer interpretations of Plato's metaphysics and epistemology, he is himself, a bit ahead of his contemporaries in his assessment of Plato's political philosophy. But although Russell appears to be familiar with the strikingly new developments, he does not refer to any contemporary scholars. He seems to be content to present an interpretation of Plato which takes account of their scholarship without wishing to direct the reader to any of the contemporary disagreements within the literature.

It would appear that Russell's rhetorical strategy is quite deliberate. Russell is writing a revisionist history of philosophy. His expressed intention is to present the history of philosophy as, "an integral part of social and political life (ix)". But it is also the case that for Russell, Plato is the crucial figure in the story of philosophy's relation to social and political life. Since this is so, Russell must present a particular view of Plato, one which will set the stage for all that he thinks is central to the narrative he is going to present. Plato is the greatest figure in the tradition, but unfortunately Plato also subverted philosophy from its true task:

Plato is always concerned to advocate views that will make people what he thinks is virtuous; he is hardly ever intellectually honest, because he allows himself to judge doctrines by their social consequences. Even about this he is not honest; he pretends to follow the arguments and to be judging by purely intellectual standards, when in fact he is twisting the discussion so as to lead to a virtuous result. He introduced this vice into philosophy, where it has persisted ever since One of the defects of all philosophers since Plato is that their inquiries into ethics proceed on the assumptions that they already know the conclusions to be reached (78-79).

This passage provides the clue to Russell's rhetorical strategy. His real quarrel is not so much with Plato's Theory of Forms, or even Plato's anti-empiricism. Plato's errors in logic, epistemology or metaphysics are in the long run harmless errors. For errors in matters of logic or science can be cleared up by further discussion. Russell's real concern is Plato's commitment to ideology, to a vision of philosophy which subordinates free inquiry to the attainment of truths previously determined to be socially or politically acceptable. Russell is concerned with Plato's basic formulation of the philosophic quest. Russell sees Plato as the great example of how philosophy can go wrong. In Russell's narrative, Plato set

the example of a philosopher who was willing to subordinate truth to other political or social values, present them, and not be distracted by alternative views and tentative conjectures.

Such a subordination of truth to other concerns is precisely what Russell could not accept in ethics and social theory. It is fitting that at the end of a long period of his life when ethics was his primary concern, when he turns to a survey of the entire history of philosophy, a history which he wants to see in the context of the social antecedents and consequences of philosophic theory, that Russell should begin his account with a re-evaluation of the Platonic tradition.

But Russell's re-evaluation of Plato is so radical that he must not let his account degenerate into considerations of alternative readings of the Platonic text or even by alternative passages in Plato which might tell against his vision of the Father of Western Philosophy introducing the basic vice into Western philosophizing about ethics and social theory. This appears to be the reason why Russell chooses a rhetorical strategy which denies the reader any account of the divergences in Platonic scholarship and any references to the wider Platonic text. Russell must marginalize his own expertise in the current controversies among Platonic scholars if he is going to focus attention effectively on the basic philosophic position he wishes to oppose. However, the absence of the explicit framework of scholarly interpretation does not necessarily mean that the writer is not familiar with the scholarly tradition.

Even if my account of the reasons for Russell's refusing to provide any documentation in his long discussion of Plato is rejected, I bode that I have shown that Russell did in fact know the writings of his contemporary Plato interpreters - and specifically their own revisionist issues - and in fact he even anticipated the radical revision of Plato's political philosophy which would dominate certain areas of Platonic scholarship in the decades after *A History of Western Philosophy* was published.

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WITTGENSTEIN'S PLACE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

A BOOK REVIEW

John Shosky

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P.M.S. Hacker. *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996. 346 pages. ISBN 0-631-20099-1.

This book provides a rough analogy of what we need in Russellian scholarship: someone of great insight who documents Russell's vast influence over twentieth century philosophy, with its personalities and crossing currents, with Cambridge as the epicenter of the shock waves sent out by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Wisdom, and Anscombe. Peter Hacker does all of this for Wittgenstein alone, using Oxford as the epicenter of Wittgenstein's powerful influence on philosophy.

Peter Hacker is a fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. You probably know him as the author or co-author (with George Baker) of numerous works on Wittgenstein, among them the four-volume *Analytical Commentary of the Philosophical Investigations*. This new book is designed as a follow-up to the commentary, locating Wittgenstein in historical context. There is much comparison to Frege, Russell, and Quine, the other central figures of the last one hundred years.

But this is not a dry, hard-to-read book. This is a rapidly-running stream of information, history, analysis, and impressions. Hacker has used his many friendly connections in Oxford to probe way beyond the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein and his contemporaries. Through personal knowledge, interviews, fresh examination of texts, a look at newly discovered material, and even some use of unpublished sources, Hacker has told the general philosophical story better than Passmore, Pears (*Wittgenstein*), Ayer, Grayling, or Monk, and even rivals the technical work of Anscombe, Malcolm, Pitcher, Hintikka, Fogelin, Kripke, Pears (*The False Prison*), or even the outstanding new addition by Genova. In short, this is a great book about philosophy and the influence of Wittgenstein, both as an important history and as a nuts-and-bolts discussion of dense issues.

The book begins with a background discussion of the origins of analytical philosophy. Twentieth century philosophy has its "twofold root" in Cambridge with Moore and Russell. Hacker tells the story of the rise of analytic

philosophy as a "historical movement" that is dynamic and constantly evolving. For Hacker, "[i]t cannot be defined by reference to a determinate number of non-trivial doctrines or principles, all of which were embraced by every philosopher who can with justice be described as a member of the analytic movement. Rather, it consists of different, overlapping strands, with no usefully defining fibre or fibres running through a whole temporal length Hence the phenomenon of analytic philosophy must not be viewed as a simple linear development. It has a complex synchronic, as well as a diachronic, dimension."

The reaction of analytic philosophy against idealism is told as a personal and professional battle by Moore and Russell against the dominant philosophical trend of their time. Their work in logic, epistemology, and language set the stage for Wittgenstein. So did the technical advances in logic by Boole, Jevons, Peano, Whitehead and Russell. Frege and Russell both made a concerted effort to analyze language, but mostly for "clues" that could help the logician. The construction of a logically perfect language was part of the solution to the "flawed, distorting mirror" of language.

The Second chapter explains Wittgenstein's achievements in the *Tractatus*. This book is viewed as a landmark of twentieth century philosophy (which it surely is). The main achievements fall within four headings: its criticism of Frege and Russell; its metaphysical picture of the relation of thought, language, and reality; its positive account of the nature of the propositions of logic; and its critique of metaphysics and its conception of philosophy as analysis. But Hacker traces Wittgenstein's later disappointment with these views, which were errors that required the attempt at resolution in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The Third chapter discusses the impact of the *Tractatus* on the Vienna Circle. There has been much written about the Circle, but rarely with such economy and clarity. After detailing the membership of the Circle, Hacker shows Wittgenstein's relationship to its main doctrines: forging a relationship between philosophy analysis and science, the demolition of metaphysics, necessary truth and conventionalism, the verification principle, and the unity of science.

Hacker then devotes his Fourth chapter to philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford during the inter-war years. This is an exciting chapter, told with much insider information, with hints of the personalities and debates that fashioned some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century. Here we can read about Cambridge's Broad, Ramsey, Braithwaite, Wisdom, Stebbing, Black, and Malcolm. We get a flavor of Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge. Then Hacker gives us the view from Oxford, where Ryle, Price, Mabbott, Ayer, Berlin, Austin, Kneale, Grice, Waissman, and Strawson were busy with their

own work in language, logic, and analysis. Some absorbed Wittgenstein through personal contact (Ryle and Waissman). Others found him second-hand through the Vienna Circle (Ayer) or through analysis of language (Austin, Grice, and Strawson). This chapter is one of the best I have ever read about Oxford philosophy, and gives some cogency to the view that there was a linguistic movement at Oxford, perhaps one-step removed from Wittgenstein, but spiritually akin through the emphasis on language in philosophical analysis.

Chapter Five then takes up the achievement of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Hacker's goal is to show the unity of the *Investigations* (no small task), assuming that readers can turn to the Hacker/Baker commentaries for illumination of the details. He groups the achievements of the *Investigations* under five headings: its repudiation of philosophical analysis and the espousal of connective analysis, its conception of philosophy and therapeutic analysis, its critique of metaphysics, its philosophy of language and conception of meaning as use, and its philosophical psychology and repudiation of the inner/outer conception of the mental. Needless to say, *Philosophical Investigations* is well-known for its uniqueness in philosophy and for what Hacker has described as its ability to undercut previously received philosophy traditions. Therefore, "(Wittgenstein's) philosophy can no more be located on the received maps of philosophical possibilities than the North Star can be located on the maps of the globe."

Chapter Six then examines Wittgenstein's impact on post-war philosophy. It was during this time that Wittgenstein's disciples came to the forefront of philosophy: Anscombe, Malcolm, Toulmin, von Wright, Geach, Rhees, and others. While Wittgenstein considered Oxford "an influenza area," his influence was spread by Ryle, Ayer, Pears, Paul, Flew, Woozley, Hare, Kenny, Hampshire, Strawson, Warnock, Grice, and even the jurist Hart. Harre combined an interest in Wittgenstein with science and psychology. A second generation of Wittgenstein philosophers in Oxford included Hacker, Baker, and Grayling.

Chapter Seven outlines post-positivism in the United States and Quine's famous apostasy from the "two dogmas of empiricism." Several logical positivists came to the United States before the Second World War, and brought their enthusiasm for the early Wittgenstein with them. Philosophers such as Carnap, Feigl, Hempel, Reichenbach, Frank, Gödel, Tarski, and Menger each found their way to American universities to continue their work. Yet, one member/attendee of the Circle, Quine, argued that the analytic/synthetic distinction was untenable, that significant empirical statements were not reducible to sense data, and that sentential verificationism was untenable. These objections cut to the heart of positivism and its Wittgensteinian inspiration, and

had serious consequences for analytical philosophy.

Finally, Hacker shows that Wittgenstein's influence has led to a decline in analytical philosophy, if we mean by that "a tradition of connective analytical philosophy." The center of gravity in philosophy has shifted, with many philosophers now working with Wittgenstein's "new vision and new methods . . . His bequest is a vision of philosophy as the pursuit not of knowledge but of understanding. The task of philosophy is not to add to the sum of human knowledge, but to enable us to attain a clear understanding of what is already known."

This is Wittgenstein's story, and a similar story could be told about Russell, but perhaps of no other philosopher in the twentieth century. This is a story about how one philosopher's influence can change the history of Philosophy. In the absence of a similar book about Russell and his importance to several generations of scholars, Hacker's book will allow the documentation of Wittgenstein's influence to rule by default. This book is well-done, formidable, and breath-taking in its scope. I recommend *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy* very highly. It is brilliant, brilliant, brilliant. I find myself reading it for fun and enjoyment, using it as an encyclopedic reference, citing it as the final word on several key interpretations of various philosopher's positions, and searching for new nuggets of wisdom. Perhaps only Hacker could corral all of the evidence, texts, gossip, impressions, and interpretations into a readable, fast-moving, scholarly, and fascinating volume. I hope Russell scholars will look at this book and sigh, wishing for a companion volume for Russell, either by Oxford's Hacker or someone of comparable gifts at Cambridge. There should be a *Russell's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*, and Hacker's book should be the model for this much-needed effort.



"Reds" (1981)

MEMORY COMES AND GOES: A Video Review

Cliff Henke

Author's note: This series, which has been devoted to recent films, now will consider several older movies that also involved people and events Russell knew well.

"I don't recall them too well," Dora Russell muses at the beginning of this epic about the Russian Revolution, among other things, as seen through the eyes of American communists of the time, "Memory comes and goes." This can be said of all history. We all tend to recall events selectively, and in turn shaped by our own world views. Jack Reed, the enigmatic American left-wing journalist who viewed first-hand not the abdication of Czar Nicholas but the Bolshevik takeover is a convenient canvass for those to paint their own recollection of the times. To the "witnesses," the figures of that era who knew Reed and whose interviews writer/director Warren Beatty excerpts throughout the story, the protagonist was a complex personality. He was at once a coward, a naive ideologue, a rogue, a nobody, and an influential visionary.

The resulting portrait of both documentary and fictional parts is an engaging film worth revisiting today. It won Academy Awards for Beatty's direction and for Maureen Stapleton's supporting performance in playing Emma Goldman. Both are deserved, as well as Vitorrio Stororo's for his sweeping and lyrical cinematography. In fact, I admire this quality of *Reds* most, which joins Stororo's other breathtaking masterpieces of camera and lighting technique (for me most notably *Apocalypse Now*).

Also enhancing the movie's realistic yet romantic feel are Richard Sylbert's sets and locations. The poignant design of Reed's and wife Louise Bryant's (played admirably by Diane Kenton) flat, an abandoned upper-crust apartment complete with initially covered chandelier, is particularly inspired and evocative of the tumultuous time and place. Dave Grusin's and Stephen Sondheim's music embellish the feel at another dimension. So, too, does the supporting cast, which includes not only Stapleton's performance but also Edward Herrmann and Paul Sorvino as resident Greenwich Village lefties, as well as Jack Nicholson's detached, wry portrait of Eugene O'Neill.

Whether Beatty's, or Keaton's, or some other member of the team's choice, the decision for Kenton to wear her hats pulled down so far onto her forehead to frame Keaton's eyes is a splendid touch. Stororo masterfully exploits it with just the right lighting and close-ups, and these give the film even more eloquence of what must have been true earnestness among those like Bryant who were faithful to the cause.

Beatty also plays Reed, but unfortunately here is where he might have bitten off more than he can chew. I have never found his wooden acting style very engaging anyway, and it seems even more out of place given the passion of the time. I wonder what Beatty's contemporary, Martin Sheen, or even today's John Cusak could have done with the intensity and self-absorption the role demands. Meanwhile, the story and script are simultaneously compelling and unsatisfying, perhaps also evocative of the time. On the one hand, the story takes in most of the

great events in the first part of the century, much as *Carrington* and *Tom and Viv* do, plus one more: *Reds* also has the backdrop of the Russian Revolution, which dictated so much of the tension in the world even to this day. It successfully illuminates the paradox of that time -- that dissent against revolutionary excesses would be considered treasonous. Emma Goldman tells Jack Reed late in the story that she plans to leave, because "it can never work." Jack asks her how she can when "we've just started." Herein dramatizes the left's dilemma in supporting the Bolsheviks: were they really a transition to proletarian rule or just another totalitarian state but with the correct rhetoric?

The central relationship between Jack and Louise is far less satisfying, on the other hand. It is no fault of how Louise is characterized and played; she seeks Jack's love, is torn up inside by desiring that much from a man, and comes to terms with the fact that the struggle for power is less important than love and happiness. To me she is the real protagonist in this movie, yet I think Beatty's sympathies lie with Jack. He is somehow allowed to get away with leaving her for a flattering and ultimately vain occupation. Whether due to the mixed record of the factual Jack Reed or Beatty's opaque portrayal of the man, this film sheds little light on what really animated the only American to be buried within the walls of the Kremlin. Yes, memory comes and goes, but like literature and other arts, film is supposed to help fill in those gaps in between.

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THE GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET

Peter Stone

University of Rochester

After laying dormant for almost a year, the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) is once again alive, and spreading the gospel according to Bertie. The Set, a Rochester, NY-based group dedicated to the study and discussion of the life and ideas of Bertrand Russell, has already held two successful meetings in 1997, one devoted to *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), the other to *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (1952). In 1998, we hope to hold many more. Sadly, we fear that many of the participants from last year's meetings are unaware that the group has been revived. Thus, we are anxious to make our presence known once again.

The GRRS meets on the second Tuesday of every month at 7 p.m. at

Moonbeams Gallery & Coffee Saloon, 696 University Avenue, Rochester, NY. There will be no January meeting. The February meeting will be devoted to *On Education Especially in Early Childhood* (1926) (retitled *Education and the Good Life*), and the March meeting to *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916).

The group is anxious for ideas for future meetings and encourages everyone both to participate and to get involved in keeping the GRRS a lively part of Rochester's intellectual culture. Interested people should contact David White at (716)461-3495 or at davidw@sjfc.edu or just come to a meeting ready to listen and talk. See you in February!

●●●●●●●●●●

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

Membership Profiles

BRS members have asked for information about other members in the Society. Here are just a few profiles. If you haven't yet sent yours in, please take a few moments when you finish this issue of the *Quarterly* and send yours in.

Name: Howard A. Blair
Address: 118 Hertford Street
 Syracuse, New York 13210
e_mail: Blair@top.cis.syr.edu
First book of Russell's I read was: *Why I Am Not A Christian.*
Latest book of Russell's I read was: *Collected Papers, Volume 7: Theory of Knowledge.*
Favorite Russell Quotation: "Common sense is the metaphysics of savages."
Reason for joining BRS: Access to discourse on ideas having affinity with those espoused by Russell.
Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: (Re-)developing an intense skepticism, particularly about common sense.

Name: Bruce Thompson
Address: 82 Topping Drive
 Riverhead, New York, 11901
e_mail: BruceT@cat.s.ucsc.edu
First book of Russell's I read was: *Autobiography*
Latest book of Russell's I read was: *Portraits from Memory.*

Favorite Russell Quotation: *"The old world will pass away, burnt in the fire of its own hot passions. And from its ashes will spring a new world, full of fresh hope, with the light of morning in its eyes." From Proposed Roads to Freedom.*

Reason for joining BRS: *To honor an intellectual hero, stay in touch with Russell scholarship.*

Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: *Conquest of Happiness is always good therapy.*

Additional Comments: *Recently acquired three Russell letters in Northern California (they had been in someone's attic) and sent them off to the Russell Archives at McMaster University.*

Name: Christos Tzanetakos
Address: 3120 N. A-1-A, Apt. #5033-South
Fort Pierce, Florida 34949
e_mail: athalfc@AOL.com

First book of Russell's I read was: *Either Why I am Not a Christian or A History of Western Philosophy.*

Latest book of Russell's I read was: *The Conquest of Happiness.*

Favorite Russell Quotation: *"We ought to make the best we can of the world, and if it is not so good as we wish, after all it will still be better than what others have made of it in all these ages. A good world needs knowledge, kindness, and courage; it does not need a regretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by the words uttered long ago by ignorant men. It needs a fearless outlook and a free intelligence. It needs hope for the future, not looking back all the time towards a past that is dead, which we trust will be far surpassed by the future that our intelligence can create."*

Reason for joining BRS: *To get in touch with other admirers of Russell and promote his ideas.*

Recent applications of Russell's views to your own life: *His Conquest of Happiness has been a daily guideline.*

Additional Comments: *As founder and president of ATHEISTS OF FLORIDA, INC., I have introduced his book, Why I Am Not a Christian by giving free copies to all our student members. Also, over 150 copies of the book have been sold either at the Miami Book Fair International, held annually in Miami, Florida, or during the annual conventions of the Atheist Alliance, Inc. in which Atheists of Florida is a member society. In 1994, as television producer for Atheists of Florida, Inc., I dedicated one of the twelve half-hour programs on Bertrand Russell. Main guest was Mr. Lee Eisler, founding member of the Bertrand Russell Society.*



BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY 1998 Call for Board Nominations

Current Directors of the Bertrand Russell Society (all 3 year terms)

Jan. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1997
(about to expire)

Louis K. Acheson
Kenneth Blackwell
John A. Jackanicz
David E. Johnson
Justin Leiber
Gladys Leithauser
Stephen J. Reinhardt
Thomas J. Stanley

Jan. 1, 1996-Dec. 31, 1998

Linda Egendorf
Donald W. Jackanicz
Tim Madigan
Michael J. Rockler (Chairman of the Board)
Warren Allen Smith
Ramon Suzara
Thom Weidlich

Jan. 1, 1997-Dec. 31, 1999

James Alouf
Jan Loeb Eisler
Nicholas Griffin
Robert T. James
Chandrakala Padia
Harry Ruja
John Shosky
Peter Stone

Ex Officio Directors (other)
(terms concurrent with term of office, which is annual)

John R. Lenz (President)
Lee Eisler (BRS VP Emeritus)
Dennis J. Darland (Treasurer)

Send nominations no later than to:

Michael Rockler
529 14th Street, N.W., Suite 1125
Washington, D.C. 20045

I wish to nominate the following individual(s) for the BRS Board of Directors: (1) _____ (2) _____

(3) _____ (4) _____

**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
Membership Profile Form**

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
BRS Editor
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

E_MAIL: _____

First book of Russell's I read was _____

Last book of Russell's I read was _____

Favorite Russell Quotation: _____

Reason(s) for Joining BRS: _____

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life: _____

Additional Comments: _____

**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
1998 Membership Renewal Form**

This is a reminder to renew BRS membership for 1998.

- If you have already renewed for 1998 or have joined the BRS in 1998, please accept our thanks once again for participating in the BRS.
- If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1998 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form below along with the appropriate payment TODAY.** Thanks!

Please mail this form and payment to:

Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer
1965 Winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, IA 52807
U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1998 dues in U.S. funds payable to "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Individual \$35 | <input type="checkbox"/> Couple \$40 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Student \$20 | <input type="checkbox"/> Limited Income Individual \$20 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Limited Income Couple \$25 | <input type="checkbox"/> Contributor \$50 and up |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sustainer \$75 and up | <input type="checkbox"/> Sponsor \$100 and up |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Patron \$250 and up | <input type="checkbox"/> Benefactor \$500 and up |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Life Member \$1,000 and up | <input type="checkbox"/> Organization Membership \$50 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PLUS \$10 (if outside U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico) | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PLUS \$4 (if in Canada or Mexico) | |

NAME _____ DATE _____


ADDRESS _____

E_MAIL _____

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February, 1998

No. 97



*Bertrand Russell Society
c/o John R. Hussey, Ph.D.
1806 Collins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307*

MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1965 WINDING HILLS RD. (1304)
DAVENPORT IA 52807

Bulk Mail
U.S. Postage
PAID
Permit No. 5659
Alexandria, VA

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

3802 North Kenneth Avenue,
Chicago, Il. 60641-2814, U.S.A.

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Chair | Michael Rockler |
| President | John Lenz |
| Vice President | Jan Eisler |
| Vice President/Information Emeritus | Lee Eisler |
| Secretary | Ken Blackwell |
| Treasurer | Dennis Darland |

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY ON THE NET

The Bertrand Russell Society Home Page
<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/brd.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly
<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/gtly.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Annual Book Award
<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/bkaward.html>

Russell-L is a world-wide electronic discussion and information forum for Russell studies, with about 245 members from 28 countries. To subscribe, send the following message on electronic mail to listproc@mcmaster.ca stating "subscribe russell-l" and follow with your name on the same line. The Russell Archives' home page is at: <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm>.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY *QUARTERLY*

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

February, 1998

No. 97

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FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
CHARLES UNIVERSITY, PRAGUE

In a first for the *Quarterly*, this issue and the next will be edited in Prague, where this semester I am a visiting professor in the philosophy and logic departments at Charles University and a visiting fellow at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. I send greetings to all Society members from the beer halls and restaurants of the city often called "The Second Paris." Here philosophy is alive and thriving; even the president, Vaclav Havel, and the former premier, Vaclav Klaus, have published academic works in philosophy. The atmosphere is electric as the Czech Republic confronts the advantages and disadvantages of capitalism in an attempt to join the European Community and NATO. The philosophy department at Charles has even invited me to give a separate graduate seminar on the philosophy of Russell and Wittgenstein, even though Russell's work will be discussed in another graduate class on Modern Deductive Logic.

The center of gravity is shifting in Europe, away from the West, moving eastward to Berlin, Vienna, Prague, and Warsaw. Historically, these are cities are famously associated with Russell. As a young man, Russell committed himself to producing a series of books that were a converging synthesis of philosophy, history, and social commentary while walking in the Tiergarten of Berlin in the Spring of 1895. He also lived in Berlin for parts of two years and wrote a book, *German Social Democracy*. In the 1930s, the Vienna Circle met to discuss the work of Russell and Wittgenstein, drawing together gigantic figures in philosophy -- Schlick, Hanh, Carnap, Frank, Neurath, Waismann, Quine, Ayer, and others -- in one of western culture's most influential philosophical discussion groups. Gödel, Popper, Hayek, and Wittgenstein were outsiders to the Circle, but part of the intellectual climate of Vienna and of Prague, a second seat of the Circle because Carnap lived there. In Warsaw, the so-called "Polish Logicians" were extending the discoveries of *Principia Mathematica* into new realms of thought. Led by Tarski, Lesniewski, Jaskowski, and Lukasiewicz, the Polish School of Logic was extremely influential until most of them were killed by the Nazis. Fortunately, Tarski was saved by a courageous and visionary group of American academics (including BRS Honorary Member Willard Quine) who invited him to the United States just as hostilities broke out. Lukasiewicz was reportedly smuggled out of Poland by his colleagues. Almost all of the rest perished.

You may recall that Quine earlier made a trek to Vienna, Prague, and Warsaw as a recent graduate from Harvard in the 1930s. At that time, these cities contained some of the most exciting figures and developments in philosophy. Now, sixty years on, these cities are again epicenters for significant philosophical and political thought.

As we have witnessed a "Russell Renaissance" in Western Europe and even in the Arab World, I believe that we will soon see more work on Russell in the rest of Europe, especially Bulgaria, where Russell is extremely popular and studied by a dedicated band of academics at the University of Plovdiv and elsewhere. So it is appropriate that the next issue of the *Quarterly* will primarily feature short pieces about Russell and his influence by my Czech and Eastern European colleagues. Russell has been a very important intellectual influence in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe. He was a powerful writer of hope and encouragement when communism ravaged the minds and spirits of millions of people. He remains a great voice of freedom, rationality, humanism, and compassion for people who bitterly remember the previous days of oppression and fear, and who look forward to better days ahead.

This issue's cover features a new portrait of Russell by Iva Petkova of Bulgaria, one of the most talented upcoming artists in Europe today. All of 22 years old, Iva was the artist who designed last year's cover. I received so many favorable comments by letter and e-mail that I asked her to do one more for us. This drawing will appear on the four issues of the *Quarterly* for 1998.

BRS Society President John Lenz has important information about the annual meeting, June 19-21 at the Ethics Center, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida. This is our 25th annual meeting and it will feature films, tapes, papers, and panels on various aspects of Russell's work. If you want to learn more about Russell, whether a Russellian novice or a mighty Russell scholar, the annual meeting is designed for you. Please read John's information carefully and then make plans to come to Florida in June. This 25th anniversary could be a "gathering of the clans." Everyone is most welcome. As a member of the Society, I must thank John Lenz, Mitchell Haney, and Jan Eisler for working so hard on our behalf to make this the best meeting ever. Good job!!!

There follows a discussion about the philosophical methodology and humanist views of Antony Flew, an honorary member of our Society. Flew is emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom. His most recent book, *Philosophical Essays*, will be available in late April or early May. He has just completed another book on critical thinking, *Thinking Straighter*, for Prometheus Press of Buffalo, New York.

I welcome an analysis of Russell's often overlooked, but extremely cogent, work on *Power* by Evan Selinger of the University of Memphis. This book has inspired several presentations at our last three annual meetings, notably by Peter Stone. I highly recommend this review.

Assistant Editor Robert Barnard has reviewed *Interfaces: Essays on Philosophy*

and *Bordering Areas*. This is a book that uniquely bridges the philosophical divide between Anglo-American and Continental thought.

There is also a review of Volume 10 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. This volume was edited by John Slater and Peter Köllner.

From the world of cinema and television, we have a video review from Cliff Henke, the fourth in a series about films dealing with Russell and his circle of friends. This time Cliff looks at a recent BBC production about D.H. Lawrence. Entitled "Coming Through," this production examines Lawrence's infamous courtship of Frieda von Richthofen Weekley. It stars Kenneth Branagh and Helen Mirren. In the next issue, Cliff will turn to the video documentary, "The First World War and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century." Cliff's work has been an important edition to the *Quarterly*. I invite additional reviews of videos or books by Society Members, particularly of Russell's own work.

In the BRS, you are asked to do more than read; you are also invited to interact. If you haven't done so, please examine, fill out, and return three essential items for the Society. The first is our membership profile. You have surely noticed the inclusion of these profiles in the last two issues of the *Quarterly*. They are an important way that we learn about each other, sharing our interest in Russell. Have you sent one? Please take a moment and fill out the profile. Then mail it to me. The second item is the membership renewal form. We need you to renew immediately, sending in your personal information and membership fees. Your support allows the Society to continue to promote the work and views of Russell worldwide, pays for the *Quarterly*, partially funds *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives* (edited by Ken Blackwell), finances the Russell Book Award and the Russell Paper Prize, and supports the annual meeting. Thank you for your support. And if you can, please give a bit extra to help secure the financial basis of the Society. The third item is your voting ballot for the Board of Directors. In the last issue of the *Quarterly* there was a call for nominations. Unfortunately, because I produced the *Quarterly* behind schedule, the nominations should have been suggested in the previous issue to that, and the ballot in the last issue. I am completely to blame for the tardiness of these materials. But we can catch up quickly if you will take a moment, fill out the ballot, and mail it to the chairman of the board of directors, Michael Rockler. His address is on the form.

I hope you enjoy this issue of the *Quarterly*. Thanks again to my assistant editors, Bob Barnard and Katie Kendig.



FROM THE PRESIDENT
THE 1998 ANNUAL MEETING:
"NEW DIRECTIONS IN RUSSELL STUDIES"
JOHN LENZ
DREW UNIVERSITY

Believe it or not, the 1998 meeting will be the 25th annual meeting of the BRS. As announced in the last *Quarterly*, we have been busy making plans for a great meeting. We think we have put together a solid, informative, and enjoyable program. We even have a full multi-media program. We believe it will be as good as, or better than, the meeting two years ago, which the editor of *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives* called "the most intellectually stimulating BRS conference this member can recall attending." In addition to our scheduled speakers and workshops, we also have important business to conduct, such as the election of new officers and much discussion about the future direction of the Society. One challenge is how the BRS can work together with the large worldwide group of people who engage in learned and stimulating discussion of Russell via the Internet mailing list, *Russell-L*. The annual meeting is the one time that all those who love Russell, for our various and different reasons, come together to share ideas. We are also looking forward to meeting new members, members from the South who may not regularly attend the annual meeting, and philosophers and humanists from Florida. The St. Petersburg area is the home of, among others, longtime Russell activists Jan and Lee Eisler, respectively our current BRS Vice President and Vice President Emeritus.

The theme of the program calls attention to the revival of Russell studies in recent years. New criticisms of Russell have appeared in recent works, such as Ray Monk's biography and Philip Ironside's intellectual biography. New perspectives on Russell continue to enrich our understanding of his work and his place in the history of thought. At the annual meeting we will acknowledge this trend with provocative papers in several key areas of Russell studies, including biography, philosophy, humanism, religion, and education.

The Annual Meeting of the BRS will be held on the weekend of June 19-21, 1998, at the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida in St. Petersburg. The address is 100 5th Avenue South, St. Petersburg. Please note: there is also an Ethics Center at the University of South Florida's Tampa Campus. We are at the St. Petersburg campus. Please don't get confused -- come to St. Petersburg. The program will begin on Friday evening, June 19th and end early in the afternoon on Sunday, June 21st. Much of the planning work has been done by Jan Eisler and by Mitchell Haney, a postdoctoral fellow who teaches at USF.

The St. Petersburg area is served by Tampa/St. Pete Airport. The airport at

Conf#

64875959

Clearwater is also an option. There is a limo service at Tampa/St. Pete that is available for \$12.00, dropping people off at downtown hotels or other destinations. It is quite frequent and highly recommended. The Hilton and some other hotels have a shuttle service.

Those attending the meeting have the choice of staying in several excellent hotels in the area, such as the Hilton (813-894-5000) across the street from the Ethics Center (at \$75 a night) or the Heritage Holiday Inn (at \$58 a night). The latter is highly recommended, only about a fifteen minute walk from the Center, or a five minute cab ride. The Heritage Holiday Inn is at 800-283-7829. However, it does not have a shuttle service from the airport. We have reserved a block of rooms at the Heritage Holiday Inn. The special rate may be obtained there by asking for the "USF/Ethics Center/ Russell Conference rate" from June 19-21. Other hotels in the area include the McCarthy Hotel (813-822-4141), the Four Seasons (813-894-7411), the Bayboro Inn (813-823-0498), the Imperial Inn (813-821-2281), the Beach Park Motor Inn (813-898-6325), the Madison House Bed and Breakfast (813-821-9391), and the Hotel Pennsylvania (813-822-4045). Except for the Imperial Inn, these hotels are less than a half mile from the Ethics Center. The Imperial is one mile away.

Again, the Heritage Holiday Inn does not have a hotel shuttle. You should take the limo service at the airport, a cab, or arrange for an airport pickup through either myself or John Shosky (703-660-9279). We will have a couple of cars down there, so an advance arrangement for airport pickup by one of the BRS members is quite possible and recommended for anyone who wants to forego a cab. But make your pick-up arrangements well in advance, so everyone can be accommodated.

Routledge has again offered to furnish a book display with discounted prices for those attending the BRS annual meeting.

There is a lot to do in St. Petersburg. I recommend the Salvador Dali Museum (very close by), the Sea Bird Sanctuary, or Busch Gardens. The beach is also very close to the Ethics Center.

Please register ASAP, using the enclosed form.

For more information, please contact me at jlenz@drew.edu or by calling 973-765-0776. I look forward to seeing you there.



**"NEW DIRECTIONS IN RUSSELL STUDIES"
PRELIMINARY PROGRAM
JUNE 19-21, 1998
ETHICS CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA
ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA**

FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1998

- 4:00 - 5:30 Registration
- 5:30 - 7:00 Dinner (on your own)
- 7:00 - 7:30 Welcoming Remarks, Award of the 1998 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award, and the 1998 Bertrand Russell Society Award
- 7:30 - 8:00 Jan Loeb Eisler (BRS VP): "Humanism in Florida and Around the World"
- 8:00 - 8:30 Alan Schwerin (Monmouth College): "Russell and Critical Thinking"

SATURDAY, JUNE 20, 1998

- 8:00 - 9:00 Registration
- 9:00 - 9:30 Tim Madigan (*Free Inquiry*): "W.K. Clifford and the Ethics of Belief"
- 9:30 - 9:45 Coffee
- 9:45 - 11:15 Audio Tape (with transcript) of Russell's Debate with Father Frederick Copleston on "The Existence of God"
- 11:15 - 11:30 Break
- 11:30 - 12:00 Stefan Anderson (Lund, Sweden): "Bertrand Russell's Personal Religion"
- 12:00 - 1:30 Lunch (on your own)
- 1:30 - 2:00 H. James Birx (Canisius College): "Russell and Cosmology"
- 2:00 - 2:30 Robert Barnard (University of Memphis): "Russell's Flirtation with Phenomenology"
- 2:30 - 2:45 Break
- 2:45 - 3:15 John Shosky (Charles University): "How Russell Taught Symbolic Logic"
- 3:15 - 4:00 Michael Rockler (National-Louis University and BRS Chairman) and James Alouf (Sweet Briar College): Workshop on Russell's Essay "Freedom v. Authority in Education"
- 4:00 - 6:00 Free Time
- 6:00 - 7:00 Red Hackle Hour in Ethics Center
- 7:00 - 9:30 Banquet and viewing of new BBC

documentary about Russell's life (not as yet seen in the United States)

SUNDAY, JUNE 21, 1998

- 8:00 - 9:00 Registration
9:00 - 9:30 John Lenz (Drew University): "Bertrand Russell as a Utopian Thinker"
9:30 - 9:45 Break
9:45 - 10:15 Trevor Banks (Ottawa, Canada): "The Dogmatism of a Rationalist: Some Thoughts on Bertrand Russell's Tendency to Overgeneralize"
10:15 - 11:15 Panel Discussion on Ray Monk's *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*. Invited panelists include Ken Blackwell (McMaster University), Nick Griffin (McMaster University), Mitchell Haney (University of South Florida), and John Shosky (Charles University)
11:15 - 12:30 Business Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society and Meeting of the Board of Directors
12:30 Closing

REGISTER NOW!

"NEW DIRECTIONS IN RUSSELL STUDIES"

**THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY**

FRIDAY, JUNE 19-SUNDAY, JUNE 21, 1998

**THE ETHICS CENTER,
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA**

**100 5TH AVENUE SOUTH
ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA 33701**

To Register: Simply fill in the registration form below and mail it back to John Lenz. Please also include \$75 per person for coffee and snacks, the Red Hackle Hour, the Saturday night banquet, and conference fees and materials.

Name: _____

Address: _____

Phone or e-mail: _____

Please make check payable to John Lenz. Please send registration form to **John Lenz, BRS President, 38B Loantaka Way, Madison, New Jersey 07940, U.S.A.** Thank you.

RUSSELL NEWS

The following are essential talking points for Russell scholars:

- ◆ Peter Stone reports that the Greater Rochester Russell Set is meeting on the second Tuesday of each month at 7:00 p.m. The location is Moonbeams Gallery and Coffee Saloon, 696 University Avenue, Rochester, New York. The phone number is 716-244-5370. The April meeting will discuss Russell's "Nightmares of Eminent Persons." Peter can be contacted at prse@troi.cc.rochester.edu.
- ◆ Phoenix Books, a division of Orion Publishing Company, 5 Upper St. Martin's Lane, London, WC2H 9EA, has recently released a very short work on Russell by Ray Monk. Entitled *Russell: Mathematics Dreams and Nightmares* (ISBN 0 753 80190 6), this work is part of a new series called "The Great Philosophers", edited by Monk and Frederic Raphael. Other works in the series include *A.J. Ayer: Analyzing What We Mean* by Oswald Hanfling (ISBN 0 753 80182 5) and *Wittgenstein on Human Nature* by P.M.S. Hacker (ISBN 0 753 80193). These books are roughly 50-60 pages in length, providing a short introduction to the life of each philosopher and an analysis of an important philosophical issue from that philosopher's point of view. Unfortunately, the printing fonts, the paper, the editing, and the overall presentation recall the pulp novels of past times. The writing itself varies, from an excellent presentation by Hacker to a simple rehash by Hanfling. Monk's work needed a good edit to correct misspellings and line duplications (a problem we often have with the *Quarterly*, too). Monk's choice of material made for an interesting read, highlighting the joy of Russell's discovery of the logic of relations and writing of the *Principles of Mathematics*, in contrast to his dejection over the discovery of the paradox that bears his name. The books are selling for £2.00 in the United Kingdom.
- ◆ Honorary BRS Member Antony Flew debated Dr. David Craig of the Campus Crusade for Christ on "The Existence of God" in Madison, Wisconsin on February 18th. No word on who won.
- ◆ John Shosky spoke on March 9th about "Russell's Hidden 1913 Manuscript" to the Institute for Critical Studies at Paissiy

Hilendarski University of Plovdiv in Bulgaria. The lecture, held at the American Culture Center in Sofia, coincided with publication of Russell's *Theory of Knowledge* in Bulgarian, translated by Todor Petkov of the University of Plovdiv. Petkov and Deyan Deyanov are in the early stages of planning a conference in Bulgaria on this manuscript. In addition, there will be another conference in Bulgaria on Russell in October concerning his work in logic and epistemology. Details are forthcoming.

- ◆ Ivor Grattan-Guinness lectured on the topic "Karl Popper: For and Against Russell" on March 14th at the "Annual Conference on the Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper", held at the Old Theatre, London School of Economics. Professor Grattan-Guinness reminded the audience that Russell himself spoke in that same theatre to a packed audience. The lecture concerned the philosophical and personal relationship between Russell and Popper. In attendance were several prominent philosophers, including Brian Magee, David Miller, and John Watkins. There was much discussion on Russell's view of induction, science, ethics, and politics. Grattan-Guinness spoke of Popper's great admiration for Russell's writing style and clarity of thought. Ivor even showed the picture he took of Popper holding Russell's portrait, with Popper's comment that "This is the Russell I loved."
- ◆ Steve Maragides wrote to alert readers of the *Quarterly* to a reference to Russell in the February 22nd issue of *Parade Magazine*. Found in the "Ask Marilyn" column, the discussion is surprisingly about Russell's five postulates to validate scientific inquiry proposed in *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*.
- ◆ It is with profound sadness that the *Quarterly* announces the death of Martin Hollis, who died on February 27th of a brain tumor. As a professor and dean of the University of East Anglia, Hollis wrote several fine works in the philosophy of social sciences and in economics, including *Two Models of Man* and *The Cunning of Reason*. Hollis' *Invitation to Philosophy* is a standard introductory text. Hollis studied under A.J. Ayer at Oxford, assuming a lectureship at East Anglia in 1967. He then became an important and dynamic member of the university community and the community of Norwich, where he served as

a justice of the peace for ten years. His moving obituary was printed in the *London Times* on March 4th, p. 21.



**ANTONY FLEW:
PROFILE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL HUMANIST
JOHN SHOSKY
CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

Antony Flew is an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society. He is also one of my favorite philosophers and, proudly for me, a good friend. I first heard Tony Flew lecture in 1983, when I was a graduate student in philosophy on a summer semester program at the University of London's Chelsea College, a program sponsored by the Institute of Anglo-American Studies. The organizers of this program, James Halsted and Woody Hannum, the former from the University of Southern Mississippi, the latter from University of South Alabama, brought in Sir A.J. Ayer, Lord Quinton, Elizabeth Anscombe, Martin Hollis, Alan Ryan, and Kenneth Minogue, among others, to lecture to us on the topics in "Modern British Philosophy." Each lecturer had two hours to present a topic of personal choice. Then, after a vigorous question and answer session, the lecturer and the students would often adjourn to a nearby pub, such as the Black Bull or the Wheatsheaf, for lunch and beer. That is when we would take a full measure of our visiting lecturers. How would they hold up under the intoxication of philosophy and ale?

Some refused this trial by fire, notably Professor Ayer, who probably thought that we were lightweights, both intellectually and in terms of party endurance (compared with him we were). Some proved highly fascinating up close. Especially I am thinking of Professor Anscombe, who matched us Guinness for Guinness, all the while offering profound insights into Wittgenstein and the direction of contemporary philosophy.

One of our last lecturers was Flew. He gave a spirited defense of linguistic philosophy, telling us that linguistic philosophers were "Real McCoy" philosophers who shared much with Plato and Aristotle's approach and method. Flew punctuated the air in that lecture hall with precise prose, rapid changes of volume and rate, significant pauses for emphasis, and even some facial mugging to make sure we did not miss a vital point. All of us were enchanted and intentionally prolonged the question period because we did not want the lecture to end. When we were finally thrown out of the lecture hall, several students and I raced Flew over to the Wheatsheaf. As we sat down, Flew surveyed the place and said "I'll have something wet," which in this case meant a pint of Heineken. Then, in that

loud and rollicking pub, Flew mesmerized us with tales of Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and offered reminders to read important pieces by J. J. C. Smart, David Pears, Richard Swinburne, John Wisdom, and John Searle, all the while displaying elegant taste in beverages. Flew also was the teacher, listening to us, finding out about our own work, inquiring whether we had looked at a certain book or considered a salient viewpoint.

The camaraderie, the whizzing exchange of ideas, and the steady rate of patronage at the bar produced my most cherished memory of the summer. I had someone take a picture of all of us that day, and it now hangs in my office, a constant reminder of all that is good and vital about philosophy.

The next day, fully recovered from our afternoon at the pub, I raced to Foyle's bookstore on Charing Cross Road and bought *Thinking About Thinking* and *Logic and Language, II*. I immediately devoured them both and became a great admirer of Flew's work. Years later, I was pleased to invite Flew on several occasions to lecture at the American University in Washington, D.C.

From his early career at Oxford, and now as professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Reading, Flew has been a leading voice in philosophical scholarship for more than forty years. Flew is one of the most important interpreters of David Hume. He is one of the most recognized advocates for university instruction in critical thinking. Like Bertrand Russell before him, Flew has worked tirelessly to make philosophy accessible to larger audiences. Flew has also been a serious advocate of free speech, greater individual choice, market-drive economies, the right to die, racial harmony, educational reform, and the elimination of dogmatic/theocratic government policies. As he recently demonstrated in the first series of Prometheus Lectures, philosophy can be successfully applied to a wide range of current issues, providing insights into solutions and helping citizens and policy-makers avoid dangerous mistakes.

In his own work, Flew surely has demonstrated the value of linguistic philosophy in addressing traditional philosophical problems in epistemology, theology, and ethics. At the beginning of *An Introduction to Western Philosophy*, Flew argues that "there can be, has been, and ought to be progress in philosophy." (18) That is a surprising contention from a late twentieth century philosopher. In an era of deconstruction, post-structuralism, skeptical pragmatism, and other nihilistic intellectual movements, Flew optimistically, and unfashionably, is a "real McCoy, old time philosopher." He believes that philosophy should boldly pursue the truth, and through the faithful employment of rational thinking, help improve the human condition. Flew is no ivory tower philosopher; for him, knowledge must lead to action. That is why I admire Flew so much.

Several common and interwoven threads run through Flew's body of work. First, heavily influenced by Sir Karl Popper, Flew believes that the scientific method can never produce unassailable knowledge about the world. There can never be enough instances of confirmation to allow for certain justification. One falsifying instance can be used to defeat a theory, meaning that all previously confirmed theories merely await falsification. Like Popper, Flew believes that "what must disqualify a theory, or a theoretician, as unscientific is, rather, that it, or he, refuses to allow for any things which if they were to occur, would constitute falsification." (*Thinking Straight*, 55) We do have some indication as to how the world works, but this information is provisional. It can only be the best we have, so far. Scientific knowledge is not eternal and unchallengeable. The demarcation of falsification would eliminate all reductive theories, such as Marxism, Freudianism, materialism, idealism, and empiricism. The falsification challenge has devastating consequences for many theological beliefs. Of course, the philosophical merits of Flew's position could be, and have been, vigorously discussed. But one vital lesson Flew draws from the debate is that no person, political party, religious sect, corporate entity, philosophical movement, or scientific discipline could ever, or will ever, possess unchangeable truth. Therefore, philosophy and politics must form common cause to craft an unrestricted marketplace of ideas. The best way to test a theory is to allow for its examination against all other competing theories, leaving room for further and continuous examination in the future. Free thought is essential to knowledge and progress.

Second, the marketplace of ideas should be accompanied by a free economic system. Flew embraces Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, and rejects the abysmal centralized, planned economies in communist countries. For Flew, people must be allowed to make the choices best suited to their individual needs, and the economy should be allowed to meet those needs, unless doing so would violate the inalienable rights of others. Like Adam Smith, Flew would leave the decisions of investment and disinvestment to those who have the greatest possible individual interest in getting them right. Free-market prices transmit information, provide incentives to adopt the least costly methods of production and the most valued use of scarce resources, and determine the passive distribution of earned income. While government has a role in establishing a safety net for those in need, and for tempering the excesses of free markets, Flew would have the government stay out of the marketplace as much as possible.

Finally, Flew believes that we must avoid indoctrination and abdication of rational thought. Reason must not take flight when faced with the pressures of conformity and group-embraced irrationality. Flew maintains that in any argument between a religious believer and an atheist, the presumption lies with atheism. He reminds the critical thinker that "if it is to be established that there is a God, then we have to have good grounds for believing that this is indeed so. Until and unless some

such grounds are produced we have literally no reason at all for believing; and in that situation the only reasonable posture must be either the negative atheist or the agnostic." ("The Presumption of Atheism," *God, Freedom and Immortality*, 22)

Not surprisingly, Flew is a humanist. He is willing to place limited trust in our rationality. He rejects overarching, all-knowing dogmatic claims. He is an ardent, committed free-market lobbyist. He values individual freedom and choice. He finds theological explanations unconvincing and often threatening to the liberties of others. Armed with engaging, entertaining, and energetic prose, Flew has fought for freedom of thought, freedom of choice, and the freedom to reject the chains of irrational and unwarranted authority. He has sought all of this -- not to be rebellious, cantankerous, or irritating. Flew is far from an intellectual "gadfly". Rather, the underlying goal is to produce a more understanding, compassionate, and tolerant culture. For Flew, humanism is more than "a rejection of all religious beliefs," and the "insistence that we should be exclusively concerned with human welfare in this . . . the only world." (*A Dictionary of Philosophy*, Second Edition, 153) He would agree with A. J. Ayer, that humanists believe that "the only sound basis for a sound morality is mutual tolerance and respect: tolerance of one another's customs and opinions, respect for one another's rights and feelings, awareness of another's needs." (Ayer, "Introduction," *The Humanist Outlook*, 10)

Flew's work in philosophy has sought to make our world more sane, free, and secure. We can be proud that he is an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society.



**BOOK REVIEW:
POWER BY BERTRAND RUSSELL
REVIEWED BY EVAN SELINGER
UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS**

Bertrand Russell has a two-fold agenda in *Power*. His principle task is to show how various social dynamics, including the formation of the state, the regulation of the economy, the maintenance of organized religion, and even the construction of idealist philosophical metaphysics are only explainable in terms of "power" in its various forms. Thus, for most of the book, Russell provides a constitutive analysis of what power is and how power manifests itself. On the basis of classifying the essential features of power, he proceeds to review various important historical examples of the ways in which organizations and individuals have acquired control over human life, which is to say power over human life. While Russell concedes that power is not the sole human motive, he quickly qualifies this

allowance with the assertion that "love of power is the chief motive producing the changes which social science has to study" (11) According to Russell, the advantage of using analysis of power as the fundamental principle for explaining social dynamics is that it makes modern history more intelligible than when such a phenomena is explained by economists and social theorists whose views on human psychology are trapped in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Whereas the first goal is primarily constructive, Russell's second goal is normative. On the basis of his conceptual analysis of power, Russell proposes an ethics and politics of power. To this end, he is interested in the effectiveness of ideas and moral codes in taming and re-directing the various distributions of power. In contrast to those whom Russell calls ascetic theorists -- people who predicated moral evaluations on the complete renunciation of power -- Russell proposes a universal ethics based on the coordination of power with the good of all humanity. Politically, Russell argues for a slightly modified form of socialism. The fundamental difference between Russell's version of socialism and "orthodox" socialism is that Russell's analysis of power leads him to suggest that while "public ownership and control of all large-scale industry and finance is a *necessary* condition for the taming of power, it is far from being a *sufficient* condition." (197) The reason that it is not a sufficient condition, according to Russell, is that it needs to be supplemented by additional safeguards against tyranny, such as additional freedom of propaganda, and the re-structuring of the police force to include not only a branch designed to prove guilt, but also one designed to establish innocence.

As I see it, the most important contribution of the book is not its history of power, but its presentation of Russell's concept of power. Russell defines power as "the production of intended effects." (25) This means that power is not a qualitative, but rather, a quantitative concept. If power were a qualitative concept then we would have an exact means of comparing divergent groups of desires. For example, if I wanted to be a professor of philosophy, and my friend wanted to be a lawyer, we would be able to estimate on the basis of our subjective choices of occupation, and the conditions of mutual success, which one of us had more power. Such a comparison, Russell claims, is not possible. In Russell's analysis, power is a quantitative concept because it is measured in terms of extrinsic satisfaction. "[I]t is easy to say," Russell writes, "...that A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few." (25) Because humans desire to produce different effects, power is classified heterogeneously. There are various ways of classifying the forms of power, each of which has its own utility. Russell's constitutive analysis in *Power* shows how no form of power can be understood as subordinate to, or derivative from, any other. The different forms of power are to be understood as operating within a variety of different language games. As Russell writes: "To revert to the analogy of physics: power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from one of its forms into another, and it should

be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations." (10) Thus, Russell locates the attempt, especially the Marxist one, of isolating power in a specific area, such as the economic, as too partialist to be accurate.

The reason that Russell's conception of power is so interesting is that it operates at the threshold between the volitional and the pre-subjective. On the one hand, Russell's analysis of power has a quasi-existentialist flavor. He suggests that by understanding how power operates, we can re-arrange our social institutions to promote a more socially responsible application of power. For instance, Russell argues that pedagogy can be altered in such a way as to incite students to neither be power-mongers nor timid of their drive to power. In other words., by acknowledging the necessity of power as a human motive, teachers can help students achieve a sense of self, e.g., personal identity which is not subordinate to the logic of the master-slave relation. Such a relation, according to Russell, includes "the duty of children to submit to parents, wives to husbands, servants to masters, subjects to princes, and (in religious matters) everyman to priests..." (75)

One of the potential results of this change is that more people would be disposed to participating in moral rebellions. Russell claims that without rebellion, humans would stagnate, and injustice would be irremediable. (72) For Russell, a moral rebellion occurs when an individual does not challenge the law for personal reasons, but to bring about a new stage of social organization which would satisfy more of the desires of humankind than the status quo. To be in a position to challenge the law or the current power relationship in this way, it helps if the "rebel" is trained to neither be afraid of the laws nor interested in transgressing it solely for his or her own benefit.

On the other hand, by highlighting power as a universal impulse to achieve effects, Russell's analysis goes below the personal to a pre-subjective, or, to use Russell's language, unconscious dimension of human existence. One of the results of power being classified as a pre-personal force is that humans cannot master power completely, even when it is integrated and affirmed in humanity's understanding of how society functions. At best, power can be "tamed." In fact, Russell claims: "Every man would like to be God, if it were possible." (18) This human desire to transcend finitude separates us from all of the other animals according to Russell. Because this desire is proper to us as humans, it cannot be removed without our humanity being annihilated. Thus, for Russell, humans are not autonomous Cartesian subjects, but rather beings already implicated within a nexus of power.

In conclusion, *Power* is an example of why Russell's political writings should be taken seriously.

Although more meditative than systematic, *Power* challenges some widely held

assumptions about human nature and provides the hermeneutic framework from which social scientists and philosophers can both benefit.



BOOK REVIEW:
INTERFACES:
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY AND BORDERING AREAS
EDITED BY JOE FRIGGIERI AND SALVINO BUSUTTIL
REVIEWED BY ROBERT BARNARD
UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS

Joe Friggieri and Salvino Busuttil (eds.), *Interfaces: Essays in Philosophy and Bordering Areas*, Malta: University of Malta Press, 1997. ISBN 99909-2-017-6. Price Unknown.

This *festschrift* attempts to capture the intellectual range and depth of Father Peter Serracino Inglott, the retiring Rector and Philosophy Department Chairman at the University of Malta. The contributing authors are drawn both from inside the philosophical community of Malta and from the wider circle of those Serracino Inglott came to know while he studied philosophy in Oxford and in Milan, and theology in Paris, and through his academic and clerical work. The style and subject matter of the 14 included essays varies widely. They are divided into four parts reflecting the various areas in which Serracino Inglott worked: logic and philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, ethics and social philosophy, and aesthetics. The volume also includes an annotated partial bibliography of Serracino Inglott's writings, as well as a stylized autobiography in verse form from Serracino Inglott as appendices.

The four papers in Part I, *Logic and Philosophy of Language*, are "Communication, Interpretation, and System" by David E. Cooper, "Interpretations: Conflicting, Competing, and Complementary" by Joe Friggieri, "Critical Studies: Nietzsche's Use of Metonymy" by Claude Mangion, and "The Logical Dialogue" by Vincent Riolo. The first two papers by Cooper and Friggieri may be read as a single discussion addressing issues of interpretation concerning the relation of linguistic syntax and semantics to the pragmatic features of speech acts. The papers are especially interesting in that they capture what seems to be the uniquely open character of Maltese philosophy -- one foot in Anglo-American style philosophy and the other in Continental thought. Between the two essays the work of Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and W. V. Quine as well as the writings of Hans Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida are discussed side by side, often in the same

paragraph, in a way which highlights the similarity of their respective projects rather than emphasizing stylistic differences. Mangion's paper investigates the extent to which Nietzsche's work was influenced by traditional rhetoric. And Riolo's paper extends the formal aspects of a dialogical model of argument and reasoning developed by Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz.

Part II, *Philosophy of Religion*, contains three papers. First, John Haldane discusses the epistemological issues associated with the supposed infallibility of *ex cathedra* Papal pronouncements. Drawing on themes from Wittgenstein, Descartes, and Moore, the author concludes that the notion of infallibility is not logically incoherent, but that it employs a problematic notion of evidenced judgment. This paper also includes an interesting discussion of how the doctrine of infallibility has historically affected philosophy, e.g., how the young priest, Franz Brentano's opposition to the doctrine of infallibility forced him from the Church. The second paper, "Scientific Research Programmes and the Religious Option," by Anthony Spiteri examines how the current inescapable theme of indeterminacy in epistemology and philosophy of science may be understood to prompt a re-examination of the role played by religious concerns in philosophy. The final paper of the section is "Hume and Friends on Architecture, Taste, and the Design Argument" by Peter Jones. He considers how authors contemporary to Hume employed Humean themes to attack the design argument by calling into question the evidence of causal relations implied by the experienced world.

Part III, *Ethics and Social Philosophy*, contains four essays and opens with Frederico Mayor's "L'Ethique du temps." Mayor writes as Director General of UNESCO on why philosophy is an important tool for coming to understand the changing intellectual, social, and economic currents of the world, specifically as a means to reflect upon how we can improve the human condition. Second, "Hunger," by Paul Streeten argues that the inequity of food distribution is a root cause of structural poverty in some developing countries. He then reflects on the difficult choices that confront policy makers who would seek to eliminate hunger. The third and fourth essays, "The Rights of Future Generations" by Emmanuel Agius and "The Common Heritage of Mankind" by Elizabeth Mann Borgese, are both concerned with the question of what obligations the current population of the Earth has to subsequent generations. This is a difficult issue, for if one recognizes that the future has any claim upon the present, then the obligation appears infinite. Specific questions related to the "futurity problem" are discussed by Agius, while Mann Borgese presents us with a draft "manifesto" which diagnoses the problematic issues and suggests the outlines of solutions.

Finally, Part IV, *Aesthetics*, contains three papers. First, "Is Authorial Intention a Useful Concept in Literary Criticism?" by David Farley-Hills. he argues that intention is a centrally important concept in aesthetic interpretation, even if we can

never know what the actual authorial intention was. This is because, he argues, it is sufficient intention as a way of uncovering the aesthetic structure of the work, as opposed to recovering a single privileged meaning. "The Moral Import of Fiction" by Gordon Graham follows. Graham's discussion uses Aesop's fables and the novels of Trollope to highlight how our "moral understanding employs a host of images and episodes drawn from fiction, some of them so deeply embedded that they are standard parts of our moral vocabulary." Finally, Alain Blondy reflects upon how the social and cultural character of Malta is related to the omnipresence of the baroque in Maltese art and architecture in his "De L'Ostention: Signes et Signification Du Baroque."

The bibliography, prepared by Mary Ann Cassar, confirms the breadth of work suggested by the wide range of topics covered in this volume. Overall, the essays offer much food for thought while expressing an honest admiration for Serracino Inglott's life and service.



BOOK REVIEW:
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL,
VOLUME 10:
A FRESH LOOK AT EMPIRICISM 1927-42
REVIEWED BY JOHN SHOSKY
CHARLES UNIVERSITY

Bertrand Russell, *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 10: A Fresh Look at Empiricism 1927-42*, edited by John G. Slater with the assistance of Peter Köllner, London: Routledge, 1996, 928 pages. ISBN 0-415-09408-9 US \$185.00, Canadian \$259.00.

In the July, 1997 issue of the Quarterly, Volume 11 of the *Collected Papers* was reviewed, with considerable reference to Volume 10. In the previous review I argued that the two volumes should be looked at as a set, both because of the importance of each to Russell's later philosophical views and the commonality of editors. Yet, Volume 10 can stand on its own for scholars because of the vast importance of its contents to understanding philosophy in the Twentieth Century. It is indispensable for Russell scholars.

As the title suggests, the contents cover Russell's philosophical work from the end of the "Roaring Twenties" to the middle of the Second World War. By this time

Russell was quite famous with the general public, and there was much demand for his life story. So Volume 10 begins with Part I, three essays of "Autobiographical Writings": "Things That Have Molded Me", "How I Came By My Creed" (sometimes titled in other volumes "What I Believe"), and "My Religious Reminiscences". These short essays give a quick, delightful background to Russell's philosophical positions, demonstrating that autobiography is essential to understanding empiricism. After all, a philosopher chooses methodology based on personal experiences.

Methodology is the implicit topic of Part II, "History and Philosophy of Science". However, ostensibly it concerns the central figures of mid-century science (Einstein, Eddington, Jeans, and Levy), and key topics (the future of science, determinism, physics and theology, and scientific certainty). But these figures and topics allow Russell to explore the common ground between philosophy and science, showing why scientific methodology is helpful in philosophy and how atomistic analytical philosophy has a basis in science.

Part III, "Logic and Probability Theory", is aptly situated as a counterpoint to Part II. Here Russell examines the usefulness of deductive and inductive theory, borrowing and expanding the strengths of logic and using them in conjunction with the intuitive starting points of induction. This section is particularly valuable because it contains both of Russell's insightful reviews of Frank Ramsey's *The Foundations of Mathematics*, the collection of Ramsey's work after his shocking and unexpected death at age twenty-seven. There is also the intriguing essay "On the Importance of Logical Form" and Russell's now-famous examination of one version of pragmatism in "Dewey's *New Logic*."

Part IV concerns "Educational Theory". This brief section, containing only two essays, has heightened interest for Russell scholars who have heard the presentations of Michael Rockler at previous annual meetings of the society. As Rockler has shown, Russell is a weighty educational theorist, with much to say in our time. These important essays will provide further evidence for that view.

Part V presents essays on "Writings Critical of Religion". This section begins with the monumental "Why I Am Not A Christian", surprisingly fresh after its initial publication seventy years ago in 1927. Among the eleven pieces is the very interesting "Need Morals Have a Religious Basis", which Slater and Köllner believe to be a short outline for an unpublished book. Russell seemed to believe that the moral function of religion, which was to give "an impersonal form to the wishes of the holders of power," could be supplanted by education and the enforcement of laws by the police.

Part VI is about "Epistemology and Metaphysics". This section includes another

famous gem, "On the Value of Scepticism", the introductory work in Russell's *Sceptical Essays*. The beginning passage, read in Blackwell's Bookstore in Oxford, moved A.J. Ayer to a career in philosophy and many other students to further study of Russell: "I wish to propose for the reader's favorable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true." Ayer committed this passage to memory and quoted it often. It elegantly lays out the revolutionary value of skepticism. For those who explore deeper into the essay, Russell offers a philosophical position as strong and clear as Descartes' First Meditation. The best, only hope for knowledge is rationality -- rationality tempered by skepticism. This skepticism cannot be used to isolate philosophers from the world. Instead, it must be used to foster tolerance and attack greed. A new morality can spring from tempered rationality, "not based on envy and restriction, but on the wish for a full life and the realization that other human beings are a help and not a hinderance when once the madness of envy has been cured." There are eleven other essays concerning issues about knowledge, language, psychology, metaphysics, and culture.

Part VII may be of considerable interest to many of the readers of the *Quarterly*. It is about "Ethics and Politics", the latter of large concern to Russell in the years covered by this volume. While many of the twelve essays attempt to integrate science with ethical theory and political philosophy, there are two visionary contributions: "The Philosophy of Communism" from 1934 and "The Ancestry of Fascism" from 1935. Russell sees one of the many flaws in Marx to be an insufficient account of how scientific discoveries and inventions influence history. For Russell, the growth of science led to modern industry. And, in our time, we know that the fruits of scientific technology, the multiplicity of communication devices, the arms race, and faster, easier methods of transportation can destroy communist states. Thanks to Russell, we can now see in hindsight that certain philosophers can negatively influence an entire culture, leading to world war. Russell names names: Nietzsche, Fichte, Carlyle, Mazzini, Treitschke, Kipling, (Houston) Chamberlain, and Bergson. These philosophers, and others in earlier intellectual history, infected Europe with "the fever of nationalism" and laid the foundation for Fascism.

Part VIII covers the "History of Philosophy", as Russell discusses Plato, Santayana, Hegel, Descartes, Spinoza, and Lewis Carroll. There is one broader essay on "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century", which is a review of John Laird's *Recent Philosophy*. Laird was a former student of Russell's, and this review allowed for a negative assessment of philosophy in the first four decades of the century. Russell believed that philosophy "suffers" because the "impulse of philosophy is dried up by scientific scepticism" and the "opportunity" for dispassionate reflection "is denied by a despotic dogmatism" in many countries. But philosophy can be a

decisive weapon against the totalitarian state, "an essential ingredient in the defence of mental liberty."

Part IX is the three "How-To Papers", a series by Haldeman-Julius Publications of Girard, Kansas in 1942. The three essays are "How to Become a Philosopher: The Art of Rational Conjecture", "How to Become a Logician: The Art of Drawing Inferences", and "How to Become a Mathematician: The Art of Reckoning". They have been subsequently gathered into one volume, *The Art of Philosophizing and Other Essays*, most recently published by Rowman Littlefield. I have actually used these essays for presentations and instruction on several occasions, and the first, "How to Become a Philosopher: The Art of Rational Conjecture", is very good. Russell tried to explain how to do philosophy to a lay audience, not merely inform them of his results. Such methodological instruction is often missing in the work of great philosophers and this essay is highly recommended to answer the question, posed by students: "How does someone *do* philosophy?"

At this point, almost two-thirds of the book has been described. After Part IX there follows fourteen appendices designed to illuminate several of the essays. There are also substantial annotations and textual notes. A bibliographical index and a general index, both of which reflect considerable work, also follow.

A general introduction by Slater and a helpful chronology by Sheila Turcon precede the essays.

This is a volume of immense importance and distinction. In combination with Volume 11, it is a powerful indictment of those who believe Russell's philosophical work was barren between 1927 and 1940. For virtually any other philosopher, these essays would have been evidence of a productive career. For Russell, they may have been less substantial and more general than his work prior to 1927. But that only highlights the landmark, singular progress of Russell's earlier efforts. The early successes should not hide, overshadow, diminish, or indict his philosophical labor from 1927-42. This is a volume of value and substance. Like the rest of the laudable *Collected Papers* series, it should be in every major library and on the bookshelves of all serious Russell scholars. My congratulations to Slater and Köllner for a professional, encyclopedic, and comprehensive demonstration of scholarship.



"DIVIDED LOYALTIES" THE VIDEO OF *COMING THROUGH* (1993) REVIEWED BY CLIFF HENKE

Reviewer's Note: We continue our series of reviews with another film covering the times and issues greatly influenced by Bertrand Russell, though he is not himself a character in the film's story.

First a disclosure: I have a bias against most use of flashback technique. Its overuse, I further believe, too often hides unsuccessfully myriad plot, and other artistic and commercial problems; sometimes a director or writer will use flashback even to disguise a story that is not very interesting. Of course, there are splendid exceptions -- *The Godfather Part II*, *Citizen Kane*, and *Pulp Fiction* come immediately to mind -- but they are damn rare in relation to the multitudes that have crashed on the cruel shoals of bad technique.

Though this film clearly finds itself on these rocks, I am still impressed enough with its ambition to value some of the wreckage. One cannot fault its striving, for it tells the story of how writer and one-time Russell friend D.H. Lawrence met and fell in love with his wife, Frieda Weekley. And what a tale it is. Lawrence was in his late twenties when he met Frieda, who was in her early thirties, already married to a prominent university professor, and the mother of three children. In a matter of weeks, Lawrence takes her away from all that. The episode shocked English society. By 1912, Lawrence had already become a young sensation, making the affair with his former professor's wife even more infamous. More bad technique: Although the dialogue is sharp, even clever most of the time in incorporating Lawrence's authentic passages into the script, a particularly cheesy failure is the use of the poem from which the film's title is derived at the end. Such amateurish stuff cannot be excused, especially since its writer, Alan Plater, is an award-winning playwright.

Why Lawrence can bring himself to propose such a radical romance to her, and why she would be willing to risk all she had for him, including never seeing her young children again, is well enough for a full-length picture by itself, if not a mini-series. (This is not to mention the immense social and political pressures brought to bear on the couple after their elopement to the Continent, she being of German aristocratic birth, the sister of the Red Baron no less).

Yet that is only the first of two stories this short movie (80 minutes!) examines. The plot is actually two parallel stories, both in England, the one set in the present and the other in the period before the Great War.

Despite all that the first plot has going for it (whose central characters are played

with the usual force delivered by Kenneth Branagh and Helen Mirren), I could not decide which of the two parallel stories in this film I liked the most. The second tale is an encounter in modern-day Nottingham between a bohemian, self-styled local Lawrence "expert," called David, and a housewife named Kate who has gone back to university after starting her family on its way. She has come to Nottingham to do research on a Lawrence paper she must write; she meets David in a local library. He offers to be her private tour guide; she accepts warily. It is a plausible, familiar encounter between strangers, who have common but perhaps temporary interest in Lawrence's life and philosophies and it gives the viewers a chance to see just how the great writer's words might become flesh (shameless pun intended) in the present world. These characters are also played engagingly by Philip Martin Brown and Alison Steadman.

That these two stories are so interesting and have so much promise is *Coming Through's* central problem. There are so many possibilities with the themes, characters and materials both stories offer, but writer Plater and director Peter Barber-Fleming simply will not play them off in either. As mentioned earlier, this production made for television doesn't allow itself to tell either story sufficiently, much less two. The avoidance of the tough choices needed to do so probably reveals their divided loyalties as well.

However, it should be noted that Kevin Lester's editing almost pulls the whole thing off. He skillfully escorts us between both worlds, often matching seamlessly shots from the same location where scenes from both stories occur. It shows viewers, perhaps intentionally, that little is different about the Nottingham of 1912 and that of the 1990s. It also gives us a chance to see Lawrence's ideals of sexual honesty and classless society tested in a way Brecht would: same themes in different situations. Which is why a mini-series length would have been even more compelling in this treatment.

Actually, there is a place where one can view a triumph of these techniques. It was executed masterfully in the film adaptation of *The French Lieutenant's Woman*. In it, Harold Pinter solved a similar thematic juxtaposition in John Fowles novel of the same name, though that film's parallel contemporaneous and period stories was a device of Pinter's. He needed to do something about the incisive third-person commentary Fowles interwove in the period tale, the combination of which gave the book so much of its appeal. The feat won Pinter an Academy Award, but again it was a successful departure from my aforementioned rule; indeed, if anything, *Coming Through* proves that, like Russell said of clarity, Pinter's ingenious experiment will ever be both difficult and rare.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP PROFILES

John De La Cruz
3104 Del Monte St.
San Mateo, California 94403

"The first book of Russell's I read was *Why I am not a Christian*. The last book of Russell's I read was *History of Western Philosophy* and his *Autobiography*.

My favorite Russell quotation is about his life, described as being 'tossed here and there.'

My reasons for joining the BRS were my curiosity about people and the fact that I wanted to read more about Russell. Like Russell, I am an ethical relativist and behaviorist. I talk about everything as if I am talking about trains. I have been a determinist since 1984. It has been more than a decade since a friend of my brother borrowed my copy of *Why I am not a Christian* and never returned it. Maybe that guy liked the book."

Gordon Diss
1430 Standish Court, S.E.
Salem, Oregon 97302
gordis@teleport.com

"The first book of Russell's I read was *Principles of Mathematics*. The last book was *A History of Western Philosophy*.

My favorite Russell quotation is 'Philosophy is to be studied because the questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind.'

I joined the BRS because of my admiration for Russell's thought."

Arvo Ihalainen
6322 Colbath Avenue
Van Nuys, California 91401-2207

"The first book of Russell's I read was *Education and the Good Life*, a Finnish language edition published in 1930. The last book I read was *On Ethics, Sex and Marriage*.

My favorite Russell quotation is 'The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.' In arguments I appeal to Russell's quotations strongly.

I joined the BRS because his writings impressed me, so I wanted to support his philosophy. And I miss people of philosophy."

Paul Doudna
10644 Jesskamp Drive
Ferguson, Missouri 63136-4425
PDouda@aol.com

"The first book of Russell's I read was about 40 or 50 years ago. It was probably one of three: *Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind*, *Bertrand Russell's Best*, or *Mysticism and Logic*. Those are the three oldest books by Russell I have in my library. The last book of Russell's I read was probably *The Quotable Bertrand Russell*.

My favorite Russell quotation is 'The scepticism that I advocate amounts only to this: 1) that when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; 2) that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a nonexpert; and 3) that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive belief exist, the ordinary man would do well to suspend his judgment.'

There are a number of shorter quotes that I also like, such as 'To teach men how to live without certainty and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing philosophy can still do,' 'Science is what you know, philosophy is what you don't know,' 'The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed in view of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widespread belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible,' 'The secret of happiness is this: let your interests be as wide as possible, and let your reactions to the things and persons that interest you be as far as possible friendly rather than hostile,' 'Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true,' 'Every advance in civilization has been denounced as unnatural while it was recent, and 'The infliction of cruelty with a good conscience is a delight to moralists. That is why they invented hell.'

I joined the BRS because, as a teenager, I had four heroes, all of them living: Einstein, Schweitzer, Gandhi, and Russell. I liked Russell particularly because he wrote in a straight-forward common sense way that made me feel that I need not be intellectually isolated.

I think that Russell's brand of scepticism, as reflected in the above quotations, has continual application to everything of any intellectual significance."

John Shosky
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307
jshosky@gmu.edu

"The first book of Russell's I read was *Power*, given to me during a long convalescence for my 19th birthday. I read it immediately. The last book I read (again) was *Principles of Mathematics*.

My favorite Russell quotation is 'There are those who think that clarity, because it is difficult and rare, should be held suspect. The rejection of this view has been the deepest impulse in all my philosophical work.'

I joined the BRS because I wanted more information on Russell and because I wanted to share my enthusiasm for Russell with others."

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
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Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
Editor, BRS *Quarterly*
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

NAME:

ADDRESS:

First book of Russell's I read:

Last book of Russell's I read:

Favorite Russell Quotation:

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

Additional Comments:

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It is time to renew your membership for 1998.

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- ◆ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1998 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form below along with your payment TODAY.** Thank you.

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Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer
1965 Winding Hills Road, #1304
Davenport, Iowa 52807
U.S.A.

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**TREASURER'S REPORT
DENNIS DARLAND**

JANUARY 1, 1997-DECEMBER 31, 1997

BALANCE ON DECEMBER 31, 1997 \$973.80

INFLOWS:

 Contributions -- BRS 933.30
 Total Contributions 933.30

 Dues
 New Members 820.00
 Renewals 4,725.00
 Total Dues 5,545.00

 Interest 3.55
 Library Income 98.05
 Meeting Income 9.95

 Total Inflows 9,589.85

OUTFLOWS:

 Meeting Expenses 139.10
 Newsletter 4,603.00
 Other Expenses 193.39
 Russell Subsidy 2,300.00
 Uncategorized Outflows 15.01
 Reimbursement to Don Jackanicz 2,403.50

 Total Outflows 9,654.00

OVERALL TOTAL: -64.15


BALANCE ON DECEMBER 31, 1997 909.65



THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May, 1998

No. 98



*Bertrand Russell Society
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

3802 North Kenneth Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60641-2814, U.S.A.

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

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Russell-L is a world-wide electronic discussion and information forum for Russell studies, with about 245 members from 28 countries. To subscribe, send the following message on electronic mail to listproc@mcmaster.ca stating "subscribe russell-l" and follow with your name on the same line. The Russell Archives' home page is at: <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm>.

THIS IS THE LAST ISSUE WHICH WILL BE SENT TO THOSE WHO HAVE NOT RENEWED FOR 1998

It is time to renew your membership for 1998.

- ◆ If you have already renewed for 1998 or have joined the BRS in 1998, **please accept the thanks of the Society** once again for your participation.
- ◆ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1998 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form on the next page along with your payment TODAY.** Thank you.

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John Lenz
BRS President
38B Loantaka Way
Madison, New Jersey 07940 U.S.A.

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**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY**

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

May, 1998

No. 98

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**FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

This is the second edition of the *Quarterly* edited in Prague. Here the Spring weather has been remarkably beautiful, making it hard to concentrate on philosophy. But my colleagues in the Academy of Sciences and at Charles University have been excellent role models, helping me to learn that love of logic and philosophy can overcome the temptations of a sunny day.

In this issue you will find a membership renewal form as you open the *Quarterly*. I have learned that there are some of you who believe that the placement of the renewal form at the end of the *Quarterly*, as in past issues, makes it easy to overlook this important request. So, by popular demand, the membership renewal form is now in the front. If you haven't renewed, please pull out the checkbook, fill in the form, and send check and form to John Lenz as soon as possible. Thank you for your continued support, because you are the Bertrand Russell Society.

In this issue we have a letter from John Lenz about the death of Lee Eisler, a co-founder of the Society and a herculean figure in Russell Studies. Words cannot convey his immense importance to the BRS or the personal loss felt by many of us. Lee was a dynamic, visionary supporter of the Russell Society. His loss is acutely felt by those who knew him because Lee's love of Russell was infectious and his work on behalf of the BRS was formidable. All of us send condolences to Lee's wife, Jan, our current Vice President.

There is another edition of "Russell News", a series of talking points about new developments in Russell Studies.

Ken Blackwell has prepared a valuable survey of recent reprints of Russell's work. He has included publications dates and the name of the eminent person providing a contextual introduction. How many of these reprints have made it to your library?

In a featured essay, Timothy Childers examines Russell's contributions to probability theory. A distinguished member of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and a scholar in the Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy, Tim is one of the foremost students of probability theory in the Czech Republic. This essay is a valuable addition to the Russell corpus.

We also have a report by the editor on Russell's influence in the Czech Republic. Through translations, correspondence, courageous educators, and dedicated students, Russell has been an important influence on Czech logic and philosophy. The

enclosed report is probably analogous to that of many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where Russell was sometimes viewed as a hero by the communist governments and sometimes vilified by those same governments. As a voice of freedom and reason, Russell had a singular impact on the intellectual climate of this part of the world.

In another report, Assistant Editor Bob Barnard finds that in many parts of Southeastern Europe Russell's influence is receding. Russell is now primarily remembered for his philosophical contributions, not his political or social commentary.

Surprisingly, there is a growing "Russell Renaissance" in many parts of Europe. Following Barnard's report there is a discussion of *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* by Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra of Spain. His book is a powerful example of the growing interest in Russell Studies in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Great Britain, as well as on the European Continent.

Cliff Henke has supplied another video review, this time looking at a documentary about the First World War. As a pacifist, Russell worked to limit British involvement in that war. This documentary captures the issues, intellectual climate, and historical events of the "war to end all wars." This review is important, given the earlier discussion of Russell's influence in Europe. The video provides a thorough contextual presentation of the Great War, allowing the viewer to better understand Russell's pacifism and the opposition in Great Britain to Russell's position.

If you haven't filled out a membership profile form, please do so we can learn more about your interest in, and appreciation of, Russell.

As explained in the last issue, the cover drawing is by Iva Petkova, an outstanding artist from Sofia, Bulgaria.

My apologies for the delayed appearance of this issue. The fault is entirely mine. We'll try to get the *Quarterly* back on schedule with the next issue.

Again, I thank my assistant editors, Katie Kendig and Robert Barnard.

####

**LEE EISLER:
REMEMBRANCE OF A GOOD FRIEND
JOHN LENZ
DREW UNIVERSITY**

I am very sorry to inform the members of the BRS of the death of Lee Eisler in Florida on April 22, 1998. Lee was the long-time spirit behind the BRS, of which he was a co-founder. He held the BRS together as editor of the *Newsletter* for many years and as a wonderfully congenial officer for membership and information (in addition to his many other services) until his retirement several years ago.

Lee led a colorful life. After graduating from the New York Military Academy and Dartmouth College, he worked at Bulova Watch Company and then entered the field of advertising. Upon retirement he moved to rural Pennsylvania and then to Florida.

Lee had a life-long interest in Russell. He was the author of *Morals Without Mystery: A Liberating Alternative to Established Morality Based on Bertrand Russell's Views Applied to Current Problems* (Philosophical Library, 1971). The book was based on Russell's views in *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*. Russell reviewed an early copy of Eisler's book and his comments were included on the front cover of the dust-jacket: "*Morals Without Mystery* is a well-written short presentation of the kind of morality I believe in and advocate." About the book, Lee said that "Unfortunately, most people don't read books by philosophers, even readable ones like Russell. I hope *Morals Without Mystery* will bring Russell's views on morality to people who might otherwise not come across them."

Lee was also the editor of *The Quotable Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus Books, 1993). That book was dedicated to the memory of Russell, "who let light into dark corners of the past and present and saw a happy future for Man, despite current troubles, with Intelligence showing the way."

Lee will be missed by all of us who knew him. He is survived by his second wife, Jan Loeb Eisler, the current Vice President of the BRS. I know I speak for the entire Society when I send Jan our heartfelt condolences. Thank you for sharing Lee with all of us.

####

RUSSELL NEWS

There are eight newly elected members of the BRS Board of Directors: Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Gladys Leithauser, John Lenz, S.J. Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, and Ruili Ye. Each was elected to a three-year term. Congratulations.

Kenneth Blackwell is the newly elected chairman of the board, replacing Michael Rockler. Peter Stone is the new BRS secretary, as well as the secretary of the board of directors. Peter replaces Ken as BRS secretary. The other officers of the society were re-elected to new terms at the most recent annual meeting in Tampa, June 19-21, 1998. More about the annual meeting in the next issue of the *Quarterly*.

Daniel Hearsom, owner of Pembroke Lodge, Russell's childhood home, writes to inform the BRS that his family company has entered into a long-term agreement with the Royal Parks Agency to restore the Lodge. He proposes to dedicate a room to Russell. Therefore, he would like any assistance in providing Russell memorabilia or financial support. He can be reached at Pembroke Lodge, Richmond Park, Richmond, Surrey TW10 5HX, United Kingdom. The telephone number is 44-0181-948-7088.

Irving Copi is the recipient of the 1998 Bertrand Russell Society Service Award. Professor Copi, known to generations of students for his *Introduction to Logic* textbook (now in its tenth edition, co-authored with Carl Cohen), was a longtime fixture at University of Michigan. He is now a professor at the University of Hawaii. He is well-known for three other publications: *Symbolic Logic* (now in its fifth edition), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (edited with Robert Beard), and *Readings on Logic* (edited with James Gould). Professor Copi has been an avid student of Russell's work and a powerful advocate for the use of logical reasoning in philosophy. It is an honor to associate Professor Copi's name with our Society. Congratulations.

John G. Slater of the University of Toronto received the 1998 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for his cumulative contributions to Russell Studies, most recently through his editorship of Volumes 10 and 11 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. Congratulations to a giant in the field of Russell Studies.

BRS President John Lenz was interviewed by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation on April 1st for a series of radio programs they are preparing on Bertrand Russell.

Robert Barnard, assistant editor of the BRS *Quarterly*, recently attended a

conference in Bled, Slovenia on the topic of "vagueness" in philosophy. Bob's presentation concerned the foundations of logic. Bob has constantly noted in his presentations that Russell was the real father of this topic, dating from the 1923 paper "Vagueness" (*Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, Volume 1, June, 1923, pp. 84-92).

David Rodier, chairman of the Philosophy and Religion Department at American University and a recently elected BRS Board Member, spoke at "Logica '98" in the Czech Republic on "Russell's 'Notes on Logic.'" Rodier reports that the paper discussed the historical significance of Russell's "Advanced Logic" Seminar at Harvard in 1914.

Ray Monk, the 1997 winner of the Bertrand Russell Society Book Award for his volume *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, wrote to express his thanks to the BRS. He is currently finishing the second volume of his biography of Russell.

Ivor Grattan-Guinness reported in *Axiomathes* (Number 3, December, 1996, pp. 435-6) that there are some manuscripts concerning Wittgenstein in the Archives at University College, London. C.K. Ogden was the first translator of the *Tractatus* (with considerable help from Frank Ramsey, Dorothy Wrinch, and Russell). The manuscripts are part of a larger donation by the Mark Hayman family in 1992 (Hayman was Ogden's solicitor). Included are six sets of materials directly concerned with Wittgenstein: 1) a typescript of the original translation, 2) transcriptions of Wittgenstein's letters, 3) various lists of proposed changes, 4) letters concerning changes for the reprint of the *Tractatus* in 1933, 5) letters of the mid-1950s from Max Black and Georg Kreisel about the translation, and 6) letters from 1962 and later. Grattan-Guinness doubts that there is anything unknown here. But this is a finding of note, even if duplicated elsewhere. As always, Ivor seems to find things. He surely is one of the most diligent and accomplished historians of logic and mathematics. He is also the author of the *Fontana History of the Mathematical Sciences*, published in 1997.

Petr Kolár, chairman of the Department of Logic in the Institute of Philosophy at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, has started a member branch of the BRS in Prague. Petr is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at Charles IV University and the author of several important papers on logic and truth theory. He told your editor that "Russell has always been my hero." Good luck to our friends in Prague. Let the word go forth. There is some discussion about starting a branch of the BRS in Bulgaria. More about that in the next issue. With other branches in India and the Philippines, the BRS is starting to expand world-wide.

Professor Karol Berka, a logic legend in Prague, recently donated a copy of a letter

from Russell to the *Quarterly*. The correspondence was on stationary from the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and concerned Berka's efforts to compile a bibliography of Russell's writings. Russell wanted a copy and also was interested to discover if Berka had come across any Russell papers in the hands of private collectors. Of interest are the listed sponsors of the Peace Foundation in 1966: the Duke of Bedford, Dr. Max Born, Lord Boyd Orr, Pablo Casals, Danilo Dolci, Queen Elisabeth of the Belgians, Kenneth Kaunda, Ayub Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Linus Pauling, S. Radhakrishnan, Vanessa Redgrave, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, Haile Selassie, Leopold Senghor, and Norodom Sihanouk.

Claudio de Almeida has published *Russell on the Foundations of Logic* (Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1998). The book consists of two long essays: "The Argument of 'On Denoting'" and "Russell: a logica e a teoria do juízo." The second essay is in Portuguese and is about Russell's theory of judgment. Dr. de Almeida did his Ph.D. in Russell Studies at McMaster University.

Chi-Chun Hu has recently completed *Bertrand Russell: Life and Philosophy* (Taipei: forthcoming September, 1998). The book is in Chinese. Professor Hu is the author of a note "Did Mao or Chou Attend Russell's Lectures in China?", *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives*, New Series, Number 3, 1983, pp. 41-2.

####

**NEWLY INTRODUCED RUSSELL
REPRINTS
KENNETH BLACKWELL
McMASTER UNIVERSITY**

During this decade Russell's publishers have hastened to reintroduce him to a new public and have reprinted some two dozen of his books with new introductions for paperback release. These reprints didn't get into *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell* (in three volumes, London: Routledge, 1994), which closed as of 1990, so I'm compiling a complete list. Here's the list so far, with the date of publication of the reprint, arranged by introducer.

Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 1995, Thomas Baldwin
My Philosophical Development, 1995, Thomas Baldwin
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In addition, Volume 2 of *Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell's American Essays, 1931-1935* has just been published. Editor Harry Ruja has included over 50 columns Russell wrote for the Hearst Press.

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**RUSSELL AND THE
 PHILOSOPHY OF PROBABILITY
 TIMOTHY CHILDERS
 ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
 CZECH REPUBLIC**

From the time of Bolzano until the Second World War, the foundations of probability fascinated Central European philosophers.¹ Brentano, Meinong, Lukasiewicz and Carnap are good examples, but it is rare to find a book published in philosophy in this tradition that did contain at least a chapter on probability.² The favored interpretation was usually the logical one. According to this interpretation, probability should be equally distributed over some basic logical particles. If probability is so defined, it serves as a generalization of logic, in that given extreme assignments of only 1 and 0, the calculus becomes the usual Boolean one, preserving entailment relations. The main rival to this interpretation, also widely canvassed in Central Europe, was the frequentist interpretation, according to which probability is the measure of the occurrence of an attribute in a population.³ The highest development of the logical interpretation was at the hands of Carnap in his monumental *Logical Foundations of Probability*. But this development was certainly due to earlier contributions, originating from Cambridge. We can trace the logical interpretation from J.M. Keynes to Wittgenstein to Waismann and finally to Carnap.

My aim in this paper is a modest one: to show that Russell was responsible in significant part for the renewal of interest in the theories of probability. This is perhaps not surprising: he knew all the key figures, working closely with some. As well, he wrote extensively on epistemology and logic, and on probability as well.

¹ More specifically, philosophers trained in the Austro-Hungarian tradition.

² Interestingly enough, T.G. Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia and friend and student of Brentano, gave his 1882 inaugural address at the Czech University in Prague on the application of probability to Hume's problem of induction. More information on this can be found in Rene Weller, "Introduction" and Rudolf Haller's "Masaryk's Theorie der Wissenschaft," both found in *On Masaryk: Texts in English and German*, Volume XII of *Studien zur Osterreichischen Philosophie*, edited by Josef Novak, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1988, pp. 1-11, 39-53, respectively.

³ A good introduction to the philosophical issues surrounding the theories of probability discussed here can be found in Donald Angus Gillies, "Induction and Probability," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by G.H.R. Parkinson (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 179-204; Colin Howson, "The Development of Logical Probability," *Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos*, edited by R.S. Cohen, P.K. Feyerabend, and M.W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 276-298; and Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, *Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach*, 2nd Edition (Chicago: Open Court, 1993).

But even more specifically, it was Russell's account of justification, transmitted to (and via) Keynes, that led to the responses leading to significant advances in other interpretations. Thus I will trace out at least some of the connections from Russell to Carnap, and to other thinkers on the foundations of probability.

G.E. Moore's comments on probability in *Principia Ethica* inspired Keynes to write his *A Treatise on Probability*.⁴ Moore had argued that a society's moral rules served as a rational guide to right action because these rules, if followed, would with high probability lead to right actions. (The relevant argument can be found in *Principia Ethica*, p.162.) It was this argument that in part led Keynes to write this *Treatise*, as he later reported in his essay "My Early Beliefs": "He [Moore] also has a section on the justification of general rules of conduct. The large part played by considerations of probability in his theory of right conduct was, indeed, an important contributory cause to my spending all the leisure of many years on the study of that subject..." (Keynes 1933 [1972], p. 445) But he ends this sentence by stating his other main influence-Russell: "I was writing under the joint influence of Moore's *Principia Ethica* and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*..." (*Ibid.*)⁵ In the

⁴ We could take an earlier starting point, for example, John Venn's *Logic of Chance* (London: Macmillan, 1888). However, Keynes' work is a good starting point since his *Treatise* was the first book-length work in English on the foundations of probability for 55 years (as Keynes himself notes in the introduction). Keynes' book also served as a catalyst for an explosion of interest in the foundations of probability, both in England and on the continent. This, it seems, was mostly due to his account of the knowledge of the probability relation, which as I shall argue came from Russell, and so makes it an appropriate starting point for an article in this *Quarterly*. I should also mention that the date of the publication of the *Treatise* can be confusing. Keynes had completed 27 of 30 chapters of the book by 1910, basing it on his fellowship dissertation submitted in 1908. For citations and other matters regarding the research on probability at Cambridge at this time, see S.L. Zabell, "Ramsey, Truth and Probability, *Theoria*, Volume LVII, pp. 211-238.

⁵ I should note that Keynes goes on to say that he accepted neither Moore's view of probability nor his account of the relation of probability to rules of conduct. In particular, Keynes regarded Moore's frequentist interpretation of probability as untenable. His disagreement with Moore's interpretation of probability seems to have been related, or perhaps motivated by, his rejection of Moore's conclusions about the ethical implications of an intuitionistic approach. Also, there has been much debate as to the accuracy of Keynes' report of Moore's influence on him, and of the accuracy of Keynes' report of the ethical views of his and the Bloomsbury group's ethical views in "My Early Beliefs" (e.g., Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed, 1883-1920*, Volume 1, London: Macmillan, 1983). An account of Moore's considerable influence, drawn from Keynes' unpublished papers, may be found in Skidelsky and in D.E. Moggridge, *John Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography* (London: Routledge, 1992). Moggridge's book also serves as a good introduction to the growing literature on Keynes' theory of probability. Also noteworthy are A.M. Carabelli, *On Keynes' Method* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988) and Rob M. O'Donnell, *Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics: The Philosophical Foundations of Keynes' Thought and Their Influence on his Economics and Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). It is clear from Keynes' many statements of Moore's influence on him, in both his published and unpublished writings, that although Keynes disagreed with much in Moore, and developed his theory of probability in opposition

preface, he acknowledges a broader range of influences: "It may be perceived that I have been much influenced by W.E. Johnson, G.E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell, that is to say by Cambridge..." (Keynes, 1921 [1973]). Russell reports in his *Autobiography*: "I had no contact with him [Keynes] in his political and economic work, but I was considerably concerned with his *Treatise on Probability*, many parts of which I discussed with him in detail." (Russell 1967, p. 71)

There is one sense, of course, in which all the following developments could not have occurred without Russell's contribution, for they all employed the logic of *Principia Mathematica*.⁶ But his influence was more specific: Keynes adopted Russell's epistemology of logic.⁷ As is well known, Russell held, at least at the time of the writing of Keynes' *Treatise*, that there are self-evident truths, "incapable of demonstration." Among these are "the principle of induction" and "other logical principles" and "self-evident truths... immediately derived from sensation." (Russell 1912 [1946], pp. 112-113) The highest degree of self-evidence comes from being known by "acquaintance," which is "an absolute guarantee of truth." (Russell 1912 [1946], p. 137) Acquaintance meant having "a direct cognitive relation to that object." (Russell 1910 [1917], p. 209) Acquaintance "may be called perception, though it is by no means confined to objects of the senses." (Russell 1912 [1946], p. 136) This perception seems to be a kind of intuition, since Russell refers to "intuition" and "intuitive knowledge." Russell also includes objects of introspection, such as universals, as things known by acquaintance. (1910 [1917], p. 212) It is clear that Keynes adopted these parts of Russell's philosophy in his epistemology of probability relations. Keynes used the same terminology as Russell, drawing a similar distinction between direct and indirect acquaintance, and citing Russell's example of sense data to illustrate the former. (Keynes 1921 [1973], p. 12) Keynes drew a distinction between direct acquaintance and direct knowledge. The difference between the two is that the former is the indubitable sensation of experiencing something, the latter is concerned with indubitable propositions. Necessary to this distinction is a difference

to Moore's, Keynes adopted many of Moore's general philosophical positions. As well, the fact that Keynes discussed his then-unpublished *Treatise on Probability* with Moore (Moore even read the proofs) suggests Moore's strong influence on his work. But, unfortunately, we have no details of their discussions, only the dates of appointments (see B.W. Bateman, "G.E. Moore and J.M. Keynes: A Missing Chapter in the History of the Expected Utility Model," *American Economic Review*, Volume 78, Number 5, 1988, pp. 1098-1106).

⁶ This is perhaps not quite correct. Lukasiewicz in 1913, for example, developed a logical theory independently of the trend from Cambridge. Nonetheless, his account of logical probability was almost completely ignored outside of Poland.

⁷ Or, at least, his epistemology of logic as put forward in 1910 and 1912. His account at this time, it should be noted, resembles in many respects Moore's epistemology for ethics.

between "[t]he objects of knowledge and belief" and "the objects of direct acquaintance" which are "sensations, meanings, and perceptions." (*Ibid.*, p. 12) Direct acquaintance, according to Keynes (and Russell), leads to direct knowledge "as the result of contemplating the objects of acquaintance." (*Ibid.*) Keynes gave as an example of direct knowledge gained from direct acquaintance the transition from the sensing of yellow to knowledge of certain propositions about yellow. (*Ibid.*, p. 13) Russell had likewise used the sensation of yellow as a paradigmatic example of things known by direct acquaintance (Russell 1910 [1917], pp. 212-213). Moore of course also used this example.

Keynes followed Russell in calling propositions obtained directly "self-evident." (Keynes 1921 [1973], p. 18) Keynes, like Russell, assumed direct knowledge ("knowledge by acquaintance") to be indubitable: "...I have assumed that all direct knowledge is certain." (*Ibid.*, p. 17) He held that we could come to know probability relations (which are second order, or "secondary" propositions) by "perceiving... [a] probability relation" which holds between the propositions of direct knowledge. (*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13)

So for Keynes, direct acquaintance serves two purposes: it supplies propositions about which we are certain, and it supplies knowledge of the logical and probabilistic relations we can use to reason from the certain propositions to probable propositions. Thus the very foundations of his theory of probability came from Russell. And it was just Keynes' account of foundations that sparked Ramsey's development of a theory of subjective probability, leading to what is now the dominant interpretation. Ramsey remarked: "...there really does not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he [Keynes] describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be perceived; but speaking for myself I feel confident that this is not true. I do not perceive them, and if I am to be persuaded that they exist it must be by argument; moreover I shrewdly suspect that others do not perceive them either, because they are able to come to so very little agreement as to which of them relates any two given propositions." (Ramsey 1978, p. 62. The essay was written in 1926 and published posthumously in 1931.) Ramsey, like many other writers, aimed to provide other more certain foundations, and ended up with a subjectivist interpretation.⁸ Russell's stand on Ramsey's

⁸ The list of writers so influenced leads us to at least two of the very important foundational articles on probability. B.O. Koopman's "The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability" *Annals of Mathematics*, Volume 41, 1940, pp. 269-292, which introduced for the first time interval-valued probabilities. Shimony's "Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation, (*Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Volume 20, Number 1, 1955, pp. 1-28), introduced a complete version of the Dutch Book argument in response to difficulties with Keynes' claim of an intuitionistic justification: "Both Keynes and Koopman justify their axiomatizations by a claim of self-evidence. However, if it is meaningful to speak of degrees of self-evidence, many of Keynes' axioms and several of Koopman's...are less self-evident than is desirable. Consequently, a more adequate justification of the axioms...is needed." (*Ibid.*, p. 4.)

criticism is interestingly ambiguous. He wrote two reviews of Ramsey's work in *Mind* in 1931 and in *Philosophy* in 1932 (both published in Russell 1996). The first review contains a discussion of the use of direct perception, as he and Keynes called it, and Ramsey's claim that there is no such thing. He concludes: "

The whole matter of direct perception in abstract matters is difficult. There are those who use it too readily, and those who will not use it at all. It is to be wished that a canon could be established regulating its legitimate use. Meanwhile, those who claim to perceive a probability relation which others do not perceive are naturally heard with scepticism, although it may well be that they are in the right. Ramsey argues that Mr. Keynes does not himself perceive this relation, but a negative of this sort is always difficult to establish. (Russell 1931 [1996] p.111)

Clearly, Russell felt the force of Ramsey's criticism, but was unwilling to accept it. Concerning Ramsey's positive contribution Russell was quite dismissive: "Ramsey's theory of probability is, to my mind, less penetrating than his work on mathematical logic." (*Ibid.*) His reason, later echoed by Carnap, was that

Probability, if concerned with degrees of belief, is concerned with what they ought to be, not with what they in fact are. What they ought to be must depend on something objective, which ought therefore to be used as the definition of probability. I am still not persuaded that some amended form of the frequency theory may not prove feasible." (*Ibid.*, 112)

Russell's later review, however, was quite dismissive, saying only that Ramsey's now much-celebrated essay "is, to my mind, less valuable than most of the other essays." (Russell 1932 [1996], p. 117) Russell continued in his views, as far as I know. He held a two-concept view, according to which both the relative frequency and logical interpretations are to be correctly applied in different domains, although he considered both interpretations problematic. He also continued to ignore the subjective interpretation of probability. And, he also seems to have held to Keynes' account of how we come to know probabilities.

The other means of responding to Ramsey's criticism was to remove the reliance on intuition. This was Wittgenstein's revival of the Bolzanian theory of probability in the *Tractatus*, which placed him firmly in the Central European tradition. In a letter to Keynes from Cassino, dated June, 12, 1919, Wittgenstein writes: "Have you done any more work on probability? My M-S. contains a few lines about it which, I believe-solve the essential question." (Wittgenstein 1980, p.251) Wittgenstein's theory, though mathematically the same, was derived from

assumptions of logical independence, and thus, in a sense at least, merely follows from the definition of logical structures involved. Appeals to intuition, it seems, are thus circumvented.⁹ Wittgenstein's views were transmitted to Waismann, who delivered a paper on it at the 1929 Prague conference, which was then reported in *Erkenntnis* (1930-1931). Following the paper was a discussion, also recorded in this volume of *Erkenntnis*. Carnap was present at the meeting. He much later turned his attention to these problems, and, in a sense, completed the program of logical probability.¹⁰ Thus the further development of logical probability in the Central European (Bolzanian) tradition was also given impetus by the reaction to Keynes' views.

We can therefore say that at least two of the major trends of probability were given impetus by the reaction to Keynes' views: the subjectivist and the logical. But the reaction was to Keynes' interpretation of the probability relation, that is, to Keynes' account of the epistemology of probability. And this comes from Russell, who continued to champion it. I shall not examine in any detail Russell's account of probability. This was not my aim. I rather hope to have shown the importance of Russell's influence on the subsequent inquiries into the foundations of probability.

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⁹ A discussion of Wittgenstein's theory of probability and its motivations would take us far beyond the scope of this article. Concerning some puzzles with its interpretation, see T. Childers and O. Majer, "Lukasiewicz's Theory of Probability," *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by K. Kijania-Placek and J. Wolenski (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998, pp. unknown at this time).

¹⁰ Interestingly enough, Carnap, like Russell, adopted a two-concept view. While the first mention I find of this in Carnap is 1945, the first tentative mention in Russell is 1930, which is then made much more explicit in *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* in 1948. Russell did not mention Carnap's work on probability. Carnap, however, placed himself in opposition to Russell's view in *Human Knowledge* by approaching probability as a branch of logic, independently of any intuition, and thus in the tradition begun by Bolzano (Carnap, 1950, pp. 180-181).

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**RUSSELL'S LEGACY
IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
JOHN SHOSKY
CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

During the Spring Semester of 1998 I taught a graduate seminar at Charles IV University on "Russell and Wittgenstein". It was a great honor, but even more so because this year is the 650th anniversary of Charles University, founded in 1348. The university has been associated with some of the greatest names in European intellectual history, such as Jan Hus, Johannes Kepler, Tycho Brahe, Tomáš Masaryk (the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic), Edvard Benes (the second president), Jaroslav Heyrovsky (Noble Prize winner in 1959 for work in polarography), and many other great scholars. The university prizes its philosophy and logic departments, which are staffed by outstanding, world-class scholars and populated by brilliant, hard-working students. The philosophy department is in an impressive building that dominates the landscape at Jan Palach Square, a beautiful spot by the Vlatava River. The square, named for a student who committed suicide to protest the Soviet occupation in 1968, also has the beautiful Rudolfinum, home of the Czech Philharmonic, an outstanding orchestra. The university even publishes a booklet about its history with a picture of Sir Karl Popper receiving an honorary degree.

So I assumed that Russell would be well known to the students at Charles. But I was quite surprised to discover that analytical philosophy was virtually ignored by many of them, including graduate students in logic who were well-versed in logical systems. I found little knowledge of the work of Moore, Russell, Ramsey, Ayer, Austin, Ryle, Flew, or Nozick. There was some knowledge of Frege, especially the *Concept Script* and the *Foundations of Arithmetic*. There was vast knowledge of Gödel, Tarski, and other European logicians. In fact, Gödel is probably read more closely by the logic students here than in most American universities. I discovered a deep knowledge of Quine and Strawson, which I believe is due to the lasting impact of recent lectures by those philosophers in the Czech Republic. But Russell was a hollow name for most, vaguely associated with Frege, Gödel, or Quine.

Of course, part of the problem was political. British and American philosophers were ignored during the Nazi occupation, the twenty-year Czech communist rule of 1948-1968, and the Soviet occupation from 1969-1989. I was amused to see that in the Department of Logic in the Institute of Philosophy, where framed pictures of the great philosophers grace the hallways, there were few British thinkers. Hume and Bacon are given some pride of place. Locke is hidden at the end of one hall. I did not see pictures of Hobbes, Berkeley, DeMorgan, Hamilton (either one), Boole, Bentham, Mill, Whitehead, Russell, Moore, Ayer, or even

Wittgenstein, who must be excluded by association. I was told this exclusion was deliberate, a legacy from the Nazi and Communist past, an attempt to highlight the European contributions to philosophy and ignore the philosophers who came from Britain's liberal democracy. There were no American philosophers pictured, which means that Pierce, Emerson, James, Royce, Perry, C.I. Lewis, and Dewey were too politically-charged for acknowledgement. Given Quine's immense stature here, his picture will probably be up in a few years.

But the major problem -- the primary reason for this lack of influence -- was unavailability of texts and inaccessibility of ideas. Western textbooks are prohibitively expensive. I was advised to bring any required texts with me and I did (I used Russell's "On Denoting" and *Lectures on Logical Atomism* (the version edited by Pears), Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, and Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*). There simply was a lack of available books on Russell and most other analytical philosophers, period. I found the students here hungry for ideas, and they expressed great appreciation for philosophers like Quine and Strawson because they had personally made the effort to come to the Czech Republic. But without textbooks students were limited in their knowledge of those figures who had not been translated into Czech or whose translations were now out of print. There was some knowledge of Wittgenstein, which is due to the widespread availability of his work in German, English, and Czech. I will discuss this below in more detail. The availability of texts that we take for granted in Western Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere is so important to the progress of knowledge. Without textbooks, whether in translation or in the original languages, students are severely limited in their ability to explore philosophical ideas in any depth.

As we talked about Russell in our seminar, I wondered about the intellectual history of Russell in the Czech Republic, and of other philosophers associated with logic or analytical philosophy in this century. So I decided to ask around and try to piece together a brief commentary on the influence of analytical philosophy in the Czech Republic. The following commentary is very idiosyncratic and personal, a reflection of the impressions from conversations and extensive oral history. I have no way of knowing if some of what I heard was true.

I thought that Carnap might be a key figure in my sojourn. He had taught at the German University (in 1882 ethnic polarization led to a division of the university into two independent bodies, Czech and German. The Czech University was closed during the Nazi occupation and the German University was closed permanently after 1945). So I asked about him. Several logicians and philosophers told me that Carnap was isolated during his time here, having little influence on the Czech intellectual climate. Because he taught at the German University, he didn't have much contact with Czech philosophers or logicians. And

evidently his colleagues at the German University didn't pay much attention to him. I was unable to find any who knew Carnap, knew a student of Carnap's, or was a scholar of Carnap's work. It was like Carnap never was in Prague, which is a shame because of his vital contributions to philosophy. Quine visited Carnap in Prague during 1932, staying for two months and reading Carnap's *Aufbau* as it was leaving the typewriter. When Quine visited again a few years ago, he asked to see Carnap's home. Despite several attempts, no one could find it. Quine was even driven to one spot, but it turned out to be wrong.

There was less knowledge of Phillip Frank, another member of the Vienna Circle who also taught at the German University.

The only remaining influence of Carnap is in his writings. One of my colleagues at the Academy of Sciences, Tim Childers, found a first edition of Carnap's *Logische Syntax der Sprache (Logical Syntax of Language)*, Vienna: Julius Springer, 1934, forward dated May, 1934, Prague) in one of the many antique bookstores in the town center. This book was part of a series of works by the logical positivists, so there is an announcement in the back of published works by Carnap (*Abriff der Logistik*), Richard von Lises (*Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit*), Moritz Schlick (*Fragen der Ethik*), Otto Neurath (*Empirische Soziologie*), Phillip Frank (*Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen*) and Otto Kant (*Zur Biologi der Ethik*). These works were advertised as published under the general direction of Phillip Frank and Moritz Schlick. The announcement also mentions forthcoming books, including the infamous *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* by Fredrich Waismann. Other forthcoming books include Karl Popper's *Logik der Forschung*, E. von Aster's *Die Wahrheit und ihre Grenzen*, and Richard von Mises *Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus*. This wonderful first edition gives the reader a feeling of the excitement of logical positivism. It is a piece of history. But books like this are all that is left of Carnap in Prague.

Because of Carnap's left-wing views, his works were unpopular with the Nazis. Tim tells me that anyone even possessing Carnap's work would have been in serious trouble during the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The logician Gerhardt Gentzen also taught at the German University in Prague. Unfortunately for him, he was a member of the Nazi Party, although I've been told by several sources not a serious member. He died at the end of the Second World War. I was told two stories about his end. One was that he was imprisoned during the Czech Uprising against the Nazis at the end of the Second World War and died in a prison camp of malnutrition. The other is that he left his home during the Uprising and never returned, having been shot on the streets. But either way his many contributions to logic did not protect him. Violence does not respect scholarship.

Russell's great champion in Prague was, and is, Karol Berka. Of Jewish lineage, Berka was rounded up by the Nazis during the occupation and sent to work as an agricultural laborer. He was later pressed into work as a mason, forced to construct underground bunkers. Toward the end of the war he was placed in the Terezin concentration camp (*Theresienstadt* in German), where he was liberated by the Soviet Army. He returned to Prague and took up an interest in philosophy, logic, and science. He taught philosophy and logic at the Institute Für Philosophie in Leipzig. In the Spring of 1968 he was a visiting professor at Penn State, and returned to Prague in 1969 where was a professor at Charles University and a member of the Institute of Philosophy. Berka was often in conflict with the communist authorities for his work in analytic philosophy and, especially, for his work in symbolic logic. During the communist era, Hegelian approaches to logic were favored for their political advantages and progressive view of history. Hence, symbolic logic was considered a dangerous alternative because it was apolitical. Berka taught symbolic logic, so he was suspect.

Berka's work in philosophy and logic gave him a strong appreciation of Russell. But Russell was in and out of favor. The communists disliked Russell's rejection of Bolshevism, but loved his criticism of the Vietnam War. Russell's liberalism was unfavorable but his socialism acceptable. Marxist philosophers were in vogue. British philosophers were seen as apologists for capitalism.

However, Russell's views penetrated Czech society. His work in logic was known, directly and via Poland, particularly his introduction to the first volume of *Principia Mathematica*. His introduction to the *Tractatus* was read with great interest. His popularizations of science were read, books such as the *ABC's of Relativity*. Some of his books and articles were available in translation (see discussion below). Berka told me that Russell was "popular in the private life." So, his social commentary was known, especially *Marriage and Morals*, which was widely read. Perhaps his most famous book was *Why I Am Not a Christian*, twice translated into Czech. Berka's opinion is that Russell was "the most influential Western philosopher, as a philosopher, in Czechoslovakia."

Berka tried to make Russell's thought more widely available. For him, Russell was "the father of logic" and "the catalyst to anything new in logic." Russell also "knew his capacities -- knew when he was exhausted on a subject." Berka like the combination of brilliance, accomplishment, and honesty. So Berka and L. Tondl published a translated collection of Russell's work in 1967 entitled *Logika, Jazyk, and Veda (Logic, Language, and Science)*, Prague: Svoboda, with an introduction by Russell. The book contained three sections. The first, "Logic and Mathematics", reproduced "On Denoting," "Descriptions," which was Chapter 16 of *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, and "Theory of Logical Types," which was the version found in the Introduction and in Chapter 2 of *Principia*

Mathematica. The second section, "Logic and Theory of Knowledge", had a discussion of language from Part Two, Chapters 2-9 of *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. The final section, "Philosophy and Science," had Russell's "Logical Atomism," from *Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements*, First Series, "On the Notion of Cause," from Chapter 9 of *Mysticism and Logic*, and "Scientific Concepts," from Part Four, Chapters 1-3 of *Human Knowledge*.

Professor Berka has also been involved in other translations of Russell. In 1975, he worked with J. Husak to produce *Zkoumání o Smyslu a Pravdivosti (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, Prague). I don't know the publisher, but it may have been Svoboda again.). In 1993, he edited and translated another collection: *Logika, Veda, Filosofie, Spolecnost (Logic, Science, Philosophy, Society*, Prague. Again, I don't know the publisher.). Section One, "Logic and Mathematics", included the two chapters on *Principia Mathematica* (7 and 8) in *My Philosophical Development*, "Mathematics and Metaphysicians," which was Chapter 5 from *Mysticism and Logic*, "Analysis of Propositions" from Chapters 15 and 18 of *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, and "Truth and Falsehood" from Chapter 13 of *The Analysis of Mind*. Section Two, "Science", contained "Scientific Knowledge" from Chapters 2 and 3 of *The Scientific Outlook* and "Is Science Superstitious?" from Chapter 3 of *Sceptical Essays*. Section Three, "Philosophy", was composed of "On the Relation of Universals and Particulars" from *Logic and Knowledge*, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," which is Chapter 6 in *Mysticism and Logic*, "Logical Positivism" from *Logic and Knowledge*, "Hume," which is Chapter 17 of Book Three of *History of Western Philosophy*, and "Philosophy and Politics," Chapter 1 of *Unpopular Essays*. Section Four, "Man and Society", contains "A Free Man's Worship," from Chapter 3 of *Mysticism and Logic*, "Can a Man Be Rational?" from Chapter 4 of *Sceptical Essays*, "Freedom and Society" from Chapter 13 of *Sceptical Essays*, "Steps Towards Peace," found in *Portraits From Memory*, "Methods of Settling Disputes in a Nuclear Age," from Chapter 3 of *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, and "The Social Responsibilities of Scientists," from Part Four, Chapter 3 of *Fact and Fiction*.

Professor Berka has recently translated *The Problems of Philosophy*, but has had trouble finding a publisher. He has been looking for a grant to defray the cost of publication.

Berka has also published three papers on Russell: "Russell's Theory of Quantity and Magnitude," *Teorie a Metoda*, Bulletin, Volume II, 1970, pp. 35-51; "Bertrand Russell 18.5.1872 - 2.2.1970," *Vesmir*, Number 5, 1970, p. 153; and (with L. Tondl) "Bertrand Russell -- Vedec a Myslitel (Scientist and Thinker)," *Filosoficky Casopis*, 1970, pp. 535-540.

There have been other Czech translations of Russell's work, but none of them

recent. Professor Berka has compiled a list and discovered that the translations include (All were published in Prague.):

Problemy Filosofie (The Problems of Philosophy), translated by Z.Smetacek, Cin, 1927

"Teorie Poznani" (an article on theory of knowledge), translated by J. Schutzner, *Ruch Filosoficky*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1928

Proc Nejsem Krestan (Why I Am Not a Christian), translator unknown, Volna Myslenka, 1928. There was another translation by F. Kejdana for Orbis in 1961.

Boj o Stesti (The Conquest of Happiness), translated by L. Vymetal, Orbis, 1931

Manzelstvi a Mravnost (Marriage and Morals), translated by O. Voadlo and R. Voadlova, Aventinum, 1931, Second Edition 1947

O Vychove Zejmina v Ranem Detstve (On Education, Especially in Early Childhood), translated by J. Hrusa, Orbis, 1932

Prospelo Nabozenstvi Civilizaci? (Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilization?), translated by K. Planansky, Volna Myslenka, 1935

Svoboda a Organizace: 1814-1914 (Freedom and Organization: 1814-1914), translated by J. Kriz, Delnicke Nakladatel Stvi (Worker's Publishing House), 1948

Berka has been a strong advocate for Russell, sometimes at considerable personal risk. But his integrity has guided him during the times when Russell was unpopular with the authorities. Because he has experienced the prison camps, he knows the worst that can happen. He told me that, if you are of a certain age in the Czech Republic, between the Nazis and the Communists, "then you probably spent some time in prison if you were a good person."

Now, in retirement, he is still active in philosophy and logic. I have witnessed Berka in action at the Golden Lion Pub where he meets with colleagues twice a week over beer to discuss their work informally. This is the pub where Václav Havel, Bill Clinton, and the late, beloved Bohumil Hrabal (author of *Closely Observed Trains* and many other delightful books) sat and drank beer during Clinton's state visit (Clinton is very popular here because he went out to the pubs with Havel). There is even a picture of the three of them on one wall. This is a pub that caters to locals and shuns tourists, so Clinton saw the real Prague. Twice a week Berka and his colleagues hold court here: listening, lecturing, advising, encouraging, laughing, gossiping, drinking, and speculating on the quality

of various local brews. One of my most cherished, unexpected experiences in Prague was to be invited to a session at the "Lion", escorted by Berka. I was dazzled by stories of various philosophical figures in the Czech Republic and elsewhere, as one philosopher after another spoke to me about past memories or current projects. I later told Tim Childers that I learned more about Czech philosophy in one hour at the "Lion" than in several weeks of discussion elsewhere, further cementing my view that philosophy and beer go very well together.

In whatever setting, Berka is a survivor who has been tested by the authorities, by the events of history, and by the horrors of war. His honesty and integrity have never deserted him.

Another philosopher who was a proponent of analytic philosophy was the late Pavel Tichy. Tichy was born in 1936 in Brno, that great city associated with so many philosophers and musicians. He taught at Charles University from 1961-1968 and then left at the time of the Soviet occupation. He became a research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Exeter and received a Ph.D. from Exeter in 1971. He then assumed a lectureship at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, where he became one of the bright lights in a well-regarded department that includes Charles Pigden and Tichy's wife, Jindra. He stayed at Otago for many years, with a brief interruption as a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh from 1976-1977. He rose to the rank of professor in 1981. Tragically, Tichy died in 1994, just weeks before returning to Prague to assume a professorship at Charles. His loss is still deeply lamented in Prague.

Tichy was incredibly influential in the Czech Republic, even during his exile. You cannot enter into a prolonged philosophical conversation, hear a presentation on modern philosophy, read a syllabus about a logic or a contemporary philosophy class, or go to a conference without hearing his name. One friend of Tichy's, the widely-respected Pavel Materna, has worked very hard to publicize Tichy's work. Materna spoke to me of the importance of Tichy's scholarship ("the views of famous men are the milestones of progress"), especially his "Transparent Intentional Logic", which I won't try to explain here. But I refer the reader to Tichy's many published articles in Western journals and to *The Foundations of Frege's Logic* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988). Tichy was also a close student of Russell, with important observations about the theory of types and theory of denoting in *The Foundations of Frege's Logic*. Many of Tichy's unpublished papers, together with an appreciation by Materna, have been translated into English and gathered into an issue of the journal *From the Logical Point of View*, Volume III, Number 2, 1994. The journal is published by the Institute of Philosophy. Personally, I also recommend "The Scandal of Linguistics," an essay published in an earlier volume of the same journal (Volume I, Number 3, 1992, pp. 70-80).

There Tichy argues that linguists haven't made much progress in understanding the nature of language or the real uses of meaning. He also claims that language cannot be viewed as a game. Rather, "it is one of the most important weapons in our struggle for survival." (p. 80) I must admit I'm still trying to learn about Tichy and I don't claim to know much more than I've written here. But I do recommend his work to anyone who wants to understand Czech philosophy. He is a central figure in today's philosophical discussions.

So far I have spoken of Carnap, Frank, Gentzen, and Russell. Perhaps I should add a few comments about Wittgenstein. The study of Wittgenstein has flourished in Prague, although with less intensity or recognizable impact than in the United States or the United Kingdom. There have been two recent translations concerning Wittgenstein into Czech that deserve mention. One is a fine translation of the *Philosophical Investigations (Filosofická Zkoumání)* by Jiri Prechar. Published by Filosofia in 1998, the main publishing house of philosophical texts in Prague, this affordable (about \$6.00), handsome publication has made Wittgenstein's later thought accessible at the same time as the appearance of a translation of Ray Monk's *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (Wittgenstein Udel Genia)*, Prague: Hynek, 1996) by Otakar Vochoc, my office mate in the Academy of Sciences. Mr. Vochoc is one of the premier translators of philosophical texts into Czech, having also just finished a translation of George Simmel's work (*Penize v Moderni Kulture a Jine Eseje*, Sociologické Nakladatelství, 1997). The Monk translation is in virtually every bookstore. Several of my students had already read Monk's book or were in the process of reading it. Many only knew of Russell through Wittgenstein. Most of my students had read something by Wittgenstein prior to my seminar (usually the *Tractatus*, with a rough split between those who had read the German text or the English translation, both with the Russell introduction).

However, while there was some knowledge of Wittgenstein, there was very little understanding of his logical discoveries. Most of my logic students were well-versed in various logical systems. But they did not have a deep background in the applications of logic to philosophy. In particular, there was little evidence of any thought about the implications of the *Tractatus*. In another graduate seminar I taught on philosophical logic, I was staggered by the lack of thought about the nature of logic or its relationship to the formation or use of propositions.

Frankly, the Czech students I encountered were as good as any students in the world at the development of logical systems in propositional, quantificational, modal, fuzzy, or deontic logics. Yet, there was a clear need for more thought about what these systems do, what the propositions in these systems mean, and the application of logical systems. This is a critique that could be given of most logic students. I simply found that same need in Prague.

The actual teaching of logic at Charles University is first-class, and perhaps best described as "world-class." The Department of Logic at Charles University is outstanding. The course offerings give students a thorough background of historical and current work in logic.

The scholarship at Charles is also notable. I was very impressed by a new book, *Logika a Etika (Logic and Ethics)*, written by Kolár and Vladimír Svoboda. It was published by Filozofia in 1997. Kolár I have mentioned above and elsewhere in this edition of the *Quarterly*. Svoboda also teaches courses in logic and deontic logic at Charles and is in the Academy's Department of Logic. The book is an attempt to look at meta-ethics (especially deontic logic) from a logical standpoint, or logic from a meta-ethical standpoint. The availability of this book is remarkable, with copies everywhere. Kolár and Svoboda are using the book in the classroom with much success. I hope that we will soon see a translation into English.

In conclusion, I searched for Carnap and Frank in Prague. I did not find them. I heard of Gentzen, who died tragically, a victim of politics, nationalism, and war's brutality. I found Berka, a man who respected Russell and worked against considerable political resistance to disseminate Russell's work. I am sure that Russell understood and respected Berka's efforts, which he certainly knew about, as evidenced by the two letters of correspondence from Russell to Berka. And I discovered that Wittgenstein is now a powerful influence in Prague, thanks to the availability of his work in translation and Monk's biography. In this most literate and cultured of countries, with its well-educated and gentle people searching for economic and cultural contact with Western Europe, Russell may again have a role in forging a united, democratic continent. But unless his books are available, his influence will be limited to those who are fortunate enough to find him in a library or second-hand store. Ideas have consequences, but only if the ideas are publicly known.

For those who might wish to read more about the Czech Republic, may I recommend three important books. One is Timothy Garton Ash's *The Magic Lantern*, New York: Vintage Books, 1993 (published in Great Britain by Granta Books of Cambridge in 1990 as *We the People*). Ash is a fellow of St. Anthony's College, Oxford, and is the great historian of contemporary Eastern and Central Europe. This book is about the fall of communism in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. He was an eye-witness to many of the important events and knew most of the key dissidents. He is very popular in the Czech Republic. A powerful book about life under the Nazis and Communists is Heda Margolius Kovaly's *Prague Farewell*. It has been published by various houses in both Czech and English since 1988. The version I recommend is by Indigo Press in 1997. Kovaly survived the concentration camps, married an influential member

of the Community Party who was purged and executed as part of the infamous Slansky Trial, escaped to the West, worked at Harvard Law School, and then returned in 1996 to live in Prague. Her love of Prague and her candid discussion of Czech history will stay with you long after finishing the book. I have given it to several friends to read. I also recommend Jiri Weil's *Life with a Star*, the most profound, unforgettable book about Jewish life during the Nazi Occupation of Prague. This book has been praised as "one of the finest novels of the century" (*The Independent*), and rightly so. It is the only book I've ever read that I simply could not put down, no matter how sleepy I was or how hard I tried to think about something else. It is disturbing, gripping, and courageous.

I should also add a word about Czech literature, although the quality of Czech writing is as well-known and admired as Czech beer. But if you haven't read something by Ivan Klima, Milan Kundera, Josef Skvorecky, Ludvik Vaculik, or the great Bohumil Hrabal, then I strongly urge you to include them on your list. These are great, timeless writers who have much to teach us.

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**RUSSELL IN WAITING:
RUSSELL'S INFLUENCE
IN EASTERN EUROPE
ROBERT BARNARD
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In this brief note it is my aim to acquaint the reader with some of the things I have recently learned about the status of Russell's writings and related themes of philosophical interest in various parts of Eastern Europe. While we often think of Vienna as perpetually having a rich intellectual tradition, the fact that most of Southeastern Europe was unified politically, and to some extent culturally, under the Austro-Hungarian Empire has slowly faded from most people's thinking. One result of this unification was a common intellectual heritage, especially in the development of philosophy prior to World War I. This heritage is deeply rooted in the philosophic "descriptive psychology" of Franz Brentano but has robust branches which extend into Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia. The connection to Russell emerges from his reaction to Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* in the early 1900s.

It is natural to say that one cannot really understand a thinker unless one comes to know those who have influenced him and those against whom he has reacted. Until recently, English speaking philosophy has all but ignored the work of

Meinong, except as an historical curiosity, and often when it was considered, distorted second-handed characterizations were treated canonically. However, anyone who goes back to read Russell's original articles on Meinong in *Mind*, prior to his *volte face* in 1905's "On Denoting," will find Russell a surprisingly sympathetic commentator. It is therefore only an historical accident that Meinong quickly faded from view as Russell's work came to be more influenced by Wittgenstein, and then later as he reacted against Wittgenstein and his interests started to range more widely. But this much is preface.

One reason Meinong is an all but lost interlocutor with Russell's philosophy is that his work is not widely available to those who, unlike Russell, do not read German. I have recently learned that Russell's work shares a similar fate in some parts of Eastern Europe. According to Professor Matjaz Potre of the University of Ljubljana in the Republic of Slovenia, one of the main barriers to a wider appreciation of Russell's work is the fact that very few of his texts have been translated into the national languages of emerging post-communist Europe. When I asked Professor Potre if he could recall anyone recently teaching a course focusing upon Russell's work, he could only point to one: an interdisciplinary seminar which read the introduction to *Principia Mathematica*. Still, even there, it was one text among many, and made more difficult by that fact that the Slovenian students had to read it in non-native Croatian. Those who know the work in question will sympathize, for the text in question is taxing enough in English.

Potre recalled that among the works by Russell available in Slovenia, though not all in Slovene, were *Principia Mathematica*, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, *Problems of Philosophy*, *The Nature of Acquaintance*, and *Logical Atomism*. At first this list seems encouraging, for surely Russell the mathematician and logician must be universally read. But, Potre indicated that, if Russell is mentioned, it is almost always in association with the theory of descriptions, not his work on the foundations of mathematics. And, of course, it is not surprising that much of Russell's work on social themes would not have been available in formerly communist Eastern Europe. Further, this situation is made more difficult by the limited development of the publishing industry in these areas. But there is hope that this may change one day.

Recently, interest and participation in analytic philosophy has been expanding greatly in Southeastern Europe. At the same time the old intellectual connections among the universities of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire have been reasserting themselves, encouraging a vibrant revitalization of intellectual life. There is a very active contingent of Slovenes and Croatians in the European Society for Analytic Philosophy and a number of significant conferences have been held in Slovenia and Croatia in the last 15 years on topics in analytic metaphysics

and epistemology, as well as philosophy of mind and cognitive science. These conferences have drawn some of the top analytic philosophers from Great Britain and the United States. But the flow of ideas is in both directions. Professor Potre is an example. His research during a recent Fulbright Fellowship in the United States was on the relations between early phenomenology and contemporary cognitive science. He also currently holds an editorial position with *Acta Analytica*, the premier journal of analytic philosophy on the European continent.

In conclusion, despite his lack of prominence in Southeastern Europe, I suspect Russell would be content with both the pace and direction of change. Russell, too, often sought to come to know a place or culture better by experiencing it firsthand. Recall his visits to Germany, Russia, China, and the United States. So, as we seek to better understand Russell, we must come to know figures like Meinong and Brentano. And, as those studying the tradition of Meinong and Brentano look back, they will find Russell waiting for them.

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**THE MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
BERTRAND RUSSELL
BY FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ-CONSUEGRA
REVIEWED BY
JOHN SHOSKY
CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

Francisco A. Rodriguez-Consuegra, *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell: Origins and Development* (Boston/Basel/Berlin: Birkhauser Verlag, 1991) 236 pp. It may seem strange to review a book that is now seven years old. But *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* is a landmark publication, both in terms of its scholarship and the historical value of its appearance. Any serious student of Russell should possess a copy of this brilliant, cogent, and thorough book. Because this issue of the *Quarterly* concerns Russell studies in Europe, it is important to mention this fine work published by one of the leading scholars on Russell on the continent. Rodriguez-Consuegra is to be congratulated on a fine presentation, and for having the courage and persistence to devote himself to unearthing the sources, influences, and stimulants for Russell's mathematical philosophy. *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* is highly recommended, both as a careful description of Russell's efforts and achievements, and as an important history of the development of mathematical philosophy in the first quarter of the twentieth century. I agree with Ivor Grattan-Guinness in his preface: Rodriguez-Consuegra has "launched a veritable one-man Armada upon

the history of Russell's logical thought" (xiv).

The book offers five lengthy chapters. The first concerns "Methodological and Logician Background." Russell was a determined, eager, and encyclopedic student of his predecessors. The rise of quantificational logic, engineered by Boole, Frege, Schroeder, and Peano, provided the genealogy for Russell's achievements. The groundbreaking discoveries of Cantor and Dedekind were inspirational to Russell. This chapter shows how vital these influences are in understanding Russell's goals, methodology, and direction. Logicism, the attempt to deduce mathematics (and covertly knowledge of the external world), from logic was a direct result of the discoveries of Russell's predecessors. This chapter should be required reading for graduate comprehensive examinations that test the evolution of mathematical logic from 1847 to 1901. There is also a rare discussion of Russell's *Foundations of Geometry*, submitted for a fellowship dissertation in 1895 and later published by Cambridge in 1897.

The second chapter deals with Russell's "Unpublished Mathematical Philosophy: 1898-1900." The central event in Russell's mathematical/logical development was the Paris Congress of 1900, where he met Peano. However, prior to July, 1900, Russell had examined many of the issues that would figure in his later work. Drawing upon these unpublished manuscripts (now found in the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Volumes 2 and 3), Rodriguez-Consuegra shows Whitehead and Cantor's influence on Russell, and how logic came to have a "philosophical priority" over mathematics in the logicist program. One of the great strengths of this book is that Russell's reliance on logic to address problems in ontology is repeatedly highlighted and examined. The logicist program offered a chance to uncover knowledge about the external world, and Russell recognized the mutual advantage of linking logic and epistemology. Russell's logical realism can be traced to this period, revealing an epistemological agenda well before Russell's more obvious steps in the *Problems of Philosophy*, the 1912 "shilling shocker", and *Theory of Knowledge*, the unpublished manuscript of 1913. Incidentally, Wittgenstein hated both of these efforts, in part because he clearly understood Russell's intention to use logic as covert epistemology.

The third chapter concerns "The Contribution of Peano and his School." Russell came to the Paris Congress looking for a mathematical logic that could satisfy the needs of the logicist program and his own demands for philosophical progress. He left armed with Peano's logic of relations, elegant new symbolism, and a cogent view of material implication. Russell said that he spent one month digesting everything that Peano wrote, and then in the Fall of 1900 began writing the monumental *Principles of Mathematics*. Popper, Quine, and many others have paid much tribute to this book, which was a precursor to *Principia Mathematica*. But few scholars have actually examined the writings of Peano and explored the links

them to Russell. This chapter fills that void admirably.

A fourth chapter looks at the *Principles of Mathematics*, and its use of symbolism, class concepts, indefinables, relations, propositional functions, material implication, and an early atomistic structure. The definitions for cardinal numbers, ordinal numbers, and real numbers are explicated and analyzed. This chapter is actually a continuation of the previous one, because it ends with a long list of lessons Russell learned from Peano.

Finally, in the last chapter, Rodriguez-Consuegra re-examines the "Philosophical and Methodological Problems" confronting Russell. Like Frege before him, Russell's methodology is best understood by examining the use of definitions, which are the linchpins of his entire enterprise. We also see a clear emergence of Russell's use of abstraction, logical analysis, and relational logic.

I now move from a review of the book itself to a wider discussion of Russellian scholarship. Since 1990, there has been a renaissance in Russellian scholarship, of which this book is a part, primarily motivated by new explorations of Russell's work from the misguided idealism of the late 1890s to the publication of his lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" in 1917-1918. During this period, Russell churned out an enormously rich, deep, and lasting legacy. Consider just a few of his publications: "The Logic of Relations" in 1901, the discovery of Russell's Paradox in 1901 (if not earlier) and communicated to Frege in 1902, the *Principles of Mathematics* in 1903, "On Denoting" and "The Existential Import of Propositions" in 1905, "Mathematical Philosophy Based on a Theory of Types" in 1908, *Principia Mathematica* (with Whitehead) in 1910, his unpublished manuscript *Theory of Knowledge* in 1913, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" in 1914, *Our Knowledge of the External World* in 1914, and the profound "Philosophy of Logical Atomism" in 1917-1918. During these two decades, Russell found the most important paradox of the century, explicated his theory of descriptions and theory of types, constructed his logical atomism, re-invigorated empiricism, and developed new logical techniques. He played a leading role in the rise of logicism. Russell also had formative interactions with Peano, Frege, Couturat, Whitehead, Moore, James, Hardy, Wittgenstein, and Dewey. In addition, the Russell of this period directly inspired Wittgenstein's work, and later stimulated the work of American logicians (Lewis, Sheffer, and Quine), the Vienna Circle (especially Carnap and Ayer), and the anti-Circle Popper and Gödel. Arguably, Russell is also the key counterpoint of linguistic philosophy, where he is both a godfather and favorite target.

Yet, surprisingly, at the end of the 1980s, Russell was the scholastic equivalent of yesterday's papers. From Russell's death in 1970 until 1989, Russellian scholarship seemed sparse, mostly mopping up old encounters, and leaving the

impression that work on Russell had been exhausted. Russell never wanted disciples, and he didn't have many. Ayer, Quine, and many others associated with Russell were too independent, talented, and honest to become Russell's mouthpiece. Also, Russell's clear, straightforward prose left little room for re-interpretation.

Russell's errors were well known, and his virtues forgotten. One of my own professors once asked me, "How can you like Russell, when he was so wrong about everything he ever wrote?" There were many in academic philosophy who shared a disdain for Russell.

There was also an important, powerful crossing current -- the almost mythic figure of Wittgenstein, who seemed to become all things to some people. Elizabeth Anscombe once wrote that it was a tragedy that Wittgenstein had become a "cult figure." It was a double tragedy because Wittgenstein's popularity was at Russell's expense. For example, the Derek Jarman film on Wittgenstein pictures Russell as a doddering and perplexed oaf, whereas Wittgenstein is heroically tortured and relentlessly driven to uncover the truth in the world. In my view, many philosophers are now emerging from the shadow of Wittgenstein, and welcome a reassessment of Russell.

Russell was, after all, his own worst critic, and, after his death, other critics finally had the field to themselves. Michael Dummett pushed Frege, often at Russell's expense. Richard Rorty pushed pragmatism, Derrida, or both, finding Russell mistaken, old-fashioned, and philosophically quaint. It was hard to find a good word about Russell anywhere. He seemed destined for quick relegation to obscurity, not escalating significance.

All of that began to change in 1990, when Hylton published his magnificent *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy*. Hylton demonstrated that Russell's early work had been insufficiently examined. For too long, Russell's own analysis and that of his critics was taken to be the final word. But Hylton showed that fresh insights could be found, and that there was a voluminous amount of unpublished material that needed scrutiny. Such an enterprise showed a depth and force in Russell's work that recalled the relevance of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* and the fruitfulness of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In my view, the great achievement of Hylton's book was its productive unpacking of Russell's elegant prose, revealing an underlying and little-realized appreciation of the difficulties involved in tackling philosophical problems. There was more to Russell than we thought.

So, the publication of Rodriguez-Consuegra's book is an exciting event in Russellian scholarship, part of the new wave of Russellian studies. It adds an important and scholarly voice to the growing number of excellent commentators

on Russell's early, most prolific work.

The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell is also an important event in the European study of Russell, which has previously been less interesting and less prevalent than in Anglo-Austrian-American circles. Many German scholars find Russell important, but simply view him as a foil for Wittgenstein, ignoring the apparent similarities between Russell and Husserl, particularly the Russell found in the 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript. Rodriguez-Consuegra is one of the most visible and capable leaders of a vanguard of Russellian students on the rest of the continent, principally found to date in France, Spain, and Italy.

Among Russell scholars, the kick against *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* is that Rodriguez-Consuegra is a bit too rapid in drawing his conclusions and that many of his interpretations are questionable. Granted, there is much to debate here, which is good news. The early Russell provides much grist for philosophical thought, both in what he covers and in what he leaves out. The wisdom of Russell's premises, methodology, theories, corrections, deletions, and historical scholarship is questionable. There are many alternative interpretations within and outside of the theory of descriptions, the nature of propositions, and other aspects of Russell's thought that are now again open to discussion. In philosophy, nothing is settled, and Russell himself welcomed criticism as the road to progress. But Rodriguez-Consuegra has given us a formative, well-reasoned, tough, and comprehensive discussion of Russell's mathematical philosophy. He has also led the renaissance of Russell studies in Anglo-Austrian-American circles, and provided a powerful voice for Russellian scholarship in the rest of Europe. *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* is a book that cannot be ignored.

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"AND SWEAR YOU'LL NEVER FORGET"
A VIDEO REVIEW OF
THE GREAT WAR AND THE SHAPING
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
REVIEWED BY
CLIFF HENKE

Reviewer's Note: We continue this series of video reviews with more new twists. This column is the first to examine a work that touches on themes raised by Russell's life work and looks at events important in his life. It is also the first to review a documentary.

Seven decades after the war's end, the "eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month" that marks Armistice Day is but an afterthought to most of us. This is especially true of Americans, who were never comfortable with involvement in the Great War anyway. It was viewed here as a European affair, and, when the United States finally entered the war, it did so veiling its interest in protecting its commerce "to make the world safe for democracy" in Woodrow Wilson's famous words.

Of course, we now know, it did not, and given the greedy terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it might have actually endangered democracy's chances in places like Germany, Russia, Italy, and Austria.

These facts are sad enough, given the tens of millions who lost their lives or parts of their bodies or minds in the struggle. But the residue of hatred catalyzed by the Great War set the stage for even more gruesome theater and still plays out to this day in the Balkans and trans-Caucasus.

The lessons of territorial ambition and ethnic hatred as impulses for war remain lost of some, to the detriment of the rest. These lessons were all too painfully known to Russell himself. He paid a high price for his objections to the war. He lost both liberty and livelihood at the peak of his reputation. He broke with dear friends, including his mentor and collaborator Alfred North Whitehead.

Yet, Russell's courage needs to be fully appreciated in light of two other facts. First, although he had Marxist and Bolshevik sympathies during the war, his visit to the Soviet Union in the 1920s turned him against that brand of communism. Second, while he was vehemently against the First World war, he was vociferous in support of the Second World War. The difference lay in what he viewed as a diametrical contrast of purposes: in his view the first war was to execute national ambition and the second to defend against hegemonic tyranny.

Although Russell's role is curiously absent from this production, Russell himself would be proud of this magisterial joint production of the BBC and the Los Angeles public television station KCET, in association with the Imperial War Museum of Great Britain, because all his rationale for hating the Great War is eloquently presented. Executive Producer Blaine Baggett and his team lay it all out for us in eight two-hour episodes, five years and five million dollars in the making. The first six episodes give us the war itself: the raw national lust for power and militarism that drove all of Europe to distemper, the miscalculation and foolish repeat of the old military adage that we are always preparing to fight the last war, the political intransigence that drove the soldiers themselves to rebel against their leaders in the conflict's next-to-last year and, most of all the interminable, incessant carnage that almost unexpectedly stopped in 1918. The last two episodes detail the larger effects: the political aftermath that led to the next world war, the birth of nihilist philosophy and literature and dadaist art in Weimar Germany, and the popularization of spiritualism, seances, and other attempts to speak with dead loved ones in France and Britain.

Interviews with some of the world's most respected Great War historians give the episodes authority and keen insight. Cambridge University's Jay Winter co-wrote many of the episodes and is also credited as the series chief historical advisor. There are also volumes of letters, diaries, newspaper accounts, and other first-hand material that add further credibility. And because the Great War happened after the invention of cinema, there are clips of fascinating and at times harrowing detail, some of which was never before viewed by a mass audience. The ones of a soldier having a twitching, heaving nervous breakdown because of "shell-shock" and those of "the men with broken faces," as the French call them, who have noses gone and faces hideously shattered being fitted for masks are two that I will never forget.

Salome Gens gives the narration an Old World, yet personal, dignity that makes this loaded material even more evocative. The use of actors such as Gens, Jeremy Irons, Ralph Fiennes, Martin Landau, Ruth Stapleton, and others to read the personal accounts mentioned above borrows heavily from a technique that Ken Burns made popular. This series compliments Burns' most famous work, *The Civil War*, handsomely.

It is in this technique that Irons, reading the poetry and other words of the famous British poet Siegfried Sasson, almost steals the show. Sasson wrote poetry from the front, then was sent to convalesce in a Liverpool hospital from shell shock in the middle of the war. It was in hospital where he wrote some of the most eloquent opposition to the war, and as a result was declared temporarily insane and not allowed to return to his men. Finally, he renounced some of his opposition and went back to the front where he was wounded near the war's end.

"Does it matter -- losing your legs?" asks Sasson/Irons after the boys come home. "For people will always be kind, and you need not show that you mind when the others come in after hunting to gobble their muffins and eggs." This kind of bitter, graphic, ironic tonic that Sasson and others provided was desperately needed, but ignored, before, during, and after the Great War. Yet, as Baggett's stunning work illustrates, neither the populace nor their leaders would ever come to grips with why it went on for so long, or mind the reasons for it in the first place, leading to an even bigger tragedy merely two-decades later.

Some reviewers of this series have said that they felt caught up in the creator's anger at all this waste after viewing it. I felt profound sadness, not anger, after seeing it. I was sad for what now seems upon reflection to be inevitable, for lessons not learned, for warnings unheeded. Perhaps Sasson's words at the end can explain: "Have you forgotten yet?", Irons begins to read, "For the world's events have rumbled on since those gagged days, like traffic checked while at the crossing of city ways....Do you remember the stretcher cases lurching back with dying eyes and lolling heads, those ashen-grey masks of the lads who once were keen and kind and gay? Have you forgotten yet? Look up, and swear by the green of the spring that you'll never forget."

I assure you will not after viewing it.

####

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
Editor, BRS *Quarterly*
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

NAME:

ADDRESS:

First book of Russell's I read:

Last book of Russell's I read:

Favorite Russell Quotation:

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

Additional Comments: _____

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August, 1998

No. 99



Bertrand Russell Society
c/o John E. Sheehy, Ph.D.
1806 Rockline Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307

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Bethesda, Maryland 20892

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

3802 North Kenneth Avenue,
Chicago, Il. 60641-2814, U.S.A.

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| Chair | Kenneth Blackwell |
| President | John Lenz |
| Vice President | Jan Eisler |
| Secretary | Peter Stone |
| Treasurer | Dennis Darland |

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY ON THE NET

The Bertrand Russell Society Home Page

<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/brd.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly

<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/gtly.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Annual Book Award

<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/bkaward.html>

Russell-L is a world-wide electronic discussion and information forum for Russell studies, with about 245 members from 28 countries. To subscribe, send the following message on electronic mail to lstproc@mcmaster.ca stating "subscribe russell-l" and follow with your name on the same line. The Russell Archives' home page is at: <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm>.

It is time to renew your membership for 1999.

- ◆ If you have already renewed for 1999 or have joined the BRS in 1999, **please accept the thanks of the Society** once again for your participation.
- ◆ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1999 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form on the next page along with your payment TODAY.** Thank you.

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
1999 MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL FORM**

Please mail this form and payment to:

John Lenz
BRS President
38B Loantaka Way
Madison, New Jersey 07940 U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1999 dues in U.S. funds payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

- Individual \$35
 Couple \$40
 Student \$20
 Limited Income Individual \$20
 Limited Income Couple \$25
- Contributor \$50 and up
 Sustainer \$75 and up
 Patron \$250 and up
 Organization Membership \$50
 Sponsor \$100 and up
 Benefactor \$500 and up
 Life Member \$1,000 and up
- PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada or Mexico
 PLUS \$4 if in Canada or Mexico

Total _____

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

ADDRESS:

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY
*Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society***

August, 1998

No. 99

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**FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

This edition and the next primarily will present papers and information about the 1997 Annual Meeting, held in St. Petersburg at the campus of the University of South Florida.

First, by popular demand, Board Chairman Ken Blackwell has submitted a copy of the BRS By-Laws. These By-Laws have proven indispensable at our annual meetings and are obviously important in conducting the business of our society. I suggest you keep this edition handy for easy reference to this society constitution.

Next you will find the minutes of the annual meeting and a list of attendees.

There is also a paper by Victoria Patton, winner of the 1996 BRS Student paper Prize. When presented at the 1996 annual meeting in Amherst, New York, in absentia by Katie Kendig standing in for Ms. Patton, the audience expressed its great pleasure at the careful scholarship evident in this analysis of Russell's theory of judgment. I highly recommend this valuable paper to you.

There is also a video review of a recent *International Biography* program on the life of Bertrand Russell.

If you haven't filled out a membership profile form, please do so we can learn more about your interest in, and appreciation of, Russell.

As explained in the last issue, the cover drawing is by Iva Petkova, an outstanding artist from Sofia, Bulgaria.

Again, my apologies for the delayed appearance of this issue. The fault is entirely mine. We'll try to get the *Quarterly* back on schedule. The November issue will follow this one within a few weeks. The February issue will be out at the beginning of March, 1999.

Again, I thank my assistant editors, Katie Kendig and Robert Barnard.

####

BYLAWS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
Revised June 1984; revised June 1985

Article 1. Name

The name of this organization shall be The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. It may also be referred to as "the Society" or "the BRS".

Article 2. Aims

The aims of this Society are: (1) to promote interest in the life and work of Bertrand Russell; (2) to bring together persons interested in any aspect of the foregoing; (3) to promote causes that Russell championed.

Article 3. Motto

The Society's motto shall be Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

Article 4. Power and Authority

Ultimate authority resides in the Members. The Members elect the Directors. The Directors elect the Officers. The Officers make decisions and take action.

Article 5. Membership

Section 1. General. Membership in the Society shall be open to all persons and organizations interested in Bertrand Russell and the Society's activities. Types of membership shall be: Individual, Couple, Student, Limited Income, Life, Organization, and Honorary. Dues shall be set by the Board of Directors, and are to be paid annually. Life members shall pay dues only once in an amount set by the Board. Honorary members pay no dues. Life and Honorary memberships are for life unless terminated for cause, as specified hereafter.

Section 2. Individual Membership. Individual Membership shall be available to all persons.

Section 3. Couple Membership. Couple Membership shall be available to two persons sharing the same mail address. Each person shall have one vote; two mail ballots shall be sent, but only one copy of other Society mailings.

Section 4. Student Membership. Student Membership shall be open to any

student enrolled in an educational institution and who is less than 25 years old.

Section 5. Limited Income Membership. Limited Income Membership shall be available to a person who, as the name implies, is living on a limited income.

Section 6. Life Membership. Life Membership can be conferred on any person who meets the minimum dues set by the Board of Directors for Life Membership.

Section 7. Honorary Membership. Honorary Membership may be conferred on a person who has been nominated by a member and approved by two-thirds of the Directors voting, after having met one or more of the following conditions: (1) is a member of Bertrand Russell's family; (2) had worked closely with Russell in an important way; (3) has made a distinctive contribution to Russell scholarship; (4) has acted in support of a cause or idea that Russell championed; (5) has promoted awareness of Russell or of Russell's work; (6) has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of Russell. Honorary Members have the same rights and responsibilities as Individual Members, but they pay no dues.

Section 8. Organization Membership. Membership of organizations--such as libraries, associations, corporations--is available upon payment of dues and approval of the President. Dues shall be higher than for a Couple. Organizations may not vote or be on the Board. Only one copy of Society mailings shall be sent.

Section 9. Conditions of Membership. Application for membership shall be made in writing, submitting name, address, and correct amount of dues. The Board may refuse an application, in which case the President must notify the applicant within 30 days, stating why the application was turned down.

Membership terminates when a member fails to pay dues, resigns, dies, or is expelled.

Any member--including Life or Honorary--may be expelled for seriously obstructing the Society's business, misappropriating the Society's name or funds or acting in a way that discredits the Society. The expulsion procedure consists of five steps:

Step 1. A formal expulsion proposal shall be presented in writing to the Board by any member.

Step 2. The Board shall examine the evidence. If a majority of the Board Members voting decides, either by mail ballot or at a meeting, that expulsion

may be appropriate, the matter will be submitted to, and decided by, the members. This shall be done by mail, or at an Annual Meeting if one is scheduled within two months. If it is to be done by mail:

Step 3. The case against the member shall be presented in the next newsletter or by a special mailing.

Step 4. In the following newsletter, or in a second special mailing, the accused member shall present a defense against the charge. A ballot shall be included in the second newsletter or second special mailing, so that members can vote on whether to expel. If the expulsion process takes place at an Annual Meeting:

Step 4'. The equivalent of Steps 3 and 4 shall be followed, that is, the case against the member shall be presented, after which the accused shall present his defense; and then the members present shall vote on whether to expel. The President shall notify the accused member as soon as the result of the vote is known.

Article 6. The Board of Directors

Section 1. Responsibilities. The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") shall be responsible for Society affairs and policy, and shall elect the Officers. The Board shall be subject to these Bylaws and to the Bylaws of The Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.

Section 2. Constitution. The Board shall consist of not less than six nor more than 24 elected members. Society Officers are ex-officio members of the Board. Elected and ex-officio Board members shall have the same rights and responsibilities.

Members may nominate candidates for the Board, or volunteer to be nominated as candidates. Directors are elected to three-year terms that start on January 1 of the following year; one-third are elected every year. Directors may be reelected. If a Director dies, resigns, or is expelled, the Board may fill the unexpired term with any member.

Article 7. Officers

Section 1. General. The Society shall have the following Officers: President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Secretary. There may also be other Vice-Presidents whose duties shall be specified by the Board. Officers shall be at least 18 years old and shall have been members for at least one year. They shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's

Annual Meeting. An Officer's term of office lasts until the next election of Officers, the following year. No one shall hold more than one Office at a time, except that the same person shall be Secretary of the Society and Secretary of the Board. An Officer may be removed or suspended by a majority of the Board members voting. An Officer may resign by notifying the Chairman of Board in writing. If an Office becomes vacant, the Board shall elect a successor to fill the unexpired term. If an Officer is temporarily unable to serve, the Board may elect a temporary replacement.

Section 2. The President. The President shall be the Chief Executive Officer, coordinating the work of other Officers and Committees. Other Officers and Committee Chairmen shall consult the President about their activities, and submit a written report on their activities to him *one month before the Annual Meeting*, with a copy to the Chairman. The President shall promptly inform the Chairman of any major decisions. After the Board has selected the site and time of the next Annual Meeting, or of a Special Meeting, the President shall be responsible for making all Meeting arrangements, including compiling the Meeting's agenda. The President shall chair the Meeting. The President shall report regularly, through the BRS newsletter.

Section 3. The Vice-President. The Vice-President becomes President if the President's Office becomes vacant; and assumes the office temporarily if the vacancy is temporary. The Vice-President shall assist the President as requested.

Section 4. The Secretary. The Secretary shall: (1) record the minutes of Society and Board meetings; (2) handle Society and Board correspondence; (3) maintain a permanent file of Society and Board Bylaws and other corporate documents, including minutes of Society and Board meetings, Officers' and Committee Chairmen's reports, newsletters, correspondence; (4) maintain a permanent record of Society and Board decisions, rules, motions made and carried; (5) have custody of the Society's corporate seal.

Section 5. The Treasurer. The Treasurer shall: (1) keep records of money received and spent; (2) safeguard Society funds; (3) invest funds, with Board approval; (4) submit an annual budget to the Board; (5) submit quarterly and annual reports, for publication in the BRS newsletter.

Section 6. Other Vice-Presidents. The Office of "Vice-President/ ..." may be created and filled by the Board. There is no connection between this Office and that of the Vice-President.

Article 8. Committees

Section 1. General. There shall be standing (permanent) and ad hoc (temporary) Committees. Each shall have a Chairman, and may have a Co-Chairman and other members. A member may serve on, or chair, more than one Committee. Committee Chairmen shall consult with the President about their activities, and describe them in a written report to the President *one month before the Annual Meeting*, with a copy to the Chairman.

Section 2. Committees. The Board shall establish standing and ad hoc Committees, and appoint their Chairmen who, in turn, appoint Committee Members. Each Committee shall provide the Secretary with a written statement of Committee aims and procedures.

Article 9. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Meetings. The Society shall hold an Annual Meeting, at a time and site determined by the Board *and in time to give the members at least two months' notice of the Meeting*. As to time: it should suit the convenience of as many members as possible. As to site: it should be either (a) near locations of special interest to the BRS, or (b) near population centers having many members. Any member may propose agenda items, in writing, to the President, in advance of the Meeting. At Meetings, items may be added to the agenda with approval of the majority of the members present. Six members constitute a quorum.

Section 2. Special Meetings. Any member may write to the Chairman requesting a Special Meeting, claiming that an emergency exists requiring immediate action. The Chairman shall decide whether the request merits consideration by the Board; if it does, the Chairman shall promptly inform the Board, which shall decide, within three weeks, by mail ballot, whether, when and where to hold a Special Meeting. The Special Meeting shall be held no later than six weeks after the Chairman's initial receipt of the request. The Chairman shall announce the Special Meeting to all members by letter, as soon as possible. A quorum shall consist of the members present.

Section 3. Board of Directors' Meetings. The Board shall hold its Annual Meeting during the Society's Annual Meeting and at the same site. The Board may also hold Special Meetings, in accordance with its own Bylaws. Board Meetings shall be open to Society members.

Article 10. Publications

Section 1. Newsletter. The Society shall publish a newsletter at regular intervals.

Section 2. Other Publications. The Society may authorize other publications.

Article 11. Voting

Section 1. General. All members, other than Organization Members, shall be entitled to vote. All votes shall have equal value. Members may vote by proxy. In contests of more than two candidates or choices, a plurality shall be sufficient.

Section 2. Voting by Mail. Voting may be by mail. Ballots shall be sent to all eligible members, either in the BRS newsletter or by special mailing. The deadline for the return of ballots shall be not less than three weeks from the date ballots are mailed by first class mail, not less than four weeks if mailed third class. Ballots must go first class to Canada and Mexico, and by airmail to other foreign countries. Mail ballots shall be tallied by the Elections Committee, and verified by the Secretary. Ballots for the Board's voting by mail shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary; the Chairman may designate a substitute for the Secretary.

Article 12. Amendments to These Bylaws

Section 1. Voting to Amend at a Meeting. These Bylaws may be amended at a Society Meeting by a majority vote of those members present and voting.

Section 2. Voting to Amend by Mail. These Bylaws may also be amended by mail ballot. The proposed changes, with supporting arguments, will appear in the BRS newsletter or a special mailing. In the following BRS newsletter or second special mailing, other views, including opposing views, will appear, along with a mail ballot. To pass, the Amendment must be approved by a majority of the ballots cast.

BYLAWS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.

Revised June 1984

Article 1. Responsibilities and Obligations

The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") has these responsibilities: (1) to set policy for the Society's affairs, and (2) to elect officers of the Society and of the Board. The Board has these obligations: to be governed by these Bylaws and by the Society's Bylaws.

Article 2. Membership

Membership shall be in accord with Article 5 of the Society's Bylaws.

Article 3. Officers

Section 1. The Chairman. The Chairman shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Chairman's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Chairman may be reelected. The Chairman presides at Board Meetings, and rules on procedure.

If the Chairman is absent, the Directors may elect an Acting Chairman. If the office of Chairman is vacant, the Directors shall elect a new Chairman as soon as possible, at an Annual or Special Meeting or by mail ballot. The votes shall be tallied by the Acting Chairman and verified by the Secretary. The Chairman may be removed from office by a majority of Directors present and voting at a meeting, with the Secretary presiding.

Section 2. The Secretary. The Secretary shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Secretary's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Secretary may be reelected. The Secretary of the Board and the Secretary of the Society shall be the same person. If the Secretary is absent from a Meeting, the Chairman shall appoint an Acting Secretary.

Article 4. Voting

Voting shall be in accord with Article 11 of the Society's Bylaws, except as follows: the Chairman's vote counts as one except in a tie, when it

counts as two.

Article 5. Committees

Committees may be created by the Board, to perform Board functions, and shall follow Board instructions.

Article 6. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Board Meeting. The Board shall meet annually, at some time during a Society Annual Meeting, and at the same site. Society Members may attend Board Meetings.

Section 2. Special Board Meetings. A Special Board Meeting shall be called by the Chairman when at least three Directors request it, stating the purpose. In choosing the time and site, the Chairman shall aim to achieve the largest possible attendance by Directors.

Section 3. Agenda. The Agenda for Board Meetings shall be prepared by the Chairman. Additions to the Agenda may be made by any Director, with the concurrence of the Chairman.

Section 4. Quorum. The quorum for any Board Meeting is three Directors.

Article 7. Amendments to Board Bylaws

Any Director may propose an amendment.

At an Annual or Special Meeting, a majority vote of the Directors present and voting shall carry the proposed amendment.

When an amendment is proposed by the Chairman, in writing, between Meetings, the Chairman shall decide whether to hold the proposal for the next Meeting or put it to an earlier vote by mail. For voting by mail, the Chairman shall promptly notify the Directors by a special mailing of the proposed amendment, with supporting arguments, requesting opposing arguments by 21 days after the date of mailing. Thereafter, the Chairman shall mail the opposing arguments, and a ballot, to the Directors, with a voting deadline of 21 days after the date of mailing. The votes shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary, who shall notify the Directors of the outcome.

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING PETER STONE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

The 1998 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society took place at the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida, St. Petersburg Campus, located at 100 5th Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The meeting ran from Friday, June 19, to Sunday, June 21.

This year, the Society held its Annual Business Meeting in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors. These minutes record the decisions of both meetings.

Peter Stone announced the results of the elections to the Board of Directors held at the beginning of the year. The eight Board members elected were Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Gladys Leithauser, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, and Ruile Ye.

John Lenz chaired the joint meeting. Ken Blackwell and Peter Stone took notes. Board Members present were James Alouf, Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Jan Loeb Eisler, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, Michael Rockler, Peter Stone, and Ruile Ye.

The Board then took up the issue of electing Board and Society officers. The following individuals were unanimously elected:

Chairman--Ken Blackwell
President--John Lenz
Vice President--Jan Loeb Eisler
Secretary (Board and Society)--Peter Stone
Treasurer--Dennis Darland

The process of nominating and electing officers required the reassignment of a few responsibilities. Mr. Blackwell agreed to take over from Mr. Lenz the job of managing the Russell-1 listserve. He will also take on the responsibility of pursuing additional renewals this year. In addition, Mr. Darland may be unable to perform his duties as treasurer for part of the year, and so Blackwell and Lenz later agreed to work out an arrangement to take over his duties temporarily. These duties include keeping a computerized version of the membership list, printing out labels for the Society newsletter, handling the Society's money, and keeping track of who has paid dues and who owes the Society money. In addition, Darland also sent out postcards to delinquent members in the past; in light of the Society's current membership problems (to

be discussed later), it will be necessary to resume this practice as soon as possible.

The Board then took up the subject of the next annual meeting. Alan Schwerin, a professor at Monmouth College, volunteered to arrange holding the meeting at Monmouth. The chair of his department would support this move, there is a very good limo service available to provide transportation, the drive from Newark Airport is not too bad, and there may even be dorm space available. Ms. Eisler moved that the next meeting be held at Monmouth College at a time to be arranged by Schwerin and Lenz. The Board unanimously approved the motion.

The site for the annual meeting in 2000 was also briefly discussed. Mr. Rockler would like the meeting to move back to the West Coast, or possible the Midwest. He noted the meeting hadn't been held in either area since the 1993 meeting in San Diego. Mr. Lenz thought that it would be necessary to have someone on site to organize the meeting there, but Mr. Rockler and a few others disagreed.

Mr. Stone inquired if another joint meeting will be held in 2000 with the Humanist Society of Canada, the Council for Democratic and secular Humanism, and others; Mr. Lenz and Mr. Blackwell responded that it might be, but that nothing was definite yet. Stefan Anderson indicated that he might within a year or two be able to organize a meeting at Vancouver. No final decision was reached.

The Society then discussed the question of incorporation. Don Jackanicz, the BRS's Secretary for many years, had handled the paperwork for our continued incorporation in Illinois. He has now asked the Society to be relieved of this duty within a year. This means that the Society must forego continued incorporation, find a new agent in Illinois to incorporate us, or reincorporate in another state.

Two specific options were discussed. Jan Loeb Eisler announced to the Society that the Center for Inquiry in Buffalo is willing to incorporate the BRS at its address and handle all the paperwork. The Center would apply for nonprofit status for the Society in New York and act as agent for the state's annual report. It would also provide a permanent space for the BRS at the Center, including space for a Society library (as part of their larger collection) and commission a sculpture or painting of Russell for the Center.

Ms. Eisler read a letter from Paul Kurtz at the Center outlining the proposal. She strongly endorsed the move. Other members, including Mr. Blackwell and Mr. Rockler, were more wary. Rockler was unsure what "affiliation" with the

Center would entail. Blackwell also expressed concern that humanism represented only one of Russell's interests, and that affiliation with a humanist center would suggest that the Society was uninterested in other aspects of Russell's life and thought (including even positive aspects of religion). He thought that it would be better for all of Russell's interests (including humanism) if the BRS remained independent in both appearance and fact. In addition, Mr. Lenz wanted to know whether the Center would help us publicize the Society amongst the many people connected to the Center.

The second option discussed involved finding an independent agent in Illinois willing to serve as a registered agent for the BRS. The Society would have to locate such an agent, probably through the Secretary of State's office (Mr. Jackanicz would know how to do this), but for an as-yet undetermined yearly fee this agent would do all the work for us. Either way, the BRS would need a new address by January 1999, unless Mr. Jackanicz could be persuaded to give the Society another year.

In the end, the Society agreed to seek out an agent in Illinois willing to do the work for us and inquire into the price. This was agreed to with two abstentions. The Society also decided by a 9-6 vote (no abstentions) to obtain more information as to what affiliation with the Center for Inquiry would entail. Mr. Lenz and Ms. Eisler will prepare a mailing to the Board of Directors on the topic by September.

Mr. Lenz raised several issues for Mr. John Shosky, who was unable to attend. First Shosky wanted to solicit materials from the membership for the newsletter, especially membership profiles. Second, he nominated Peter Strawson for Honorary membership in the Society. Mr. Stone moved successfully that the Board table this nomination until Shosky can provide a short statement in support of his nomination. Third, he announced that there are two organizations in Eastern Europe that wish to obtain organizational memberships in the BRS--the Institute of Logic of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, and the Institute of Social Science at the University of Plovdiv in Bulgaria. The Society advised Shosky to check the bylaws; no vote should be necessary on this action (in any event, no one seemed to have any objection to the new memberships).

The Society also made several requests of the editor of the BRS *Quarterly* (Shosky). Mr. Blackwell requested that Shosky provide in a future issue a list of all the BRS's honorary members and award recipients, as well as a copy of the Bylaws of the Society and Board of Directors. Mr. Lenz also requested a list of all the BRS's members, which used to be published annually in the *Quarterly*. Some objected that there may be people who would not want the publicity. And so it was agreed that people should be given a chance to indicate that they do

not want their names publicized in a non-commercial way. This should be done on the membership renewal form; the Editor should make the appropriate changes before renewal time.

A motion was made to rename the Society's Service Award (an ad hoc award given to members who perform outstanding service to the Society) for Lee Eisler. The motion was unanimously approved with one abstention.

The Society discussed publicity. Among the methods discussed were slipping BRS bookmarks into books in bookstores and print ads (the latter having been discontinued, without any loss in new memberships according to Mr. Lenz).

A large number of members have so far failed to renew this year. The Society agreed that the renewal form in the Quarterly must be made more visible, and if possible a return envelope should be provided in the Quarterly.

Mr. Schwerin advised the BRS to hold sessions at the APA's annual meetings. Mr. Lenz explained that the Society did indeed have such meetings but has not done so lately for lack of someone to organize them. Schwerin will look into doing Russell events at the APA.

Ms. Eisler inquired if the BRS was in arrears with its membership in the International Humanist Ethical Union. Mr. Lenz claims we were given an honorary membership but fears that the IHEU has forgotten this. He will write to the Union.

Mr. Schwerin suggested that the BRS hold an annual paper contest, much as the Leibniz Society apparently does. Mr. Lenz informed him that the BRS has such a contest but that in recent years no contest has been held due to lack of an effective committee to run it. He will look into reviving it.

Ms. Eisler asked how much money it costs the BRS to have a membership. No one had an effective answer.

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RUSSELL'S THEORIES OF JUDGMENT 1903-1913
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[Editor's Note: This paper won the 1996 BRS Annual Student Essay Award. It is printed with the permission of Ms. Patton.]

The development of Russell's theory of judgment was accompanied by a change in his metaphysics. In 1903, Russell believed that it was propositions that constitute reality. But by the time of the 1910 multiple-relation theory, propositions were displaced from this role by facts. With this change came a shift in Russell's account of truth. Truth and falsehood were no longer seen as inexplicable properties of propositions, and something like a correspondence theory of truth came to be adopted. My aim in this paper is to give a detailed outline of the development of Russell's theory, and assess his success in providing a viable account of judgment. In particular, I will be looking at the change in Russell's attempt to provide an adequate account of the unity of the proposition - a notion which will be discussed in detail below.

Section 1

I would like to begin with a few comments on Russell's 1903 account of propositions. Russell's view of propositions in *The Principles of Mathematics* was shaped by a reaction against the suggestion that a proposition consisted of ideas or concepts of objects. Russell believed that "[on this account] ideas become a veil between us and outside things ... [so that in knowledge, we never really] attain to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things."¹ That is, if a proposition consisted of ideas, we would never have access to anything outside our own minds. For Russell, who wanted the mind to have maximum exposure to the external world², this suggestion was abhorrent.

Accordingly, Russell held that a proposition does not consist of words or ideas,

¹ B. Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description in *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 221-222. Although this quotation is taken from a 1911 publication, I think the ideas it expresses are latent in *The Principles of Mathematics*. At any rate, it was Russell's fear of Idealism that led him to hold that a proposition consisted of real things.

² D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy*, p. 198.

but "contains the entities indicated by words".³ Russell referred to the constituents of propositions as 'terms'. Every term was a "logical subject . possessed of all the properties commonly assigned to substances".⁴ This implies that terms are no different in kind from actual objects out there in the world. For Russell, then, the constituents of a proposition are the real things which the proposition is about.

Also central to Russell's 1903 account of propositions is the idea that propositions are unified entities. The source of propositional unity, Russell says, is the verb.⁵ On his view, the verb is not a name for a relation, it is the actual relation itself. By relating the other terms that occur in the proposition, the verb distinguishes a proposition or judgment like 'A loves B' from a mere list of its constituents, (A, love, B) so that it actually says something.

There is, however, a difficulty with Russell's 1903 account of propositional unity. In an article published in *Mind* 1911, F.H. Bradley writes:

Is there anything, I ask, in a unity [i.e. a proposition] besides its 'constituents', i.e. the terms and the relation, and, if there is anything more, in what does this 'more' consist? Mr Russell tells us that we have got merely an enumeration or merely an aggregate . But, since we seem to have something beyond either, the puzzle grows worse. If I remember right, Prof. Stout some years ago stated the problem as attaching essentially to the fact of 'relatedness'. What is the difference between a relation which relates in fact and one which does not so relate? And if we accept a strict pluralism, where, I urge, have we any room for this difference?⁶

Whether or not it is correct to say that Russell thinks of unities as merely enumerations or aggregates of terms, Bradley does have a point here. For the pluralist, the world consists of a multiplicity of self-subsistent entities; entities

³ B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, sec. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec 47.

⁵ See *Ibid.*, sec. 54.

⁶ F. H. Bradley, 'Reply to Mr Russell's Explanations', *Mind*, Volume 20 (Jan. 1911), p. 74-6.

which exist independently of each other. In accordance with this view, Russell held that "every constituent of every proposition must, on pain of self contradiction, be capable of being made into a logical subject".⁷ The verb, then, on Russell's account, must also be something capable of being made a logical subject. That is, it must be a term. But the verb must be a very peculiar kind of term for it must have a "two-fold nature": it must be the source of the proposition's unity, relate all of its constituents, and at the same time be one of the related Items. As Bradley points out, however, these roles are inconsistent.

Russell himself was also aware of this problem and illustrates the point with the following example:

Consider the proposition 'A differs from B'. The constituents of this proposition, if we analyse it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis [i.e. after we make the verb a logical subject] is a notion which has no connection with A and B.⁸

In other words, as soon as we treat the verb as a mere term of the proposition, we are forced to identify it as a "relation in itself", rather than a relation actually relating the other constituents. All we have now is an ordered list of elements (A, difference, B). In this way, we immediately destroy the unity of the proposition which the verb is supposed to be creating. How it is that the verb simultaneously manages to be a constituent of the proposition and also the source of its capacity to communicate a meaning thus looks very difficult to explain.

At the time of *The Principles of Mathematics*, Russell had no solution to this problem. He said only that:

A proposition is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition,

⁷ *The Principles of Mathematics*, sec 52.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sec 54.

and is thus distinguishable from the verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear account of the nature of the difference.⁹

Despite his inability to resolve the above difficulty, the 1903 Russell was committed to the view that a proposition is a complex entity whose constituents are real things. On this account, it is propositions which make up reality. As I will attempt to show in the following, most of the problems with the 1903 theory of judgment can be traced back to Russell's attachment to these ideas.

Section 2

Russell's account of the proposition in *The Principles of Mathematics* has, as a by-product, a very simple account of judgment. On the binary relation theory: "every judgment whether true or false, consists in a certain relation, called 'judging' or 'believing' to a single object which is what we judge or believe ." I will now give a brief outline of the theory and discuss some of the problems associated with it.

(i)

The binary relation theory of judgment is described by Russell in 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood'. In this article, Russell rejects the theory and attributes it to Meinong. Meinong called the single objects to which we are related when we judge 'objectives', so that "every judgment has an objective. True judgments have true objectives and false judgments have false objectives".¹⁰ Meinong's objectives are equivalent to Russell's 1903 propositions. They are unified entities which either have the property of being true or the property of being false.

To use Hylton's example of how the theory works, suppose I form the judgment that John is taller than Mary. On this account of judgment, there is a single objective - the proposition that John is taller than Mary - and in judging I am related to it. Judgment thus involves acquaintance with a proposition: it is a two-place relation holding between a person or mind, on the other hand, and a proposition (or objective) on the other.

(ii)

Russell had a number of reasons for rejecting the binary relation theory of judgment. The first was his growing intuition that there are no propositions in the sense he was using the word. This intuition resulted from a consideration of the fact that although

⁹ *Ibid.*, sec 54.

¹⁰ B. Russell, 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Logical and Philosophical Papers 1903-1913*, Volume 6, Routledge, 1992, pp. 115-124.

the 1903 theory does seem plausible when applied to true judgments, it cannot give an adequate account of what happens when a judgment is incorrect. For if we hold that all judgment consists in a relation of the mind to a single proposition, then we have to admit that a false judgment is a relation to the mind to a false proposition. This means that "there will be in the world entities, not dependent on the existence of judgments, which can be described as objective falsehoods."¹¹

But as Russell himself points out, the idea that the world contains peculiar things like that Charles I died in his bed even though Charles I died on the scaffold is "almost incredible". For we generally feel that truth and falsehood are primarily properties of beliefs or judgments, not of actual objects. That is, "we feel that there would be no falsehood if there were no minds to make mistakes".

Although the existence of objective falsehoods is an unwelcome consequence of the 1903 account of judgment, the only other alternative for the theory would be to say that false judgment is impossible. The dilemma arises as a result of Russell's attachment to the idea that propositions are unified entities whose constituents are real things. Russell himself seems to be aware of this and illustrates the problem with the following example: "If [on the binary relation theory] I judge that A loves B . [my judgment] would be impossible unless there were such a thing as 'A's love for B'".¹²

Because Russell held that the terms of a proposition are actual objects in an actual relation, I would not even be able to make the judgment 'A loves B' unless it were true. Consequently, unless there are entities out there in the world (1903 propositions) which have the peculiar property of being false, there would be no such thing as an incorrect judgment: every judgment would be made true by the mere act of formulation.

It could be argued that we can avoid postulating the existence of objective falsehoods by adopting an asymmetric theory in which true judgments have objectives while false ones do not. Russell considers this suggestion but rejects it on the following grounds. Firstly, an asymmetric theory of this type would entail that in judging falsely the mind is related to nothing. And if this were the case, a false judgment would not even be a judgment at all. Secondly, if true judgments have objectives and false ones do not, there would be an "intrinsic difference" between true and false judgments which would be visible on inspection. This, Russell says, is "obviously impossible": we cannot tell

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Russell, 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood', p. 119.

truths from falsehoods simply by examining the intrinsic nature of our judgment.¹³ The only way to avoid the problem of objective falsehoods thus seems to be to abandon the view that judgment consists in a dual relation of the mind to a single proposition.

The other reason Russell had for rejecting the binary-relation theory of judgment was that it cannot provide a sensible account of truth. On the 1903 view, truth and falsehood have to be seen as ultimate and unanalysable properties of propositions. 'That the sky is blue' and 'That the sky is green' play exactly the same role in constituting reality even though the sky is in fact blue. Every proposition is either true or false, but this is just a brute fact which cannot be explained.

It is easy to see why Russell eventually found this account of truth and falsehood unacceptable. For surely there should be some explanation of what makes these properties different, and why it is that truth is generally considered to be a better guide to the external world. For example, we may want to express the difference between truth and falsehood by reference to the notion of fact; to whatever is actually in the world regardless of what we see fit to believe. Russell's 1903 account of propositions, however, makes an explanation of this type impossible. For since a proposition is an objective, unified entity whose constituents are real things, a true proposition and the fact it is about are exactly the same thing. As a result, the difference between the two properties and our preference for truth over falsehood simply has to be accepted as 'ultimate' and 'inexplicable'.

The above problems with the 1903 theory of judgment led Russell to abandon the idea that propositions are unified entities. He came to believe that it was facts and not propositions, which make up the world. Propositions (or rather, the phrases which express propositions) thus became 'incomplete symbols' which require the addition of a mind to render them meaningful. When taken out of the context of a belief or assertion, they do not denote a definite object. Accordingly, Russell no longer thought of judgment as "a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but [as] a multiple relation of the mind to the various other constituents with which the judgment is concerned".¹⁴ The 1910 version of the multiple-relation theory will be outlined in the following section.

¹³ *Ibid.* It is interesting to note that although this point against an asymmetric theory is a good one, Russell is not entitled to this commonsense view. As Candlish points out, on the 1903 account, the "constituents of judgments are real things . [so] inspecting the proposition cannot be distinguished from inspecting the world." Inspecting the world for its contents, however, is exactly how we should go about deciding which judgments are true and which are false. S. Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, Monk and Palmer (eds.), Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 107.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Section 3

This section is divided into two parts. In part (i), I will give a brief outline of Russell's 1910 theory of judgment. Then in part (ii), I shall attempt to show that the advantages Russell claims for the multiple-relation theory - that it allows for a correspondence theory of truth and the possibility of false judgment - are only apparent.

(i)

The 1910 version of the multiple-relation theory of judgment is set out by Russell in 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood'. The theory and its associated correspondence theory of truth can be summarized as follows. When we judge, say, that A loves B, our judgment is not a relation of the mind to the whole proposition as a unit. Rather, it is a multiple relation between the mind and the individual constituents of the proposition, so that we are separately acquainted with the person A, the person B and the relation of loving. We bring these objects together in thought to form the judgment. How, then, does the judgment 'A loves B' differ from the judgment 'B loves A'? Russell's answer to this question is to say that the relation of loving must "not be abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A".¹⁵ This is the 'sense' of the relation. The judgment will be true when the terms in question are actually related in the way they occur in the judgment, (in this case, when A loves B), and false when they are not.

The differences between the above account of judgment and the binary relation theory should be clear. Because the mind is separately acquainted with the objects of judgment and only unites them in thought, there are no longer any propositions in the 1903 sense. The verb no longer has to relate the other constituents and is thus free to fill the role of being a term of the judged relation without difficulty. Nevertheless, the objects of the judgment are still real things, it is just that the unity of the proposition is replaced by what might be called the unity of the propositional act. In contrast to the old view, then, there is now no need for an objective combination formed of the objects of the judgment for the judgment to occur. This, apparently, is what makes false judgment possible without the need for objective falsehoods.

Furthermore, on the multiple-relation theory, truth and falsehood are no longer seen as unanalysable properties of actual objects, but as properties of beliefs or judgments. And because the proposition judged is not an entity in itself, Russell says that the truth of a judgment can be explained in terms of its correspondence with a complex object or fact. The 'corresponding' complex:

consists of the two terms related by the relation R with the same sense.
The judgment is true when there is such a complex and false when

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

there is not.¹⁶

This account of truth means that there would be no truth or falsehood if there were no minds, but Russell makes it clear that: "If I judge that Charles I died in his bed, I judge falsely, not because of anything to do with me, but because he did not die in his bed". That is, the truth or falsehood of a proposition is not dependent upon the judging mind, but only upon the objective fact about which the judgment is made. In this way, the notion of a fact guards against Idealism.

(ii)

The chief difficulties with the 1910 theory arise in respect to Russell's solution to the problem of how we account for the 'sense' or 'direction' of a non-symmetrical judgment. I agree with Candlish in saying that there are two ways in which to interpret Russell's requirement that the judged relation "must not be abstractly before the mind but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A". It could be said that the relations not figuring 'abstractly' means:

- (1) not that it actually relates A and B, but that its 'sense' or 'direction' must figure in the judgment. Or,
- (2) that the relation must actually relate A and B.¹⁷

Let's consider (1) first. There is reason to believe that this is what Russell did mean by his comments about 'sense', because on this interpretation of the theory, the objects of the judgment enter into the act of judging as separate terms. Because these constituents are not related by their judged relation, they are prevented from forming a complex object account and the problem of objective falsehoods is avoided. However, Candlish argues that the problem with this interpretation is that it leaves the 1910 theory open to Bradley's very criticism of *The Principles of Mathematics*.¹⁸ Namely, that it cannot account for the unity of the proposition, without which there can be no judgment.

Candlish's objection seems a reasonable criticism to make. Take for example, the judgment 'A loves B'. If the relation of 'loving' enters into the act of judging, not as relating A and B, but only as a term in itself, all we get is an ordered list of elements (A, love, B). But this cannot be considered a judgment for it doesn't even say anything. For judgment to occur, it is essential that the constituents be somehow

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12A.

¹⁷ S. Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 112.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

united, so that A and B are brought into the relation of love and what we get is an actual proposition. What is it, then, that combines the constituents so as to form a judgment?

Russell claims that the person judging unites the objects of his judgment in thought, but it is far from clear what this means. For surely the real things to which we are related when we judge are either already united in fact, (regardless of whether this is judged to be the case), or they are not. If they are so united, then nothing further can be done by the mind in the way of uniting them; and if they are not, then no amount of thinking will bring these objects together. In either case, all we will have is our separate acquaintance with A, B and the relation 'love'. Exactly how it is that the mind has the power to turn this acquaintance into a meaningful judgment is something which Russell leaves quite unexplained.

Under interpretation (1), the 1910 theory is also subject to the following objection from Geach:

If the relation R is before the mind not as relating A and B, but only as a term of the judged relation that holds between the mind, A, the relation R, and B, how can there be any talk of the relation Rs 'proceeding' from A to B rather than from B to A?¹⁹

For the relation to have 'sense' (i.e. to 'proceed') it must actually relate A and B. If it does not do this, then it will enter into the act of judging 'A loves B' in exactly the same way as it enters into the act of judging 'B loves A'; namely, as "a relation in itself". This means that it will not combine or order the other constituents at all. Our ability to form a judgment with the appropriate direction thus looks quite mysterious, despite Russell's claims to the contrary.

In view of the above difficulties, we may want to adopt Candlish's second interpretation of Russell's requirement that the judged relation not be present 'abstractly'. On this interpretation, the objects of a judgment appear before the mind in their actual relation, with that relation actually relating them. The relations being active would thus provide an explanation of what supplies direction to a non-symmetrical judgment and how it is that a list of constituents is turned into a unified assertion.

Yet despite these advantages, the problem with interpretation (2) is that it makes the 1910 theory incompatible with its correspondence theory of truth. For if the judged relation actually relates the constituents of the judgment, then these constituents will no longer enter into the act of judging as separate terms. And as Candlish points out, since

¹⁹ P. Geach, *Mental Acts*, Humanities Press, 1964, p. 51.

Russell held that the constituents of judgments of real things, the immediate consequence of their being united is that when a judgment is true:

... the combination involved in the judging cannot after all differ from the actual fact which is being judged to obtain.²⁰

A distinction between judgment and fact is essential if the truth of a belief is to be explained in terms of correspondence with an outside entity. But on the 1910 theory, if the relation is allowed to relate A and B and thus supply unity and direction to the proposition judged, judgment and fact become one.

A further difficulty concerns false judgment. Under interpretation (2), the relation R has to be a 'relating relation'. This means that simply by forming the judgment that A loves B, I must somehow bring the actual objects A and B into the real relation of love. For if I do not have these 'psychokinetic powers', then the unified proposition necessary for judgment will not be achieved. Consequently, false judgments become impossible on the 1910 theory: they either resist formulation or any act of judging will create the fact which makes the judgment true.

The above points highlight the central flaw in Russell's 1910 account of judgment. On the multiple relation theory, unity is imposed by the mind. But Russell attributes the ability to order the constituents of a non-symmetrical judgment to a property of the judged relation. This, however, explains direction in a way that involves unity. For the relation to 'proceed' from A to B, it must actually relate the two items, thereby turning the objects of the judgment into a single entity. Ironically, it was this unity of propositions and all its associated problems that Russell wished to deny.

Section 4

This section will deal with Russell's 1912 account of judgment. In 1910, Russell had held that the 'sense' of a non-symmetrical judgment belonged to the judged relation. The difficulty with this idea had been that a relation cannot have direction without actually relating and thereby creating the judged fact. The 1912 multiple-relation theory is only a modification of the 1910 version, but the modification is an attempt to overcome this problem.

On Russell's 1912 account, direction belongs not to the relation R, but solely to the relation of judging. He writes: "The relation of judging has what is called a 'sense' or 'direction'."²¹ It is thus the propositional act and not the judged relation which puts

²⁰ Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 113.

²¹ B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1912, p. 126.

the objects of the judgment into a certain order.

This suggestion, however, does not do much to clarify how it is that we turn a list of constituents into a judgement. For when I judge that A loves B, the relation of love enters into the judgment as a "relation in itself". It is a related relation, not a relating one, and so cannot be used to supply unity or direction to the proposition judged. And if the judged relation cannot unite the constituents, the only alternative for Russell is to say that "the relation judgment is special: it is the sole relation which combines its relata into a judgment". So, as Candlish points out, while the 1910 theory attributed the ability to correctly combine the constituents to "an otherwise mysterious power of the mind",²² the 1912 theory just re-delegates this power to the relation of judgment.

Furthermore, like the 1910 theory, the 1912 account of judgment is subject to criticisms that Russell received from Wittgenstein. The theory allows for the formation of nonsensical judgments. On Russell's view, the function of the judged relation R is not to relate the other constituents, it is only to be thought of as relating them. But if this is the case, the "relation does not have to do anything. It is as if it were a dormant relation". The problem with this is that if the relation is 'dormant', then there is nothing in Russell's theory to prevent a person from forming judgments like 'Loves A B' where the relation occurs in the wrong place in the proposition. Neither is there anything to prevent me from forming the judgment 'The knife is to the square root of the fork' where the relation is incapable of relating the other items. This is a real problem for Russell's theory because things like 'the knife is to the square root of the fork' cannot even coherently be thought, let alone judged true.

Section 5.

In an attempt to avoid some of the aforementioned problems, Russell added the notion of logical form to his multiple-relation theory of judgments in 1913.

On the 1913 version of the theory, in order to make a judgment or understand a proposition I need acquaintance not only with the constituents of a proposition, but also with the way they are to be united. The logical form of a judgment is the manner in which the constituents are to be combined. It is the form of the fact which corresponds to the judgment when the judgment is true. And when the judgment is false, the logical form is the form of at least some fact out there in the world.²³ Russell claims that, by

²² Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 117.

²³ Russell says: "In an actual complex, the general form is not presupposed; but when we are concerned with a proposition which may be false. We have only the 'idea' or suggestion' of the terms being united in such a complex, and this, evidently, requires that the general form of the merely supposed complex should be given." *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Theory of Knowledge*,

definition, the introduction of form makes it impossible for nonsensical judgments to fit within the theory.

Russell introduced the notion of logical form to deal with the problem of unity, not the problem of the 'sense' or 'direction' of asymmetrical judgments.²⁴ He argues that the introduction of form provides a means of making sense of the notion of uniting the constituents of a judgment in thought which does not imply uniting them in reality. The idea is that:

The judgment represents the constituents as combined in the right way, not by so combining them but by including 'the way they are to be combined' as a further entity, the logical form, which the judging mind combines with all the others.

For Russell, then, judgment and judged fact differ via the inclusion of logical form. The judgment contains the form as an element, but the fact does not. This, supposedly, is what makes a correspondence theory of truth possible.

What, then, are logical forms? Since we must be acquainted with forms it is necessary that they be actual entities in some sense, not merely creations of language like classes. To meet these requirements, Russell claims that:

The form [of a judgment is] is the fact that there are entities which make up complexes having the form in question.²⁵

The logical form, then, is a fact of a peculiarly abstract kind: the fact that there are facts of the given form.

According to Russell, the fact which is form can be obtained by replacing every name in a given sentence by a variable or its linguistic equivalent. For example, in 'Socrates loves Plato', the name 'Socrates' becomes 'something', 'Plato' becomes 'something', and 'loves' becomes 'some relation'. The logical form of the judgment 'Socrates loves Plato' will thus be the abstract fact that 'Something has some relation to something'.

Volume 7, Eames and Blackwell (eds.), Routledge, 1984, p. 116.

²⁴ This point is made clear by Peter Hylton. See Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 344-345.

²⁵ Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 114.

There are, however, a number of difficulties with Russell's notion of logical form. The idea that we are acquainted with from-facts seems to imply that the logical form of a judgment or proposition is another one of its constituents. But as Russell himself notes, if this were the case:

There would have to be a new way in which it and the other constituents are put together, and if we take this way as again a constituent, we find ourselves embarked on an endless regress.²⁶

To avoid this problem, Russell insists that although he calls the form an object, it is a logical object and therefore not a constituent of the proposition. But the difference between a logical object and something that is a constituent is not a clear one, and Russell offers no explanation of what the conditions for membership of this class of logical objects actually are.

Neither is it clear that the introduction of form actually solves the problem of the unity of the proposition. For the fact remains that in judgment, it is the act of judging or understanding itself that unites the constituents, not the logical form.

How it is that the mind has the capacity to unite real things in thought is never explained by Russell. All that happens on the 1913 theory is that the "psychokinetic powers" he attributed to the mind on his earlier accounts of judgment are now "transferred from the mind alone to the mind with access to logical forms."²⁷

And even if form could explain how it is that we achieve a unified judgment, it is questionable as to whether it would allow for this without the creation of the judged fact. I mentioned earlier that Russell believes that the form's presence in the judgment but absence in the fact allows him to account for the truth of a belief in terms of correspondence with an outside entity. But if Hylton is correct in saying that "the logical form which figures in the judgment is the form of the corresponding fact,"²⁸ it seems that facts must have forms. Although Hylton does not demonstrate his claim by reference to the text, it does seem a reasonable one to make. For Russell himself states that the logical form of a judgment is "the fact that there are entities having the form in

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁷ Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 123.

²⁸ Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy*, p. 345.

question."²⁹ And this can only imply that facts also include the way they are to be combined as an ingredient.

Yet if we allow facts to have form on the 1913 theory, a correspondence theory of truth would once again become impossible and there would be no account of falsehood at all. For given that Russell holds that the constituents of judgments are actual objects, fact and judgment would be exactly the same thing. What is it, then, that prevents facts from including logical form? This is an important question, but it is one to which Russell offers no coherent answer.

A further problem arises when we consider that the form of (say) a dual complex - 'Something has some relation to something', is actually a proposition. How is it that we understand this proposition, and account for its unity, without invoking the multiple-relation theory and embarking on an infinite regress? Russell sees this objection and attempts to counter it by saying that in the case of logical form, the proposition is both a simple and a fact. Because these propositions are simple objects of acquaintance, Russell says that the duality of truth and falsehood does not apply to them.³⁰ All such propositions are necessarily true. On introspection, one thus finds that understanding logical form is simply acquaintance with the logical truth it expresses.

The problem with all this is not just the question of how something can be both a simple and a complex fact. More importantly, Russell's proof that understanding pure form is acquaintance commits him to the logical truth or a contingent proposition. For 'Something has some relation to something' is evidently an existential claim. This aspect of Russell's theory is criticized by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein points out that, on Russell's view, "the enumeration of special forms...[becomes] entirely arbitrary." We can formulate an infinite number of n-termed relational sentences, and according to Russell, all these contingent propositions are logical truths. One consequence of this, Wittgenstein says, is that it looks as if we can anticipate the existence of a certain kind of fact simply by considering a relational statement.

²⁹ Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 114.

³⁰ Russell argues: "The dualism of true and false presupposes propositions and does not arise so long as we confine ourselves to acquaintance, except, possibly, in the case of abstract logical forms, and even here there is no proper dualism, since falsehood is logically impossible in these cases."

Russell, cited in Pears, 'The Relationship Between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theories of Judgment', *The Philosophical Review*, 1977, p. 182.

This presents a real problem for Russell's theory because:

How could we decide a priori whether, for example, I can get into a situation in which I need to symbolize with the sign of a 27-termed relation?³¹

The question of whether reality contains a fact with 27 constituents in a certain relation to one another is an empirical question. To answer it, we need to look to the world and investigate its contents. And although it may be necessary that such a fact be possible, it does not seem that there actually has to be one if all we want to do is understand the 27-termed logical form. But if propositions expressing form are logical truths, as Russell maintains, then there must be such a fact and we should know this a priori. For in this case, understanding the proposition is becoming acquainted with just that state of affairs; the fact that there is a fact of the given form.

Attacks on the 1913 account also came from Wittgenstein before the *Tractatus* was published. In a letter to Russell dated 1913, Wittgenstein questions Russell's theory of types. Then in June of the same year he writes:

I can now express my objection to your theory of judgment exactly: I believe that it is obvious that, from the proposition 'A judges (say) a is in relation R to b', if correctly analysed, the proposition 'aRb' v '-aRb' must follow directly without the use of any other premiss.³²

It is far from clear exactly what Wittgenstein meant by these objections, but we do know that they provide at least part of the reason for Russell's decision to cease work on *The Theory of Knowledge*. One possible interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks has been offered by Ray Monk,³³ the main thrust of which shall be outlined below.

As we have seen, Russell held that whole propositions could be broken down into their constituents, which are real things. This means that if we analyse the proposition

³¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (trans. C.K. Ogden) Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, 5.554.

³² This, incidentally, is the precursor of *Tractatus* 5.5422: "The correct explanation of the form of the proposition 'A judges p' must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition.)"

³³ R. Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, Jonathan Cape Publications, 1996, p. 296.

'Socrates is mortal' we will end up with 'Socrates' and 'mortality' as actual objects. And since Russell held that "everything is at bottom an object of the same sort",³⁴ both 'Socrates' and 'mortality' have to be the same type of thing (i.e. objects of the same logical type). Monk suggests that Wittgenstein saw a problem with this because there is nothing in Russell's theory to prevent a person from taking the two objects together and forming the judgment "Mortality is Socrates", a judgment which is obviously nonsensical. Yet surely it is a legitimate requirement that what is judged must at least make sense.

The logical form cannot prevent the above situation from occurring because it can only guarantee that the judged relation gets into the right place in the proposition. If 'Socrates' and 'mortality' are both objects of the same status, then they are both equally capable of taking the place of either of the lower case variables in the form of a dual complex - 'aRb'. The only way for Russell to prevent nonsensical judgments from fitting within his theory would be to build a theory of types into his account of judgment. That is, he would have to distinguish between different kinds of objects, so that there is some explanation of why 'mortality' cannot take 'Socrates' as a predicate.

This solution, however, is not available to Russell because his theory of understanding propositions relies on the idea that we have acquaintance with their constituents. Acquaintance is supposed to be direct and immediate knowledge of an object, not about it. It therefore need not carry with it any information about what kinds of objects 'Socrates' and 'mortality' are, nor how they can occur in a proposition. The consequences of Wittgenstein's objection thus look unavoidable.

The above difficulties with Russell's notion of logical form prevent the 1913 theory from being a viable account of judgment. The problems associated with how to account for the unity of the proposition are not solved, and cannot be solved so long as Russell holds to his view of propositional constituents. To allow for the possibility of incorrect judgment and a correspondence theory of truth, there needs to be a distinction between the constituents of the judgment and the physical objects about which the judgment is made. If the mind manipulated tokens of these objects and not the objects themselves, as in Wittgenstein's picture theory, we could account for propositional unity without the creation of the judged fact. But since Russell held that the constituents of judgments were always real things, this was out of the difficulty was never open to him. Russell's growing awareness of these problems, plus the criticisms that he received from Wittgenstein, eventually led him to abandon the multiple-relation theory in 1919.

####

³⁴ Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 104

THE LIFE OF BERTARND RUSSELL
A DOCUMENTARY REVIEW BY
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Bertrand Russell, International Biography Series. Produced and Directed by Denys Blakeway, 1997 (BBC) and 1998 (A&E). Hosted by Peter Graves. Narrated by Jack Perkins. Ray Monk, Consultant. Series Editor, Janice Hadlow.

In the Spring of 1997, Denys Blakeway's documentary of the life of Bertrand Russell was shown in Great Britain as part of the *Reputations* Series produced by the BBC. This documentary has now been shown in the United States as part of the Arts and Entertainment Network's *International Biography* Series.

The documentary features an impressive array of interviews about Russell: daughter Katherine Tait, son Conrad Russell, grand-daughter Felicity Russell, Dora Black's daughter Harriet Ward, Alyce Russell's cousin Barbara Strachey, Russell archivist Ken Blackwell, biographer Ray Monk, philosopher Roger Scruton, Beacon Hill student Roger De Vere, friend Mary Feddon, Russell Secretary Pat Pottle, and *Peace News* correspondent Adam Roberts. There are also numerous still photographs of Russell, portions of the Freeman interview with Russell, other interview clips, and readings from Russell's letters and *Autobiography*.

So, with all of this material, one should assume that the documentary was a well-told tale. Far from it. The documentary concentrated on Russell's sex life, marriages, affairs, and political notoriety. While host Peter Graves (yes, Mr. *Mission: Impossible*) claimed that Russell was "the most influential British philosopher of the Twentieth Century," he also spoke of the "terrible suffering" caused by Russell and his "great destruction in the lives of those closest to him." For Graves, Russell was a "mass of contradictions" and his "public image was a lie." Narrator Jack Perkins (surely not the narrator of the BBC production -- if so, why?) concentrates on Russell's "darker side", his feelings that he was "a vampire" living off those around him. Russell is singled out for his romance of Alyce's sister Mary in Paris, Alyce's long-suffering love after he divorced her, John Russell's insanity, the misfortunes of John's three daughters (two suffered severe depression and other mental illness, a third committed suicide), the insanity of Peter Spence, and, the narration "destruction and desolation" of his family and his relationships. Monk claims that "Russell revelled in the role that there was something satanic about him." Grand-daughter Felicity Russell said the terrible life she suffered and that suffered by her sisters says all one needs to know about Russell.

Get the picture: Russell as villain, liar, cheat, blood-sucker, and evil genius. Of course nothing is really said about his contributions to philosophy, except a brief mention of

Principia Mathematica and Scruton's comments about its importance (one wishes Scruton was given more to say here). There is also an off-hand comment in the narration that "Russell was never at home with modern British analytical philosophy," which is surely false. The writer of the script probably meant that Russell was never "at home" with Oxford linguistic philosophy and the later work of Wittgenstein. But such a comment would have required an explanation of Russell's titanic contributions to philosophy, logic, and political theory, which would have cut into the time allotted for scandal. There is also a kind word by De Vere, who said that the Beacon Hill students "loved" Russell. There is also a brief mention of Russell winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Otherwise, the script is dominated -- overwhelmed -- that the portrait of Russell as blatant hypocrite, selfish savant, and wacky liberal.

The documentary begins with Russell's "ban the bomb" activities in 1961, but then transitions into a chronological story that starts with Russell's birth and early life, his time at Trinity College, Cambridge, his marriage to Alyce Pearsoll Smith, his affair with Ottoline Morrell, his anti-war activities in the First World War, his marriage to Dora Black, his work in progressive education and the founding of the Beacon Hill School, his marriage to Patricia "Peter" Spence, the financially-difficult years in America during the Second World War, his return to Trinity, his efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the establishment of the Peace Foundation, his involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis, his association with Ralph Schoenmann, and his death in 1970.

Conspicuous in absence, there is no mention of Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Sartre, Einstein, and the other giants who appreciated Russell's genius. Whitehead is mentioned only as the co-author of *Principia*. And I guess time constraints prevented any explanation of Russell's theories or philosophical positions, except his advocacy of free love.

In the end, I was saddened by this documentary. In my political and consulting life, I've worked closely with three cabinet members, two U.S. presidents, and several high-profile corporate executives. I'm no stranger to harsh press. But I always try to see what motivates bad press, which usually has an underlying, untold story. This documentary is too blatant to misunderstand or under-estimate. It is one of the worst examples of character assassination in my experience. Frankly, it is a disgrace. I don't expect much from American television. But I'm used to a larger sense of fair play from the BBC. What happened to intellectual honesty and some semblance of the complete truth? This is a shameful documentary that gives us scandal instead of substance, forgetting the essence of the subject and his vast accomplishments. I suppose in our current media pre-occupation with sex and voyeurism, this documentary is a sign of the times. In an attempt to diminish Russell, this documentary reduces all involved. The rejoinder might be that Russell's affairs, disappointments, fears, and failures are all true. I can't argue with that. But I can demand a more balanced, fair,

honest perspective, which is only found in a comment by Blackwell late into the documentary: Russell's wisdom about nuclear warfare saturated into the minds of the reading public, who in turn influenced political viewpoints, thereby helping to avoid nuclear catastrophe. Other than that one comment, one would be hard-pressed to understand Russell's greatness and his many positive accomplishments from his disappointing documentary.

####

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
Editor, *BRS Quarterly*
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

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First book of Russell's I read:

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

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

November, 1998

No. 100



*Bertrand Russell Society
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The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
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It is time to renew your membership for 1999.

- ◆ If you have already renewed for 1999 or have joined the BRS in 1999, **please accept the thanks of the Society** once again for your participation.
- ◆ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1999 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form on the next page along with your payment TODAY.** Thank you.

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John Lenz
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**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY**

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

November, 1998

No. 100

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**FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

This is the 100th edition of what began as a newsletter and became as a quarterly. Over the last 25 years, the BRS has benefitted from the good work of previous editors Lee Eisler, Don Jackanicz, Dennis Darland, and Michael Rockler. Now, after this issue, we will turn the editorship over to Tim Madigan, a long-time member of the BRS who is well-known to most of you. Tim has been editor of *Free Inquiry* and is now with the University of Rochester Press. He is extremely competent as an editor and scholar. Tim will vigorously promote Russell Studies. I am very pleased that he will be the new editor. My tenure has been marked, some would say "blighted", by the late appearance of issues. Tim is much more conscientious and dedicated than I am, so I believe we will soon be producing our issues on time, rather than a few months late.

Since this is my last *Quarterly*, I would like to thank my Assistant Editors, Bob Barnard and Katie Kendig. They have been of tremendous help. I also thank John Lenz and Ken Blackwell for their interest in the *Quarterly* and their patience. I have been proud of the *Quarterly* the past two years, but I am especially pleased to have produced two issues from Prague. The May, 1998 issue was memorable for me because of the articles by Barnard, Tim Childers, and myself on Russell's following in Eastern and Central Europe. Also, I have been very happy with Cliff Henke's video reviews, but the one in the May issue was particularly good. Cliff is a life-long friend and brother. I'm proud to have included him in this project. Trevor Banks has a valuable comment on the May video review at the end of this issue.

Perhaps I might be allowed one observation about how to improve the *Quarterly*. Over the two years of my editorship, there have been precious few contributions from the membership. This is a strange thing because most of our members are opinion leaders, thoughtful advocates of Russell's work, good writers, and eager communicators. Surely we could see more in the way of essays, reviews, and other commentary from the membership. I include the BRS leadership in this comment, because we need our officers and board members to set a high standard of participation. We especially need more comments from our European and Asian members. We need to know what is happening in France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, the Philippines, India, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and many other countries where we have members. I would also be interested in comments from our members in Mexico and Puerto Rico. I strongly urge our members to support Tim Madigan and the *Quarterly* with submissions on Russell Studies and related areas of interest. I hope that the members continue to express themselves in greater numbers through essays, reports of important conferences and

events, video reviews, contemporary re-considerations of Russell's books, reviews of new secondary literature on Russell, and other comments that keep Russell's views at the fore-front of modern thought.

I thank all of those who have submitted work during my time as editor. You've made my life easier and I have enjoyed being associated with your fine efforts.

In this issue, our centenary issue, we have more commentary from the Annual Meeting last June at the University of South Florida. BRS President John Lenz has a report for our membership.

Then, we have another addition of "Russell News", talking points for cutting-edge study of Russell.

Two papers read at that conference by Alan Schwerin and Mitchell Haney follow. Schwerin's concerns Russell and critical thinking. Haney has some critical insight on Ray Monk's biography of Russell.

We also have another conversation with a famous philosopher about Russell. This time it is Sir Peter Strawson, interviewed in Oxford last year.

There are two books reviews. One is by Matt McKeon, reviewing a new volume of collected essays by Antony Flew, an honorary member of our society. The other is by Bob Barnard, examining a book by Jan Dejnozka, a member of the BRS.

Finally, there are two membership profiles. These profiles help us learn about each other. Please take the time to fill in a form if you haven't done so in the past.

And don't forget to renew your membership for 1999!!!

Cheers.

**REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT
JOHN LENZ
DREW UNIVERSITY**

The 1998 Annual Meeting

We had a most successful and productive BRS Annual Meeting at the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida, in St. Petersburg, on June 19-21, 1998.

Attendees came from as far afield as Portugal; Caracas, Venezuela; Ontario; and many parts of the United States. We saw some BRS members who live in Florida and our meeting at the Ethics Center also enabled us to meet a number of the members of the Humanist Association of St. Petersburg (or HASP). Steve Reinhardt, we discovered, is the only person who has attended all 25 annual meetings (this brought him a small reward).

I wish to thank, besides all who attended and participated, Jan Eisler, Mitchell Haney, and John Shosky for helping with essential work in the preparation of the meeting, and Don Jackanicz for generously supplying a jug of the quasi-sacramental Red Hackle. Financially, the meeting almost broke even, and it would have done so, but for one recalcitrant individual who refuses to pay the registration fee.

The program was varied and, I thought, very rich and well balanced. We had talks by new (to us) philosophers, such as Bob Barnard, Henrique Ribeiro, and Alan Schwerin, presentations by old favorites such as Stefan Anderson and Trevor Banks, and a good audience composed of persons of varied interests and backgrounds, all united by their passion for Russell and what he stands for.

The meeting served as a poignant memorial for Lee Eisler. Jan Eisler, Lee's wife, distributed beautiful postcard reproductions of Lee by her friend (and attendee and new BRS member) Carol Dameron, and hosted a lovely memorial luncheon on Sunday (which happened to be World Humanist Day).

Javier Bonet (from Caracas) took photos of the meeting (including the star, the bottle of Red Hackle) with his digital camera and posted them to the WWW at: members.tripod.com/jbonet/brs98.

BRS Business

At this meeting we began to address some business crucial to the continuing future vitality of the BRS. New officers were elected, as previously reported in the *Quarterly*. Next year, it will be important to elect a new president. It is not good for an organization to have the same persons serve too long as officers. I see this year as a transition period.

The new Chairman of the Board is Kenneth Blackwell, the founding editor of Russell and former long-term Russell Archivist. Besides his duties as Chair -- such as coordinating committees and Board discussions -- Ken will also oversee Memberships and Renewals.

Ken, Jan, and myself have been gathering information about a crucial decision facing us: the status of our incorporation. Currently, the BRS is incorporated in

Illinois, with Don Jackanicz as our Registered Agent and his address as our Registered Office. Don is a lifetime member but, after having held virtually every BRS office and over some 20 years, he very reasonably wishes to pass on these particular duties to someone else. Two possibilities are on the table: we can pay a company to serve as our Registered Agent and Registered Office in Illinois (for \$125 a year) or we can move to the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, New York (near Buffalo), as an affiliated group. We will be collecting more details and presenting them to the Board of Directors for discussion and a vote.

Myself, I am doubling as Acting Treasurer since Dennis Darland, the BRS Treasurer for the past 20 years, is temporarily disabled. Dennis will be undergoing medical treatment for the next six to nine months. You may send him your wishes at 9000 Rockville Pike, 4E, Bethesda, Maryland 20892.

For 1999, we accepted Alan Schwerin's kind offer to host the BRS Annual Meeting at Monmouth University, located on the New Jersey coast not far south of New York City and Newark airport.

Alan also plans to revive the BRS session at the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Society, Eastern Division, held every December.

I will also be improving and updating the BRS Home Page and planning the next Annual Meeting.

As usual, please send your ideas for the BRS and contributions to the *Quarterly*. Beginning with the next issue, Tim Madigan will be the new editor. Please send your contributions to him.

RUSSELL NEWS

Tim Madigan has been named the new editor of the BRS *Quarterly*. He will begin his editorship with the next issue, February, 1999, Number 101.

Alan Schwerin, David Rodier and John Shosky spoke at the Russell Session of the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 29, 1998 in Washington, D.C. Schwerin lectured on Ottoline Morrell and Bertrand Russell ("A Lady, Her Philosopher, and a Contradiction"). Rodier spoke about Russell's comments on a paper by Victor Lenzen at Harvard in 1914. Shosky discussed Russell's introduction to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The session was well-attended and thanks go to Alan for arranging it.

Whittier Publications has announced *Reason and Belief: Great Issues in*

Philosophy, edited by Alan Schwerin of the BRS. In addition to essays by Russell, Wittgenstein, Popper, Ryle, Ayer, and others, one treat are the photographs taken by Schwerin. Look for his essay, "On the Assertion: 'I Am My Brain.'" ISBN 1-57604-075-5.

Routledge has announced the publication of a new edition of Russell's *Autobiography*, with an introduction by Michael Foot. The ISBN is 0-415-18985-3. It is available in hardcover and contains the entirety of the three volume work within one single cover. Routledge is advertising a 20 percent discount, which presumably would include purchases by BRS members. There is no information about the duration of the discount.

Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico announces the publication of Guillermo Hurtado's *Proposiciones Russellianas*, with an expected publication date of 1999. Dr. Hurtado is a Research Fellow at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filossficas de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico and in 1998 was a Visiting Fellow at the Instituto de Filosofma, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientmficas, Madrid.

Oxford University Press has published BRS member Greg Landini's *Russell's Hidden Substitution Theory*. No additional information was available to the *Quarterly*.

Ashgate Publishers has announced a new book by Jan Dejnozka entitled *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance* (ISBN 1-84014-981-7, hardcover only). Dejnozka is Visiting Scholar in Law and Philosophy in the Rackham School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan. He is the author of *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins: Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*, reviewed in this issue of the *Quarterly*.

Cambridge University Press has published Jaakko Hintikka's *The Principles of Mathematics Revisited* (1996 in hardcover, 1998 in paperback).

CRITICAL THINKING AND PHILOSOPHY: SOME REMARKS ON RUSSELL'S VIEWS ALAN SCHWERIN MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY

[Editor's Note: This paper was read at the 25th Annual Meeting of the BRS.]

It looks as though I could lay down the general rule: whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. *Descartes*

Bertrand Russell's letter, written towards the end of 1911 to his confidant and lover, Lady Ottoline Morrell, is characteristically candid: his most recent manuscript is a "shilling shocker." No, this is not a steamy novel from the pen of (arguably) the world's greatest thinker, but a modest collection of fifteen essays on a variety of philosophical issues that would hopefully have mass appeal.¹ Russell clearly hoped that his text would sell well -- among both academics and non-academics. But this is not all Russell hoped to accomplish with his book. His earlier heroic struggle with the monumental *Principia Mathematica* -- the daunting three volume investigation of the foundations of mathematics, co-authored with Alfred North Whitehead -- had taken its toll: "my intellect never quite recovered from the strain. I have been ever since definitely less capable of dealing with difficult abstractions than I was before."² To regain his strength, and to refine some of his ideas on less technical philosophical matters, Russell accepted Gilbert Murray's invitation to write *The Problems of Philosophy*.

Put broadly, *The Problems of Philosophy* enabled Russell to accomplish three tasks: to present his analysis of the ideas of other philosophers in an accessible package, to outline his own philosophical positions, and to consider the value of philosophical investigations such as his and those of other thinkers. Now there can be little doubt that *The Problems of Philosophy* has been influential, at least among philosophers. For one thing, the positions staked out in this "shilling shocker" play a pivotal role in the propagation of a leading movement in Western philosophy.

¹ At only a shilling, Russell's inexpensive text could reach a wide audience. However, this attempt to popularize philosophy did not sit well with his contemporaries. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for one, despised this move by Russell: "People who like philosophy will pursue it, and others won't, and there is an end to it." See Ray Monk in his excellent biography, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, Free Press, 1990, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

The arguments in this text form a significant part of the foundation of analytic philosophy -- an approach to philosophical investigations rooted in Gottlob Frege's contributions to theories on meaning, and subsequently elaborated on by philosophers such as Ayer, Wittgenstein, and Quine.¹ History, however, shows that Russell's "shilling shocker" has had broad appeal -- it certainly has had an appeal far wider than that of Russell's other, more technical bequests, such as *Principia Mathematica*.²

Russell's views have influenced, and continue to be of consequence, for many non-philosophers. As I shall demonstrate in this paper, his ideas can be put to practical use as well, serving as an invaluable resource for instructors engaged in teaching critical thinking. I shall explore two sets of issues. In Section One, I outline the central strands of Russell's conception of philosophy and critically consider his rationale for this conception. My thesis is that he identifies philosophical thought with critical thinking in *The Problems of Philosophy*. With this theoretical analysis behind us, in Section Two I consider a few of the practical applications of Russell's conception of critical thinking in the classroom. My hope is that this composite account of Russell's conception of philosophy will be of some value to instructors in their attempts to challenge students to think critically. If nothing else, this discussion should encourage some instructors and students to reflect on the rationale for higher education in the liberal American tradition. For surely we need, at some point, to reflect on the following basic question: "Why teach students to think critically?" My paper can be seen as a modest contribution to this important question. To begin, consider Russell's views on the nature of philosophical thought.

Section One: Philosophy as Critical Thinking

Readers of *The Problems of Philosophy* might find some of Russell's comments in philosophy disconcerting, if not disingenuous. In the final essay in the collection, entitled "The Value of Philosophy," he asserts that philosophical

¹ The paper that encapsulates Frege's foundational work on the analysis of meaning is his "On Sense and Reference, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.), 1977. Ludwig Wittgenstein's contributions to analytic philosophy center around two (arguably disparate) texts: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1921, and *Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, 1953. Two important texts from Willard Van Orman Quine that have furthered analytic philosophy are *Mathematical Logic*, Harvard, 1940, and *Word and Object*, Harvard, 1960.

² This accomplishment is perhaps not too impressive when we recall that on Russell's own estimation only six individuals had managed to read *Principia Mathematica* in its entirety: three Poles and three Texans. And by the end of World War II, three of them were presumed dead by Russell. *Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, Jonathan Cape, 1996, p. 193.

reflections are valuable. Unlike the so-called practical man "who recognizes only material needs," students of philosophy are immeasurably enriched by their intellectual endeavors. The philosophically inclined work with so-called goods of the mind, and "even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body."¹ However, Russell introduces a discordant note into his discussion -- nothing precise is to be gained from philosophy:

Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves.²

These concluding comments must come as a surprise to the readers of a text ostensibly devoted to an analysis of the problems of philosophy. For that matter, *anyone* troubled by a philosophical problem is likely to be surprised that a leading philosopher such as Russell could espouse this view. In advising us to stop looking for definite answers to our philosophical questions, and directing us to the questions themselves, Russell offers what appears to be counter-intuitive advice.

What he appears to suggest here can be characterized as follows. Imagine an enthusiastic tourist about to journey by car to some spectacular resort. Before she leaves, we advise her to cancel the trip and stay home. Furthermore, our advice is that she devote her energy to inspecting her car, rather than driving it. Just as this tourist is likely to be taken aback by our advice, so Russell's proposal that we redirect our efforts and focus on the philosophical questions we are interested in, is bound to raise an eyebrow or two. Notwithstanding their problems, cars, as with questions, surely have their uses -- and the problems that might arise when these devices are used surely ought not detract from the overall enterprise that gave rise to these devices in the first place. Individuals who raise philosophical questions seek solutions to their problems, and they are unlikely to be mollified by a mere analysis of the questions themselves. How else are we to placate the powerful desire we have for solutions to their philosophical problems? All of which raises an important question: Why does Russell suggest we reassign our labor to an investigation of the philosophical questions, rather than search for definite solutions to these questions?

To answer this question, it might be useful to briefly consider the views of one of the students who had a significant influence on Russell after the time he wrote *The*

¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1912, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Problems of Philosophy: namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein. At this early stage of his career, Wittgenstein also thought that the philosophically perplexed ought to focus on their questions, rather than on the possible answers to these questions. As he insists in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, we must refrain from seeking answers for philosophical questions *because these responses will be meaningless*. Toward the end of his analysis Wittgenstein issues the following advice:

6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science -- i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy -- and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical [i.e. philosophical] to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person -- he would not have the feelings that we were teaching him philosophy -- *this method would be the only strictly correct one*.¹

Attempts to appease the philosophically perplexed by inviting them to abstain from philosophical reflection will meet with resistance, concedes Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, as Wittgenstein sees it, it is not possible to get around this difficulty, given the essentially nonsensical nature of philosophical questions and their possible answers. This last judgment points to an important difference between the two thinkers who share a common concern about the assumption that we take philosophical questions at face value.

While both Russell and Wittgenstein have serious qualms about everyday philosophical questions, it would be a mistake to infer from this that their views overlap entirely on this issue. Nothing could be further from the truth! Wittgenstein thinks that the answers (i.e. philosophical propositions) we might be tempted to offer in response to the philosophical questions are *nonsensical*, and thus that these questions are nonsensical. As he bluntly put it in the *Tractatus*:

6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. *The riddle does not exist*. If a question can be framed at all, it is also *possible* to answer it.²

Unlike Wittgenstein, Russell holds that the answers to philosophical questions are

¹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 74. My italics.

² *Ibid*, p. 73.

indeterminate (i.e. uncertain, but *not* nonsensical), thereby implying that these questions are not nonsensical, but merely in need of clarification. In short, Russell appears to maintain that philosophical questions are initially unclear, but that critical analysis of these questions -- i.e. some critical thinking on the meaning of these questions -- can help clarify matters, and possibly lead to determinate results. But why are philosophical questions in need of clarification? And are only philosophical questions beset with this defect?

Are philosophical questions inherently impossible to work with, as Wittgenstein seems to suggest in the *Tractatus*? This is not Russell's position as a consideration of *The Problems of Philosophy* shows. While Russell does not provide us with an explicit answer to this important issue, his text does contain the ingredients for a plausible response. In his analysis Russell is candid about the past successes of philosophers -- their accomplishments are few and far between:

...it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions.¹

Of course, one might argue that this shortcoming is a function of the questions themselves, not of the philosophers attempting to answer them. Russell implicitly rejects this suggestion of the inherent problems with philosophical questions, constantly urging us to persist with the *same* questions in our analysis. To the best of my knowledge, on no occasion does she invite us to jettison the (problematic) question under consideration. While Wittgenstein -- at least in the *Tractatus* -- insists that we turn to a *different* set of questions and pursue meaningful scientific, rather than meaningless philosophical questions, Russell doggedly suggests that we clarify the questions that puzzle us. What is more, as the passage just provided intimates, Russell concedes that there has been at least some progress in philosophy -- unfortunately, not the "great measure of success" one might expect, but success nevertheless. This modest progress would not have been possible had the philosophical questions been inherently impossible to work with.² So if

¹ Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 90.

² Russell's colleague, Alfred North Whitehead, would later endorse this view on the scant progress made by philosophers:

The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.

Process and Reality, Macmillan Company (New York), 1929, p. 63.

philosophical questions are amenable to meaningful treatment, why do problems arise when we attempt to solve these questions?

Once again, *The Problems of Philosophy* is silent on this important issue. But an explanation can be constructed. Although Russell has not given an explicit explanation of the need to clarify our philosophical questions, his text does contain the necessary ingredients for a plausible explanation. In the opening sections of his analysis, Russell defends a thesis that turns out to be central to his enterprise: namely, the view that our ideas are logically defective. More specifically, Russell argues that our *ordinary* ideas are logically defective. Furthermore, he suggests that philosophical inquiry will help us realize just how unsatisfactory our normal ideas are. In his view, "all vagueness and confusion that underlies our *ordinary* ideas" will become apparent when we do philosophy.¹ This last strongly suggests that Russell attributes the problems with philosophical questions to our ordinary (i.e. non-philosophical) ideas. As he sees it, philosophical questions are puzzling and in need of clarification by virtue of the defective ideas we rely on in non-philosophical contexts. But these, presumably, are the very same ideas that inform our non-philosophical questions. So, for Russell, there appears to be little, if any, difference between our philosophical ideas and our ordinary ideas. For all intents and purposes, they are one and the same.

However, there is more to this suggestion than meets the eye! If my thesis on Russell's view of the relationship between philosophical and non-philosophical ideas is correct, an interesting proposal follows for exponents of critical thinking. If our allegedly defective ordinary ideas function as the basis of both our philosophical and non-philosophical questions, it seems reasonable to conclude that for Russell *all* of our questions are initially obscure, and that they all need to be clarified. So Russell's injunction that we reflect critically on the ideas that inform our philosophical questions in the end amounts to the suggestion that all questions must be critically evaluated. From this it follows that for Russell there can be little difference between philosophy and critical thinking: both activities require close scrutiny of our questions. As they stand, these questions apparently mask defective (ordinary) ideas. And unless we undertake a careful critical analysis of our non-philosophical questions, we will discover that we are without "any very great measure of success in [our] attempts to provide definite answers to [our] questions." In short, we will be in the very same predicament that philosophers, apparently, have been in! But what leads Russell to conclude that our ordinary ideas are problematic? I would like to briefly address this critical question before outlining a few practical implications of Russell's views for the classroom.

¹ Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 123. (My emphasis)

Russell's argument for the thesis that our ordinary ideas are logically defective, or "vague and confused," is a variant of the argument from illusion. It proceeds along the following lines. Suppose that Jack is looking at an object in the sky. When we ask him to tell us what it is that he is looking at, he might reply as follows: "I am looking at the moon." But Jack's assessment of the properties of the object that he apparently is looking at will be significantly influenced by a number of factors. To mention a few: he might be drunk and lying beneath a street light, under the impression that it is the moon he is looking at; or he might be sick, and conclude that the moon has a yellow tint, while another person with a different ocular condition might conclude that the moon is pink; someone with poor vision might see a fuzzy soft object in space, while another sees a sharp, precisely defined object; Jack might see a spherical moon, while a friend in a different country on the other side of the globe might see a crescent object. Talking about observations of color, Russell maintains that

...color is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the [object] and the spectator and the way the light falls on the [object]. When, in ordinary life, we speak of *the* colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just a good a right to be considered real...¹

The diversity of possible observations leads Russell to conclude that our grasp of reality is not as sure as we initially thought. Our ideas of reality -- both philosophical and non-philosophical -- are obscure. This fundamental shortcoming manifests itself most forcefully when we attempt to articulate them. The multiplicity of the possible answers one can produce in response to questions on our observations leads Russell to conclude that "any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong."² This philosophical observation is highly significant for the classroom.

Let us now turn to the practical consequences of Russell's views on philosophy.

Section Two: Some Practical Suggestions

While Russell has not provided any specific proposals, the presentation in *The*

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

Problems of Philosophy clearly has a number of practical implications for philosophers and non-philosophers alike. I want to identify and briefly discuss a few of these implications for the classroom.

As we have seen, Russell's view of philosophy, and by implication, his account of critical thinking rests full square on the suggestion that our ordinary ideas are vague and confused.¹ As teachers of critical thinking, we need to develop techniques that enable our students to recognize this shortcoming. By encouraging our students to reflect on their ideas and on the relationships between them, we show the class the obscurity and imprecision of our ideas. For example, the invitation to consider the conception or idea of happiness that underlies a particular novel may lead students to explore a variety of ideas. To begin with, students are likely to discover that the class has diverse views on the idea of happiness. So, they have a lot to learn from the comparison of *different* ideas, e.g. in comparing one's idea of happiness with the idea of pleasure, a deeper understanding emerges of the two ideas. A careful analysis and comparison of ideas will thus heighten a student's appreciation of the subtleties of the text under consideration.

But precisely how do we encourage the class to reflect on their ideas and compare them with one another? Russell's text suggests an answer: get students to write out their views on the issues under consideration. If Russell is correct, the statements that students will initially produce in class are likely to be misleading, vague, and more than likely false. The instructor, perhaps with the assistance of the class, must encourage recognition of these shortcomings. One way to do this is to get the class to present their individual statements to the class. The display of preferably short statements from a variety of sources in the classroom will alert students to the need to think more critically on their own ideas. And the warning will come from within their own ranks. If we admit that the production of a false statement is proof positive that the ideas that inform the statement are logically defective, there surely can be no better way to show the defects with our ideas than to write them out.

Having shown that our ordinary ideas are vague and confused, Russell highlights some of the problems that arise when we attempt to articulate these (confused) ideas. Most importantly, as we saw above, his view is that our explanatory statements will probably be unsatisfactory, i.e. they are "very likely to be wrong."² While we need to encourage students to express their ideas, we must strive to

¹ As Russell put it, "...philosophy is merely the attempt to answer...ultimate questions...critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas." *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

produce clear and precise expressions of these ideas in the classroom. Confusing statements must be isolated and carefully analyzed. Students and teachers alike need to develop an intolerance for obscure and confusing statements. It is not a sign of failure for a student or the teacher to declare that a text or a specific statement in a text appears difficult, if not impossible, to understand. If Russell is correct about the general inadequacy of our ideas, these explicit acknowledgements of incomprehension will not be infrequent in the classroom.

In this situation, the teacher needs to take the initiative and serve as a role model for the class. When students discover that their teacher willingly reveals his or her difficulties with the texts, they will be prepared to raise their own critical questions about the questions and statements under consideration. Unless the teacher shows the way, students are unlikely to openly declare that they do not understand the material. For instance, how many of us have not had the experience of teaching a text to a class, only to discover, almost by accident, that most of the students don't understand some of the basic terms used in the text? We should all strive to clarify the texts we read and discuss: this objective will remain out of reach unless we analyze the concepts articulated by the texts.

Initially, students are likely to be surprised by this candor. Surely the teacher, as a trained profession, possibly with ample experience with these texts, already understands the material being taught? Students need to learn that their teacher is not as confident as they might have thought. That is to say, the class needs to appreciate that *both* student and teacher are often engaged in a joint venture to discover the full import of a text. In this environment there can be no room for dogmatic pronouncements about the texts studied by the class. The more reflective, cautious attitude engendered by this realization of "learned ignorance," which is central to Russell's conception of philosophy, is surely one of the primary objectives of any course in critical thinking.

In advising us to reconsider the questions that arise in philosophy and ordinary life, and in pointing out the shortcomings endemic to initial uncritical statements of our ideas, Russell is alluding to the primary value of philosophy, and, by implication, critical thinking. This is the recognition and possible elimination of our prejudices. For Russell, the critical investigation of the questions of philosophy, rather than the search for (indefinite) answers to these questions, widens our mental horizons, thereby enabling us to discover previously hidden presuppositions of our views:

...these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic

assurance which closes the mind against speculation..."¹

By retreating from the search for answers to our questions to a consideration of the questions themselves, we pre-empt the restrictive perspective that the philosophical answers could impose on us. In short, we become less dogmatic -- for now our task is not to merely assess competing answers to our philosophical questions, but to begin afresh, i.e. to confront the prejudices endemic to these initial philosophical questions. Naturally, this confrontation of the established perspective is not without risk, but as Russell sees it, the benefits far outweigh the costs involved. While philosophy -- any by implication, critical thinking -- cannot provide us with certain views on the issues we consider, it can "suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom."² Philosophy and critical thinking can, therefore, keep "alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect."³ If we do not explore our ideas, these new, exciting vistas will not emerge. As Russell has shown, this journey must begin with a critical investigation of the devices we rely on to articulate these ideas. Our journey must begin with a scrutiny of our questions and statements.⁴

**SUITABLE MEMORIES:
A META-ETHICAL REFLECTION
ON MONK'S *BERTRAND RUSSELL*
MITCHELL HANEY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA**

[Editor's Note: This paper was read at the 25th Annual Meeting of the BRS.]

What is so interesting about another story of a privileged, white, male whose neuroses are portrayed as the driving force of his brilliance? I would say, "Very little!" In a day when the general premises of psychoanalysis are part and parcel of many people's unanalyzed folk psychology, an exegesis of anyone's life that

¹ *Ibid*, p. 94.

² *Ibid*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ This project has been made possible by the generosity of a grant from the Aid-To-Creativity Committee at Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey. I also want to thank two individuals for their invaluable suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper: my wife, Helen, and a good friend, Guy Oakes. Their critical responses helped me clarify and improve my thoughts.

seeks such a deep analysis is, at best, cliché. Now although it is not my aim to critique Monk's latent psychoanalytic presuppositions (although it would certainly be one worthy way of responding to his work),¹ we should nevertheless note that this latent psychoanalysis provides us with a highly reductive account of the persona of Bertrand Russell.

Monk clearly presents, and supports with a quotation from Russell's *Autobiography* (xiii), what he believes are the three essential drives underlying Russell's life and work:

In each of their various ways, Russell's three great passions were attempts by him to overcome his solitariness through contact with something outside himself: another individual, humanity at large, or the external world. The first comprised by his terror of madness, which led him to fear the depth of his emotions; the second by his discovery that he felt alone even in a crowd; and the third by the progressive scepticism, the increasing loss of faith, that characterized his philosophical development.²

From the very first page, Monk masterfully intertwines the everyday and the philosophical moments of Russell's life so that we may see the grounds of his reductive analysis. What we acquire is a picture of Russell that may be believable to anyone who has uncritically internalized basic psychoanalytic premises concerning the force of unconscious drives (whether libidinal or vital) into their daily folk psychological explanations. I know that some commentators have been repelled at Monk's portrayal of Russell. These critics, however, have not been repelled by its underlying, unanalyzed Freudian presuppositions, but due to the fact that the portrayal of Russell is incessantly dark and dismal -- to the point of being 'wicked'.

Monk's book is not exactly the portrayal of a 'hero'. Irrespective of whether or not readers are attracted or repelled by Monk's 'Russell', I think that both reactions are explicable. To explain both the praise and the denunciation of Monk's book is the central aim of my commentary.

However, before entering the body of my essay, I must make a confession. It

¹ Ken Blackwell, at the recent Annual Meeting of the BRS, chided Monk for interpreting every instance that Russell speaks of 'love' and meaning 'sex'. If this is even largely the case, and it seems that it is, then Monk could surely be taken to task, because even for Freud 'love' is sometimes just love just as sometimes a 'cigar' is just a cigar.

² Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, Jonathan Cape, 1996, p. xix.

doesn't upset me in the least to believe that a philosophical hero and world citizen, such as Russell, may have had deep neuroses stemming from his childhood that darkened every moment of his life. Analogously, it didn't upset me to find out that Michel Foucault, a philosophical giant and world citizen in another (The Other) tradition, struggled throughout much of his life with his homosexuality. My general reaction to both of these biographical illuminations has been, 'So what! Does it really matter?' I offer you this confession so that you may know that the criticism of Monk's work that I will forward below is largely motivated independently of whether or not I accept Monk's portrayal of Russell. What does irk me, and it is a problem for any biographical story-telling, is Monk's reduction of Russell's persona to some core digestible description as outlined above (regardless of the fact that it relies upon some dubious and trite psychoanalytic presuppositions). In order to flesh out my worry, I will forward a general meta-ethical account of biographical discourse.¹

The Meta-Ethics of Biography

I suggest that the notion of 'persona' is irreducibly a normative concept. As a result of this irreducible normativity, a person's persona is neither an object capable of a pure description nor is it an object of which we can have knowledge -- either by acquaintance or description. The persona, I suggest, is a construction or presentation that *endorses* either a suitable or an unsuitable memory of the person in question. The suitability of a memory prescribes to others how they ought to think, feel, and/or react to the person being presented. In addition, the memory being prescribed can either be short-term (as in a first impression) or long-term (as in a legacy). In either case, we portray ourselves and others via depictions that attempt to highlight characteristics that are either favorable or unfavorable by our own lights. As we intuitively know, the presentations we make concerning the characteristics of ourselves and others will generally be favorable in the case of ourselves, our families, and our compatriots, and unfavorable in the case of our expatriots and our foes. As a result, most (interesting) portrayals of ourselves and others in autobiographies and biographies will have evaluations nested into the depiction of the persona in question. (I take it that -- in part -- the role of 'Thick Moral Concepts' -- as Bernard Williams has described them -- is to capture how depictions of ourselves and others can be evaluative.) However, insofar as the attempt to capture any persona in an autobiography or biography has this normative dimension, I believe, we must begin to worry about the descriptive adequacy of any reductive biographical analysis.

¹ Monk even suggests -- but never develops -- that Russell saw a close affinity between ethical discourse and biographical discourse. Monk states: "Without going into the details, but in a way that showed that, in (Russell's) mind, moral theory and autobiography were closely linked..." (146). I thank Bob Barnard for reminding me of this brief comment.

What I want to suggest is that any reduction of a human persona (whether to deep unmet desires or to the noblest of passions, or some other reduction) commits G.E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy. As we all know, Moore argued in *Principia Ethica* that naturalistic definitions of the good could be undermined by the 'Open-Question' argument. The argument states: if a naturalistic definition of the good, e.g., 'pleasure is the good', is adequate, then it would not strike us as a legitimate, i.e., open, question to ask 'Is *X* feature really the good?', e.g. 'Is pleasure really the good?' Moore suggested, and I think rightly, that if we question the descriptive adequacy of a naturalistic definition of the good, the question will be open rather than closed. Now, if Monk's reduction of Russell's persona into the three drives to overcome solitude is *the* 'Bertrand Russell', then the question 'Are the three drives to overcome solitude *really* the Bertrand Russell?' should be closed. However, it is my intuition that this question is open even after we provide for all the 'evidence' Monk presents to us in 600 plus pages portraying Russell's life from 1872-1921.

If I correct that the 'persona' cannot be given a reductive, naturalistic definition without thereby committing the naturalistic fallacy, thus suggesting another reason for believing that it is a normative concept, then what can we say of the depiction of anyone's persona? Well, at this point, there are two ways we can go: 1) We can argue, analogously to Moore, that the persona is a non-natural property of each person, or, 2) We can argue that the persona is irrealist, and it actually reflects something non-cognitive about the agent or biographer providing the depiction.

I think that there are good reasons for taking the second option.

If we were to argue that the persona is a non-natural property, then we have to embrace two anti-naturalistic propositions. First, we would have to accept that either there are persons who can track the true persona of individuals or all people can track this property; that such persons or all people have an interpersonal sense analogous to a moral sense. Second, and most obvious, we would have to accept that the persona is some property in the world that is irreducible to any set of natural properties. I will not argue for it here, but, generally speaking, if one desires to remain within the bounds of a metaphysical naturalism ('what is' is within the bounds of natural science), then these two propositions are *prima facie* untenable. As a result, I believe the second option is the favorable course. In addition, I believe that the expressivist option I will outline below also provides a more plausible explanation of how we can have strong opposing emotional reactions to the same depiction of a persona.

It is my belief that biographical depictions of persona are largely expressivist in nature. The characteristics that are presented as relevant to others express the emotional response, e.g. the like or dislike, that a biographer has towards her

subject. In addition, the depiction she offers prescribes to the reader that they ought to share the same affective response towards the person being depicted. Certainly, there are statements inside of any biographical depiction that are either true or false, but many of the statements, I suggest, are expressive of the respect or disdain felt by the presenter and they are an attempt to lure the reader to accept a similar stance towards the subject. The expressive nature of a biographical presentation, I believe, will be reflected in the number of linguistic, epistemic, and literary devices aimed at prescribing a suitable or unsuitable memory of the person being portrayed. The devices my include: direct evaluative utterances, the features of the person's life that are deemed salient (as opposed to those that are not), the historical causal explanations depicted (as opposed to those that are not), as well as the simple tone of the language employed in describing the person being depicted. Hence, I suggest that biographies constitute prescriptions to the reader to accept suitable or unsuitable memories.

Conclusions

If I am correct about my meta-ethical analysis of the nature of the persona and the normative dimension of biographical writing, then there are three conclusions that I would think follow concerning Monk's Russell. First, he should have avoided any attempt to reduce Russell to any specific naturalistic description, because such a description commits the naturalistic fallacy (apart from concerns about the adequacy of pop-psychoanalytic explanations). He is not describing; he is prescribing. Second, it offers us a plausible explanation for why different readers of Monk's book react favorably or unfavorably to the same depiction. Opposing readers have opposing emotional stances toward the memory of Russell. Some readers are already pre-disposed to have suitable memories of Russell and others unsuitable. Third, it also suggests that, in many cases where we have readers who are familiar with Russell's life and work, arguing over the facts will not likely alter the emotional stances of those who are in opposition. Suitable and unsuitable memories cannot be altered or constructed on merely cognitive grounds.

As a result, I believe that the real issue underlying both favorable and unfavorable reactions to Monk's biography is whether or not his depiction will be allowed to guide future students to a memory of Russell. Will future students receive a suitable or unsuitable memory of one of this century's leading philosophical figures?

CONVERSATION WITH SIR PETER STRAWSON JOHN SHOSKY AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

This is the third short report prepared on Russell's influence in Oxford. Previous interviews were with Antony Flew and Rom Harré.

On March 4, 1997, I met with Sir Peter Strawson at University College, Oxford, where he has an office next to Ronald Dworkin, the famous jurisprudence scholar. Strawson, Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy, Emeritus, and a Fellow of Magdalen College and of University College, is best known to Russell scholars for "On Referring", his famous reply to Russell's theory of descriptions. First published in *Mind*,¹ and reprinted with additional footnotes in Flew's *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*² and in Strawson's *Logico-Linguistic Papers*.³ This article may be Strawson's most famous short essay. Russell's response was "Mr. Strawson On Referring," published in *Mind* in 1957,⁴ which was extremely critical of ordinary language philosophy and often personal in his comments on Strawson. The response was later included in Russell's *My Philosophical Development*⁵ and in the *Last Philosophical Testament, 1943-68, Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*.⁶ Since it has been almost fifty years since "On Referring" was printed, and now over forty years since Russell's reply, I wanted to discuss this historic exchange with Strawson. Rom Harré kindly made some initial contacts on my behalf and then a date was arranged. I arrived at University College to find Strawson in his office, several books open and scattered around the room, tea cups in evidence, an ash tray filled with butts and a strong smell of smoke in the room, and half empty bookshelves, for this clearly was an office for working and meeting people, and not the repository of the Strawson library. He reminded me of Basil Rathbone's characterization of Sherlock Holmes and the office had the look of the Baker Street apartment in old movies.

¹ Vol. LIX, N.S. 1950.

² St. Martin's, 1963, pp. 21-52.

³ Methuen, 1971.

⁴ *Mind*, N.S. 66, July 1957, pp. 385-9. Quotations below will be from a reprinted version found in *Essays in Analysis*, Douglas Lackey (ed.), George Braziller, 1973, pp. 120-126.

⁵ Unwin, 1959, pp. 175-180.

⁶ Volume 11, edited by John Slater and Peter Kollner, Routledge, 1997, pp. 630-35.

But this Holmes is a philosophical sleuth. Strawson is a key, central figure in Twentieth Century philosophy. He is well known for his *Introduction to Logical Theory* and *Individuals*.¹ I have used his edited collection, *Philosophical Logic*,² when I have taught classes on philosophical argumentation in the United States and in the Czech Republic. He also edited another important collection of lectures delivered to the British Academy entitled *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action*.³ Many philosophers have consulted his great book on Kant, *The Bounds of Sense*.⁴ His lectures in 1987 at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., have been published as *Analysis and Metaphysics*.⁵ Along with so many philosophers, I have vast admiration for his work in logic and epistemology. Still philosophically active at eighty, he graciously set aside time to discuss Russell.

For those who haven't had the chance to meet him, Strawson is the quintessential British gentleman. He is tall, elegant, charming, and graceful. He is one of the most polite, gracious, and attentive people I've met, whether in academia, politics, or business. As I staggered through my questions he was unfailingly decent and fair in providing honest and careful answers.

I asked what books of Russell's Strawson read. The first was probably *The Problems in Philosophy*. Strawson also read "On Denoting" and subsequent developments of the theory of descriptions. He was a keen student of *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, and read the "Introduction" to *Principia Mathematica, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, and *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. He greatly admired Russell's "Lectures on Logical Atomism." He did not read *The Analysis of Mind* or *The Analysis of Matter*, unlike many of his contemporaries.

During Strawson's time, from the late 1940s to the present, Russell's influence in Oxford was not direct, "although we all read Russell. We all knew him -- he was inescapable." But there was little agreement with his positions. Even in the 1940s, Russell was more of an historical figure. He "didn't write much that was new."

¹ Metheun, 1952 and 1959, respectfully.

² Oxford, 1967.

³ Oxford, 1968.

⁴ Metheun, 1966.

⁵ Oxford, 1992.

While Ayer was an avid defender of Russell, particularly the theory of descriptions, Strawson believes that the major influences in Oxford "were local": J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle. But Strawson also noted that "everyone admired Russell's fertility, lucidity, and elegance of writing."

Russell did visit Oxford once during Strawson's early years there. He spoke about linguistic philosophy and his unfavorable view of it. Russell took some questions, mostly from J.O. Urmson. Strawson remembers that Russell displayed "wit, elegance, and acerbic charm." Later, Russell asked H.L.A. Hart, "Did I win?" However, as far as Strawson remembers, Russell didn't convince anyone in the audience to abandon linguistic philosophy.

One of my objectives was to learn more about the genesis and purpose of "On Referring." This work is a landmark in philosophical logic, a field Strawson credits, in part, to Russell. Philosophical logic is the study of "the way constituents (of logical form) are put together."¹ It is "the business of philosophical logic to extract (knowledge of logical forms in discourse) from its concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure."² Strawson believed that philosophical logic must look at issues involving the general form of the proposition, reference and predication, truth-functions and conditionals, meaning and use, meaning and necessity, truth, categories, and other issues.³

I should preface by saying that there are many people who believe that philosophical logic is hostile to Russell's work, partly because of Russell's dislike of "On Referring." It is true that philosophical logic is often at odds with Russell, but primarily because he often didn't see the difference with traditional logic. Yet, Russell is certainly the "godfather" of philosophical logic, as I learned examining Ryle's copy of the *Principles of Mathematics*, housed in the Linacre College Library at Oxford. Ryle notes in the margins that Russell is laying the groundwork for philosophical logic from the very beginning of that masterpiece. Strawson found Russell an inspiration, with Strawson often expanding or developing ideas suggested by Russell. In fact, I would argue that there are four philosophers who have proven worthy and influential advocates for Russell's contributions in logic: Quine, Strawson, Carnap, and Ayer. Each were intrigued by Russell's work, developed overlapping interests to Russell, often showing Russell's initial positions to be in error, and then taking portions of Russell's logical writings in new

¹ Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, George Allen & Unwin, 1914, p. 52

² *Ibid*, p. 53.

³ See Strawson's "Introduction," *Philosophical Logic*, pp. 1-16.

directions. I would add Wittgenstein to that list, but hesitate because he so often disparaged Russell, while at the same time benefitting greatly from Russell's personal and professional assistance. Strawson readily acknowledges Russell's importance in the development of philosophical logic, even though Russell strongly disliked its reliance on ordinary language. In fact, one could argue that Russell never understood the full significance of philosophical logic, even though he was so important to its development.

Strawson originally came up with his objections to the theory of descriptions in 1946 and 1947, when he was "teaching in the provinces."¹ Upon arriving back in Oxford, he offered lectures in 1948 or 1949 on "Nouns and Descriptions" to some visiting Americans which touched on Russell's theory. Ryle, upon hearing Strawson's view on referring, said "We've got to have that." And in 1950 the article appeared in *Mind*, which was edited by Ryle.

Strawson had some very pointed criticisms of Russell. He sees Russell as advocating two positions: 1) that sentences which are about some particular person or individual object are significant when the logical form is analyzable as a special kind of existential statement, and, 2) they are significant when the grammatical subject is a logically proper name, of which the meaning is the individual thing it designates.

Strawson reasoned that:

...Russell is unquestionably wrong in this, and that sentences which are significant, and which begin with an expression used in the uniquely referring way, fall into neither of these two classes. Expressions used in the uniquely referring way are never either logically proper names or descriptions, if what is meant by calling them 'descriptions' is that they are to be analyzed in accordance with the model provided by Russell's Theory of Descriptions.

There are no logically proper names and there are no descriptions (in this sense).²

Instead, Strawson argued that referring was not inherently part of a proposition. Instead, it was something that a proposition accomplished within a contextual use.

¹ While perhaps not the best statement, Russell's most famous articulation of the theory of descriptions was in "On Denoting," *Mind*, N.S. 14, 1906, pp. 479-93.

² "On Referring," *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, Methuen, 1971, p. 5.

He claimed "'Mentioning', or 'referring', is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do. Mentioning, or referring to, something is a characteristic of *a use* of an expression, just as 'being about' something, and truth-or-falsity, are characteristics of *a use* of a sentence."¹ In addition, the meaning of a sentence is not the same thing as the proposition itself. Meaning is wrapped up in "rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert."² Context matters, and so does convention. Hence, "[t]he source of Russell's mistake was that he thought that referring or mentioning, if it occurred at all, must be meaning."³

Strawson also worried about "the troublesome mythology of the logically proper name."⁴

The late Sybil Wolfram, in her wonderful book *Philosophical Logic: An Introduction*,⁵ explained the difference. For her, Russell's theory of descriptions, in analyzing the proposition 'The King of France is wise', would be said to claim

- (1) There is a King of France and
- (2) There is not more than one King of France, and
- (3) There is nothing which is both King of France and not wise.

For Russell, when there is no King of France the proposition is false because a conjunction is false when one conjunct is false, and (1) is false.

Alternatively, Strawson found that the theory of descriptions views such a proposition as 'The King of France is wise' as a complex existential proposition. For Wolfram, Strawson claimed that

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵ Routledge, 1989, pp. 42-3. Wolfram was University Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. I have used this book in a class on "Advanced Modern Logic" at American University and in a graduate class entitled "Philosophical Logic" in Prague. While it has some shortcomings for serious advanced students, the book is till one of the best available texts on philosophical logic. I highly recommend it to the reader, especially if examined in conjunction with Strawson's (ed.) *Philosophical Logic*.

The *sentence* 'The King of France' has a meaning. When there is no King of France it does not make a true or false *statement*.

Strawson believed that the conjunctive approach by Russell was a mis-statement. The first two conjuncts are not stated, but assumed. If they are not true, then the result is not that 'the King of France is wise' is false but that it is neither true nor false. Wolfram argues that Strawson has a theory of presupposition, where relevant concepts are not entailed or stated, but act as given before being analyzed. The presupposed concepts are in italics and best unpacked in the following way:

The King of France is wise does not state or entail that there is a King of France.

It *presupposes* that there is a King of France.

If *There is a King of France* is false, then *The King of France is wise* is neither true nor false.

So someone using the theory of descriptions approach is not making a true or false claim with 'The King of France is wise'.

For Strawson, "[t]he important point is that the question of whether the sentence is significant or not is quite independent of the question that can be raised about a particular use of it....The question whether the sentence is significant or not is the question whether there exists such language habits, conventions or rules that the sentence logically could be used to talk about something; and is hence quite independent of the question whether it is being so used on a particular occasion."¹

In conversation, Strawson told me that "I simply didn't know what he was trying to accomplish." There was a "dis-regard for pragmatics and the operation of speech." Russell's view "seemed wholly implausible." Strawson was bewildered because Russell simply did not count "how definite descriptions worked in ordinary language." And Strawson politely added that "This is all I can say -- I don't know enough about his own thinking."

Russell bitterly replied to Strawson's criticisms in "Mr Strawson 'On Referring'". One major complaint was that Strawson ignored Russell's many writings on egocentricity, and that Russell himself had grasped the problems already. Russell argued that many examples had nothing to do with egocentric words, such as mathematical propositions, and that others may be bound within an historical context, such as 'The King of France is bald', as uttered in 1905. Another complaint was that Strawson did not sufficiently explain his objections to logically

¹ Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, p. 11.

proper names. Russell claimed that logically proper names were linked with ostensive definitions. Words in language must designate something, and logically proper names are designations of experience.

But Russell was most bitter about Strawson's reliance on ordinary language. It is ordinary language that "is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and ...any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax."¹ The attempt by Strawson to distinguish a case where 'The King of France is wise' could be significant, not true, and not false was a misuse of the term 'false'. This was a "purely verbal question."²

In the end, both Strawson and Russell seemed to agree that ordinary language had no exact logic, but where Strawson believed that ordinary language should be our guide, and can be our only guide, Russell maintained that ordinary language should give way to logical improvements.

The exchange was laced by bitter personal attacks by Russell: "I am totally unable to see any validity whatever in any of Mr. Strawson's arguments;"³ "Mr. Strawson (pretended) that I overlooked the problem of egocentricity;"⁴ "He is helped in this pretense by a careful selection of material;"⁵ and "Mr. Strawson, in spite of his very real logical competence, has a curious prejudice against logic."⁶

Strawson did not respond to "Mr. Strawson On Referring" in print, which disappointed Russell, anxious for further exchange. Strawson felt the article "unworthy of him" and wanted to avoid further embarrassment. Russell evidently felt ignored by this inattention and conveyed his disappointment to Freddie Ayer. Through Ayer, Strawson learned of Russell's feelings and responded with a letter dated February 26, 1962:

¹ "Mr. Strawson On Referring," as reprinted in *Essays in Analysis*, p. 123.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

Ayer told me recently that you would like to know what my reactions were to your comments in *Mind* on my criticisms of the Theory of Descriptions. Though I still think that my account of definite descriptions comes nearer to the facts as far as the "pragmatics" of ordinary speech-situations are concerned, I must acknowledge that I was wrong not to refer to your own account of the egocentric element in many ordinary empirical statements; and, of course, my criticism of your theory does not bear on its merits as a technical proposals.

I hesitate to inflict philosophical writings upon you at a time when you are concerned with matters of greater importance. But I should be very glad if you would accept the enclosed copy of my recent book as a small tribute from one who has admired your writings ever since he began to read philosophy and has learned more about philosophical logic from them than from any other source.

Russell replied on March 6, 1962: "Thanks for your kind letter and for your book *Individuals*. I am glad to know that we do not differ as much as had seemed to be the case."¹

Later, Strawson received an invitation to the dinner honoring Russell on his 90th birthday, and he went. This was the only time Strawson and Russell met. Arranged by Ayer, speakers included Julian Huxley, E.M. Forster, the Duke of Bedford, Ayer, and Russell. It was a grand affair at the Savoy Hotel, although most of Russell's contemporaries were dead.

I am pleased that Strawson was so forthcoming with his views and memories. He is one of the most important philosophers of our time because of his strong and lasting accomplishments in analysis, language, and logic. Like his good friends, Quine and Ayer, Strawson has long been an advocate for Russell's work in logic. Like them, he found Russell's contributions were not the last word on any subject, but rather a point of departure. Like them, he appreciated Russell without becoming a disciple. Unlike them, Russell attacked him professionally and personally, even though I know of no instance where Strawson reacted in kind. Of course, those who haven't looked at Strawson's work in logic may think that "On Referring" is his only discussion of Russell. Others who somehow associate Strawson with ordinary language philosophers like Ryle and Austin have completely missed his vast, landmark legacies in logic and epistemology. I would

¹ Both letters were reprinted in Volume 11 of the *Collected Papers*, p. 603.

add that Ryle had great admiration for Russell, and Austin did in his early years. The dislike of ordinary language philosophy was more one-sided than the record bears out, and it was Russell who made it extremely personal.

Strawson had some wonderful things to say about other philosophers. We spoke of G.E. Moore, whom Strawson met once in old age. He has "the greatest, unqualified respect for Moore," whom he described as "intellectually virtuous." We also spoke of Ayer, who was "a good friend" and "great epistemologist. Strawson believes that Ayer will ultimately be regarded as "a better epistemologist than Russell." We spoke of Quine, "his decency, brilliance, and accessibility." We also discussed Kant, who Strawson sees as "the great modern philosopher."

BOOK REVIEW
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OF ANTONY FLEW'S
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

Antony Flew, *Philosophical Essays*, edited by John Shosky, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. ISBN 0-8476-8578-0 (hardback) and 0-8476-8579-9 (paperback).

This is a well-organized collection of ten essays written by Antony Flew that also includes an autobiographical sketch especially written for the book. The material is refreshing for both its clarity of exposition and depth of philosophical insight. This review is primarily a short report on several of the essays. My brief evaluative remarks are merely suggestive.

The first two essays, "Oxford Linguistic Philosophy" and "Philosophy and Language" present the well-known methodology characterized by Flew as 'Oxford Linguistic Philosophy' or 'philosophy of ordinary language'. The articles are excellent introductions to the ordinary language approach to philosophy.

Extensional characterizations of ordinary language philosophy which simply name alleged practitioners are more frequent than intensional characterizations. Indeed, as Dummett points out,¹ one is hard pressed to produce the uniquely defining characteristics of this approach. Certainly, the ordinary language approach to a philosophical issue places great emphasis on meticulous study of the uses and

¹ Michael Dummett, "Oxford Philosophy," in *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 431-436.

usages of the key words and the terms logically associated with them. According to Flew, this is (quoting Austin), "if not the be and end all, at least the begin all of philosophy." (36) Indeed, if philosophy is conceptual inquiry and the only epistemic access to concepts is the understanding of the correct usage of the words through which these concepts are expressed (two claims accepted by Flew -- see 196), then the methods of ordinary language philosophy are paradigmatic of philosophical analysis. While many are skeptical of this study constituting proper philosophical analysis, it is common to regard attentiveness to ordinary language as at least the begin all of philosophy.

One may say that 'inattentiveness to language' is the mantra of critical study in the ordinary language style of philosophy. Flew writes that, "When philosophers are attacked for misusing an ordinary or even an extraordinary word...the point is that they [have] been somehow misled into misusing a word in a way which generates paradox, confusion, and perplexity." (33) Briefly, if the meaning of a word *X* is (or can be) taught by reference to paradigm cases, then there can be no valid skepticism of the existence of things of type *X*. Let *X* be 'free will' or 'knowledge,' and this style of argument is a means for claiming that the denials of free will and knowledge are meaningless.

A nice feature of this collection is the inclusion of several essays in which Professor Flew deftly applies the methodology sketched in the first two essays to a wide range of philosophically interesting issues. For example, in the popular "Theology and Falsification," Flew argues that in order for an individual to know the meaning of his assertion, he must be aware of circumstances which would falsify the assertion. The theist asserts that God exists. What would it take for him to withdraw the assertion? If the theist has no answer, it is doubtful that his assertion is meaningful to him. The force of Flew's thesis is, of course, that theists are unwilling to identify such circumstances in advance. Perhaps the theist need only be aware of what would count against (in the sense of conflict with) his assertion in order for it to be meaningful to him.¹

In "Against Indoctrination," Flew first defines 'indoctrination' as "the implanting, with the backing of some sort of special authority, of a firm conviction of the truth of doctrines either not known to be true or even known to be false." (46) The indoctrination of children is always morally wrong because "...it deprives the child (or at least tries) of the possibility of developing into a person with the capacity and the duty of making such fundamental life-shaping judgments for himself, according to his own conscience..." (51)

¹ See Basil Mitchell's response to Flew in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, Macmillan, 1955.

Flew then spends the second half of the essay arguing that Roman Catholic education is an institutionalized form of indoctrination and is, therefore, morally wrong. He makes the argument turn on the epistemological status of Church doctrine as 'not known to be true'. However, it appears that the alleged immorality of indoctrination turns on neither the epistemic status nor the actual truth-values of the relevant doctrines, but on the fact that they are forced upon youth who are not given a chance to make up their own minds. The gist of the problem is not the implanting of falsehoods, but the very implanting itself; it is this which turns youth into automata. Hence, the inference from *X* is a form of indoctrination to *X* is immoral does not depend on *X* satisfying the last third of Flew's definition of 'Indoctrination'.

In "Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity," Flew's critique of Locke's account of personal identity focuses on Locke's inattentiveness to ordinary usage of person words. For example, Locke intends his account to be a descriptive analysis of 'same person'. Flew argues that 'person' is ordinarily used to refer to very special creatures of flesh and blood, and hence Locke is leaving ordinary usage and abandoning his descriptive analysis when he distinguishes persons from their physical bodies. Flew's criticism of Locke is developed into a positive consideration for the bodily criterion of personal identity: same body, same person. However, the problem with this criterion, perceived by Locke and not acknowledged by Flew in his essay, is that it fails to ground the individual's certainty of his identity prior to the recognition of his body. Self-consciousness makes the later recognition unnecessary in establishing one's identity.

Very quickly, "Private Images and Public Language" and "What Impressions of Necessity?" give the reader a taste of Flew's well-known scholarship in Hume Studies. "Communism: The Philosophical Foundations" argues that such foundations are shaky. Russell fans will like "Russell's Judgment on Bolshevism." In "Responding to Thrasymachus," Flew argues that in accordance with common usage of 'justice', the word cannot be defined in terms of the interests or prescriptions of any particular power group. Finally, Flew assesses the import of the cosmological question, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?', in "Stephen Hawking and the Mind of God."

To end on a methodological note, the significance of the common usage of terms in philosophical analysis is unclear. Russell's dis-satisfaction with those practicing 'Oxford philosophy' was based in part on his view that attentiveness to ordinary language encumbers philosophical analysis. In his critique of Strawson, Russell writes:

They are persuaded that common speech is good enough not only for daily life, but also for philosophy. I, on the contrary, am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax.¹

Interestingly, Flew's argument for his definition of 'indoctrination' departs from ordinary usage, appealing to considerations of economy, clarity, and utility. This is good in this case because "[ordinary] usage seems...to be somewhat untidy and even inconsistent...In so far as there is any such untidiness and inconsistency in present usage any definition determining a philosophically satisfactory concept of indoctrination must be to some extent prescriptive (or stipulative), as opposed to purely descriptive (or lexical)." (47) This is a somewhat mitigated emphasis on ordinary usage from an ordinary language philosopher! But then we must attend to previous usage because:

(I) examination of existing usage may well reveal subtleties of which the wiser reformer will wish to take into account;

(II) it is foolish unnecessarily to try to go against the grain of well-established speech habits;

(III) a reformed concept can only be any sort of concept of indoctrination in so far as there really is some substantial overlap between new and the old use of the term.

Are (I)-(III) good reasons for always attending to previous usage in philosophical analysis? (I) is fairly harmless, nothing in Russell's remark denies it. With respect to (II), it is far from obvious that philosophical analysis should be steered by the speech habits of the common man. As Russell points out, they are not relevant to the study of, say, light in physics. Furthermore, there is tension between (II) and (III): in those cases where usage of the term expressing the old concept is particularly untidy the overlap between the old and the new should not be substantial.²

At any rate, the import of (III) as a reason to attend to the common usage of terms

¹ Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, Routledge, 1959, p. 78.

² Indeed, there is not substantial overlap between Flew's definition of "indoctrination" and the one in my Webster's *New World Dictionary*, which defines the word as "the instruction of doctrines, theories, or beliefs, as of a sect."

in philosophical analysis is unclear. For example, I do not see how the claim that there is substantial overlap between Flew's definition of indoctrination and the ordinary one adds in any way to his persuasive argument that indoctrination is always wrong. Let Flew's definition be for the new word, 'schmedtrination'. Then we may argue that Catholic education is morally wrong because it is a form of schmedtrination. What exactly is lost from Flew's original argument?

In conclusion, this stimulating collection is of value to novice and expert alike. To the mind of this reader, it prompts serious reflection on the nature of philosophical methodology and on the web of issues connected to this topic. Surely, how philosophy should be practiced is a central concern to anybody working in the field.

BOOK REVIEW
BY BOB BARNARD
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OF
JAN DEJNOZKA'S
THE ONTOLOGY OF THE ANALYTIC TRADITION
AND ITS ORIGIN:
REALISM IN FREGE, RUSSELL, WITTGENSTEIN,
AND QUINE

Jan Dejnozka, *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and its Origin: Realism in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine*, Littlefield Adams Books, 1996. ISBN 0-8226-3053-1 (paperback).

The repudiation of the metaphysics of substance is a received dogma for contemporary analytic philosophers. Ever since Berkeley and Hume, the notion that there are in some sense deep ideal real essences of things has been subject to varying degrees of scorn. In this book, Dejnozka argues that this dogma has been accepted too quickly and uncritically. He advances the thesis that, instead of being exiled, substance -- robustly metaphysical Aristotelian substance -- has been, perhaps unwittingly, retained by analytic philosophy under the guise of identity (e.g., Quine's "No entity without identity"), even in the face of currently fashionable claims to conceptual and ontological relativity. The author claims that there is a fundamental approach to ontology shared by all the "great analytics": modified realism, which holds that there are both "real distinctions and distinctions in reason," "real and rational (or linguistic) identities." Thus, the view advanced seems to be that there is at least one "real" or "self-identical" entity, and that the entities countenanced by shifting conceptualizations of object, or number, are in

some sense modifications of the first entity.

Dejnozka's broader strategy emerges in the global structure of the text. The first chapter introduces the particular conceptions of ontology, metaphysics, and realism, including modified realism. More particularly, it is in the context of these preliminaries that the author analyzes Aristotle's conception of substance in terms of seven themes which ultimately reduce to one: the unity or identity of substances. The second and third chapters deal with Frege. Chapter Two considers the question of whether Frege is an ontological relativist. Chapter Three develops a reading of Frege according to which objects must be identifiable. Chapters Four and Five focus on Russell, the former looking into Russell's basic "robust" conception of reality, and latter considering the development of Russell's metaphysics over time, and through his "forty-four 'No entity without identity' theories. Chapter Six returns to Aristotle, arguing that Aristotelian metaphysics manifests a form of conceptual relativity, e.g., that Socrates is a man qua rational animal, but that Socrates is an animal qua animal, where what a thing is said to be varies with the specific modifications of substance one imagines. Finally, the seventh chapter draws the several threads together to argue that if identity is sufficient for existence, specifically the existence of substance (theses developed in chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5) and if the fact that a view entails conceptual relativity does not entail the denial of substance (chapter 6), then both critically and analogically, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine may all plausibly be taken as espousing, like Aristotle, varieties of modified realism.

I feel I must briefly comment before proceeding on the strangeness of Dejnozka's use of some terms, for instance, 'theory'. The author advances an interpretation according to which each distinct expression by a philosopher, even briefly quoted passages, of a "no entity with identity" thesis counts as a so-called theory. To me, it would have seemed far more natural, and far clearer, to have pointed to 44 instances where Russell endorse the "no entity without identity" thesis, rather than foisting 44 competing theories upon Russell. I say this because it is not clear in context whether the reader needs to keep track of each theory. This may be a case where moderation demands that parsimony should prevail over full precision.

Throughout the text, Dejnozka exhibits both a broad appreciation of ontological issues, and an even deeper appreciation of the primary and secondary literature. Indeed, any exhaustive assessment of Dejnozka's scholarship would far outrun the scope of this review. Instead, I wish merely to raise a traditional objection to Dejnozka's definition of existence. I think my worry can take two forms. First, following Russell and Quine, we could try to understand the claim that identity is the criterion of existence as the claim that if anything exists, then it is identifiable. But a canonical (in Quine's sense) expression of this claim would require that we existentially quantify over some collection of objects in order to determine if they have the property of (self-) identity. Since this does not seem an entirely

implausible exercise (the ascription of identity to an object does not strike one as obviously redundant), one might infer that identity is merely a sufficient condition for existence, but not a necessary condition. Further, one cannot legitimately argue from the conceptual claim that all existing things are self-identical, to the existential claim that something self-identical exists. Indeed, to reverse the force of Quine's famous argument against Meinong, there is no identity condition for subsisting possible fat men in doorways, therefore if subsistence counts as existential then existence is not synonymous with identity. Second, following G.E. Moore, we might ask 'Does what is (self-) identical exist?' According to Moore's famous treatment of such questions, if the previous question 'Does what is self-identical exist?' is recognized as obviously affirmative, then the question is closed. Alternatively, if our question, like the question 'Is pleasure good?', does not have an obvious affirmative answer, then the question is open and the definition should be rejected as there is no necessary conceptual connection between the two terms of the proposed definition. Both arguments weigh in against the necessary conceptual linkage of existence and identity. In the end, however, this is not a real indictment of Dejnozka's book. Rather, it is only a prima facie case that the view he attributes to the "great analytics" begs certain questions. Still, I am in total agreement with Dejnozka that a serious discussion of these issues is needed.

In conclusion, it is more than fair to say that in this book Dejnozka offers a daring re-reading of the analytic tradition which, if it stands in the face of inevitable scholarly criticism, could force both a long overdue reassessment of how analytic philosophy since Frege relates to the historical and contemporary continental traditions, and a reconsideration of the prevailing analytic conception of metaphysics as dependent on semantics. However, I found Dejnozka's prose to be very demanding, often so dense and prone to digress that the continuity of the main argument suffered. Though for my part I am prepared to forgive this stylistic failing because so many challenging ideas and innovative interpretations await the earnest reader on each page.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR
TREVOR BANKS

via e-mail
August 10, 1998

To The Editor:

I enjoyed Cliff Henke's video review of *The Great War and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century* (BRS Quarterly, No. 98, May, 1998) and agree entirely with the sentiments he expresses.

Mr. Henke rightly notes that the poet Siegfried Sassoon wrote "some of the most eloquent opposition to the war." But in a review "examining a work that touches on themes raised by Russell's life and work" it is surprising that Mr. Henke doesn't mention Russell's involvement.

Sassoon asked Russell (in July, 1917) to help him draft a denunciation of the war. This provided Russell with "another opportunity to act unilaterally and potentially, to bring off a very valuable propaganda coup," according to Ray Monk in his recent biography (*Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, Jonathan Cape, 1996, p. 500.).

Russell complied with Sassoon's request, but their combined effort to embarrass the War Office was unfortunately thwarted by novelist Robert Graves, Sassoon's C.O. For a detailed account, see Ronald Clark's biography of Russell (*The Life of Bertrand Russell*, Knopf, 1975), especially pages 320-24.

Sincerely,

Trevor Banks

RECENT MEMBERSHIP PROFILES

Name: *Albert P.D. Ku, Ph.D.*

Address: *5430 Birdwood Road, #412, Houston, Texas 77096, e-mail
pdku@aol.com*

First Book of Russell's I read: *Why I Am Not A Christian*

Last Book of Russell's I read: *The Conquest of Happiness*

Favorite Russell Quotation: *"To like many people spontaneously and without effort is perhaps the greatest of all sources of personal happiness." The Conquest of Happiness*

Reason(s) for Joining BRS: *Bertrand Russell is my first teacher on rational thinking, and I am deeply grateful for that.*

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life: *"The man who can center his thoughts and hopes upon something transcending self can find a certain peace in the ordinary troubles of life which is impossible to the pure egoist."*

Additional Comments: *When I first came from Taiwan to the United States as a graduate student of civil engineering in 1993, I was persuaded to join a Christian church. Soon after I came across Russell's book Why I Am Not A Christian. Nearly one year later, I decided not to continue going to church. Now when I occasionally hear the interesting comments uttered by the Christian Coalition and other religious right organizations, I know I made the right decision. I enjoy my current rationality and sanity, with a lot of thanks to Russell's writings.*

Name: *Charles L. Weyand*

Address: *17066 Los Modelos Street, Fountain Valley, California 92708*

First Book of Russell's I Read: *The ABC of Relativity and The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, both concurrently in the late 1950s or early 1960s.*

Last Book of Russell's I read: *(can't remember)*

Favorite Russell Quotation: *words to the effect that "There are two commandments: 1) Love the truth and 2) Be kind." I don't recall from which*

work I read this or the exact wording.

Reason(s) for Joining BRS: *Bertrand Russell's clear thinking and command of the English language.*

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life: *Clear Thought! Always!*

Additional Comments: *Should have another West Coast meeting. I'll try to attend.*

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
Editor, *BRS Quarterly*
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

NAME:

ADDRESS:

First book of Russell's I read:

Last book of Russell's I read:

Favorite Russell Quotation:

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

Additional Comments: _____

*THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY*

1999

No. 101



It is time to renew your membership.

- ◆ **If you have already renewed for 2000 or have joined the BRS in 2000, please accept the thanks of the Society once again for your participation.**

- ◆ **If you have not yet renewed your membership for 2000 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- please mail the form on the next page along with your payment TODAY. Thank you.**

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
2000 MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL FORM**

Please mail this form and payment to:

Dennis Darland
Treasurer
Bertrand Russell Society
1406 26th St.
Rock Island, Illinois 61201-2837

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1999 dues in U.S. funds payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

- Individual \$35
 Couple \$40
 Student \$20
 Limited Income Individual \$20
 Limited Income Couple \$25

 Contributor \$50 and up
 Sustainer \$75 and up
 Patron \$250 and up
 Organization Membership \$50
 Sponsor \$100 and up
 Benefactor \$500 and up
 Life Member \$1,000 and up

 PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada or Mexico
 PLUS \$4 if in Canada or Mexico

Total _____

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

ADDRESS:

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY**

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

1999 Combined Issue

No. 101

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**FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

As instructed by the Chairman of the Board and the President, this issue of the *Quarterly* is a combined package, covering all four issues for 1999. I have been asked to resume the editorship of the *Quarterly*, which I am pleased to do. The February, 2000 issue will be in your hands by the end of March, which will then put us back on track with the publication schedule.

First, before you do anything else, don't forget to renew your membership for 2000!!!

Second, send nominations for the Board of Directors to Ken Blackwell before March 10th. These nominations will form the ballot for the new board members. That ballot is scheduled to appear in the next issue of the *Quarterly*.

I would like to thank John Lenz, Peter Stone, Alan Schwerin, Steven Bayne, Bill Cooke, Warren Allen Smith, Santiago Zorzopulous, and Ken Blackwell for information used to construct this issue, which is dedicated to the late Trevor Banks.

In the next issue we will have contributions by Judy Toth, Sylvia Rolloff, Peter Stone, and Rachel Murray.

###

**BOARD OF DIRECTORS
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY:
CALL FOR NOMINATIONS**

Each year we elect one-third of the 24 Board Members of the Bertrand Russell Society. This year eight members are ending a three year term which began in January of 1997: James Alouf, Jan Loeb Eisler, Nicholas Griffin, Robert T. James, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja, and Peter Stone.

The current Board members are:

3 Year Term, January, 1998-December, 2000

Kenneth Blackwell
Dennis Darland
Gladys Leithauser
John R. Lenz
Stephen Reinhardt
David Rodier
Tom Stanley
Ruili Ye

3 Year Term, January, 1999-December, 2001

Stephan Andersson
Derek Araujo
Kevin Brodie
Tim Madigan
Ray Perkins
Alan Schwerin
Warren Allen Smith
Thom Weidlich

Nominations are now due to fill the open positions. You may nominate past members or any other members of the BRS. Please send your nominations to Ken Blackwell by March 10, 2000. His address is Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4L8. His e-mail is <blackwl@mcmail.cis.McMaster.CA>. A ballot will then be sent to each member, either by mail or in the next issue of the *Quarterly*.

By the way, here is a list of our honorary members.

The Honorary Members of the Bertrand Russell Society

Sir Alfred Ayer (deceased)
Noam Chomsky
Ken Coates
Peter Cranford
Elizabeth R. Eames
Paul Edwards
Antony Flew

Michael Foot
Paul Kurtz
Talima Nasrin
David F. Pears
Willard van Orman Quine
Conrad Russell
Katharine Russell Tait

####

RUSSELL NEWS

New books on Russell include Mafizuddin Ahmed, *Bertrand Russell's Neutral Monism*, New Delhi: Mittal (ISBN 81-7099-165-X); Rashidul Alam, *Bertrand Russell's Logical Atomism*, New Delhi: Mittal (ISBN 81-7099-201-X); and S.P. Chaturvedi, *Bertrand Russell: A Study of His Selected Essays*, Uttar Prakash, Pakistan: Prakash Depot, n.d. (ISBN unknown). There is news of I. Vavilov's translation of Bertrand Russell's *Power* (published in the Ukraine, the first translation of this book in the former Soviet Union, although exact publication information is unknown). Henrique Ribeiro, who has travelled from Portugal in each of the last two years to speak at the Annual Meeting of the BRS, has written "From the Official Image on Russell to the Rehabilitation of his Philosophy: 'Vagueness' as a Case Study," (this title is a translation from the Portuguese) found in *De Natureza ao Sagrado*, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra Ed., Coimbra (Portugal).

One of the late Trevor Banks' last papers, "The Not So Quotable Bertrand Russell," was presented to the Annual Meeting of the BRS in June, 1998. It has now been published in "Humanist in Canada", No. 130 (Autumn 1999), pp. 18-22. The paper dealt with quotations from Russell's "dark side," his "irrational dogmatic tendencies," as Trevor put it.

The American Philosophical Association Eastern Meeting held a session for the Bertrand Russell Society on December 29, 1999 at the Marriott Hotel, Copley Plaza, in Boston. The session was chaired by BRS President Alan Schwerin of Monmouth University. The four papers were Rom Harré's (Linacre College, University of Oxford) "Reflections on Russell and Wittgenstein," Robert Barnard's (University of Memphis) "Knowing About Logic: Russell and Logical Intuition," David White's (St. John Fisher College) "Russell and Butler on God and Religion," and John Shosky's (American University) "Eliot's 'Notes on Logic'." The session was very well attended and the exchange lively. The night before, BRS member

Greg Landini (University of Iowa) was given an "Author Meets Critic" session for his landmark publication *Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory*. Chaired by Alan Schwerin, the session featured two prominent critics: Allen Hazen of the University of Melbourne and Bernard Linsky of the University of Alberta. Landini responded to both critics. The event was extremely well-received.

The American Philosophical Association Central Meeting in late April will have a session for the Bertrand Russell Society. The session is on Friday, April 21, 2000, 5:15-7:15 p.m. The site is the Palmer House Hotel in Chicago. The event will be chaired by David Rodier of American University. The four papers are Chris Lubbers (University of Florida) on "A Challenge to Contemporary Theories of Meaning From Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument," Mitchell Haney on "Russell on Ethics," Sylvia Roloff (Washington University, St. Louis) on "Frege and Russell," and John Shosky (American University) on "Russell and the Existential Fallacy."

Tom Stanley, the BRS Librarian, has books for sale to members. Please look at the available texts listed at <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268>.

John Shosky and Rom Harré have edited and published new critical essays on, and previously obscure papers by, Gilbert Ryle. Found in the *Linacre Journal* (Number 3, November, 1999), the critical essays include a piece by BRS Honorary Member Antony Flew ("Gilbert Ryle: A Personal Remembrance,"), as well as "Gilbert Ryle's Debt to Bertrand Russell" by Shosky. The pieces by Ryle include comments on Wittgenstein, Jane Austen, the history of Oxford Philosophy, and the nature of reasoning. Other essays by Ryle are forthcoming in subsequent issues of the *Linacre Journal*. Copies of the "Gilbert Ryle Edition" of the *Linacre Journal* may be purchased in the United States from John Shosky for \$9.00, which includes shipping. Copies in the UK may be purchased for 10 British pounds from Linacre College, OX1 3JA, Oxford. Copies of the *Journal* are also on sale at Blackwell's in Broad Street, Oxford.

Warren Allen Smith reports that "Dr. Paul Edwards on March 19, 1999, gave a public lecture, 'God and the Philosophers,' at New School University in New York City. He underlined the importance of the thinking of Bertrand Russell and told of their communicating during his writing the forward to *Why I Am Not a Christian*. The one hundred who attended heard the third of a three-part series. In the earlier parts, which have been published in *Free Inquiry*, he traced the development of various philosophers' views of God, starting with the ancient Greeks and leading to the pragmatists in our own century. This night he turned to Nietzsche's and others views, explaining the 'semantic' challenges that are now featured in various philosophers writings. Currently, Dr. Edwards is working on a definitive book with the same title. 'Pain: why is there pain in our as well as

other animals' existence?' he asked his audience. The various theologians' answers do not provide satisfactory explanations, Edwards holds, and his own non-theistic observations were a central feature of his lecture. Neither are many of the philosophers' answers to some of the elementary questions we all have. But in his forthcoming book Edwards intends to lay the groundwork for a rational approach to resolving a range of contemporary problems, and his survey of different philosophers' views will highlight Russell's and certain others' positive outlooks as well as critique the weakness of others' arguments."

Check out the BRS web page at <http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>. There you will find information on the society, calls for papers, and other vital data. The web site is maintained by the hard-working John Lenz, who is due our continuous thanks for a job well done.

Margaret Copi, M.D., contacted Peter Stone, thanking the society for the 1998 BRS Award. She wrote: "I wanted to respond on behalf of my father, Irving Copi, Ph.D., to your letter dated February 9, 1999. He is sorry he could not make it to your annual meeting. But he is thrilled to receive your offer of the 1998 Annual Award. He looks up to Bertrand Russell as his most important mentor and loves to recount stories about the year he (my father) and Abe Kaplan were undergraduates at the University of Chicago, having gone there specifically to study with Bertrand Russell. I know he will be very proud of this award. I shall get the certificate, if there is one, framed and put on his wall where he will enjoy it immensely."

The BRS gave its 1999 Annual Award to Henry Morgentaler, M.D., one of Canada's leading abortion rights advocates. Upon receiving news of this award, he wrote to Peter Stone: "I am deeply honored by the decision of the Bertrand Russell Society to offer me its 1999 annual award. I have been a great admirer of Bertrand Russell and consider him one of my mentors, the man who deeply influenced my philosophy of life. As founder of the Humanist Association of Canada, I often quoted Bertrand Russell, especially his saying that 'the good life is based on love guided by reason.' I have tentatively scheduled to attend your meeting June 4th to 6th (1999) if health or other circumstances do not interfere. This award means a great deal to me. With many thanks." Unfortunately, Dr. Morgentaler was not able to come to the annual meeting. Peter Stone and Rachel Murray traveled to Toronto to personally give him the award. Look for Rachel's tribute to Morgentaler in the next issue of the *Quarterly*.

The BRS Awards Committee has given the 2000 Annual Award to Professor Stephen Jay Gould, Curator of the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University and author of numerous best-selling works on science and culture. When informed of the award, Professor Gould wrote back to Peter Stone that "I

met Russell when I worked on the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament during an academic year abroad in Britain in the early 1960s. (Obviously I know and admire him for many other reasons as well.) It was kind of you to think of me as a recipient of your award, and I am of course happy to accept. I can't promise to attend your meeting, and probably will be unable since I expect to be in Europe during that week. Let me close for now by thanking you again and complimenting you on your logo."

####

CENTURY SURVEY BARUCH COLLEGE

The Baruch College of Philosophy has recently conducted a survey poll of Great Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.

The top five books, by frequency of citation, are:

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations*
2. Martin Heidegger: *Being and Time*
3. John Rawls: *A Theory of Justice*
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*
5. Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead: *Principia Mathematica*

The top five articles, by frequency of citation, are:

1. Willard van Orman Quine: "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
2. Bertrand Russell: "On Denoting"
3. Kurt Gödel: "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of *Principia Mathematica* and Related Systems"
4. Alfred Tarski: "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages"
5. Wilfred Sellars: "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"

For a complete account of the poll and other information, please consult the December 1999 issue of *The Philosophical Forum*.

####

**"HAMLET'S HORATIO:
A.J. AYER ON THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH"
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

On July 29, 1983, while studying at the Anglo-American Institute, Chelsea College, University of London, I had the chance to meet A.J. Ayer. He came to lecture on the topic: "Can There Be Objective Values?" For weeks I had designated Ayer's lecture "The Main Event," encouraging my fellow philosophy students to read *Language, Truth and Logic*, and other works by the former Wykeham Professor of Logic in Oxford. Ayer was famous, productive, and relevant, so a big crowd was expected.

Unfortunately, he was in a foul humor, having arrived an hour early, well before the designated greeting committee of James Halsted, my tutor, and myself. With no one around, he became agitated, worried that he had shown up on the wrong day or misunderstood the location. When we found him, or he found us, Ayer was in a lather. It took us a while to calm him down.

He demanded his fee in advance -- cash. He told us he had once been stiffed and that would never happen again. Fortunately, we had been warned and had pound notes in hand.

Somewhat mollified, Ayer then delivered a masterful and elegant lecture with energy, bravado, and pride. As he spoke, I noted his natty appearance, confident demeanor, liquid eyes, and rapid rate of delivery. The entire package was impressive, but his intensity was white-hot. He was the most intense person I had ever seen (that's still true to this day). In his early seventies, he showed no signs of age. His lecture was a marvel and an inspiration.

When he took questions, he gave no quarter. The first questioner confusedly tried to ask about the notion of propositions in *Language, Truth and Logic*. However, when Ayer probed the questioner for further details, the student tried to bluff with a dishonest statement about Ayer's position, probably because he just hadn't read the material. I was sitting in the front row. Ayer swooped over me like a hawk, grabbed my copy of the book, and demanded to know the page under discussion, exclaiming "I've never written such rot." He scared the hell out of that student and the rest of us. I followed with the next question and he insulted me before replying. He then mowed down the rest of the questions and questioners until the final two. As a penultimate query, I asked, "Well, we know where you think philosophy has been. Now where should it go." He replied, "Now, that is a good

question" (I glowed), and Ayer proceeded to talk about the need for philosophers to link themselves even more closely with science. Halsted finished by asking about Ayer's religious views: "Many people believe in God. What do you have to tell them?" "Well," Ayer replied, "that they're not very good logicians!" Surprisingly, the students burst into sustained applause. He went over well. They loved him!

Afterwards, Ayer quietly talked to two other students and myself for about an hour, giving us insightful tips on readings, viewpoints, and philosophers. He spoke at some length about Russell and Wittgenstein. I asked him about his debate with Father Copleston on the existence of God. He replied, "At least I convinced Copleston to become a logical positivist." Finally, when I asked about his place in philosophy, he said that would probably be "a footnote to Russell." At this point we were walking along and he then left us with an Errol Flynn-like move, leaping on a bus. I simply stood on the curb, gazing in his direction long after the bus had disappeared.

Afterwards, I eagerly devoured Ayer's work again. He thought his best book was *The Problem of Knowledge*, which contains a crucial discussion on justified true belief in the first chapter and an illuminating analysis of selfhood in the last chapter.

Others felt his best work was found in his Gifford Lectures, published as *The Central Questions in Philosophy*, which cemented Ayer's lasting legacy as an empiricist. At any rate, this book inspired one of the best openings for a review in the history of philosophy. This is by Jonathan Harrison:

The *Central Questions of Philosophy* is an extremely efficient book. Problems appear on the horizon, are solved, and recede into the distance with almost monotonous regularity. The vehicle is no longer the sports car used by the early Ayer, but a well-upholstered saloon, but it still travels with an unvarying velocity which is well above the speed limit, and there is still the one hand on the steering wheel, while the other nonchalantly flicks cigarette ash out of the window.¹

That paragraph captures Ayer perfectly -- cultured, clever, and focused. He was on a mission, in a hurry.

Perhaps as a minority one of, I liked *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, an

¹ Jonathan Harrison, "Critical Notice: *The Central Questions of Philosophy* by A.J. Ayer," *Mind*, Volume LXXXV, Number 340, October 1976, p. 603.

analysis of which I submitted for my master's degree at Wyoming in 1987. This book was the loathsome target of J.L. Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia*. I defended Ayer over Austin, which forced my examining committee to question my competence, sanity, and savvy. When they awarded me my degree, there were frowns and sighs. *Foundations* is a good read, even if you side with Austin, because it contains Ayer's famous "argument from illusion" and an explanation as to why there is a "logical gap" between sensation and the outside world. There is also a good argument about the need for a language about sensation that is less ordinary and more logical.¹

Despite his faults, which included incredible vanity, Ayer was a loyal mentor and friend to his students. He also was a loyal and supportive friend to Russell, whose memory was well-served. As Ayer vividly recalls in the first volume of his autobiography, he was led to philosophy by reading Russell's *Sceptical Essays* in 1928. In addition to several essays, chapters, and discussions on Russell in various publications, Ayer published two book-length treatments: *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage* and *Bertrand Russell*. He was an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society and an advisor for *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*.

His distinguished career began and ended at Oxford. He studied under Gilbert Ryle at Christ Church, graduating in 1932. He then spent two months as part of the Vienna Circle, whose discussions were transmitted in *Language, Truth and Logic*, published in 1936, when Ayer was age 26. Ayer received a master's degree from Christ Church in that same year. In 1940, he joined the British Army, serving at one point in British intelligence, rising to the rank of captain. Afterwards, he was elected a tutorial fellow at Wadham College, Oxford. In 1946, the year *Language, Truth and Logic* was reprinted with its now famous second introduction, he then abandoned the "city of spires" to revive the philosophy department at University College, University of London, where he held the Grote Professorship of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic. In 1958, he returned to Oxford, elected as Wykeham Professor of Logic, a chair which he held until 1978. He then became a fellow of Wolfson College, Oxford, until 1983. Ayer was knighted in 1970. He died on June 27, 1989, after an infamous incident ten months earlier when his heart stopped for four minutes, providing an opportunity for Ayer to later write an article "What I Saw When I Was Dead..."²

¹ In 1997, one thrill for me was to see an inscribed copy in Gilbert Ryle's books at Linacre College. Ayer sent it from Malta, where he was stationed at that time.

² The title was supposed to be "That Undiscovered Country." The article first appeared in the *Sunday Telegraph*, August 28, 1988. It was reprinted under the original title in A.J. Ayer, *The Meaning of Life*, pp. 198-204. The article created some controversy, so Ayer later wrote "Postscript to a

It is fitting that we remember Ayer on the tenth anniversary of his death. Along with Quine and others, he followed the earlier lead of Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, promoting the power and importance of discoveries in analytic philosophy. At a memorial service, Lord Quinton noted that "Ayer always thought of himself as Russell's successor. He modelled his thought on that of Russell, both in its content and in its unguarded expression and also, to some extent, his manner of life, both political and amorous."¹ Sir Peter Strawson has predicted that Ayer will probably be remembered as a better empiricist than Russell.²

Upon Ayer's death, John Slater wrote a nice piece for the journal *Russell*. Ken Blackwell put together a secondary bibliography of Ayer's writings on Russell. I commend both for further reading.³

Ayer ended his first volume of autobiography with his own speculation about his place in philosophical history:

(At almost 36 years of age) I was old enough to realize that philosophically I was 'not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be', though I still had pretensions to being something more than 'an attendant lord'. What I have achieved since is for others to estimate, but if I could be thought even to have played Horatio to Russell's Hamlet, I should consider it glory enough.⁴

For me, I am pleased to recall a lecturer's force and fury in search of truth, the watery eyes full of intense intelligence, and the later kindness and consideration

Postmortem," a reply to his critics, published in the *Spectator*, October 15, 1988. It is included in *The Meaning of Life*, pp. 205-208.

¹ Anthony Quinton, "Ayer's Place in the History of Philosophy," *A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays*, edited by A. Phillips Griffiths, p. 31

² John Shosky, "Conversation with Sir Peter Strawson," *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, Number 100, November 1998, p. 29.

³ Kenneth Blackwell, "A.J. Ayer on Russell: A Secondary Bibliography," and John G. Slater, "Alfred Jules Ayer (1910-1989)," *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives*, New Series, Volume 10, Number 1, Summer 1990, pp. 80-81 and 82-91, respectively.

⁴ A.J. Ayer, *Part of My Life*, p. 312. A second volume was later published entitled *More of My Life*.

shown to a student full of questions.¹

####

**TREVOR BANKS OBITUARY
JOHN LENZ
DREW UNIVERSITY**

We're saddened to hear that Trevor Banks passed away on July 26, 1999.

Trevor was 65 and suffered a heart attack.

Trevor was very active in humanist causes. He enlivened meetings with his impersonations of Bertrand Russell. Last June Trevor entertained the BRS with his recounting of Bertie's wit and humor, and with his own charm and good company.

He was also active in the Humanist Association of Canada and he was a local celebrity in Ottawa, where he lived. The Ottawa Citizen newspaper printed a touching eulogistic obituary on July 26, 1999. (See <http://www.cpcug.org/user/ackerman/trevor.html>)

Trevor will be missed.

####

**GREATER RUSSELL ROCHESTER SET
SPRING, 2000 SCHEDULE**

Thursday, January 27

Topic: "The Young Russell"

Suggested Reading: *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, Volume One.

Thursday, February 17

¹ There is good secondary literature about Ayer and his influence on Twentieth Century Philosophy. I recommend *A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays*, edited by A. Phillips Griffiths; *Perception and Identity: Essays presented to A.J. Ayer, with his replies to them*, edited by Graham Macdonald; John Foster's, *A.J. Ayer, Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic*, edited by Graham Macdonald and Crispin Wright; *Logical Positivism in Perspective*, edited by Barry Gower; and *The Philosophy of A.J. Ayer*, edited by Lewis Hahn.

Topic: "It Depends What the Word 'The' Means..."
Suggested Reading: *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Chapter 16.

Thursday, March 18

Topic: "Bertrand Russell's America"
Suggested Reading: *Bertrand Russell's America* by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils

Thursday, April 15

Topic: "Bertrand Russell on the Internet"
Suggested Reading: None

Thursday, May 18 (Russell's Birthday)

Topic: Secularism
Suggested Reading: *Why I Am Not A Secularist* by William E. Connolly

All meeting will take place at 7:00 p.m. at Blue Sunday Coffeehouse and Used Bookstore, 3118 E. Henrietta Road (corner of Lehigh Station Road), Rochester, New York. For directions, please contact the coffeehouse at 716-334-4415. For all other questions, contact Tim Madigan at 716-424-4184 or <timothymad@aol.com>.

All meetings are free and open to the public. Everyone is welcome and will be included in the discussion, whether they are novices or experts in Russell's work. Readings are highly recommended but not essential to benefit from the discussions.

Peter Stone
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**BOSTON AREA BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
STEVEN BAYNE**

Some of you may have been wondering what has been going on to get a Cambridge/Boston chapter of the BRS started. Until recently, a couple of things have held me back from setting things in motion, not least of which was the Thanksgiving holiday here in the States.

From experience elsewhere, it has become my opinion that success here depends

on promotion -- in the usual sense. What I've needed, to use a phrase from journalism, is a "draw," i.e., something that would justify "attention" besides an announcement of intent to start such a group.

I am very pleased to report that Hilary Putnam has offered an hour of his time to address the first meeting. The nature of the content of the talk has yet to be determined, but I have mentioned that remarks on how Russell influenced his work as well as some informal comments on Russell's thought would be desirable. Although I do not yet know whether he will permit it, I hope to record his remarks and make them available for the record. Of course, I will make clear that there would be no effort to profit from this. The tape would be given to the Russell Archives.

Another "draw" will be an essay contest with a cash award of \$500 for the best essay on a very narrow aspect of Russell's philosophy. Because of the recent financial problems with publishing *Russell*, my intention is to allow open competition for all people living in the Boston area, but to require subscription to *Russell* or membership in the BRS for those living outside the area. The subject of the essay contest would come from Russell's *Principles* (Oxford 1959 [1912], p. 48.)

...it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a judgment or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about.

One idea is to change the intended organization name to the Boston Area chapter or some such thing. The reason is that Brandeis, Tufts, Boston University, may -- along with other fine schools such as UMASS Boston and Boston College, just to name a few -- otherwise may feel slighted. Around the middle of next week (note: the text is dated December 6, 1999) I will announce formation of the group itself. Then a week after that I will announce Putnam's talk, assuming everything continues to go smoothly. Finally, a week after that I will announce the essay contest formally.

Any comments by "anyone" are very encouraged. There are remaining problems. For example, the options for a meeting place, hopefully in the Harvard Square area, are limited. I don't really want to have the meeting at Harvard because I don't want this to be an academic affair, per se -- there are some pretty sophisticated folks around here who have nothing to do with academia, and who in fact are a bit cynical in this regard. MIT is in fact a more open institution, but it is difficult to find anyone's destination -- the way things are laid out. If anyone has any ideas here, they would be very much appreciated.

Steven may be reached on e-mail at <srbayne@channel.com>

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**2000 ANNUAL MEETING:
CALL FOR PAPERS
MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY
WEST LONG BRANCH, NEW JERSEY
JUNE 2-4, 2000**

If you are interested in presenting a paper at the forthcoming annual meeting of the BRS to be held at Monmouth University, June 2-4, 2000, please send a title and an abstract of your proposed paper to Alan Schwerin no later than May 1, 2000. You can contact him at:

Department of Political Science and Philosophy
Monmouth University
West Long Branch, New Jersey 07764
e-mail aschweri@monmouth.edu

Alan would also like suggestions for panel presentations with a list of potential panelists.

The meeting last year was well attended, with many memorable papers. Please put the annual meeting of the BRS in June on your calendar now. We'd love to see you there.

####

**RUSSELL AND WITTGENSTEIN:
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE
SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, MARCH 25-26, 2000
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

SATURDAY, MARCH 25, 2000

8:50- 9:00
Boardroom

Welcome by David Rodler, American University, in the Butler

SESSION ONE

Moderator: Lucinda Peach, American University

9:00- 9:45 Alan Schwerin, Monmouth University, "On Getting Religion From Philosophy: Some Thoughts on Russell's 1911 Search for a Spiritual Vision."

9:45-10:30 Greg Landini, University of Iowa, "The Russellian Nature of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*."

BREAK

10:45-11:30 Steven Bayne, "Perspective Space and the Elusive Self."

11:30-12:15 Antony Flew, University of Reading, Russell, Wittgenstein, and *Cogito Ergo Sum*."

LUNCH

SESSION TWO

Moderator: Jeff Cothran, American University

2:00- 2:45 Robert Barnard, University of Memphis, "On *What There Is* Revisited."

2:45- 3:30 Santiago Zorzopulos, American University, "On Formally Decidable Propositions in *Principia Mathematica* and Related Systems."

BREAK

3:45- 4:30 Timothy Childers, Czech Academy of Sciences, "Russell and his Role in the Development of Logical Probability."

4:30- 5:15 David Rodler, American University, "Marginalia on Russell's Lowell Lectures."

5:15- 6:00 Nick Griffin, McMaster University, "Russell and Wittgenstein on the Logical Form of Belief Statements."

SUNDAY, MARCH 26, 2000

8:50- 9:00 Welcome by Rom Harré, University of Oxford/American University, in the Butler Boardroom

SESSION THREE

Moderator: Jason Adick, Association of American Medical Colleges

9:00- 9:45 John Shosky, American University, "Ryle's Reading of the *Tractatus*."

9:45-10:30 Dan Rothbart, George Mason University, "Wittgenstein and the Grammar of Schematic Diagrams in Science."

BREAK

10:45-11:30 George Farre, Georgetown University, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Science."

11:30-12:15 David Stern, University of Iowa, "What Kind of Jew Was Wittgenstein?"

LUNCH

SESSION FOUR

Moderator: Mitchell Haney, Missouri Western State College

2:00- 2:45 Michael Tisaw, Georgetown University, "*Tractarian* Psychology."

2:45- 3:30 Gordon Baker, University of Oxford, "Everyday Use: What Wittgenstein Meant and Russell Misunderstood."

BREAK

3:45- 4:30 Petr Kolar, Charles IV University, "Logics of Fact."

4:30- 5:15 Cora Diamond, University of Virginia, "Does Bismarck Have a Beetle in the Box? The Private Language Argument in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*."

5:15- 6:00 Keynote: Rom Harré, University of Oxford/American University, "Wittgenstein: Science and Antiscience."

The conference is free and open to the public. Members of the BRS are most welcome and encouraged to participate. Nine members of the BRS are among

those listed above. For further information please call the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University, Washington, D.C. 20016, 202-885-2925. You may also call John Shosky in the University Honors Office at 202-885-6194. The American University is located at the intersection of Nebraska and Massachusetts Avenues, N.W. Street parking is available, as well as parking in the lot on Nebraska Avenue and public parking on campus. The closest metro stop is Tenley Circle/AU on the Red Line of the District of Columbia's Metro System. A shuttle bus to AU may be found behind the metro entrance.

The night before the conference Petr Kolar will give the 41st Hurst Lecture. Begun in 1958, the Hurst Lecture is an endowed lecture series at AU that has featured some of the greatest names in Twentieth Century Philosophy, including A.J. Ayer, Peter Strawson, Anthony Quinton, Isalah Berlin, Antony Flew, G.E.M. Anscombe, Joseph Margolis, Stanley Rosen, Walter Kaufmann, Ernst Nagel, and Rom Harré. The lecture is among the most prestigious in Washington during the academic year. Petr's topic is "Academic Freedom in Times of Turmoil." The lecture begins at 7:30 p.m. in the Bentley Lounge of Gray Hall at the American University. A dinner will precede the lecture. The lecture will be followed by a departmental reception and then later a student party to honor Petr.

####

**THE INFLUENCE OF BERTRAND RUSSELL
BILL COOKE
SCHOOL OF ART AND DESIGN
MANUKAU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
MANUKAU CITY, NEW ZEALAND**

How gratifying it would be were we able to report that, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, the influence of Bertrand Russell was never greater. It is, however, a testimony to the twentieth century that this report cannot be made. The general consensus seems to be that the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century have been Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger. The rationalism of Russell gave way to the cryptic mysticism of the later Wittgenstein, which has in turn been overshadowed late in the century by the return to prominence of the byzantine obfuscation of a *völkish* romantic. Were one to want to put faces to the much discussed gulf between analytic and continental philosophy, those of Russell and Heidegger certainly spring to mind.

An interesting indication of the way Russell is perceived at present can be seen in the series *Time Magazine* ran early in 1999 on the greatest this and that of the century. Ludwig Wittgenstein got the number one ranking among philosophers, but

as Daniel C. Dennett, who wrote the article on him noted, it had more to do with the tantalising complexity of his work than for it being right. The other philosopher to rate a mention in the *Time* survey was Russell, whose chief legacy was held to be his humane rationalism. I agree, and it is in his popular writings where Russell's humane rationalism can best be found. The magical lucidity and clarity of Russell's popular writings can surely be relied upon to play their part in the on-going struggle against the apparently overwhelming waves of irrationalism and whimsy that passes for philosophy in the wake of Heidegger and his postmodern legacies.

This may well be where Russell's legacy will be the longest-lasting. In a century where philosophy has become as comprehensible for the general reader as quantum mechanics, thinkers like Russell may well preserve their lasting value. A review I once read of one of Richard Dawkins' books said that he makes the reader feel like a genius. Russell also had this extraordinary facility. What the average reader will feel in the unlikely event of tackling any work by Martin Heidegger can be left to the imagination. The title of a work by Jean-Paul Sartre comes to mind.

It is true that if Russell's lasting influence lies in his popular writings, then his breakthroughs in logic and the philosophy of mathematics will be confined to footnotes in philosophical manuals, to be read by the initiated few. But maybe this is not a bad thing. Last year, in the *London Review of Books*, Jonathan Rée endorsed Richard Rorty's criticism of analytical philosophy that, by concentrating on attacking pretentious fuzziness, as he called it, imagination, enthusiasm, and hope were being frozen out. Much of this is a grim necessity of the moment, as clear thinking and exposition are themselves under attack on the most preposterous grounds. And until recently, of course, Russell's popular writings were often scorned precisely because they offered imagination, enthusiasm, and hope. The criticism, however, is valid, and a return to the style of Russell could only help maintain a lightness of touch while dealing heavy blows.

The other point about Russell's influence that we need to remember is the extraordinary strength of his personality. Russell may have had trouble earning boy-scout merit awards, as Ray Monk's biography has demonstrated, but under all this he was still a very great man; one who can be looked up to as something of a hero. Rupert Crawshay-Williams noted of Russell that he continued to feel in extremes even when he was thinking in moderation. I can think of no finer way to write works of imagination, enthusiasm, and hope for the general reader. Again, the contrast with either Wittgenstein or Heidegger is instructive. Both of these men were self-absorbed and humourless. Wittgenstein lacked any sense of social obligation and was critical of social obligation when he came across it. And Heidegger's brief foray into the wider world was disastrous. This is not to advocate some extravagant Carlyle-esque hero-worship. But it is true to say that

the twenty-first century will need all the examples of personal courage, dedication to wider causes, and cosmic humility that it can get, and who will provide such an example more than Russell?

####

RUSSELLIAN POTPOURRI WARREN ALLEN SMITH

Kids playing around the Acropolis of Athens must surely have argued as to whether Dionysus could drink more wine than Zeus. Whether Hestia was really a virgin. Or whether Adamastor's penis really was so huge that he and the nymph Thetis were unable to have sex.

Kids today have similar questions about such gods as Yahoo, Lycos, or Excite. Some of *their* gods' answers aren't based upon fact, either, which illustrates how as we progress from childhood to adultery we shed much of what we used to think.

Formerly, kids found some answers from an oracle at a shrine. Today, kids turn to the oracle Jeeves, who is found on the World Wide Web at <www.ask.com>. Ask Jeeves various questions and Jeeves will buttle the news that Dionysus is connected with Australian fine Victorian wines. That you can sleep in a tree-top on Thetis island off Vancouver. And that Adamastor has 30 ... matches on the WWW.

The WWW is like a newly constructed international library, one in which information that is not mainly from books is being accessioned daily, facts are accumulating by the trillions, and the Web is growing exponentially as well as anarchistically. No Zeus nor Jehovah has created nor controls the Web, its measure of mankind being Man.

If it is true that a person does not die so long as someone remembers, Bertrand Russell is very much alive and is destined for immortality. On the search engine Alta Vista (<www.altavista.com>) over 12,500 references are currently found, and the number increases daily. Russell's books are named and commented upon, his name is linked with other figures in philosophy, his views are analyzed, his picture appears on the screen, and his voice comes out of the computer's speakers.

Alas, Russell still has his enemies. The Reverend Ralph A. Smith, for example, takes him to task for being a sinner and an infidel -- meaning, one hopes, that Smith's and Russell's concept of morality is inspiringly different.

Ask Jeeves or Alta Vista about Russell, and both will supply thousands of references, including two major sources all Russellians surely consult often:

<www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm>

<www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Anyone, anytime, and anywhere can click those two WWW homepages, and all kinds of information is seductively presented on the computer screen. Skeptics, of course, are quick to point out that much of the information on the Web is false, but recognizing this encourages one to distinguish unenlightenment from enlightenment.

Lovers of trivia can determine who on the Web is mentioned most often, for example. As to the number of times a word or a phrase occurs, anyone's computer comes up with an almost immediate mathematical answer -- methinks Lord Russell would have loved playing with one. Sex (9,788,020) is mentioned more than God (5,627,610), he would find.

Using the Alta Vista search engine one finds that Plato (157,360) rates more mentions than Aristotle (121,400), Aristotle more than Socrates (119,840). More Web pages cite Nietzsche (72,810) than Wittgenstein (31,819). Even in July 1991, Monica Lewinski (54,079) rated higher than Pope John Paul II (31,819). Isaac Asimov (21,025) scores more than Sir Arthur C. Clarke (14,638). Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. (12,241), so it goes, rates higher than Pat Robertson (11,744), who rates higher, alas, than David Hume (8,508).

Russell's *Why I Am Not A Christian* rates 118 entries, whereas *Principia Mathematica* only rates 16. The *New Yorker* (May 31, 1999), reporting that the latter book surfaced at #23 on Modern Library's list of the century's hundred greatest nonfiction books, described it as "the most influential book never read."

Of the 546 entries for our honorary member Taslima Nasrin, <humanists.net/nasrin/Photos.htm> has photographs of her with Jacques Derrida, Guntar Grass, Mario Vargas Llosa, and French Presidents Mitterand and Chirac.

One does have to be careful. Many of the 3,006 Paul Edwards citations are about a footballer who has the same name as the distinguished philosopher. It's the same story with the 182,140 Kenneth Blackwells, some of whom are Clevelanders.

Alan Schwerin (26 entries), the computer -- a la Big Brother -- reveals, is so interested in model aircraft that he bought a low-level airfoil. The good thing about the Net is that people can find you. The bad thing about the Net...is that people can find you.

####

WITTGENSTEIN: A VIDEO REVIEW
SANTIAGO ZORZOPULOS
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Wittgenstein. Directed by Derek Jarman. Written by Ken Butler, Terry Eagleton, and Derek Jarman. Produced by Tariq Ali. Starring Clancey Chassey, Michael Gough, Karl Johnson, and John Quentin. Available at amazon.com for \$20.95.

In *Wittgenstein*, director Derek Jarman attempts to present the life and contributions to philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the enigmatic genius whose work in philosophy is already classic.

The film opens with the young Wittgenstein (Clancey Chassey) introducing his family, certainly one of the oddest around. Each member is given a brief, usually morbid, biographical sketch. Wittgenstein speaks of everything from the suicides of three of his brothers to the loss of Paul Wittgenstein's (Jan Lantham-Koenig) hand during the First World War. The setting is more like a stage play than a film, with lighting used brilliantly to say more by showing less.

Wittgenstein then tells us of his young life, the struggles he had at school, his attending the same school as Adolf Hitler, and other bizarre nuggets. The action shifts to a grown-up Wittgenstein (Karl Johnson) during his first days in Manchester, England, where he studied aeronautical engineering, before giving it up after failing in his attempts to invent a new kind of propeller engine. From there he goes south to Cambridge to study philosophy under Bertrand Russell (Michael Gough).

In Cambridge, the mood shifts from pure story telling to a deeper investigation into Wittgenstein's life influences and philosophy. We are introduced to a colorful group of historic characters including John Maynard Keynes (John Quentin), Lady Ottoline Morrell (Tilda Swinton), and Lydia Lopokova (Lynn Seymour). It is here that the action is dominant, except for three rather brief interludes. The first shows Wittgenstein in the Great War and his subsequent job as a school teacher in rural Austria. The second is his failed attempt to immigrate to the Soviet Union to be a farmhand. The third is his brief residence in Ireland shortly before his death.

Bertrand Russell is presented in this film primarily in two ways: he acts as a kind of philosophical foil for Wittgenstein, the old guard of philosophy that has it all hopelessly wrong, and as the only person able to keep a level head during that dynamic time at Cambridge. When we first see Russell, he is arguing with Wittgenstein about the possibility of there being a rhinoceros in the room. Russell denies that it is there, looking under the table for it, while Wittgenstein tells him the proposition isn't empirical but metaphysical. Jarman manages to insert a jab

at Russell's position, for when Russell gets up to leave the room, an actor in a rhinoceros costume emerges from the shadows. During a subsequent scene, Lady Ottoline Morrell chastises Russell for his inability to answer direct questions. Even Keynes, whose own philosophical performance in the film is less than flattering, tells Lydia Lopokova that having Wittgenstein at Cambridge provides an alternative to Russell.

However, to focus only on this negative portrayal of Russell as a philosopher is short-sighted. For whatever defects Jarman arranged for Russell's philosophy, he certainly didn't let it infect Russell's character. Russell is the only one of the Cambridge crowd who is aware of the terrible effect Wittgenstein has on his pupils. Russell, in his most memorable scene, confronts Wittgenstein about his decision to influence a young student to abandon Cambridge in order to become a laborer. He tells Wittgenstein that Johnny's (Kevin Collins) parents sacrificed their whole lives to be able to provide something better for their son, who now Wittgenstein has returned to the ranks of the proletariat. Wittgenstein is clearly stunned by these words, and offers only token explanations on his behalf. In the end, Wittgenstein prefers to end his friendship with Russell rather than admit his role in the whole affair.

Wittgenstein is portrayed as profound, yet deeply unaware of how difficult he is to be around. He constantly demands perfection from himself and others. In one amusing scene he is talking with Lady Ottoline Morrell. She tells him that his problem is that he wanted to be perfect. Puzzled, Wittgenstein asks her, "Don't you?" She laughs and says no, to which Wittgenstein becomes angry and says that he cannot see how they can be friends. Lady Morrell, with a big smile, shrugs her shoulders and says she doesn't understand either.

Wittgenstein is also portrayed as partly unstable because of his homosexuality. During a monologue he sits alone in a large cage, admitting his sexual affairs with Johnny and his inability to resist his urges, resulting in regret and feelings of dirtiness. How much of a psychological influence this actually was, or even if it was true is a matter of a rather heated debate. However, the film does an excellent job of showing the stormy relationships Wittgenstein had with some of the young men at Cambridge.

John Maynard Keynes is presented in an unflattering manner. He carries himself like an over-enthusiastic amateur in philosophy. He displays a constant admiration for Wittgenstein and his philosophy without even seeming to understand a word of it. However, he is quite loyal to his friend and recites the metaphor of the ice-castle, for which the film is famous, at Wittgenstein's deathbed.

On the whole, the acting is adequate to fantastic, with the best performance turned in by Karl Johnson's portrayal of Wittgenstein. Johnson has a real flair that made

what might have been dud-lines sound quite genuine. He is undoubtedly aided by his twin-like resemblance to Wittgenstein.

As a piece of art-biography, the film works well. It gives insight into the nature of this fascinating philosopher's relationships and problems. The characters, while clearly written in a way which won't upstage Wittgenstein's brilliance, all seem to capture the essence of their real-life counterparts. For someone interested in an historical-dramatic work, this film fits the bill.

As far as the philosophical content of the work, it is rather weak. Wittgenstein's early work dealt almost exclusively with logic and its limits. This fundamental part of his early philosophy is referred to, but never really shown or talked about. Instead, much attention is given to Wittgenstein's strange collection of writings dealing with religion. This leads to some rather amusing mistreatments of Wittgenstein's philosophy. For example, in the scene with Russell and the rhinoceros, Russell asks why Wittgenstein won't believe there is no rhino in the room. Wittgenstein responds by saying, "Because the world is made of facts, not of things," which is Proposition 1.1 of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Understood properly, as a statement about materialistic relationships in logic, this would present absolutely no answer to Russell's question. Other than allowing Jarman to insert a line from the *TLP*, it serves no purpose except to have Wittgenstein utter a complete non-sequitur, which I am guessing wasn't the intention.

The film does a better job in addressing Wittgenstein's later philosophy, especially the social nature of languages. Sometimes it captures something rather funny, such as when Wittgenstein is being interviewed by Sophie Janovskaya for immigration into the Soviet Union. She tells him he should read more Hegel. Wittgenstein responds by laughing and saying "I can't read Hegel! I'd go quite mad!" However, the film never really succeeds in doing more than making banal comments that lack penetrating insight.

On the whole, this film is a worthy effort to portray an extraordinarily difficult subject. It is a film of more interest to those with a taste for the lives of philosophers than their work. However, I think anyone with broad philosophical interests will enjoy this film.

####

A.J. AYER: A LIFE
BY BEN ROGERS
REVIEWED BY JOHN SHOSKY, Ph.D.
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

A.J. Ayer: A Life, by Ben Rogers, London: Chatto and Windus, 1999, 402 pp. ISBN 0 7011 6316 X.

I bought this book in Oxford and read a large portion of it there. This was an appropriate place to encounter a biography on Ayer, especially for someone like me, who greatly admired him (and still does). Oxford was the site of his undergraduate and graduate work at Christ Church in the late 1920s and early 30s, his post-war teaching position at Wadham in the late 40s, his fellowship at New College in the 60s and 70s, and his later fellowship in retirement at Wolfson in the late 70s and the decade of the 80s. Most importantly for almost twenty years, from 1959-1979, Ayer was Wykeham Professor of Logic in the university.

But Oxford has a tendency to harshly judge its own, and Ayer still illicit some very strong views among older philosophers. The majority line, traced back at least as far as J.L. Austin, is that Ayer was a vain, unoriginal, wholly unpleasant, and disreputable fellow who is vastly over-rated by anyone who finds him moderately interesting. He was merely "clever", that pejorative term for someone who is able but not deep (read here "not a serious scholar"). The minority line, traced back to Peter Strawson, is that, yes, Ayer was vain and sometimes unoriginal, but a key figure nonetheless who brought a clarity and style to philosophical writing, as well as some important new views on epistemology (read here "he was a serious scholar"). Some of the younger philosophers have side-stepped this debate like a bantamweight, looking at Ayer primarily as an historical figure. Others have joined a party line, for or against, as they encounter Ayer's legacy.

The defining moment was Ayer's return to Oxford in the late 1950s after a thirteen year stint as Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London. When H.H. Price retired from the Wykeham Chair in 1958, Ayer actively sought to be his replacement. A seven member committee, which included the philosophers John Mabbott, Anthony Quinton, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle and Austin, was responsible for finding the new chair. Ryle and Mabbott wanted William Kneale, who had been giving lectures in Oxford on logic and would soon produce his monumental *The Development of Logic*. Austin voted for Strawson, who was much younger than Ayer. Quinton, Wisdom, and the two non-philosophers voted for Ayer, prompting Mabbott, Austin and Ryle to resign from the committee. There were many interesting variables: Ryle was Ayer's friend and former tutor, Wisdom was the outside vote from Cambridge, the non-

philosophers (who didn't know the subject) had sided with Ayer, Austin and Ryle were the only members of the committee to hold chairs in philosophy in Oxford, and Quinton and one of the non-philosophers were associated with New College. So the two most important philosophers in Oxford didn't want him in the Wykeham Chair, and they both felt that the New College "fix" determined Ayer's election (Ayer was subsequently elected a fellow of New College). In a closed community like Oxford, still essentially medieval, the elements of small events become indicative of much larger issues.

So, with Oxford dominated by Ryle and Austin's philosophy of ordinary language, Ayer already knew he was coming home to what was enemy territory. Even now, except for *Language, Truth and Logic*, his work is hard to find in Oxford bookshops, as if he lived in another time, another century.

The majority line was recently aired in the *Times Literary Supplement* by Colin McGinn ("The Hollow Man's Story: A.J. Ayer and the Philosophy of 'One Damn Thing After Another,'" June 25, 1999, pp. 3-4.), which was surprising because McGinn was an intimate and friend of Ayer's. However, in a "balanced" assessment that was vastly tilted to one side, McGinn used the opportunity to conduct a harshly personal evaluation of Ayer. Roger's book, which was under review, was recommended as "a solid and well-turned biography," "gripping reading," and "a concise portrait of intellectual life in the middle part of the twentieth century." But with that said, McGinn outlined in some detail "Freddie's faults." Here is one passage:

But I would now have to say that not only Ayer never have an original idea in his life, he also never had a good idea, his own or anyone else's. His dogmatic empiricism, his conventionalism about logical truth, his emotivism in ethics, his sense-datum theory of perception, his "bundle theory" of objects and persons - none of this seems to me (or to most others) remotely on the right track. I think he misread Hume as an undergraduate, combined this with a misreading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, and never freed himself from the errors and confusions that resulted. Moreover, he was remarkably hostile to new ideas if they did not conform to his own preconceived opinions, dismissing important developments as mere "fashion". His contemptuous, and thoroughly confused, reaction to the work of Saul Kripke was the most obvious example of this. He is now very little read within analytical philosophy -- his chosen field -- and his ideas play almost no role in contemporary debates. Compared to W.V. Quine and P.F. Strawson, say, let alone Russell and Wittgenstein, he is a negligible figure on the philosophical scene. (p.3.)

With friends like these...! This assessment is unfairly presented. Ayer had views on skepticism, the logical construction of experience, and other issues which are of the first rank. His views on the verification principle, the argument from illusion, ethics, and humanism are of historical and contemporary interest, and cannot be ignored. As a philosophical historian, his assessments of Russell, Moore, and the pragmatists are insightful and solid. His view of Wittgenstein and the continentals was partisan, but offered many good arguments for discussion. As a teacher, Ayer had few peers. As an advocate for philosophy, Ayer was the most visible, famous philosopher since Russell. He is far from a "negligible figure."

What's more, McGinn's negative assessment goes beyond the pale. It is personal, mean-spirited, cruel, and malicious. He concentrated on Ayer as social butterfly, slick dancer, and party animal. Ayer's womanizing comes in for much play ("The Bill Wyman of philosophy, he managed to seduce a truly amazing number of women, typically maintaining a small harem of girlfriends simultaneously." [p. 3.]). Why is it in the recent biographies of Russell, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and now Ayer, sex is the story line? There is a strange, constant fascination in contemporary biographical efforts with sex, especially if the writer can juxtapose intellectual achievement with an over-stimulated libido.

McGinn also tells us of Ayer's self doubts, his insecurities, his dependency on mother figures, and his own doubtful assessment of his philosophical legacy. Most of that may be true, perhaps, but is it the kind of thing that outweighs Ayer's brilliance, professional accomplishments, zest for life, loyalty to friends, many kindnesses, determination to take philosophy to the public, vast teaching skills, and building of a first class philosophy department at University College? Why push up the scandalous stuff and downplay the positive elements of a unique life? I wondered if McGinn thought his comments would do more than give the party line. Perhaps he was trying to do Rogers a favor, making the book seem unseemly in our peeping post-modern culture, thereby bumping up sales.

Since McGinn's review told me everything about his view of Ayer, and next to nothing about the book itself, I knew I had to go to the source. Co-incidentally, I knew a little about the biography before it came out. In the Ryle Papers at Linacre College there is correspondence from Rogers in 1993 looking for any letters from Ayer to Ryle. At that time, Rogers said he was working on an "authorized" biography, with complete cooperation from Lady Ayer and the literary executors. Dutifully, Linacre sent the single letter they had, and Rogers responded with a cheery reply, thanking them for such good material. No one at Linacre knew more until the book came out in June.

Rogers had a tough job. I know that the construction of a biography of an intellectual figure is tricky. Who is the target audience? How detailed in technical subjects should the biographer become? How much sympathy should go into the

discussion of the intellectual material, verses the mere recitation of life events flavored with the psycho-speculations that define current biography? He decided to go for a general audience, perhaps hoping to duplicate Ray Monk's bestselling efforts on Wittgenstein and Russell. He forewent the technical stuff, except for a few lapses. He was largely sympathetic to the subject, but didn't fawn. He employed a good bit of psychological and character analysis, which tended to confirm Ayer as self-centered, selfish, unimaginative, and dependent on others.

I have my gripes about this book, which I discuss below. But Rogers does a good job in most respects. The writing is crisp and compelling. The sentences are generally clean and punchy, except for some occasional strange placement of verbs and some overly long and numerous dependent clauses, tempting the reader to lose track of the subject and the independent clause, with some sentences going on much too long (like this one). The story itself moves quickly and I read the book over two days in three sittings, largely because I couldn't leave it. It is a tale well told, moving from epistemology to love affairs to dance steps to Labour Party politics to vacation spots, and so on.

The book suffers, in my view, from giving us merely a cursory treatment of Ayer's philosophical views and his critics' reactions. True, there is a long discussion of both *Language, Truth and Logic* and *The Problems of Knowledge*, as well as a handful of articles. But there is little attempt to demonstrate the value of Ayer's work after the publication of *Language, Truth and Logic*. For example, I would have appreciated a much more detailed discussion of *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* and *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, which I personally regard as Ayer's best book. There could have been more substantial discussion of Ayer's treatment of Hume, the pragmatists, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and especially Quine, who virtually disappears after the Vienna Circle. Rogers mentions Ayer's close reading of the existentialists, but we get precious little content. Ayer had a powerful debate with Strawson on individuals, Ryle on consciousness, Austin on perception, and Copleston on the existence of God. We don't get much about any of this. His famous rejection of Wittgenstein on private language and Kripke on essentialism are only briefly covered, and it's hard to tell who wins, or why. I would have especially like more background information on Frege, Carnap, Moore, Ramsey, Wisdom, Anscombe, Price, Ryle, and Austin. All show up, but in a one-dimensional presentation. Monk excelled at providing background information on important figures and Rogers could have done much more to fill in the picture. If you don't have a background in the history of philosophy, you would have little idea who these people are or what they thought based on Roger's treatment. In particular, Austin is a fascinating figure who deserves a richer presentation, especially concerning his bitter disagreements with Ayer and the development of his methodology from his war experiences.

Rogers does a good job in trying to reconcile Ayer's empiricism with his lifestyle. When you believe that experience is just a bundle of perceptions, then perhaps there is little need for self-reflection. This becomes a powerful sub-plot throughout the book, used to explain Ayer's behavior towards women, relationships, friendships, and pace of life.

For Russell scholars, this book is of some importance. There is much about Russell here. While Ayer claimed to owe the most to Hume, clearly Russell was the most influential for Ayer in this century. Read in 1928 while in his last year at Eton, Russell's *Sceptical Essays* inspired Ayer to go into philosophy. In an Oxford openly hostile to Russell, Ayer read several of his works as an undergraduate, including *Principia Mathematica*, *The Problems of Philosophy*, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, and *The Analysis of Mind*. Ayer's two books on Russell and many articles show a careful understanding of his work and place in the history of philosophy.

As a philosopher, Ayer also used Russell as a standard. Russell's empiricism was extended and improved by Ayer. Russell's logic was championed, especially his theory of descriptions, but not developed. Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy* was the inspiration for Ayer's *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, as was Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy* for Ayer's *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, which was supposed to be a sequel.

Philosophically, Ayer saw himself squarely in the tradition of British Empiricism. Therefore, in many respects he was Russell's heir. Rogers notes that

Ayer always shared the spirit, if not the detail, of Russell's outlook, and identified wholeheartedly with his rejection of mysticism and philosophical idealism, his commitment to a broadly scientific view of the world, and his belief in the importance of scepticism, rigour and clarity of thought. Philosophy was not a science, but Ayer agreed with Russell that it needed to be put on a scientific footing. (p. 47.)

Ayer offered the first set of lectures in Oxford advertising Russell's name. In the autumn of 1933 he gave a series of Saturday morning lectures entitled "The Philosophy of Analysis (Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap)." In fact, Rogers believes that this was the first time that lectures were given on a living philosopher in Oxford. Price credited Ayer with almost single-handedly familiarizing Oxford with "the Russell-Wittgenstein school."

This professional regard was returned by Russell, who wrote two favorable reviews of *Language, Truth and Logic*, and a strong letter of recommendation for Ayer's

application for the Wykeham Chair.

Ayer was extremely proud of his personal friendship with Russell. Although they had met before, Ayer came to know Russell well during the academic year 1937-38, when Russell was giving lectures in Oxford. After the war, they saw much of each other in London. University College became a strong advocate for Russell's philosophy and a welcome forum for Russell's views, unlike Oxford and Cambridge. Russell looked to Ayer to keep him informed of current events in philosophy, remarking to Ved Mehta: "I have respect for Ayer. He likes information and has a first class style." Later, after returning to Oxford, Ayer took the lead in organizing the famous 90th Birthday Party for Russell.

There are also comparisons about Russell and Ayer's views on ordinary language philosophy, politics, romantic love, and many other topics.

I recommend this book because it is a good introduction to a great philosopher. Rogers has brought together countless tributaries into a single stream, telling us much about the people, personalities, and events that made up strong currents of thought in our culture and history. It should be read in conjunction with Ayer's own two volumes of autobiography (*Part of My Life* and *More of My Life*), which often give us more details about particular incidents. In turn, Rogers often clears up vague matters in the autobiographies. For those looking for a comparison, this book is not as thin as the Moorehead biography of Russell, but close. It is not up to the Clark or Monk standard. It is Ayer-Lite, which was a conscious choice by Rogers to expand interest in Ayer to the general public. I'm sure the book will be well-received. Ayer's story is amazing. He was famous, brilliant, glamorous, connected, and a celebrity. He was also a challenging, hard-hitting, and thoughtful philosopher who did much to push the subject forward in this century.

Ryle told a story about overhearing two Oxford philosophers, H.W.B. Joseph and H.A. Pritchard, complaining in a bookshop that *Language, Truth and Logic* had ever found a publisher. The metaphysician R.G. Collingwood overheard them and said "Gentlemen, this book will be read when your names are forgotten." Such a comment says much about Collingwood's generosity, Ayer's legacy, and contemporary criticism.

####

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
Editor, *BRS Quarterly*
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

First book of Russell's I read:

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Favorite Russell Quotation:

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

Additional Comments: _____

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

3802 North Kenneth Avenue,
Chicago, Il. 60641-2814, U.S.A.

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

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
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*THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY*

February, 2000

No. 102

Bertrand Russell Society
C/O John Shosky
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, VA 22307



It is time to renew your membership.

- ◆ If you have already renewed for 2000 or have joined the BRS in 2000, **please accept the thanks of the Society** once again for your participation.

- ◆ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 2000 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form on the next page along with your payment TODAY.** Thank you.

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Please mail this form and payment to:

Dennis Darland
Treasurer
Bertrand Russell Society
1406 26th St.
Rock Island, Illinois 61201-2837

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 2000 dues in U.S. funds payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

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**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY
*Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society***

February, 2000

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FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

The Annual Meeting is coming up fast. And it's time to vote for the Board of Directors. Inside the envelope containing this issue you will find a ballot. Please choose eight members to serve on the Board. Then send the ballot via e-mail, snail mail, or phone to Alan Schwerin by June 1st. Thank you for your quick response.

The cover photo shows Russell at Trinity College, Cambridge.

BERTRAND RUSSELL RESEARCH CENTER
McMASTER UNIVERSITY

The editor has received the following report, passed on by Ken Blackwell:

"The Faculty of Humanities has established a Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster. The Centre will bring a variety of activities relating to the famous philosopher together for administrative purposes.

Daniel Woolf, Dean of Humanities, notes that the Faculty has identified Russell studies as an academic priority. 'This is a way of harmonizing a number of activities which currently operate under various umbrellas, and bring them together under one roof.' The actual Bertrand Russell Archives, located in Mills Library, would remain there, he adds.

'It is remarkable that [McMaster] has the papers of Bertrand Russell. It has great significance for the Faculty and the University,' Woolf says.

The Centre will be housed within the Faculty and be administered by a director. It is expected that the Centre will be operational by July 2000. The Centre will inherit the premisses currently occupied by the Russell Editorial Project, in TSH-719, along with its telephone number (905-525-9140-x24896) and e-mail contact (duncana@mcmaster.ca).

The activities that will come under the auspices of the Centre include the *Collected Papers* project, publication of *Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies*, and presentation of the annual Bertrand Russell Peace Lectures, sponsored by the Centre for Peace Studies. Other activities are being considered.

'This is an imaginative initiative by Dean Woolf,' comments Richard Rempel, who

is retiring as director of the Russell Editorial Project. 'It will extend and deepen the boundaries of research on Russell by bringing scholars and post-docs to McMaster.'

Both Woolf and Rempel say that the most important advantage of such a Centre will be the opportunities it offers for building on McMaster's strength as the international homes of Russell studies.

'It will be a major intellectual stimulus for McMaster,' says Rempel, 'and will place the University in the forefront of research related to liberal ideas and thought in the 20th century.'"

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
"CAST YOUR VOTES"

Each year we elect one-third of the 24 Board Members of the Bertrand Russell Society. This year eight members are ending a three year term which began in January of 1997: James Alouf, Jan Loeb Eisler, Nicholas Griffin, Robert T. James, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja, and Peter Stone.

Here are the biographies of the ten nominees for the Board of Directors. The nominees have supplied some of the information for these biographies.

James Alouf: "I have just completed a three year term on the Board and have accepted renomination because I believe that I can offer yet another interpretation of Russell and what the society should be doing to promote Russell's ideas."

Robert Barnard: (supplied by the editor) He is the Spindel Doctoral Fellow at University of Memphis, where he is completing his dissertation. He has taught at Memphis and the University of Mississippi. He will assume a full-time teaching position at the University of Mississippi in the Fall 2000 semester. He has given several conference papers on Russell, including the BRS Annual Meeting in 1998, the BRS session at APA Eastern in 1999, and the Russell/Wittgenstein Conference in 2000.

Steven Bayne: "My background is philosophy and history. I have several publications and have lectured on Russell, once in relation to Meinong, and recently on Russell's theory of space. I have also lectured on 'Human/Machine Interaction' (MIT, 1997) and logical models of causation (FISI at Buffalo, 1994). Soon, I hope to give a paper on Russell's relation to mathematicians who were not logicians. Currently, I am examining early philosophical responses to the 'new'

physics. My main concern is to see that the BRS explores new funding resources. I have experience with the press and public relations."

Jan Eisler: "We have opportunities to present an expanded Russell Society as never before. This is the time to go forward. Our presence in IHEU and other international venues offers a respected exposure long needed. I am willing and able to provide leadership towards reversing our declining membership."

Keith Green: "I am a Senior Lecturer in Linguistics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK. I have published widely in linguistics, literary studies, and the philosophy of language. My publications include "New Essays in Deixis" (1995) and "Critical Theory and Practice" (1996), as well as articles on Russell, in whom I have a special interest. I gave a paper at the 1999 Society conference at Monmouth. My book, *Spectres and Scimitars: Bertrand Russell, Language and Linguistic Theory*, will be published in late 2000 or early 2001. I am keen to see the Society grow and thrive, and I wish to encourage new members from the UK and Europe, as well as from the United States and Canada."

Nicholas Griffin: (supplied by Ken Blackwell) He has a life-long interest in Bertrand Russell. Since 1976, he has been able to indulge that interest as a member of the philosophy department at McMaster University, where he has had a special responsibility for research connected with the Bertrand Russell Archives. He was one of the original editors of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, and has published many articles on Russell's life and works. His book, *Russell's Idealistic Apprenticeship*, was published in 1991 and honoured with the BRS book award. More recently, he has been editing the *Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell* and is now editing the *Cambridge Companion to Russell*. He has been a member of the BRS for many years.

Justin Fritz Leiber: (supplied by Ken Blackwell) He has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and a B.Phil from Oxford. At Oxford, A.J. Ayer was one of his graduate tutors. His books include *Noam Chomsky: A Philosophical Overview*, *Structuralism*, *Can Animals and Machines Be Persons?*, *Paradoxes*, *An Invitation to Cognitive Science*, and a science fiction trilogy -- *Beyond Rejection*, *Beyond Humanity*, and *Beyond Gravity*. The first five chapters of *Beyond Rejection* are anthologized in Hofstadter and Dennett's *The Mind's I* and in several introductions to philosophy. Many of these books have been issued in translation. His published papers concern the work of Noam Chomsky, Alan Turing, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Chandrakala Padia: (supplied by Ken Blackwell) She teaches philosophy at Benares Hindu University, India. She is the author of *Liberty and Social Transformation: A Study in Bertrand Russell's Political Thought*. She heads up

the BRS's chapter in Benares, which has organized numerous events concerning Russell.

Harry Ruja: (supplied by Ken Blackwell) He is a retired professor of philosophy from San Diego State University. He has written numerous papers on Russell, and edited *Mortals and Others* (a collection of Russell's lesser known articles) and (with Ken Blackwell) the 3-volume *Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*. He has been active in BRS for many years and is a former Chairman of the Board.

Peter Stone: (supplied by Ken Blackwell) He is a graduate student in political science at the University of Rochester. He has been a member of the BRS for ten years, and currently serves as Secretary of the Society and as Chairman of its Awards Committee. He is also active in promoting Russell through the Greater Rochester Russell Set, a local chapter of the BRS which holds regular discussions of Russell's work. If elected, he hopes to continue to work on resolving the Society's organizational problems so it may grow and prosper in the future.

RUSSELL NEWS

Check out the BRS web page at <http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>. There you will find information on the society, calls for papers, and other vital data. The web site is maintained by the hard-working John Lenz, who is due our continuous thanks for a job well done.

Jack Odell has published a book, *On Russell*, Wadsworth, 2000. Unfortunately, more is not known at this time.

Thom Weidlich has just published *Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000). Reviews are forthcoming from John Lenz and others. The ISBN is 1-57392-788-0. It is very well researched and written, according to many who have read it.

Ken Blackwell reports that there is a taped interview between Studs Terkel and Russell. The transcript appeared in Terkel's *Talking to Myself*, 1977. The audio may be found in *Four Decades with Studs Terkel* (sound recording, St. Paul: Penguin Highbridge Audio, 1993). There are four sound cassettes in analog stereo, Dolby processed. Russell is on tape three.

John Lenz notes that there is a forthcoming new article entitled "Russell on Religion with Buddhist Commentaries, by Dr. Albert Shansky of Fairfield University. It may be found in the April/May issue of *Philosophy Now*.

Ken Blackwell tells us that the 14th Annual Bertrand Russell Peace Lectures were given by Johan Galtung at McMaster University on March 27 and 28, 2000. John Galtung is Distinguished Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Hawaii, the University of Witten/Herdecke (Germany), the European Peace University, and the University of Tromso (Norway). He established the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) in 1959, and the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. He has had an international academic career spanning 40 years, five continents, a dozen major executive positions, and over 30 visiting professorships. Dr. Galtung has worked extensively for the United Nations family of organizations and currently serves as the Founding Director of TRANSCEND, a Peace and Development Network of approximately 100 scholars and activists worldwide. He is the author of over 70 books and the recipient of numerous awards. The titles of the lectures were "The Big Power Approach, With Examples" (March 27) and "Alternative Approaches, With Examples" (March 28).

Russell's article of 1964, "16 Questions on the Assassination," is part of the material for a course in the examination of the John F. Kennedy assassination at the University of Rhode Island. The class (PSC482G) is entitled "Political Science Seminar: The JFK Assassination." The instructor is Kenneth A. Rahn. The article is on the course's website at http://karws.gso.uri.edu/PSC482G/Spring2000/The_critics/Russell/Russell_bio.html. The link is to a brief bio of Russell on which the article link appears.

Ray Perkins shared a great letter from the *London Times*, February 28, 1959, p. 7g (or 7q): "In order to discourage confusions which have been constantly occurring, we beg herewith to state that neither of us is the other. Yours, etc., RUSSELL (Bertrand, Earl Russell) and RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL (Lord Russell of Liverpool), February 25."

There is a collection of quotations attributed to Russell at http://cybernation.com/victory/quotations/authors/quotes_russell_bertrand.html

Please note three new members whose addresses may not be included on the membership list: Jaako Suoninen, Ojennustie 3, FIN-9960 Sodankyla Finland; Kevin Bodie, PO Box 488, Colchester, Connecticut 06415; and Glenn Moyer, 34 N. 16th Street, Allentown, Pennsylvania 18102-4203. Also, please note an address change for David Rodier to 18625 Mustard Seed Court, Germantown, Maryland 20874.

Richard Rempel, professor of history at McMaster University and since 1978 project director of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, has announced his retirement. The 15th volume in the series will be published in June. He is a landmark figure whose tireless work has introduced countless people to Russell's

thought. He deserves the well-earned thanks of every Russell scholar.

The American University conference on Russell and Wittgenstein in March was a success. The Department of Philosophy and Religion has committed to a second conference in late February, 2002.

While not concerning Russell, the present editor highly recommends Peter Matthiessen and Maurice Hornocker's *Tigers in the Snow* (New York: North Point Press, 2000). It is about efforts to save the Siberian Tiger. It would be interesting to have someone research Russell's position on the environmental crisis, particularly the destruction of habitats and the extinction of species. The ISBN is 0-86547-576-8.

DR. HENRY MORGENTALER: A DIFFICULT HERO BY RACHEL MURRAY

By awarding Dr. Henry Morgentaler -- one of Canada's leading advocates of abortion rights and reproductive freedom -- the 1999 BRS Annual Award, the Bertrand Russell Society has honoured a man who is both a hero and an enigma. For those of you unfamiliar with Dr. Morgentaler or his work, I'm going to give you a very brief background and some reasons why we've decided upon this Canadian for this year's award. All of this biographical information has been taken from the book *Morgentaler: A Difficult Hero* by Catherine Dunphy (Toronto: Random House, 1996) and additionally supplemented by the book *Morgentaler: The Doctor Who Couldn't Turn Away* by Eleanor Wright Pelrine (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1975). While I was unfortunately unable to attend the annual meeting at which the award was officially presented, as a Canadian and BRS member, I am gratified by the BRS's decision.

Dr. Henry Morgentaler was born March 19, 1923 in Lodz, Poland, to Josef and Golda Morgentaler. Perhaps one of the greatest influences on him was his experiences in Poland during the Second World War. This man, who has been vilified as evil, was a survivor of both Auschwitz and Dachau, and lost both parents in Auschwitz. After the war, he went to medical school at Marburg-Lahn University, continuing his education in Belgium. Dr. Morgentaler speaks English, French, German, Polish, and Yiddish; his original education in English came from reading "Little Lord Fauntleroy."

Morgentaler married his wife Chava (Eva), a fellow Holocaust survivor and childhood friend, and arrived in Canada in February 1950 with \$20 U.S. in his pocket. After coming to Canada, Morgentaler faced anti-Semitism in his attempt

to become a doctor, having to repeat exams he passed in Belgium. Eventually he became certified and opened a family practice in Montreal, becoming a Canadian citizen in 1955. Dunphy writes that, after his immigration to Canada, "Henry was a successful physician, but tormented by a need to do more for society than tend to grateful patients' ailments...[T]hat Henry survived five precarious years in the ghetto and the last nine months of the war at Auschwitz and Dachau should be viewed as a triumph. But it was not that clear cut for Henry...(He) was not convinced that living an ordinary life was enough."

It was around 1963 that Morgentaler was exposed to humanism, which led him to the issue of reproductive rights. It is interesting to note that his work on abortion came originally at the theoretical level -- in 1967 he worked on a humanist brief on abortion presented to a House of Commons standing committee. Indeed, as Dunphy writes, "Henry had approached the issue of abortion as a good humanist: he had applied pragmatic, rational, scientific-based thinking to an abstract."

Unfortunately, the issue of abortion is to many an emotional, contentious issue. Dunphy says that "Abortion would become the most divisive issue of the decade. It would ignite a movement, incite violence, and grow so corrosive it would nearly divide and conquer a people. And it would soon be wrestled from its birth control context of family size and women's health and relocated in a more contemporary, confusing, and perilous territory. It was the object of a power grab."

Not only was abortion volatile, it was also illegal in Canada. In a 1970 article in the *Humanist*, Morgentaler wrote, "I still cannot believe that I, who have always been a law abiding citizen, could bring myself to defy the law of the land and the state and to risk imprisonment, loss of license to practice medicine, the contempt of my colleagues, the ruin of my family, and the opprobrium that goes with that terrible word: abortionist. Here I was for the first time in my life doing my most daring thing in my life, really, defying the law of the new country that had adopted me, basically, and playing for very high stakes, risking prison, possibly my medical license, the security of my family."

As a result of his work, Morgentaler has been arrested numerous times and spent time in jail. As the American Humanist Association said when awarding him their 1975 Humanist of the Year award:

Dr. Henry Morgentaler was chosen to honour his work to reform abortion law in Canada. Abortions were legal, but could only be performed in hospitals, which in Quebec mostly denied abortions in spite of the law. Dr. Morgentaler performed abortions in his clinic, feeling women must have some recourse to safe procedures. As a result, he was harassed by authorities and

finally convicted on a criminal charge. Acquitted by a jury, the decision was overturned by the Canadian Supreme Court, and he was imprisoned in March, 1975. He was unable to receive his award until his release in 1976. Dr. Morgentaler is a former president of the Humanists of Canada. He has continued to work for women's rights, for secular Canadian schools, and other humanist causes.

Morgentaler's legal case had huge repercussions for Canadian society. His case centered on the relationship between the government and the individual, and whether the government or the person has control of an individual's body and that individual's future. In framing the issue in this way, we can see how Morgentaler fits into Russell's and humanism's vision of an ideal society -- one in which the individual -- all of us -- must work to ensure the human rights of others. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., said it best: "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."

Regardless of the words and rhetoric spawned by this debate, the thanks that Canadian women owe to Morgentaler is genuine and with good reason. By challenging inhumane laws and confronting out-of-date attitudes, Morgentaler has fought for the reproductive rights of women -- not only Canadian women, but all those who seek guidance in their challenges to repressive governmental regimes and policies. Their battles are especially crucial at a time when religious fundamentalism -- and especially in the States, radical Christian fundamentalism -- threatens the freedoms people have fought for in civil rights and feminist activism for the past thirty years. We all owe the Morgentalers of the world our thanks. For, you see, the simply right of a woman to choose and control her reproductive destiny has repercussions beyond the arena of sexual freedom. Morgentaler's battles continue the long tradition of activists who rage against the state, society, and the churches for the most honourable causes of justice, equality, fairness, and freedom. Through his dogged determination, Dr. Henry Morgentaler has fought -- and won -- reproductive freedoms for women in Canada. He has worked to correct an injustice that affects not only women or Canadians, but all of us. He has illustrated that the fight for reproductive rights reflects how we care for human beings and what rights we as a society truly believe in and determine are worth fighting for. For these and many other reasons, I am pleased that the BRS presented its award to Morgentaler.

Unfortunately, Morgentaler was unable to receive his award in person due to ill health, but as a native of Toronto I was able to bring the award to his clinic in that city and present it (with Peter Stone, the Chair of the BRS Awards Committee) to Morgentaler's personal assistant, Ms. Cathy Columbo.

I hope that all members of the BRS will give this steadfast crusader a large round

of applause in appreciation for all his work. Let's make it loud enough for him to hear it in Toronto!

**A RUSSELL PUZZLE PAGE
BY GERRY WILDERBERG
ST. JOHN FISHER COLLEGE**

Not long ago I solved one of the syndicated "CryptoQuote" type puzzles and found it was by Russell. This inspired the present submission.

The following are five "simple-substitution cyphers." That is to say they are coded quotes in which each letter stands for another letter. For example, BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFFRYY, O=B, R=E, etc., etc.

All of these quotes have been attributed to Russell. So extra fun may be had by locating the source and correcting my errors.

Solutions are found in a later section of the *Quarterly* on page 14.

1. YZX SXELXX WG WMXP XIWYUWM OVLUXP UMOXLPXCR DUYZ
WMXP FMWDCXSEX WG YZX GVJYP YZX CXPP RWK FMWD YZX
ZWYYXL RWK EXY.

2. VABP PEIA EF, ZK LKFZ LAU, B PKUW FAXKUG-DAFZ, B
MAVMAZRPB XKLMVKLEFA DAZQAAU ZSA EGABP BUG ZSA
MKFFEDPA; DRZ ZSA QKVPG KI MRVA VABFKU JUKQF UK
XKLMVKLEFA, UK MVBXZEXBP PELEZBZEKUF, UK DBVVEAV ZK ZSA
XVABZEYA BXZEYEZH.

3. XWO XG UEO YRUFUXJY XG SW SFFKXSQEPWA WOKMXNY
LKOSDVXTW PY UEO LOBPOG UESU XWOY TXKD PY UOKKPLBR
PJFKKUSWU.

4. ZBTP ZL DLLM OR DHP PBL ZOGG PH FLGOLUL, FWP PBL ZORB PH
IODM HWP.

In the last one, I've made it a bit harder by removing the spaces between words and removing the punctuation. The grouping into "words" of five letters is just for readability. (Some Russellians may be surprised to learn that experienced puzzlists can solve cyphers of this type quite easily.)

5. EHQBZ EOIXZ UBECV OESVX PEGIQ IGLEC OOEZC CIESO ZOYIX

EBGIH CGVJB VCSIX ZUSVW IGOLA YVBYE GIPW ZHVIH VJZI PEMVP
OYIUZ GODJE OIPDX OJZOW IGIXO GEVJI HVJOY IIMIG BVXIZ UOLGE
JLZQ IGOYI DJUZG ODJEO I.

**GREATER RUSSELL ROCHESTER SET
SPRING, 2000 SCHEDULE**

Thursday, May 18 (Russell's Birthday)

Topic: Secularism

Suggested Reading: *Why I Am Not A Secularist* by William E. Connolly

A discussion of secularism and the challenges it faces today. There will be a cake and a rousing chorus of "Happy Birthday to Bertie."

All meetings will take place at 7:00 p.m. at Blue Sunday Coffeehouse and Used Bookstore, 3118 E. Henrietta Road (corner of Lehigh Station Road), Rochester, New York. For directions, please contact the coffeehouse at 716-334-4415. For all other questions, contact Tim Madigan at 716-273-5778 (days)/716-424-3184 (evenings) or <timothymad@aol.com>.

All meetings are free and open to the public. Everyone is welcome and will be included in the discussion, whether they are novices or experts in Russell's work. Readings are highly recommended but not essential to benefit from the discussions.

**2000 ANNUAL MEETING:
MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY
WEST LONG BRANCH, NEW JERSEY
JUNE 2-4, 2000**

The Bertrand Russell Society will host its Annual Meeting at Monmouth University in New Jersey on June 2-4, 2000. Fifteen papers from an international group of Russell scholars have been accepted for the conference. The papers are not technical and will be intelligible to both an academic and a non-academic audience. The presenters will be given twenty minutes to deliver their papers, with a further twenty minutes for discussion from the audience.

If you would like to attend the meeting, please contact Alan Schwerin at Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey 07764 (e-mail aschweri@monmouth.edu or phone 732-571-

4470).

A web site has been built for the conference at <http://www.monmouth.edu/~aschweri/brs/>

For virtual attendance at the Annual Meeting, see the source page. Questions following each paper will include participation from the virtual audience. The source is www.monmouth.edu/brs

Participants who stay on campus should contact Alan as soon as they arrive. His office is located in 243 Bey Hall.

Here is the schedule at the time of the *Quarterly's* publication:

Friday, June 2, 2000

- 5:00 - 6:00 Registration, Turrell Board Room, Second Floor, Bey Hall
- 6:00 - 7:30 Dinner in "The Club" (on campus)
- 7:30 - 8:00 Welcome from **Ken Blackwell** and **Alan Schwerin**, Turrell Board Room, Bey Hall
- 8:00 -10:00 Open discussion of **Russell's** views on religion, including the audio presentation of portions of the **Russell/Copleston** debate on the existence of God

Saturday, June 3, 2000

- 8:15 - 8:45 Registration, Turrell Board Room, Bey Hall
- 8:45 - 9:25 **Stefan Andersson**, Lund University, "Russell on Mysticism (Part II)"
- 9:30 -10:10 **Mark Couch**, Columbia University, "Russell's Criticism of Moore's Proof"
- 10:15 -10:55 **Steven Bayne**, Independent Scholar, "Russell and those 'Other' Mathematicians"
- 11:00 -11:40 **Burdett Gardner**, Monmouth University

(Emeritus), "Bertrand Russell and the Terminological Fallacy"

11:45 -12:25

David White, St. John Fisher College, "Russell on the Web"

12:30 - 1:30

Lunch -- The Board of Directors will have a working lunch in the Turrell Board Room

2:00 - 2:40

Boris Kukso, Duke University, "Russell's Logical Atomism and Armstrong's Philosophy of States of Affairs"

2:45 - 3:25

Roselind Carey, Boston University, "Russell's Working Notes on Propositions Appended to *Theory of Knowledge*"

3:30 - 4:10

Edgar Boedeker, Northern Illinois University, "The Hidden Influence of Russell's Theory of Substitution on Wittgenstein's N-operator"

4:15 - 4:55

Chad Trainer, Independent Scholar, "Language: A Leading or a Lagging Indicator of Truth for Russell?"

6:00

Banquet at Squire's Pub. Drinks at 6:00. Meal at 7:00.

Sunday, June 4, 2000

8:15 - 8:45

Registration, Turrell Board Room, Bey Hall

8:45 - 9:25

Matt Caia, American University, "The Problem of Causality in Sense Experience: Russell's Assessment of Locke"

9:30 -10:10

John Shosky, American University, "Russell and Quine"

10:15 -10:55

Rom Harré, Oxford University (Emeritus) and American University, "Reference Revisited"

11:00 -11:40

Ken Stunkle, Monmouth University, "Russell on History"

- 11:45 -12:25 **Thom Weidlich**, Editor, *PR Week*, "Russell's Sexual Revolution"
- 12:30 -1:15 **Nick Griffin**, McMaster University, "Russell's Logicism is not If-Thenism"
- 2:00 -4:30 Barbecue at Helen and Alan's Home

**SOLUTIONS TO THE RUSSELL PUZZLE PAGE
GERRY WILDERBERG
ST. JOHN FISHER COLLEGE**

1. The degree of one's emotion varies inversely with one's knowledge of the facts -- the less you know the hotter you get.
2. Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible; but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity.
3. One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one's work is terribly important.
4. What we need is not the will to believe, but the wish to find out.
5. Advocates of capitalism are very apt to appeal to the sacred principles of liberty, which are embodied in one maxim: The fortunate must not be restrained in the exercise of tyranny over the unfortunate.

**MINUTES OF THE 1999 ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
SUBMITTED BY
PETER STONE
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER**

The BRS Board of Directors held its annual meeting on June 4 and 6, 1999, in conjunction with the BRS Annual Meeting at Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey. Ken Blackwell chaired. Peter Stone took notes. Directors present on June 4th were Stefan Andersson, Ken Blackwell, Jan Loeb Eisler, John Lenz, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, David Rodier, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Thom Weidlich, and Ruili Ye. Perkins and

Rodier were absent from the second part of the meeting on June 6th.

David Rodier moved to suspend a reading of the minutes from the last Board meeting and to approve the minutes. Thom Weidlich seconded, and the Board approved the motion unanimously.

John Lenz gave the (temporary) treasurer's report. The group is somewhat flush with money right now, but this is primarily because the Society has not yet produced a *Quarterly* this year (Tim Madigan is currently working on a double issue for February and May). Each *Quarterly* costs \$700 or more. Lenz gave Peter Stone a copy of the treasurer's report, and Stone will make sure it gets published with the minutes.

Ken Blackwell reported on membership. The BRS had about 175 members last year and about 120 so far this year (renewals continue to trickle in). The Board then briefly discussed the problem of declining membership. Jan Eisler suggested that the group needed exposure, possibly through a speaker who could talk on Russell at various humanist events. Ray Perkins suggested t-shirts or bumper stickers. Ken Blackwell said that finding a picture for a t-shirt that the BRS could legally use should not be a problem. Blackwell will endeavor to find such a picture and pass it on to Thom Weidlich, who will investigate the manufacture of Russell t-shirts and report back to the Board about it. Blackwell suggested that the BRS might even wish to give a t-shirt out with membership.

The Board then briefly discussed the arrangements for the treasurer. Dennis Darland, while still officially treasurer, has been on leave for almost a year. John Lenz and Ken Blackwell have taken on the duties of handling funds and maintaining the membership list, respectively. Darland is willing to resume his duties, and several Board members voiced the view that Darland seemed perfectly able to do so.

In addition, Peter Stone voiced concern about the monthly fees Dennis Darland has been paying on the BRS's bank account. Apparently, when the treasurer's duties were shifted from Darland to John Lenz, most of the money was taken from the BRS account maintained by Darland, leaving only a residual amount to keep the account open. The small amount of money in the account requires the BRS to pay fees to keep the account open. When Lenz transfers the BRS's money back to Darland, this problem should cease. Jan Eisler inquired if the BRS could earn any form of interest on its money. Lenz will speak to Darland about this.

The Board then returned to the subject of finding new members. John Lenz reported that he will try to revamp and revise a brochure about the BRS written by Don Jackanicz. The old brochure lists Jackanicz's address, and Jackanicz does not

wish this to continue.

Continuing on the same subject, Peter Stone suggested reviving the position of Vice President for Information. Steve Reinhardt emphasized that members needed to get something for their money. Thom Weidlich remarked that it is unclear to which address people should direct inquiries about the BRS (John Lenz conceded that this quite ad hoc right now). Trevor Banks suggested that the newsletter should be less technical, and Tim Madigan agreed.

Tim Madigan asked how many members of *Russell-1* (the listserv for people interested in Russell) are members of the BRS. Ken Blackwell put the figure at about 15 percent, which still constitutes a significant portion of the BRS's membership.

Steve Reinhardt inquired if members were getting the program of the Annual Meeting in advance. John Lenz said that they were. Alan Schwerin noted the difficulties in attracting people; apparently, he posted notices about the meeting at nine different international electronic sites with a call for papers, with little apparent results.

The Board then moved on to reports from committees. Peter Stone noted that the Awards Committee had given the 1999 Society Award to Dr. Henry Morgentaler, and that the Book Awards Committee had given the 1999 Book Award to Gregory Landini. Alan Schwerin hopes to use the APA as a means to promote Russell as a scholar, but unfortunately the last BRS session at the APA was poorly attended, with only 12 in attendance (the Leibnitz Society drew 60-70). For the next meeting, Schwerin hopes to have a full panel of papers and maybe even an "author meets his critics" session (They are usually well-attended). Ken Blackwell indicated that the BRS should continue to keep *Russell-1* apprised of its awards, APA sessions, etc.

The Board then held elections for Board and Society Officers. The following officers were each unanimously elected:

President -- Alan Schwerin (nominated by Madigan, seconded by Eisler)
Vice President -- Jan Loeb Eisler (nominated by Madigan, seconded by Weidlich)
Treasurer -- Dennis Darland (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Eisler)
Secretary -- Peter Stone (nominated by Weidlich, seconded by Perkins)
Chairman -- Ken Blackwell (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Eisler)

The Board then took up the question of where to hold the next meeting. Ken Blackwell indicated that the meeting could take place at McMaster University, where the meeting has not been held in a number of years. Tim Madigan raised

the possibility of a joint meeting with the Center for Inquiry and the Canadian Humanist Association, as the Society did in 1994 and 1997. The Center for Inquiry et. al. will have their annual meeting in Los Angeles in May, 2000. The Society has not been on the West Coast since 1993. Thom Weidlich raised the possibility of meeting at Pembroke Lodge in England.

John Lenz suggested that this topic could best be resolved after further consideration of whether the BRS should join the IHEU and/or affiliate with the Center for Inquiry. The Board therefore agreed to postpone the issue until the second part of the meeting.

Peter Stone then proposed a change in the bylaws of the Board. Both the bylaws of the Board and the Society discussed committees. But the rules were ambiguous as to whether both sets of rules referred to the same committees, as well as the duties of these committees. Therefore, Stone suggested amending Article 5 of the Board bylaws, which then read

Committees may be created by the Board, to perform Board functions, and shall follow Board instructions.

To now read

Committees may be created by the Board in accordance with the bylaws of the Society. These committees may perform Board functions by making or implementing the Society's policies, and will follow Board instructions. Functions delegated to a committee may be withdrawn by the Board at any time.

After a brief discussion, Ken Blackwell moved to amend the bylaws in this manner. David Rodier seconded. The Board approved the change unanimously.

The Board then took up the question (postponed from last year's meeting) as to whether the BRS should affiliate with the Center for Inquiry. Don Jackanicz does not wish to continue to do the work to maintain the BRS's incorporation in Illinois. The Society's alternatives are to hire an agent to maintain the Illinois incorporation, or to reincorporate as a new nonprofit in New York based at the Center. Hiring an agent would cost the BRS about \$150 a year; it would also have to provide some information about the BRS's activities. Affiliating with the Center for Inquiry would (according to Jan Eisler and other backers of the proposal) provide a permanent address, a permanent repository, membership and bookkeeping related services, and more. The Center has a full-time librarian to handle books and stand in as the person on the spot to handle inquiries about the BRS. It would also mean more exposure, particularly in humanist circles, and a possible relationship with Prometheus Press. Ray Perkins asked if it would solve the problem of where to

have the annual meeting each year. Tim Madigan said that the Center might be available for meetings, but Steve Maragides pointed out that it was probably available now.

A long debate ensued on the subject. Opponents of affiliation made the following points: 1) If the arrangement did not work out, then the BRS would have to go through the rigmarole of re-incorporation again, which is more difficult than maintaining an existing corporation; 2) The BRS might lose autonomy, and possibly its identity, by affiliation with a large and highly-organized group; 3) Some members might not like the association, and would leave; 4) With Board member Tim Madigan no longer at the Center, it is unclear who would look out for the Society at the Center; 5) The Society would not be able to act independently by taking stands contrary to those of the Center; 6) It is not obvious what the Center gets out of the arrangement; 7) The BRS would be perceived differently, as people associated the BRS with only one aspect of Russell's life and thought.

Supporters of affiliation responded with the following points: 1) The Center for Inquiry houses many groups, each of which has its own board and "identity"; 2) The Center is anxious to spread inquiry, as its name indicated, and the BRS incorporation would help it with that goal; 3) Association with the Center is perfectly compatible with a multifaceted approach to Russell.

In the end, the Board decided to postpone a decision until the second part of the Board meeting. A straw poll at the end of the discussion indicated 4 Board members for affiliation, 4 against, and 5 undecided.

Jan Eisler brought up the subject of IHEU membership. In the past, there was a misunderstanding that the BRS was invited free into the IHEU. If the BRS wishes to become an associate member of the IHEU, it will cost 20 British pounds a year and require that several forms be filled out. Eisler argued that joining would provide international exposure. Warren Allen Smith moved that the BRS obtain an associate membership, John Lenz seconded, and the motion carried unanimously. Eisler will act as a liaison with the IHEU.

Peter Stone read a letter from Ramon Suzara, in which he indicated that he has formed his own group, called "BRS--Philippines". He has formed this organization in response to perceived failings of the "BRS-USA" (meaning the BRS). He argued that the Board should concern itself with real problems in the world, as Russell did, rather than just talking about them. John Lenz pointed out that this subject has come up before, but the Society has always been unsure what it could do beyond discussing such topics at its meetings.

Alan Schwerin asked if this new organization generated any legal issues by using

the BRS's name. John Lenz responded negatively, but Peter Stone suggested that the real harm might come through damage to the BRS's reputation, particularly in the 3rd World.

As far as taking action on various issues, Ken Blackwell indicated that nothing prohibited the BRS from doing so (Thom Weidlich, however, disagreed). In that spirit, Blackwell raised the issue of whether the BRS should take a position on the war in Yugoslavia. Steve Maragides pointed out that the BRS had previously had a large battle over the issue of the Society taking public positions on various issues. Lee Eisler, who was involved in these disputes, had argued that the only appropriate issues would be those on which Russell himself took a clear stance (nuclear disarmament, for example).

Charles Krantz asked if the Russell Peace Foundation had taken a position on the Yugoslav war (No one knew). Peter Stone asked if the BRS had ever taken a position on U.S. military actions (It hadn't). Stone requested that the Board take up the issue again in the second half of its meeting.

Ken Blackwell went over the BRS's various committees, with an eye to keeping them fully staffed. The BRS now has the following committees:

- 1) **Book Awards** (Ray Perkins - chair, Ken Blackwell, Nick Griffin, Russell Wahl, and Keith Green) The Board agreed that this committee was best kept small to maximize the chance that its members can actually read the books eligible for the award.
- 2) **Elections** (Ken Blackwell -- chair) The Board recognizes that Blackwell will ask some individuals to serve on this committee as needed.
- 3) **BRS Awards** (Peter Stone -- chair, Alan Schwerin, Ken Blackwell) Schwerin will replace John Lenz on this committee.
- 4) **Paper Awards** (Alan Schwerin -- chair, John Lenz, Tim Madigan)
- 5) **APA** (Alan Schwerin -- chair, David White) The Board would like to ask John Shosky if he would serve.

In addition, the Board considered whether to create some sort of student outreach committee (mostly targeting college students, but possibly also high school students). Jan Eisler and Tim Madigan will both speak to Derek Araujo about serving on such a committee. In addition, Steven Bayne has suggested the Board create a committee to promote the BRS. Alan Schwerin suggested combining these two proposed committees, and John Lenz suggested that all of these duties might fall under the aegis of a Vice President for Information, if the position is recreated.

The Board ended the discussion without a final resolution.

At the end of the first part of the Board Meeting, Ken Blackwell suggested the BRS consider streamlining its functions in light of its membership problems. Jan Eisler replied that the BRS needs to make an extra effort to recruit membership, possibly through some sort of spokespeople and/or speaking tours. The Board will discuss the issue further at a later date.

The second part of the Board Meeting commenced with the following three items of unresolved business:

- 1) Picking a site for the 2000 Annual Meeting;
- 2) Deciding the question of affiliation with the Center for Inquiry; and
- 3) Considering whether the BRS should take a position on the war in Yugoslavia.

One issue #1, Ken Blackwell announced that the Society had five somewhat viable possibilities on the table -- McMaster University; Rochester, N.Y.; Los Angeles, CA; Pembroke Lodge, UK; or West Long Branch, NJ (i.e., doing the meeting at Monmouth again). Tim Madigan pointed out that the BRS could simply have a session at the upcoming LA humanist meeting without moving the entire Society meeting there. Both Madigan and Eisler will be at the meeting, so there will be people on site to coordinate a BRS presence. They could organize one or two sessions along a "BR as humanist theme." Blackwell added that if at least three directors attend, the BRS could have an additional Board meeting there, providing there is business that needs to be discussed. On a similar note, Alan Schwerin added that the BRS could have a Board meeting at the APA's West Coast meeting if enough directors attended and the need was there. Jan Eisler moved that the BRS at least have a presence (if not an entire annual meeting) at the upcoming humanist meeting in LA. Tom Weidlich seconded. The motion carried unanimously. John Lenz will provide brochures (possibly old ones with a sticker over Don Jackanicz's address) to Madigan and Eisler for the meeting, and Madigan will find speakers for the BRS section. In addition, both Eisler and Madigan would look into finding people on the West Coast who might be willing to help arrange a future BRS meeting out west.

Gerry Wildenberg indicated that the BRS members in Rochester would need some time to investigate the matter before committing to hosting an annual meeting. He will look into the matter. In the meantime, the BRS will hold off on planning a meeting in Rochester for at least a year.

Thom Weidlich and Tim Madigan will investigate a possible meeting at Pembroke Lodge. Again, the BRS will hold off on a meeting there until the two Board members can report back on the matter.

Jan Eisler expressed an interest in knowing where the members were, so that future meeting plans could take this into account. Ken Blackwell indicated that a geographic breakdown of the membership would appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Quarterly*.

Alan Schwerin indicated his willingness to host the meeting at Monmouth University again, provided he could convince the University to support it. He believed that would prove no problem. He had high hopes that he could improve on what was already (in the eyes of most of those assembled) a fine meeting. Stefan moved that the BRS hold its 2000 Annual Meeting at Monmouth, provided that Alan Schwerin provided accurate directions to the university (actually his directions were not bad at all). Thom Weidlich seconded. The Board agreed unanimously with the proposal, the first time that the BRS will hold its annual meeting at the same location in two consecutive years.

The Board agreed that the meeting would take place on June 2-4, 2000. Peter Stone noted, while expressing appreciation to Schwerin for undertaking the huge task of planning two meetings in a row, that the BRS should not give up on either joint meetings with the Center for Inquiry or the idea of a West Coast meeting. Ken Blackwell moved that the Board recognize the desirability of holding the annual meeting on the West Coast in 2001. Stone seconded and the motion carried unanimously. Thom Weidlich expressed satisfaction that plans were in the works for future years, including possible meetings in England, Rochester, and (in a pinch) Hamilton.

With regard to issue #2, various people once again raised concerns about affiliation with the Center for Inquiry (identification with militant humanism, lack of information, etc.), as well as various defenses of the idea (not all of the groups at the Center are militantly humanist). Stefan Anderson moved that the BRS obtain a registered agent for one year while looking into more information about the matter of affiliation. Tim Madigan seconded. Peter Stone pointed out that much of the devil here was not in the details, but in broader concerns (about independence, image, autonomy, etc.) that further information would probably not resolve. The Board passed the motion 8-2, with one abstention. Stone then moved that Tim Madigan, who will visit the Center shortly, be provided with questions from the Board for which he could obtain answers, so that the matter could be resolved. Andersson seconded and the motion passed 10-0, with one abstention.

On issue #3, the Board discussed the matter very briefly. Charles Krantz expressed concern that perhaps the timing was wrong for a position on the Yugoslav war. Laurie Thomas regretted that people she knew from the American-Yugoslav Friendship Committee could not attend. She also discussed some of the factors involved that would point in favor of taking a position. Gerry Wildenberg

questioned whether the BRS should ever take a position on political issues. Steve Reinhardt suggested that in the future the BRS designate an hour or two for general "bull sessions" on issues of the day. He also suggested that the *Quarterly* would make an excellent vehicle for such discussions. In the end, the Board took no action on this matter.

**MINUTES OF THE 1999 BRS ANNUAL MEETING
SUBMITTED BY
PETER STONE
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER**

The Bertrand Russell Society held its annual meeting at Monmouth University, West Long Beach, New Jersey, on June 4-6, 1999. John Lenz and Alan Schwerin presided. Peter Stone took notes. BRS members present were Bob Ackerman, Stefan Andersson, Trevor Banks, Mary Bayne, Steven Bayne, Ken Blackwell, Russell Dale, Jan Loeb Eisler, David Goldman, Keith Green, Jose Idler, Charles Krantz, John R. Lenz, Timothy Madigan, Steve Maragides, Mary Martin, Gary Ostertag, Ray Perkins, Stephen J. Reinhardt, Henrique Ribeiro, Cara Rice, David Rodier, Alan Schwerin, John Shosky, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Laurie Thomas, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich, David White, Gerry Wildenberg, and Ruile Ye. Non-members present were William Cornwall, Thomas Drucker, Burdett Gardner, Terri Gillis, Bonnie Gold, Carl Koreen, Jill LeBihon, Chris Lubbers, Guy Oakes, Karen Perkins, Samantha Pogorelsky, Helen Schwerin and Santiago Zorzopulos.

On Friday night, President John Lenz welcomed everyone present, and complimented Steve Reinhardt for remaining the only member to have attended every meeting. Lenz then pointed out that the conference had attendees from many exotic places, including Portugal, Venezuela, England, Canada, Illinois, New Jersey, and Rochester, New York (which provided about ten percent of the meeting attendees). He also urged members to make sure they renewed (and paid for their meeting registration and accommodations), thanked the BRS for the years he spent as an officer, and acknowledged the hard work of the other officers (especially Ken Blackwell, who has been serving as temporary membership supervisor). Finally, he pointed out that the Society had been unable to procure Red Hackle for the meeting, and so members would have to make due with "honorary" Red Hackle.

Chairman Ken Blackwell also welcomed meeting attendees, and urged them to attend the two-part Board meeting to be held that evening and later on in the weekend. Alan Schwerin concluded the welcoming remarks by expressing his pleasure that so many people had attended. Some, like Chandrakala Padia (from the BRS's chapter in India) were hoping to attend but could not, yet the turnout

was quite good, and others (including a contingent from American University to rival Rochester's large delegation) would be arriving the following day. The number of attendees had made for a tight program, and Schwerin reminded everyone that they would have to keep closely to the schedule in order for every speaker to have a chance.

Ray Perkins, Chairman of the BRS Book Award Committee, presented the 1999 Annual Book Award in absentia to Gregory Landini for his book *Russell's Hidden Substitution Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Peter Stone, Chairman of the BRS Award Committee, presented the 1999 Annual Society Award in absentia to Dr. Henry Morgentaler, and will hopefully be able to present the award in person to Morgentaler when Stone visits Toronto next week.

Jan Eisler told the meeting that BRS Honorary Member Antony Flew had recently visited Florida. Eisler hosted Flew there, and a great many people had the chance for stimulating interaction with the famous philosopher. Steve Reinhardt mentioned that Random House's recently issued list of the 100 greatest nonfiction books published in English in the 20th century included Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. Two or three weeks earlier, the *New Yorker* ran a light and entertaining piece on this fact. The article was later photocopied and distributed to all interested parties.

The BRS Board of Directors then held the first part of its Annual Meeting for the remainder of the evening (see notes above).

Stefan Andersson began the program Saturday morning with the paper "Is Russell a Mystic?". Jose Idler then gave a paper entitled "The Human Project in Bertrand Russell" (This paper won the 1999 Prize for a paper by a graduate student). John Lenz chaired this session. Peter Stone chaired the next session which contained a presentation by John Shosky on A.J. Ayer entitled "Hamlet's Horatio" and a paper by Ray Perkins called "Russell's Preventive War Phase." During his presentation Shosky invited all BRS members to attend a conference on Russell and Wittgenstein to be held at American University on March 25-26, 2000. He thanked David Rodier for helping to make this conference possible.

After lunch, the program continued with a session chaired by Alan Schwerin. The two papers in this session were by David Rodier ("Russell's Reading of Plato's Theaetetus") and Tim Madigan ("Russell's Evasion of Evolution"). The next session, chaired by Ken Blackwell, featured Keith Green's "It Means 'All Ravens are Black': Russell Against Ordinary Language Philosophy" and Henrique Ribeiro's "The Present Relevance of Bertrand Russell's Criticism of Logical Positivism."

After some free time, the BRS held its Red Hackle Hour (sans Red Hackle) and banquet. Entertainment at the banquet was provided by Trevor Banks and his talk "The Lord of Laughter: Russell's Triumph Over Solitude and Solemnity."

On Sunday morning, the program continued with Steven Bayne's paper, "The Problem of Asserted vs. Unasserted Propositions for 'General Philosophy' and Alan Schwerin's "Russell on Vagueness." Keith Green chaired the session. In the course of his talk, Schwerin indicated that he had joined the three Poles and three Texans who had read (or at least, looked at every page of) *Principia Mathematica*. He is looking for references to "vagueness" in *Principia*, and has not found any. He will give a bounty of ten dollars to the first person who can find such a reference (Ray Perkins won: the reference is on page 12). Ken Blackwell then doubled the bounty, offering a like amount for every joke found within the book (Gerry Wilderberg suggested that one likely joke would be any sentence starting with "The reader who has followed me up to this point...").

There followed three more sessions, designed to accommodate the large number of papers without requiring double sessions. First, Ken Blackwell spoke on "New Works in Russell Studies." Then Russell Dale discussed "Bertrand Russell and the Theory of Meaning," and Samantha Pogorelsky talked about "Reflections on the Self." The program continued with Santiago Zorzopulos speaking on "Russell and Wittgenstein" and Chris Lubbers presentation "On Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument in 'On Denoting.'" This final session ended with Gary Ostertag's "Russell and the Anxiety of Influence: The Case of E.E. Constance Jones." Stefan Andersson chaired the first session, while Alan Schwerin chaired the next two.

There followed the Society's Business Meeting, which blended into the continuation of the meeting of the Board of Directors (see above). The meeting ended with a delicious barbecue at the home of Alan and Helen Schwerin.

**BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
TREASURER'S REPORT
CASH FLOW REPORT
JANUARY 1, 2000-MARCH 31, 2000
SUBMITTED BY DENNIS DARLAND**

BALANCE ON DECEMBER 31, 1999 \$5,994.04

INFLOWS

Contributions, BRS:
110.00

Totals 110.00

Dues:

New Members 190.00
Renewals 1,729.00

Total Dues 1,919.00
Library Inc 24.40

Total Inflows 2,053.40

OUTFLOWS

Bank Charges 3.18
Newsletter 24.77
Russell Sub 1,886.00

Total Outflows 1,913.95

Overall Total 139.45

BALANCE ON MARCH 31, 2000 6,133.49

**BOOK REVIEW:
ANTONY FLEW'S *HOW TO THINK STRAIGHT*
BY
SANTIAGO ZORZOPULOS
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

"Many people would sooner die than think. In fact they do" Bertrand Russell

Antony Flew, How to Think Straight, Prometheus Press, 1998. Much has changed in the last 100 years. The world has modernized a great deal. Most people in industrialized nations now enjoy high standards of living and free education. The progressive democratization of the world has created a relatively stable political structure, both here and in other nations. Gone are the days in some places when physical force is used as the primary means of persuasion. The medieval monarch's swords have given way to the power of the written and spoken word.

Despite all of these liberalizing changes, many people today are unequipped to deal

with the kind of mental warfare which is used to establish social goals or policies. A host of blunt intellectual weapons have found their way into the arsenals of various demagogues, political figures, and businessmen. Improper argumentation is so prevalent in social life that even some philosophers have given up trying to change it, proclaiming that there is no such thing as truth, much as the Sophists did in ancient Athens. At least, they say, not the kind of truth that philosophers typically seek, a truth that is trans-social and isn't used simply as a political weapon. In this bleak situation, where various schools of skeptical philosophy, such as Deconstructionism or Structuralism, seem to be entrenched, enters a real McCoy philosopher, Antony Flew, with his newly revised book *How to Think Straight*, the successor to *Thinking Straight* (in the UK the title was *Thinking About Thinking*).

Flew has made a successful career in philosophy by asking for a little common sense in philosophy. He attempts to provide a book of basic inductive logic, simple enough for any adult reader to understand, which shows us how to evaluate arguments.

The book is neatly divided into eight chapters, with each chapter progressively building on the concepts introduced in the preceding one. Along with this layout, the various paragraphs have been numbered for easy reference. With his characteristic clarity, Flew brings to life the concepts of validity in arguments and truth of propositions.

As a textbook, *How to Think Straight* works well. Without going into the more difficult concepts of propositional logic, Flew presents the basic elements of logical arguments. He uses entertaining examples and current references. In an example which describes the concept of logically necessary conditions, he writes "Many of us, however, must have known marriages of which it would have been fair, though unseemly, to comment 'Well, I suppose marriage is a logically necessary precondition of divorce.'"

Flew analyzes evasion, falsification, motives, grounds of evidence, proper understanding of statistics, and a host of fallacies. He provides a much-needed grounding for any student of philosophy, or indeed anyone who wishes to be properly equipped mentally. The themes are often driven home by supporting quotations or analysis of philosophers, poets, politicians, scientists, and others. Flew provides a strenuous, successful mental workout.

While many of Flew's examples are political in nature, one ought not to be turned off this book for that reason. What Flew has done is provide the common public ground from which debates can take place. From then on, the truth of a proposition and the validity of the argument will be our guides. As Socrates said,

"We must follow the argument wherever it leads."

MEMBERSHIP PROFILES

Yves Fournier

Address: 100 Rowena Drive, #620, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada M3A 1P9

First Book of Russell's I Read:

Why I Am Not a Christian

Last Book of Russell's I Read:

A History of Western Philosophy

Favorite Russell Quotation:

"The good life is one inspired by love and
guided by knowledge."

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

1) To become more aware of the world of
philosophy, and, 2) To participate in the real
world of philosophy.

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

1) Broader, more critical perspective on
Christianity, and, 2) Learning more science and
modern logic

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
MEMBERSHIP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

John Shosky
Editor, *BRS Quarterly*
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

NAME:

ADDRESS:

First book of Russell's I read:

Last book of Russell's I read:

Favorite Russell Quotation:

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

Additional Comments: _____

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

PO Box 434
Wilder, Vermont 05088-0434

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| Chair | Kenneth Blackwell |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Jan Loeb Eisler |
| Secretary | Peter Stone |
| Treasurer | Dennis Darland |

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY ON THE NET

The Bertrand Russell Society Home Page

<http://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly

<http://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/qily.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Annual Book Award

<http://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/bkaward.html>

The Russell Archives' home page is at:

<http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.html>

Russell Society News

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<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlentz/brs.html>

No. 102. May 2000

Highlights of the 2000 annual meeting



Rapt attention for David White's "Russell on the Web". For the text and more photos visit www.monmouth.edu/brs. (Photo by Alan Schwerin)

Minutes of the meeting

by Peter Stone, Secretary, BRS

The Bertrand Russell Society held its annual meeting at Monmouth University, West Long Beach, New Jersey, on June 2-4, 2000. Alan Schwerin presided. Peter Stone took notes. BRS members present were Stefan Andersson, Mary Martin Bayne, Steve Bayne, Ken Blackwell, Alan Bock, Pat Bock, Edgar Boedeker, Rosalind Carey, Dennis Darland, Peter Friedman, Dave Goldman, Nick Griffin, David Henehan, Steve Maragides, Ed McClenathan, Rachel Murray, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, Cara Rice, Alan Schwerin, John Shosky, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich, David White, Gerry Wildenberg, and Ruili Ye. Non-members present were Mark Couch, Jon Dobbs, Burdett Gardner, Bonnie Gold, Rom Harré, Boris Kukso, Nancy McClenathan, Kris Oser, David Payne, Karen Perkins, Samantha Pogorelsky, David Repa, Helen Schwerin, and Ken Stunkel.

Back to the RSN

by Ken Blackwell, Chairman, BRS, and Interim Editor

Oldtimers will recognize the "new" title of *The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*. For its first 21½ years, under the editorships of Lee Eisler and Don Jackanicz, it was called the *Russell Society News*. The Board of Directors decided to make it a newsletter again. Send me short contributions of any kind c/o Russell Research Centre, McMaster U., Hamilton, Ont., L8S 4M2.

Last call to renew for 2000

This is the last issue to be sent to members who haven't renewed for 2000. To renew, send your payment (made out to The Bertrand Russell Society) to Dennis Darland, BRS Treasurer, 1406 26 St., Rock Island, Ill. 61201-6837. Renewals will be acknowledged. If you're unsure whether you've renewed this year, check the line with your name the envelope. "/1999" means you're in arrears. Regular membership is \$35, students \$20.

On Friday night, President and conference organizer Alan Schwerin welcomed everyone present. He then chaired a brief business meeting, at which various officers, committee chairs, and members made reports. Schwerin reported on efforts to secure and **expand the BRS's presence at APA meetings**. Peter Stone, Chair of the BRS Awards Committee, announced that **the 2000 Annual Award had been given to Stephen Jay Gould**. Gould is Alexander Agassiz Professor of Zoology and Professor of Geology at Harvard, Curator of Invertebrate Paleontology in the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology, and adjunct member of the History of Science dept. He is best known for his extensive writings on scientific issues for a general audience, in the best Russellian tradition. Ray Perkins, Chair of the Book Awards Committee, announced that **the 2000 Annual Book Award had been given to Charles Pigden for his anthology *Russell on Ethics***. Pigden is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and the author of numerous articles on ethics and metaethics. Alan Schwerin gave a brief tribute to Trevor Banks, a longtime member of the BRS who passed away shortly after

the 1999 annual meeting. Banks was well known in the Society and in broader humanist and philosophical circles for his excellent "one-man show" as Bertrand Russell. Ken Blackwell urged members present to pay their dues for the year, and non-members to consider joining. He also encouraged members to vote in the elections for the Board of Directors and to attend the Board meeting on Saturday.

Alan Schwerin then led an open discussion on Russell's views on religion. To focus the discussion, Schwerin played an excerpt from the famous debate on religion between Russell and Father Copleston. The lively discussion lasted quite late.

Stefan Andersson again led off the program Saturday morning with the paper "**Russell on Mysticism (Part II)**." Alan Schwerin chaired this session. Rosalind Carey chaired the second session, which featured a paper by Mark Couch on "**Russell's Criticism of Moore's Proof**." Steve Bayne then gave a paper on "**Russell and those 'Other' Mathematicians**," followed by David White's presentation "**Russell on the Web**." Boris Kukso and Chad Trainer chaired these two sessions, respectively.

At this point, the meeting broke for lunch. The Board of Directors held a lunchtime meeting (see the Board minutes).

After lunch, Boris Kukso presented a paper entitled "**Russell's Logical Atomism and Armstrong's Philosophy of States of Affairs**." Thom Weidlich chaired Kukso's presentation. Rosalind Carey spoke on "**Russell's Working Notes on Propositions Appended to *Theory of Knowledge***" in a session chaired by Alan Schwerin. Nick Griffin chaired Edgar Boedeker's paper presentation, on "**The Hidden Influence of Russell's Theory of Substitution on Wittgenstein's N-operator**." And Chad Trainer capped off the afternoon with his paper "**Language: A Leading or Lagging Indicator of Truth for Russell?**" Peter Stone chaired this session. After some free time, the BRS held its Red Hackle Hour (with *real* Red Hackle, courtesy of Don Jackanicz) and banquet.

Rom Harré began the Sunday morning session with a talk on "**Reference Revisited**," chaired by Alan Schwerin. John Shosky then spoke on "**Russell and Quine**" in a session chaired by David White. Rosalind Carey then chaired Ken Stunkel's talk "**Russell on History**." Thom Weidlich followed with "**On Russell's Sexual Revolution**," followed by Nick Griffin's "**Russell's Logicism If Not If-Thenism**," which concluded the Sunday morning session. Mark Couch and Stefan Andersson, respectively, chaired the last two sessions.

The meeting ended with a short Society business meeting presided over by Alan Schwerin and then Ken Blackwell. At this meeting, Treasurer Dennis Darland presented **annual treasury and membership reports**. The entire gathering also offered a strong show of thanks to Alan and Helen Schwerin for their excellent work organizing the meeting; for the **BRS banner** they made to hang at the meeting (and which will travel to the 2001 meeting next year); for the extremely useful **bell** used to ensure sessions started on time; and last but not least for the excellent **barbecue** which was to (and did) follow the conclusion of the Sunday morning session.

Board minutes

by Peter Stone, Secretary, BRS

The BRS Board of Directors held its annual meeting on Saturday June 3, 2000, in conjunction with the BRS Annual Meeting at Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey. Ken Blackwell chaired. Peter Stone took notes. Directors present were Stefan Andersson, Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Thom Weidlich, and Ruili Ye. Also present were candidates for the Board Steve Bayne, Nick Griffin, Peter Stone, and David White. Due to a delay in the balloting for Board positions, the status of these 4 candidates had not yet been determined. The officers of the Society therefore agreed to count these 4 candidates as interim Board members, and allow them to vote at the Board meeting. Steve Bayne participated in the discussions but did not wish to take part in any votes. This left 12 voting directors, seated and acting. The meeting was also attended by a number of other BRS members, including Peter Friedman, Steve Maragides, and Rachel Murray.

Thom Weidlich moved to waive a reading of the minutes from the last Board meeting and to approve them. He pointed out that the minutes had appeared in the last issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* for anyone wishing to see them, and commended Peter Stone for his work. Ray Perkins seconded, and the Board approved the motion unanimously.

The Board then held elections for Board and Society Officers. The following officers were elected:

President—Alan Schwerin (nominated by Perkins, seconded by Smith, unanimous vote)

Secretary of the Society and Board—Peter Stone (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Andersson, unanimous vote)

Treasurer—Dennis Darland (nominated by Stone, seconded by Andersson, unanimous vote)

Vice-President—Tim Madigan (nominated by Smith, seconded by Schwerin. Also nominated was Jan Loeb Eisler, nominated by Perkins, seconded by Weidlich. Madigan received 7 votes to Eisler's 2, with 3 abstentions).

Chairman of the Board—Ken Blackwell (nominated by Weidlich, seconded by Andersson, unanimous vote)

In addition, Alan Schwerin moved that the Board create the position **Vice-President for Humanist Outreach**, and appoint Jan Loeb Eisler to this position. Dennis Darland seconded, and the motion carried 10-0, with 2 abstentions.

The Board then took up the question of the **location for the 2001 Annual Meeting** of the BRS. Nick Griffin proposed McMaster University. He explained that the university was in the process of setting up a Bertrand Russell Research Centre, which would incorporate the *Collected Papers* editorial project, the journal *Russell*, and other neat stuff. Holding a BRS meeting there—on what would be approximately the

first anniversary of the new center—would help cement relations between the various Russell-related groups and projects.

Alan Schwerin seconded Griffin's proposal. Steve Reinhardt pointed out that the location would allow both East and West Coast members the chance to attend, without the logistical difficulties involved in setting up a West Coast meeting.

Alan Schwerin and Steve Maragides suggested the BRS consider Pugwash, Nova Scotia, site of the famous first few Pugwash meetings organized by Russell. Maragides realized this location might constitute a hard sell to the BRS. The town is in a remote rural area; the nearest airport is in Halifax, and travel from there to the town involves extensive driving over rural roads. However, the town does pride itself on its intellectual life; it is known as the "home of the thinkers," and its mascot is Rodin's famous statue of that name. Maragides believes the town might be very accommodating and helpful if the BRS inquired about setting up a meeting there.

Ken Blackwell thought a Pugwash meeting might be worth exploring, one that might be the start of a pattern of meetings at Russell-related sites. Such sites might include Phoenixville, PA (where Russell lived from 1941 to 1943 and near Merion, home of the Barnes Foundation, where Russell taught in 1941-2) and possibly Pembroke Lodge (where Russell spent his childhood), although the latter could pose even more formidable difficulties than Pugwash. Steve Bayne concurred that establishing such connections with sites associated with Russell was important for the Society. But Blackwell was also concerned about the BRS's continuing neglect of the West Coast. Thom Weidlich agreed, although he has favored the idea of Pembroke Lodge for some time.

Peter Stone proposed amending the motion to meet at McMaster University in 2001. The amendment would direct the President to **write to each of the BRS members currently residing in California**, and attempt to solicit some of these members to organize the 2002 meeting on the West Coast. Nick Griffin accepted this amendment, and the motion carried unanimously.

Next meeting to be at McMaster

Home of the Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University will be the site of the next annual meeting. Our host will be the newly formed Bertrand Russell Research Centre, directed by Board member Nick Griffin. The dates are May 25-27, 2001.



The next item on the Board agenda concerned the Society's continued registration as a nonprofit corporation. Dennis Darland proposed taking over the registration from Don

Jackanicz, who has asked the BRS to find someone else to handle the responsibilities. Darland lives in Illinois, where Jackanicz also lives and the BRS is registered. By taking over the registration, Darland can save the BRS the hassle of either reincorporating in another state or of finding a paid agent to maintain registration in Illinois. He already has the necessary paperwork for the job. Nick Griffin moved that **Darland be made the registered agent for the BRS**, Peter Stone seconded, and the motion carried 11-0, with 1 abstention. In addition, Stone will write to Jackanicz, requesting that he send Darland all relevant records and thanking him for maintaining the registration for so long (as well as for the Red Hackle that he provided for the meeting).

The Board then began a long discussion of the status of the *BRS Quarterly* (hereafter *Q.*). Ken Blackwell explained that the *Q.*'s haphazard publication has caused difficulties for Society business; the most recent Board elections have not yet been completed due to the tardiness of the issue containing the ballots. Blackwell suggested that the BRS needed either more reliable production of the *Q.* or else a different method for distributing ballots.

Alan Schwerin proposed dropping the *Q.* completely. He observed that no one seemed willing or able to do the work necessary to produce it on a timely basis. Ken Blackwell, however, pointed out that the Society's Bylaws specifically required that the BRS publish a regular newsletter. On a more practical note, Thom Weidlich pointed out that, for most BRS members, the *Q.* is the primary benefit of membership. Without it, there is little reason for most people to consider joining. He added, however, that the BRS employed a newsletter for many years before switching over to the *Q.*

Peter Friedman suggested the BRS consider a purely Web-based *Q.* Alan Schwerin, however, pointed out that many current members are not on the Web. Peter Stone added that regardless of format, there was still a need for an editor to publish the *Q.* on a regular basis.

Ken Blackwell suggested that the size and scale of the project may be what prevents regular publication; the most recent *Q.*, for example, ran 42 pages, not counting inserts for the Board elections. Steve Bayne concurred. Two possible solutions might include making the *Q.* biannual, and focusing the *Q.* on discussions by the various members. Thom Weidlich urged the Board to keep in mind that content, not cost, was the primary obstacle. Peter Stone objected, however, arguing that the content only lacked an editor willing to do the *Q.* on a regular basis.

David White proposed abandoning the *Q.*, and replacing it with a brief (1-2 page) newsletter. Substantial articles written by BRS members could then appear elsewhere—possibly (as Peter Friedman suggested) on the Web. Several Board members concurred with the general idea that this newsletter be made a less ambitious project than the current *Q.*, although some saw no need to carry this reduction to quite the extreme White proposed. Friedman suggested this newsletter could focus on news relating to Russell, news relating to the BRS, and miscellaneous "Russell lite" stuff.

Alan Schwerin formally moved that the Board retire the *Q* and replace it with a newsletter, effective immediately. Warren Allen Smith seconded. Peter Stone suggested that such a motion left uncertain the exact nature of the newsletter and, more importantly, who would edit it. Ray Perkins proposed maintaining the current *Q* until some of these points could be worked out. Ken Blackwell, however, pointed out that the *Q*'s current irregular publication caused the BRS to incur much extra worry and effort through the periodic mailings the late *Q* often made necessary. In the end, the Board voted 9-2, with 1 abstention, in favor of Schwerin's motion. Nick Griffin then proposed thanking John Shosky for his efforts in editing the *Q*. Alan Schwerin seconded; the motion carried unanimously.

Peter Stone requested an update on the status of the revised introductory trifold on the BRS. Thom Weidlich informed him that Tom Stanley, BRS librarian and director, is revising it.

The Board then took up the topic of the BRS's policy towards its annual award. Alan Schwerin expressed concern that no award recipient had attended the annual meeting to accept his or her award in person in many years (the last anyone could remember was Zero Population Growth, which sent a member to accept its award in 1995). He urged the BRS Awards Committee, when making award decisions, to take into account the likelihood that the recipient will accept the award in person. Steve Bayne added the additional concern that the award may not mean much to many of its recipients.

Nick Griffin, however, pointed out that the award traditionally goes to very eminent people, and higher eminence implies a lower probability of meeting attendance. Peter Stone added that age is also frequently a factor; a number of recipients, such as Karl Popper, W.V. Quine, and Irving Copi, have expressed great pleasure at receiving the award, but age precluded their acceptance in person. In the end, the Awards Committee—currently composed of Stone (chair), Blackwell, and Schwerin—agreed to try to balance eminence with probability of attendance. Steve Reinhardt added that, regardless of attendance, every award recipient should be strongly encouraged to provide the BRS with a brief statement, to be read at the meeting should the recipient be unable to attend.

The Board briefly considered the idea that the BRS advertise in philosophical journals. Such advertisements can apparently be very expensive; a full-page ad in *Philosophy Now* would cost 950 pounds. Peter Friedman and David White agreed to look into free advertising options that would reach segments of the philosophical community.

Peter Stone mentioned that the Greater Rochester Russell Set (an informal local chapter of the BRS based in Rochester, NY) had discussed a possible means of generating publicity for the Society. The group suggested that the BRS ask the Episcopal Diocese of New York City for an apology for its critical role in ousting Russell from his CUNY (formerly CCNY) teaching appointment. Thom Weidlich, author of a recent book on the CUNY case, wholeheartedly endorsed the idea. He agreed to ask an Episcopal priest living in New York City he knew about the idea. He will also look into a press release on the matter, as well as the possibility of a "Court of Public

Opinion" show on the CUNY case. Steve Reinhardt suggested that rather than an apology, the BRS more diplomatically ask the Diocese for a "clarification of its position" on the matter.

At the end of the meeting, Warren Allen Smith proposed that the BRS confer honorary membership on Ibn Warraq, pseudonymous author of *Why I Am Not a Muslim*. Ken Blackwell suggested postponing consideration of this proposal until Smith could present the Board with a brief statement in support of his nomination. Peter Stone added that this postponement could give the Board time to conclude its current elections and seat its newly elected members. Smith agreed to this suggestion.

Directors elected

The results of the election for the eight vacancies on the Board of Directors, held belatedly in June, were as follows. Steve Bayne, Jan Eisler, Keith Green, Nick Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja, and Peter Stone were all elected. David White's name was inadvertently omitted from the ballot, for which the Society apologizes not only to David but to all the membership. Thanks also to Jim Alouf and Bob Barnard for running.

What the minutes don't say: quotable quotes

by Peter Stone, Secretary, BRS

The following verbatim quotes arose in the course of the annual meeting. Warning: If you find yourself saying any of these lines, you've probably spent too much time doing philosophy. Do not attempt to return to the real world on your own; seek immediate medical attention.

"Presumably the same argument would apply to feet."

"I want to reserve the right to agree with you."

"Eat with Wittgenstein at your peril."

"That's my chapstick, not my laser pointer."

"My promise is indexed with my loose moral character."

"I might comment on the dog's breakfast."

"This is the radical contingency of sex."

This last quote was the last sentence uttered during the last paper session of the conference. Seems appropriate, eh?

BRS t-shirts for sale

Some snappy green or orange t-shirts remain from the A.M. The front has the Society's name, motto and a photo of Russell. The back has the famous quote: "Remember your humanity and forget the rest." To purchase a shirt, send \$13 (which includes \$3 shipping, but include \$2 more outside the U.S.) to Alan Schwerin, Philosophy & Political Science, Monmouth U., West Long Branch, NJ 07764. Payment should be made out to the BRS.

Russell Society News

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<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Nos. 103–104. August 2000

Board nominations close Dec. 4

8 vacancies to be filled for 2001–03

by Ken Blackwell, Chairman, BRS, and Interim Editor

The BRS has 24 directors, each for a term of three years. One third of the positions falls open each year. Nominate yourself or someone you respect by Dec. 4 by sending in his or her name to the Secretary of the Board and the Society, Peter Stone, Dept. of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, or by email to prse@troi.cc.rochester.edu. Nominations must be received by Dec. 4. Include a brief writeup (one or two paragraphs) to identify the candidate to the Society. The ballot will be mailed in the *RSN* dated November 2000.

There's usually only one meeting of the Board a year, and it takes place at the annual meeting (on May 25–27 in 2001, at McMaster). However, any three directors may request a Special Board Meeting to be held between annual meetings. A reason must be given, as well as a convenient time and place.

The directors whose terms are over at the end of 2000 are: Dennis Darland, Gladys Leithauser, John R. Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, Ruili Ye and myself.

The other directors are: For 1999–2001: Stefan Andersson, Derek Araujo, Kevin Brodie, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith and Thom Weidlich. For Jan. 1, 2000–Dec. 31, 2002: Steve Bayne, Jan Loeb Eisler, Keith Green, Nicholas Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja and Peter Stone.

BRS, Philippines
Two number problems
Philosophical uses of the Russell Archives, 1968–2000
Next annual meeting
Russell conference in Brazil
Honorary memberships

Treasurer's report

by Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer, BRS

The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow Report
7/1/00 through 9/30/00

| | | |
|---------------------|--------|------------|
| BALANCE 6/30/00 | | \$7,098.20 |
| INFLOWS | | |
| Contributions: | | |
| Contrib-BRS | 100.00 | |
| TOTAL Contributions | 100.00 | |
| Dues: | | |
| New Members | 125.00 | |
| Renewals | 385.00 | |
| TOTAL Dues | 510.00 | |
| Meeting Inc | -35.00 | |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 575.00 | |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| Advertising | 143.51 | |
| Newsletter | 263.39 | |
| Other Exp | 28.50 | |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 435.40 | |
| OVERALL TOTAL | | 139.60 |
| BALANCE 9/30/00 | | \$7,237.80 |

The BRS library

by Tom Stanley, Librarian, BRS

Founded in 1975, the collection is comprised of donations from members, publishers and broadcast organizations. The Society's book

Inside this *RSN*

Treasurer's report
The BRS Library
The Bertrand Russell Research Centre
BRRC exhibition bonus
BRS websites

sales program offers a selection of current and out-of-print titles at a discount. A lending library is available to Society members. Write to The Bertrand Russell Society Library, 98 Gillette Street, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05088.

The library's holdings are:

Bibliographies

Blackwell, K. and C. Spadoni *A Detailed Catalog of the Second Archives of Bertrand Russell*
 Denonn, L. *The Bertrand Russell Collection of Lester Denonn*
 Martin, W. *Bertrand Russell: A Bibliography of His Writings, 1895-1976*

Quotations

Denonn, L. *The Bertrand Russell Dictionary of Mind, Matter & Morals*
 Egner, R. *Bertrand Russell's Best*
 Eisler, L. *The Quotable Bertrand Russell*

Russell's Books

The ABC of Atoms
The ABC of Relativity
The Amberley Papers
The Analysis of Mind
The Art of Philosophizing & Other Essays
Authority and the Individual
The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind
Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare
The Conquest of Happiness
Education and the Social Order (Education and the Modern World)
On Education Especially in Early Childhood (Education and the Good Life)
Essays in Scepticism
Fact and Fiction
Freedom Versus Organization
Has Man a Future?
German Social Democracy
The Good Citizen's Alphabet
History of Western Philosophy
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits
Human Society in Ethics and Politics
Icarus or the Future of Science
The Impact of Science on Society
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
New Hopes for a Changing World
The Prospects of Industrial Civilization
In Praise of Idleness
Justice in Wartime
Marriage and Morals
Mysticism and Logic
My Philosophical Development
Nightmares of Eminent Persons
An Outline of Philosophy (Philosophy)
Philosophical Essays
Political Ideals
Portraits from Memory
Power: A New Social Analysis

The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (Bolshevism: Theory and Practice)
*Principia Mathematica to *56*
The Principles of Mathematics
Principles of Social Reconstruction (Why Men Fight)
The Problem of China
The Problems of Philosophy
Religion and Science
Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism (Proposed Roads to Freedom)
Satan in the Suburbs
Sceptical Essays
The Scientific Outlook
Unarmed Victory
Understanding History
Unpopular Essays
War Crimes in Vietnam
Which Way to Peace?
The Will to Doubt
Wisdom of the West
Why I am Not a Christian

Selections of Russell's Writings

Blackwell, K., et al. *Cambridge Essays 1888-99*
 Eames, R. and K. Blackwell. *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*
 Egner, R. and L. Denonn *The Basic Writings Of Bertrand Russell*
 Fienberg, B. and R. Kasrils *Bertrand Russell...A Selection of His Correspondence with the General Public 1950-1968.*
 Griffin, N. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 1*
 Marsh, R. *Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950*
 Pears, D. *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*
 Rempel, R., et al. *Contemplation and Action 1902-14*
 Rempel, R. *Prophecy and Dissent 1914-16*
 Ruja, H. *Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell's American Essays 1931-1935*
 Russell, B. *The Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell*
 Seckel, A. *Bertrand Russell on Ethics, Sex, and Marriage*
 Slater, J. *Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914-19*
 Slater, J. and B. Frohmann. *Essays on Language, Mind and Matter 1919-26*

Books about Russell

Aiken, L. *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals*
 Andersson, S. *In Quest of Certainty: Bertrand Russell's Search for Certainty in Religion and Mathematics*
 Ayer, A.J. *Russell*
 Blackwell, K. *The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell*
 Brink, A. *Bertrand Russell: The Psychobiography of a Moralist*
 Chomsky, N. *Problems of Knowledge: The Russell Lectures*
 Eames, R. *Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries*
 Garciadiego, A. *Bertrand Russell and the Origin of the 'Set-Theoretic' Paradoxes*
 Grattan-Guinness, I. *Dear Russell—Dear Jourdain*
 Griffin, N. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*
 Hager, P. *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy*
 Hill, C. *Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell*

- Hylton, P. *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*
 Ironside, P. *The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell*
 Irvine, A.D. and G. Wedeking *Russell and Analytic Philosophy*
 Jager, R. *The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*
 Jourdain, P. *The Philosophy of Mr. B*rr* and R*ss*ll*
 Kilmister, C.W. *Russell*
 Kuntz, P. *Bertrand Russell*
 Leithausen, G. *Principles and Perplexities: Studies of Dualism in Selected Fiction of Bertrand Russell*
 Lewis, J. *Bertrand Russell: Philosopher and Humanist*
 Meyer, S. *Dewey and Russell: An Exchange*
 Nath, R. *The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*
 Park, J. *Bertrand Russell on Education*
 Patterson, W. *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism*
 Pears, D.F. *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy*
 Rodriguez-Consuegra, F. *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*
 Vellacott, J. *Bertrand Russell and the Pacifists in the First World War*
 Weimer, D. *The Rhetorical Approach of Bertrand Russell: A Study in Method*

Miscellaneous

- Coates, K. *Essays on Socialist Humanism in Honor of the Centenary of Bertrand Russell*
 Klemke, E.D. *Essays on Bertrand Russell*
 Savage, C. and C. Anderson *Rereading Russell*
 Schilpp, P. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*
 Slater, J. *Bertrand Russell*
 Winchester, I. and K. Blackwell *Antinomies and Paradoxes*

Biographical works

- Clark, R. *The Life of Bertrand Russell*
 Clark, R. *Bertrand Russell and His World*
 Cooke, A. *Six Men*
 Crawshaw-Williams, R. *Russell Remembered*
 Darroch, S. *Ottoline: The Life of Lady Ottoline Morrell*
 Feinberg, B. and R. Kasrils *Bertrand Russell's America, 1945-1970*
 Gottschalk, H. *Bertrand Russell: A Life*
 Lamont, C. *Yes To Life: Memoirs of Corliss Lamont*
 Monk, R. *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*
 Moorehead, C. *Bertrand Russell: A Life*
 Russell, D. *The Tamarisk Tree: My Quest for Liberty and Love*
 Tait, K. *My Father Bertrand Russell*
 Wood, A. *Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic*

The Bertrand Russell Research Centre

by Nick Griffin

As many BRS members will already know, this past summer McMaster University set up The Bertrand Russell Research Centre to bring together and advance a number of Russellian enterprises on campus. First and foremost, the BRRC takes over the work of the Bertrand Russell Editorial Project, which has hitherto been responsible for editing *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. In addition, the Center now publishes the journal *Russell* and it is also the host of Russell-I.

The official opening of the Centre takes place on Thursday, 16 November. Ray Monk will be coming over from Britain for the opening. He will give a public lecture, "The Continuing Importance of Bertrand Russell", in Convocation Hall at 7.30 that evening, and another lecture the next day at 2 pm, again in Con. Hall. The second lecture will be on "A Room of One's Own: Wittgenstein and Virginia Woolf on Biography". It will make use of Wittgenstein's notion of what it is to understand another person.

The opening coincides with a major exhibition of Russell material at the McMaster Museum of Art. Among other art works, the exhibition will include the Epstein bust and the Augustus John drawing of Russell, as well as photographs, political cartoons, and other Russell memorabilia. There will be a viewing of the exhibition after Ray Monk's lecture.

BRS members are warmly invited to join us on the 16th of November to inaugurate the new Centre, to celebrate 30 years of Russell at McMaster, to hear Ray on why Russell is still important, and to see a collection of images and documents not previously exhibited together. Copies of the second volume of his biography of Russell will be available in the McMaster bookstore during his visit. The American edition will not be published until March 2001.

McMaster University is located in Hamilton, Ontario. Directions can be found at:
www.mcmaster.ca/welcome/findus.html

BRRC exhibition bonus

A beautiful brochure will be published to mark the exhibition of art and artifacts from the Bertrand Russell Archives that will be mounted in the McMaster Museum of Art. Carl Spadoni, Research Collections Librarian, is its chief editor. The exhibition will last until January 2001. Members of the BRS are due to be sent a copy, whether or not they attend the BRRC's opening.

BRS websites

The Russell Society has an official website at www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html, and it seems to be mirrored at sfr.ee.teiath.gr/htmlSELIDES/Russell/BR_Society.htm.

Alan Schwerin, BRS President, has a website for the past two annual meetings at www.monmouth.edu/~aschweri/brs/

Steve Bayne has one for his Boston Area Chapter: www.channel1.com/users/srbayne/BRS/russell.html

Tom Stanley has one for the BRS Library at www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268/

Finally, the Greater Rochester Russell Set, with several BRS members, has a most active and impressive web page at home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs. See especially webmaster David White's essay there, "Guide to Russell on the Web".

Among non-chapter member sites, Warren Allen Smith's at idt.net/~wasm/humanist.html is photogenic, quotes from Russell's letters to him, and reproduces his "Russellian Potpourri" column.

The BRS of Japan (not affiliated with The BRS, Inc.) has a charming web page at <http://www3.justnet.ne.jp/~e00859/R701.HTM>. This page includes full details, in Japanese, of its *Bulletin*, nos. 1–23 (1965–75). The webmaster is Akiyoshi Matsushita.

BRS, Philippines

by Ramon "Poch" Suzara

Thank you for writing to an ex-member, and to an ex-director, and to an ex-founder of the BRS, Philippines chapter. It's good to hear from Russellians out there. From 1988 to 1998, a chapter of the BRS existed in the Philippines. Aside from India, have chapters been established in other countries? And what has the BRS, USA done to support and encourage the birth, growth and development of such chapters overseas?

In 1964, when I set up the Philippine branch of the BR Peace Foundation, Russell himself and his directors, gave to us here in the Philippines a lot of support and encouragement. At that time I felt and still do feel that I must not only try to live the good life inspired by love and guided by knowledge, but I must also do everything in my power to spread the word to others.

In 1987, I set up the Philippine chapter of the BRS. I regretted to have received neither support nor encouragement from BRS directors out there? Yet the record shows that I contributed much to the BRS since I joined from San Francisco since 1983.....

[The above extract is from a letter dated Oct. 22, 2000. We're going to try to work things out with Mr. Suzara, who is a devoted freethinking Russellian.]

Two number problems

The issue number of the *RSN* should have changed last time, but it didn't; thus the catch-up this time. Our apologies!

The other number is more serious. The BRS suffered a net loss of about 30 members this year, after a net loss last year of about 20 and 15 the previous year. I have requested a Special Board Meeting on the problem during the opening of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre on Nov. 16.

Philosophical uses of the Russell Archives, 1968–2000

by Ken Blackwell

(The following was a talk in the "Bertrand Russell at McMaster" session of the meeting on October 27–29 of the Ontario Philosophical Society hosted at McMaster.)

First, a little pre-history. Russell himself wasn't the first user of his own philosophical papers, though he contributed to their use. As early as 1916, he must have donated his letters from the logician Louis Couturat to Xavier Léon's project to collect his papers. In the mid-1930s, he gave Heinrich Scholz, in Nazi Germany, his even more precious Frege letters. The latter were destroyed in World War II, but Russell had photostats to replace them. Both donations have been in use for some time. In the next decade Russell went through his remaining correspondence and designated and annotated some of it as "shop" for eventual publication. Alan Wood, Russell's first biographer, was the first to use Russell's papers for philosophical research. For his biography he commented that it's necessary to read every word that Russell wrote, and for his book on Russell's philosophy he estimated the number of words at 20,000,000. He even borrowed Russell's graduate essays for study (now you can read them in Vol. 1 of the *Collected Papers*). Unfortunately, Wood became incurably ill before he got very far in writing *Russell's Philosophy: a Study of Its Development*.

Russell published Wood's literary remains at the end of *My Philosophical Development* in 1959. Wood was not a professional philosopher, and while Russell prized and blessed the massive enterprise Wood undertook, the results might not have been as impressive as, say, Ronald Jager's would have been, had he had the same access to private material. Jager's *The Development of Russell's Philosophy* (1972) and Sainsbury's *Russell* (1979) were the last attempts at a single-author approach. Russell himself described that approach in *A History of Western Philosophy*:

“If there is any unity in the movement of history, if there is any intimate relation between what goes before and what comes later, it is necessary, for setting this forth, that earlier and later periods should be synthesized in a single mind.” (*HWP*, 1946 edition, p. 5)

Jager paid the Russell Archives an early visit but used neither the recent bibliographical discoveries nor Russell’s manuscripts. Whether it is even possible for such a work to be written by one person now, I don’t know. Certainly the episodic philosophical pages in Vol. 2 of Ray Monk’s biography of Russell don’t reach this ideal, even though his work is supposed to contain as much philosophy as is necessary to understand the life of a philosopher (1: xviii). Monk has two pages on *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, of which one is devoted to Russell’s notion that what we see is in our heads. This hypothesis about percepts, however, isn’t a concern of the *Inquiry*. Monk has three pages on *Human Knowledge*, of which one is on Norman Malcolm’s review. However, Monk earlier has a page on Russell’s project to investigate what he called the postulates of human knowledge and a valuable chapter on Russell’s return to philosophy in 1935.

The arrival of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster made available for unrestricted scholarly study a large number of new documents, some of them in manuscript form, some published in obscure journals. Brand Blanshard was the keynote speaker at the official opening on November 9, 1968. His beautifully written, highly competent and comprehensive paper, “Bertrand Russell in Retrospect”, appeared the next year in *Dialogue* (7 [1969]: 584–607). He surveyed Russell’s philosophies for five aspects: the relations of percepts and things, of body and mind, of universals and particulars, and of words and ideas; and contrary to his plan he added a sixth topic, religion. Blanshard showed that he was a close follower of Russell’s publications. In the last section he quoted Russell’s just-published letter to *The Humanist* on rumours that he was soon to convert to Christianity. (In a year and a half Russell would be dead.) Blanshard also told the story of his visit to Russell in Pennsylvania about 1942. It took me until this year, in the company of BRSers Chad Trainer, Stefan Andersson and Nick Griffin, to make the same visit. We saw that Russell must have chosen to live at Little Datchet Farm for the “wide horizon” it afforded him. Russell was always keen on wide horizons.

As soon as Professor Blanshard returned home, he sent us the manuscript of Moore’s “Russell’s Theory of Descriptions”, which, after writing it for the Schilpp volume on Russell, Moore had given to Blanshard. The manuscript was the first gift to the Archives of original secondary material. Three years later Mrs. Moore gave us a photocopy of Moore’s unpublished review of *The Principles of Mathematics*, which is still unpublished.

In my own opening speech I said:

“The Archive’s relevance to philosophers lies, I think, in helping to show how he came to some of his more difficult notions. By tracing an idea through every possible form preceding its publication, that is, through annotated texts and notes on texts, lecture notes, unpublished articles or books,

correspondence, and the manuscripts of published articles and books, we may be able to understand how Russell came to certain notions that at first strike one as incredible, or insufficiently argued. It is McMaster’s responsibility and privilege to provide the best possible conditions for such studies of these documents.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 614–15)

On archival tools I said:

“After the microfilming we plan to describe each letter to a computer. Eventually it will be able to produce upon demand a list of all the letters, say, on the philosophy of pragmatism, or on a specific chapter of *Principia*. But this subject indexing is still far in the future.” (P. 614)

To update this 32 years later, I can say that about two-thirds (or 63,000 items) of Russell’s correspondence have been computer-catalogued in BRACERS (the Bertrand Russell Archives Catalogue Entry and Retrieval System). Unfortunately, that project has been suspended. Its development lies dormant, despite significant use of its database. I manage to make a few corrections in my retirement. We have also made and published several non-electronic catalogues and (with Harry Ruja) a three-volume bibliography.

The influence of the Russell Archives on the provision of scholarly editions of Russell’s books has been slow—very slow. There *are* no scholarly editions of any of Russell’s published books. Typos even remain in some of them. Nick points out one in *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* in the current issue of *Russell*. Opportunities for scholarly editions are passed over, as e.g. in Routledge’s recent resetting of type for *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*. *The Problems of Philosophy* is an in-between case. Russell revised it slightly over the years (1912–67), but we don’t know what those revisions were. There are five editions in print at present, and a text is available at more than one site on the Internet (along with four other books by Russell). Two of the editions of the *Problems* have new Introductions and additional bibliographies, although neither Introduction leads the student to the Russell Archives. My favourite current edition is one of two Oxford University Press editions, the U.K. one with John Skorupski’s Introduction and which includes Russell’s preface to the 1924 German translation. However, the *Collected Papers* project has now published seven of Russell’s eight unpublished books, which include:

An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning (1898)
On the Principles of Mathematics (1898)
The Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics (1899)
Principles of Mathematics (1899–1900)
The Pilgrimage of Life (1902–03)
The Perplexities of John Forstice (1912)
Theory of Knowledge (1913)

The eighth title is *The Problems of Democracy*, written in 1942. Apart from *Theory of Knowledge*, these texts are just starting to have an effect on scholarship. As for shorter writings, Lackey included some important unpublished

articles in his *Essays in Analysis*, and now we have 14 volumes of the *Collected Papers*, with only one of the philosophical and logical volumes to be completed. This project arose out of the Archives in 1969. McMaster's president proposed it to Russell himself. There are also philosophical texts in the two volumes of the *Selected Letters*, including some "shop" letters, with the second volume to join us soon.

There have been about two dozen philosophical books on Russell since his death, such as those by Eames (who made extensive use of correspondence and manuscripts), Ryan, Crawshaw-Williams, Kuntz, Pears, Jager, Sainsbury, Landini, Rodriguez, Odell, Slater, Grayling, Griffin, Hager, Watling, Kilmister, Chomsky, Grattan-Guinness (who provided new texts), Patterson (who provided an old-style commentary on *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*), several French authors, and myself. About one quarter of them make use of archival material, if we include new bibliographical discoveries. Theses—of which over a dozen have been done at McMaster—are more likely to be based on new material, since graduate students, when they're not already here, are encouraged to find new materials. Of course, our purpose with the *Collected Papers* is to bring the Russell papers to your own libraries so that you can study reliable, annotated texts without additional bother.

Let's turn to the anthologies of articles on Russell, including proceedings. There are six—those edited by Schilpp, Schoenman, Klemke, Pears, Nakhnikian, and Roberts—that were unaffected by the availability of the Archives. Some, of course, were published too early to be possibly affected. There are now more than that number that *are* affected by the Archives: those by John E. Thomas and myself, Spadoni and Moran, Winchester and myself, Savage and Anderson, Irvine and Wedeking, Monk and Palmer, and Griffin's forthcoming *Cambridge Companion*. In addition, there are a few issues of periodicals devoted wholly to Russell and partly affected by new material. There are also anthologies devoted to ideas or issues arising out of Russell's thought and life. They—even Ostertag's *Definite Descriptions: a Reader*—don't use archival or new bibliographical material.

Then there is Routledge's *Russell on ...* series, edited by Anthony Grayling. This is very promising. These volumes cannot help but be dependent on the fruits of the Archives, and the first two are: Pigden doing Russell on ethics, and Greenspan and Andersson doing Russell on religion.

Finally, Irvine's four-volume collection of *Critical Assessments* comprises about one-third published from before the opening of the Russell Archives, and two-thirds after. Many of the latter were selected from *Russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives* (now subtitled *the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies*). The proportion that was influenced by the study of our documents is unknown. In addition, Irvine has a select secondary bibliography of some 1200 items on Russell. Many of the more recent ones used the *Collected Papers* or the Archives directly.

Obviously, the task attempted by Jager and Sainsbury has become much more difficult since the Russell Archives opened,

and we will see many more, necessary studies like O'Briant's on *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* for every large one "synthesized in a single mind". More than ever, however, the large studies are worth doing.

Next annual meeting to be at McMaster

Home of the Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University will be the site of the next annual meeting. Our host will be the newly formed Bertrand Russell Research Centre, directed by Board member Nick Griffin. The dates are May 25–27, 2001.



Russell conference in Brazil

The NEL Epistemology and Logic Research Group's Second Principia International Symposium, "THE WORKS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL", will be held August 6–10th, 2001, at Florianopolis (Santa Catarina), Brazil. For more, visit www.cfh.ufsc.br/~nel/spis.html.

Honorary memberships in the BRS

Two new candidates for honorary membership are being voted on by the Board of Directors. The results will be in the next *RSN*. The complete list—including deceased honorary members—is at www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/BRS_Officers.html. We have 13 at present.

Our By-law (Art.5, sec. 7) for honorary membership requires that a candidate meet one of the following criteria:

1. is a member of BR's family;
2. had worked closely with BR in an important way;
3. has made a distinctive contribution to BR scholarship;
4. has acted in support of a cause or idea that BR championed;
5. has promoted awareness of BR or of BR's work;
6. has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of BR.

Two thirds of the Directors voting have to be in favour of a given candidate.

Honorary members have the same rights and responsibilities as regular members, but they pay no dues.

Russell Society News

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<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

No. 105. November 2000

It's time to renew. Vote by Feb. 23

Renewal time

It's time has come to renew your BRS membership for 2001. The renewal rates, which are unchanged, are:

Individual US\$35
Couple \$40
Student \$20
Limited Income Individual \$20
Limited Income Couple \$25
Organization Membership \$50

"Contributor" \$50+
"Sustainer" \$75+
"Patron" \$250+
"Sponsor" \$100+
"Benefactor" \$500+
"Life Member" \$1,000+

Life members are Dennis Darland, Don Jackanicz, Jim Reid and Charles Weyand.

Send your cheque (made out to the Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.) to the BRS Treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26 St., Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA.

The other 16 directors are: For 1999–2001: Stefan Andersson, Derek Araujo, Kevin Brodie, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith and Thom Weidlich. For Jan. 1, 2000–Dec. 31, 2002: Steve Bayne, Jan Loeb Eisler, Keith Green, Nicholas Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja and Peter Stone.

Inside this RSN

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8 Board vacancies for 2001–03

by Ken Blackwell, Chairman, BRS, and Interim Editor

There are 15 candidates for the 8 vacant directorships. On page 4, select up to 8 candidates. Ballots must be received by Feb. 23.

A director's job isn't onerous, but there's room for a great deal of improvement in the Society. There's usually only one meeting of the Board a year, and it takes place at the annual meeting (on May 25–27 in 2001, at McMaster).

Treasurer's reports

by Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer, BRS

The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
Treasurer's Report

QUARTERLY CASH FLOW REPORT
10/1/00 through 12/31/00

| | |
|-----------------|------------|
| BALANCE 9/30/00 | \$7,237.80 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions: | |
| Contrib-BRS | 30.00 |

| | | |
|---------------------|--------|------------|
| TOTAL Contributions | 30.00 | |
| Dues: | | |
| New Members | 75.00 | |
| Renewals | 744.00 | |
| TOTAL Dues | | 819.00 |
| Other Inc | | 104.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | | 953.00 |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| Newsletter | 182.91 | |
| Other Exp | 69.66 | |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | | 252.57 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | | 700.43 |
| BALANCE 12/31/00 | | \$7,938.23 |

ANNUAL CASH FLOW REPORT 1/1/00 through 12/31/00

| | | |
|---------------------|----------|------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/99 | | \$5,994.04 |
| INFLOWS | | |
| Contributions: | | |
| Contrib-BRS | 450.00 | |
| TOTAL Contributions | 450.00 | |
| Dues: | | |
| New Members | 715.14 | |
| Renewals | 3,764.00 | |
| TOTAL Dues | | 4,479.14 |
| Library Inc. | | 24.40 |
| Meeting, Inc. | | 2,250.00 |
| Other Inc. | | 104.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | | 7,307.54 |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| Advertising | 143.51 | |
| Bank Chrg. | 3.86 | |
| Meeting Exp. | 2,755.75 | |
| Newsletter | 471.07 | |
| Other Exp | 103.16 | |
| Russell Subs. | 1,886.00 | |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | | 5,363.35 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | | 1,944.19 |
| BALANCE 12/31/00 | | \$7,938.23 |

Honorary memberships update

Nineteen of the 24 directors took part in the voting on two candidates for honorary membership last fall. Nelson Mandela and Ibn Warraq both received well in excess of the necessary two-thirds majority of those voting.

We are awaiting word on their acceptance of honorary membership in the BRS.

How to join BRS-list

by Ken Blackwell

Over one quarter of BRS members have joined the listserv BRS-list, maintained at McMaster University for the exclusive use of BRS members.

To join the list, visit mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list and fill out the form. Alternatively, for those without Web access, the list may be enjoyed entirely by email. Send the message

subscribe

to brs-list-request@mailman.McMaster.CA.

We believe this list to be private and secure. E.g., the only way in which your email address will become known to others on the list is if you provide it in any messages you send. The list is moderated by myself.

BRS websites

The Russell Society has an official website at www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html, and it seems to be mirrored at sfr.ce.teiath.gr/htmSELIDES/Russell/BR_Society.htm. Besides much else, the official website has a valuable page of links to writings by and about Russell on the Web. John Lenz maintains the site.

Alan Schwerin, BRS President, has a website for the annual meetings at www.monmouth.edu/~aschweri/brs/.

Steve Bayne has one for his Boston Area Chapter: www.channell.com/users/srbayne/BRS/russell.html

Tom Stanley has one for the BRS Library at www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268/

Finally, the Greater Rochester Russell Set, with several BRS members, has a most active and impressive web page at home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs

Annual meeting at McMaster

The Russell Society's 28th annual meeting will be held at McMaster University on May 25-27, 2001. The local sponsor is the Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Arrangements are well in hand. For the schedule and developing registration information, visit www.monmouth.edu/~aschweri/brs/

The registration fee is still being set. Accommodation on campus (breakfast included) has been arranged. Tours of the unique research facilities for Russell Studies will be offered.

Candidates for the vacant directorships

Compiled by Peter Stone

Here are the write-ups of this year's candidates. Select up to 8 and record your choices on the ballot that follows. If you don't vote by email to prse@troi.cc.rochester.edu, mail your ballot to Peter Stone, Secretary of the BRS, Dept. of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. To be counted, your ballot must be received by Friday, Feb. 23, 2001.

DONG-IN BAE

Dr. Dong-In Bae is a professor of sociology in Korea and a longtime member of the BRS.

KEN BLACKWELL

Ken Blackwell is Honorary Russell Archivist at McMaster University and an editor of the *Collected Papers*. He is a founding member of the BRS, a longtime Board member and Chairman of the Board since 1998.

DENNIS DARLAND

Dennis Darland graduated from Augustana College (Rock Island, IL) with a B.A. with majors in Mathematics, Physics, and Philosophy. Most of his life since then he has been employed as a Software Engineer, and pursued the above fields independently. In philosophy he has been particularly interested in Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Whitehead, and Dennett. He has served as both a Board member and as Society Treasurer for many years.

PETER FRIEDMAN

Peter Friedman has 26 years of experience with computers, working as a computer and website consultant. Bertrand Russell's is the most interesting life story he has ever encountered; Russell's writing, at its best, demonstrates what is for him the greatest command of the English language in all of modern nonfiction. He believes the BRS could and should reach out to a wider audience, and would like to help the Society achieve this aim.

DAVID GOLDMAN

A frequent attendee of Society meetings, David Goldman, a New York psychiatrist, is a longtime member.

HEIDI HELLER

A new member of the BRS, Heidi Heller is a law librarian in Philadelphia.

JOHN LENZ

John Lenz is Associate Professor and Chair of the Classics Dept. at Drew University in Madison, NJ. Currently he maintains the BRS website. He was BRS President from 1995-99, an officer since 1984, and founding director of the Prizes for Papers Program. He is very proud to have his own entry in *Who's Who in Hell* by Warren Allen Smith.

STEVE REINHARDT

Steve is the only BRS member to have attended every annual meeting to date. He's retired from the legal staff of Dupont. He is a longtime Board member, and has served as Treasurer and on the Society's Bylaws Revision Committee.

DAVID RODIER

David Rodier teaches philosophy at American University. He played a central role in organizing the March 2000 International Russell-Wittgenstein conference there. He was a student of Raphael Demos, who studied with Russell at Harvard. He is currently interested in Russell's philosophic development from 1911 to 1918; in Russell's understanding of the history of philosophy; and in Russell as a writer. As a director, he hopes to ensure that all aspects of BR's writings be included in the Society's ongoing projects.

TOM STANLEY

Tom Stanley has been the Society librarian since 1984 and a director since 1985. He and his wife operate Stanley Books, specializing in the fine arts.

LAURIE ENDICOTT THOMAS

Laurie Thomas is a peace and human rights activist who lives in New Jersey. She joined the Bertrand Russell Society partly to pursue her interests in logic and partly because of admiration for Russell's opposition to World War I and the Vietnam War. Although her day job involves turning bad writing into good writing for medical publications, she pretends that her opinions about Russell have not been unduly influenced by the high quality of his prose style. BRS members may remember Laurie's paper, "Bertrand Russell and the Liberal Media," which she presented at a BRS annual meeting several years ago.

CHAD TRAINER

Chad Trainer lives near Little Datchet Farm in Pennsylvania, where Russell lived in 1941-43 and on which Chad's researches have turned up more information. He gave a paper to the Society in 2000. He has a railroad job.

DAVID WHITE

David White studied Russell with Peter Klein at Colgate University in the late 1960's, and continued to work on Russell with Max Black and Norman Malcolm at Cornell University. White has used such works as *The Problems of Philosophy*, *Marriage and Morals* and *Why I Am Not a Christian* in classes at St. John Fisher College for over twenty years now. In addition to helping found the Greater Rochester Russell Set, a group that has conducted monthly public meetings on Russell, White has lectured on Russell at meetings of the Bertrand Russell Society and to other groups. As a board member, White would seek to expand the Society's membership, to encourage the study of Russell in high schools and colleges, and to support the formation of other local and regional chapters.

RUILI YE

Ruili Ye received a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the City University of New York (dissertation: "Belief, Names and Modes of Presentation: A First-Order Logic Formalization") and is currently an assistant professor at CUNY.

Ballot

The ballot can be marked for up to 8 candidates. If you mark more than 8, only the bottom 8 will be counted. Don't rank them. There is space for a write-in candidate. Sign the ballot and send the page (or a photocopy) to Peter Stone, Dept. of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 so that HE RECEIVES YOUR BALLOT no later than Friday, Feb. 23.

| Candidate | X |
|-----------------------|---|
| DONG-IN BAE | |
| KEN BLACKWELL | |
| DENNIS DARLAND | |
| PETER FRIEDMAN | |
| DAVID GOLDMAN | |
| HEIDI HELLER | |
| JOHN LENZ | |
| STEVE REINHARDT | |
| DAVID RODIER | |
| TOM STANLEY | |
| LURIE ENDICOTT THOMAS | |
| CHAD TRAINER | |
| DAVID WHITE | |
| RUILI YE | |
| | |
| | |

Russell Society News

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<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

No. 106. February 2001

Attend the Annual Meeting, May 25–7

Annual Meeting in a nutshell

It's time to declare your intention to attend the annual meeting, to be held this year at McMaster University. The A.M.'s presence at McMaster—the first since 1990—is being sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Besides the usual events of an A.M., this is your opportunity to tour the Bertrand Russell Archives and the Russell Research Centre.

This is the Society's 28th annual meeting. Previous meetings at McMaster were in 1978, 1981, 1983 and 1990. Arrive early and tour the facilities for Russell scholarship and view his many memorabilia.

While the Society has a Board of Directors that is elected by the membership, and while the Board elects the executive officers of the Society at the A.M., the Bylaws require full direct democracy at the Annual Meeting in respect to amending the Bylaws and considering any cases of expulsion of members. Any member of one year's standing and of 18 years of age may run for office in the Society. All offices will be open to qualified candidates.

8 Board vacancies filled for 2001–03

by Ken Blackwell, Chairman, BRS, and Interim Editor

The 14 candidates for the 8 vacant directorships were joined by one write-in candidate when the election was held. The ballots were counted Feb. 23 and by Secretary Peter Stone and recounted by member Dave Henchan the next day.

The winning candidates (in order of votes) for the 2001-03 term are: Ken Blackwell, David White, Dennis Darland, John Lenz, David Rodier, Laurie Endicott Thomas, Steve Reinhardt, Tom Stanley.

Many thanks to the following candidates who ran: Peter Friedman, Heidi Heller, Chad Trainer, Ruili Ye, Dong In-Bae, Dave Goldman, John Boland (write-in).

The other 16 directors are: For 1999–2001: Stefan Andersson, Derek Araujo, Kevin Brodie, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith and Thom Weidlich. For Jan. 1, 2000–Dec. 31, 2002: Steve Bayne, Jan Loeb Eisler, Keith Green, Nicholas Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja and Peter Stone.

As many as possible should attend the Board meeting at Annual Meeting.

Inside this *RSN*

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Time to renew memberships
Donors to the BRS
A.M. registration and accommodation
Registration form
Presentations at the A.M.
Schedule of events

Call for Papers at the A.M.

If you would like to present a paper at the forthcoming meeting of the BRS, please send an abstract of 150 words to the BRS President:

Alan Schwerin
Department of Political Science and Philosophy
Monmouth University
West Long Branch
NJ 07764

Phone: (732) 571-4470
Email: aschweri@monmouth.edu

Complete papers are due no later than May 1. The abstracts of the papers that have been accepted for the conference will be posted at <http://www.monmouth.edu/aschweri/brs2001.htm> along with the full text of the paper.

How to join BRS-list

by Ken Blackwell

Over one third of BRS members have joined the listserv BRS-list, maintained at McMaster University for the exclusive use of BRS members.

To join the list, visit mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list and fill out the form. Alternatively, for those without Web access, the list may be enjoyed entirely by email. Send the message

subscribe

to brs-list-request@mailman.McMaster.CA.

We believe this list to be private and secure. E.g., the only way in which your email address will become known to others on the list is if you provide it in any messages you send. The list is managed by myself.

BRS websites

The Russell Society has an official website at www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html, and it seems to be mirrored at sfr.ee.teiath.gr/htmlSELIDES/Russell/BR_Society.htm. Besides much else, the official website has a valuable page of links to writings by and about Russell on the Web. John Lenz maintains the site.

Alan Schwerin, BRS President, has a website for the annual meetings at www.monmouth.edu/~aschweri/brs/.

Steve Bayne has one for his Boston Area Chapter: www.channell.com/users/srbayne/BRS/russell.html

Tom Stanley has one for the BRS Library at www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268/

The Annual Meeting's website is <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~russell/brsmeeting.htm>.

Finally, the Greater Rochester Russell Set, with several BRS members, has a most active and impressive web page at home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs

Time for renewals

The time has come to renew your BRS membership for 2001. The renewal rates, which are unchanged, are:

Individual US\$35
Couple \$40
Student \$20
Limited Income Individual \$20
Limited Income Couple \$25
Organization Membership \$50

Outside the U.S., add \$4 for postage to Canada and Mexico, and \$10 overseas.

Donors are ranked as follows:

"Contributor" \$50+
"Sustainer" \$75+
"Sponsor" \$100+
"Patron" \$250+
"Benefactor" \$500+
"Life Member" \$1,000+

Life members are Dennis Darland, Don Jackanicz, Jim Reid and Charles Weyand.

Send your cheque (made out to the Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.) to the BRS Treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26 St., Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA.

Donors to the BRS

by Dennis Darland

The Bertrand Russell Society received donations above their membership fees from the following individuals in 2000:

Sponsors:
Neil Abercrombie
David S. Goldman

Contributors

J. M. Altieri
Jay Aragona
Dong-in Bae
Whitfield Cobb
Robert K. Davis
Linda Egendorf
Charles W. Hill
Alvin D. Hofer
Gladys Leithauser
Michael A. Sequeira
Barbara Testi
Laurie Endicott Thomas

All taxes are included. Send a single money order or cheque (no traveller's cheques, please) for registration and any accommodation, made out in either currency to THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC., to:

Dr. Kenneth Blackwell
The Bertrand Russell Research Centre
TSH-619
McMaster University
1280 Main St. West
Hamilton, ON
Canada L8S 4M2

You can contact him by email at blackwk@mcmaster.ca or by phone at 905-525-9140 ext.23173.

A.M. Registration and Accommodation

You can see who's already registered by visiting the A.M. home page at <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~russell/brsmeting.htm>.

The Welcome Desk for the meeting will open at 4 pm and the Buffet at 6 on Friday, May 25. Checkout is by 3 on Sunday.

Registration and payment deadline: Monday, May 7, 2001.

| Item | US \$ | Cdn \$ | What You Get |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---|
| Registration for Members | \$40.00 | \$60.00 | Welcome Buffet, Lunch, Banquet, Barbeque & Papers |
| Registration for Non-Members | \$50.00 | \$75.00 | Welcome Buffet, Lunch, Banquet, Barbeque & Papers |
| Registration for Students | \$10.00 | \$15.00 | Lunch, Barbeque & Papers |
| Single Accommodation | \$62.00 | \$93.00 | 2 Nights + Hot Breakfast, Linen, Parking |
| Double Accommodation | \$52.00 | \$77.00 | 2 Nights + Hot Breakfast, Linen, Parking |
| Breakfast with Residence Guests | \$4.75 | \$7.00 | 1 Hot Breakfast |

Registration form

Return this form when you send in your payment to register for the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society.

Date: _____

Name: _____

Address: _____

E-mail: _____

Telephone: _____

Accommodation desired (number of nights, single or double room):

Breakfast with residence guests (one or two mornings?):

Dietary or other requirements:

Registration category:

BRS member

Non-member

Student

TOTAL PAYMENT AND CURRENCY:

If I am a smoker I realize that McMaster University does not permit smoking within its buildings.

Signed: _____

Presentations that have been accepted for the Annual Meeting:

Stephen Toulmin will speak following his award on Friday evening.

| | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| David White | St. John Fisher College | Russell, Smith and the Religion of the Future |
| Chad Trainer | Independent Scholar | Bertrand Russell: A Carneades Reincarnate |
| Nick Griffin | McMaster University | On how the Russell papers came to McMaster. |
| Kevin Brodie | Lyman Memorial High School | Russell, Gardner, and Home Room: Philosophy Class in High School |
| Henrique Jales Ribeiro | University of Coimbra | B. Russell and H. Hertz: The Logicist reading of Hertz's <i>The Principles of Mechanics</i> |
| Nick Griffin | McMaster University | What was Russell trying to do in <i>Principia Mathematica</i> ? (An introduction for non-philosophers) |
| Alan Schwerin | Monmouth University | Metaphysics, Mysticism and Russell |
| Ken Blackwell | McMaster University | Leader of discussion about a film on Russell (TBA) |
| Steve Bayne | Independent Scholar | Toulmin and the Discovery of History |

The following is a tentative schedule of events for the meeting:


| | | | |
|----------|----------------|---|------------------------------|
| Friday | 4.00 - 6.00 pm | Registration | Commons Building |
| | 6.00 - 8.00 | Welcome Buffet and award to Stephen Toulmin | |
| Saturday | 7.30 - 9.00 am | Breakfast | Commons Building |
| | 9.00 - 12.30 | Papers | University Hall |
| | 12.30 - 2.00 | Lunch | University Hall: Common Room |
| | 2.00 - 4.30 pm | Papers | University Hall |
| | 6.00 - 7.00 | Red Hackle Hour | Royal Hamilton Yacht Club* |
| | 7.00 | Banquet | |
| Sunday | 7.30 - 9.00 am | Breakfast | Commons Building |
| | 9.00 - 12.30 | Papers | University Hall |
| | 1.00 - 3.00 pm | BBQ | Refectory Patio |
| | 3.00 | Checkout | |

*The Royal Hamilton Yacht Club's website may be visited at <http://www.rhyc.on.ca>.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May 2001

No. 110



Board member David White and BRS Vice President Tim Madigan

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St. John Fisher College
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Rochester, New York 14618

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

John Lenz, webmaster
jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

The *Quarterly* is published in February, May, August and November by the Department of Philosophy, St. John Fisher College, and edited by Peter Stone and members of the Russell Set of Rochester, NY.

Letters and unsolicited manuscripts are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to David White, Department of Philosophy, St. John Fisher College, 3690 East Avenue, Rochester, NY 14618 or by e-mail to white@sjfc.edu.

Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society, St. John Fisher College or any other individual or institution.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May 2001

No. 110

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Editorial

**THE FARMER AND THE COWMAN
CAN BE FRIENDS**

For too many years there has been tension and conflict between those who have a general, public interest in Russell and the BRS and those who see the BRS as a high and dry academic society. What would Bertrand Russell say? In this case, at least, we know what Russell would say since he addressed the issue, directly or indirectly in everything he wrote and everything he did. Russell's writing is always as clear and readable *as the subject allows*. Russell detested compromise and consistently refused to compromise. When any clique claims to own Russell, they deface the man's memory. Russell was a philosopher for all. We have no objection to scholars like Ray Monk telling us slowly and carefully how little they think of some of Russell's popular writings and some of his personal actions. That sort of criticism shows respect for the man who would not suffer humbugs. Nor do we think less of those who have neither the time nor the patience nor the interest to take up Russell's technical work. What we do strenuously and categorically object to are those who seek to impose their most favored aspect of Russell's life and work on the Society as a whole. There may be a shortage of Red Hackle, but there is surely enough Russell for all to share. The essential charm of the BRS is its eclecticism and its devotion to Russellian intelligence, Russellian passion and Russellian wit.

**2001 Annual Meeting
of the Bertrand Russell Society
McMaster University
25-27 May**

Full details are posted at:

<http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~russell/brsmeeting.htm>

For further information, write to blackwk@mcmaster.ca
or call (905) 525-9140 ext. 23173.

The deadline for advanced registration is

Monday, May 14, 2001.

Please register as soon as possible!

The following people have already registered:

Alan Schwerin, Giovanni Vianelli, Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr., Stephen Toulmin, Thom Weidlich, Kris Oser, Steve Bayne, Mary Martin, David Henehan, Pat Bock, Alan Bock, Rachel Murray, Peter Stone, Linda White, David White, Ken Blackwell, Tim Madigan.

Eastern Division

American Philosophical Association

meeting in Atlanta, Georgia

December 27-30

There will be a BRS session at the meetings and a BRS table at the smoker. If you are interested in giving a paper or tabling at the smoker, please get in touch with David White (white@sjfc.edu).

LETTERS

December 29, 2000

Just a short note on the APA meeting on Wednesday [December 27, NYC]. The session went down very well, with four excellent papers. They were short, well written and entertaining. I was also pleased to meet a number of members of the society that I had not met before. For instance, I met Justin Leiber from the University of Houston. We had twenty-two people attend our session between 8 and 11 on Wednesday evening – quite a feat when one remembers that the conference really only gets going on Thursday. I took along T-shirts, our banner, and fliers on the society. In my opening remarks I put in a plug for the annual meeting. The exchanges between the presenters and the audience was lively and well informed. All in all, a great success, thanks in large part to the quality contributions. I later had an opportunity to attend a session of the Hume society, of which I am a member, and noted that they drew twenty-five people. And their presenters were 'big name philosophers' - at least where Hume scholarship is concerned. It is clear that APA participation is essential for the society. Chad Trainer attended his first big conference and spent Wednesday night with the Schwerins. We traveled in and out of the city by train. David and Linda White and Linda's sister, Janice, dropped in to table for the BRS at the smoker last night and attended to the table Friday night. Other Russell aficionados also dropped in and introduced themselves. We should make a point of having a table at all APA functions.

Alan Schwerin, president

The Quarterly welcomes interesting stories about honorary members of our society.

January 3, 2001

My nicest memory of Quine is of showing him round Russell's library when he visited McMaster in 1979. Russell of course had a number of Quine's books, several of which Quine had sent him. Quine was delighted to find evidence that Russell had read them and especially delighted that there were some that he had not sent Russell. 'Oh', he'd say, 'I didn't send him that one', as if it were a complete mystery how the book could be in Russell's library otherwise. And then, almost incredulously, 'He must have bought that one.' When we came to Russell's copy of *Set Theory and its Logic* (which is dedicated to Russell) we found the pipe cleaner used as a book mark. It marked Quine's discussion of the Russell paradox. Quine was obviously touched to discover that Russell at 91 had been concerned to know what Quine thought about his paradox. It seemed clear that Quine felt about Russell somewhat as I felt about Quine: a bit overawed!

Nicholas Griffin

FEATURED ARTICLES

The BRS Board of Directors voted last year to offer honorary membership in the Society to Nelson Mandela. Ken Blackwell nominated Mandela, and wrote the following eloquent defense of his proposal. Mandela has since accepted our offer of honorary membership, and so it seemed fitting to reprint Ken's words here.

WHY NOMINATE NELSON MANDELA FOR HONORARY MEMBERSHIP IN THE BRS?

Ken Blackwell

Russell was well aware of apartheid policies from the time of their official installation in 1948. For example, he wrote in "Is a Third World War Inevitable?" (1950) that "The policy of the present South African government is of enormous propaganda value to Moscow." He was fond of pointing out the weakness for the West of its own racist states. By this time Mandela was already 32 years old and had been a member of the African National Congress for several years. Had Russell heard of him yet? We may fairly doubt it. But the political issue in question was one he wholeheartedly supported.

By 1953 Russell was a staunch supporter of an anti-apartheid organization under the leadership of Canon John L. Collins of later CND fame. The organization was Christian Action. Russell sometimes wrote that neither he nor they found their respective theological beliefs a hindrance to cooperation on the South African issue. By 1960 he could write: "I have already said enough on the subject to reap virulent abuse in

South Africa." He was proud of the Afrikaans edition of *Why I Am Not a Christian* (1955). His archives contain three substantial files on apartheid (see South Africa, RA1 640 and RA2 330).

Mandela had become a revolutionary by the early 1960s and had gotten into trouble for it. He was tried in the fall of 1962. During his defense he used Russell's example of civil disobedience and imprisonment in Brixton Prison the previous year:

(From 'Black man in a white court' Nelson Mandela's First Court Statement - 1962. Extracts from the court record of the trial of Mandela held in the Old Synagogue court, Pretoria, from 15 October to 7 November 1962. Mandela was accused on two counts, that of inciting persons to strike illegally (during the 1961 stay-at-home) and that of leaving the country without a valid passport. He conducted his own defense. Visit: <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1960s/nm6210.html>)

Your Worship, I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country drives him continuously to a conflict between his conscience on the one hand and the law on the other. This is not a conflict peculiar to this country. The conflict arises for men of conscience, for men who think and who feel deeply in every country. Recently in Britain, a peer of the realm, Earl Russell, probably the most respected philosopher of the Western world, was sentenced, convicted for precisely the type of activities for which I stand before you today, for following his conscience in defiance of the law, as a protest against a nuclear weapons policy being followed by his own government. For him, his duty to the public, his belief in the morality of the essential rightness of the

cause for which he stood, rose superior to this high respect for the law. He could not do other than to oppose the law and to suffer the consequences for it. Nor can I. Nor can many Africans in this country. The law as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is written and designed by the Nationalist government, is a law which, in our view, is immoral, unjust, and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we must oppose it, and that we must attempt to alter it.

Russell issued a statement in support of Mandela before the end of the same year. Presumably he knew of this reference to himself (Christopher Farley, Russell's last secretary thinks so), for the trial drew worldwide attention. Russell's statement was extracted in the newspapers, and Harry Ruja quoted it in *Russell Society News*, May 1992. Here it is in its entirety, from the typescript at RA2 330.187637 ("Statement on Nelson Mandela"):

The conditions which exist in South Africa today are those such as early peoples experienced in the history of man. A whole people is enslaved, and their spokesmen are subjected to torture, humiliation and death. South Africa is one great concentration camp and, because this is so, the protest of those who stand out against it is all the more incredible and courageous. There is in South Africa the most clear duty of conscience. Conscience requires that everyone who finds it possible to do so should resist to the limit until this filthy regime is eliminated and the people of South Africa are free. I wish to pay tribute to Nelson Mandela, for we are all in his great debt.

In early 1964 Russell signed a couple of petitions for the release of Mandela and other named prisoners. One was sent to the United Nations in March 1964, and you will find it at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/campaigns/prisoner.html>.

There was the threat of execution over Mandela. It was converted to life imprisonment about June 13, 1964. The next day Russell attended an Anti-Apartheid meeting in Trafalgar Square, and spoke from the plinth under large portraits of Mandela and Sisulu. A well-known photo of him on that occasion appeared in *The Times* the next day. The *Daily Telegraph* called it a "Free Mandela' Rally." In a speech that appears to have been drafted for him but which was revised in his own hand, Russell began:

Friends: We meet at a sombre moment for the suffering people of South Africa. They endure a most appalling tyranny and we have now seen their leaders sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime of opposing the oppression of the people of South Africa.

This is a time to assess the world-wide protest which has grown through the recent years of tyranny and struggle in South Africa. It is certain that the lives of Nelson Mandela and his brave colleagues have been saved by the world-wide outcry over their trial...

I hope the consumer goods boycott will be intensified and extended. The pickets which protest all over the world indicate

the extent to which the South African regime is hated and opposed. Nelson Mandela has told us how much this international protest means to the opponents of Verwoerd: to Robert Sobukwe and the many in prison.

That is the extent of the observations either man made about the other. I submit that it is sufficient to qualify Mandela for Honorary Membership under condition (4), "has acted in support of a cause or idea that Russell championed." Is that all there is to it?

More than half the 36 years that have elapsed since Russell's last speech in Trafalgar Square were spent by Mandela in prison, and the rest in extraordinary political activity out of prison. No longer a revolutionary in the violent sense, he was President of South Africa in 1994-99. He led the country from the brink of civil war to a remarkably peaceful resolution of the whites' centuries of racial contempt, hatred and finally fear. Everyone agrees that he is an example of overcoming hatred in oneself. He is now a ambassador of goodwill, and, I suspect, South Africa is prospering as never before. He continues to be active at 82. His speech intervening in the recent AIDS conference hosted in South Africa is a model of compassion, poetry and political wisdom.

He must also qualify under condition (6), "has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of Russell."

Let us honor with our gift of membership one of the last statesmen with whom Russell was engaged and whom he supported.

The following obituary appeared in Rationalist International Bulletin #70 (April 13, 2001). The BRS receives the bulletin as members of the International Humanist Ethical Union. For more information visit <http://www.rationalistinternational.net>.

REMEMBERING MADALYN MURRAY O' HAIR

Sanal Edamaruku

In September 1995, Madalyn Murray O' Hair, then president of American Atheists, her son Jon Garth and her granddaughter Robin fell victim to a gruesome murder. The three atheist leaders disappeared on 4th September 1995 and have never been seen again by their friends and colleagues. For five and a half years there have been various rumors, some of them absurd and obviously invented to make the victims appear to be the villains. Only in March 2001, their remains have been identified and their death was finally confirmed. They had been murdered in September 1995 itself, after short captivity. Their murderer and two others involved in the crime have been convicted, but the circumstances of their end remain mysterious. Many questions are yet to be answered. For example: Who is behind the firm in California which allegedly paid one of the most expensive lawyers to defend the murderer? What was the secret deal between the authorities and the murderer that saved him from the electric chair?

There are two huge white boxes in one of the bookshelves in my studio. They contain letters from Madalyn Murray O' Hair. Most of these several hundred letters she wrote in the late seventies and early eighties to me and to my father.

These years have been a phase of intense communication between us, over months we would receive two or three letters a week from Madalyn, sometimes even every day one. Our answers were fewer in number, because at those times a daily airmail letter from India to USA would eat up quite a lot of money. In April 1997, I heard the shocking news that Madalyn and her children had disappeared without any traces 19 months before. I opened these letterboxes after many years for the first time again and spent many hours reading since then.

We met Madalyn in 1978. Together with Jon and Robin she visited India and spent several memorable weeks with us. At that time our family had just moved to New Delhi and occupied a new house, still without any furniture and with no washbasins fixed. Madalyn did not bother about the lack of comfort and decided to stay with us in our improvised new home. Sleeping on mattresses on the floor and sharing bravely our hot Indian food, the three of them became family members. This was the beginning of a great friendship.

We discussed for long hours our work in such different countries as America and India, about our experiences, our plans, our hopes, future prospects. Madalyn was excited that she had discovered birds of the same feather, people with great commitment, energy and fantasy who had dedicated their lives to the fight against obscurantism and religion like she and her children. Our exchanges have been so open hearted, so inspiring and encouraging for all of us, that we continued them in an intense and unconventional correspondence.

I was a research scholar at the School of International Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1978. After having been the founder convenor of the Rationalist Student

Movement in Kerala (1973-1977), I had become the secretary of the Delhi Rationalist Association. I was passionately absorbing everything that would equip me theoretically and practically to become a powerful rationalist. I had read many books of the Thinkers Library of the Rationalist Press Association, which my father collected, and was inspired by the works of Thomas Paine, Ingersoll and Joseph McCabe. Madalyn shared these traditions, she was breathing and living in their spirit. Her lectures and letters have been invaluable eye openers for me. Her sharp observations and clear analyses of the mechanisms which dominate organized religion on one side and organized atheism on the other, have developed my understanding and prepared me for things to come. She has broadened my horizon and initiated me to the international movement by sharing insider knowledge and the fruits of her long experience with me. Only today, after having years of experience by my own, I am able to fully value her precise and sometimes hard-hitting characterizations of organizations and personalities in the field. Madalyn was well known for her blunt and merciless criticism, which would not spare anyone - including herself. Getting their dose of it, many people felt offended and turned forever her enemies. What most of them could not imagine was that she did not criticize them with the intention to damage but to point out mistakes for everybody to understand and overcome them. Her letters give many examples for her kindness and fairness vis a vis people who considered her their enemy. There are also examples for her incorruptible, sometimes damning judgements about people who commanded great respect in the movement.

In April 1979, Madalyn invited my father and me to Austin, Texas. My father, Joseph Edamaruku, was a scheduled speaker at the American Atheist Convention that year along with British

rationalist Nicolas Walter and abortion activist Bill Baird. Madalyn suggested we visit her much earlier to the Convention and we spend one full month with the O' Hair family, living in their house and working in the headquarters of American Atheists. The preparations for the Convention were in full swing, and there was plenty of work. Most of the days we would return home only late in the evening, completely exhausted, improvise a little cooking together and talk till late in the night. At six o'clock in the morning Madalyn would invariably call us for breakfast and discuss the program for the day. She was untirable and indefatigable. If she had decided about something, nothing and nobody could stop her. One day she needed urgently a printed note for the conference, but the printer refused to work overtime. So she stood four hours at the small offset press and printed the note personally. I was given the responsibility for folding and stapling, and we finished the work well in time. Another day we had scheduled an internal meeting to discuss an important project, but the meeting place was closed and no key available. Madalyn fixed her boot and kicked out an expensive glass door through which one could enter and open the house. Our meeting took place as planned. The Convention was a memorable event for us. Father received the World Atheist Award. Despite our close involvement in the preparations, this information had been kept secret from us and we were completely surprised and overwhelmed. Father's speech about the Indian movement was well received, it was a cordial atmosphere, and we felt being among good friends. We met Gerald and Gloria Tholen and Lloyd and Pam Thoren. And we spent interesting and pleasant hours with Nicholas Walter of Rationalist Press Association, who was the editor of *The New Humanist* then

During our time at Austin, "United World Atheists" was born. It had been Madalyn's dream to create an umbrella, under which atheists from all over the world could unite. Meeting us, she felt encouraged to make this plan reality. In my little room in the headquarters, I drafted the constitution, and we all discussed every detail till late in the nights. Madalyn was the founder president, my father, Nicolas Walter from UK and Lavanam from India were named vice-presidents, and I became the treasurer. Over the next years we worked to establish the organization and planned to formally launch it during the World Atheist Meet at Helsinki in 1983, which was organized by Madalyn together with Erkki Hartikainen. But things came differently. The new world organization fell victim to hyenas, which ganged up to sabotage its take-off. The analysis of their operation became an important part of our correspondence during the next years, and gave us new insights about the camp of our enemies. Many years later, when I organized the first International Rationalist Conference in December 1995, I wished Madalyn to come and inaugurate the "International Alliance Against Fundamentalism" (which later became "Rationalist International"). I wrote to her, but there was no reply. In June 1995, I went to Buffalo to participate in the inauguration of the new Center for Inquiry, founded by Paul Kurtz, who had meantime become another friend and respected colleague in the USA for me. I planned a stop over at Austin, but I could not reach them in time and changed my schedules. Since we had not been in personal communication for quite some time, I did not know anything about the latest

developments in Austin. Today I know that my letter, if at all, must have reached them in deep trouble. Court cases and harassment by the tax authorities were shaking the base of their existence and Madalyn's health had gone badly down hill. This would have been my last chance to see Madalyn, Jon and Robin ever again. I am very sad that I missed it. Three months later they were already dead.

Before sometime in 1993 or 1994 Madalyn went silently out of my sight, she has been there all throughout the years to cordially appreciate me for every success and - of course - to vehemently criticize a few of my decisions. One tie question between us remained for a long time the rationalist/atheist question. Madalyn felt that strong and uncompromising atheists as we were (and still are), had to express their conviction by calling themselves "atheists". In the beginning, she even proposed us to change our name. We were not in a position at that time to move the national council of Indian Rationalist Association for a name change, but apart from this we also did not accept the necessity of breaking with our long tradition. Moreover, we argued, there was not much difference in the meaning of atheism and rationalism or even humanism or freethought. Its fruits recognized the tree, and no name board or trademark could guarantee that its bearers fought seriously for our cause. Finally, didn't she herself draw inspiration mainly from the rationalist heritage? And didn't she select a core group of atheists and rationalists like us and Nicolas Walter to form United World Atheists? She did. But despite winning this point, I started, back from Austin, "Indian Atheist Publishers" and launched my first magazine, the "Indian Atheist". Full of enthusiasm and new ideas and with a huge collection of old RPA and Haldeman Julius books, which

Madalyn had generously gifted to me, I laid the foundation stones of what is today the largest freethought publishing house in Asia.

In 1983, I was elected national general secretary of the Indian Rationalist Association, and my new responsibilities together with many other activities as a publisher, writer and rationalist campaigner occupied me completely. But I never forgot to keep Madalyn informed about my ventures and plans and I looked forward for her advises, proposals, warnings, friendly encouragement as well as her hitting humorous remarks and her criticism. I wrote her long letters from Tokyo and from Amsterdam, she reported extensively from Helsinki and from Moscow. Once she told me that she got a star with her name. It had been quite expensive, but she liked the idea to become "eternal" that way.

What impressed me most in Madalyn over the long years of our friendship was her honesty and seriousness, her straight and often provocatively open ways, and her total lack of pretensions and vested interests. She would never submit to any authority but the authority of the better argument. She would never accept any bonus, not for being a woman, not for being famous, not for - later - being old and ill. I was often infected by her enthusiasm and energy and strengthened by her courage and fighting mood. Her unusual personality made many people her friends and admirers, but as many hated her openly or secretly. I was deeply shocked about the reactions on her disappearance by people who allegedly share our cause. Many did not hesitate to scornfully spread insults and propaganda of her hardcore enemies in the religious camp. Madalyn herself would perhaps have expected something like this. It was one of her main worries that she could die one day

in front of the hyenas who would cheer and celebrate her end as a triumph. She wished to die secretly, unnoticed, far away from the public eye. In an ironic and cruel way, this wish has come true: she died under a shroud of mystery and only five and a half years later, her fate became known.

I think about sharing Madalyn's letters and papers with the public. Both her friends and her enemies deserve it. But time has not ripened yet.

* * *

Second *Principia* International Symposium
THE WORKS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL
August 6th to 10th, 2001

Epistemology and Logic Research Group (NEL)
Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC)
Florianopolis (Santa Catarina), Brazil

Following the success of the First *Principia* International Symposium, which took place last year in Florianopolis, NEL has decided to organize the Second *Principia* International Symposium, to be held from August 6th to 10th, 2001, again in Florianopolis, in honor of Bertrand Russell. *Principia* is an international journal of epistemology published by NEL and UFSC University Press.

For more information, contact NEL - Epistemology and Logic Research Group, Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Caixa Postal 476, 88010-970. Florianopolis, SC, Brazil. Phone/fax: + 55 48 331.8808. e-mail: nel@cfh.ufsc.br.

The following obituary and tribute for W.V.O. Quine, an honorary member of the BRS and recipient of its annual award, appeared on the listserv Russell-I. The obituary was translated from the Portuguese and posted to the list by Giovanni de Carvalho.

WE LOST QUINE (1908-2000)

Paulo Ghiraldeli, Jr.

To all members of the Virtual Philosophy Community.

On Christmas day the greatest living philosopher of this century has passed. His paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" was a turning-point in the history of the philosophy of the XXth Century. Quine was active till the last moment. He lived for almost a hundred years. He was the one who mixed together pragmatism and analytical philosophy in America and in the world, by building a bridge between two great traditions and giving us, in addition, a precious agenda of philosophical renewal. His spirit will hover upon us forever. The following obituary was written by his son Douglas Quine and it can be found in the mostly complete site he did for his father. The news was giving to me by Hugo Cerqueira. We, all professors of philosophy, are in a great loss. We lost the great man.

Paulo Ghiraldeli Jr. (pgjr@terra.com.br) Professor of Philosophy - University of State of S. Paulo at Marilia. Publisher of Virtual Magazine (www.filosofia.pro.br). Coordinator of "ANPOL" Pragmatism Group.

OBITUARY: WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE

Douglas B. Quine

Edgar Pierce Professor Emeritus Willard Van Orman Quine of Harvard University, 92, died December 25, 2000 (Christmas) in Boston, Massachusetts following a brief illness. Professor W. V. Quine was recognized as a world leader in mathematical logic, set theory, and the philosophy of language. Professor W. V. Quine (eponym of "Quinean" in the *Oxford English Dictionary*) wrote 22 books in English and 1 in Portuguese (61 translations have been published representing 14 languages). From his best-known work, *Word and Object* (1960), to his autobiography (*The Time of My Life*, 1985), and his highly accessible book of essays, *Quiddities* (1990), his understanding of language and clear writing style earned him fans in many walks of life. He has been the subject of countless dissertations, books, papers, and discussions; Garland Books is publishing a five volume set of papers on his work later this month (Professor Dagfinn Føllesdal, editor). He was awarded 18 honorary degrees by international institutions including University of Lille, Oxford University, Cambridge University, Uppsala University, University of Bern, and Harvard University. His influence in philosophy and mathematics was recognized (<http://www.wvquine.org/wv-quine.html>) in his professional offices and through professional honorary fellowships and awards including: Society of Fellows, Harvard University (Junior Fellow, 1933-1936; Senior Fellow, 1949-1978), American Academy of Arts and Sciences (fellow 1949), Harvard University (Chairman, Philosophy, 1952-1953), Association for Symbolic Logic (President, 1953-1955),

Institute for Advanced Studies (Princeton, NJ, 1956-1957), American Philosophical Association (President 1957), American Philosophical Society, member (1957 -), Centre for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (Palo Alto, CA, 1958-1959), British Academy corresponding fellow (1959 -), Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia, corresponding member (1963-), Centre for Advanced Studies (Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT), Nicholas Murray Butler gold medal (1965), Columbia University (New York, 1970), National Academy of Sciences fellow (Washington DC, 1977), Institut de France (1978), Norwegian Academy of Sciences (1979), F. Polacký gold medal (Prague, 1991), Charles University gold medal (Prague, 1993), Rolf Schock Prize (Sweden, 1993), and the Kyoto Prize (Japan, 1996).

Van Quine, as he was known to his friends since high school years, was born in Akron, Ohio on Anti-Christmas (June 25) 1908. His parents, Cloyd Robert Quine and Harriet Van Orman, were both raised in Ohio. His father founded the Akron Equipment Company and his mother was a teacher. A love of canoeing and geography led him to paddle around the lakes near Akron and draw maps for the summer inhabitants. Stamp collecting was an early influence which led to a high school stamp business and short lived internationally distributed publication OK Stamp News (1924-1925); his life long wanderlust led to travel in 118 countries (plus 27 viewed from above or the side) and all 50 states (North Dakota after his 90th birthday). He graduated from Oberlin College (Oberlin, Ohio) in 1930 and earned his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1932 (the fastest in Harvard history). Hired in 1936 as an Instructor in Philosophy, promoted to Associate Professor (1941), Professor (1948), Edgar Pierce Professor (1956), and

finally Edgar Pierce Professor Emeritus (1978), his active career at Harvard University spanned more than 60 years with a 4 year gap during World War II in United States Navy Intelligence (Lieutenant then Lieutenant Commander, 1942-1946). Throughout his career, he composed manuscripts by hand and then polished them with scissors, tape, and a portable 1927 Remington typewriter which was modified to include special characters required for mathematics by eliminating the duplicated or easily simulated characters such as !, ?, and 1. Following his official retirement to emeritus status, he continued to write and expanded his travel as he participated in mathematical and philosophical conferences on his work around the world. His love of languages (he spoke English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish) led him to learn enough of a local language to introduce his talk if he could not present it all in the local language. His love of music led him to savor Dixieland Jazz, Mexican folksongs, Gilbert and Sullivan; he enjoyed playing the mandolin and piano (self taught - preferentially the black keys). Despite European press reports to the contrary, he never did own or play jazz on a clarinet.

He was predeceased by his brother, Robert Cloyd Quine, his first wife Naomi Clayton, and his second wife Marjorie Boynton. He is survived by his children Elizabeth Quine Roberts of Anchorage (Alaska), Norma Quine of London (England), Douglas Boynton Quine of Bethel (Connecticut), and Margaret Quine McGovern of San Francisco (California). He is also survived by his grandchildren Melissa O'Brien, Alexander Boynton Quine, Grant Augustus McGovern, Victoria Boisvert Quine, Ashley Quine McGovern, a great grandson Jesse Rice, and nephews Robert Wolfe Quine and William Van Quine.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness*.

Free Press, 2001.

Part 1

Stefan Andersson

The Spirit of Solitude, part one of Ray Monk's biography of Russell concludes with Russell's return from China with pregnant Dora Black. L'enfant terrible of English aristocracy managed to get a divorce from his first wife to marry Dora, twenty-two years younger, a feminist, a communist, an atheist, and against marriage. She agreed to marriage to satisfy Russell's wish for legitimate heirs to his title. John Conrad Russell was born in November 1921 in a bed that Russell bought from Wittgenstein. John was a longed-for child, and it was the ambition of his parents to raise and educate him according to the most progressive theories of education. This is where Monk continues the biography with part two: *The Ghost of Madness*.

Before World War I, Russell had made himself known as one of the founders of modern logic. After the war he left the world of academia and started a career as an independent writer. This was a mistake according to Monk, who agrees with Wittgenstein that Russell's books should be bound in two colors: those dealing with mathematical logic in red (all students of philosophy should read) and those dealing with ethics and politics in blue (no one should be allowed to read). Others disagree. The Swedish Academy awarded Russell the

Nobel Prize for literature in 1950 and millions of people throughout the world read Russell's works on ethics and politics with great appreciation.

Monk offers two reasons why he found writing about Russell taxing. First, there was the sheer quantity of available documentation, but more significant was his growing sense of the tragedy of Russell's life. This tragedy Monk attributes to Russell's deep fear of madness and to his colossal vanity. How could Russell have been so cold toward those who loved him? How could he have treated his son, John, as he did? how could he have written so much second-rate journalism?

Monk acknowledges he writes as one who sees Russell as emotionally maimed and his books on political, social and moral questions as mostly bad books poorly written.

Whatever the causes, no one can deny the tragedy of Russell's life. His mother, sister and father were dead before Russell was four years old. When he sought to marry Alys, his grandmother warned him regarding cases of insanity in his family. As it happened, Alys was unable to have children and Lady Ottoline did not want any. Dora Black wanted children, and Russell, in spite of the warnings, did not hesitate.

Russell and Black shared a belief in free love. Open relationships between free and strong partners who could tolerate occasional infidelities were to replace the outdated traditional marriage. Katharine (Kate) was born in 1923. Dora took care of the children and Bertie wrote to support the family. In 1924 Russell went on his first lecture-tour in the United States.

Between 1921 and 1927 Russell wrote *The Analysis of Mind*, *The ABC of ABC of Atoms*, *Logical Atomism* and *The Analysis of Matter* plus a new introduction to the second

edition of *Principia Mathematica*. The problem with these books, according to Monk, is that they are so bad and that Wittgenstein had convinced Russell that his new project was doomed to failure. According to Monk, Russell had adopted Wittgenstein's linguistic interpretation of logic, which reduces it to a manipulation of formalized tautologies. According to this view logic does not give us any new knowledge. For a short period Russell seems to have been convinced by Wittgenstein, but he never became a total convert.

The year John turned six—1927—his parents decided to start a school of their own. This was the beginning of the end of their marriage and a disaster for John, who was a very sensitive and delicate child. The school did not become a success. After a few years of marriage Russell became impotent with Dora. This became another source of conflict. Dora wanted more children and later had two with Griffin Barry. Despite all talk of tolerance and universal love, Russell could not withstand the situation. He began despising his wife.

In 1929 *Marriage and Morals* was published and quickly became a great success. Monk shows how, in the light of his experiences with Dora, Russell adjusts his earlier theories on marriage and morals. Russell became more and more miserable. It was in these circumstances that he wrote *The Conquest of Happiness*, which Monk considers his most superficial and dishonest book. At this time Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge and started to work on philosophy again with a different approach. Russell read the manuscript of *Philosophical Remarks*. If Russell held grudges against Wittgenstein, he had an opportunity to make them known. Trinity College had turned to Russell for an appraisal of Wittgenstein's work, which would influence his chances of

staying at Cambridge. Wittgenstein's position at Cambridge was renewed.

In the summer of 1931, Dora had her first child with Griffin Barry. She employed a twenty year old student from Oxford to look after John and Kate. Patricia Spence ("Peter") was beautiful and talented. She and Russell fell in love. After Russell divorced Dora in 1935, he married Peter and two years later their son Conrad was born. For Russell it was like jumping out of the ashes into the fire. He left the school in Dora's hands in the hope of returning to academic philosophy.

In 1938 Russell was invited to Oxford to give a series of lectures on "Words and Facts." In the same year he left with his new family for the United States to a temporary position in philosophy at the University of Chicago. His lectures were based on the manuscript of *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris attended his seminars. Carnap was a leading figure of logical positivism. He and Russell got along well, although their thinking was going in different directions. Carnap had adopted the linguistic turn in philosophy and thought that the solution to philosophical problems was to be found in an analysis of language, its syntax and grammar. Russell looked for a solution in modern psychology and a causal theory of meaning. Monk relates all this, and yet he does not realize that this indicates that Russell had not adopted the linguistic interpretation of philosophy.

The following year Russell was offered a three-year appointment at the University of California at Los Angeles and so the family moved again. At the outset everything looked good, but then Russell took a dislike to the president of the university. Within a few months Russell began looking for

another position. He had not waited long when he received an invitation to give the William James lectures at Harvard in the fall of 1940. A short time later, the College of the City of New York offered him a teaching position for three semesters starting in the spring of 1941. Russell accepted both offers and wrote to president Sproul at UCLA saying he wanted to resign. That decision turned out to be premature.

Thom Weidlich, a member of this Society, has documented all the twists and turns in the circus of Russell's involvement with CCNY in *The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell: Appointment Denied*.

Dr. Albert C. Barnes heard about the persecution of Russell and offered him a five-year position at his private art museum in Philadelphia. Russell naturally accepted. He was to give weekly lectures on the history of philosophy at the Barnes Foundation. Here Russell started work on what was to be his best-known book and the solution to his financial problems: *A History of Western Philosophy*. Barnes and Russell did not get along, and when Russell accepted invitations to lecture elsewhere as well, Barnes sued. Russell won a counter-suit.

As Russell's financial situation improved, his problems with Peter grew worse. In the midst of these troubles, Russell accepted an invitation from Trinity College in Cambridge for a five-year fellowship, to begin in the fall of 1944.

Russell was very happy to return to his homeland and his Alma Mater, but soon he discovered that the philosophical discussions centered on the thinking of Wittgenstein. Younger philosophers showed little interest in Russell's *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, and Russell was devastated by the negative review it received by Norman Malcolm, who

eventually established Cornell University as the center for Wittgenstein Studies in the new world.

Russell was born into one of the great political families of England and had long been politically active. During the Cold War, his political activism moved again to the foreground.

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SEARCHING ROUTLEDGE'S WEBSITE:

Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years 1914-1970. [Vol. 2] Nicholas Griffin, ed., 2001. ISBN 0415249988 Hardback £25.00, 600 pp.

This exciting selection reveals many letters never published before. Readers discover the inner workings of a philosophical genius, an impassioned campaigner for peace and social reform, and a man torn between longing for closeness to those he loved and an intense fear of possessiveness which he saw as his own "fundamental vice". The anguish of his personal life comes through powerfully in his letters to Ottoline Morrell and Colette O'Neil.

The letters cover most of Russell's adult life, a period in which he wrote over thirty books, including his famous *History of Western Philosophy*. From Russell's thoughts on science and education to his troubled friendship with D. H. Lawrence and T. S. Eliot, this is, with Russell's *Autobiography*, the most accurate and enthralling account of his life yet published. It includes letters to some of the greatest figures of the twentieth century, including Ho Chi Minh, Lyndon Johnson, Tito, Jawahral Nehru, John Dewey and Jean-Paul Sartre. Table Of

Contents: Preface Introduction 1. War (1914-1918) 2. Children, Companionship, and Joint Work (1918-1927) 3. Starting a School and Ending a Marriage (1927-1935) 4. Marriage, Poverty, and Exile (1936-1944) 5. Respectability at Last (1944-1954) 6. Peace (1955-1970).

Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy, Richard Gaskin, ed., 2001. ISBN 0415224462 Hardback, \$115.00, 272pp.

This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, particularly in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on its relevance to metaphysics, logic and science. Contents: Introduction: Proposition and World *Richard Gaskin*. 1. Frege and the grammar of truth *Richard Mendelsohn*. 2. Categories, constructions and congruence: Husserl's tactics of meaning *Peter Simons*. 3. Logical form, general sentences, and Russell's path to 'on denoting' *James Levine*. 4. Grammar, ontology, and truth in Russell and Bradley *Stewart Candlish*. 5. A few more remarks on logical form *Alex Oliver*. 6. Logical syntax in the *Tractatus* *Ian Proops*. 7. Wittgenstein on grammar, meaning and essence *Bede Rundle*. 8. Nonsense and necessity in Wittgenstein's *Mature Philosophy* *Richard Gaskin*. 9. Carnap's logical syntax *Gary Ebbs*. 10. Heidegger and the grammar of being *Graham Priest*.

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RUSSELL AND HEGEL

Peter Stone

While checking out the myriad of online reviews noted on Russell-I, I stumbled across a review of Terry Pinkard's *Hegel: A Biography*. The review is by Roger Kimball, and appears in *New Criterion*, Vol. 19, #1, September 2000. It's online at www.newcriterion.com/archive/19/sept00/hegel.htm

The review makes liberal use of Russell's critique of Hegel in *History of Western Philosophy*. Here's the first paragraph:

Hegel, Bertrand Russell observed, is "the hardest to understand of the great philosophers." Hegel would not have liked very much that [sic] Russell had to say about his philosophy in *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945). Russell's exposition is a classic in the library of philosophical demolition, much despised by Hegel's admirers for its vulgar insistence on common sense (Best line: that Hegel's philosophy "illuminates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise.") But I am not at all sure that Hegel would have disagreed with Russell's comment about the difficulty of understanding him. He knew he was difficult. He was always going on about the "labor of the negative," the superficiality of mere common sense, and the long, "strenuous effort" that genuinely "scientific" (i.e., Hegelian) philosophy required. It is even said that on his deathbed Hegel declared that there was only one man who had understood him—and he had misunderstood him.

Pinkard apparently goes on to claim that this story is apocryphal.

Here's one other choice paragraph:

Hegel wrote a great deal of nonsense. Yet he did not do it on purpose. Arthur Schopenhauer, one of Hegel's bitterest enemies, was right to complain about "the stupefying influence of Hegel's sham wisdom." (No one under the age of forty, he thought, should read Hegel: the danger of intellectual corruption was too great.) But I believe that Schopenhauer was wrong to attributed mystifying motives to Hegel. He may have been, as Schopenhauer also said, a "charlatan," but Hegel was a sincere charlatan. He said a lot of loopy things. He believed them all.

I liked that paragraph, but I suspect Russell would have classed a "sincere charlatan" alongside a "round square."

All in all, an enjoyable review--although Kimball still makes me want to cough up a hairball (after all, my fondest aspiration is to become a "tenured radical").

* * *

RUSSELL AND ALAN SOKAL

Peter Stone

I recently read a piece by Edward Said from the *London Review of Books* (it was mentioned on Russell-I). That let me to "Le Pauvre Sokal," a review of Sokal and Bricmont's book *Intellectual Impostures*. The review was by John Sturrock, and it appeared in the July 16, 1998 issue. The reviewer says Sokal and Bricmont "quote from Bertrand Russell, explaining how he lost faith in Hegel as a thinker only after discovering how bad he was at maths." I feel sure that's a rather reductionist version of what BR said, but it fit the rather disparaging tone of the whole review.

My favorite passage in the review is as follows:

I've read only a little of the work of the feminist writer, Luce Irigaray, but I was delighted to learn, from the few briskly contemptuous pages devoted to her here, that, in arguing for the masculinist bias of science, she has had the estimable insolence to suggest that the 20th century's most resonant (and sinister) equation, $E = MC^2$, may be sexist for having 'privileged the speed of light' or 'what goes fastest' over other velocities, and that if the science of fluid mechanics is under-developed, then that is because it is a quitesentially feminine topic. Irigaray's invocations of the sciences concerned may be worse than dodgy, but in that libertarian province of the intellectual world in which she functions, *far better wild contentious theses of this sort than the stultifying rigor so inappropriately demanded by Sokal and Bricmont*" (my emphasis).

I'm not sure what scares me more about this passage--the fact the reviewer takes sides against Sokal and Bricmont here, or the sheer number of commas the reviewer uses in the first sentence (10, I think). I suspect Russell would strongly disagree with both the anti-rationalist sentiment and the anti-clarity style demonstrated here.

* * *

"Never get involved with studying a thinker who lived to be more than 95 years old."

Jack Selzer, on his growing biography of Kenneth Burke (*Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 20, 2001, p. A27).

Wonder if Ray Monk ever had the same thought.

A READER'S GUIDE TO BERTRAND RUSSELL

David White

The best and cheapest way to acquire a basic shelf of Russell books is to frequent used book sales at libraries and on college campuses. All of BR's popular works are available for less than \$1.00 plus the time and patience needed to find them. The bookfinder.com service scans book-dealers on the web and provides a composite report of what is available new and used. Ordering is usually easy and safe, but there are so many Russell items at any given time that you will still have a full scale shopping experience. Russell items including all sorts of magazines and pictures seem always to be in good supply on eBay. Even an astrology book that happened to quote BR was dutifully indexed by eBay. If you are new to the game, eBay will allow you to "watch" an auction without participating, and you can ask eBay to alert you when new Russell related lots come up for bid. A bonus, noted some time ago by Ken Blackwell, is that many eBay vendors include quite good pictures of the product and with nothing more than a right-click you can help yourself to the picture and do what you will with it. If you need (well, want or think you want) something you cannot find on eBay, you can advertise your desires for free in your eBay account.

The Bertrand Russell Archives lists all recent and forthcoming books by or about Russell, and the BRS website maintains a comprehensive list of Russell's works that are on the web. The GRRS site has a shorter list designed for those who want to start a web-based course of Russell Studies.

For those who prefer the look and feel of paper (may their tribe increase), public libraries today provide a full range of services such as interlibrary loans and the ability to renew books over the internet. Many public reference librarians will take questions by telephone or e-mail, and some of the standard reference guides, such as the venerable *Reader's Advisor* or the massive *Dictionary of Literary Biography* have good articles on Russell (detailed without being pedantic) with an emphasis on what to read depending on your taste.

The Russell-I e-mail list has traditionally been very useful as a way to ask the experts about any of Russell's writings. Elementary questions on any topic may be sent to the *Quarterly* for a personal reply. We will publish a selection of those of general interest in future issues.


More advanced readers will want to use the Center for Russell Studies and the Bertrand Russell Archives. If you have access to a major research library, you may be able to not only read many of Russell's papers through JSTOR, but access is limited to those who can afford the steep charges. The special beauty of JSTOR is that you can search for Russell's name (or any string of characters) through a vast number of academic journals going back more than a century.

One of the divine attributes that no one would deny of Russell is ubiquity. Following Gilbert Ryle, many academics scoff at "index readers," those who use indexes to find the good passages and never consider reading the whole book, presumably as its author intended. While we do not approve of those who willingly pretend to know that of which they are ignorant (Russell, like Socrates, boasted of his ignorance), we nevertheless see index reading as a secret source of harmless pleasure.

MISCELLANEA

If you visit London, be sure to have your picture taken with BR. He is waiting for you in Red Lion Square near the South Place Ethical Society. BRS Vice President Tim Madigan is preparing an album of pictures of Bertie and his friends.





Paperback book. *The Conquest of Happiness* by Bertrand Russell (British mathematician and philosopher). Signet Key Ks322, 1955, 3rd printing, 142 pages. Slight spine warp, reading crease on cover, pencil letter "a" on cover, some chipping/soiling on cover, corner crease on both front and back covers, 1/4" corner crease pages 111-14, very good condition.

As offered by Gary and Pat Radtke on eBay

WHEREOF WE CANNOT SPEAK

David White

Mr Bertrand Russell sat
at his hard, brown, desk
working a proposition of mathematics.

She watched.
"So, Mr. Bertrand Russell, show *me*
your mathematical proposition.
No, really, I adore maths, Mr. Bertrand Russell."
[She is naked now.]

Russell is hard.
hard as the brown table,
hard as mathematics.

"Show me the proposition
[silence].
I want to see your mathematical proposition, Mr. Russell."
[Russell removes his trousers.]

"Don't be hard with me, Mr. Russell,
tell me about your mathematical proposition.
Tell me about it.
Then we can fuck all you want."
[Her legs spread wide. Russell speechless.]

"Oh, God." Russell says to himself,
what am I getting into?"
"God" Russell keeps saying
as her hand works his erection.

"Not yet, not yet,
first tell me about the proposition,
the mathematical proposition."

Russell enters without effort.

"They are all different;
every one is different,"
Russell thinks.

She is silent.

Silent as a mathematician hard at work.

Russell comes,

too soon.

There is no fuck.

"Fucking is hard."

Russell says to himself,
"as hard as mathematics,
as hard as my table. And,"

Russell goes on to himself

(not daring to say it),

"there are no words. Words fail."

"So, Mr. Bertrand, here is your pipe,

may I fill it?

may I light it?"

Russell, naked, is silent

Russell, no longer hard, is silent.

But she, still not satisfied, speaks.

She is firm, knowing whereof she speaks:

"The Pythagorean Plato advised,"

she tells him,

"that by the use of problems,
as in geometry,

we let the things of heaven come
and go. Come, and go."

THE HUNT FOR RED HACKLE

Many members have been engaged in the search for a continuing supply of Red Hackle. Since a meeting of the BRS without Red Hackle is a logical absurdity, fear not. There will be enough to go around. However, we need to be mindful of the needs of future generations. If you are aware of anyone who has Red Hackle for sale (in accord with all applicable laws) please communicate with any one of the officers of the BRS.

Habu R.R. Gogineni reports on his frustration, as have others.

Sorry to say have not found any place selling Red Hackle - Harrods was an amusing experience. A rather friendly chap there asked 'what exactly is that?' in all the posh accent he could muster! When I explained, he directed me to a specialist shop in Soho; but they too did not have it. Have just returned - I was kind of suspecting this because website searches did not give many clues - but shall keep trying: the Airport will be another likely source.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Officers and any others requesting reimbursement from BRS funds should have prior authorization and then receipts.

GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET

Bertrand Russell Discussions

Thursday, May 17, 7:00 PM

Mr. Christian's Coffeeshouse

Village Gate Square, 274 North Goodman Street, Rochester, NY

There will be a discussion on Russell's book "Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare" as well as a celebration of his 129th birthday (with cake).

All meetings are open to the public at no charge. Many who attend have no special knowledge of Bertrand Russell and use these meetings to become better acquainted with his ideas. For further information, contact Tim Madigan at 273-5778 (days) or 424-3184 (evenings) or by e-mail: timothymad@aol.com

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
Cash Flow Report
1/1/01 Through 3/31/01
Dennis J. Darland, treasurer

| | |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| BRS-Bank, Cash, CC Accounts | 4/21/01 |
| BALANCE 1/1/01 | 7,938.23 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions: | |
| Contrib-BRS | 294.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 294.00 |
| Dues: | |
| New Members | 221.01 |
| Renewals | 2,115.00 |
| TOTAL Dues | 2,336.01 |
| Meeting Inc | 35.00 |
| Other Inc | 41.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 2,706.01 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Library Exp | 9.34 |
| Meeting Exp | 340.00 |
| Newsletter | 222.22 |
| RUSSELL Sub | 2,620.50 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 3,192.06 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -486.05 |
| BALANCE 3/31/01 | 7,452.18 |

THE GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET

The GRRS conducts Bertrand Russell Discussions at Mr. Christian's Cafe in Rochester, NY, on the third Thursday of each month. For up-to-date schedule information see:
<http://home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs>

17 May 2001 Celebration of BR's Birthday
discussion of *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*

September 20, 2001 Newcomers' Night. An Introduction to
Bertrand Russell.

October 18, 2001 "On Denoting"

November 15, 2001 "Russell, Conrad and Conrad Russell"

December 20, 2001 *Russell on Religion*

January 17, 2002 *Who's Who in Hell*

February 21, 2002 "Dora, Dora, Dora"

March 21, 2002 *Wittgenstein's Vienna*

April 18, 2002 "Tom and Viv and Bertie"

May 16, 2002 *The Conquest of Happiness*
(We'll be celebrating BR's birthday as well—two days early)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August 2001

No. 111*



Stephen Toulmin accepts the 2001 BRS Award.

**The current issue, #111, follows #110 (May 2001)
Numbers 107, 108 and 109 never appeared.*

Department of Philosophy
St. John Fisher College
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

John Lenz, webmaster

jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

The *Quarterly* is published in February, May, August and November by the Department of Philosophy, St. John Fisher College, and edited by

Peter Stone and members of the Russell Set of Rochester, NY.

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to David White, Department of Philosophy, St. John Fisher College, 3690 East Avenue, Rochester, NY 14618 or by e-mail to white@sjfc.edu.

Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society, St. John Fisher College or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

Chairman of the Board

President

Vice President

Secretary

Treasurer

Kenneth Blackwell

Alan Schwerin

Ray Perkins

Steve Bayne

Dennis J. Darland

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August 2001

No. 111

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Editorial:

Greetings from Rochester!

The search for a home for the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* (*BRSQ*) has come to an end. The Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS), the most prominent—and only—chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society (BRS) in North America, has agreed to assume responsibilities for editing the Society's fine journal. In May, the GRRS published its first issue (#110). At that point, however, the GRRS's role was still technically unofficial. Since then, the Board has officially vested control of the project in a *BRSQ* Committee to be based in Rochester, with Peter Stone serving as both Committee Chair and Editor. We therefore feel that now is the right time to introduce ourselves and share with you our thoughts and excitement about the new project.

The astute reader will have noticed that the May issue (#110) followed the February issue (#106), but skipped three numbers in the process. Due to the somewhat irregular publication schedule of the *BRSQ* over the past few years, the numbering fell somewhat awry. Had the BRS produced 4 issues a year (in February, May, August, and November) every year since the start of 1974 (the year the Society was founded), then the May 2001 issue would indeed have been #110. Nevertheless, we don't want the gap thus created to forever haunt the BRS without resolution. To set things aright, we are cutting the Gordian knot by announcing that the *BRSQ* has officially skipped issue #s 107, 108, and 109. The cover of this issue notes this prominently, so hopefully you won't get too confused while perusing your back issues.

Whatever the numbering, this issue of the *BRSQ* should have plenty to interest the Russell enthusiast. Note, however, that while Peter Stone assumed the position of *BRSQ* Editor at the 2001 BRS Annual Meeting, he at the same time stepped down as Secretary of the Society and Board and as Chair of the BRS Awards Committee. As a result, you'll be hearing from him a lot in this issue in all three capacities. We mention this because none of us (especially Peter) want this to become an "All Peter Stone! All the time!" publication. We strongly encourage members to send us Russell-related articles of all kinds for inclusion in the *BRSQ*. If you have something to say about Russell, write an article about it for us; as our previous editorial indicates ("The Farmer and the Cowman Can Be Friends"), we welcome submissions dealing with all aspects of Russell's life and thought—mathematics, philosophy, politics, humanism, sex, etc. If you've read a Russell-related book, review it for

us. If you just have a quick comment, send a Letter to the Editor. If it's just a brief notice or clipping, we'll mention it in our "Odds and Ends" column (An occasional feature that will premiere in our November issue). And announcements of events that may be of interest to BRS members (philosophical conferences, humanist gatherings, peace-related activist events, etc.) are always welcome. We'll try to publish everything members send us (with the usual exceptions for length, libel, relevance, etc.). We'll also occasionally publish items by non-members, but we will always give members priority.

But wait, you may find yourself thinking. I sent an article (book review, announcement, whatever) to the *BRSQ* some time ago, only to see it fail to appear again and again. Unfortunately, the lack of a stable home for the *BRSQ* created some problems of continuity. The editorship of the *BRSQ* changed hands four times over the past few years, and so a few items may well have been misplaced amidst all the changes. If you haven't seen your piece appear, please don't give up on us. Just accept our sincerest apologies, and send us another copy.

Articles, book reviews, etc., can be sent to David White, Philosophy Department, St. John Fisher College, 3690 East Avenue, Rochester, NY 14618, white@sjfc.edu.

Our preference is for written materials to be sent to us in Word, either on a disc or as an e-mail attachment. If you have any general concerns about the *BRSQ*, you're welcome to write to the Editor, Peter Stone, at the Political Science Department, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, prse@troi.cc.rochester.edu.

We here in Rochester are very excited about the *BRSQ*. We see it as a way to continue the excellent conversation about Russell carried on at the BRS Annual Meeting, a meeting at which our local chapter is always well-represented. Now let's all do our part to keep this conversation going all year!

* * *

News about the 2002 Annual Meeting

Plans are well underway for the **2002 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society**. The tentative meeting location is the Center for Inquiry West, in Los Angeles. Stay tuned for more information!

Call for Board Nominations

This fall, the Bertrand Russell Society will be holding elections to fill 8 of the 24 positions on its Board of Directors. (There may be an additional seat or two to fill, as one or more additional directors may not complete their terms.) The time has come for nominations for those positions. Members are encouraged to send their nominations to Steve Bayne, BRS Secretary, 64 Vinal 6A, Somerville MA 02143, srbayne@channell.com.

Please note that **the deadline for nominations is October 1**. The ballots will be sent out in the November issue of the *BRSQ*. Any member of the BRS may run for a seat on the Board. The 8 members of the Board with expiring terms may be renominated and reelected. Members may nominate themselves; if you do this, please include a short (1 paragraph) statement about yourself and why you should be on the Board. A complete list of current Board Members is included below; please don't nominate any current Board member whose term does not expire this year.

Our esteemed Chairman of the Board, Ken Blackwell, would like to step down from that position after completing his current term (his fourth). The Board will select his successor next year from amongst its own members. Hopefully, members will be thinking about who would make a worthy successor to Ken in making their nominations this summer and casting their votes this fall.

Directors of the BRS (Note: Officers of the BRS, elected annually, serve *ex officio* on the Board of Directors.)

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 1999-Dec. 31, 2001: Stefan Andersson, Derek Araujo, Kevin Brodie, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Thom Weidlich.

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2000 - Dec. 31, 2002: Steve Bayne, Jan Loeb Eisler, Keith Green, Nicholas Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Harry Ruja, Peter Stone.

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2001- Dec. 31, 2003: Kenneth Blackwell, Dennis Darland, John R. Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, Laurie Endicott Thomas, David White.

2002 BRS Award Search Begins Proposals Welcome

The BRS Awards Committee will soon begin its search for a person or organization to receive the 2002 BRS Award. This award is given annually to one or more people or organizations for outstanding achievement in one or more areas of concern to Bertrand Russell. The award may reflect achievements in either the academic or social and political realm, and achievements made in the recent past or over a lifetime. The award may also be given for extraordinary acts that, by the character they display, are particularly reminiscent of Russell at his best.

Members of the BRS are invited to propose individuals or organizations to the BRS Awards Committee to be considered for the 2002 BRS Award. Anyone wishing to make a proposal should contact the Committee Chair as follows: Kevin Brodie, 54 Cedar Swamp Road, Storrs, CT 06268, kevin.brodie@lebanonct.org.

The Committee will begin deliberating in the early fall, so please get your proposals to the Committee as soon as possible.

For those interested, the following is a list of previous BRS Award recipients:

| | |
|--|---|
| 1980 Paul Arthur Schilpp | 1991 Planned Parenthood Federation of America |
| 1981 Steve Allen | 1992 Karl Popper |
| 1982 Henry Kendall | 1993 Harry Ruja |
| 1983 Joseph Rotblat | 1994 (none) |
| 1984 Dora Black Russell | 1995 Zero Population Growth |
| 1985 Robert Jay Lifton and Lester Denonn | 1996 Willard Van Orman Quine |
| 1986 People for the American Way | 1997 (none) |
| 1987 John Somerville | 1998 Irving Copi |
| 1988 Paul Kurtz | 1999 Henry Morgentaler |
| 1989 Paul Edwards | 2000 Stephen Jay Gould |
| 1990 (none) | 2001 Stephen Toulmin |

The 2001 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society



The modern conference resembles the pilgrimage of medieval Christendom in that it allows the participants to indulge themselves in all the pleasures and diversions of travel while appearing to be austere bent on self-improvement. To be sure, there are certain penitential exercises to be performed - the presentations of a paper, perhaps, and certainly listening to the papers of others. But with this excuse you journey to new and interesting places, meet new and interesting people, and form new and interesting relations with them; exchange gossip and confidences (for your well-worn stories are fresh to them, and vice versa); eat, drink and make merry in their company every evening; and yet, at the end of it all, return home with an enhanced reputation for seriousness of mind.

David Lodge, *Small World* (1984)

Quote of the Meeting

"To be surrounded by philosophers is unsettling."

-Warren Allen Smith



Minutes of the 2001 BRS Annual Meeting

Peter Stone
Secretary, BRS

The Bertrand Russell Society held its annual meeting on May 25-7, 2001 at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, home of the Bertrand Russell Archives and the newly created Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Alan Schwerin presided. Peter Stone took notes. BRS members present were Stefan Andersson, Steve Bayne, Ken Blackwell, Howard Blair, David Blitz, Alan Bock, Pat Bock, Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr., Kevin Brodie, Rosalind Carey, Giovanni de Carvalho, Peter Friedman, Nick Griffin, David Henehan, Tim Madigan, Mary Martin, Ed McClenathan, Ray Perkins, Ray Plant, Michael Potter, Steve Reinhardt, Cara Rice, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, Giovanni Vianelli, Thom Weidlich, David Wesley, David White, Avon Wilsmore, and Barrie Zwicker. Non-members present were Andrew Bailey, Matthew Barber, Renu Barrett, Elizabeth Blackwell, Andrew Bone, Adam Dobai, Arlene Duncan, Louis Greenspan, Afeah Henderson, Dan Kervick, Peter Loptson, Kent MacAskill, Nancy McClenathan, Karen Perkins, Jane Robin, Carl Spadoni, Stephen Toulmin, Sheila Turcon, Samuel Wesley, Cory Wendorf, and Linda White. This turnout was the highest ever at a BRS meeting held at McMaster, of which there have been 5 since 1978.

The meeting began with tours of the Russell Archives and coffee at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, at which various unpublished CD-ROMs of Russell were available for examination. A book swap was also held at which members could exchange Russell-related materials. The Russell Archives also offered various books for sale at the book swap.

On Friday night, President Alan Schwerin greeted everyone present at a welcoming buffet. At the buffet, Schwerin presented the 2001 BRS Paper Award to Giovanni Vianelli for his paper "The Centenary of the Paradox: Pythagoras and Some Recently Discovered Manuscript Pages by Russell." Vianelli accepted the award in person. After this, BRS Awards Committee Chair Peter Stone presented the 2001 BRS Award to Stephen Toulmin, Henry R. Luce Professor at the Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies at the University of Southern California. Toulmin also accepted the award in person, and gave a brief history of his personal encounters with Russell. Ray Perkins then presented the 2001 BRS Book Award to Thom Weidlich (a freelance journalist) for his book *Appointment Denied: the Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus Books, 2000). Weidlich was also there to accept the award in person, and

expressed his appreciation to the BRS. Toulmin concluded the evening for the Society with an address entitled "Rationality and Reasonableness in Twentieth-Century Philosophy." The address was based on Toulmin's recently published book, *Return to Reason* (Harvard University Press, 2001).

After the conclusion of the evening, the Board of Directors held its annual meeting (see Minutes of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the BRS Board of Directors).

Nick Griffin led off the program Saturday morning with "What Was Russell Trying to Do in *Principia Mathematica*?" an introductory talk aimed at non-philosophers. Alan Schwerin chaired this session. Andy Bone chaired the second session, in which Giovanni Vianelli presented the paper which received the 2001 BRS Paper Award, "The Centenary of the Paradox: Pythagoras and Some Recently Discovered Manuscript Pages by Russell." Steve Bayne then concluded the Saturday morning session with a paper entitled "Toulmin and the Discovery of History." Ken Blackwell chaired this session, and Stephen Toulmin took the opportunity to respond to Bayne's remarks.

The members of the BRS then had the opportunity to avail themselves of numerous opportunities. These opportunities included a tour of the Bertrand Russell Archives, where other CD-ROMs were available; another session of the book swap and book sale by the Russell Archives; a continuous showing of two videos on Russell (this continued throughout the entire meeting); a trip to the McMaster Bookstore featuring numerous books by and about Russell; and lunch.

After lunch, the BRS held its 2001 Business Meeting. Alan Schwerin welcomed all BRS members to the business meeting, and congratulated the three newly elected officers of the Society and Board—Ray Perkins (Vice President), Steve Bayne (Secretary of the Society and Board), and Peter Friedman (Vice President for Outreach). He also congratulated the reelected officers—Dennis Darland (Treasurer) and Ken Blackwell (Chairman of the Board).

Ken Blackwell proposed a change in the Bylaws. He noted that there has been some confusion as to the number of officers of the Society and Board. He therefore proposed revising as follows the sentence at the start of Article 7, Section 1 of the Bylaws:

"The Society shall have the following five officers: President, Vice President, Treasurer, Secretary, and Chairman of the Board."

This motion, Blackwell, observed, would explicitly recognize that special Vice Presidents (which the Board could create) were not officers. Thom Weidlich seconded the motion. Alan Schwerin found the idea of having officeholders (like special Vice Presidents) who were not "officers" rather odd. Dave Henehan asked for clarification as to the purpose of the motion. Blackwell explained that the goal would be to clarify who would be consulted during the day-to-day operations of the BRS. Peter Friedman suggested that a distinction between executive and non-executive officers might be a better way of drawing this distinction.

David Blitz saw good reason in having 5 officers to consult. An inquiry was made if the laws of Illinois had any ramifications for this proposed change, and further asked if the motion would have any bearing on the BRS's ability to sign checks and contracts. Alan Schwerin answered that three people currently had the power to sign checks for the BRS—himself (President), Peter Stone (outgoing Secretary), and Dennis Darland (Treasurer).

Alan Schwerin proposed substituting for the proposed amendment the creation of an Executive Committee. The amended version of the amendment would substitute the following for the second sentence:

"The Society shall have an Executive Committee composed of the following five officers of the Society and Board: President, Vice President, Secretary of the Society and Board, Treasurer, and Chairman of the Board. There may also be other Vice Presidents whose duties shall be specified by the Board; these will not be members of the Executive Committee."

Ken Blackwell accepted this amendment, noting that the Executive Committee would (quite properly) leave the President in charge of most executive decision-making. The motion carried 20-0, with two abstentions.

The Society then considered a motion by Peter Stone to expel John Boland from the BRS, an act deemed "appropriate" by the Board (as Alan Schwerin pointed out) by an overwhelming majority. Peter Stone laid out his case for expulsion, a case based on Boland's continued abuse of the BRS's e-mail listserv, BRS-List, as well as his repeated refusal to remove BRS members' personal e-mail addresses from his own

distribution list. Steve Bayne provided a defense of Boland, as requested by Schwerin.

Alan Schwerin inquired if any member had ever been expelled before. Ken Blackwell answered that only one expulsion has ever occurred (that of John Sutcliffe), and it took place in 1981. Thom Weidlich requested that the Bylaw governing expulsion (Article 5, Section 9 of the BRS Bylaws) be read; Ken Blackwell did so. Blackwell further explained that the Bylaws required expulsion decisions to be resolved at the BRS Business Meeting if the Board deemed an expulsion "appropriate" within two months of the scheduled Business Meeting. Otherwise, the matter would have been resolved by mail. He added Boland was informed of this procedure several weeks in advance of the Annual Meeting, but Boland decided not to attend.

The Society then debated the merits of the proposal, including alternatives to expulsion and the precedents set by this particular expulsion. After extensive discussion, the Society approved the motion by a vote of 23-7, with 4 abstentions. In addition to the members present, the following members voted by proxy: Derek Araujo, Javier Bonet, Gordon Diss, Don Jackanicz, Taslima Nasrin, Bob Riemenschneider, David Rodier, Ibn Warraq, Charles Weyand, and Gerry Wildenberg. Schwerin and Blackwell indicated they would write to Boland informing him of his expulsion, and would direct the Treasurer to refund Boland's membership renewal and donation for the year 2001.

The BRS then moved on to other business. Alan Schwerin called for treasury and membership reports. Ken Blackwell directed the BRS to Dennis Darland's last treasury report (published in the May 2001 issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*) and indicated that the Society had received 116 renewals thus far this year. Schwerin urged everyone to either join the BRS or renew their membership as appropriate. Warren Allen Smith moved to approve these reports, Kevin Brodie seconded, and the motion carried unanimously.

The Business Meeting concluded with a pair of announcements. Peter Stone announced that he had taken over as editor of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, and urged members to send materials for publication to the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS), which will now collectively produce the publication. And Ray Perkins invited all members to brainstorm for possible sites for the 2002 Annual Meeting. Ken Blackwell added that members should propose their own cities as possible sites, not the cities of other people. Phoenix, Arizona and Lake

Forest, Illinois were suggested in the manner Blackwell advised, and Schwerin will consider these proposals.

Saturday afternoon began with David Blitz's paper "Did Russell Really Advocate Preventive War against the USSR?" in a session chaired by Rosalind Carey. Before the start of the next session, it was announced that Routledge had made available exam copies of some of its Russell-related books. These books were available to meeting participants at a 20% discount. Peter Stone chaired the session that followed, which featured Andy Bone's "Russell and the Communist-Aligned Peace Movement in the 1950s." Kevin Brodie then presented "Russell, Gardner and Home Room: Philosophy Class in High School." David Blitz chaired this session. The afternoon concluded with a panel discussion of Ray Monk's *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness* chaired by Alan Schwerin. Panel participants included Tim Madigan, Peter Stone, Warren Allen Smith, and Peter Friedman. After a brief recess, the BRS held its Red Hackle Hour and banquet. Nick Griffin capped off the evening with his talk "How the Russell Papers Came to McMaster."

Sunday morning began with Chad Trainer's "Bertrand Russell: A Carneades Incarnate," presented in a session chaired by David White. Ray Perkins chaired the following session, which featured a paper by Rosalind Carey entitled "Why Did Russell Accept Neutral Monism?" Alan Schwerin then spoke on "Metaphysics, Mysticism and Russell." Stefan Andersson chaired this session. Thom Weidlich chaired the final session, in which David White capped off the paper sessions with his "Russell, Smith, and the Religion of the Future."

Ken Blackwell then reiterated the call for meeting attendees to join the BRS if they had not done so already. He also urged them to nominate candidates for the forthcoming Board elections. Blackwell then announced that the BRS had enough Red Hackle left from its Saturday Red Hackle Hour to provide for a future meeting at McMaster, and that he had already e-mailed John Boland about his expulsion (and received no less than six e-mails in response) and removed him from BRS-List. Alan Schwerin and the Society then thanked Blackwell appreciatively for his work in organizing the meeting. Blackwell then asked that the BRS thank Arlene Duncan and Alison Miculan for their work on the meeting, and the Society did so. A brief Special Board Meeting then took place to wrap up a few loose ends (see the Minutes of the First 2001 Special Meeting of the BRS Board of Directors). The meeting attendees then enjoyed a delicious barbecue before departing.

Minutes of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the BRS Board of Directors

Peter Stone Secretary, BRS Board of Directors

The BRS Board of Directors held its annual meeting on Friday, May 25, 2001, in conjunction with the BRS Annual Meeting at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. Ken Blackwell chaired. Peter Stone took notes. Directors present were Steve Bayne, Ken Blackwell, Kevin Brodie, Nick Griffin, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Thom Weidlich, and David White. A number of other BRS members, including Peter Friedman, also attended the meeting.

Ray Perkins moved to waive a reading of the minutes from the last Board meeting and to approve the minutes. Alan Schwerin seconded, and the motion was approved unanimously.

Ken Blackwell then decided to postpone election of officers until the end of the meeting, and brought up the issue of expenditures. The Bertrand Russell Archives had recently bid for a manuscript—a draft of Russell's essay "Mysticism and Logic"—in an internet auction. Before the auction, Blackwell had in his capacity as Honorary Russell Archivist decided at the 11th hour to ask the BRS to put up \$1000 towards the Archives bid. President Alan Schwerin, Vice President Tim Madigan, Secretary Peter Stone, and Treasurer Dennis Darland all approved of Blackwell's request, and so the Archives proceeded to the auction with a pledge from the BRS in hand. The bid failed; the winning bid was for \$17,000, and as auction-watchers within the BRS predicted, the manuscript was immediately thereafter available for bids at a higher asking price (\$45,000). The BRS's pledge did not affect the outcome; there were two bids considerably higher than any amount the Archives could have raised.

Ken Blackwell asked the Board for guidance on the question of future large potential purchases such as these. Was the Board, he asked, content to allow the officers to agree to make decisions on purchases of this size? Peter Stone pointed out that technically, the buck had to stop somewhere, and that there was no provision for the officers of the Society and Board to make decisions of any kind collectively (by majority vote, for example). Alan Schwerin was wary of setting bad precedent via bids of this kind, and supported Blackwell's call for guidance on this matter.

Nick Griffin observed that the Board could respond to this request in numerous ways. Perhaps the solution, as Ken Blackwell proposed, lay in entrusting the decision to a majority vote among the officers after all. Thom Weidlich proposed that the limit on such large purchases be \$1000. Ken Blackwell, however, did not want a limit. Steve Reinhardt observed that such limits usually apply to officers at subordinate levels in corporations, although not at the top. Peter Stone observed that the issue of a limit was only half the matter; the other half was the question of the person or group empowered to make such spending decisions, with or without a limit.

Nick Griffin moved that the Board restrict the power of the Society's officers to make spending decisions of this sort to \$1000 or 10% of the Society's cash in hand, whichever was greater. Ken Blackwell ruled that this constituted a proposed amendment to the Bylaws of the BRS, and so was out of order for a Board vote. Peter Stone, however, questioned why this would qualify as a Bylaw amendment; surely, he observed, the Board could direct the BRS's officers on questions of policy without constantly changing the Bylaws. Blackwell then reversed himself, and permitted the motion. Steve Bayne seconded the motion.

Steve Reinhardt revisited the question of whose actions would be restricted by the amendment. Was it to be a majority of officers thus restricted, and if so, for which spending decisions? All of them? Peter Stone asked for clarification on the question of who could at present sign checks on behalf of the BRS. Alan Schwerin indicated that at present, three people had that power—Alan Schwerin (President), Peter Stone (Secretary), and Dennis Darland (Treasurer). Of the three, however, only Darland is currently in possession of any blank checks.

Alan Schwerin observed that ultimately, there was no foolproof solution to this matter, that at some point the Board had to trust someone to make judgment calls on questions like this. Nick Griffin decided in response to withdraw his motion. Thom Weidlich moved that the Board express its approval of the current informal arrangements (informal consultation among the officers) for handling purchasing decisions of this sort. Tim Madigan seconded the motion, and the motion carried 11-1.

Ken Blackwell then announced that the Board's vote indicating that expulsion of John Boland from the BRS might be appropriate had carried. The final vote total, according to Alan Schwerin (who counted the ballots to so as to make the process as fair as possible), was 18-2. As President, Schwerin will preside over the expulsion motion at the Society

Business meeting on Saturday, May 26. Peter Stone, as the Society member making the expulsion motion, will present his case for expulsion. Steve Bayne will then (at the request of Schwerin), offer a defense of Boland (who will not be present at the meeting), and then, following a discussion the Society will vote on the matter. Schwerin promised to prevent the whole process from dragging on forever.

The Board then took up the question of the 2002 Annual Meeting. In pursuance of the Board's expressed desire for a west coast meeting in the near future, Peter Stone has been in contact with Charles Weyand, a longtime member of the BRS who lives in Los Angeles. Weyand is willing to work with other west coast Society members in setting up a meeting in Los Angeles next year; he has already contacted many of them and received varying degrees of support. He has not, however, proposed a definite meeting time or place. In addition, as Alan Schwerin pointed out, a meeting in Los Angeles could be expensive.

In light of the indeterminate nature of the Los Angeles proposal, Ken Blackwell expressed the desire for a backup location. Thom Weidlich suggested Rochester. David White expressed some interest but thought that the timing could be cut very close if Rochester had to wait and see if Los Angeles would work out. He also outlined some of the shortcomings of meeting in Rochester—most notably, the absence of high-quality meeting space. Steve Bayne suggested that MIT might be a suitable venue in Boston, but did not push the matter further. Peter Friedman mentioned the University of Pittsburgh in the same light; furthermore, as home to the papers of F.P. Ramsey and Rudolph Carnap, it might be especially appropriate. However, Peter Stone asked if the BRS had any active members in Pittsburgh, and received a negative response.

Ken Blackwell stressed the need for fresh ideas as to meeting sites, and proposed asking the Society for further ideas at its business meeting the following day. Thom Weidlich, however, felt uncomfortable with leaving the matter without a motion, and Peter Stone and Steve Bayne concurred.

Ray Perkins suggested the Society revisit the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, NY (near Buffalo). Tim Madigan agreed to breach the idea with his contacts there but was not optimistic. In addition, he seconded David White's assessment of the drawbacks of Rochester.

Ken Blackwell stressed that the BRS had not met on the west coast since 1993. If not a west coast meeting now, he asked, then when? He proposed working with Charles Weyand to secure a place and time by

June 30, and going with a backup location (as yet to be determined) after that. Kevin Brodie proposed reserving space in Buffalo and then canceling if Los Angeles worked out. Nick Griffin, however, indicated that such a move would double the work and expense of the early stages of the meeting process. David White supported Blackwell's proposal, but stressed the importance of having people with experience organizing conferences involved with the process; if Weyand had no such experience, that meant that the President and others would have to work very closely with him. There was no substitute, however, for a person "on the ground" at the meeting site. Peter Stone expressed agreement.

The Board continued brainstorming for possible meeting places. Steve Bayne indicated having attended a good conference at SUNY Buffalo; perhaps a good meeting could be organized there. Ray Perkins thought that his own university (Plymouth State College, in central New Hampshire) might be able to serve as host. Nick Griffin suggested McMaster follow Alan Schwerin and Monmouth University in hosting the meeting twice in a row, an idea of which Ken Blackwell did not approve.

Steve Bayne suggested Iowa and Chicago as other possibilities. Ken Blackwell, however, reiterated the need for a BRS member onsite, and proposed working with Los Angeles, with Plymouth State College as a backup. Peter Stone asked if a motion was required to this effect, as was done in previous years. Blackwell said no. Alan Schwerin then moved that the Board make no motion on the question of a 2002 meeting site. Nick Griffin seconded the motion, only to have Blackwell rule the motion out of order. The Board then proceeded to waste much time with Russell Paradox-related jokes about a motion not to make a motion. In the end, the Board decided (without a motion, paradoxical or otherwise) to leave the annual meeting location site in the hands of the officers of the Society and Board, with the understanding that Los Angeles and Plymouth State College would be the first and second meeting location choices, respectively.

The next item on the Board's agenda concerned the Society's publication. The Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS, the BRS's unofficial chapter in Rochester, New York) had produced the May issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* in May (the first time in several years when an issue of the *Quarterly* had appeared in the month advertised). Peter Stone, as a member of the GRRS, proposed that the Board

- 1) officially reestablish the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* (officially disbanded at the 2000 Annual Board Meeting, but unofficially revived by the GRRS);
- 2) establish a *Quarterly* Committee, with the responsibility of producing the *Quarterly*, and with the understanding that the Chair of this Committee would also serve as editor of the *Quarterly*; and
- 3) appoint Peter Stone as Chairman of this Committee.

Ken Blackwell expressed approval of this proposal. He argued that it was about time the Society placed its *Quarterly* operations on an official level. Kevin Brodie moved that the Board approve Peter Stone's proposal, and Alan Schwerin seconded the motion.

Alan Schwerin asked if any Rochester-area universities would be involved with the project. David White explained that St. John Fisher College had provided the tax-exempt status for the nonprofit mailing rate but did not furnish further support. He suggested the BRS establish what would be necessary to send the *Quarterly* out under its own imprimatur should this prove necessary. He further urged Dennis Darland to send him a check for the May issue as soon as possible.

Peter Friedman suggested the BRS consider a web version of the *Quarterly*. Peter Stone promised to investigate the possibility after the GRRS had placed the publication on a secure footing. After further discussion and clarification, the Board passed the motion endorsing Stone's proposal unanimously.

The Board then held elections for Board and Society officers. The Board first considered whether to maintain the Vice Presidency for Humanist Outreach. Steve Bayne moved that the office be changed to a more general Vice Presidency for Outreach, and that Peter Friedman be elected to this position. Warren Allen Smith seconded, and the Board approved the motion unanimously.

The Board then elected the following officers by acclamation:

Treasurer—Dennis Darland (nominated by Weidlich, seconded by Schwerin)
President—Alan Schwerin (nominated by Perkins, seconded by Griffin)
Secretary of the Society and Board—Steve Bayne (nominated by Perkins, seconded by Weidlich)
Vice President—Ray Perkins (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Madigan)

Chair—Ken Blackwell (nominated by Stone, seconded by Schwerin)

Ken Blackwell was reluctant to stand for reelection, and only agreed to do so because of the evident lack of other candidates.

The final issue taken up by the Board at this meeting was the question of BRS-List, the BRS's listserv. The repeated spamming of this list by John Boland has prompted Ken Blackwell to seek more explicit Board authorization from this list, rather than the tacit, unofficial support currently given to it. With such authorization, he would feel better equipped to deal with possible abuses of the list. Peter Stone moved that

- 1) BRS-List become an official listserv for the BRS;
- 2) The purpose of BRS-List is to allow members to make BRS-related announcements and to discuss BRS-related business (in accordance with the more detailed description of the list proffered by Ken Blackwell);
- 3) The list-owner of BRS-List be empowered to ensure that BRS-List serve this purpose, using all appropriate means up to and including removal of a BRS member from the listserv; and
- 4) Ken Blackwell be approved as list-owner of BRS-List.

Thom Weidlich seconded Peter Stone's motion, which the Board then unanimously approved.

**Minutes of the Special Meeting of the BRS Board of
Directors
Peter Stone
Secretary, BRS Board of Directors**

The BRS Board of Directors held a special meeting on Sunday, May 27, 2001, in conjunction with the BRS Annual Meeting at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. Ken Blackwell chaired. Peter Stone took notes. Directors present were Stefan Andersson, Steve Bayne, Ken Blackwell, Tim Madigan, Steve Reinhardt, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Thom Weidlich, and David White. Peter Friedman also attended; as Vice President for Outreach, he participated as an *ex officio* Director. A number of other BRS members, including Dave Henehan, also attended the meeting.

At the conclusion of the 2001 Annual Meeting, Ken Blackwell realized that the BRS Board of Directors had left several issues unresolved. He

therefore, in conjunction with Directors Steve Reinhardt and Peter Stone, called for a special meeting in accordance with the Bylaws of the BRS Board of Directors. Blackwell arranged the special meeting to coincide with the tail end of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the BRS so as to ensure maximum possible participation of the Board, in accordance with the Board's Bylaws (Article 6, Section 2).

Ken Blackwell opened the meeting by expressing his wish to amend the Bylaws of the BRS Board of Directors. Currently, those Bylaws set a quorum for a Board meeting of only 3 directors (out of 24 plus *ex officio* directors). Moreover, a special meeting of the BRS Board of Directors can be called upon the request of only 3 directors (as was done in the case of this special meeting). Blackwell found the number for the quorum far too low, and urged the Board to consider amending this provision. Peter Stone moved that the Board raise the quorum for a board meeting to 6 (thus changing Article 6, Section 4 of the Board Bylaws). Steve Bayne seconded.

Stefan Andersson questioned the need for such a change in the Bylaws. Ken Blackwell responded by explaining the circumstances under which he recognized the need for change. In the days leading up to the opening of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre (held in November 2000), Blackwell had asked the Board if the directors attending wished to hold a special Board meeting so as to address the question of declining membership. Some directors indicated that they would not be attending the opening but favored a special meeting. This drew Blackwell's attention to how easy it was to schedule a special Board meeting, and how low the quorum was.

Peter Friedman worried that this change might cause the BRS to react too slowly to new circumstances. Ken Blackwell assured him that most Society business was conducted by the various officers, and now by the newly formed Executive Committee. Alan Schwerin added that as things stood now a small number of directors could take some action that would embarrass the BRS against the wishes of the majority, and Blackwell concurred that the change would provide a safety net against this possibility. Peter Friedman then admitted that this method could be tried and changed if it did not work.

Warren Allen Smith asked if there was any advantage to an odd quorum. Stefan Andersson asked if there was any advantage to an even one. Ken Blackwell said no to both. Steve Bayne asked if proxy votes could affect

the procedure at all. Ken Blackwell said that proxy votes were acceptable only for votes of the Society as a whole, not the Board.

Alan Schwerin said that the number requested in the motion was an improvement without setting a figure too high as to pose problems with regular Board meetings. Peter Stone concurred, but added that the Chair should make a strong effort to encourage enough directors to attend meetings so as to obviate the problem of the quorum. The Board then passed the motion 10-0, with 1 abstention.

Peter Stone then noted that he was stepping down as BRS Awards Committee Chair. He nominated Kevin Brodie to take over the position. Warren Allen Smith seconded the motion, and it carried 10-0, with 1 abstention. This concluded the meeting.

* * *

A Post-Meeting Note from the Chair

The accounts for the annual meeting are complete. The meeting was designed to break even, and it did. There was even a slight surplus of \$40 for the BRS treasury. In addition, the meeting attracted 7 new members for the Society, and t-shirt sales netted \$148.20.

Thanks are due the Bertrand Russell Research Centre (and its director, Nick Griffin), which hosted the meeting, Alison Miculan, Arlene Duncan, David Godden, and Liz Blackwell.

-Ken Blackwell

* * *

The 5th Biennial Radical Philosophy Association Conference will be held at Brown University on November 7-10, 2002. The theme of the conference is "Activism, Ideology, and Radical Philosophy." Please send paper, workshop, poster, and other proposals to RPA PROGRAM COMMITTEE, c/o Lisa Heldke, Philosophy Department, Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, MN 56802. Or send them as an attachment to heldke@gac.edu. The deadline for submissions is **January 31, 2002**. For more information on the RPA, go to www.radicalphilosophy.org.

Articles:

The Manuscript of "Mysticism and Logic" at Auction Carl Spadoni

"At last I have a bone with meat on it," L.P. Jacks, the editor of *The Hibbert Journal*, told Russell on 20 April 1912, after reading his essay, "Mysticism and Logic." "If you had my work for a week you would know what a joy it is," Jacks added. Russell's essay, which focuses on the tension between the mystical and the logical, is unquestionably one of his most important pieces of writing. First published in July 1914 in *The Hibbert Journal*, it has been reprinted frequently. The section of the essay called "Reason and Intuition" appeared in Russell's Lowell Lectures, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914). The essay was the lead article in *Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays* (1918).

Writing the essay did not come easy to Russell, however. He was dissatisfied with its first draft on 11 January 1914 because it consisted mainly of scraps from other lectures. Even when he altered it a few days later, he was disappointed with the result. He told Lady Ottoline Morrell that the essay was "sober, careful, and balanced" but not eloquent. Jacks sent proofs to Russell on 28 April 1914. He returned the manuscript by separate post to Russell at Trinity College, Cambridge. When Russell was lecturing in the United States in May of the same year, he gave the manuscript as a gift to his good friend, Lucy Donnelly. When Professor John Slater edited the essay for volume 8 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, he was unable to locate the manuscript in Donnelly's archives or elsewhere. Its whereabouts were unknown for more than 85 years. The fact that the manuscript surfaced at auction in San Francisco on 10 May of this year was cause for excitement among Russell scholars.

According to the description in Butterfields' auction catalogue (lot 3067), the manuscript is 44 pages long. The estimate was modest, between \$4,000 and \$6,000. Russell's manuscript was one of many treasures in the catalogue—an early photo of Hitler as a corporal, a page of a manuscript by Isaac Newton, letters from Margaret Mitchell, and most conspicuously, a battered briefcase embossed "J.F.K." (apparently a wedding present from Jacqueline Bouvier to her future husband, John F. Kennedy). At McMaster University, however, only the Russell manuscript interested us. Butterfields reproduced the first page in facsimile. Even a brief glimpse of it showed that there were textual variants and deletions. Bob Riemenschneider of the BRS viewed the manuscript in San Francisco and confirmed that there were many more.

The Honorary Russell Archivist, Kenneth Blackwell, and I discussed our bid and the market value of the manuscript several times. Initially, we thought that we might be lucky to purchase it for under \$10,000. Auctions are unpredictable, and the amounts paid for Russell manuscripts and letters vary considerably, depending on their content and the dealer who owns the document in question. We also attempted, rather impossibly, to judge the importance of the manuscript's research value relative to other Russell documents that might come on the market. We didn't want to purchase the manuscript simply for its iconographic cachet. We revised our bid several times. The Library, the Russell Research Centre and members of the Russell Society jointly raised \$15,000 for our bid.

A dealer from San Francisco, Michael Thompson, phoned me about the manuscript a couple of weeks before the auction. Thompson has sold a number of Russell manuscripts and other items to the Russell archives since 1970. He intimated that the manuscript would fetch many times the catalogue estimate, and he also mentioned that several dealers and collectors would be interested in its purchase. At this point we knew that our bid was in jeopardy. Another contact in California informed us that unless we were prepared to put between \$30,000 and \$50,000 on the table, our bid would be unsuccessful. The contact's prediction proved to be correct. The winning bid was \$17,000. With auction fees the manuscript's price came close to \$20,000.

The manuscript is now owned jointly by three antiquarian book dealers—Michael Thompson, Heritage Book Shop, and Bernard Quaritch. Their asking price is \$45,000. In comparison to the \$2.4 million recently paid by the owner of the Indiana Colts for the typescript scroll of Jack Kerouac's *On the Road*, \$45,000 may appear to be rather paltry. Yet it is a considerable sum for one Russell manuscript. Given the Library's budget and other funding sources available through the Russell Research Centre, it is unlikely that we will be able to raise this amount unless a donor can be found. Admittedly, we are disappointed that McMaster University was unable to purchase the manuscript. Since the Russell Archives came to McMaster in 1968, we have been able throughout the years to purchase many significant Russell documents. The auction has brought to the attention of the educated public and the scholarly world one of Russell's greatest essays.

Carl Spadoni is Research Collections Librarian at Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, home of the Bertrand Russell Archives.

**One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox:
International Conference in Logic and Philosophy
University of Munich, 2-5 June 2001
Nick Griffin**

Russell discovered the paradox which bears his name in either May or June 1901, depending upon whether you believe his *Autobiography* or the autobiographical essay, "My Mental Development," which he wrote for the volume edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (most recently published in paperback by Open Court, 1990). One hardly likes to talk about "celebrating" an event which caused so much trouble, but the wonderful four-day conference organized by Godehard Link and his colleagues at the University of Munich shows that logicians will use any excuse to have a good time.

The conference brought together philosophers, logicians, set theorists and historians and philosophers of mathematics from all over the world to discuss Russell's paradox and its aftermath. Fifty-one papers were presented over the four days, plus two symposia and two evening panel discussions, so participants had to pick and choose which sessions they went to—often with considerable difficulty from a range of equally tempting items. The fact that one had to choose between hearing Hans Kamp on definite descriptions and Alasdair Urquhart on Russell's "zig-zag" theory gives some idea of the difficulty.

Participants were worked hard, with sessions beginning at 9:00 a.m. and continuing through the evening. Alas, this left little time for sight-seeing—though I can report that Leopoldstrasse, which ran from the hotel to the conference hall, was pleasant and spacious. We got a brief glimpse of Munich's cultural life on Saturday afternoon when Leopoldstrasse was cordoned off for a large technopop festival. Unfortunately, it poured with rain for the whole event and few of us were tempted to linger with the handful of drenched fans dutifully bopping in the street. Discussions, of course, were carried on over meals in restaurants around the hotel. In one, a group of us got so carried away discussing the Gray's *Elegy* argument in "On Denoting" that the restaurateur had to ask us to be quiet—this was probably the first time that particular argument could be cited as the cause of disorderly conduct in a restaurant.

The line-up of speakers was quite spectacular, with John Bell, Charles Chihara, Sol Feferman, Harvey Friedman, Geoffrey Hellman, Hans Kamp, Per Martin-Löf, Vann McGee, Yiannis Moschovakis, Charles

Parsons, Graham Priest, Alasdair Urquhart, and Hugh Woodin among the logicians and set theorists, and Allen Hazen, Peter Hylton, Andrew Irvine, Greg Landini, Bernard Linksy, Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra, and Russell Wahl among the Russellians. Jan Mycielski and Ray Monk were scheduled to attend, but did not show up. David Kaplan was there but did not give a paper, though he contributed frequently to the discussions and also to the panel discussion on Russell.

The Russell panel, held on Sunday night, was a lively event chaired by Andrew Irvine. Peter Hylton, David Kaplan, Alasdair Urquhart, and myself were panellists, and the talk, much of it in response to questions from the floor, ranged widely over Russell's work and even, to some extent, his life. Your reporter was lured into speaking injudiciously and ill of Wittgenstein, though in this company he was more mildly reprimanded than he might have expected. More seriously, I was especially pleased to have the opportunity to talk about the work of McMaster's newly created Bertrand Russell Research Centre.

The set theorists in the second panel on the following night were much more serious. David McCarty, Sol Feferman, Harvey Friedman and Hugh Woodin took part, with Yiannis Moschovakis in the chair—one could hardly do better for expertise than that. It was a surprise to some of us outsiders to see just how passionately they are divided over the constructivism vs. realism issue. Very little in this century-old dispute seems to have been settled and even things that one thought were settled seem now to be open again. Most remarkable here were Woodin's comments—a preview of his paper (the very last at the conference), "Set Theory after Russell: The Journey back to Eden." (The title refers to Hilbert's remark that mathematicians would never be expelled from the paradise that Cantor had created for them.) Woodin ended his talk with the conjectures that Cantor's continuum hypothesis would turn out to be decidable—contrary to Paul Cohen's 1963 proof—that it would be shown to be false and that the cardinality of the continuum would prove to be \aleph_2 . This was the most surprising news that your reporter took away from the entire conference—indeed, that he had heard in a very long time!

Several of the papers on Russell were only obliquely on the paradox and its resolution. Peter Hylton, for example, compared Frege's concept of a function with Russell's, and Rodriguez-Consuegra spoke on Russell's theory of judgment from 1910-18. Some of the papers were not on the paradoxes at all. Two, by Vann McGee and Sebastiano Moruzzi, were on Russell's 1923 paper on vagueness, casually dismissed by Ray Monk as "arguably the weakest piece of philosophical writing that Russell...had

produced" to that date. I missed Moruzzi's paper (in order to hear James Levine on Russell and Moore at the turn of the century), but McGee's was an important piece dealing with quite serious problems in semantics broached in Russell's paper for the first time.

Recent books by Bernard Linksy and Gregory Landini have taken radically different views of *Principia Mathematica*. They aired their differences at the conference in a special symposium on propositional functions—and on several other occasions. Continuing work by Allen Hazen, who spoke on "Interpreting the 1925 Logic," has served to convince me that there is more mileage in *PM2* (for all its mistakes) than I had previously supposed.

Russell's paradox remains a potent source of difficult for logicians and set theorists. Many current ways of dealing with it were discussed at the conference—with constructive and type theoretic approaches taking pride of place. These, of course, are not mutually exclusive and elements of both can be found in *PM*. An approach I favour—of which there is definitely no trace in *PM*—is that of abandoning classical logic. This view was represented at the conference by Alan Weir and Graham Priest, who nonetheless took different views as to how to implement the project. Weir recommended placing restrictions on condition Cut (transitivity of implication) and Priest the adoption of a paraconsistent metatheory. Both projects are yet in their early stages and—sad to say—on account of Curry's paradox, not even a paraconsistent metatheory will save a logic with unrestricted comprehension principles from triviality.

Russell's work—even his weakest, if we are to believe Monk—remains a lively source of controversy. There is still no commonly accepted way of dealing with the paradoxes and each attempt to eliminate them seems to produce similar problems somewhere else. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Russell seemed drawn to that we are doing something deeply, deeply wrong. "Never glad, confident morning again," as Whitehead said when Russell first told him of the problem.

Nick Griffin is Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University.

Regular Features:

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

The philosopher Stephen Toulmin attended the 2001 BRS Meeting at McMaster University to accept his award in person. BRS Awards Committee Chair Peter Stone made the following remarks before presenting the award to Toulmin:

In recent years, the BRS has presented its Award to a number of distinguished and impressive figures—Irving Copi, Stephen Jay Gould, Henry Morgentaler, Karl Popper, and others. However, this year's Award recipient, Stephen Toulmin, has one outstanding quality that all of these other fine figures lack—he had the intelligence and good taste to show up and accept his award in person. We at the BRS are honored and privileged by Professor Toulmin's presence at our Annual Meeting.

Professor Toulmin was born in England, and studied mathematics and physics at King's College. After the war, he studied philosophy at Cambridge with (among others) Ludwig Wittgenstein. He received his doctorate in 1948, having written a dissertation on the place of reason in ethics, subsequently published as a book under that title.

Professor Toulmin has taught at numerous institutions, including Oxford, Melbourne, University of Leeds, Columbia, Dartmouth, Michigan State, Northwestern, Stanford, and the University of California at Santa Cruz. His many books include *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (co-authored with Alan Janik; Simon and Schuster, 1973), *The Abuse of Casuistry* (co-authored with Albert Jonsen; University of California Press, 1988), *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Free Press, 1990), and most famously *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge University Press, 1958). This modern classic argued that not all types of argument can or should be held to the standards of formal logic. His most recent book, *A Return to Reason* (Harvard University Press, 2001), continues this critique, arguing that too formal a conception of rationality can impoverish our notion of reason.

Professor Toulmin presently serves as Henry R. Luce Professor at the Center for Multiethnic and Transnational Studies at the University of Southern California. This title, coupled with the background described all-too-sketchily above, demonstrates well why he is receiving the BRS Award this year. Toulmin has worked on many issues of great concern to Russell, such as philosophy of science and the nature of ethics. He has pursued these issues with the same disdain for disciplinary boundaries that Russell himself practiced. In an era which produces specialists

without the vast classical training assumed of philosophers in the previous century, it is rare to see someone demonstrate the breadth of knowledge that Stephen Toulmin has.

In his book *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, Professor Toulmin argued that much of the spirit of innovation gets lost when a particular set of tools become ends in themselves, and the purposes for which they were to be used fall into neglect. Philosophy has itself been dogged by this problem. In the wake of the analytic revolution pioneered by Frege, Wittgenstein, and (of course) Russell, many so-called disciples of the greats are content to work ever more esoterically on refining their formal systems without regard to the profound problems the giants created these systems to solve. Professor Toulmin himself has done much to keep philosophers' "eyes on the prize," as it were, and for this he deserves the respect of anyone who professes to honor the legacy of a man like Russell. And so it is my great pleasure to present the 2001 Award of the Bertrand Russell Society to Stephen Toulmin. The Award Reads,

The 2001 Bertrand Russell Society Award to STEPHEN TOULMIN

For pursuing the life of the mind across disciplinary boundaries
in the spirit of Bertrand Russell

* * *

Here are some selected quotes relating to Toulmin from the meeting.

"I have a terrible Tristram Shandy-like tendency to elaborate."

Stephen Toulmin

"Is that the kind of argument that would have convinced Hitler?"

Bertrand Russell, in response to Stephen Toulmin's argument in *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*

"I was afraid I might find myself in a nest of symbolic logicians."

Toulmin, explaining why he was nervous about attending the BRS Annual Meeting.

"I'm very metaphysical about this."

Steve Bayne, in his presentation on Toulmin.

“God, sir, I was a genius when I wrote that.”

Samuel Johnson, in response to prompting by Boswell (Toulmin quoted this in his response to Bayne’s presentation).

* * *

BRS Books Awards Committee Chair Ray Perkins presented the 2001 BRS Book Award to Thom Weidlich. In doing so he made the following remarks:

The BRS 2001 Book Award is for the best book on Russell's life or work published in the previous year. This year's competition was unusually difficult owing to the excellence among the contenders, which included Gideon Makin's, *The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation* (London: Routledge); Ray Monk's *Bertrand Russell: the Ghost of Madness* (London: J. Cape); Richard Rempel and Beryl Haslam's Vol. 15 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Uncertain Paths to Freedom: Russia and China, 1919-22* (London, New York: Routledge); Jack Odell's *On Russell* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth); and Thom Weidlich's *Appointment Denied: the Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Buffalo: Prometheus).

This year's award goes to Thom Weidlich for *Appointment Denied*. This important account of one of the most disturbing episodes in Russell's life and one of the most shameful in the history of U.S. civil liberty is skillfully told in a way that helps us to better understand both Russell's personal ordeal in the disgraceful City College case and the illiberal character of American politics in 1940.

* * *

The BRS Awards Committee also recently offered the BRS Award to world-renowned linguist, philosopher, and social critic Noam Chomsky. Chomsky, already an honorary member of the BRS, wrote the following letter to Peter Stone in reply:

Dear Peter Stone,

Just received your Nov. 7 letter, delayed for some reason. Can't tell you how much I appreciated the Society Award. It was a great honor for me

to have been able to deliver memorial lectures for Bertrand Russell at Trinity College. This would be yet another. He is one of the rare figures of modern intellectual and social-political life whom I really admire (and the only one whose picture has been prominently in my office for the past 40 years). I am greatly distressed, therefore, that I cannot manage to attend the meeting. I'll spare you the details, but I'm scheduled in harrowing detail far, far ahead. Included in fact is a visit to McMaster, but not at that time: November 2002, date not yet exactly fixed. That was hard to arrange; has been in the works for years. I really would be very pleased to be able to attend a meeting, but attending meetings is one of those many activities I've reluctantly been compelled virtually to abandon, because of the intensity of other demands, which is extreme.

Noam Chomsky

* * *

The October 29, 2000 issue of the *Augusta Chronicle* noted the passing of Dr. Peter Cranford, Sr. Cranford was a retired clinical psychologist who helped create both the game show *The \$64,000 Question*—and the Bertrand Russell Society. Cranford was with the BRS from the very beginning, serving as its first Chairman of the Board and providing generous financial and moral support at a time when the Society desperately needed both. In 1999 he was made an Honorary Member of the BRS in recognition of his tremendous contribution to the Society. *Here's an update from Warren Allen Smith concerning another of our honorary members.*

Taslima Nasrin, an honorary member of the BRS, is finishing up an autobiographical work, *My Girlhood*, that will be published by Steerforth Press (South Royalton, Vermont).

In June, the French Parliament invited Nasrin to speak on the worldwide refugee situation. The occasion was the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention, which guaranteed the right to asylum. “If there were no such law about asylum,” she told them at the event, “I would have been killed by fanatics long ago, as so many others have been.”

When forced to leave Bangladesh in 1993 because of a fatwa placed on her by Muslim fundamentalists, Dr. Nasrin, a physician, fled to Sweden, where she remains today. For a period of time she hid in Germany, Paris, and (with Society member Warren Allen Smith) New York City. More information is available at <http://humanists.net/nasrin/index.html>.

Nelson Mandela has accepted the BRS's offer of honorary membership. A transcription of his letter of acceptance appears below.

01 March 2001

RE: LETTER SENT TO MR. MANDELA

I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter 08 December 2000 addressed to Mr. Mandela. We apologise for the belated response to your communication.

Mr. Mandela has asked that I convey his thanks to you for your letter that you sent to him. The time and trouble you took to send your letter is greatly appreciated.

You can send copies of your Russell Society News to the Nelson Mandela Foundation offices, on the address listed below.

Yours Sincerely,

BUYI SISHUBA
SECRETARY

* * *

News from the Humanist World

The Bertrand Russell Society is an associate member of the International Humanist Ethical Union (IHEU). It encourages its members to become individual supporters of the IHEU as well. Supporters receive free copies of the IHEU's thrice-annually publication, *International Humanist News*, as well as discounts on attendance of IHEU Congresses. Annual membership costs £30 (Visa or MC accepted). To join write to IHEU, 47 Theobalds RD, London WC1X 8SP, or fax +44 207 404 8641. For more information, drop them a line, or visit their website at www.iheu.org.

* * *

Several members of the *BRSQ* Committee have received complimentary copies of the new publication *Commonsense: The Intercollegiate Journal of Humanism and Freethought*. The complimentary copy (Volume 2, Issue 3, spring 2001) is quite good, featuring several excellent student articles on religion and ethical issues as well as an interview with Peter

Singer. The journal promises to be an excellent forum for philosophical and ethical discussion, one that reaches out beyond the traditional academic audience. Subscriptions cost \$25, and can be obtained by writing to *Commonsense*, P.O. Box 370, Princeton, NJ 08542-0370. For more information, contact the journal at 507-252-9403 or at publisher@cs-journal.org. Or visit the journal's website at www.cs-journal.org.

* * *

The *BRSQ* would also like to direct your attention to *Splash!*, the newsletter for the St. Petersburg Largo Area Secular Humanists (SPLASH). The editor is Jan Loeb Eisler, a longtime member of the BRS. The June newsletter contains a fascinating report on the Indian Rationalist Association's efforts to combat an outbreak of mass hysteria in New Delhi, a hysteria based on a mythical "monkey-man" supposedly plaguing the city. Membership in SPLASH costs \$40 for individuals and couples, \$20 for students and low income persons. For more information, write to SPLASH, P.O. Box 8099, Madeira Beach, FL 33738-8099. Or drop Jan Loeb Eisler a line at splash.info@gte.net.

* * *

Rationalist International, a high-quality humanist newsletter based in India, will be hosting the Third International Rationalist Conference on February 8-12, 2002 in New Delhi. Conference registration is already open. For more information, visit *Rationalist International's* website at www.rationalistinternational.net or write to Conference Secretariat International, Rationalist Conference 779, Pocket-5, Mayur Vihar-1, New Delhi 110 091, India.

* * *

The American Humanist Association is currently seeking contestants for its Annual Humanist Essay Contest. Possible topics include "Responding to the Population Crisis," "Alternatives to War in the Twenty-First Century," and "Death with Dignity: Is It the Ultimate Human Right?" First prize is US \$1000. Contestants must be below 25 years of age and residents of North America. For full details on the application process, write to The Humanist Essay Contest, 1777 T Street NW, Washington, DC 20009-7125, or visit the website <http://www.humanist.net/essaycon/>. The deadline for entries is December 1, 2001.

The 2001 edition of *The Freethought Directory* is now available. This organization lists humanist, atheist, and freethought-related groups from around the world. Both the BRS and its Rochester chapter, the GRRS, have listings in this directory. The book costs US \$13, postpaid. To order a copy, just write to Freethought Directory, AAI, P.O. Box 6261, Minneapolis, MN 55406; or visit www.atheistalliance.org. Questions can be directed to the *Directory* editor, Victoria McCoy, at freethoughtdirectory@juno.com.

* * *

Reviews:

Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness*.

Jonathan Cape, 2000. Free Press, 2001.

Part 2

Stefan Andersson

When Russell returned to his Alma Mater, Trinity College, Cambridge, in the fall of 1944, his political views started to attract public attention. Russell feared that the establishment of a World Government would be impossible if Stalin succeeded in producing his own nuclear weapons. Russell suggested that Stalin should be given an ultimatum: either accept the demands of freedom and democracy or face the possibility of a nuclear war. As the Soviet Union soon had nuclear weapons itself, the ultimatum was only briefly threatening. Russell at times expressed himself carelessly, something which Monk comes back to over and over again. A few years later his disdain of Stalin and communism was replaced by an equal disgust for American imperialism.

Russell's marriage to his third wife Peter came to an end soon thereafter. She subsequently forced Conrad to choose between her and his father. As a result, Conrad did not see his father until two years before Russell's death. At the same time it became evident that Russell's other son, John, suffered from severe psychological problems. In 1946 John married Susan Lindsay, daughter of the American poet Vachel Lindsay. Susan also struggled with deep psychological disturbances. When they met, she had been married for two months and had a daughter, Anne, from an earlier relationship (John adopted Anne when he married Susan). In January 1947, the couple had another daughter, Sarah; the following August, the family moved to England. The young couple had difficulties taking care of themselves and their children. For a short while they

stayed with Dora, but conflicts arose between her and Susan. They moved in with Griffin Barry. The situation soon became intolerable and when their third daughter, Lucy, was born, they moved to a smaller apartment. John and Susan lacked the ability to create a stable home and the money John had received through a trust from Russell was soon gone. Russell bought a big house and offered John and his family use of the two top floors.

One year earlier Russell received The Order of Merit and the following year he was awarded The Nobel Prize for literature. He received the news while on a successful lecture tour in the US and in New York, of all places, he was treated as a hero. It was at this time he renewed an old friendship with Edith Finch, which developed into a romance. They married two years later and were happy in this union. Edith moved to London. This, however, created further turmoil in Russell's household. On Christmas Day 1953, John and Susan moved out, leaving their children in the hands of Russell and Edith, who started procedures to get full custody of the children. Russell thought that John was in such poor mental condition that he needed professional help. When Susan left John the following summer for another man, he broke down. In December he was admitted to a mental hospital. He was diagnosed as having a psychosis. Russell's worst fears had come true.

During the Fifties Russell's political involvement grew. He wrote a number of books and articles in which he explained how the world could be spared of nuclear war. On the day before Christmas Eve 1954, Russell gave his most famous radio broadcast—"Man's Peril"—in which he said, "I appeal, as a human being to human beings: remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you, but universal death." These words echoed those of a few years earlier in New York, when he said that what the world needs is love—Christian love, or compassion. These words made many think that Russell had become a Christian, something he ardently denied. There was, however, something of a revivalist in Russell. An English bishop once said that Russell was a natural Christian, except for his views on marriage. Russell's ethical views had much in common with what Jesus said in The Sermon on the Mount and Saint Paul's eulogy of love, but he could not believe in God or any Christian dogma.

In his eagerness to save the world Russell wrote to a number of distinguished scientists urging them to sign a document explaining the horrible consequences of a nuclear war. He wrote a letter to Albert

Einstein asking him to sign the document, which he did just a few days before he died. The document became known as The Russell-Einstein Manifesto. It was the beginning of the Pugwash movement in which the future Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Rotblatt, with the help of Russell, played an important role.

In 1956 Russell and Edith moved with the grandchildren to a remote house in Wales called Plas Penrhyn, from which he continued his struggle for peace. He became engaged in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). At the beginning of the Sixties he started The Russell Peace Foundation in order to implement his ambitions more effectively. It was during this time that he met a young radical American, Ralph Schoenman, who would develop a great influence on Russell—an influence decried by many of Russell's friends. Russell and Edith were soon relating to Ralph as a son. He possessed all the qualities that John lacked. After some time, though, his eccentricities caused Russell a number of difficulties. His presence in the home also created problems for the grandchildren, who thought that Ralph received far too much attention at their expense.

In the fall of 1962 the Cuban missile crisis unfolded, which gave Russell and Schoenman an opportunity to act. Russell wrote letters to Kennedy, Khrushchev and other top-politicians urging them to come to their senses. Russell acted as a "World Ambassador" and enjoyed the attention that was being directed towards Plas Penrhyn. Whether Russell had any real influence on the outcome is difficult to say, but he seemed to think so at times, a belief to which Monk refers with some sarcasm. A short time later a border conflict erupted between India and China. Russell again had an opportunity to act and wrote letters to Nehru and Chou En-lai. He sent Schoenman to negotiate a settlement. The negotiations were unsuccessful, in part because of Schoenman's odd behavior.

In the spring of 1963 alarming reports began filtering through about American activities in Vietnam. Russell was among the first to react. The motives of the Americans were more than obvious to Russell and he found their methods loathsome. Russell sent out his own observers to collect information that would later be used as evidence in an unofficial trial against the United States. This prepared the way for the Russell Tribunals. The first session took place in Stockholm in the spring of 1967. In the light of these sessions there is no doubt that the United States had committed terrible crimes in the name of democracy. Monk withholds any credit that well could be given Russell in this regard.

Additional problems arose with Schoenman, however, which finally led to his dismissal from the Peace Foundation.

During the Sixties Russell was so deeply involved in world politics that he did not have time to pay much attention to his grandchildren. They suffered badly from being neglected and from the conflicts within the family. The youngest, Lucy, suffered the most. At the age of twenty-seven she burned herself to death on a gravestone in a remote churchyard.

Russell died quietly in February 1970 with Edith at his side. He was cremated without any religious ceremonies and his ashes were scattered over the Welsh hills. He had reconciled with his youngest son Conrad two years earlier, but the only one who never stopped loving Russell was his daughter Kate, who had become a Christian and married a minister.

Monk has no positive remark to make on Russell's work on ethics and religion. Anyone interested in forming an opinion in these areas should consult *Russell on Ethics*, edited by Charles Pigden, and *Russell on Religion* edited by Louis Greenspan and myself. These are the first collections of texts by Russell on various topics under publication by Routledge. Through these collections, a new generation of readers has the opportunity to discover an important writer and philosopher, who has been overshadowed by a number of less interesting but more fashionable thinkers, during the latter part of the 20th century. Thought I would disregard Monk's often pointedly negative view of Russell, I cannot deny that he has written an interesting book about one of the most fascinating personalities of the last century in all categories.

Stefan Andersson defended his doctoral thesis Bertrand Russell's Search for Certainty in Religion and Mathematics up to The Principles of Mathematics 1903 *in 1994 at Lund University. He has continued to do research on Russell and Wittgenstein's views on logic, ethics and mysticism and on the Russell Tribunals. He lives in Lund and is currently working on Forty-Four Semesters or Why I Did Not Become a Lutheran Minister. Part one of his review appeared in the May 2001 issue.*

Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell 1921-1970. The Ghost of Madness*. Jonathan Cape, London, 2000. Pp. 574.
Thom Weidlich, *The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell; Appointment Denied*. Prometheus Books, Amherst, 2000. Pp. 233.
Russell on Ethics, Selections from the writings of Bertrand Russell, edited by Charles Pigden, Routledge, London, 1999. Pp. 257.
Russell on Religion, Selections from the writings of Bertrand Russell, edited by Louis Greenspan and Stefan Andersson, Routledge, London, 1999. Pp. 261.

Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association, meeting in Atlanta, December 27-30, 2001. There will be a BRS session at the meetings and a BRS table at the smoker. If you are interested in giving a paper or tabling at the smoker, please get in touch with David White (white@sjfc.edu). Confirmed speakers include: **Kevin C. Klement** (University of Massachusetts), **Timothy Madigan** (University of Rochester Press), **Matthew McKeon** (Michigan State University).

BRS Business and Chapter News:

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc., 2nd Quarter Treasurer's Report, Cash Flow Report, 4/1/01 Through 6/30/01

| | | |
|---------------------|----------|----------|
| BALANCE 3/31/01 | | 7,452.18 |
| INFLOWS | | |
| Contributions: | | |
| Contrib-BRS | -45.00 | |
| TOTAL Contributions | -45.00 | |
| Dues: | | |
| New Members | 260.85 | |
| Renewals | 412.90 | |
| TOTAL Dues | 673.75 | |
| Library Inc | 10.95 | |
| Meeting Inc | 2,575.49 | |
| Other Inc | 148.20 | |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 3,363.39 | |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| BRS Paper Award | 200.00 | |
| Meeting Exp | 2,427.33 | |
| Newsletter | 1,072.66 | |
| Other Exp | 295.90 | |
| RUSSELL Sub | 51.00 | |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 4,046.89 | |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -683.50 | |
| BALANCE 6/30/01 | | 6,768.68 |

Note: The reason for the negative contribution figure is the refund of a contribution by a member who was expelled. Also all annual meeting expenses & income are included except \$107.49 in partial refunds to those who paid but could not attend. Also the newsletter expense includes an advance for the August issue. **Dennis J. Darland, BRS Treasurer, djdarland@qconline.com.**

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Five Years of Monthly Russell Meetings Open to the Public

GRRS Catches APA's Attention

The American Philosophical Association has placed a copy of our flyer upon its website, citing it as "an example of the kind of thing that we would like to encourage." The flyer can be viewed at the APA site at <http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/centennial/100anniv.html>.

Advance Program 2001-2001

Fall 2001

| | |
|----------|----------------------------|
| Sept. 20 | Newcomer's Night |
| Oct. 18 | "On Denoting" |
| Nov. 15 | <i>Who's Who in Hell</i> |
| Dec. 20 | <i>Russell on Religion</i> |

Spring 2002

| | |
|---------|-------------------------------------|
| Jan. 17 | "Russell, Conrad, & Conrad Russell" |
| Feb. 21 | "Dora, Dora, Dora" |
| Mar. 21 | <i>Wittgenstein's Vienna</i> |
| Apr. 18 | "Tom and Viv and Bertie" |
| May 16 | <i>The Conquest of Happiness</i> |

Christian's Coffeehouse

Village Gate Square, 274 North Goodman St., Rochester, NY.
For information
call Tim Madigan 716-424-3184 or write TimothyMad@aol.com
or visit <http://home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs>.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

November 2001

No. 112



*Chad Trainer and
U.S. Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI)*

Philosopher Kings? A Russellian in Government?
...get the inside scoops on how politics makes
strange bedfellows...

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>
John Lenz, webmaster jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone

Associate Editors: Tim Madigan, Rachel M. Murray, David White
The *Quarterly* is by the Council for Secular Humanism
in conjunction with the Bertrand Russell Society.

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:
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Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors
and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society,
the Council for Secular Humanism, or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Chairman of the Board | Kenneth Blackwell |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Ray Perkins |
| Secretary | Steve Bayne |
| Treasurer | Dennis J. Darland |
| Vice President/Outreach | Peter Friedman |

Quote of the Quarterly

"Faith is the amazing ability of man which enables us to believe things which we know to be untrue."

From Werner Herzog's film *Nosferatu: The Vampyre* (1979).

Herzog's character was trying to defend faith here, by the way. What would Bertrand Russell say...

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

NOVEMBER 2001

NO. 112

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it's time to renew!!!
See editorial for details!!!

From the Editor:

Russellian Reflections for the End of the Year

(Note: the following Editorial was composed before the events of September 11.)

The year is drawing to a close, and for the first time in a couple of years there will be few predictions that the end of the world is nigh. (After all, if the human race can survive the turn of the millennium, it can survive anything.) At this time of year, my thoughts, like those of every good BRS member, turn to two subjects—the mission of the BRS and renewing my membership. Permit me a few words on the loftier first subject before venturing into the crass and materialistic second one.

I was at the bank today, depositing the refund I had received from Dubya. (I had intended to donate it to some cause Dubya hates, but I'm a bit short on cash right now, and I like to think my very existence annoys the President-Select enough.) My bank has the annoying habit of playing children's movies on videotape for the alleged enjoyment of its customers and their kids. Between movies, I was treated to advertisements for *Cinderella* and *Angels in the Outfield*. While the former, if not the latter, can presumably be enjoyed purely from an aesthetic point of view, to me both movies remind me how strong an anti-rationalist streak still runs through our culture. Both films invite passive resignation in the face of human problems. Just accept your lot meekly, there's nothing you can do, and maybe if you have enough faith a fairy godmother, seraphim, or other supernatural friend will take pity on you and make everything better. Above all, don't try to help yourself, or (shudder!) think for yourself. Don't worry—maybe your prince will come too, someday.

Being reminded of how ever-present such themes are in our culture makes me glad to belong to a society dedicated to someone like Bertrand Russell. Here, the idea of thinking for yourself, of refusing to accept the problems of the day (intellectual or political) without trying to find solutions, is welcomed and encouraged. Our membership holds diverse views on many subjects, but all embrace the idea that a community of minds is a cherished and (unfortunately) scarce thing.

If you bought any of that, then you'll do anything just to remain in such a wonderful society. This is good, because it's time to renew. All memberships (except Life and Honorary memberships) expire at the end of the calendar year, so everyone needs to renew as soon as possible. There's a membership form in the center of the *Quarterly*. Please return it to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. Please make checks payable, in US Dollars, to "BRS." If you have any questions about your membership, feel free to drop Dennis a line at djdarland@qconline.com.

But wait, you might ask. What happens in February or March if I don't remember if I've renewed? We endeavor to make things as easy as possible for you. You'll hopefully be getting a personal reminder after a few months, but there's no reason to wait that long. Once you receive the February BRSQ, you can check the mailing label. It will have one of the following 3 four-digit numbers on it:

2001 means you are paid through 2001, but still need to renew for 2002.

2002 means you have indeed renewed for 2002, and so are all set for the year.

9999 means you have a Life or Honorary membership, and so never need to renew.

Check for your number, and you'll always know your status.

The BRS is constantly looking for ways we can make it easier for you to keep your membership current. We'd hate to lose any member because of a misunderstanding over the timing of a dues payment. If you have any suggestions to help us improve the process, please drop us a line.

The 2002 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL) May 31-June 2, 2002

Mark your calendars! The meeting site for the 2002 Annual Meeting has been selected—Lake Forest College, in Lake Forest, Illinois (about 30 miles north of Chicago, near Northwestern University). The BRS thanks Rosalind Carey, an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Lake Forest, for agreeing to host the meeting.

BRS President Alan Schwerin is currently preparing a website with information about the conference and a call for papers. The website will be at <http://bluehawk.monmouth.edu/aschweri/brs2002.htm>. Members may also submit paper proposals to Alan at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ 07764 USA, (732) 571-4470, aschweri@monmouth.edu. Please direct all other questions about the conference (concerning housing, food, travel, etc.) to Rosalind Carey, Department of Philosophy, Durand Hall, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045 USA, carey@hermes.lfc.edu.

The *BRSQ* encourages every member to attend and participate in our latest meeting! See you in Lake Forest!

Letters

The BRSQ sent free copies of its May issue to everyone participating in the monthly meetings of the Greater Rochester Russell Set, in an effort to convince them to join the BRS. One of those receiving the free issue wrote the following response to David White:

May 29, 2001

Dear David,

If you are the one responsible for sending me a copy of *The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, I want to thank you. It was nice to see the images of my two favorite Russellites on the cover. I enjoyed and enjoy Tim [*Madigan—ed.*]'s warm congeniality and your intellect and happy disposition also re: the BR meetings I was able to sit in on.

Tim and I try to keep in touch but it is hard with both of us working so hard.

Regarding the booklet, I especially liked the information on Madalyn Murray O'Hair. I had read the conjectures regarding her and her relatives absconding with the organization's funds, but nothing about the truth of the murdered bodies being found. That, like so much else, is very upsetting. As I am the only woman who speaks out against religion that I know of in this area, it makes me think of the risks. Perhaps it is good that I don't have a bigger form to do so in.

I can't do a lot of things that I would like to but I do what I can and that is to be our area's representative for a national organization and to write letters of objections to all things of organized religion. On the back of this letter, I am going to copy you my latest objection. I wrote Tim that I wished the BRS in Rochester could tackle issues as a group; play more of a part in educating the general public about religious issues and government. But Tim reminded me that people have to be protective of their jobs. I am fortunate that I don't have that kind of job and that I am married to a man who dislikes religion perhaps even more than I do. Al was enlightened before I was. He had to wait for me to catch up, but then I surpassed him as I was fortunate to be able to return to three area colleges and enjoy all the latest knowledge.

I was surprised to see your verse at the end of the booklet. Avoiding all things mathematical throughout my life, I had to look up the word Pythagoreanism to find: the eternal recurrence of things, and the mystical significance of numbers. That sounds so Pagan or pre-Christian as in the cycles of life and also the Goddess

numbers such as 13, for the months of the moon and the corresponding women's menstrual cycles, which was demonized by the patriarchal religions as was everything else to do with women's sexuality and spirituality. The verse seems to be a wish that Russell wasn't doing as well with the physical things of his life as he was with the mental? The Christian notion was that the two aspects of our life had to be in constant conflict with each other. And even for those of us who don't embrace the monotheistic religions, they still have influenced our ways of thinking that we probably will never be able to shed. I include myself among those who will never be free in thought as people of color who have not had centuries of the kind of sexual repression as those of us of European heritages. There was lots of things to think about in your verse. The important thing is that you said what you wanted to, not that I understood the meaning.

I hope all the Russell guys are being that forthcoming with objections to the things that are going on now like our tax dollars going to the "faith-based" groups to dole out as they see fit to the needy. This is what happened to the Native Americans long ago as an incentive to their embracing Christian thought, but it has not raised their financial status. It seems like this form of forced Christianity is going forward again using your and my tax money. I hope you and Tim and the other Russell guys are objecting as I know you could do a great job.

Sincerely

Julie Fawcett

June 27, 2001

Sanal Edamaruku should do some fact-checking before writing about events that happen half a world away. His Madalyn Murray O'Hair report in your May, 2001 issue claims that O'Hair, her son Jon Garth Murray, and her adopted daughter Robin Murray O'Hair went missing on September 4, 1995. This is off by about a week; a note was found at the American Atheists office by employees coming to work on the morning of August 28 saying that the three had been called away on an emergency. According to testimony at the Gary Karr trial, they were presumed to have been in the office on August 27.

Sanal asks, "Who is behind the firm in California which allegedly paid one of the most expensive lawyers to defend the murderer?" What firm is he talking about? David Waters, the accused killer, was declared indigent, meaning he was unable to afford a lawyer. An attorney was appointed to defend him; his fees were paid by the U.S. government. Sanal also asks, "What was the secret deal between the authorities and the murderer that saved him from the electric chair?" This makes me wonder what his opinion of the death penalty is. Those who say they're against the

death penalty, but would make an exception in Waters' case, are really for the death penalty. None of the federal charges would have resulted in his execution. Had he been charged and convicted of a death penalty offense, he would have been executed by lethal injection, not the electric chair. The "deal" was no secret; it's called a plea agreement. In short, Waters agreed to plead guilty to the robbery charge, and to show the investigators where the bodies were buried. In return, the feds dropped all other charges, requested that the Texas state government not pursue any charges regarding the murder of the Murray O'Hairs, and transferred Waters from state to federal prison.

Sanal claims to have hundreds of letters written by Madalyn Murray O'Hair, but declines to share copies of them with his readers. What is he hiding? Are these letters unflattering? They're his property, of course, and he can do with them what he pleases. But if he won't at least quote from any of the letters, then why even mention them?

Sanal doesn't specify what rumors he heard, but given the evidence presented at the Karr trial, it remains possible that the Murray O'Hairs attempted to flee overseas, hired smooth-talking Danny Fry to help them out, and got double-crossed when the gold coins were delivered. Remember, Karr was acquitted of the kidnapping charge. When have kidnapers ever requested gold coins as ransom? All those that I've read about demand unmarked bills. Gold coins, which aren't considered legal tender in the U.S., leave an easily-traced paper trail when they're exchanged for cash. Furthermore, Jon Murray had the chance to alert the authorities that he, Madalyn, and Robin were in danger when he picked up the gold coins, as he was in a room with the coin dealer and an off-duty San Antonio policeman, and no one else, for about an hour. The fact that he didn't ask for help, that he didn't even show any nervousness while he counted out the coins, indicates that his actions were voluntary and purposeful.

Sanal claims that United World Atheists "feel victim to hyenas, which ganged up to sabotage its take-off." Once again, specifics aren't provided. When he makes such an allegation, he should present the facts as he knows them, so that other atheists can be warned about the rogues in our midst.

Did it never occur to Sanal that O'Hair appointed herself the President of United World Atheists because she wanted to monopolize atheism? She took over publications such as the *Free Humanist*, the *Ripsaw*, and *Progressive World*, and organizations such as United Secularists of America. Her predatory ways were finally halted when her attempted hostile takeover of the *Truth Seeker* failed.

G. Richard Bozarth worked at the American Atheist office when Sanal and his father visited in 1979. In an article published in the January-February 1983 issue of

American Rationalist, he wrote, "When Edamaruku, the great Atheist leader in India, and his son were in the USA for the 1979 American Atheist Convention, Madalyn and Garth referred to them as 'beggars' and 'monkeys.'" In his book *A Case Against Madalyn Murray O'Hair: Interrelated Essays on an Experience* (1989), Bozarth recalls that United World Atheists was formed as one of Madalyn's many publicity stunts, and as an excuse to take foreign vacations. He writes that Madalyn's brother Irv said of Sanal and his father, "Don't they look like something that just swung out of the trees?" and that Madalyn and Jon "made it clear to me that these two admirable men were to them just an act to help give the convention more drawing power."

Former American Atheist employee David Kent reported that "Madalyn did refer to [Indian atheist leader] Gora as a beggar, although she played up her 'friendship' with the Atheist Centre and with Gora, his wife and his son. She saw the value to her of Gora, since their centre is by far the most extensive atheist operation in the world—a model of what she talked about but never did. Playing on Gora's hopes that financial support might be forthcoming through her efforts, she and Jon and Robin 'cosponsored' the World Atheist Meet in Vijayawada, which meant they flew to India and back on atheist funds. Of course, Gora received nothing from that junket or any other of hers."

Bozarth and Kent both said that Gora, Lavanam, Sanal and Joseph Edamaruku, as well as other atheists from India were ethical people who didn't deserve the derision heaped upon them by the Murray O'Hairs. What Madalyn Murray O'Hair really thought of atheists might best be described in her own words; during a speech in Berkeley, she said, "I do not like atheists very much, if at all," and "Atheists are faithless, gutless, and brainless, and they cannot inherit the future." (The speech is reproduced in the July 1971 edition of *Progressive World*.) Atheists can, and should, do much better than that kind of representation.

John Rush

Mr. Rush enclosed a copy of the plea agreement entered in the David Waters case, as well as a brief article he had written about the plea and sentencing, with his letter.

July 12, 2001

When I was packing for a holiday in Europe, I looked through my t-shirt drawer and selected a couple. One of these was the Russell t-shirt I had bought at last year's national meeting. That the shirt was comfortable and wore well was no

surprise. What was a surprise were the many conversations this t-shirt engendered. "Who is this Ber-TRAND RUSS-ell?" an accented voice asked me. "A *philosophe*," I replied, using the French term. "And why is there a Bertrand Russell Society?" he asked. So I told him a bit about Russell's ideas. This was typical of many encounters I enjoyed. On trails in Chianti, in the Louvre, on the beach, on a cliff in Cinque Terre and elsewhere, this t-shirt was an attention-getter and a conversation-starter. "Remember your humanity and forget the rest." That's quite a message to bring to the world." I was told. "I wish I'd said it, those were Russell's words," I answered.

Would YOU like a T-Shirt like This?

If you've ever wanted proudly to display your enthusiasm for Russell in public—and stay out of jail along the way—the BRS has just the thing for you. The Society now has t-shirts available. The shirts feature Bertie's face on the front, along with the BRS's motto, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." The back displays another classic Russell quote, "Remember your humanity, and forget the rest."

The shirts are available for \$10 each plus \$3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Please make checks out to the BRS, and send them to Ray Perkins, 854 Battle ST, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color. Shirts are available in black or yellow. (White may also be available; check with Ray at perkrk@earthlink.net.)



I've travelled in Europe many times and never has any t-shirt attracted half the attention that my Russell t-shirt did.

Garry Wildenberg

BRS Board Elections—Vote Now!

It's time for the Bertrand Russell Society to fill the 8 seats on its Board of Directors that fall vacant at the end of the year. Please cast your vote for up to 8 of the 11 candidates whose statements appear below. You may also write in candidates if you wish. Candidates must be members of the BRS in good standing.

A ballot appears at the center of this issue (right under the renewal form). Please return your completed ballot to BRS Librarian Tom Stanley at Box 434, Wilder, Vermont, 05080 USA, tom.stanley@valley.net. If a couple has a joint membership, each member of the couple is entitled to a vote; just photocopy the ballot and send in one copy for each member. All ballots must include the name and signature of the member voting. (Ballots will be viewed only by the Elections Committee and the Secretary.) All ballots must be received by *January 1, 2002!*

Board Candidate Statements

Kevin Brodie was first elected to the Board three years ago. Since then, he has learned a great deal about the operations of the Society. He has been proud to be on the board, and to serve as a member of the BRS Awards Committee (which he now chairs). He is interested in finding ways to increase BRS membership, and in reaching out to non-academics to diversify the membership. He recently succeeded in persuading the administration of the high school at which he teaches to introduce philosophy courses for the first time. (Russell's work has been integral to this endeavor.) He is anxious to continue to serve the Society as a member of the Board of Directors.

Rosalind Carey holds a Ph.D. in early analytic philosophy (with an M.A. in religion) and currently works as an Assistant Professor outside of Chicago at Lake Forest College, Illinois. Her main interest in Russell lies in his middle period metaphysics/epistemology/logic and in his collaboration with Wittgenstein. Her interest in Russell began in the mid-eighties by accident. As a young graduate student of religion, she purchased a used copy of *Logic and Knowledge* at a bookstore in Boston and found the first essay she read—"Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types"—utterly fascinating, though quite opaque. Several years later, as a philosophy graduate student, an interest in Duns Scotus and individuation led her to read Russell's work on acquaintance. She is proud to be a Russellian, not least because she cannot imagine exerting so much effort to understand someone not in sympathy with her own liberal, progressive, atheist social and political views.

Nino B. Cocchiarella is a Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. He has written extensively on analytic philosophy, formal ontology and philosophical problems in mathematical logic; formal semantics and theories of predication, reference

and nominalization; and the philosophy of language; as well as our understanding of the logical properties of time and modality. He is the author of several books, including one on early analytic philosophy. He has written numerous articles, book reviews, and reviews of technical papers. His work covers the philosophy of logical atomism and modal logic as well as Montague grammar; and he has written extensively on Russell's paradox of predication and Frege's and Russell's metaphysics, including a logical reconstruction of their different forms of logicism. In his own framework of conceptual realism he has logically reconstructed Lesniewski's ontology and the medieval supposition theory. The recipient of numerous honors, Prof. Cocchiarella is on the editorial boards of a number of distinguished publications, including the *Journal of Philosophical Logic* and *Synthese*. He has been awarded grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and a grant from the Government of Italy. His essays on Russell have appeared in several encyclopedias, and he is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

Peter Friedman received unconditional offers of places on Philosophy Honours Degree courses from nine U.K. universities, based upon the submission of an essay on Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*. He has a Certificate in Management Studies from what is now Hertfordshire University. His most recent work is a series of studies into the fundamental nature of traffic generation on the World Wide Web; the psychology of the web surfer; the strategic misunderstanding of the role of e-mail in supplier/consumer relationships; and the impact of context in web-based promotion. He also took a decisive role in turning around the U.K.'s leading financial document image service. He has also had a brief spell as head of the technology sub-committee for the leading U.K. regional Chamber of Commerce.

Bernard Linsky (B.A. University of Chicago, 1971; Ph.D. Stanford University, 1975) is Professor and currently Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. His work on Russell includes *Russell's Metaphysical Logic* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and two papers in *Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments* (Routledge, 1999). He has been to McMaster University to see the Archives but has not actually studied the manuscripts. His interest in Russell is longstanding, having been brought up hearing about "On Denoting" and the theory of definite descriptions from his father, Leonard Linsky, who passed along a love of logic and fascination with Russell's philosophy.

Tim Madigan is Editorial Director of the University of Rochester Press. He has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the State University of New York at Buffalo, and was for 12 years on the editorial staff of *Free Inquiry*, the secular humanist journal. He is a past Vice President of the Bertrand Russell Society, and has been a member of the Society for 14 years. He is also an active member of the Greater Rochester Russell Set in Rochester, New York and is on the editorial board of the *BRS Quarterly*.

Ray Perkins is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Plymouth State College in New Hampshire. He has been a student of Russell's philosophy ever since, as a 16 year-old high school student perplexed about religion, he discovered Russell's "Why I Am Not a Christian". He has served one term on the BRS Board of Directors and is currently Vice President of the BRS. He is editor of the recently published collection of Russell's letters to the editor, entitled *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell* (Open Court, 2001).

Alan Schwerin teaches Philosophy at Monmouth University, where he is an Associate Professor and the current Chair of the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies. He completed his doctorate on Hume at Rice University and to date has published twenty-four refereed papers, predominantly on empiricism. His two most recent books are *Apartheid's Landscape and Ideas: A Scorched Soul* (University of Rochester Press, 2001) and a collection of papers on Russell's views on ethics and language (Greenwood, forthcoming). He is the current President of the Bertrand Russell Society and has served in this capacity for the past two years.

Warren Allen Smith is the author of *Who's Who in Hell* (Barricade Books, 2000). He corresponded with Lord Russell in 1953 and 1956. He has served on the Board since 1974. He would prefer that a much younger, better looking, and more brilliant member would replace him, whereupon he would continue to partake in Society business (in the recent past he recommended Ibn Warraq and Taslima Nasrin for Honorary Membership in the BRS) and attend annual meetings. But, to paraphrase Russell, if elected he'll do his humanistic best. If not re-elected he sure as "Hell" won't resign.

Chad Trainer has an appreciation of Bertrand Russell dating back to the late 1970s, when he found the outlook of Russell a welcome alternative to the more orthodox viewpoints to which a Catholic school background had subjected him. He has read over thirty of Russell's books and delivered papers at the last two Annual Society Meetings. His essay "Language: A Leading or Lagging Indicator of Truth for Russell," which he delivered at the Bertrand Russell Society's 2000 Annual Meeting, was recently published in Monmouth University's *Nexus: A Forum for Ideas*. Over the years, he has been in correspondence about many of philosophy's different facets with approximately twenty philosophy professors from institutions ranging anywhere from Bryn Mawr College to Oxford University. He lives in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania less than ten miles from Little Datchet Farm where Russell lived during the Second World War. (He periodically visits this farm to enjoy the Russellian "broad horizon.")

Thom Weidlich is a New York-based freelance writer. He wrote *Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus, 2000), a book dealing with the City College case, published in 2000. (This book won the 2001 BRS Book Award.) He has been a member of the Society for about 15 years.

September 11, 2001: Two Humanist Responses

In the wake of the horrible attacks on September 11, 2001 against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the BRSQ has received a number of responses from various voices in the humanist world. We publish below two of these—a statement by the International Humanist Ethical Union (IHEU) released on September 12, and a brief statement by Paul Kurtz, Editor-in-Chief of Free Inquiry and an honorary member of the BRS. The BRSQ received the first statement directly from the IHEU, while the second appeared in the September 27 issue of Rationalist International. The statements reflect the views of their authors, and not necessarily those of the BRS or the BRSQ.

Copy of Message Sent to American Colleagues

Dear Friends,

In this time of tragedy and great distress, on behalf of the IHEU we would like to share with you all our feelings of solidarity and togetherness.

There is disbelief and disgust for what has happened. The horror of the human devastation was as intense as the incomprehension and anger at the spontaneous jubilation in some parts of the world. Never, it seems, are human values more urgently needed than now. In the past, civilisation has ultimately triumphed against such barbarity, and we hope this will be the case now as well.

As we all psychologically pick ourselves up from the rubble of our destroyed humanity, our hearts go out to those who have become victims of this mindless and senseless attack.

The culprits who have planned and conspired to carry out this attack have to be identified and punished appropriately, but we hope that vulnerable communities will not be victimised in the search for the guilty.

In solidarity, and in hope,

On behalf of the IHEU's member organisations and the Executive Committee,

*Levi Fragell
Babu Cuginani*

A Call for Caution and Prudence

Paul Kurtz

I wish to speak personally and not on behalf of the Council for Secular Humanism.

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11th has shocked the civilized world and has rightly brought forth expressions of regret and condemnation. What has stunned everyone is the apparent willingness of nineteen terrorists to commit suicide by slamming their aircraft into targets and their absolute insensitivity to the deaths of thousands of innocent people. Some of the terrorists apparently are men in their late twenties and thirties who have taken months or years to train for their deadly mission. A soldier sent into combat to inflict damage on his enemies usually has some hope of coming out of the battle alive; but not in these cases, where death was inevitable. How could they have acted in this way? What were their motives?

We know that the suicide bombers in Israel and Palestine who enter into crowds of innocent people, including women and children, often yell "Allah akbar!" (God is great!) as they blow themselves to kingdom come. In many cases families of the bombers when interviewed applaud their sons or brothers, for their "heroic deeds." In one case, the father even hoped that his second son would make the same sacrifice.

Obviously, the motives are religious. And they are based upon a deep faith that they are doing the work of Allah and will be rewarded in heaven after death. According to the story, such a hero who dies for Islam will have seventy or seventy-two virgins throughout eternity. All enemies of Islam—as perceived by them—are considered evil and need to be destroyed. Their victims are dehumanized. Here the jihad is considered righteous and just because it is done in the name of God.

Contrast this with the faith of Christians and Jews who pray to God, implying that he is on their side. They often claim that any retribution they may take is in the name of their God and religion.

As the United States in grief and fear responds to these terrorists, one should ponder the opposing religious premises in this conflict. Are we about to enter a Holy War—in the name of God—as viewed differently by the contending factions? Clearly the acts of the Islamic terrorists are unconscionable. But what about self-righteous retribution done with the conviction that God "is on our side?" If He is, why did He allow more than 6,000 innocent people to die in the World Trade Towers; and why will he allow the death of tens of thousands of innocent victims who will surely die in retaliatory military strikes?

Unfortunately, the basic religious premises of this conflagration are not open to discussion. There is all too little inquiry into the foundations of religious beliefs. It is considered in bad taste or intolerable to do so. The age-old jihad is based in the Koran and Hadith (traditions), as the Judæo-Christian response to it is often rooted in the Bible. These documents were spawned in nomadic and rural societies in the infancy of the race and are not appropriate to the modern world. We should seek to find common ground with other human beings—by opening up discussion of the grounds of revelation in the Old and New Testaments and the Koran—and by refusing to allow these ancient documents to dictate our policies.

The Koran is a good case in point, because if one studies the history of Islam, one finds that it expanded its hegemony by the use of the sword. Mohammed himself raised an army of ten thousand men and destroyed his enemies and he advanced Islam by ruthless methods. The jihad has been practiced throughout history by the militant believers in Allah and Muhammad—by North African Moors, in Spain, France, and the Mediterranean, by the Ottoman Empire of Turkey in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and by the Mongol invasions of Europe. The Crusades, seeking to defend the Christian faith in the 11th and 12th centuries, were led by militant Christians who attacked Islamic lands and seized the "Holy Land" from Muslims, only to have it retaken. The Holy Inquisition sought to expel Jews and Muslims from the Iberian peninsula in the 15th century. The jihad was halted two centuries ago when the European colonial powers, especially France and Great Britain, conquered many Islamic countries in North Africa and the Middle East. It was resumed again after the Second World War when these countries were liberated and established their own feudal theocracies. And it has continued to grow as the fundamentalists gain ground and terrorize governments and impede any measures against them.

The battle for Palestine in part is between Jews who believe the Old Testament and Muslims who revere the Koran. Today significant peace-loving and democratic Moslem minorities exist in all the countries of the West—especially the United States, Germany, France, England. But what is not discussed and needs to be discussed, urgently and critically, are the foundations of the claims for the jihad. One can argue that Islam will continue, of course, as the creed of a great civilization. But there is a difference between a liberal reading of the Koran with an emphasis on symbolic pronouncements, and the literal reading of the Koran and the Hadith which justifies jihad. The literal tradition condemns to death those who seek to break away from Islam; those who blaspheme it are considered foes. The jihad needs to be interpreted in light of the fact that these revelations have doubtful foundations. We need Koranic criticism and we need to discuss the Koran carefully, without any condemnation in doing so.

If the Koran and Hadith are used to repress others or to unleash a holy war, then we need a clear discussion of how and why and to show the fragmentary and questionable grounds of this faith which so inspires many Muslims to die in the name of Allah. A similar kind of free inquiry should apply to the Bible.

Free Inquiry magazine was founded in 1980 in response to the emergence of the Religious Right and their use of the Bible to justify repression in the United States and to bridge the separation of church and state. If the Koran and Bible are used to justify wars of aggression or retaliation, then they have to be read critically. Alas, they are still not in most parts of the world.

Fundamentalist Muslims hate the modern Western world, its devotion to democracy, civil liberties, moral freedom, reason, and science. In its place they would establish a medieval and barbaric patriarchy, which suppresses women and freedom of inquiry. Modern Muslims realize that Islamic culture will not advance until it enters into the modern world and accepts democracy, secularism, and rational scientific inquiry. They are intimidated by fundamentalist mobs.

In the current situation we advocate caution and prudence; and we hope that the hysteria and frenzy on all sides will abate. Those who commit heinous crimes of terror must be brought to the bar of justice. But the terrorists are an international problem, not the exclusive problem of the United States, and we need an international convention of all civilized nations of the world—Moslem and Western, Christian, Jewish, and secularist—as President Mubarak of Egypt has advised. Unilateral action by the United States is imprudent. We need all civilized nations of our planetary community to act in concert against terrorism.

We realize that the American people are seeking justice; and they wish to punish those who would commit such foul deeds. President Bush has called for an all-out war against terrorism, but had unfortunately used the term "crusade" to describe that war. He is to be commended for recognizing the threat and asking Americans and others in the world to deal with it. However, I would urge a reflective response. Any action that we take should be in concert with all our allies in the democratic world and also with the support of moderate Muslim nations. The United Nations should be involved and an international peace-keeping force needs to be created. All terrorists should be brought to the World Court in the Hague for a trial.

A cloud of fear overlays America. People are afraid to travel. There is apprehension of spies in our midst. And there are calls for a limitation of our civil liberties. There are fears that a police state will in time result. We should not turn against our Muslim neighbors, the vast majority of whom are not committed to holy jihad.

What is essential is that although we need to defend ourselves, clearly, we also need to protect our cherished civil liberties and our constitutional guarantees and guard against their erosion and abrogation. The United States has been in existence for over two centuries, and our Constitution has safeguarded this great democracy. We should not, in a fit of fear and anger, be willing to suppress our precious liberties.

A call for caution and prudence:

- * We need free inquiry of the religious premises of the growing conflagration.
- * We need rational debate of the questionable premises of a "holy war" or jihad.
- * We need a rational debate of the biblical call for retribution.
- * We call upon the United States not to act unilaterally and to petition the United Nations to establish a peace-keeping force.
- * All terrorists when apprehended should be brought to the World Court at the Hague and put on trial.
- * The basic constitutional civil liberties of America should not be abrogated.

American Philosophical Association

Eastern Division Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia ~ December 27-30, 2000
Pacific Division Meeting in Seattle, Washington ~ March 27-30, 2001
There will be a BRS session at the meetings and a BRS table at the smoker
For more information, contact David White at white@sjfc.edu.

Call for Papers

"Activism, Ideology, and Radical Philosophy"
5th Biennial Radical Philosophy Association Conference
November 7-10, 2002
Brown University

Please send paper, workshop, poster, and other proposals to RPA PROGRAM COMMITTEE, c/o Lisa Heldke, Philosophy Department, Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, MN 56802. Or send them as an attachment to heldke@gac.edu. The deadline for submissions is January 31, 2002. For more information on the RPA, go to www.radicalphilosophy.org

A Conversation with U.S. Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) - Conducted by Chad Trainer

Congressman Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii) was first elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in a 1986 special election. He returned to the House after being elected again in 1990. He is a member of the Committee on Armed Services, where he is ranking Democrat on the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, and the Committee on Resources.

Abercrombie began his political career in the Hawaii State House of Representatives in 1974. After two terms in the State House, he was elected to the State Senate, where he served for eight years. He chaired the Senate Committees on Education, Higher Education and Human Services. He also served on the Honolulu City Council from 1988 to 1990.

Congressman Abercrombie received a B.A. degree in Sociology from Union College in Schenectady, N.Y., and a Masters degree in Sociology and a Ph.D. in American Studies from the University of Hawaii. He worked as a waiter, custodian, probation officer, graduate teaching assistant, college lecturer, professor, construction apprentice program director, and special assistant to the State Superintendent of Education.

Abercrombie's community activities include service on the boards of the Nuuanu YMCA, the Hawaii Special Olympics, the Epilepsy Foundation of America, Friends of Father Damien, Variety Club (Tent 50), the Life Foundation/AIDS Foundation of Hawaii and Amnesty International.

Awards received by Neil Abercrombie include the Japanese American Citizens League President's Award, Toastmasters International Award, National Epilepsy Foundation Advocacy Award, Hawaii Epilepsy Foundation of Hawaii Person of the Year Award (renamed the Abercrombie Award), Ronald McDonald House Support Award, Favorite University of Hawaii Professor, Friends of the Library of Hawaii Mahalo Award, Most Popular Legislator of the Year Award, United Group Home Operators Legislative Award, Hawaii State Chiropractic Association Senator of the Year Award, Clifford Award (Mental Health Public Official of the Year), Hawaii Federation of the Blind Eva H. Smyth Award for Distinguished Contribution, Clinical Laboratories Management Association Special Recognition Award, and SERTOMA Freedom Award.

Neil Abercrombie and Richard Hoyt co-authored Blood of Patriots, a work of fiction focusing on the role of money in electoral politics. He is married to Dr. Nancie Caraway, an author and educator. He has been a member of the BRS since 1989.

CT: What I thought would be interesting would be to get your feelings about Bertrand Russell but also, maybe, if I could ask you some questions that I think Russell might ask you if he was alive today. I had some fun the other night jotting down some ideas. And, I guess, I was thinking the first question would be: What makes Congressman Abercrombie the only person in Congress who is a member of the Bertrand Russell Society?

NA: Maybe because of my fascination with him all my adult life. What I mean by my adult life is I had no real conception of what Russell was about, let alone who he was, when I was in high school. But by the time I got into college, I got exposed to him—actually through my brother, who was at Syracuse and had picked up on some writings by Russell. I think I picked up *Authority and the Individual*, *Unpopular Essays*, some of the things I have right here, *Sceptical Essays*. And, of course, I was fascinated with him immediately because of the clarity of the concepts, the clarity and the insight of the writings and its appeal. This was in the '50s, and I went to college '55-'59 in a small liberal arts school. There was an engineering base to it, though I wasn't an engineer. It was fortunate for me to go to such a school because it helped me to form my conceptions about urban planning and in that atmosphere, in the 50s, my views on the button down generation, the man in the gray flannel suit, that kind of thing, the pre-beatnik and the pre-hippie, all the gross characterizations that have taken place over that era.

But there was a renaissance underway of literature and theatre that manifested itself in the 1960s, and there was music. Interestingly enough, Russell was a part of that. He was a catalyst in many respects—intellectually for me, certainly. He had been associated in many people's minds with the anti-nuclear testing and anti-nuclear weapons movement, the peace movement, more broadly. And as a result, there had been a lot of exposure—political exposure—to some of his work. But it hadn't really carried through to a whole lot of people. They were familiar with his name. Intellectuals hadn't necessarily done any reading of him and that was really sad because the reading was so easy to do. In some regard, I don't think he got all the attention or respect that he deserved because his work was too easy to read. If he had been Hegel, you see, or Wittgenstein, or Kant, where you had this impenetrable and incomprehensible text to deal with or even, sociologically speaking, Talcott Parsons—all these folks, even Durkheim, it would be different. He didn't have that academic veneer. He was so accessible that way. It couldn't be important, it couldn't possibly be something to be reverential about because he was so irreverent himself. He had no pretense, no public pretense, regardless of what people may write about him, biographically speaking, on his personal relationships and such. His public persona was devoid of that kind of egotism and distance from the mass of people who might be contemplating what he had to say and how he had to say it. He was very accessible. He was the only contemporary pop philosopher.

In other words, he was a celebrity, a celebrity philosopher. And I guess, the only academic I can think of that fell into that category was Marshall McLuhan, maybe. McLuhan was an incandescent candle. He kind of burst for a little while. In pop culture terms, he was a manifest persona—was there for a while, shined very brightly, disappeared kind of thing. But Russell had been there forever and kept on going.

CT: He wouldn't die.

NA: He wouldn't die, literally! So, all of that combined in the late '50s to stimulate me to pay attention to what he had to say. And of course, the more I read the more sense he made. I had great difficulty in finding anything that he said that I didn't agree with which was kind of strange and exhilarating in some respects. In a sense I became a disciple of Russell because he was writing about things that were on my mind and I didn't have many other sources to go to in order to verify the things that were on my mind. Some of the writers, contemporary writers—there was Habermas, more in the academic philosophy that made sense to me. And C. Wright Mills was writing as a sociologist then, again in a popular vein, with *The Power Elite* and *White Collar*. Some of these sociological treatises were parallel examinations of things that Russell was talking about philosophically.

I was interested in religion. That was a thing that drew me to him too in both *Sceptical Essays* and in *Why I Am Not a Christian*—provocative title—*Why I Am Not A Christian*. Today, that may seem kind of prosaic, an interesting title perhaps but almost pedestrian. But let me tell you, fifty years ago it wasn't. And it's really fifty years ago. I am looking here.

CT: 1926, or something like that.

NA: Maybe the publication dates are a little different. "Why I Am Not A Christian" may have been written earlier, the one that I got was published in 1957 and was one essay among other essays that was the title essay of a book of essays that came out in '57 when I got a hold of it. I think that you are right and it was written thirty years earlier. But the point is still made that this was very provocative going on forty or fifty years ago in that era of conformity, those Eisenhower years, the end of conformity, I should say, I guess. And he contributed to that enormously.

The last thing I would say in that regard is that much of the intellectual freedom which was sought, as well as the other kinds of freedom—social freedoms, sexual revolution, personal freedoms, feminism etc., were anticipated—in fact, a foundation was laid for them by Russell's writing. He doesn't get any credit for it. He helped to establish that atmosphere and had done so for decade after decade after decade. You could count on Russell, if you go back over the history of his

writing, to have been zeroing in with great precision on those issues which became so high profile over the years.

CT: You once told me that Russell had influenced your politics more than any other individual. Could you elaborate on that?

NA: Take a book like *Political Ideals*. That was written as a public lecture in 1917 with respect to Britain going into World War I and was banned and remained unpublished in Great Britain I believe until the 1960s. He outlined the basic tenets of his political code. He talked about capitalism. He talked about the pitfalls of socialism. Don't forget he was the first one to analyze communism—remember his *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* in which he analyzed Leninism. He essentially understood it. He was one of the first people to visit Russia, or the burgeoning Soviet Union, and he, with great insight, great prescience, understood the cycle that was going to take place. He figured out in China too that this essentially was a dictatorship not of the proletariat per se but a dictatorship of the mind and was going to fall of its own weight as a result, and there would be purges and all those kinds of things. He understood that implicitly as well as stating other observations explicitly. He was quite aware.

He even has sections in *Political Ideals*, about socialism, individual liberty and public control, and national independence and internationalism—all those things. The whole essay is less than a hundred pages printed. It is about 75 pages. It went into many things in a conversational way, in a vernacular way, all of the elements that we were trying to come to grips with at that time in the late '50s, early '60s.

Go back in the context of time, all of those things that he was talking about in here, capitalism and the wage system, for example. Now, some of that may seem rather naïve because you have the defeat of communism. But you see Russell understood communism was not a Left ideology at all. It was Red fascism. Another form of fascism is what he was talking about, institutionally speaking, organizationally speaking—communism as just another form of fascism. He understood that and I understood that as a result. Although I was never a Marxist, I had to deal with Marxist ideas and with Marxists all my intellectual life in the '50s and '60s and even into the '70s. And Marxism as such only fell out of favor recently. Everyone tends to think about only what happened in the last two minutes. This all seems like ancient history. And why were people talking about it? Didn't everyone realize that communism wouldn't work? And no, not everybody did. Even if they did, still that didn't mean that they were going to prostrate themselves for capitalism as such. And Russell had a way of working through it.

Just, for example, in "Capitalism and the Wage System," and I'm quoting now, "the most dangerous aspect of the tyranny of the employer is the power it

gives him of interfering with man's activities outside of their working hours." You read *White Collar* or *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills and you see this. I mentioned Durkheim before and others that influenced my thinking as a sociologist. I was a sociology major before I went into American studies. All I'm driving at is sentences like that would stimulate me to think about things politically. How do you reconcile the individual and authority? How do you maximize the capacity for individual autonomy and at the same time meet the necessities of reaching the common good? How do you reconcile those things? Should they be reconciled? What about societies who emphasize the group over the individual?

People see things different ways. They see the same thing and interpret it much differently depending on the value system they have inculcated. How much do you try to transcend the cultural baggage you have been given, your view of the world? All those things he addresses in "The Pitfalls of Socialism." And again quoting, "One of the sources of evil in modern large democracies is the fact that most of the electorate have little or no vital interest in most of the questions that arise." Of course, this was written much earlier than the time of television. But you can see immediately how applicable that was to television. He commented on those kinds of things later on in other essays that he wrote and observations that he made.

One needs to remember that Russell was commenting on the world around him, virtually from Queen Victoria's time. The Victorian era certainly went on beyond her passing, and right up until the post-atomic world. So his grasp of the necessity of updating in the outer world that which had been a product of his inner life and thought was fascinating. It was awesome. He was willing to do that, eager to do it.

He basically pioneered taking the scientific attitude and approach into the modern world. Obviously that is where you do experimentation and verification and duplication. When you find you are going in the wrong direction, rather than causing you heartache and grief, you find a sense of joy and relief that you discovered it, that you had an error in your system, and you want to correct it. The thrust of your philosophy is discovery, particularly discovery of that which is in error, is an occasion for happiness. You think, "Gosh, I was going in the wrong direction. I think I am going to go a more positive way." All of this done with a touch of humor, a profound sense of the kind of absurdity of existence.

What is interesting to me is that I never found a contradiction between Bertrand Russell and existentialism, for example. Existentialism had a kind of grim inevitability and fatalism. Of course, Russell, to me, always had a profound sense of optimism and eternal interest in life. Inquiry was an occasion of joy of stimulation and enthusiasm.

CT: Not something to dread.

NA: Not something to dread or simply to accept, but I didn't see it as a contradiction. I think I felt very much in empathy, sympathy with existentialism, and I did not see it as contradiction at all and Russell, I don't think, would have either. He, I think, would see it as a paradox. Different ways of inquiry, different ways of trying to come to terms and grips with life. That really was essential. I think what I took mostly out of the political ideas and ideals of Bertrand Russell was that politics offered constant stimulus to your creative impulses and humanitarian impulses. To try and give yourself the opportunity to justify your existence in terms of your relationship to others, and what you are contributing—it is our moral obligation essentially to do that.

CT: I'd like to talk about you for a moment. What politically oriented accomplishments are you proudest of? And what in your political career are your biggest regrets?

NA: You know, I really don't think that way. Maybe that has something to do with Russell too. Look at him. He lived almost a century and contributed, intellectually, in terms of his activities, for more than three quarters of that time. And to pick something as "well, that was really good" or "that was really bad," or even the regrets—I am not trying to run away from it. It is that—it is not a concern, because I see this thing as a continuum. There are lots of things that I am proud to have been associated with. And by proud, I mean I feel I was acting in a way that certainly Russell might have approved of—I hope so anyway—and that I approved of in myself. There's dozens of things, things that I did with respect to health and education, higher and lower in Hawaii, individual instances in which I may have helped to make someone's life a little more productive. Perhaps I give them a moment of happiness or surcease from grief or pain, and you can do that in politics. That is the appeal of a public life, I think.

If I regret things, it is that I haven't been good enough in explaining some of the things that I do even to those that I am closest to and whose good opinion I treasure. I haven't always been able to explain to people why I did what I did. Maybe I haven't been able to explain it to myself as well. My only regret is that I probably haven't devoted the kind of energy and discipline to trying to accomplish a public life worthy of the name that I should have. I am often struck by Russell's discipline. But I don't have that and he was a genius.

CT: He read all the time. It is amazing what he accomplished.

NA: He's so prolific. You'll get upset with yourself if you start comparing. That is why I was always reluctant to start comparing. Even comparing myself to myself.

I think that it is essentially useless. I see all these things as a continuum. You are doing better on some days than you are on others.

CT: It is quite possible that someone with the political acumen of Russell would have been prevented from pursuing a political career because of his private life. To what degree do you think a person's private life should be a factor in determining suitability to a political office?

NA: That is a good question because there is no necessary reason for someone with Russell's insight and his obvious political interest to necessarily manifest that in electoral office at all. Just by coincidence last night I was watching the British elections on C-SPAN. C-SPAN showed the BBC broadcast of the second election cycle for Tony Blair which I found very interesting, very fascinating, because it is quite different. The irreverence of the commentators is great fun, and you have to be on the ball and very sharp. Russell would have been ideal in that give-and-take, that kind of thing, because of his wit, because of his humor, because of his self-deprecating approach and his command of language and his ease in public. He would have been ideal in that regard. I think he would have been happier, though, and more productive, not running for office and dealing with all the quotidian details of having to be in public office. Believe me, when you see people on the TV with shaking hands, and the big bill-signing ceremonies and all that, that is one thing. But that doesn't begin to get into the scutwork, the dogsled work, I call it. That is the way that I always think about it. I think about myself attached to the sled of a public life, and you are pulling that sled and you have to do it with single-minded energy. He was far too eclectic. If I had been in Parliament, not a Prime Minister, of course, but if I had been in Parliament or in a Ministry, what I would have wanted was Russell there as an advisor—not even advisor as such but as a commentator on everything. It would be a "What do you think?" "How does this look?" "What is your view?" "What do you think about things?" "If you've got anything to say to me about it, let me know" kind of a routine. "Let's exchange and meet to refresh my mind and get a fresh perspective."

I don't know if he would have been so great talking to caucuses there, or whatever the equivalent is in Great Britain. But I just don't think that the best use of his energy, his time, his talent, and his genius would have been necessarily in electoral politics. As for his private life, I wouldn't think, particularly in his time, it would have been anything one way or the other. In some respects his private life to me is fairly conventional—a couple of affairs involved and so on and so forth. His life is, compared to some others these days, rather prosaic.

Today there is very little in the way of private life because of television, because of degeneration—I won't even say the degeneration of journalism because I am sure that the yellow journalism, the sensationalism, the tabloidism has always

been there from the first instance. But the instantaneous pervasiveness of it didn't exist before as it does now with entertainment and television operating twenty-four/seven and the capacity to sustain that kind of interest in the name of profit-getting people to watch long enough to sell commercials, of sensationalizing human foible, and tragedy in some instances, personal stupidities and difficulties, and so on. It shouldn't be a part of it. But it is very difficult these days, with the incredible intensity of political life, public life, electoral life, not to sensationalize and put great pressure on the private side, the personal side—families.

It is a tough life. This is a tough life. I don't say much about it ever because you never get any sympathy from anybody about it anyway, but it is hardest on family. Again, you always have to consider the context in which people were doing things in the time Russell lived. He was just, as he entered the last decades of his life, beginning to encounter the type of intensity of scrutiny that we now deal with as an everyday fact of life. We don't have private lives as public figures. You can have a personal life. I differentiate from private and personal. If you go to a restaurant, that is not private anymore. But what you say to your wife or husband is personal. What you do is try to salvage something of the personal but it takes extraordinary, well-integrated people in terms of their personality and psychology to be able to live with, let alone be associated with, a public life, and a public figure who is subject to the electoral process. The requirements of those who are associated with them in terms of their personal rectitude—I don't mean moral rectitude in a cultural sense. I mean their sense of self, their self-esteem, their capacity to understand what is going on around them has to be greater in the spouses, in the friends, in the loved ones than it has to be for the political figure, himself or herself. So there is not a whole lot that we can do about it except understand that it's going to happen and try to take an attitude that you can do very little about much of what is said about you or done to you. All you can do is pay close attention to your own motivation, your own conclusions and activities, and push ahead on the basis that you are examining yourself as best you can with the tools intellectual and other that you have available. You try to effectuate the public good as best you can understand it, and in the process call upon those elements that I guess Lincoln called the "better angels" in yourself. And certainly what Russell would have required of you is a no-holds-barred self-examination of what you are doing and why and not to lie to yourself anymore than you are going to by default anyway. Try not to do it by design.

Endnotes:

- 1 Many thanks to Jenny Miller for transcribing a tape recording of this conversation.
- 2 Cf. *Political Ideals* (p. 29 of Unwin paperback edition).
- 3 Cf. *Political Ideals* (p. 44 of Unwin paperback edition).
4. This conversation took place on June 8, 2001.

The Second International Principia Symposium Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianopolis, Brazil. August 6-10, 2001

Nick Griffin

Philosophers who lament that only doctors and dentists hold conferences in gorgeous and exotic locations can take heart from the International Principia Symposia organized by the Nucleo de Epistemologia e Logica of the Federal University of Santa Catarina at Florianopolis on the Brazilian coast. The symposia are named after the two *Principia Mathematica*s, Newton's and Russell and Whitehead's, and are held every other year. This year the sessions were held in a hotel right on Florianopolis's spectacular shoreline - a truly stunning location.

The conference was dedicated to Russell, but included papers on many other topics in analytic philosophy, especially in epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science. With five days of papers in English and Portuguese running in up to four concurrent sessions there was a great deal from which to choose. Not having Portuguese, some choices were made for me—sadly, since there were many Brazilian papers on logic (especially paraconsistent logic) and philosophy of science which I should have liked to hear. The two in English that I attended, Adonai Sant'Anna on the elimination of space-time from classical field theories and Decio Krause on sortal logics and quantum theory, were especially interesting.

Many other topics were covered. There was Daniel Vanderveken on speech-act theory, Susan Haack on scientific evidence, Michel Ghins on Putnam's anti-realism, Sven Bernecker on memory, Oscar Nudler on progress and stagnation in philosophy, and Claudio de Almeida (a lapsed Russell scholar now working in epistemology) on knowledge and benign falsehoods. As a graduate student at McMaster working on Russell's theory of descriptions, Claudio de Almeida was an early recipient of the BRS's student award. He is now associate professor at the Pontificia Universidade Catolica in Porto Alegre and gave a particularly polished and cogent paper.

(Of Russellian topics, there were no less than three papers on vagueness—two in English, by Mark Colyvan and Marco Ruffino (admittedly on Frege rather than Russell), and one in Portuguese by Carlos Augusto Sartori. It is quite amazing that Ray Monk, in his anxiousness to dismiss Russell's 1923 paper on the topic as inconsequential, could have ignored the explosion of interest in it over the last ten years. The paradoxes and logicism also received their share of attention. Particularly good in this area were Andre Fuhrmann's account of the paradox of propositions in Appendix B of *The Principles of Mathematics* and Otavio Bueno's

defence of a version of Frege's logicism reconstructed to avoid the paradox. Dorothea Lotter surprised everyone by finding a Kantian strain in Frege—I'm not persuaded it's real, but I have a list of passages from her to consult. Last but not least were papers by Oswaldo Chateaubriand disputing Russell's view that there are negative and general facts and a masterly account of Russell's theory of memory by Thomas Baldwin.

Altogether it was a most valuable conference, not only for what one learnt of Russell, but for what one learnt of analytic philosophy in Brazil. Some very interesting work is being done there and my only regret was that my lack of Portuguese prevented me from doing more than scratch the surface.

Nicholas Griffin is Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University.

E-Mail Lists and Websites for the Discriminating Russellian by Peter Stone

As of late, there's been some confusion regarding the various e-mail lists dealing with Bertrand Russell and the BRS. There's also been some curiosity about Russell's presence on the web. Hopefully, this article will clear up some of the confusion. If you find yourself getting confused during discussions of all the various lists and websites, you might want to post this on your wall right next to your computer for future reference.

Lists:

Here's a quick rundown on the primary lists:

- **Russell-I**: Not officially affiliated with the BRS, this list is intended for discussion of all aspects of BR's life and thought. To subscribe to this list, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/russell-I>.
- **BRussell**: A message board on e-groups, this list temporarily replaced Russell-I when that list was briefly discontinued. Now defunct.
- **g-brs**: The list used by the BRS Board to discuss Board business. Only open to the Board of the BRS.
- **g-allbrs**: Used to be the list used by all BRS members (and only by them) to post BRS-related announcements and to discuss BRS business. This list was discon-

tinued due to a large number of e-mails unrelated to Russell or the BRS being posted to the list (The format of the list did not allow for any way to stop spam).

- **BRS-List**: Replaced g-allbrs. This list has controls to stop certain types of spam (e.g., it rejects excessively large e-mails). Only members of the BRS may join. If you are a BRS member, and wish to join this list, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list>

Please note the critically important distinction between BRS-List and Russell-I. BRS-List is only for BRS-related announcements and discussion of BRS business. It's intended for the member who wants to stay "in the loop" without receiving an excessive number of e-mail. Russell-I is for discussion of all aspects of Bertie's life and ideas. It's the list for anyone who wants in depth discussion and doesn't mind receiving multiple e-mails every day. One can, of course, be on both lists. Indeed, the only reason to join Russell-I and not BRS-List is a desire not to join the BRS. And what Russellian would not want to be in our genial company?

Websites:

Here are the big five.

- The Bertrand Russell Society (BRS) - <http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>
- The Bertrand Russell Society Library - <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268/>
- The Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS), a local chapter of the BRS <http://home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs/>
- The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russellI.htm>
- The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, also at McMaster <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~russell/brhome.htm>

Here are a few other websites that may be of some interest.

- The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation is still active and recently set up a webpage at <http://www.russfound.org>. Its journal, *The Spokesman*, and its publishing house, Spokesman Books, are at <http://www.spokesmanbooks.com>
- Episteme.com offers a comprehensive listing of Russell-related websites at <http://www.epistemelinks.com/Main/Philosophers.asp?Philcode=Russ>
- For an article on the "pantheistic" side of Bertrand Russell see <http://home.utm.net/pan/russel.html>
- About.com has a philosophy site dedicated to humanism at <http://philosophy.about.com/homework/philosophy/cs/humanism/index.htm>
- And of course, those interested in seriously pursuing Russell on the web must consult GRRS member David White's paper on that topic at <http://home.sjfc.edu/~white/Russell/>

For more information on the 2002 AM, bookmark: <http://mypage.campuspipeline.com/brsam2002/indexbrsam2002.html>

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

This new feature of the BRSQ will contain brief mentions of Russell sightings in the media, news pertaining to Russell, and pretty much anything Russell-related for which nobody felt like writing a complete article. To start the feature, the editors have included various odds and ends accumulated over the past year. Where possible, the BRS member who provided the information is indicated. Many of the materials here were originally mentioned on Russell-I, the Bertrand Russell discussion listserv.

Hopefully, the materials offered here will inspire members of the BRS to sent any similar items they may find to the BRSQ.

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Johan Galtung's autobiography, *Johan Uten Land: på fredsveien gjennom verden* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2000), has a chapter on BR's influence on him. Galtung is a famous pacifist and theorist of conflict reduction and gave the Bertrand Russell Peace Lectures at McMaster University recently. He also introduced the Norwegian edition of *Why I Am Not a Christian*. He says he owes much to Russell.

Source: Ken Blackwell

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The *Washington Pest*, a satirical online magazine, mentioned Russell in its column "No, We Aren't Making This Up"—"An occasional column of political stuff that we don't even have to screw around with to make it funny." Russell put in an appearance in an obituary notice of Alex Comfort, author of *Joy of Sex*. The Pest writes:

Comfort was as rebellious in politics as in sexual mores. He was a keen member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, led by the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell (more than a bit loony despite his credentials). Comfort was one of a number of campaigners briefly jailed by the Brits for marching in his cause.

Finding himself sharing a cell with Russell, Comfort passed the time by teaching Bertie how to sing Irish rebel songs. What a curious image that conjures up.

The obituary appeared in January-June 2000 at http://www.washingtonpest.com/no_we_are_not_1-6_2000.html.

Source: Ken Blackwell

The Summer/Fall 2000 issue of *Television Quarterly* reprints a brief article on Russell by Philip Hamburger. Hamburger worked as television critic at the New Yorker from 1949 to 1955; the reprinted article, entitled "Bertrand Russell Didn't Wish to Change his Hopes for the World," first appeared in the May 31, 1952 issue of that magazine. Hamburger reviews the half-hour interview with Russell broadcast on NBC a few weeks earlier. Best line? "I don't know who at N.B.C. conceived the notion for this presentation, but he certainly deserves the wholehearted thanks of every television-set owner who, stunned by fratricide, patricide, matricide, ordinary homicide, and quiz programs, may have begun to wonder what the set was doing around the house anyway."

Source: Ken Blackwell

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The October 20, 2000 issue of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* featured a review of Ben Rogers' *A.J. Ayer: A Life* (Grove Press) entitled "A Philosopher's Examined Life: It's Worth Forgiving". Amidst ruminations about the difficult inherent in writing philosophical biography, the reviewer, Carlin Romano, cites Ayer's claim that he would be content "having played Horatio to Bertrand Russell's Hamlet in the supposed sharpening (if cultural downsizing) of 20th-century English philosophy." He also describes Ayer's laments to him (in an interview given a year before Ayer's death) that so much attention was given to Russell's sexual escapades to the exclusion of his philosophy. Ayer might have well said this out of enlightened self-interest, given that (as Romano points out) Ayer "earned a 'First' in womanizing himself."

Another review of Rogers' book, entitled "Ladies, Truth, and Logic," appeared in the January 29, 2001 issue of *The New Republic*. The reviewer, Simon Blackburn, writes that "This beautifully written, sympathetic, and sensitive biography tells the life of Britain's best-known philosopher in the generation after Bertrand Russell." Of course, the qualifying clause—"in the generation after Bertrand Russell"—made a huge difference in the review. This review is online at <http://www.tnr.com/012901/blackburn012901.html>.

Source: Peter Stone

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Ever Ahab-like in his intense hatred for Bertrand Russell, political oddball Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. published a recent article which went out of its way to attack the Good Lord. The article, entitled "The Fraud against Edward Teller," appeared in LaRouche journal *Executive Intelligence Review* on December 22, 2000; it also

appears on the web at http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/2000/2750_teller.html. This article defends Teller and his brainchild, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") against two recent critiques. One of these pieces is described as a "hoax", a "puff piece for the memory of Bertrand Russell cat's-paw Leo Szilard, and, thus, a cover-up of the legacies of such Szilard accomplices as the late John J. McCloy, McGeorge Bundy, and Bundy's lackey Henry A. Kissinger." The article continues on at some length in the same vein.

Source: Peter Stone

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The January 11, 2001 issue of the *Guardian* noted the passing of Gertrude Elizabeth Mary Anscombe, one of the most famous students of Russell's most famous student, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The *Guardian's* obituary is still online at <http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4115443,00.html>.

Source: Russell-I

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On January 28, 2001, the *New York Times* published an article entitled "Philosophy in Hiding: I Have Tenure, Therefore I Am." The article, written by Peter Edidin, lamented the increasing isolation of the philosophy profession from the general public. The article contained the following quote:

Philosophers...practice a vocation that for most of its existence has sought, as Bertrand Russell once wrote, to "Make us know the ends in life that have value on their own account." Surely, that's a project for ordinary men and women as well.

Fortunately, organizations like the BRS (and our own local BRS chapter the GRRS) are making an effort to show that philosophy can be relevant outside the academy (see the note "GRRS Catches APA's Attention" in the August 2001 issue of the *BRSQ*).

Source: Russell-I

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The February 9, 2001 issue of the *Times Literary Supplement* contained a review of *The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus and its Origins*, edited by Paul W. Humphreys and James H. Fetzer (pp. 12-13). The book (published by Kluwer)

deals with the allegation that Saul Kripke, one of the leading figures in contemporary logic, had plagiarized the work of another philosopher, Ruth Marcus. The allegation, made in 1994 by philosopher Quentin Smith, has generated much debate, about both the substance of the charge and the propriety of raising it in the forum Smith employed (a meeting of the American Philosophical Association). The new book contains Smith's original paper, other papers of his, and a number of responses and rebuttals. The reviewer, Stephen Neale, provides a stimulating review of some of the issues in philosophy (especially modal logic) considered in the debate, issues tied explicitly to Russell's work on definite descriptions. The reviewer, who clearly sides with Kripke in this debate, concludes that the book does not "raise doubts about Kripke's contributions to philosophy" but does "shed light on some of philosophy's most important and difficult issues" as well as "articulate Kripke's seminal role" in dealing with these issues (p. 13).

Source: Jack Clontz

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The February 10, 2001 issue of the *New York Times* featured an obituary of Herbert A. Simon, the noted student of human rationality and artificial intelligence (p. A13). In recalling Simon's efforts to duplicate human intelligence artificially, the obituary recounts a classic story about Russell as follows:

The breakthrough came in December 1955 when Professor Simon and his colleague succeeded in writing a computer program that could prove mathematical theorems taken from the Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead classic on mathematical logic, "Principia Mathematica." The following January, Professor Simon celebrated this discovery by walking into a class and announcing to his students, "Over the Christmas holiday, Al Newell and I invented a thinking machine."

A subsequent letter to Lord Russell explaining his achievement elicited the reply: "I am delighted to know that 'Principia Mathematica' can now be done by machinery. I wish Whitehead and I had known of this possibility before we wasted 10 years doing it by hand."

Source: Peter Friedman

The March 5, 2001 issue of *The New Yorker* featured a satirical advice column by Steve Martin entitled "The Ethicist." In the column, Martin considers the following apocryphal question:

After I was banned from my nine-year-old son's Little League playing field, I began teaching him to scream at his coach. I would like to encourage him to include profanity in these adorable tirades, but, as it is banned from our household, would this make me a hypocrite?

"The Ethicist" responded as follows:

You have created a philosophical conundrum. What happens when two contradictory moral laws seem to be in effect at the same time? Bertrand Russell said that it is possible for one law to indicate the truth or falsehood of another, even though the two contradict each other. However, it should be noted that in 1948 Russell entered into a lifelong feud over the issue with a Magic 8 Ball, which said, "Reply hazy, try again."

One suspects that Martin had been reading Ray Monk's biography of Russell at the time he came up with that one.

Source: Thom Weidlich

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In an interview for the *Independent*, Monty Pythoner John Cleese indicated that "a series of essays on happiness by Bertrand Russell gave me masses of comedy ideas because good comedy is about good ideas." The interview appeared on March 7, 2001, and is still on the *Independent's* website at <http://www.independent.co.uk> (Just run a search for "Bertrand Russell").

Source: Ken Blackwell

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On March 31, 2001, the *Guardian* published an extract from the new book *Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers*, by John Eidsen and David Edmonds (Faber and Faber, 2001). This book discusses the debate over an incident in which Ludwig Wittgenstein allegedly threatened Karl Popper with a poker. The book discusses the Rashomon-like debate among those present at the alleged incident, then offers the philosophical and

historical context surrounding the confrontation between Popper and Wittgenstein. The *BRSQ* would also welcome a review of this book.

Source: Russell-I

News from the Humanist World

Those interested in boning up on humanism may wish to check out the website of the St. Petersburg-Largo Area Secular Humanists (SPLASH) at <http://splashes.org>. As mentioned in the August 2001 issue of the *BRSQ*, this organization publishes an excellent newsletter edited by the BRS's very own Jan Loeb Eisler. Their website features much introductory material on humanists. In addition, their monthly events calendars lists the birthdays of important humanist figures, usually with links that lead to more information.

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Another interesting humanist group on the web is the Buddhivadi Foundation, a "registered, non-profit, tax-exempt, educational trust for promoting rationalism and humanism." This Indian organization publishes a regular newsletter in Hindi, an occasional one in English, publishes books and papers, and maintains a library and a website. The website is at <http://www.buddhiwadi.org/index.htm>. It offers books and pamphlets for sale (in English and Hindi) and has several papers posted, including "The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell." Most interestingly, the Foundation is affiliated with the Bihar Buddhivadi Samaj, a humanist educational society and associate member of the International Humanist Ethical Union (IHEU) whose name in English (Bihar Rationalist Society) bears the same acronym as the Bertrand Russell Society.

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Rationalist International, a high-quality humanist newsletter based in India, will be hosting the Third International Rationalist Conference on February 8-12, 2002 in New Delhi. Conference registration is already open. For more information, visit *Rationalist International's* website at www.rationalistinternational.net or write to Conference Secretariat International, Rationalist Conference 779, Pocket-5, Mayur Vihar-1, New Delhi 110 091, India.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, BRS Honorary member Noam Chomsky immediately began speaking out against a U.S. military response against Afghanistan. In his discussion of "war fever," he notes how few intellectuals in either the U.S. or Western Europe maintained a critical perspective during World War I. Most of those who did, he goes on to note, wound up in jail; as examples, he cites Emma Goldman, Eugene Debs, and Bertrand Russell. Some of Chomsky's responses, as well as other materials on the same subject, can be found at <http://www.zmag.org>.

*

Two belated items of news concerning BRS Honorary Member Taslima Nasrin, courtesy of Warren Allen Smith.

First, a short reprint from the May 2000 issue of the British Humanist magazine Freethinker. This article, entitled "Taslima Nasrin Becomes National Secular Society Honorary Associate," was written by Keith Porteous Wood, General Secretary of the National Secular Society.

Taslima Nasrin's soft and charming smile might mislead some people. Behind it lurks a woman of steely determination and courage, an ardent feminist and a tireless human-rights campaigner. She is also a victim of religious oppression—a high-profile victim because she chose to fight back. She is also, now, an honorary associate of the National Secular Society—although the honour is all ours.

Taslima was in London to meet Babu Gogineni, Executive Director of the International Humanist & Ethical Union (IHEU), of which the National Secular Society (NSS) is a member.

In her novel, *Shame*, Taslima wrote about the oppression that religious conflict brings in its wake, a topic that resulted in a fatwa being issued against her in her native Bangladesh. She has now lived under the shadow of this threat for many years, hiding and living incognito in a manner similar to Salman Rushdie. When Taslima was in hiding in Bangladesh, she was also fighting a case for offending religious sentiment. IHEU helped her then by publicising her plight and raising money to defray the legal expenses. She had to flee from Bangladesh to escape prosecution and the wrath of fundamentalists, and their Government made diplomatic moves to assist her departure.

She chose Europe as her place of exile and took her elderly mother with her. In 1998 she courageously returned to Bangladesh with her mother because her mother was dying. Once again, death threats were issued against her there. Islamic fundamentalists demanded her execution as well as the introduction of blasphemy law with death as the penalty for those convicted.

Taslima has recently visited India twice, and although these visits have been somewhat turbulent, they have not provoked violence.

Taslima was surprised that so much religious privilege survives her, and particularly that it is still necessary to fight off attempts to increase it. As a tireless champion of free speech and a victim of blasphemy laws elsewhere, she was saddened to learn that such a law is still extant here [in the U.K.—ed.]. The idea that it should be extended to cover other religions she found appalling. "That would be a disaster," she said. "It would be like extending one wound to cover the whole of the body. Freedom of expression should override all sectional interests. Laws must be secular and based on equality. There should be no concession to fanaticism or any culture that is counter to the well-being of humanity." She emphasised that the way to eliminate privilege on the blasphemy law was to abolish it, rather than extend it.

Her attitude to religion was equally unambiguous. "It tells people what to do, what to wear, what to speak. No individualism is respected, and group loyalty is all." When I told her there had been calls for a religious discrimination law here, she said it would be a dangerously regressive step. She was horrified when I told her that there had never been any prosecutions in this country against female genital mutilation, although it almost certainly goes on. "The authorities should be taking action against the families and whoever else is perpetrating these acts."

There were, however, some areas where Taslima was more compromising. She does not oppose arranged marriages, provided there is no duress, and she has no problem with religious funerals. She thinks religious minorities should be protected, just like any other minority. The distinction she drew was that people should not be attacked for what they believe, but they should not be permitted privileges over others because of those beliefs.

She called on secularists and humanists in the UK to renew the fight against the forces of religious conservatism and to achieve separation of Church and State.

Resolution to puzzle on inside back cover:

With the exception of pure mathematics, every science has had to begin by fighting to establish its right to exist.

Second, a brief report by Warren Allen Smith on Nasrin's speaking engagements in the U.S.

Dr. Taslima Nasrin spoke in Los Angeles in May [2000—ed.] at the Council for Secular Humanism's Annual Conference, held to celebrate twenty years of the organization's journal, "Free Inquiry." The conference's theme was "Imagine There's No Heaven: A Future Without Religion."

The Bangladesh physician-poet-novelist-journalist, who is an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society, spoke about her efforts to confront religious extremism.

Other featured speakers included Paul Krassner (editor of *The Realist* and of Lemmy Bruce's *How To Talk Dirty and Influence People*); Alan Cranston (California's ex-Senator); Jill Tarter (director of the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence); Jared Diamond (scientist and Pulitzer Prize winner); Paul Kurtz (the philosopher who helped author *Humanist Manifesto 2000*); Steve Allen (entertainer); William B. Davis (a star of the "X-Files" who spoke about superstition in the entertainment industry); and Ibn Warraq (the pseudonymous critic of Islam whose *Why I Am Not A Muslim* was inspired in great part by Lord Russell).

"Religion," Taslima lamented, "has hurt me in a hell of a lot of ways. It successfully banned and burned my books. It was behind my being given arrest warrants, resulting in my having to leave my home and being forced to seek shelter in the dark of the night in my own land, which now has become my hostile land. Religion came to finish me off with snakes, swords, axes, and guns. Religion ran after me and held thick ropes that it wanted to tie around my throat. Religion forced me to quit my job, demanded my execution by hanging, issued a fatwa against me, promised a monetary award to anyone who would kill me. In short, it has led large numbers of human beings to want to cut my tongue out, has led to preventing me from stepping inside the borders of any Muslim country, and has chased me from my tropical land to Sweden where my native language is not spoken."

Now, she explained, Hindu as well as Muslim fundamentalists demonstrate against her because she was quoted as being critical of Hinduism when she supported an Indian film maker whose work illustrated poverty in one community. Her views against genital mutilation, patriarchy, and the sad status of women worldwide led *Time* (the Asian edition), in its century-end issue, to cite Taslima as "One of the 20 Most Important Women in the 20th Century."

As her longtime friend, friend of her family, one who helped hide her one summer, who visited her various hiding places in Sweden and an editor of some of her speeches, I told her about some early American women who also suffered derision

for their stands. Taslima had been unaware of feminist leaders in America, so I told her about the views of Susan B. Anthony (that marriage is like legalized prostitution) and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (about the futility of women's accepting a he-Hible, a he-God, a he-Christ, and he-angels). She was so amused that she included a reference to the two, then adopted my slang description of them by saying "You GO girls!" After a minimum of tutoring about how to emphasize the second word, she included in her somewhat gripping lecture—a lecture that had a few squirming when she described some of what she has had to endure from protectors of patriarchy—a reference to how she had been told about Anthony and Stanton, had found their views stirring, then added, "You GO girls!" The audience of several hundred erupted in wild applause. She stood at the podium for a moment, in fact, somewhat amazed at how the slang had succeeded.

She then ended by saying she'd certainly not look forward to a Muslim Paradise in which she would have to watch her husband fornicate (I convinced her not to use a 4 letter word she was going to use) with 70 vestal virgins for eternity, nor to a Judeo-Christian Heaven in which she would hear her friends painfully screaming in Hell because of an all-loving God.

Taslima got a standing ovation, the only one during the 3-day conference.

A cassette of Taslima Nasrin's Los Angeles speech can be obtained from the Council for Secular Humanism at Webmaster@SecularHumanism.org or <http://www.secularhumanism.org/nasrin/index.htm>. A speech given by her at UNESCO is available at <http://www.ihcu.org>. And her homepage, which includes photos of her with Jacques Derrida, Francois Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, and others is at <http://nasrin.humanists.net>.

*

Finally, a more recent report from Rationalist International (Issue # 73, July 17, 2001) concerning Nasrin.

Taslima Nasreen, Honorary Associate of *Rationalist International*, has been convicted in absentia by a court in Bangladesh on charges of blasphemy. The verdict ends a criminal case, filed by an Islamic cleric against the author for "hurting the religious sentiments of Muslims" with her novel *Shame* and her criticism of the Quran. Taslima had to leave her country in 1994 because Islamic fundamentalists threatened her life. In September 1998 she returned to see her dying mother, but had to flee once again from the wrath of the fanatics.

Paul Kurtz's latest book, *Skepticism and Humanism: The New Paradigm*, has been published by Transaction Publishers. Kurtz is Chairman of the Council for Secular Humanism and editor-in-chief of *Free Inquiry*. He has written numerous books and received many awards most recently the Chancellor Charles Norton Medal, the highest award given out by the State University of New York at Buffalo. The BRS would welcome a review of this book.

The astute reader may have noticed an abundance of items on the BRS's honorary members from the humanist community (Nasrin, Kurtz) and fewer items on honorary members renowned for work in other areas. The reason for this is the simple and obvious one; we print what we get. We encourage members to send us brief reports dealing with the BRS's various award recipients and honorary members. We periodically reprint lists of these honored people and organizations, but a member can find them at any time at the BRS's website.

The Hunt for Red Hackle

The search for Red Hackle, Russell's favorite brand of blended scotch whiskey, proceeds unabated. From the front lines comes a report from Jack Clontz, a member of the BRS currently residing in Japan. Former BRS Secretary Peter Stone had written to Clontz inquiring about Red Hackle in Japan, with a special interest in the premium brand.

Dear Peter:

I have received your message about Red Hackle and the BR Society. Yes, I am a member of the Bertrand Russell Society though only for about a year. Ray Perkins Jr., a good friend since 1968, urged me to join, and of course I did. I am unable to attend the annual meetings because the Japanese academic calendar is incompatible with the BRS schedule.

At any rate, Ray Perkins told me last year about the difficulty the BRS was having in obtaining Red Hackle from the UK. It seems that the Red Hackle people would not (or could not) ship it to the US for unknown reasons. However, in an account of the BRS meeting last year, I read that you had a Red Hackle Hour (sic). How did you get your Red Hackle last year?

I do drink whiskey at times here in Japan. Sometimes I buy whiskey at stores, but

never recall seeing Red Hackle. It is true, however, I live in the Japanese hinterlands, and that may be a factor. On the other hand, an amazing array of alcoholic beverages from around the world make their way even here, the Japanese being major tipplers in search of something unusual for reasons of prestige. I am in the midst of Final Examinations and go to visit my wife and home in Thailand next month, but in the interim I will look around in this area. In March I will be back in Japan and during part of this time I will be acting as tour guide to an American college president and his wife. I will be in areas of Japan where it is far more likely Red Hackle would be carried. I will also look in Bangkok, but the prestigious imported alcoholic beverage in Thailand is French red wine in view of the king's heart problem at the age of 73 and a wine society headed by one of Thailand's leading writers.

In sum, Peter, I shall do my best, but cannot make any promises. Incidentally, imported whiskey is extremely expensive in Japan as high duties are placed on it. As you probably know, Japan is a very expensive country anyway, though there is now considerable deflation. A cup of coffee costs more than US\$10.00 in some cases. (On the other hand, average wage rates are much higher than for comparable positions in the USA or Western Europe. The cost of living is high but so are wage rates --cf. Economics 101.) However, in my experience, the highest alcohol prices in the world are in Scandinavia, especially Sweden. Margaret Thatcher was appreciated in both Scotland and Japan for persuading the Japanese government under Nakasone to reduce the duty on imports of Scotch whiskey, some of which is greatly loved in Japan as throughout much of Asia. Anyway, your Red Hackle would be very expensive in Japan, and mailing costs would be at least 25% higher than comparable costs for exactly the same items in the USA in addition to much higher packaging charges. But perhaps this doesn't matter since it isn't a matter of importing vast amounts and the burden is shared.

Why brand of pipe tobacco did BR smoke? I think you should have a BRS smoker as well in order to show a lack of respect for political correctness! (Actually, I had to give up smoking, especially my beloved pipes, because of circulatory and coronary problems. But then look at the age at which BR died and how little evidence of senility there was!)

Anyway, I will be in contact later. I will do my best, but again will not make any rash promises. And I have taken note of your "P.S." on your premium line of the Scotch.

Regards, Jack

If you have a report on the search for Red Hackle, send it to us. The quest continues...

**Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
3rd Quarter Treasurer's Report,
Cash Flow Report 7/1/01 through 9/30/01**

| | |
|---------------------|----------|
| BALANCE 6/30/01 | 6,768.68 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions: | |
| Contrib-BRS | 321.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 321.00 |
| Dues: | |
| New Members | 55.00 |
| Renewals | 1,249.50 |
| TOTAL Dues | 1,304.50 |
| Meeting Inc | 0.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 1,625.50 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Chrg | 3.48 |
| Library Exp | 15.72 |
| Newsletter | 569.00 |
| Other Expenses | 5.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 593.20 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 1,032.30 |
| BALANCE 9/30/01 | 7,900.98 |

Russell-crypt
Gerry Wildenberg

A while ago I published some simple substitution cyphers based on Russell quotes (BRSQ #102, February 2000). To my delight, though also to my surprise, they seem to have been well received. Therefore I shall provide the editor with a new "Russell-crypt" for each issue. Below is today's coded quote in which each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFHFRYY, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quote below uses a different code.

UNCR CRF FGOFYCNJO JB YESF KZCRFKZCNQH, FPFST HQNFOQE RZII
RZM CJ XFLNO XT BNLRCNOL CJ FHICZXDNIH NCH SNLRC CJ FGNHC.

The solution is on page 35 at the bottom.

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Five Years of Monthly Russell Meetings
Open to the Public

GRRS Catches APA's Attention

The American Philosophical Association has placed a copy of our flyer upon its website, citing it as "an example of the kind of thing that we would like to encourage." The flyer can be viewed at the APA site at

<http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/centennial/100anniv.html>

Program, Spring 2001

| | |
|---------|--------------------------------------|
| Jan. 17 | "Russell, Conrad and Conrad Russell" |
| Feb. 21 | "Dora, Dora, Dora" |
| Mar. 21 | <i>Wittgenstein's Vienna</i> |
| Apr. 18 | "Tom and Viv and Bertie" |
| May 16 | <i>The Conquest of Happiness</i> |

The Iguana Club (formerly Christian's Coffeehouse)
Village Gate Square, 274 North Goodman St., Rochester, NY
For information
call Tim Madigan 7160424-3184 or write TimothyMad@aol.com
or visit <http://home.sjfc.edu/~white/grrs>

Erratum

The Minutes of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the BRS noted that Alan Schwerin "found the idea of having officeholders (like special Vice Presidents) who were not 'officers' rather odd" (BRSQ, August 2001, p. 12). It also noted that Schwerin "inquired if any member had ever been expelled before" (ibid., p. 13). Alan Bock, not Alan Schwerin, in fact made these remarks. Ex-Secretary Peter Stone apologizes for the misattribution.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February 2002

No. 113

Hell Didn't Freeze Over... It Came to Rochester!



**Warren Allen Smith, Author of
Who's Who in Hell
(with GRRS Member Dave Henehan)**

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY
c/o David White
Philosophy Department
St. John Fisher College
3690 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14618 USA

MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1406 26TH ST.
ROCK ISLAND IL 61201-2837



HAVE YOU RENEWED YET?
See Page 4 to find out!

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Webmaster: John Lenz, jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone

Associate Editors: Tim Madigan, Rachel M. Murray, David White

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:

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Opinions expressed in the *BRSQ* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the BRS or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Chairman of the Board | Kenneth Blackwell |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Ray Perkins |
| Secretary | Chad Trainer |
| Treasurer | Dennis J. Darland |
| Vice President/Outreach | Peter Friedman |

QUOTE OF THE QUARTERLY

"It's worth remembering that no matter how much they try, they are part of the British educated elite, that is, ideological fanatics who have long ago lost the capacity to think on any issue of human significance, and entirely in the grip of the state religion. They can concede errors or failures, but anything more is, literally, inconceivable."

BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky, on the British media's coverage of the ongoing sanctions and bombing campaigns against Iraq. Personal e-mail to David Cromwell, Co-Editor of the web-based magazine *MediaLens* (<http://www.medialens.org>), 24 February, 2001.

Russell, I suspect, didn't like the British media that much either.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February 2001

No. 113

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From the Editor:

The Hunt for Red Hackle

Since assuming the editorship last year, I have run several updates on the quest to lay in fresh stock of Red Hackle, Bertrand Russell's favorite scotch, for the BRS. These updates have run in a column entitled "The Hunt for Red Hackle." In lieu of this month's column, I decided to devote this issue's editorial to my own less-than-successful efforts at locating our Society's most sought-after potent potable. My hope is that it will serve as a rallying cry to enlist a devoted member or two in this difficult quest.

While Red Hackle has been the focal point of the Society's annual social hour (appropriately entitled the Red Hackle Hour) for many an annual meeting, the Society has no stock of its own. For some time it has relied upon the immense generosity of Don Jackanicz, a life member of the Society and a former Secretary of the Society and Board. Don bought several bottles of Red Hackle at a trade show some years ago, and has supplied the BRS with the stuff as needed. In hopes of relieving Don of this extraordinary responsibility, I've been trying to find a way to lay in a stock the Society can call its own.

Complicating this search immensely has been the complex and changing status of the ownership of the Red Hackle label. Red Hackle was made by Lang Brothers, Ltd. (100 West Nile ST, Glasgow). When I first began my search several years ago, the parent company was Robertson & Baxter, and the distributor was Churchill Vintners, Ltd. I contacted Churchill Vintners in hopes of finding a distributor in the U.S. or Canada who could meet my needs. But while Red Hackle has at one point or another been marketed in the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and Denmark, Churchill Vintners could identify no U.S. or Canadian distributor who handles their brands.

Temporarily stymied by this finding, I later began an effort to buy some Red Hackle directly from the UK. I soon discovered, however, that since my previous efforts Lang Brothers had been taken over by a company called the Edrington Group. The Edrington Group's main whisky operation is currently housed in the office of Highland Distillers, which the Edrington Group partially owns. Highland Distillers, then, currently serves as distributor for Edrington's brands such as Red Hackle. It was Highland, then, that I had to contact. The answer I received from them, however, was somewhat unclear. They seemed unwilling to ship the stuff to the U.S. or Canada in quantities less than a thousand cases (12,000 bottles!). While the

BRS likes to drink, this quantity still seemed a bit excessive, and so I tried to discover how a representative of the BRS might buy some in the UK and bring it back to North America. When I inquired how this might be done, however, Highland informed me that Red Hackle was no longer being distributed in the UK, either.

This seemed rather odd. Highland Distillers had made it clear that the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. did not belong to the set of countries within which Red Hackle was currently available. Given that the company presumably could identify all the elements in this set, however, I took their claim to imply (pragmatically if not logically) that the set was non-empty. Otherwise, Highland could have saved everyone a lot of trouble by simply saying that the set was empty at the outset. With this in mind, I contacted a member of the BRS in Japan, knowing that it had once been distributed there. (His response appeared in the "Hunt for Red Hackle" column in the November 2001 issue of the *BRSQ*).

In addition, Highland had also advanced the proposition "Unless you buy at least a thousand cases, we cannot send any to the U.S." Again, pragmatically this seemed an odd claim to advance if Red Hackle was completely unavailable anywhere. Unfortunately, the distillers were not very familiar with the philosophy of language, and after numerous additional inquiries I determined that the set is indeed empty. Red Hackle is a blended scotch whisky no longer being manufactured. To sell it in the U.S. or anywhere else, the company would have to blend a fresh batch, and this they would not do without a guaranteed purchase of at least a thousand cases. The quest for Red Hackle thereby ground to a sudden halt.

At this stage, then, the only way the BRS can acquire Red Hackle is if some enterprising member tracks down some leftover bottles on the internet, on the back shelf of a liquor store, etc. With this in mind, I have been authorized by the BRS to invite members of the Society to search far and wide for the fabled scotch. The BRS will compensate members for as much as US \$40 for bottles of the premium blend of Red Hackle, for as many as four bottles. (If anyone finds a larger quantity, they should contact me before purchasing it.) In addition, any member that tracks down some Red Hackle for the BRS will receive a FREE BRS T-Shirt (See "BRS T-Shirts Sure Get Around" on p. 7 of this issue) and the effusive gratitude of the Society. Let the hunt continue and thrive! Do your duty to the BRS, so that the Red Hackle Hour can remain a BRS institution for years to come!

The Editor wishes to thank David White and Peter Friedman for their generous assistance in my search.

Have You Renewed Yet?

All BRS memberships (except Life and Honorary memberships) expire at the end of the calendar year. And so if you haven't done so already, it's **time to renew**. There's a membership form in the center of the *BRSQ*. Please return it to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. Please make checks payable, in US Dollars, to "BRS." If you have any questions about your membership, feel free to drop Dennis a line at djarland@qconline.com.

Forgotten whether or not you've renewed already? The *BRSQ* endeavors to make things as easy as possible for you. Check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following four-digit numbers on it:

- 2001** means you are paid through 2001, but still need to renew for 2002.
- 2002** means you have indeed renewed for 2002, and so are all set for the year.
- 7777, 8888, or 9999** means you are a Life Member, Honorary Membership, or receiving the *BRSQ* as a courtesy. In any case, you never need to renew.

Check for your number, and you'll always know your status.

The BRS is constantly looking for ways we can make it easier for you to keep your membership current. We'd hate to lose any member because of a misunderstanding over the timing of a dues payment. If you have any suggestions to help us improve the process, please drop the *BRSQ* a line.

Breaking News!

According to our Chair, Ken Blackwell, dues can now be paid via credit card using Paypal on the web. Go to <http://www.paypal.com>, and open a free account. Then pay your dues using brs-pp@qconline.com as the recipient's e-mail address when prompted. There is no charge to make a Paypal payment, which (foreign members take note) will be handled in U.S. dollars. In the e-mail message that Paypal will send from you to our treasurer (Dennis), be sure to state the purpose of the payment. Do not include your credit card info in the message. Do include any change in your name and address. Dennis will send you an email receipt, and update the membership records accordingly. Direct any questions to Dennis at the e-mail address above.

Meet Studs Terkel ! Come to the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL) May 31-June 2, 2002

BRS Awards Committee Chair Kevin Brodie has confirmed that Studs Terkel will accept the 2002 BRS Annual Award. The meeting will be held at Lake Forest College, in Lake Forest, Illinois (about 30 miles north of Chicago, near Northwestern University).

Studs Terkel is a renowned author and journalist most famous for his interviews with people from all walks of life, from political leaders to cleaning ladies—to philosophers, including Bertrand Russell. Terkel is the author of such books as *Working : People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do* (New Press, 1997), *The Good War: An Oral History of World War Two* (New Press, 1997), and most recently *Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Reflections on Death, Rebirth, and Hunger for a Faith* (New Press, 2001). Terkel, who lives in Chicago, plans to attend the Annual Meeting so as to accept the award in person. All BRS members are encouraged to attend and enjoy this rare opportunity.

In addition to Terkel, the BRS Annual Meeting will feature many interesting papers and presentations. (The Greater Rochester Russell Set has already had a proposal accepted for a panel discussion at the meeting.) Members should submit proposals to BRS President Alan Schwerin at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ 07764 USA, (732) 571-4470, aschweri@monmouth.edu. Schwerin also has a website with information about the submission process at <http://bluchawk.monmouth.edu/aschweri/brs2002.htm>.

Registration for the meeting—including buffet, banquet, papers, and other materials—costs \$55, or \$40 for students, and can be made using the handy form at the center of this issue. Accommodations are available on campus; the rates are indicated on the registration form. Checks for registration and/or housing should be made out to "Bertrand Russell Society" and sent with the registration form to conference organizer Rosalind Carey at the Department of Philosophy, Durand Hall, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045 USA, carey@hermes.lfc.edu. Or, if you prefer, you may pay for your registration and/or housing via credit card using Paypal on the web. (See p. 4 for details.) Please direct all questions about the conference to Rosalind as well. Rosalind also has a web page devoted to the conference at <http://mypage.campuspipeline.com/brsam2002/indexbrsam2002.html>.

Congratulations...

Tom Stanley, acting Chair of the Elections Committee, has tallied the ballots from the Society's recent election for the Board of Directors. Chairman of the Board Ken Blackwell has confirmed these results.

33 members, including one honorary member, voted in the election, which featured 11 candidates. The final tallies are listed below. The 8 highest vote-getters, all of whom have won seats on the Board, are in italics.

Alan Schwerin 32, Ray Perkins 29, Tim Madigan, 26, Thom Weidlich 25, Kevin Brodie 24, Rosalind Carey 24, Chad Trainer 23, Warren Allen Smith 20, Bernard Linsky 17, Nino Cocchiarella 16, Peter Friedman 14.

All six incumbents seeking re-election won. The *BRSQ* congratulates these candidates, and welcomes newcomers Rosalind Carey and Chad Trainer to the Board. The *BRSQ* would also like to acknowledge outgoing Board members Stefan Andersson and Derek Araujo for their service to the BRS.

...and a Note of Thanks


The BRS would like to acknowledge the following members, each of whom donated money to the Society over and above their regular membership dues in 2001:

- *Sponsors (\$100 and up):* Neil Abercrombie, Carol A. Keene, Robert A. Riemenschneider, Warren Allen Smith.
- *Sustainers (\$75 and up):* Linda Egendorf, Petar Forcan.
- *Contributors (\$50 and up):* Jay Aragona, Whitfield Cobb, Robert K. Davis, John J. Fitzgerald, James Gordon, Gregory Landini, Justin Leiber, Gladys Leithauser, Stephen J. Reinhardt, Harry Ruja, Michael A. Sequeira, Barbara Testi.
- *Other Donors:* James Bunton, D.M. Daugharty, Benito Rey, Laurie Endicott Thomas.

The *BRSQ* thanks these members for supporting the BRS.

BRS T-Shirts Sure Get Around

In the picture below, an atheist (Irving Yablon) and a BRS-er (Warren Allen Smith) picket President-Select G.W. Bush's July 10, 2001 visit to New York City, where the latter honored the late Cardinal O'Connor in St. Patrick's Cathedral. Warren is proudly wearing his BRS t-shirt.



If you'd like to get in on this kind of action, why not order your own t-shirt today? The shirts are available for \$10 each plus \$ 3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Please make checks out to the BRS, and send them to BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, 854 Battle ST, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color. Shirts are available in black or yellow. (White may also be available; check with Ray at perkrk@earthlink.net.)

A Russellian is Born!



BRSQ Associate Editor Tim Madigan reports that his friends, clinical ethicist Jeffrey Spike and biology teacher Elizabeth Spike, recently had a baby—and named her after Bertie! Sophia Russell Spike was born on January 4, 2002. She is here pictured at two weeks old being held by her brother Alexander Hume Spike, who is 3 ½. Their brother, 2-year-old Perry Spinoza Spike, is out of camera, looking on quizzically. (This is all true.) Hats off to the Spike family, who will be receiving a complimentary copy of this issue for baby Sophia. (Please note that BRS memberships make great gifts for birthdays, showers, christenings, bar mitzvahs, etc. There's no minimum age to join.)

The proud father, a longtime admirer of Russell, would like to add, "Of note: Hume and Spinoza get along well, most of the time. Occasionally fight over a toy. Don't know what that tells us about the history of philosophy."

A Call for Volunteers

Astonishing as it might sound, the *BRSQ* Committee (consisting of Editor Peter Stone and Associate Editors Tim Madigan, Rachel Murray, and David White) is not omniscient, and we can't be everywhere at once. We frequently encounter topics for good articles—a BR-Related book in need of a review, a website that deserves a write-up, a theme that could make a worthy article with a little research—that none of us have the time to tackle. For this reason, we'd like to reach out to you, the membership, the "silent majority" of the Russellian community. We're looking for volunteers, members of the BRS who would be willing to write an occasional article for the *BRSQ* on a topic we think would interest the Society. So if you'd like to get more involved in the Society, now's your chance! Even writing one or two articles a year for the *BRSQ* would be a huge help. If you're interested, drop us a line, and we'll talk. We're open to just about any working arrangement that gets more members playing a role in the *BRSQ* and that produces some juicy articles for all to enjoy.

Of course, spontaneous contributions on Russell-related topics of your choice are of course always welcome. So even if you can't be a regular volunteer, keep those submissions coming! It gives your all-too-human *BRSQ* Committee a chance to relax.

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserv, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserv is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. To join the list, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively send the message "subscribe" to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserv's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

The *BRSQ* encourages all members to join BRS-List.

Special Feature: Who's Who in Hell

Introduction Peter Stone

At a time when "God Bless America" seems to be on every politician's lips (even more than usual), the *BRSQ* is proud to present a special section devoted to *Who's Who in Hell: A Handbook and International Directory for Humanists, Freethinkers, Naturalists, Rationalists and Non-Theists*, published in 2000 by Barricade Books and edited by the BRS's own Warren Allen Smith. This issue features a brief report on Warren's visit to Rochester to promote the book by Alan Bock, Warren's own musings on his Rochester visit, and a review of the book by David White.

Anyone intrigued by this review may wish to check out Warren's website at <http://wasm.ws> for more information on the book, as well as intriguing gossip (most of it unrelated to Russell but enjoyable nonetheless). The website contains complete information on ordering the book. It also contains a poem written in tribute to *Who's Who in Hell* that offers an excellent conclusion to this introduction. (The author is listed among the damned.)

How glad I am to be in that HELL book!
With Jefferson and Sartre! Take a look!
See Dewey, Paine, Hume, Rushdie and Voltaire.
Just all the world's great thinkers you'll find there.
Yes, being in the book is just so cool!
I love the company! I'm no fool!
Sure never thought I'd love to be in HELL!
I love it, and I'm proud of it as well!

Dorothy B. Thompson, Ph. D.

Speaking as another "resident" of Hell, I couldn't agree more.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
Pacific Division Meeting
Seattle, Washington; March 27-30, 2002

There will be a BRS session at the meeting featuring Rosalind Carey, David White, and Peter Stone. For more information, contact David White at white@sjfc.edu.

Warren Allen Smith Visits Rochester Alan Bock

Esteemed Russellian and author of the monumental *Who's Who in Hell*, Warren Allen Smith, was the guest of the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) over a three day period, November 14-17, 2001, where he was featured and feted at a number of public and private events.

Undeterred by the events of September 11 or by the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 just days before his visit, Warren Jet Blue-d to Rochester on Wednesday morning, November 14, where he was met by Tim Madigan of the GRRS. After lunch with Tim, Warren addressed the latter's "Introduction to Philosophy" course at St. John Fisher College (which is also home to 2 members of the Greater Rochester Russell Set, Professors David White and Gerry Wildenberg). Hopefully, the students at this local Catholic institution of higher learning were edified by Warren's discussion of his classic *Who's Who in Hell (WWH)*, an international directory of and for humanists, freethinkers, rationalists, naturalists, and non-theists. This book should constitute a suitable replacement for the *Lives of the Saints* by those of us who have entered the post-Christian era. (See David White's review of the book elsewhere in this issue.)

Thursday, November 15 was the busiest day of the 3-day visit. It began with an early morning appearance on the Brother Wease radio show—Rochester's version of Don Imus. For over 2 hours Warren, Brother Wease, various telephone callers to the program, and others engaged in a rambling, wide-open, and frequently comedic discussion on religion, gays, philosophy, mortality, the purpose of life, Jesus, feminism, movies, celebrities and numerous other topics. At the outset Brother Wease, who communicates in a rather streetwise jargon, proclaimed himself to be an agnostic who thought that the Golden Rule was "cool" but that he did not need Jesus to be good. At least one caller took issue with this. He was flabbergasted to learn that Warren is 80 years old and very amused when Warren told him that he had indeed seen the movie *Dogma*. Although Brother Wease dominated the program, Warren was able to make frequent contributions such as "The fun of life is finding answers to questions," "Who created the Creator?" and "What happens when you die? Ask the coroner." Whenever possible Warren also artfully name-dropped *WWH* celebrities such as Carl Sagan, Susan B. Anthony (for a local connection) and Christopher Reeve (for inspiration). It was a rollicking 2-hour session and Warren said he had a great time.

The featured presentation the main purpose of Warren's visit—took place on Thursday evening when he appeared as guest speaker at the November meeting of the GRRS. He was introduced by David White, who had reviewed *WWH* at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society. (His review appears elsewhere in this issue.) In his introductory remarks Professor White observed that in *WWH*, Warren has taken real people and real events and put them in an imaginary place, Hell. Secular humanists such as Isaac Asimov, Paul Cadmus, Arthur C. Clarke, John Dewey, Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell, Carl Sagan, Gore Vidal (Warren has either known or corresponded with all these figures)—have shown how the individual can through free inquiry develop a humanistic philosophy that is rational, not irrational, naturalistic, not supernaturalistic, scientific, not creationist, humanistic, not theistic. This monumental work has been the lifetime achievement of Warren Allen Smith. He did not create this "Atheist Bible" in seven days, or seven years, or even seven times seven years. It took a little longer – about fifty years.

At the outset of his talk Warren informed us that he was not a Ph.D. but that he had studied philosophy under Paul Edwards where he first began searching for answers. He is still searching, he admitted.

Born in Iowa some 80 years ago Warren recalled that one of his earliest religious experiences occurred when he was a pianist at the local Methodist Church. One day the famous Bishop Oxnam paid a visit and gave a homily on miracles. The luncheon following the talk featured oyster stew and Warren (only a teenager at the time) had secretly placed a tube under the tablecloth and, while blowing through the tube at one end, produced bubbles in the oyster stew at the other end. The performance of "miracles" like this eventually led to his skepticism.

He served in the U.S. Army during World War II and on June 6, 1944 was at Omaha Beach on D-Day where he literally gave lie to the Christian canard "there are no atheists in foxholes." By the way, Warren prefers the term "nontheist" to atheist because of the latter's pejorative connotations. While he was in the army it was the policy of the U.S. Government to place the letters J. P, or C (standing for Jewish, Protestant, or Catholic) on all army dogtags. Warren insisted that N (for none) be placed on his and it was finally allowed after some initial resistance.

After the war Warren made use of the G.I. Bill and enrolled at the University of Chicago, where he studied metaphysics under Charles Hartshorne (who, Warren says, helped him figure out that he would never be a metaphysician). Studies at the University of Iowa followed, and

Warren then proceeded to Columbia University. At Columbia Corliss Lamont gave Warren an "A" in his 1948 course on Naturalistic Humanism, although Warren, with typical humility, claims that he was undeserving. His advisor at Columbia was Lionel Trilling, who allowed him to research the word "humanism." When Warren found seven humanisms, Trilling jocularly observed, "Your seven categories have led me to understand that I must never use the word 'humanism' again."

Over half a century ago Warren began writing to celebrities like Santayana, Steinbeck, Einstein (who did not answer) and others, eventually accumulating a large collection of responses from great intellectuals and public figures. His very first request for information was sent to Thomas Mann in 1949, who responded with his ideas about humanism. The celebrity correspondence kept mounting and would eventually be the basis and inspiration for *WWH*.

Persistence is also a trait that Warren has manifested in his pursuit for information from the intellectuals of our time. In 1995, after leaving unanswered many offers to become listed as Humanist Laureate by the International Academy of Humanism, Gore Vidal was approached by Warren, whom he had never seen before. "Mr. Vidal," Warren said in a dour voice, "You and I are in love with the same man!" Conversation in the vicinity hushed. A publishers representative approached (it was a book signing event) and the novelist was taken aback. Looking quizzically ahead he wondered what was about to transpire. After a studied pause Warren looked directly into Vidal's eyes and said "The man? Lucretius."

Vidal laughed uproariously and replied "and Tiberius and Apuleius too?" The amused author then accepted an envelope containing a copy of *Free Inquiry* along with a stamped self-addressed envelope with a typed statement "I agree to be listed as a Humanist Laureate." Two days later Warren received his signed agreement in the mail and Vidal became a Humanist Laureate.

Warren personally witnessed the horrific events of September 11, 2001. From his apartment in Greenwich Village he had a clear view of the planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Later, when he learned the identity of the perpetrators and their motivation he could only marvel at what "theists could do to other theists."

Warren has observed that there is no humor in the Bible and that both the Old and New Testaments advocate patriarchy at every level. Just as in Islam women are second class citizens. For Warren, however, one woman,

BRS Honorary Member Taslima Nasrin, is his No. 1 inspiration. (She is featured prominently in *WWW*, of course.) This physician-poet-novelist-journalist has long been a target of bin Laden's operatives, and Muslim fundamentalists have placed a fatwah on her head. Like Salman Rushdie of India, Nasrin was forced into a life in hiding. She has been a bold advocate of sexual freedom and, of course, has been accused of Islamic blasphemy. She is our century's Susan B. Anthony, only much more courageous.

A short question and answer period took place after his talk on Thursday evening. Warren answered the last question—"Have you ever been sued over material appearing in *WWW*?"—with a resounding "No." After the Thursday formalities David and Linda White entertained the GRRS at their home, allowing for more informal conversation.

On Friday, Warren met with Vincent Lenti, Professor of Music at the Eastman School of Music, for a tour of the Sibley Library. Professor Lenti showed Warren where Manuel Salazar had performed at the request of George Eastman himself and where Smith's music and composition teachers—Carl Anton Wirth and Russell Baum—had studied.

That evening GRRS members Pat and Alan Bock entertained at their home. Here Warren was reunited with Rosalyn and Ewart LeBlanc, whose wedding he had attended 22 years earlier. Warren had met Ewart in Dominica during one of his visits to that island. At the time Dominica was governed by Ewart's father, Premier Edward LeBlanc, whom Smith has described as his favorite politician and the only one he has ever met. Later in the evening, Warren held court in the Bocks' "Office of the Age of Enlightenment" and, with a nearby portrait of Bertrand Russell smiling down, went to the computer and gave a tour of his website (<http://wasm.ws>). Before leaving Warren generously distributed CDs of *Manuel Salazar: Costa Rica's Forgotten Tenor* to his Rochester hosts.

On Saturday Warren returned to New York City after a legendary Rochester visit.

Russell in Brazil—Update

Readers who enjoyed Nick Griffin's report on the Second International *Principia* Symposium, held at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina in Florianopolis, Brazil (BRSQ #112, November 2001) may wish to check out some of the abstracts of papers presented at the symposium. Abstracts for the conference—some in English, some in Portuguese—are available online at <http://www.cfh.ufsc.br/~nel/resumo.htm>.

Who's Who in Hell: The Author's Account Warren Allen Smith

My trip to Rochester began with a speaking engagement for Dr. Timothy Madigan's philosophy class at St. John Fisher College. My layman's view of philosophy kept everyone awake and inquisitive about ideas not often heard from the mouth of an activist non-theist, instead of an objective professor. The next morning, I was booked for 15 minutes on Brother Wease's unusual talk show to discuss *Who's Who in Hell*. The book's thesis, I explained, is that Hell is nonexistent, simply a theological invention, and that non-believers are those who are the most advanced on the various evolutionary levels. The outspoken and highly colorful host liked the banter so much he kept me on the air for two hours. (I got in a plug for the BRS, of course.)

While in Rochester, I visited the graves of two individuals listed in *Who's Who in Hell*, Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass. I also received a guided tour of the Eastman School of Music from a Prof. Vince Lenti. He showed me where Manuel Salazar, a Costa Rican who was Enrico Caruso's competitor, had been the first opera singer to appear on George Eastman's brand new auditorium stage. As the retired owner of a Manhattan recording studio, I recently produced a compact disc, transcribed from 78rpm records, of Salazar in the 1920s. I donated a copy of this CD to the Eastman School. I then visited the school's "vault" to see the guest book signed by George Gershwin, Paderewski, Stokowski, Lily Pons, and other VIPs of that early period.

Other high points of my visit were parties at the homes of David and Linda White and Alan and Pat Bock. The latter graciously permitted me to bring along a Xerox executive, Ewart LeBlanc, at whose wedding I had been a guest 22 years ago. (I first met him in the West Indies after writing a "Scene From Manhattan" column in an island newspaper that supported LeBlanc's father, the Premier of Dominica at the time.)

Speaking to the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS), I explained the origins of *Who's Who in Hell* in a 1948 letter from Thomas Mann. He was responding to a query from me about what "humanism" meant to him as used in *Dr. Faustus*. My collection of correspondence and letters from others on the meaning of humanism grew over the next five decades—with the help of Gawd (my G-4 computer with the double processor)—into a 1,260 page, 7-pound tome with over 10,000 entries on various freethinkers. Gawd, I confessed to those assembled, constantly exhibits her

omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence. (I'm a confirmed believer in the MacIntosh, upon which I am currently working on *Celebrities in Hell*, the first of several paperbacks related to *Who's Who in Hell*.)

I then discussed how *Who's Who in Hell* was sabotaged by an unsigned book review in *Free Inquiry*. The unidentified reviewer complained that it was "deficient" because it failed to mention that James Farmer died in 1999 and was a civil rights leader and a signer of Humanist Manifesto II. I then read aloud to the group, word-for-word, from Farmer's entry (p. 363). The entry provided all of this information.

The unsigned review then complained that I had not cited Gilbert Ryle's "most important book, *The Ghost in the Machine*." But of course! For, as recognized by Ibn Warraq, Peter Stone, David White, and others, that book was written by Arthur Koestler. Warraq called this mistake a "howler." Dennis Middlebrooks and others have inquired if the magazine's editor, the secret reviewer, or the Council for Secular Humanism (which publishes *Free Inquiry*) had asked me to respond to this unscholarly critique. Heads would roll, I implied, in any ethical organization that behaved this way.

Such an ignominious review has obviously cut into sales of the \$125 book, for I had had *Free Inquiry* readers specifically in mind when I wrote the book, and had been plugging the magazine in my various TV and radio interviews. Barricade Books publisher Lyle Stuart has been unable to take out ads in the journal dedicated to "free inquiry," for its questionable policy is to run ads only for works published by Jonathan Kurtz's Prometheus Books. Meanwhile, *The Nation*, *The New Yorker*, and various freethought publications have accepted ads, and *Who's Who in Hell* is in several hundred national and international libraries.

The unanswered and profoundly important question is why those in the know about all this have not reacted publicly and vociferously, not only in *Free Inquiry* but also in the various chapter newsletters whose members may remain ignorant of this deliberate and dangerously unprofessional hatchet job.

Russell, Smith, God and Hell **David E. White**

One Enlightenment project that shows no signs of being abandoned or compromised, and which is even supported by some postmodernists, is that

of speculation about the religion—if there is to be one—of the future. Although efforts to lay the foundations of a religion of the future are unabated, the roadside is littered with the wrecks of such projects. No one, it seems, has solved the paradox of the "religion which is no religion which is the one true religion." (For the general problem, see "Enlightenment". All references in quotation marks are to articles in *Who's Who in Hell* (hereafter *Who's Who*), compiled by Warren Allen Smith and published by Barricade Books, 2000.)

In many of his other areas of interest (mathematics, education, politics), Russell offered not only theories and analysis, but also practical experiments. He is not known to have modeled what a religion of the future might be, and none of his writings on religion, by his own admission, provide or even suggest a fully satisfying alternative to religion. The problem, as Russell saw it, was to find a way to express the general attitude towards life "which must be adopted in times of stress and difficulty by those who have no dogmatic religious beliefs."

Religionists will, of course, reply that there is no such attitude; that there is an ultimate need for dogma.

Russell's analysis of what is needed for a religion of the future cleared the path for the construction of such a religion, but Russell's own project failed. Russell was so concerned with expressing himself and with discriminating among alternatives that he failed to see the necessity of appropriation. This shortcoming has now been remedied.

One of the best efforts to expound the religion of the future—the religion that is no religion—is found in John Dewey's *A Common Faith*. Dewey has no use for the creeds and dogmas of the past, and no use for God understood as an entity, but Dewey does advocate a shared but non-dogmatic attitude toward the unification of values in imagination. And that he calls God. ("Dewey, John")

Warren Alan Smith's massive *Who's Who in Hell* looks like, and in many ways is, a conventional reference book. Smith, I argue, has managed to do what Russell attempted but failed to do. Smith's basic insight is that what is needed to show the truth of atheism is the presentation of a fair, impartial, empirical argument.

Russell's attempts to show religion for what it is, to show that all religions are false and dangerous, were for the most part anecdotal, and as such can

hardly be considered fair or impartial. Smith's *Who's Who* is also anecdotal, but it is massively so, and the reader is left to draw his or her own conclusions.

Much has been made in the (generally very favorable) published reviews of the "errors" in *Who's Who*. Many of these are just that, errors that should be corrected in the second edition. Of much greater importance, however, is the reader's attitude toward the errors, infelicities and over-all queerness of *Who's Who*. I suggest that anyone who goes mistake-hunting make note whatever seems wrong and send suggested corrections on to the author. For example, it is difficult to understand what beyond simple ignorance could have led Smith to think that Russell's favorite scotch was "Red Hackles." And does Goldwin Smith get two entries, one after the other, for some reason, or were there two Goldwin Smiths who lived nearly parallel lives? No doubt housekeeping must be done by someone at some time. But readers should not let error-spotting distract from the task at hand. That main task is to come to terms with the vastness of *Who's Who*, and to enjoy the effect of reading it. Before making much of an error, the reader might well ask, "How exactly has this slip detracted from my enjoyment of the whole?" *Who's Who* is more an elaborate machine than simply a very long string of characters. One can begin anywhere and then follow the chain of cross-references, much as one would read a Scofield Bible. Nor is the comparison with the Bible trivial. (Additional and egregious errors noted: In "Christian Adherents" the world population of 1996 is seriously understated; in "Dawkins, Richard" "friendly user" should probably be "user friendly;" in "Epidemics" the Black Death ended in 1351, not 1251.) An especially satisfying chain of cross-references begins in "Evil."

Smith has called *Who's Who* his Holy Bible, and there are some interesting points of comparison. As with the Bible, one reads for edification more than for information. There is presently a humanist group that seeks to place the *Who's Who* in college libraries. One can only imagine the effect of some agnostic Gideons leaving copies in hotel rooms. The *Who's Who* is no more a single author work than is the Bible. At its heart is the collection of letters Smith has solicited from just about anyone who he thought would have something interesting to say about humanism. (From the unpublished book, *Humanists on Humanism*.)

In other ways Smith is entirely too modest. Some of the serious articles show real insight into tough subjects. (For example, "Washington, George") Attributions can be problematic, however. Curly brackets, or "{ }," around a reference indicate that material from the enclosed sources

may have been used without quotation marks. Much of the testimony Smith has collected is eminently worthy of preservation as primary. (Some of the best material is in the Hornback series—"American Humanist Association," "Ethical Culture," "Hornback, James F.")

There is an article on Russell, of course, with a follow-up collection of Russell's humor. But Russell is actually all through the *Who's Who*. For example, see "Ethics," "Evil" and "Happiness."

Anyone who is a humanist, or who is thinking of becoming one, can certainly use the *Who's Who* as an introduction to the field.

What are the prospects for the *Who's Who* eventually attaining some sort of canonical status? Library sales seem to be doing very well, but that is not at all the same as being taken up and accepted as a holy book. The history of humanism may not be as violent as the history of religion, but the constant bickering and infighting is just as discouraging. Perhaps the most helpful suggestion would be for small groups to come together simply to savor the *Who's Who*. There are a great many articles that could be read in just a few minutes at the start of a meeting, or as a form of private devotion.

The key feature here is not who is in and who is out or whether material was lifted without quotes; it is rather Smith's selection of what to use and how to use it. We never get a balanced, sterile, discrete encyclopedia entry. What we do get is a few items of note so skillfully presented that the reading becomes habit-forming if not addictive. The frequent and prolonged death scenes merit special interest. (A few notable death scenes—"Darwin, Charles," "Dewey, John," "Hammer, Armand," "Hume, David." See also p. 1219 on the significance of including the details of death.)

Who's Who will be a success only if it somehow contributes to the so far elusive goal of the religion of the future, the religion which is no religion. It was said of Dewey's *Common Faith* that it failed because its terminology allowed for backsliding, i.e., sliding back into organized religion. ("Humanism") To the extent this is true, Smith is certainly right to appropriate Unitarians into his hell. The reverse danger is that a truly non-religious organization will still take on some of the more disagreeable features of religious orthodoxy, especially the demand for creedal affirmation, for self-righteous pomposity, cant and all the other ills to which atheists are just as liable as theists.

There are, of course, some arguments in the course of Smith's work, but they are mostly incidental. Indeed, the articles on logic are substandard by any standard. ("Deduction," "Fallacies," "Induction")

What is so powerful about *Who's Who* is the total effect of reading it, or even of reading any two or three hundred pages (not even a quarter of the whole). Instead of presenting a proposal for the reform of religion, Smith concentrates on simply appropriating all that he can find in the past and the present that can be placed fairly in the world of humanists, freethinkers, naturalists, rationalists and non-theists.

Smith is impressively careful in justifying each and every person, organization or idea that is included. Thus his appropriation is a rational, or at least rationalized, one.

To say that someone belongs in *Who's Who in Hell* is not quite the same as saying that person belongs in hell. Some inhabitants are clearly guilty of nothing more than association (Fanny Farmer), and others are included more for what has been said about them than for what they really were.

The book is filled with jokes of all kinds, and its general good humor contributes greatly to its appeal. ("Deadlines," "Humanist, laughing")

As a whole, the directory presents an impressive argument against religion, one that is less easy to respond to than the standard complaints about not enough evidence or too much evil in the world. Clearly, religionists can and have made a virtue of belief that ran counter to the evidence or at least well beyond the weight of the evidence. Evidential arguments are certainly mentioned often enough. ("Clifford, William Kingdon," "Dawkins, Richard," "Russell, Bertrand," "Stone, Peter") The medical strategy holds more promise for the religion of the future. (see also "Jones, Chris (1964—)")

By presenting the vast array of inhabitants of hell and presenting them "with faces," often faces he knows well, Smith makes it hard, perhaps impossibly difficult, for anyone to throw this book down in disgust or consign it to the flames. But what then is the religionist to do? The religionist who is already a Unitarian or of some other liberal religion or who has already stood up for gay rights, is free to embrace whomever they want, for they too will find themselves, or at least their friends and heroes in the book. The traditional believers who have any sense of history are faced with a terrible dilemma. Either they have to condemn the inhabitants

of Smith's hell or they have to claim that what people did to get into Smith's hell really wasn't that bad after all. The problem with the first alternative is nothing specific but just that it becomes impossible once one has spent time with the book. The problem with the second is that the Church has already spoken very clearly.

As one reads on, the enthymeme discloses itself and the significance of the title, beyond its obvious attraction for marketing, becomes clear.

1. If anything like conventional religion is true, then all, or very nearly all, of the folks in this book are in Hell. And that will be true regardless of which definition of Hell we accept.
2. But, Smith tacitly argues, no one, or very nearly no one, who has read this book could possibly believe that all these folks are in Hell.
3. Ergo, nothing like conventional religion is true.

The point is not just the validity of this argument. Hearing the standard arguments against religion, one is left with the impression that the apologists have some explaining to do. But of course that is why they are called apologists. The cumulative effect of Smith's presentation is not a desire for an explanation, but a deep resentment, indignation. Theological attempts to explain only make matters worse.

Smith, of course, rejects a literal hell. (p. 1219). And he includes a few who certainly are in Hell ("Capone, Al," "Hitler, Adolf," "Stalin, Joseph," but even here, Smith is clever in turning the Al Capone article against religion).

This argument, I claim, does not give the religionist the wiggle room that is always available in the traditional appeals to evil, to science or to the meaninglessness of religious utterances.

Smith's work also suggests several strategies to counter religionists who claim that statements about Hell are not to be taken literally.

I do not think the religionist can reply to the argument presented here, but a neutral critic might claim it is more an *argumentum ad hominem*, an attempt to embarrass the believers. And of course it is, but there is nothing wrong with an *ad hominem* that is also a *reductio ad absurdum*. Indeed, all other forms of refutation run a greater risk of begging the question. (Some attempts to embarrass seem to me to backfire, for example, the Goldstein prank in "Endowments" falls flat.)

Those who use *Who's Who* as a portal to meet the folks who have been consigned to Hell will, I claim, not be able to believe in the religions that put them there. This is the argument Russell was looking for, and it strongly suggests that the religion of the future has actually been with us for a long time.

As St. Anselm said, admittedly in a different context, the great shame is that it is all true but we just do not see it.

This paper is based on a talk given at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society.

**Scenes From Hell:
Pictures from Warren Allen Smith's Visit
to Rochester**



**Joyous revelry at a party in Warren's honor
hosted by Alan and Pat Bock**



Warren with BRS Member Ed McClenathan



**Warren with longtime friends
Ewart and Rosalyn LeBlanc**

Reviews:

Nicholas Griffin, ed. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970*. Routledge, 2001.

Stefan Andersson

With the publication of the second volume of *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell*, Nicholas Griffin has completed a work of impressive scholarship. The first volume came out in 1992. During the intervening years Ray Monk has published a two-volume biography of Russell. The first part was published in 1996 and the second last year. Within a ten-year period Russell scholars have been blessed with four thick books about Russell that will provide them with material for a long time to come. I shall start with comparing Griffin's two volumes with each other and then compare them with Monk's work.

The first volume contains 240 letters and the second 388 letters. The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University hold between forty to fifty thousand of Russell's letters. Griffin does not claim to have looked at all of them, but he has probably read more of them than any other person. This provided him a unique perspective on Russell of which he has made the best. The letters have been intertwined with extensive commentaries and supplied with informative annotations amounting to approximately 150 pages in the first volume and 180 pages in the second. Together with the prefaces and the introductions they supply us with an epistolary biography of Russell that covers most aspects of his life.

There are some differences between the first and the second volume due to the availability of letters. In the first volume there are many letters to Russell's first wife, Alys, and his lover, Lady Ottoline Morrell. Griffin writes in the preface to the second volume that these touched on almost everything that was important to Russell, which made it unnecessary to look for letters elsewhere. The letters to Ottoline continued apace until 1916. For a time, his letters to Colette O'Neil were as revealing as those to Ottoline, but there is no correspondent in the period covered by the second volume to whom Russell revealed himself as fully and frequently as he had done to Alys and Ottoline.

For the second volume Griffin has therefore been forced to search further afield for letters. At the same time there are many more letters from which to choose. Another complicating factor has been the variety of Russell's interests after 1914. Before the First World War Russell had mainly

devoted his energy to logic and the foundations of mathematics. When the war broke out, he channeled his energy into anti-war work. After the war his interests grew in many directions, as did the number of his correspondents. Towards the end of his life he returned to political activism, but his correspondence in the 60s covers a wider range of topics than at any other time.

Given the variety of Russell's interests, Griffin had to decide which interests should be included. This must have been a difficult task, but Griffin argues convincingly as to why he has excluded letters directly related to Russell's involvement in world government organizations, letters concerning the Indo-Pakistani border dispute and technical letters about philosophy. He has also excluded letters concerning religion—although not totally—people he had known, events he had been involved in and opinions he had held. Some topics had to be excluded due to the lack of suitable letters. In spite of all these restrictions, Griffin has been able to produce a most interesting, if not complete, epistolary biography.

The book is divided into six chapters: 1) War (1914-1918); 2) Children, Companionship, and Joint Work (1918-1927); 3) Starting a School and Ending a Marriage (1927-1935); 4) Marriage, Poverty, and Exile (1936-1944); 5) Respectability at Last (1944-1954); and 6) Peace (1955-1970). The titles and the periods are aptly chosen and give a good hint about the major projects in which Russell was involved. So far my own research on Russell's life and work has been concentrated on the period ending with the onset of the First World War. This means that there is a lot of information that is totally new to me and I have benefited much from Griffin's informative commentaries and footnotes, which are often characterized with a sly sense of humor.

Although Griffin has explicitly excluded letters regarding religion, the topic is touched upon directly in some letters, and Russell's often complicated relationship to God and religious matters is indirectly revealed through his semi-religious use of words like "God," "love," "sin," and "sinful." One of my favorite letters regarding Russell's religious struggle is one he wrote to Colette in October 1916 (#279), where he writes,

The centre of me is always and eternally a terrible pain—a curious wild pain—a searching for something beyond what the world contains, something transfigured and infinite. The beatific vision—God. I do not find it, I do not think it is to be found—but the love of it is my life—it is like passionate love for a ghost. At times it fills me with rage, at times with wild despair—it is the

source of gentleness and cruelty and work, it fills every passion that I have. It is the actual spring of life within me.

Although the intensity of his religious struggle diminished with time and was replaced by a strong ethical commitment that he expressed through his political work, it still remained an undercurrent in most of his undertakings.

The topic of religion often turned up in Russell's letters to his daughter, whose struggles as a young person in many ways mirrored those of her father. His answer to her regarding her fears of Hell reveals his own understanding of what God values most, which happens to coincide with his own preferences. The letter was written in December 1946 (#476). "As for fear of Hell, I suggest the following hypothesis: God values veracity above all other virtues, and has refrained from giving us evidence of His existence; therefore He will damn all those who believe in Him, as having sinned against veracity." If Russell were right, he and other agnostics who refused to believe something without good reason had nothing to worry about, and as a matter of fact *they* would be the truly religious rather than those who believe and obey out of fear of punishment.

My favorite letter relating to philosophy is one he wrote to Robert E. Egner in response to his inquiry about Russell's views on existentialism (#605). Russell was in his 95th year and he wrote the draft by hand: "I am sorry, I still hold the same view on existentialism, but I have no wish to express it publicly, as I greatly admire Sartre and some others of the group. You will find the gist of my disagreement in *Principia Mathematica* Vol. I, *14." Griffin's footnote is short but illuminating: "The section of *Principia* which gives Russell's theory of definitive descriptions, where the existentialist view that existence precedes essence is reversed." Russell's reply can also be used as evidence against those who believe that he had abandoned realism and accepted a linguistic interpretation of logic and mathematics.

Since I am presently working on a book about the Russell Peace Foundation and the War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm 1967, I have benefited much from the last section both with regard to the selection of letters and Griffin's commentaries and footnotes. He has saved me a lot of work and given me ideas for further research for which I am greatly thankful.

In comparing Griffin's two volumes of epistolary biography with Ray Monk's two volumes of ordinary biography, there is no doubt that Griffin's

work is of far greater value from a scholarly point of view. Griffin is admirable in his attempt to be fair and neutral in his commentaries. Where Griffin supplies facts and important contextual information, Monk gives us his own prejudiced psychological interpretations and ethical evaluations that often are interesting but most of the time reveal his underlying negative attitude to Russell. I am sure that Griffin does not approve of everything that Russell said and did, but he has left it up to the reader to decide the ultimate value of Russell's personal qualities, his importance as a philosopher and the relevance of his political activism. For these reasons I am sure that Griffin's books will be used and referred to by many scholars long after Monk's books have lost their appeal.

Stefan Andersson is an independent Russell scholar affiliated with the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at Lund University.

Nicholas Griffin, ed., with the assistance of Alison Roberts Miculan. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell. The Public Years, 1914-1970*. London: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 660.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- The October 23, 2000 issue of *Partisan Review* features an article entitled "The Legacy of the Anti-Communist Liberal Intellectuals," by Ronald Radosh. The article seeks to defend those liberals who made common cause with McCarthy (despite their strong disagreements with him) to stamp out the "red menace" during the early days of the Cold War. Radosh spends some time discussing the views of one of these liberals, Diana Trilling, who was apparently greatly irritated by Russell at the time. While Russell had, "years earlier...been among the first intellectuals to accurately characterize the nature of Soviet Communism," by the 1950s Trilling thought he "had begin to lose the clarity of his early thinking" by "spreading the false idea that the United States was near the condition of Fascist Germany in the 1940s." Those interested in Russell's principled denunciations of the attacks on civil liberties from that era should consult *Bertrand Russell's America, 1945-1970*, ed. by Barry Feinberg and Ronald Kasrils (Boston: South End Press, 1983).

Source: Russell-1

- Laura Miller recently reviewed two new popular works on the history of philosophy—Christopher Phillips’ *Socrates Café* and Anthony Gottlieb’s *The Dream of Reason: A History of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance* (both published by W.W. Norton, 2001). Miller’s review, which appeared in *Salon* on March 23, 2001, compares both works to Russell’s monumental *History of Western Philosophy*. Miller writes, “Since Russell’s book combines great erudition with ample amounts of sheer reading pleasure, and since the number of readers up for *two* massive works of philosophical history can’t be large, Gottlieb [whose work comprises the first of a projected two-volume tome] certainly has his work cut out for him.” At <http://www.salon.com/books/feature/2001/03/23/philosophy/index.html>, the review can still be found.

Source: Russell-1

- The April 23, 2001 issue of the *New Republic* featured another review by Simon Blackburn, this time of Manfred Kuehn’s *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge University Press) The review, entitled “Königsberg Confidential,” pithily sums up the difference between the writing styles of Kant and Russell in the opening paragraph:

There is a scene in the film *Superman III* in which Lorelei Ambrosia, the blonde bombshell, is secretly reading the *Critique of Pure Reason*. “But how can he say that pure categories have no objective meaning in transcendental logic? What about synthetic unity?” she squeaks, before hurriedly hiding the book and picking up a trashy magazine as her gangster boss enters. The director’s choice of book was perfect: no other single work could be so improbable, and so easily recognizable as such by the audience. You might just take Bertrand Russell on a beach holiday, as I once did; but Kant, never. (Incidentally, although she has not quite mastered the jargon, Lorelei’s question is a good one.)

The review is at <http://www.tnr.com/042301/blackburn042301.html>.

Source: Jack Clontz

- On May 30, 2001, Random House, Inc. agreed to settle a lawsuit filed by Ralph Schoenman, Russell’s former assistant in the days of the Committee of 100 and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Random House agreed to stop publication of an American edition of Brian Magee’s *Confessions of a Philosopher*; other terms of the

settlement were not disclosed. The suit resulted from a claim Magee made against Schoenman in the chapter of the book dealing with Russell. An earlier lawsuit Schoenman had filed against Orion, the publishers of the British edition of Magee’s book, was similarly settled.

Source: Russell-1

- *Skeptical Inquirer* published an article by William Hare entitled “Bertrand Russell and the Ideal of Critical Receptiveness” in its May/June 2001 issue. Of course, half the BRS probably reads *Skeptical Inquirer* already, with the other half withholding judgment on the magazine until all the facts are in...

Source: Dave Henehan

- The July 9, 2001 issue of the *Nation* features several articles dealing with the movement against the U.S. invasion of Vietnam. Two of these articles mention Russell’s involvement with the movement. An article called “The Vietnam Syndrome,” by Richard Falk, briefly describes the International War Crimes Tribunal set up by Russell and Sartre to gather evidence against the U.S. for its actions in Vietnam. He also quotes French President Charles de Gaulle’s response to Sartre’s request to hold the tribunal in France: “I have no need to tell you that justice of any sort, in principle as in execution, emanates from the state.” It’s hard to think of an expression with which Russell and Sartre would more wholeheartedly disagree.

The second article consists of a review of Gerald Nicosia’s *Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans’ Movement* (Crown, 2001). The review, written by antiwar activist Michael Uhl, is entitled “That’s Vietnam, Jake.” The review discusses the Citizens’ Commission of Inquiry on US War Crimes (CCI) As follows:

As for CCI, the New York-based committee was founded by Ralph Schoenman in November 1969, just after the revelation in the US press (twenty months after the fact) of the infamous My Lai massacre. Schoenman had been a principle organizer of the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal—an unofficial panel of prominent world figures who assembled on two occasions in Europe, heard testimony and judged as “genocidal” the US conduct of the war in Vietnam.

The review further mentions that “A colorful appreciation of Ralph Schoenman, onetime kibitzer extraordinaire of the American left, now quite forgotten, is offered by Tariq Ali in his lively antiwar memoir *Street Fighting Years* (Collins).” Mr. Schoenman, who remains active in radical politics, would presumably disagree with being characterized as “forgotten.” The review provoked a heated letter exchange between Nicosia and Uhl in the September 17/24 issue which also mentioned Russell and Schoenman.

Source: Peter Stone

- Warren Allen Smith has written a brief account of the 2001 BRS Annual Meeting for *Gay & Lesbian Humanist* (Summer 2001). Here he recounts his participation on a panel (organized by the Greater Rochester Russell Set) that discussed Ray Monk’s *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness*. The contents of the panel discussion, including Warren’s contribution, will appear in a forthcoming *BRSQ*.

Source: Warren Allen Smith

- Reviews have begun to appear of *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970*, edited by the BRS’s very own Nick Griffin and published by Routledge. Hywell Williams reviewed it for the *Guardian* on July 14, 2001, under the appropriate title “A Rational Animal.” An unsigned review appeared in the July 21, 2001 *Economist*, prompting an exchange of letters with a disgruntled Lord Lawson. Lord Lawson claims that Griffin wrongly denies that Russell advocated preventative nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The exchange appeared on the letters pages of the August 4, 11, 18, and 25 issues of the *Economist*.

Other reviews include one in the *Times* on June 6 by Ian MacIntyre (“I Could Not Resist Making Love to Mademoiselle”) and one by Alan Ryan in the July 6 *Times Literary Supplement* (“Dazzled and Blinded by the Lamp”).

Source: Russell-I & Peter Stone

- A.C. Grayling, author of the Oxford “Past Masters” volumes on Russell and Wittgenstein, has published a new book entitled *The Meaning of Things: Applying Philosophy to Life* (London: Weidenfeld, 2001). Daniel Johnson has reviewed it for the August 26, 2001 issue of the *Times*. The review, entitled “The Subtitle Suggests

Philosophy, but Nobody Need Be Frightened,” takes some issue with Grayling’s liberal attitude towards sex. Of Grayling’s stance on this issue, Johnson writes, “If I have his policy right, you live with a friend, or friends, and you guiltlessly sleep with whomsoever you can, free as air. Such jouissance comes strangely from a venerable philosopher, although Bertrand Russell experimented in similar directions, with discouraging consequences.”

Source: Russell-I

- Edward Said wrote a long review essay for the September 17/24, 2001 issue of the *Nation*, entitled “The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals.” Said lists a number of Nobel Prize winners in literature, noting that each mind will “trigger in the mind an emblemized region, which in turn can be seen as a sort of platform or jumping-off point for that writer’s subsequent activity as an intervention, in debates taking place very far from the world of literature.” Among these winners he lists “Nadine Gordimer, Kenzaburo Oe, Derek Walcott, Wole Soyinka, Gabriel Garcia Márquez, Octavio Paz, Elie Wiesel, Bertrand Russell, Günter Grass, Rigoberta Menchú, among others.” Most quotable line in the review? “Realism and its close associate, pragmatism, are mobilized from their real philosophical context in the work of Peirce, Dewey and James, and put to forced labor in the boardroom where, as Gore Vidal has put it, the real decisions about government and presidential candidates are made.”

Source: Peter Stone

- Tariq Ali, a close associate of Russell during the heady days of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the first International War Crimes Tribunal, recently experienced firsthand the current effort to restrict civil liberties in response to September 11. Ali was stopped and briefly detained at Munich’s airport for carrying a book by that noted Islamic fundamentalist, Karl Marx. His description of this sordid episode appeared in the October 30, 2001 issue of the *Independent*, and is online at <http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=102144>.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- News from France! Bertrand Russell, along with Plato and Leibnitz, will form part of the “agregation” in philosophy for the next two years. The “agregation” is the national French competitive examination that determines who will fill university positions in each field. This means

that a lot of people will be studying Russell; perhaps some exciting new scholarship will come out of it, as instructors teach and students write about Bertie.

Source: Anne-Françoise Schmid

- Jeffrey Toobin has written an article entitled "Battle for the Barnes" on the state of the Barnes Foundation and its magnificent art collection. The Foundation's creator, millionaire art collector Dr. Albert Barnes, hired Russell to teach philosophy at the Foundation and then sacked him, prompting a famous lawsuit. Toobin's article appears in the January 21, 2002 issue of the *New Yorker*.

Source: Thom Weidlich

News from the Humanist World

- The International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), of which the BRS is an associate member, will be holding its 15th World Congress on July 3-6, 2002. This conference will mark the 50th anniversary of the IHEU. The meeting will be held in the Netherlands, at the Golden Tulip Conference Hotel, Leeuwenhorst, Noordwijkerhout near Amsterdam-Schiphol airport, the seaside and The Hague. The theme of the conference will be "Human Diversity, Human Rights and Humanism: All Different, All Equal."

Registration as a full participant costs 250 Euros, which includes lunch and dinner but excludes the cost of the hotel. Rooms at the conference hotel range in cost from 84-120 Euros per night; there is also limited accommodation available at a local bed and breakfast for 30 Euros per night, and there will be camping facilities as well. For more information, please visit the IHEU's website at <http://iheu.org> or contact IHEU Congress Secretariat 2002, Postbus 75490, 1070 AL Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Phone: 0031 20 5219000, Fax: 0031 20 5219080, E-mail: hv@euronet.nl.

- The IHEU is also leading a campaign to save the life of Dr. Younis Shaikh, a Pakistani academic who was sentenced to death on August 18, 2001 for blasphemy. A report on the case can be found at the IHEU's website at <http://iheu.org/Shaiikh/>. The IHEU is asking humanists to write Pakistani President Musharraf protesting the sentence and requesting Dr. Shaikh's release. President Musharraf can

be reached via e-mail at cei@pak.gov.pk. Please send copies of any letters sent to the IHEU at campaign@iheu.org.

- The Center for Inquiry Institute is pleased to announce a full 2-week summer session of educational programs available for undergraduate credit through the State University of New York (Empire State College). The summer session will be held at the Center, in Amherst, New York, on July 14-28, 2002. The summer session will feature courses on critical inquiry and the history and philosophy of naturalism, as well as seminars, guest lectures, and other special events. Some scholarships are available. The registration deadline is June 15; scholarship application deadline is May 15. For further information, contact adacey@centerforinquiry.net or the Center for Inquiry Institute, PO Box 741, Amherst, New York 14226, Tel: 716-636-4869 x223, Fax: 716-636-1733.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- A Turkish publisher recently faced criminal charges for publishing a book by BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky. Fatih Tas, editor of Aram Publishing Co., was indicted by a Turkish prosecutor for issuing a collection of Chomsky's talks entitled *American Interventionism*. In one of these talks, Chomsky describes Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish population as "one of the most severe human rights atrocities of the 1990s." The prosecutor charged that these words represented "propaganda against the indivisible unity of the country, nation, and State of the Republic of Turkey."

Appalled by this attack on freedom of speech, Chomsky flew to Turkey to attend the Tas's trial (at some risk to himself, as the prosecutor could well have issued the same charges against him). On February 13, however, a judge acquitted the publisher of the charges. Chomsky's presence, combined with an international campaign of support, almost certainly had an impact in protecting the right of expression in Turkey. More information about the affair can be found at <http://stopcensorship.org>.

- BRS Honorary Member Ibn Warraq has issued a statement on the terrible attack on the World Trade Center, and the relationship between Islam and the mentality that produced the attack. It can be found at the website of the Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Society at <http://www.secularislam.org/wtc.htm>.

Warraq also used the attack to further his own polemics against those he regards as too sympathetic to Islam, including Edward Said. His polemic against Said and other intellectuals appeared in the November 10, 2001 issue of the *Guardian*. The piece is online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4295749,00.html>.

Others have made use of Warraq to defend secularism in the wake of September 11. Polly Toynbee wrote an article against anti-blasphemy laws in the UK that appeared in the October 5, 2001 issue of the *Guardian* and cited Warraq's similar position. The article is online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4270781,00.html>.

Support for Warraq's critique of Islam has also come from more surprising corners. An article in the December 2001 issue of the *American Spectator* (written by Chris Mooney) points out that Christian fundamentalists have taken an interest in Warraq's book *Why I Am Not a Muslim* (Prometheus Books, 1995) for their own sectarian reasons—oblivious of the fact that the arguments of the book (as Warraq points out) apply just as readily to Christianity as to Islam. The article is at <http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/22/mooney-c.html>.

- Those interested in Joseph Rotblat—with Russell a founding member of the Pugwash Conferences, and winner of the 1983 BRS Award—should check out his article, "The Early Days of Pugwash," published in *Physics Today* (August 1995). The article appeared after Pugwash and Russell jointly won the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. The article is at <http://www.physicstoday.com/pt/vol-54/iss-6/p50.html#fig2>.
- Jazz musician Dave Douglas recently released an album entitled *Witness* (Bluebird), which celebrates a number of cultural activists, including Eqbal Ahmad, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and BRS Honorary Member Taslima Nasrin. *Witness* is reviewed in the December 17, 2001 issue of the *Nation*.

Member News

In this new feature, the BRSQ will report on the activities of the BRS's large and diverse membership. We begin with a brief report from Ken Blackwell on the latest book published by our President and an even briefer report from Warren Allen Smith. Members are encouraged to submit similar reports for the BRSQ.

- Fresh from securing an interview with Rep. Neil Abercrombie (*BRSQ* #112, November 2001), Chad Trainer wrote last summer to retired Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY). In an earlier conversation with Trainer, Moynihan had indicated that he had met Russell at the Rand School of Social Science. Trainer had also heard that Moynihan had seen one of Russell's books on Lenin's desk at the Kremlin. Needless to say, Trainer wanted to know more. Moynihan responded several weeks later with a letter, the text of which reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Trainer:

Alack, I am overwhelmed just now with just too many projects incautiously accepted. Besides I really have so little to report on Bertrand Russell. I went to hear him talk about 1943 at, I do believe, the Rand School. I had brought along a copy of *Why Men Fight*, which he autographed and which I still cherish. As he gave it back to me, he said, "You know I never did authorize that title." An American publisher had put it out. The British original, as I recall, was called *Principles of Social Reconstruction*. A fellow standing next to me asked what the original title was, but at the time I had no idea.

One of his books was indeed on the shelf in the bookcase behind Lenin's desk in the Kremlin. But I don't know and I don't suppose whether it was put there by Lenin himself or some functionary years later intent upon impressing western visitors in the 1930s. What a fascinating society you have created.

Best,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

The *BRSQ* again congratulates Chad on his efforts and looks forward to future interviews.

- The University of Rochester Press has just published Alan Schwerin's new book, *Apartheid's Landscape and Ideas : A Scorched Soul*. There's a cover photo at <http://www.boydell.co.uk/3906.HTM>. Here's the blurb for the book—

Apartheid's Landscape and Ideas: A Scorched Soul is an historical and artistic exploration of the culture of racism that

gave rise to apartheid. This work represents twelve years of extensive archival research conducted throughout South Africa. A mosaic of intriguing first-hand historical accounts of the country, its people, significant events, and moral and political predicaments, these accounts have been culled from diaries and correspondence from early missionaries, soldiers, politicians, laborers, and ordinary settlers. These historical documents display the prejudices, fears and character of the sojourners in South Africa. The text presents a unique view of the seeds of the racism that would later constitute the lifeblood of apartheid. In addition to the fascinating historical accounts, Alan Schwerin has compiled a set of his own black and white photographs of the South African landscape—a landscape that can be viewed as the current physical manifestation of the painful past racist perceptions that were inflicted on the indigenous people of South Africa. These striking photographs are artistic counterpoints to the sentiments articulated by the documents. Alan Schwerin completed his doctorate at Rice University and is currently chair of the department of Political Science and Philosophy at Monmouth University (New Jersey). Born in Johannesburg, South Africa, he taught philosophy in the impoverished homeland known as the Transkei, before immigrating to the United States with his family in 1985. In 1978 he won both first and second prizes in South Africa's national photographic competition for university students.

BRS members may order this book for the discounted price of US \$56.25. (That's \$25 off the regular price of \$75.) The book may be ordered from the University of Rochester Press, 668 Mt. Hope Ave., Rochester, NY 14620 USA, (585) 273-5779, and purchased using check, Visa or Mastercard. A note of thanks to Tim Madigan for arranging the discount.

- Warren Allen Smith had a letter to the editor in the November 25, 2001 issue of the *New York Daily News*. The letter responded to a rather intemperate claim by a fireman that the Clintons were somehow responsible for the September 11 World Trade Center attack. The letter is available online at http://www.nydailynews.com/2001-11-25/News_and_Views/Opinion/a-133101.asp.
- In a related story, Warren Allen Smith has also been active organizing a memorial service for freethinkers killed by the attacks on the World Trade Center—a group much neglected in days when “God Bless America” is on every public figure's lips. The memorial took place on

December 14, with participants meeting at Fraunces Tavern and then proceeding to a spot near Ground Zero. (Repeated requests to the Mayor's office for access to Ground Zero went unanswered.) Representatives from the Freethought Society of Greater Philadelphia, Freethinkers NY, the Corliss Lamont chapter of the American Humanist Association, Staten Island Atheists, the Thomas Paine Foundation, and the Brooklyn and the New York Ethical Societies, among other groups, took part.

Books & BR

This regular feature will present information on Russell-related books—new books about Russell, new editions or collections of Russell's work, etc. If you know of a book deserving mention in this space, please let us know.

Please note that if the BRSQ reports on a book for sale, the most important rule in economics applies in full—caveat emptor. The BRSQ assumes no responsibility for the validity of the claims made by any bookseller, publisher, dealer, etc.

The BRSQ would welcome reviews on any new titles discussed in this feature.

- Commonwealth books (Boston, MA) recently offered the following book for sale at its website, <http://www.commonwealthbooks.com>:

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. With an introduction by Bertrand Russell *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. New York : Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1922. First American edition. 8vo. Cloth. 189 pp. Parallel German and English language texts. Book enclosed in handsome custom-made clamshell case, quarter calf over marbled paper-covered boards with cloth edges, four raised bands ruled in gilt, double gilt rule at head, triple gilt rule at tail, burgundy calf spine label with title and author in gilt, date in gilt at tail, backstrip gilt ruled. Slight fraying to head and heel of spine, corners slightly bumped and rubbed, Walter Lippmann's bookplate on front pastedown, top edges dust soiled, gutter exposed between pp. 128 and 129, 1.5" tear to pp. 189, 2" from top edge. Book is very good in a fine clamshell case with all faults as noted. Bookseller Inventory # 407135 Price: US\$ 950.00 convert currency Presented by Commonwealth Books, Boston, MA, U.S.A.

Wonder if all journalists take such care of their philosophy books!

Source: David White

- December 2001 saw the publication of BRS member Anne-Françoise Schmid's edition of Bertrand Russell's *Correspondance sur la philosophie, la logique et la politique avec Louis Couturat (1897-1913)* (Paris: Editions Kimé, 2001). The work is in French, consisting of 2 volumes with a total of 734 pages. The price in euros is 68; in francs, 448.12. There will be an additional charge for international postage. Most of the correspondence contained within has not previously been published elsewhere.

The book can be ordered from Editions Kimé, Béatrice Charrié, 2, impasse des Peintres, F - 75002 Paris, France. For more information, visit Kimé's website at <http://perso.wanadoo.fr/kime> or contact Beatrice Charrie at kime.editions@wanadoo.fr. Credit card orders cannot be accepted.

Source: Anne-Françoise Schmid & Ken Blackwell

Russell-crypt Gerry Wildenberg

This is another in a series of simple substitution ciphers based on the writings of Bertrand Russell.

Below is today's coded quote in which each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFRRYY, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quote below uses a different code.

After you've solved it, see if you can identify the source.

KVTI WGI, G CWTXSWC, WDP YIDRDCYP D MGRP TK
UTGHTRTXH IGDHID, GRKYACGRS
OGCW AVGIY TV IDPRYHH TV PGHDHCYV DJJ GR WGH
RYGSWQTXVWTP.

The solution will appear in the next issue of the *BRSQ*.

BRS Business and Chapter News:

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. 4th Quarter Treasurer's Report (Revised) Cash Flow, 10/1/01 Through 12/31/01

Compiled 1/7/02 by Dennis J. Darland,
BRS Treasurer (djdarland@qconline.com)

| Category Description | |
|----------------------|------------|
| BALANCE 9/30/01 | 7,800.92* |
| INFLOWS | |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 198.00 |
| Renewals | 268.89** |
| TOTAL Dues | 466.89 |
| Meeting Income | -107.49*** |
| Other Income | 70.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 429.40 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Library Expenses | 29.32 |
| Newsletter | 886.36 |
| Other Exp | 7.45 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 923.13 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -493.73 |
| BALANCE 12/31/01 | 7,307.19 |

* This was erroneously reported at \$7,900.98 due to clerical errors of \$100.00 & 0.06

** Primarily for 2001. 2002 dues will be reported in 2002. This is to make it easier to see out financial situation on an annual basis.

*** Partial refunds to some who couldn't attend.

BRS in Atlanta

The BRS had a successful presence at the American Philosophical Association's recent meeting in Atlanta. Pictures of the meeting are at the GRRS's website at <http://sun1.sifc.edu/~dwhite/errs>. Check it out!

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc
Annual Report
Cash Flow, 1/1/01 Through 12/31/01

Compiled 1/7/02 by Dennis J. Darland,
 BRS Treasurer (djdardland@qconline.com)

| | |
|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Category Description | |
| BALANCE 12/31/00 | 7,938.23 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contributions-BRS | 570.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 570.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 734.86 |
| Renewals | 4,046.29 |
| TOTAL Dues | 4,781.15 |
| Library Income | 10.95 |
| Meeting Income | 2,503.00 |
| Other Income | 259.20 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 8,124.30 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 3.48 |
| BRS Paper Award | 200.00 |
| Library Expenses | 54.38 |
| Meeting Expenses | 2,767.33 |
| Newsletter | 2,750.30 |
| Other Expenses | 308.35 |
| RUSSELL Sub | 2,671.50 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 8,755.34 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -631.04 |
| BALANCE 12/31/01 | 7,307.19 |

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Five Years of Monthly Russell
 Meetings Open to the Public

GRRS Catches APA's Attention

The American Philosophical Association has placed a copy of our flyer upon its website, citing it as "an example of the kind of thing that we would like to encourage." The flyer can be viewed at the APA site at <http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/centennial/100anniv.html>.

Program, Spring 2002

Mar. 21 *Wittgenstein's Vienna*
 Apr. 18 "Tom and Viv and Bertie"
 May 16 *The Conquest of Happiness*

Program, Summer & Fall 2002

June "Russell and Critical Thinking"
 July "Russell the Anti-Communist"
Guest Speaker: Andrew G. Bone

August "Russell on Pythagoras"
 September "The City College Case"
Guest Speaker: Thom Weidlich

The Iguana Club (formerly Christian's Coffeehouse)
 Village Gate Square, 274 North Goodman St., Rochester, NY.

For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or write
 TimothyMad@aol.com or visit
<http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~dwhite/grrs>.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May 2002

No. 114



Paul Kurtz in Rochester

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY
c/o David White
Philosophy Department
St. John Fisher College
3690 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14618 USA

MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1406 26TH ST.
ROCK ISLAND IL 61201-2837

NOT AUGUSTANA

LAST CHANCE TO RENEW!
See Page 5 for details.



THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Webmaster: John Lenz, jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone

Associate Editors: Tim Madigan, Rachel M. Murray, David White

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:

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Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Chairman of the Board | Kenneth Blackwell |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Ray Perkins |
| Secretary | Chad Trainer |
| Treasurer | Dennis J. Darland |
| Vice President/Outreach | Peter Friedman |

QUOTE OF THE QUARTERLY

"Canadians are masters of what Bertrand Russell has called the twentieth century's highest achievement: the technique of suspended judgment. Canadians experiment with technology from all over the world, but rarely adopt any technical stratagem broadly."

Marshall McLuhan and Bruce Powers, *The Global Village* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 149.

Canadian members, we trust, feel appropriately proud.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May 2002

No. 114

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Have You Renewed???
See Page 5 to Find Out!
Don't Let YOUR Membership Lapse!

From the Editor:

Talking Up the BRS

The Bertrand Russell Society provides a focal point for people both inside and outside of academia with an interest in the life and thought of Bertrand Russell. But despite the excellent work the Society has done over the past 28 years, there are still a great many people out there who love Russell but don't know much (if anything) about us. On the one hand, that fact should be encouraging. Russell died 30 years ago, and yet there is no shortage of people who share our enthusiasm for him. On the other hand, it should also remind us that we don't necessarily make all the effort we could to reach out to new potential members and tell them about our Society.

I would like very briefly to describe several encounters I had over the past year or so with people interested in Russell who were unaware of our Society. All occurred thanks to McMaster University's excellent russell-l listserv. In addition to facilitating electronic dialogue about Russell, this list allows for the rapid dissemination about Russell-related items in the print media and on the web—much like this newsletter. (To subscribe to russell-l, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/russell-l>.) Two of these items caught my eye when mentioned on russell-l. The first was an announcement describing a recently published novel entitled *Duck Egg Blue*. The novel apparently describes the story of a young student caught in the middle of a battle over the presence of evolution in school curricula. (A picture of the cover appears on the opposite page.) The announcement found its way to russell-l through the "humanist grapevine."

I rarely have time to read fiction (even good fiction) and I doubt I'll read the novel any time soon. (Avid novel readers may obtain the book from its publisher, Prometheus Books. A full description appears at <http://www.prometheusbooks.com/site/catalog/popular35.html>.) Still, I was intrigued enough to drop the author, Derrick Neill, a few lines about the BRS. He responded enthusiastically. "Russell," he wrote, "is my favorite philosopher. I certainly am interested in your organization." He has since indicated his plans to join the BRS.

The second item on Russell-l concerned a webpage containing jokes and anecdotes about famous mathematicians and physicists, including Russell. The page is at <http://hexagon.fi.tartu.ee/~palo/Fun/math-phys.html>. I recognized a small misstatement of one of the more famous anecdotes about Russell (if you want to know which one, check out the page), and

Granted, not all my attempts to talk up the BRS are this successful. Several times I've been told that people are interested but do not have the time to get involved with us. This response perplexes me, I admit; the only time demand the BRS requires of its members is the time required to write a check each year and shelve our marvelous *Quarterly*. Nevertheless, some people do feel that if they join an organization they should "give it their all." I certainly don't mind that, unless it deters them from doing anything with us.

But a few failures mean little beside enjoyable and productive exchanges like the ones I described above. What these two stories indicate is that there are plenty of people who would be happy to learn more about the BRS—and possibly join—if only they knew about it. They also prove that opportunities to talk up the BRS arise all over the place. How many members have seen an article, or received an e-mail, or visited a website that seemed particularly Russellian? If every one of us reached out in situations like that to sing the praises of the BRS, membership would not be a problem. Of course, that may mean that some website owners become bombarded with invitations to join the BRS, as our enthusiastic membership reaches out across the globe, but I wouldn't exactly lose any sleep over that.

Finally, opportunities to promote the BRS can arise from conversations even if the interested party is unlikely to join. This was brought home to me in the wake of the announcements of the 2001 Nobel Prize winners. At that time, Associate Editor Tim Madigan directed me to the Nobel E-Museum, online at <http://www.nobel.se>. In addition to providing information on the latest prize winners, I discovered, the site also provides a chance to search for past laureates. A search for "Bertrand Russell" (winner of the 1950 Prize for Literature, of course) turned up a copy of the presentation given him at the awards ceremony, a brief biography, a copy of his Nobel Lecture (subsequently edited and reprinted as a chapter in his book *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*), and a list of other links. This list included the Russell Archives at McMaster University—but not the BRS! I dropped the webmaster for the site a line, and he agreed to add the link. Now everyone who checks out Bertrand Russell's Nobel Prize entry online will view a link directing them to the BRS.

So the next time you read something, and Russell's name comes to mind, consider reaching out and talking up the BRS. And make sure you have the *BRSQ* handy when you do!

Section 2. Voting by Mail. Voting may be by mail. Ballots shall be sent to all eligible members, either in the BRS newsletter or by special mailing. The deadline for the return of ballots shall be not less than three weeks from the date ballots are mailed by first class mail, not less than four weeks if mailed third class. Ballots must go first class to Canada and Mexico, and by airmail to other foreign countries. Mail ballots shall be tallied by the Elections Committee, and verified by the Secretary. Ballots for the Board's voting by mail shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary; the Chairman may designate a substitute for the Secretary.

Article 12. Amendments to These Bylaws

Section 1. Voting to Amend at a Meeting. These Bylaws may be amended at a Society Meeting by a majority vote of those members present and voting.

Section 2. Voting to Amend by Mail. These Bylaws may also be amended by mail ballot. The proposed changes, with supporting arguments, will appear in the BRS newsletter or a special mailing. In the following BRS newsletter or second special mailing, other views, including opposing views, will appear, along with a mail ballot. To pass, the Amendment must be approved by a majority of the ballots cast.

BYLAWS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC. Revised June 1984; revised June 1999; revised May 2001

Article 1. Responsibilities and Obligations

The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") has these responsibilities: (1) to set policy for the Society's affairs, and (2) to elect officers of the Society and of the Board. The Board has these obligations: to be governed by these Bylaws and by the Society's Bylaws.

Article 2. Membership

Membership shall be in accord with Article 5 of the Society's Bylaws.

Article 3. Officers

Section 1. The Chairman. The Chairman shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The

Last Chance to Renew!

All BRS memberships (except Life and Honorary memberships) expire at the end of the calendar year. The BRS sends everyone with expired memberships the first two *BRSQ* issues of the year (February and May), but those who have not renewed by August will not receive the third issue of the year. And so if you haven't renewed already, **now is the time!** If you don't, the BRS will have to send you an individualized reminder, and that takes time, money, and energy the BRS could better use elsewhere.

To confirm whether or not you have renewed as of this issue, please check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following four-digit numbers on it:

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| 2001 | means you are paid through 2001, but still need to renew for 2002. |
| 2002 | means you have indeed renewed for 2002, and so are all set for the year. |
| 7777, 8888, or 9999 | means you are a Life Member, Honorary Membership, or receiving the <i>BRSQ</i> as a courtesy. In any case, you never need to renew. |

Check for your number, and you'll always know your status.

To renew your membership, just use the handy membership form in the center of this issue. Please return it to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. You can pay by check (payable, in U.S. Dollars, to "BRS") or money order.

You can also pay by credit card using Paypal on the web. Just go to <http://www.paypal.com>, and open a free account. Then pay your dues using brs-pp@qconline.com as the recipient's e-mail address when prompted. There is no charge to make a Paypal payment, which (foreign members take note) will be handled in U.S. dollars. In the e-mail message that Paypal will send from you to our treasurer (Dennis), be sure to state the purpose of the payment. Do not include your credit card info in the message or any change in your name and address. Dennis will send you an e-mail receipt, and update the membership records accordingly.

If you have any questions about your membership, feel free to drop Dennis a line at djdarland@qconline.com. And if there's anything the *BRSQ* can do to make the renewal process easier, please let us know.

**Meet Studs Terkel! Come to the 2002 Annual Meeting of
the Bertrand Russell Society
Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL),
May 31-June 2, 2002**

BRS Awards Committee Chair Kevin Brodie has confirmed that Studs Terkel will attend the 2002 BRS Annual Meeting to accept the Society's Annual Award in person. The meeting will be held at Lake Forest College, in Lake Forest, Illinois (about 30 miles north of Chicago, near Northwestern University).

Studs Terkel is a renowned author and journalist most famous for his interviews with people from all walks of life, from political leaders to cleaning ladies—to philosophers, including Bertrand Russell. Terkel is the author of such books as *Working: People Talk about What They Do All Day and How They Feel about What They Do* (New Press, 1997), *The Good War: An Oral History of World War Two* (New Press, 1997), and most recently *Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Reflections on Death, Birth, and Hunger for a Faith* (New Press, 2001).

In addition to Terkel, the meeting will feature various papers and presentations, including the following:

Panel Discussion on Ray Perkins' *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: Letters to the Editor 1904-1969* (Panelists: Rosalind Carey, Peter Stone, and David White. Respondent: Ray Perkins)

David Blitz: "Russell and Peace in the Middle East"

Kevin Klement: "Russell's Anticipation of the Lambda Calculus"

Greg Landini: "Russell's Distinction between Logical and Semantic Paradoxes"

Tim Madigan: "Russell's Influence on Music Theory"

Alan Schwerin: "Russell and the Early Wittgenstein on Scepticism"

Chad Trainer: "Earth to Russell: The Limits of Russell's Views on Space Exploration"

For information about the program, contact BRS President Alan Schwerin

at the Dept. of Interdisciplinary Studies, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ 07764 USA, (732) 571-4470, aschweri@monmouth.edu, or visit <http://bluehawk.monmouth.edu/aschweri/brs2002.htm>.

Registration for the meeting—including buffet, banquet, papers, and other conference materials—costs \$55, or \$40 for students. Accommodations are available on campus for \$49.50 for the weekend (plus \$10 for linens if needed). Some cheaper accommodations may be available, and there are hotels in the area for those uninterested in the dorm experience. Checks for registration and/or housing should be made out to "Bertrand Russell Society" and sent with the conference registration form (located at the center of this issue of the *BRSQ*) to the conference organizer, Rosalind Carey, Department of Philosophy, Durand Hall, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045 USA, (847) 735-5185, carey@hermes.lfc.edu. Registrants may also pay via credit card using Paypal, as detailed in "Last Chance to Renew, p. 4). Anyone paying in this way must still send a registration form to Rosalind. Please direct all questions about the conference unrelated to the program to Rosalind as well. Or just check out her web page at <http://mypage.campuspipeline.com/brsam2002/indexbrsam2002.html>.

The *BRSQ* encourages every member to attend and participate in our latest meeting! See you in Lake Forest!

BRS T-Shirts Continue to Attract Attention

Stories relating to BRS t-shirts continue to pour in. *BRSQ* Associate Editor Tim Madigan was wearing his BRS t-shirt on a flight into Rochester last summer when the passenger sitting next to him took an interest in the shirt. The passenger turned out to be a mathematician and physicist interested in both Russell and W.K. Clifford (the subject of Tim's doctoral dissertation). Another passenger, a comely philosophy student, also asked about the t-shirt and the BRS. Tim provided her with the information she requested; she declined, however, to give Tim her phone number. (Regrettably, the *BRSQ* has no photographs of any of these extraordinary events.)

Stories like these remind all of us that wearing a BRS t-shirt is a barrel of fun. So why not order your own today? The shirts are available for \$10 each plus \$ 3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Please make checks out to the BRS, and send them to BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, 854 Battle ST, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color. Shirts are available in black or yellow. (White may also be available; check with Ray at perkrk@earthlink.net.)

Special Feature: Paul Kurtz in Rochester

Paul Kurtz, philosopher, secular humanist, and BRS Honorary Member, paid a visit to Rochester on April 20. The BRSQ marks the occasion with a short article describing the visit, along with pictures of the affair. But first, we would like to present a recent article by Kurtz on some of the most important issues of the day. We are pleased to reprint this article from the Spring 2002 issue of Free Inquiry.

Farewell—Fairplay Paul Kurtz

Something awful seems to be happening to the traditional American sense of fair play and goodwill. The public response in support of the victims of September 11 notwithstanding, in general there seems to be a decline of empathy and altruism. Perhaps I am overreacting, but this deficiency seems to assume many forms.

What immediately comes to mind is our treatment of prisoners. I refer first to the great flap that emerged worldwide over the Bush administration's refusal to place the prisoners of war captured in Afghanistan under the rules of the Geneva Convention. They are "unlawful combatants," we were told; or they are "dangerous and our guards need to be protected;" or, in still another statement, "They do not deserve any better." I've always thought that the Geneva Convention provided commendable rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war, rules that all civilized nations should follow. The prisoners are being treated "humanely," we were told. Surely, we would want our own soldiers, if captured anywhere in the world, to be treated in accord with the Geneva Convention. How can we demand this in the future if we violate these rules today? President Bush relented after much criticism at home and abroad and grudgingly declared that Taliban prisoners would come under the Geneva Convention, but not members of the Al Qaeda. Many critics believe that this concession does not go far enough.

"The Quality of American Mercy Is Not Strained"

This cavalier dismissal of the Geneva Convention has disturbed civil libertarians in the United States and our allies throughout the world. So has the treatment of thousands of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, recently apprehended by the Justice Department and held incommunicado and without bail. They are "terrorists," says the administration; but how do

we know unless they are indicted and put on trial and processed through the American system of justice? Will the infamous deed of September 11—which we all abhor—and the fear of future terrorist acts so erode our sense of justice that we will abandon our traditional adherence to democratic due process?

Perhaps there is something deeply amiss, for a similar vindictiveness is often displayed as well in our treatment of American prisoners, incarcerated for a wide range of infractions. The War on Drugs in particular has taken a vast toll on the American sense of balance, and its result seems close to the development of a police-state mentality. Bursting into homes at all hours to jail alleged drug offenders—even for possession or use of marijuana, for example—seems like an extraordinary overreaction. Drug offenders are considered "wicked." Not that I wish to encourage drug use, but shall we abandon our free society to rout out drug use while we permit cigarette smoking and the abuse of alcohol, the two most noxious drugs available? From all reports, brutality in American prisons seems to be intensifying. Has vindictive justice gotten the best of us? I was interested to see William Bennett, the paragon of Christian virtue, railing against sin recently at a convention of American conservatives, defending the harsh tactics of the drug police. Whatever happened to the quality of mercy among those who express the Christian faith?

Another painful sign of the retributive mentality is seen in the fact that we still exact the death penalty; indeed, the United States is the only democracy that does. Our European allies are offended by capital punishment, and many countries now are refusing to honor extradition to the United States if the accused would risk suffering the death penalty. It is highly questionable that capital punishment serves as a deterrent. Surely we need to deal with those who commit heinous crimes. I would myself recommend life imprisonment for such offenders without the right of parole. But should not one of the aims of incarceration be rehabilitation, and should not a civilized society exert efforts to educate and reform offenders so that they may be returned to society? Instead we seem to have an exaggerated sense that punishment is good for its own sake and that those who commit crimes deserve retribution.

It seems to me that what is happening in the United States is that we have been overtaken by a religious sense of retributive justice and that this has taken on exaggerated proportions. Surely one of the purposes of punishment and incarceration is to protect society from criminals. Granted, but beyond that do we need to provide cruel and unusual punishment?

Whatever happened to compassion?

The Bloated Defense Budget

I am also dismayed that the end of the Cold War has not reduced our military budget. We seem so frightened by enemies, domestic or foreign, that we are willing to spend vast sums on armaments and reduce our expenditure on domestic programs, such as medical insurance for those who lack it. The United States has also reduced foreign-aid assistance throughout the world. The ministers of the wealthy Group of Seven nations have recommended that these nations donate 0.7 percent of gross national product for international-aid programs for the poorest nations of the world. The United States currently provides the lowest percentage, only 0.1 percent. Secretary of the Treasury Paul H. O'Neill is a strong opponent of this aid, one reason why the United States is now known as "Uncle Scrooge."

President Bush's proposed military build-up would exceed that of the Reagan years. The administration proposes to increase defense spending by \$120 billion over the next five years—at a time, incidentally, when it proposes that taxes be reduced and the deficit increased. It is interesting that the United States now spends an estimated 50 percent of all arms expenditures in the world. The Religious Right seems to need demons, real or imaginary, to guard against—formerly they were Bolsheviks, socialists, left-wingers, liberals, secular humanists, child abusers, drug fiends; there are now terrorists in place of the anarchists of earlier epochs. H. L. Mencken wryly observed: "The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary." How true this is of the American political scene today.

The America that we love has in the past defended democracy and human rights and offered aid to those suffering disasters worldwide. Has this America become a swashbuckling military power, pursuing a unilateral foreign policy insensitive to the views of the world—such as the abrogation of international treaties? Are we no longer the hope of the world, but a nationalistic state pursuing our own self-interests? Today Afghanistan is defeated. Will we follow the president tomorrow by putting out of commission Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? I fear that America will lose its cherished friends and allies throughout the world, and her self-respect, and pursue imperialist policies that may be turned against us in the future by new coalitions of adversaries.

Paul Kurtz in Rochester

Alan Bock

Paul Kurtz, an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society, was the honored guest at a luncheon hosted by Tim Madigan and several members of the steering committee of the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) on Saturday, April 20, 2002. Dr. Kurtz is Chairman of the Council for Secular Humanism, founder of Prometheus Books and the Center for Inquiry, publisher of the *Skeptical Inquirer* and *Free Inquiry* magazines, renowned philosopher, and certainly one of the leading secular humanists in the world today. The luncheon, held at Mykonos (a Greek restaurant in downtown Rochester frequented by the GRRS), was a very informal affair featuring a wide-ranging discussion, addressing matters of interest to the BRS as well as numerous other matters (philosophical and otherwise). In addition to Dr. Kurtz and Madigan, Phil Ebersole, David White, Peter Stone, David Henehan, and Pat and Alan Bock also attended.

Dr. Kurtz's visit to Rochester had been heralded early in the morning by an earthquake, centered in Plattsburgh, N.Y. and registering 5.1 on the Richter scale. It was felt throughout all of upstate New York. There was widespread disagreement on whether this signified that the tectonic gods were pleased or displeased.

The main reason for Dr. Kurtz's visit was a talk given at the First Universalist Church entitled "The Great Divide: American Theocracy vs. Secular Democracy," co-sponsored by the Secular Humanists of the Rochester Area (SHoRA) and the Religious Education Committee of the First Universalist Church. After welcoming remarks by George Tiger, the youthful pastor of the church, and Ralph Reynolds of SHoRA, 3 members of the audience made promotional statements: David White for the Mark Twain Society, Tad Clements for the GRRS, and Ed Button for the CFI TV program "Humanist Perspectives" broadcast in the Rochester area.

At the outset of his talk Dr. Kurtz observed that the Center for Inquiry is located in Amherst, NY. This town has for the past 5 to 8 years been famous as the American city (with a population of over 100,000) having the lowest crime rate in the country. He suggested, facetiously, that there might be a connection. He went on to point out, however, that the Religious Right thinks otherwise and has accused the CFI of taking over the country claiming that they control the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the United Nations, the Democratic Party, Yale, Princeton, Harvard and 2,000 universities among others. (There was at least one audible

“Don’t we wish” from the audience.)

There is a great divide in America today between the conservative and liberal streams of thought, said Kurtz, and this divide goes back to the very beginnings of American society. Historically, the conservative stream has been represented by people like Jonathan Edwards, the evangelical minister of the eighteenth century; Alexander Hamilton; John C. Calhoun, the defender of slavery; the Puritans; the Temperance League; the Legion of Decency; and today’s religious right, among others. The liberal stream came out of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and included Jefferson, Madison, and Paine among the founding fathers and Emerson, Thoreau, and the abolitionists among the leading figures just prior to the civil war.

American history is, to some extent, a history of the ascendancy of first one then the other of these two streams of thought. Today the conservative stream is in the ascendancy, as is evidenced by “faith-based charities,” public piety and prayer, “God Bless America,” anti-evolution, and anti-atheist fundamentalism.

On the other hand, said Kurtz, we secular humanists defend our point of view that this country should be a secular democracy. We stand for science and reason, not faith and obedience. We defend humanist values and education and oppose discrimination against women and gays. We believe in separation of church and state. Finally, we have a naturalistic outlook believing that science is the best method to interpret human behavior.

Several slides were presented, showing poll results that measured the depth and extent of religious belief in numerous countries. Kurtz pointed out that two continents, Europe and Australia, appear to have moved into the “post-religious” era. In poll after poll, however, America seemed to be intellectually more like a third world country—and not only in all matters pertaining to religion. It was also the least knowledgeable among all countries about the basic scientific facts of evolution. In fact, said Kurtz, America was such an anomaly among the western industrialized nations that it almost looked like she was suffering from some form of “distemper.”


In analyzing the anomalous position of America in the world today, Kurtz invoked one of his own earlier works—*The Transcendental Temptation* (Prometheus, 1991), a study of the deep and powerful human tendency to accept transcendental/paranormal accounts of reality. He was not certain if this was a genetic characteristic, as “we skeptics” appear to lack the

“religious gene.” However, he did advance a number of possible reasons for the prevalence of the Transcendental Temptation in America at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

1. America was originally settled in large part by religious dissenters fleeing from persecution in Europe. As an Australian skeptic once told him, “England sent us their criminals and sent you their puritans.” Thus, from the outset, we have had a large population of religious fanatics.
2. Every street corner in America has a church, which led author Rodney Stark to opine that religion in America is “market-driven.” As in a supermarket every taste is satisfied and new tastes are being constantly introduced. According to the *Encyclopedia of Cults* there are at least 1,350 cults, sects, etc. in America today—many of them of the “nutty” variety.
3. There has been no established church in America (at least since the ratification of the constitution.) Unlike Europe, America has not experienced the evils of “theocracy.”
4. There is very little criticism of religion since it is considered in bad taste to do so. Toleration of all religions has been the rule for a long time. However, as Voltaire pointed out “if we believe absurdities we will commit atrocities.”
5. Religion in America today is combined with political power. In the last election the Religious Right captured the presidency and monotheism has more or less become the official religion. We are “one nation under God” which, of course, excludes all unbelievers.
6. Oligopoly and the concentration of power in the media blocks out alternative and dissenting viewpoints and marginalizes unbelievers. Lately, however, there has been a shift evidenced by media attacks on Catholic priests for child abuse.
7. Finally, Kurtz alluded to the “meme” hypothesis advanced by Richard Dawkins and Susan Blackmore—namely that we humans are capable of imitating and copying from one another and thereby transmitting our culture. So far, at least religiously, we have failed to develop the proper memes.

Kurtz concluded by saying that he saw very good news to report in recent polls and surveys showing the numbers of people who have turned against religion. In a recent survey commissioned by the City University of New York, those listing themselves as having "no religion" were third in number (29 million), right behind Catholics (50 million) and Baptists (33 million). That same survey showed that between 1990 and 2001 the non-religious had almost doubled in number, growing from 8% to 14% of the population. Thus, at the end of his talk Paul Kurtz was exuding optimism.


Pictures from Paul Kurtz's Visit to Rochester



Mistah Kurtz—he in Rochester!



Alan Bock Enthuses at a Sale of Kurtz's Books



Kurtz with the Members of *BRSQ* Committee

Book Reviews:

Russell and Critical Thinking: A Review Ray Perkins, Jr.

The journal *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines* recently published a special issue devoted to Russell entitled "Bertrand Russell and Critical Thinking" (Winter 2001 Vol. 20 No. 2). Various aspects of Russell's views on critical thinking are ably set forth by seven contributors, many of whom are connected with departments of education at Canadian Universities. (Nick Griffin, for example, has an informative piece on Russell research at McMaster University.) The special issue is guest edited by William Hare, who also contributed a short essay of his own ("Russell and Critical Thinking").

One of the nicest features of the issue is its inclusion of a little-known 1953 essay by Russell called "A Philosophy for Our Time." Written during the Cold War shortly after the advent of the H-bomb, Russell explains how the study of philosophy can enhance our critical thinking and undermine "fanatical dogmatism," not only by expanding our imaginative purview of the world and reminding us of human fallibility, but also by developing impersonal thinking and impersonal feeling. The study of philosophy, not unlike the study of science, can lead us from the particular to the universal; away from the "tyranny of the here and now" of our parochial exclusionary sensibilities to a more universal sympathetic vision of the world and the human race. It's a wonderful paper, and its connection with Russell's earlier views regarding logical form/ truth is evident in his simple rule: "No ethical maxim must contain a proper name." (As a crude attempt to ascertain the validity of Russell's idea, I asked a group of freshmen to agree/disagree with several assertions, including the following two: 1. If bin Laden killed your family in a terrorist act, it would be justifiable for you to kill his family; 2. If person A murders the relatives of person B, it would be morally permissible for B to kill the relatives of A. About twice as many students agreed with 1 as with 2.)

Oddly enough, only one contributor, Sheryle Bergmann Drewe, refers to this 1953 paper. Her article ("Russell in Context") is mainly concerned to show that Russell's conception of critical thinking is relevant to current work on critical thinking. As she points out, his conception (especially as explicated by William Hare in his 1998 paper in the *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*) contains many of the elements spelled out by prominent education theorists in recent decades.

Paul Hager's article, "Russell's Conception of Critical Thinking: Its Scope and Limits," also draws heavily on Hare's paper, according to which Russell's conception "embraces a wide range of skills, dispositions and attitudes." After citing a formidable list of abilities, habits, tendencies, attitudes and epistemic values, Hager settles on Hare's phrase "critical undogmatic receptiveness" to summarize Russell's conception, a conception that Russell himself describes variously as "the scientific outlook," "the scientific spirit," "the philosophic spirit," "a scientific habit of mind," "the liberal outlook," etc. The rest of Hager's paper is concerned to make the case that Russell's idea of critical thinking, as comprehensive as it is, is not "sufficient" as either a philosophical method or a scientific method; it is also insufficient for creative thinking or as an ideal by which to live. But apart from his uncritical acceptance of Hare's explication, one wonders just who Hager is arguing against when he presents his "insufficiency" cases. Nevertheless, he does shed some useful light on Russell's conceptions of philosophical method and scientific method and some important differences between the two, despite some Russellian statements seeming to equate them.

But as Hager points out, the starting points of philosophical analysis and scientific hypothesizing are generally different, as are their end products. In philosophy we move from what is certain but vague to what is more precise but less certain; and the data from which we start are complete. In science we move from what is less certain to what is more certain as we move from incomplete data to hypotheses that are continually being modified by new observations and allowing us to be less uncertain as our hypotheses approximate the truth.

A.D. Irvine's article ("Russell on Indoctrination") makes the case that the "liberal or scientific outlook" is Russell's goal for true education as opposed to indoctrination. The essence of such an outlook consists of trained intelligence rather than belief:

Russell holds that genuine education requires something more than the mere instilling of (true) belief. Indoctrination involves itself with methods of belief formation other than careful reasoning and the weighing of evidence. In such cases, the result is a type of belief whose certainty is often out of all proportion to the available evidence...it results in the kind of belief that is very often immune to ordinary processes of rational revision (p. 20).

Since dogmatists the world over believe that nations are made strong by uniformity of opinion and action, the true educator--by training

intelligence and fostering only those beliefs based on the habit of impartial reasoning, tolerance and absence of dogma—becomes the guardian of civilization and democracy. As Irvine reminds us, Russell insists that science and democracy have much in common with the empirical tradition beginning with Locke. Owing to the provisional nature of knowledge, both are receptive to new ideas; both are tolerant of alternative points of view, and both value the holding of beliefs in proportion to evidence. Just as science accepts its hypotheses tentatively and non-dogmatically, so too in politics our hypotheses should be accepted provisionally. As Russell advises, “it is not worthwhile to inflict a comparatively certain present evil for the sake of a comparatively doubtful future good. Since...the distant consequences of actions are more uncertain than the immediate consequences, it is seldom justifiable to embark on any policy on the ground that, though harmful in the present, it will be beneficial in the long run” (“Philosophy and Politics,” 1947). If adopted, this skeptical principle would tend to discourage, for example, the crashing of airplanes into landmarks like the World Trade Center.

Irvine presents Russell’s method as one which is essentially against certainty. And to the examples of science and politics he adds philosophy, which he says, paradoxically enough, advances knowledge with an accompanying increase in uncertainty. This is essentially the same point as the one brought out by Hager that Russellian philosophical analysis gains precision at the expense of certainty. Yet it must not be thought that “mere skepticism” is the goal of philosophy. As Russell puts it, “If philosophy is to serve a positive purpose, it must not teach mere skepticism, for while the dogmatist is harmful, the skeptic is useless. Dogmatism and skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is certainty, whether of knowledge or of ignorance” (“Philosophy for the Layman,” 1946).

Howard Woodhouse (“In Praise of Idleness: Bertrand Russell’s Critical Thinking about the Global Market”) extends Russell’s ideas on critical thinking into the socioeconomic sphere. He underscores Russell’s “contemplative habit of mind” as the key to understanding his willingness to “oppose the stream” and as an antidote for the harm done by the market place and its “instrumental” view of knowledge. With the help of recent work by John McMurtry, Woodhouse brings Russell’s critique to bear on the global market and its perversion of education as a servant of the “money code of value.” Part and parcel of the contemplative habit of mind is the inclusion of “useless” knowledge which affords opportunity of relief from the profit seeking “cult of efficiency” and allows us the readiness “to call dogmas into question and the freedom of mind to do justice to the most

diverse points of view.”

Woodhouse is a bit heavy on McMurtry and light on Russell, at least with regard to helping us see, beyond social diagnosis, how conceptions of “useless knowledge,” “idleness” and “the contemplative habit of mind” do more (assuming they do) than merely afford opportunity for questioning the market system. And there are some minor inaccuracies. For example, in a section reviewing Russell’s opposition to the stream, he says that Russell went to prison “for leading a sit-down demonstration outside the Ministry of Defense in Whitehall London when well into his nineties” (p. 27). Actually Russell was 89, and it was for addressing a crowd by microphone in Hyde Park (August 6, 1961), not for sitting down outside the Defense Ministry (which he also did, on February 18, 1961). Again, he says, regarding the causes of WWI, that it was the “potent mix of the power of the State combined with the overriding self-interest of Capital which, for Russell, had led to the First World War in which millions of Europeans died, so that Britain and France could maintain control over the wealth of Africa” (p. 32). Despite an anti-imperialist component in Russell’s writings on the war, Woodhouse’s statement seems extreme as a Russellian account of Britain’s motives.

Ian Winchester’s article (“Russell’s Practice of Science vs. His Picture of Science and Its Place in Liberal Education”) argues that there is a gap between Russell’s picture of science and his practice of it. His main point seems to be that Russell’s description of the scientific method as essentially the process of inductive empirical generalization is at odds with his practice. He gives as examples of Russell’s practice his critique of Leibnitz and his theory of descriptions. In both cases Russell’s method—not unlike that of Einstein in relativity theory—essentially involves the identification and challenging of the presuppositions of his predecessors.

Winchester’s observations may be true under certain interpretations of “scientific method,” a term used in several senses in Russell’s long career. As the formulation and testing of empirical hypotheses, it is not what Russell has in mind when he talks about “the scientific method in philosophy.” And neither of these senses of the term should be identified with Russell’s conception of philosophical analysis—itsself a complex and variegated notion, as Morris Weitz made clear many years ago (*The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, 1944). Hager seems to be sensitive to this point.

When Russell speaks about “scientific method in philosophy,” he is usually recommending a certain set of attitudes to accompany

philosophical theorizing and/or analysis—attitudes that will help philosophy develop theories with a better chance of being true. Specifically, he wants philosophy to be scientific in the sense of being shorn of ethical and religious motives; it is to be value-neutral, non-teleological, non-subjective, non-dogmatic and impersonal; and it should proceed in its solving of problems, like science does, in a piecemeal fashion. And beyond its lessons for doing better philosophy, science is to be positively valued in a liberal education for its “impersonal cosmic outlook” which helps to satisfy “the desire for a larger life and wider interests, for an escape from private circumstances, and even from the whole recurring cycle of birth and death...” (“The Place of Science in a Liberal Education,” 1913). Similar ideas can be found in “On Scientific Method in Philosophy;” both it and “The Place of Science” are reprinted in Russell’s book *Mysticism and Logic* (1918). Both papers are mentioned briefly by Winchester, but neither he nor any of the other contributors (except Hager briefly) mention Russell’s *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914, subtitled “As a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy”). The first lecture collected in that work, “Current Tendencies,” is especially relevant for understanding what Russell means by “scientific method in philosophy.”

Overall, this special issue of *Inquiry* gives us a helpful look at Russell qua critical thinker. It also allows us to see much of Russell’s work in philosophy, science, politics and education through the unifying theme of critical thinking.

Note: the GRRS will devote its June meeting to discussion of this special issue of Inquiry.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- *The Heretic's Handbook of Quotations*, edited by Charles Bufe, originally published in 1988, appeared in an expanded edition in 1992; both were published by See Sharp Press (P.O. Box 1731, Tucson, AZ 85702). This entertaining collection has one obvious oversight—not a single quotation by Bertrand Russell appears in the book (assuming the index is accurate)! Despite this unpardonable oversight, the *BRSQ* would welcome a review of this book.

See Sharp Press publishes a number of books and pamphlets on atheism, including Chaz Bufe's *20 Reasons to Abandon Christianity* (2000) and E. Haldeman-Julius' *The Meaning of Atheism* (1993). The latter is of note because of its author. Haldeman-Julius was one of the most important radical publishers in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. Among his many publications in pamphlet form was Russell's famous essay, "Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilization?" (anthologized in the collection *Why I Am Not a Christian*).

Source: Peter Stone

- Conrad Russell, Bertie's eldest son and the present Earl Russell, published a short piece entitled "Religion and the Law" in the *New Humanist* (vol. 114, no. 2, June 1999). The piece is available online at <http://www.rationalist.org.uk/newhumanist/issue9906/russellc.shtml>.

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserv, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserv is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. To join the list, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively send the message

subscribe

to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserv's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

contemporary English philosopher Bertrand Russell. But I must concede that Russell—who, as a lifelong radical, might have been expected to take a negative view of patriotism—was being more natural when he said: “Love of England is very nearly the strongest emotion I possess.”

Podhoretz goes on to write: “Very few, if any, statements of similar cast can be found among American intellectuals—and certainly none can be found among radicals—in the past 100 years or so.”

Source: Thom Weidlich

- The May 2000-October 2001 issue of *Modern Logic* contains two items of interest to Russell scholars. First, Jan Dejnozka has an article entitled “Origin of Russell’s Early Theory of Logical Truth as Purely General Truth: Bolzano, Peirce, Frege, Venn, or MacColl?” Second, Irving Anellis reviews in great depth Volumes 3 and 4 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. Both of the volumes reviewed, *Towards the “Principles of Mathematics”, 1900-02* (edited by Gregory H. Moore) and *Foundations of Logic, 1903-05* (edited by Alasdair Urquhart with the assistance of Albert C. Lewis), focus on Russell’s contributions to mathematical logic.

Source: Jan Dejnozka

- A review of Anthony Gottlieb’s *The Dream of Reason: A History of Western Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance* (Norton, 2000) appeared in the November 1, 2001 issue of the *New York Review of Books*. (A previous review of this book was mentioned in the “Odds and Ends” section of the February 2002 *BRSQ*.) The reviewer, M.F. Burnyeat, compares Gottlieb’s work (the first installment of a projected two-volume work) with Russell’s *History of Western Philosophy*. In particular, Burnyeat notes how Gottlieb’s treatment of Pythagoras updates (and fails to update) that of Russell. Most memorable line in the review? “The second volume should also include an apology for this sentence in the first: ‘Any subject that is responsible for producing Heidegger...owes the world an apology.’” The *BRSQ* would welcome a review of this book that compares Gottlieb and Russell in a more comprehensive manner.

Source: Warren Allen Smith

- The November 21, 2001 issue of the *Guardian* published an extract from *Wittgenstein’s Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers*, by John Eidinow and David Edmonds. This book (published originally in the UK by Faber and Faber but now available in the US via Ecco Press) discusses the debate over an incident in which Ludwig Wittgenstein allegedly threatened Karl Popper with a poker. The *Guardian* had previously excerpted the book in its March 31 issue (see *BRSQ* no. 112, November 2001, pp. 32-33), but the paper apparently thought the Rashomon-like dispute and the book that covered it deserved further publicity. The *BRSQ* would still welcome a review of this book. The extract is at <http://books.guardian.co.uk/firstbook2001/story/0,10486,603100,00.html>.

Source: Russell-I

- Adam Gopnik has also written an article discussing Eidinow and Edmonds’ book. It appears in the April 1, 2002 issue of the *New Yorker*. The article, entitled “The Porcupine: A Pilgrimage to Popper,” is at http://www.newyorker.com/critics/atlarge/?020401crat_atlarge. In the article, Gopnik describes how the book prompted him to remember his pilgrimage as a young man to visit the acerbic and curmudgeonly old Popper, and what he learned from the experience.

Source: Warren Allen Smith

- A rather odd article entitled “My Holy War: What Do a Vicar’s Son and a Suicide Bomber Have in Common?” appeared in the February 4, 2002 issue of the *New Yorker*. This article was written by Jonathan Raban, a veteran of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. “C.N.D.,” Raban notes, “was then led by John Collins, the ‘Red Canon,’ a renegade Anglican priest of whom my father richly disapproved, and the ancient, spry, pixieish Bertrand Russell, atheism’s own philosopher king.” The author then rather obnoxiously compares his devotion to the Campaign to the fanatical zeal of the fundamentalists who destroyed the World Trade Center.

Source: Sheila Turcon

- The March 14, 2002 issue of the *New York Review of Books* contains a review of Steven Pinker’s *Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language* (HarperPerennial, 2000). The review, entitled “‘Sneaked’ or

‘Snuck?’” is by John R. Searle. In the review, Searle describes Russell as “indeed the greatest twentieth-century empiricist of them all.” The review of Pinker’s book was the second of two reviews by Searle on recent work in linguistics. The first, entitled “End of the Revolution,” appeared in the February 28, 2002 issue and discussed *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind* (Cambridge University Press, 2000)—by BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky.

Source: Phil Ebersole

- The web-based magazine *Identity Theory* (online at <http://www.identitytheory.com>) currently includes two interviews with Christopher Hitchens concerning his latest two books *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (Verso, 2001) and *Letters to a Young Contrarian* (Basic Books, 2001). The interview discussing the second book, conducted by Robert Birnbaum, contains the following exchange:

RB: Is there such a thing as an old contrarian?

CH: Yes...

RB: Would that be you?

CH: It’s a curmudgeon, it [sic] you are not careful. There are people, one of whom I knew—of the two I’ll mention—Bertrand Russell and Jessica Mitford, both people, [who] it seems to me, succeeded in getting more radical as they got older. Without becoming idiotic figures, without becoming cartoon figures or making old fools of themselves.

RB: In the case of Russell, that’s arguable.

CH: Well, there were foolish things he did in his later years, but they were analogous to the foolish things he had done when he was young.

RB: Ah, consistency in foolishness.

CH: I wouldn’t say he didn’t have a foolish streak and couldn’t sometimes be taken in by charlatans or encouraged to make slightly rash statements. That wasn’t a problem with his age. I remember thinking it was very unfair, not to say graceless, for some people to say, “That just proves the old boy’s mind is softening.” There seems to me no doubt that he was extremely lucid until the final days of his 92nd year.

Presumably, Hitchens misremembered Russell’s age at death (97, not 92)—unless he’s claiming that Russell lost it suddenly in 1965.

Source: Phil Ebersole

- K. Anthony Appiah, a professor of philosophy and African-American studies at Harvard, has been in the news as of late because of his decision to move to Princeton (a move prompted, many believe, because of the well-publicized spat between Harvard President Lawrence Summers and Cornel West, one of the most renowned members of Harvard’s African-American studies program). The *Chronicle of Higher Education* ran an article on Appiah in its April 5, 2002 issue. The article, authored by Danny Postel, describes Appiah’s work in two areas of philosophy that few study simultaneously. For while his current work focuses primarily on questions of race, culture, and identity, his training was in “highly technical areas of probability theory, conditionals, and semantics.” His first two books deal with the latter topics, and “are the fruits of his apprenticeship at Cambridge, the birthplace of the analytic school and home to such giants as Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein.”

When Postel interviewed Appiah, he confessed that he had read neither of Appiah’s works in analytical philosophy. “Ha! That makes you and just about everyone else in the world” was Appiah’s response. Russell and Appiah thus share more than a Cambridge background and a concern for contemporary social issues; the most demanding works authored by each of them gather more dust than readers.

One more Russellian connection to Appiah—Appiah writes mystery novels (a genre much beloved by Russell) as well as philosophy. And one of his mysteries apparently features a Wittgenstein scholar at Cambridge as a character!

Source: Peter Stone

- The online archives of *Oregon Magazine* contain an interview with Ray Bradbury conducted by Larry Leonard. In this interview, Leonard writes, “As an aside, Bradbury spent an evening with Aldous Huxley in England, and considered him, along with Bertrand Russell (who he also knew) to be one of the smartest men he ever met.” The interview is at <http://oregonmag.com/Bradbury1001.htm>. And of course, in *Fahrenheit 451*, Bradbury alludes to Russell’s “complete essays” as among the many classic works preserved from destruction at the hands of the book burners of the future.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- The potboiler *Plato and the Internet* (Icon Books & Totem Books, 2002) credits Russell with being one of the great epistemologists of all time, on a list that includes Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Quine. The author of the book, Kieron O'Hara, is described as "a senior research fellow in the Intelligence, Agents and Multimedia Group at the University of Southampton. He co-wrote the script of the computer game *Tomb Raider 4*, and is the author of the only scholarly paper about *Carry on Cabby*."

Source: Peter Stone

- An Italian sociologist named Domenico De Masi has written a book entitled *Economia dell'Ozio: Bertrand Russell and Paul Lafargue* ("The Economics of Idleness: Bertrand Russell and Paul Lafargue"). The book compares Russell's writings on leisure, especially *In Praise of Idleness*, with the work of Paul Lafargue, Karl Marx's son-in-law, who wrote a famous pamphlet entitled *The Right to Be Lazy*. The *BRSQ* would welcome a review (in English) of this book.

Source: Giovanni de Carvalho

- Professor Randall R. Dipert, C.S. Peirce Professor of American Philosophy at the University of Buffalo, has some nice things to say about Bertie at his website. Dipert writes,

I think that every philosopher worth his or her salt—every middle-aged professional in philosophy at any rate—should possess developed views about every major issue in philosophy. Philosophy is not a subject that allows for easy specialization: every deep and major issue is intertwined with many others. Consequently, to do logic or philosophy of language alone, or even metaphysics, is truly impossible—and deluded. Philosophy as a profession has allowed itself to fall into habits of artificial specialization and jargon that do a disservice to the models of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—even to Kant.

Whatever his faults as man and philosopher may have been, Bertrand Russell stands as a model of how to do and write philosophy in English.

Dipert's remarks are at <http://www.ncologic.net/rd/aboutme.htm>.

Source: David White

- Kenneth Rendall, proprietor of a museum devoted to World War II Memorabilia, has posted the image of a letter from Russell on the museum's website. In it, Russell responds to an inquiry regarding his views on anti-Semitism and Hitler. The two-page letter begins at http://www.museumofworldwar2.com/images/TourPictures/17_BRussell_lge_scan.jpg. The website also contains images of letters concerning World War II—all apparently owned by Rendall's museum—by Walt Disney, JFK, and Albert Einstein, among others. Russell's letter also appears in Nick Griffin's *Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970* (Routledge, 2001), and the publication rights apparently belong to the Russell Archives at McMaster.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- MusicWeb, a British classical music site, features a survey on the symphonies of Gustav Mahler by Tony Duggan. In this survey, Duggan mentions a recording of Mahler's Symphony No. 9 in D by the Vienna Philharmonic, conducted by Sir John Barbirolli. Duggan claims that Sir John possessed a "clarity of focus" in conducting that amounted to "a living example of a quotation of Bertrand Russell that Michael Kennedy found in Sir John's papers after his death: 'Nothing great is achieved without passion, but underneath the passion there should always be that large impersonal survey which sets limits to actions that our passions inspire.'" The survey is online at <http://www.musicweb.force9.co.uk/music/Mahler/mahler9.htm>.

Source: David White

Solution to May 2002 Russell-Crypt

From him, I thought, had emanated a kind of poisonous miasma, infecting with crime or madness or disaster all in his neighbourhood.

Bertrand Russell, *Satan in the Suburbs*, pt. VII.

News from the Humanist World

- Rationalist International announced in its latest bulletin (April 28, 2002) that a rape victim in Pakistan has been sentenced to death by stoning. Zafran Bi Bi was arrested two years ago along with Akmal Khan, the brother of her husband. Both were accused of adultery, punishable by stoning under Pakistan's Islamic Law. In police custody and in court, Zafran Bi Bi declared that she had been raped by Akmal. But she was convicted while Akmal Khan was released.

Rationalist International is asking everyone to e-mail Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, requesting his intervention to stop the execution. General Musharraf can be reached by e-mail at CE@pak.gov.pk. Copies of any messages sent to him should be sent to Rationalist International at Campaign@rationalistinternational.net.

- The International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), of which the BRS is an associate member, will be holding its 15th World Congress on July 3-6, 2002. This conference will mark the 50th anniversary of the IHEU. The meeting will be held in the Netherlands, at the Golden Tulip Conference Hotel, Leeuwenhorst, Noordwijkerhout. The theme of the conference will be "Human Diversity, Human Rights and Humanism: All Different, All Equal." A humanist youth conference, with the theme "Empowering Youth in the Humanist Movement," will precede and partially overlap with the main conference, taking place on July 1-5. (For more information on the youth conference, go to <http://www.iheyo.org>.)

Registration as a full participant costs 250 Euros, which includes lunch and dinner but excludes the cost of the hotel. Rooms at the conference hotel range in cost from 84-120 Euros per night; there is also limited accommodation available at a local bed and breakfast for 30 Euros per night, and there will be camping facilities as well. For more information, please visit the IHEU's website at <http://www.iheu.org> or contact IHEU Congress Secretariat 2002, Postbus 75490, 1070 AL, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Phone: 0031 20 5219000, Fax: 0031 20 5219080, E-mail: hv@euronet.nl.

- The IHEU is also continuing a campaign to save the life of Dr. Younis Shaikh, a Pakistani academic sentenced to death in August 2001 for blasphemy. A report on the case can be found at the IHEU's website at <http://iheu.org/Shaiikh/>. The IHEU is asking opponents of religious

fanaticism to write Pakistani President Musharraf requesting Dr. Shaikh's release. President Musharraf can be reached via e-mail at ce@pak.gov.pk or via any Embassy of Pakistan. Please send copies of any letters sent to the IHEU at campaign@iheu.org.

- The Center for Inquiry Institute is pleased to announce a full 2-week summer session of educational programs available for undergraduate credit through the State University of New York (Empire State College). The summer session will be held at the Center, in Amherst, New York, on July 14-28, 2002. The summer session will feature courses on critical inquiry and the history and philosophy of naturalism, as well as seminars, guest lectures, and other special events. Some scholarships are available. The registration deadline is June 15; scholarship application deadline is May 15. For further information, contact adacey@centerforinquiry.net or the Center for Inquiry Institute, PO Box 741, Amherst, New York 14226, Tel: 716-636-4869 x223, Fax: 716-636-1733. Or check online at <http://www.centerforinquiry.net>.
- The Fourth World Skeptics Conference, sponsored by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), is to be held on June 20-23, 2002 in Burbank, CA. The conference will take place at the Hilton, Burbank Airport as well as Burbank's Convention Center. The conference theme is "Prospects for Skepticism: The Next Twenty-Five Years." Sessions are being planned on alternative medicine, unsubstantiated psychotherapies, confidence and financial scams, intelligent design and attacks on evolution, education and young skeptics, urban legends, a meeting of local skeptical organizations, and other topics. For registration, brochures or other information, call 1-800-634-1610.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky will be at McMaster University on November 11-14. He will visit under the aegis of the Centre for Peace Studies, the Labour Studies Programme—and, of course, the Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Chomsky's schedule is in the works, but it should include both large public lectures and smaller seminars. For more information, contact Nick Griffin at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University, 1280 Main St West, Hamilton, ON, L8S 4M2, Canada, ngriffin@mcmaster.ca.

- Noam Chomsky will also speak at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), to be held in Boston over Labor Day weekend. Chomsky has been invited to the meeting by the Caucus for a New Political Science—an organized section of the APSA that promotes radical approaches to the study of politics—in conjunction with two other sections, Human Rights and Transformational & Ecological Politics. Chomsky's talk will take place at 8 PM on Saturday, August 31. For further information, contact John Martin, APSA Program Coordinator for the Caucus, at the Division of Social Sciences, Dowling College, Oakdale, NY 11769, martinj@dowling.edu.

The Hunt for Red Hackle

Last issue, the *BRSQ* featured an appeal to the membership, calling on all Russellians everywhere to hunt far and wide for bottles of Red Hackle, Bertie's favorite brand of scotch. (See "The Hunt for Red Hackle," *BRSQ* #113, February 2002). The response thus far has been underwhelming. Apparently, it's not a fluke that we can't get our hands on the stuff.

Dave Henehan of the GRRS reported a Red Hackle sighting in an auction catalog. Robert McTear & Co., a Glasgow-based company specializing in art, antiques, and rare whisky, listed the following item in its April 17 auction catalogue:

Lot #718: Red Hackle Liqueur-Early 20th Century. An exquisite blend of fine Scotch Whiskies. Blended and bottled by Hepburn & Ross, Glasgow. Pear shaped bottle, 1st prize medal award. London, England 1928 printed on shoulder label. 4/5 quart. Stopper cork, embossed lead capsule. Level: 5cm from base of capsule. 86 degrees proof. 1 bottle: £150-200.

The BRS is still willing to reimburse members who can obtain bottles of Red Hackle for the Society—at a price *less* than £150-200. (The Society will pay up to \$40 a bottle, 4 bottles maximum, for the premium blend of the scotch.) Any member who secures Red Hackle for the BRS will also receive a FREE BRS t-shirt. (See "BRS T-Shirts Continue to Attract Attention" in this issue.)

For those who'd like to check for future whisky auctions, McTear's website is at www.mctears.co.uk.

BRS Business and Chapter News:

The Bylaws of the BRS and its Board of Directors have not been reprinted in the BRSQ in quite a while. In the interim, several changes have been made. To make sure that all members are familiar with the rules governing the BRS, we reprint both sets of Bylaws below. The Bylaws can also be found online at http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/BRS_Bylaws.html.

BYLAWS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.

Revised June 1984; revised June 1985; revised May 2001

Article 1. Name

The name of this organization shall be The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. It may also be referred to as "the Society" or "the BRS."

Article 2. Aims

The aims of this Society are: (1) to promote interest in the life and work of Bertrand Russell; (2) to bring together persons interested in any aspect of the foregoing; (3) to promote causes that Russell championed.

Article 3. Motto

The Society's motto shall be Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

Article 4. Power and Authority

Ultimate authority resides in the Members. The Members elect the Directors. The Directors elect the Officers. The Officers make decisions and take action.

Article 5. Membership

Section 1. General. Membership in the Society shall be open to all persons and organizations interested in Bertrand Russell and the Society's activities. Types of membership shall be: Individual, Couple, Student, Limited Income, Life, Organization, and Honorary. Dues shall be set by the Board of Directors, and are to be paid annually. Life members shall pay dues only once in an amount set by the Board. Honorary members pay no

dues. Life and Honorary memberships are for life unless terminated for cause, as specified hereafter.

Section 2. Individual Membership. Individual Membership shall be available to all persons.

Section 3. Couple Membership. Couple Membership shall be available to two persons sharing the same mail address. Each person shall have one vote; two mail ballots shall be sent, but only one copy of other Society mailings.

Section 4. Student Membership. Student Membership shall be open to any student enrolled in an educational institution and who is less than 25 years old.

Section 5. Limited Income Membership. Limited Income Membership shall be available to a person who, as the name implies, is living on a limited income.

Section 6. Life Membership. Life Membership can be conferred on any person who meets the minimum dues set by the Board of Directors for Life Membership.

Section 7. Honorary Membership. Honorary Membership may be conferred on a person who has been nominated by a member and approved by two-thirds of the Directors voting, after having met one or more of the following conditions: (1) is a member of Bertrand Russell's family; (2) had worked closely with Russell in an important way; (3) has made a distinctive contribution to Russell scholarship; (4) has acted in support of a cause or idea that Russell championed; (5) has promoted awareness of Russell or of Russell's work; (6) has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of Russell. Honorary Members have the same rights and responsibilities as Individual Members, but they pay no dues.

Section 8. Organization Membership. Membership of organizations—such as libraries, associations, corporations—is available upon payment of dues and approval of the President. Dues shall be higher than for a Couple. Organizations may not vote or be on the Board. Only one copy of Society mailings shall be sent.

Section 9. Conditions of Membership. Application for membership shall be made in writing, submitting name, address, and correct amount of dues.

The Board may refuse an application, in which case the President must notify the applicant within 30 days, stating why the application was turned down.

Membership terminates when a member fails to pay dues, resigns, dies, or is expelled.

Any member—including Life or Honorary—may be expelled for seriously obstructing the Society's business, misappropriating the Society's name or funds or acting in a way that discredits the Society. The expulsion procedure consists of five steps:

Step 1. A formal expulsion proposal shall be presented in writing to the Board by any member.

Step 2. The Board shall examine the evidence. If a majority of the Board Members voting decides, either by mail ballot or at a meeting, that expulsion may be appropriate, the matter will be submitted to, and decided by, the members. This shall be done by mail, or at an Annual Meeting if one is scheduled within two months.

If it is to be done by mail:

Step 3. The case against the member shall be presented in the next newsletter or by a special mailing.

Step 4. In the following newsletter, or in a second special mailing, the accused member shall present a defense against the charge. A ballot shall be included in the second newsletter or second special mailing, so that members can vote on whether to expel.

If the expulsion process takes place at an Annual Meeting:

Step 4. The equivalent of Steps 3 and 4 shall be followed, that is, the case against the member shall be presented, after which the accused shall present his defense; and then the members present shall vote on whether to expel.

The President shall notify the accused member as soon as the result of the vote is known.

Article 6. The Board of Directors

Section 1. Responsibilities. The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") shall be responsible for Society affairs and policy, and shall elect the Officers. The Board shall be subject to these Bylaws and to the Bylaws of The Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.

Section 2. Constitution. The Board shall consist of not less than six nor more than 24 elected members. Society Officers are ex-officio members of the Board. Elected and ex-officio Board members shall have the same rights and responsibilities.

Members may nominate candidates for the Board, or volunteer to be nominated as candidates. Directors are elected to three-year terms that start on January 1 of the following year; one-third are elected every year. Directors may be reelected. If a Director dies, resigns, or is expelled, the Board may fill the unexpired term with any member.

Article 7. Officers

Section 1. General. The Society shall have an Executive Committee composed of the following five Officers of the Society and Board: President, Vice-President, Secretary of the Society and Board, Treasurer, and Chairman of the Board. There may be other Vice Presidents whose duties shall be specified by the Board; these will not be members of the Executive Committee. Officers shall be at least 18 years old and shall have been members for at least one year. They shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. An Officer's term of office lasts until the next election of Officers, the following year. No one shall hold more than one Office at a time, except that the same person shall be Secretary of the Society and Secretary of the Board. An Officer may be removed or suspended by a majority of the Board members voting. An Officer may resign by notifying the Chairman of Board in writing. If an Office becomes vacant, the Board shall elect a successor to fill the unexpired term. If an Officer is temporarily unable to serve, the Board may elect a temporary replacement.

Section 2. The President. The President shall be the Chief Executive Officer, coordinating the work of other Officers and Committees. Other Officers and Committee Chairmen shall consult the President about their activities, and submit a written report on their activities to him one month before the Annual Meeting, with a copy to the Chairman. The President shall promptly inform the Chairman of any major decisions. After the

Board has selected the site and time of the next Annual Meeting, or of a Special Meeting, the President shall be responsible for making all Meeting arrangements, including compiling the Meeting's agenda. The President shall chair the Meeting. The President shall report regularly, through the BRS newsletter.

Section 3. The Vice-President. The Vice-President becomes President if the President's Office becomes vacant; and assumes the office temporarily if the vacancy is temporary. The Vice-President shall assist the President as requested.

Section 4. The Secretary. The Secretary shall: (1) record the minutes of Society and Board meetings; (2) handle Society and Board correspondence; (3) maintain a permanent file of Society and Board Bylaws and other corporate documents, including minutes of Society and Board meetings, Officers' and Committee Chairmen's reports, newsletters, correspondence; (4) maintain a permanent record of Society and Board decisions, rules, motions made and carried; (5) have custody of the Society's corporate seal.

Section 5. The Treasurer. The Treasurer shall: (1) keep records of money received and spent; (2) safeguard Society funds; (3) invest funds, with Board approval; (4) submit an annual budget to the Board; (5) submit quarterly and annual reports, for publication in the BRS newsletter.

Section 6. Other Vice-Presidents. The Office of "Vice-President/ ..." may be created and filled by the Board. There is no connection between this Office and that of the Vice-President.

Article 8. Committees

Section 1. General. There shall be standing (permanent) and ad hoc (temporary) Committees. Each shall have a Chairman, and may have a Co-Chairman and other members. A member may serve on, or chair, more than one Committee. Committee Chairmen shall consult with the President about their activities, and describe them in a written report to the President one month before the Annual Meeting, with a copy to the Chairman.

Section 2. Committees. The Board shall establish standing and ad hoc Committees, and appoint their Chairmen who, in turn, appoint Committee Members. Each Committee shall provide the Secretary with a written statement of Committee aims and procedures.

Article 9. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Meetings. The Society shall hold an Annual Meeting, at a time and site determined by the Board and in time to give the members at least two months' notice of the Meeting. As to time: it should suit the convenience of as many members as possible. As to site: it should be either (a) near locations of special interest to the BRS, or (b) near population centers having many members. Any member may propose agenda items, in writing, to the President, in advance of the Meeting. At Meetings, items may be added to the agenda with approval of the majority of the members present. Six members constitute a quorum.

Section 2. Special Meetings. Any member may write to the Chairman requesting a Special Meeting, claiming that an emergency exists requiring immediate action. The Chairman shall decide whether the request merits consideration by the Board; if it does, the Chairman shall promptly inform the Board, which shall decide, within three weeks, by mail ballot, whether, when and where to hold a Special Meeting. The Special Meeting shall be held no later than six weeks after the Chairman's initial receipt of the request. The Chairman shall announce the Special Meeting to all members by letter, as soon as possible. A quorum shall consist of the members present.

Section 3. Board of Directors' Meetings. The Board shall hold its Annual Meeting during the Society's Annual Meeting and at the same site. The Board may also hold Special Meetings, in accordance with its own Bylaws. Board Meetings shall be open to Society members.


Article 10. Publications

Section 1. Newsletter. The Society shall publish a newsletter at regular intervals.

Section 2. Other Publications. The Society may authorize other publications.

Article 11. Voting

Section 1. General. All members, other than Organization Members, shall be entitled to vote. All votes shall have equal value. Members may vote by proxy. In contests of more than two candidates or choices, a plurality shall be sufficient.



Chairman's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Chairman may be reelected. The Chairman presides at Board Meetings, and rules on procedure.

If the Chairman is absent, the Directors may elect an Acting Chairman. If the office of Chairman is vacant, the Directors shall elect a new Chairman as soon as possible, at an Annual or Special Meeting or by mail ballot. The votes shall be tallied by the Acting Chairman and verified by the Secretary. The Chairman may be removed from office by a majority of Directors present and voting at a meeting, with the Secretary presiding.

Section 2. The Secretary. The Secretary shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Secretary's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Secretary may be reelected. The Secretary of the Board and the Secretary of the Society shall be the same person. If the Secretary is absent from a Meeting, the Chairman shall appoint an Acting Secretary.

Article 4. Voting

Voting shall be in accord with Article 11 of the Society's Bylaws, except as follows: the Chairman's vote counts as one except in a tie, when it counts as two.

Article 5. Committees

Committees may be created by the Board in accordance with the bylaws of the Society. These committees may perform Board functions by making or implementing the Society's policies, and will follow Board instructions. Functions delegated to a committee may be withdrawn by the Board at any time.

Article 6. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Board Meeting. The Board shall meet annually, at some time during a Society Annual Meeting, and at the same site. Society Members may attend Board Meetings.

Section 2. Special Board Meetings. A Special Board Meeting shall be called by the Chairman when at least three Directors request it, stating the purpose. In choosing the time and site, the Chairman shall aim to achieve

the largest possible attendance by Directors.

Section 3. Agenda. The Agenda for Board Meetings shall be prepared by the Chairman. Additions to the Agenda may be made by any Director, with the concurrence of the Chairman.

Section 4. Quorum. The quorum for any Board Meeting is six Directors.

Article 7. Amendments to Board Bylaws

Any Director may propose an amendment.

At an Annual or Special Meeting, a majority vote of the Directors present and voting shall carry the proposed amendment.

When an amendment is proposed by the Chairman, in writing, between Meetings, the Chairman shall decide whether to hold the proposal for the next Meeting or put it to an earlier vote by mail. For voting by mail, the Chairman shall promptly notify the Directors by a special mailing of the proposed amendment, with supporting arguments, requesting opposing arguments by 21 days after the date of mailing. Thereafter, the Chairman shall mail the opposing arguments, and a ballot, to the Directors, with a voting deadline of 21 days after the date of mailing. The votes shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary, who shall notify the Directors of the outcome.

Russell-crypt Gerry Wildenberg

This is another in a series of simple substitution ciphers based on the writings of Bertrand Russell.

Below is today's coded quote, in which each letter stands for another letter. For example, BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFRRYY, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quote below uses a different code. After you've solved it, see if you can identify the source.

DZ NKWQQRN VZB CZDGXSN DYDXN DZJQSOVYDQZ QJ VRR
NQSYN DN RVBRXB QCY, HCY ZQ QZX DN YVCIWY YQ
SXVNQZ, QS YQ KQZNBXS MWVY DN XGDBXZKX JQS MWVY.

The solution will appear in the August *BRSQ*.

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc
Annual Report
Cash Flow, 1/1/02 Through 3/31/02

Compiled 4/8/02 by Dennis J. Darland,
 BRS Treasurer (djdarland@qconline.com)

| | | |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Category Description | | |
| BALANCE 12/21/01 | | 7,307.19 |
| INFLOWS | | |
| Uncategorized | | 0.42 |
| Contributions | | 0.67 |
| Contributions-BRS | | 233.22 |
| TOTAL Contributions | | 233.89 |
| Dues | | |
| New Members | | 170.00 |
| Renewals | | 1,498.52 |
| TOTAL Dues | | 1,668.52 |
| Library Income | | 38.70 |
| Meeting Income | | 53.77 |
| Other Income | | 112.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 2,107.30 | |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| Bank Charges | | 7.66 |
| Library Expenses | | 16.05 |
| Newsletter | | 858.92 |
| Other Exp | | 12.50 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | | 895.13 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | | 1,212.17 |
| BALANCE 3/31/02 | | 8,519.36 |

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Five Years of Monthly Russell
 Meetings Open to the Public

2002 Program

- | | |
|-------|---|
| June | “Russell and Critical Thinking” |
| July | “Russell the Anti-Communist” |
| | <i>Guest Speaker: Andrew G. Bone</i> |
| Aug. | “Russell on Pythagoras” |
| Sept. | “The City College Case” |
| | <i>Guest Speaker: Thom Weidlich</i> |
| Oct. | <i>Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell</i> |
| Nov. | Studs Terkel’s Interview with Russell |
| Dec. | <i>The ABC of Armageddon</i> |

Dates TBA

New Meeting Location!!!

Daily Perks Coffee House
 389 Gregory ST, Rochester, NY

For information contact Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or
TimothyMad@aol.com. Or visit
<http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~dwhite/grrs>.


American Philosophical Association
Eastern Division—2002 Annual Meeting
Philadelphia, PA. December 27-30, 2002.

The BRS will offer a panel at this event. For more information on the BRS
 at the APA, contact David White at white@sjfc.edu.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY


August 2002

No. 115




**Studs Terkel, Winner of the
2002 BRS Award**

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY
c/o David White
Philosophy Department
St. John Fisher College
3690 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14618 USA



MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1406 26TH ST.
ROCK ISLAND IL 61201-2837

61201-2837 08



THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Webmaster: John Lenz, jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone

Associate Editors: Tim Madigan, Rachel M. Murray, David White

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:

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Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Chairman of the Board | David White |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Ray Perkins |
| Secretary | Chad Trainer |
| Treasurer | Dennis J. Darland |
| Vice President/Outreach | Peter Friedman |

QUOTE OF THE QUARTERLY

"We study Communist thought the same way Americans study the Bible."

Xu Lu, a student at Peking University,
as quoted in the *Chronicle of Higher
Education*, May 10, 2002, p. A56.

Russell would no doubt agree.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August 2002

No. 115

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From the Editor:

130 Years of Bertrand Russell

On May 18, 2002—Bertrand Russell's 130th birthday—BRSQ Editor Peter Stone gave a public lecture at the Center for Inquiry (Amherst, NY) entitled "A Celebration of Bertrand Russell." The remarks below were excerpted from this lecture.

Before discussing why we are gathered here today, I would like to acknowledge some of the reasons why we are *not* gathered here. We are not here to celebrate the birthday of Bishop Joseph Butler, the eighteenth-century philosopher and theologian, although his birthday is today. Despite the importance of Butler for the development of ethical theory, he's not the sort who would normally draw a crowd at the Center for Inquiry. We are also not here to celebrate the birthday of the esteemed logical positivist Rudolph Carnap, also born on May 18. He's a somewhat better candidate for a talk here, but the dormitive powers of his work would probably prove too much. We are not even gathered here to celebrate the birthday of the most famous Pole alive today, Pope John Paul II, though he shares his birthday with Butler and Carnap. (Incidentally, when a friend told me this morning that it was the pope's birthday, I was a bit skeptical, as I'd never heard it before. But before coming to the Center for Inquiry today, I visited some of Buffalo's fine used bookstores, one of which had a biography of Karol Wojtyla on its shelves. So I was able to confirm that the Catholic Church is indeed impossible to escape, even on May 18.)

Instead, we are gathered here to celebrate the life of the most important person born on May 18, Bertrand Russell. Russell would be 130 years old today, and we're here to celebrate it. Now to many people in this country, this may seem like an odd thing to do—precisely because he'd be 130 years old now. This means that even though Russell was famously long-lived—he lived to be 97—he's been dead for over 30 years. He died in fact about a year and a half before I was born. And so there are many people today who just don't know Russell.

Let me share with you two quick anecdotes that should remind us all how many people don't know Russell. Two years ago, I traveled with the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) to McMaster University, to attend the opening ceremonies of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre. The keynote speaker was Ray Monk, author of the two-volume biography of Russell, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude 1872-1921* (Free Press,

1996) and *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness 1921-1970* (Free Press, 2001). The second volume of Monk's biography was available in Great Britain at that time but not in North America. However, at Monk's talk it was announced that Monk would be at McMaster's bookstore the next day to sign copies of the second volume. Fifty copies of the hefty tome had been brought to McMaster for the occasion. As my traveling companions can well recall, I was quite insistent that we arrive at the book signing early. After all, I reasoned, fifty copies of a biography like *this* will go like hotcakes, right? Needless to say, I overestimated both the size of the reading public and the extent of its interest in Russell. (I did get a signed copy of the book, however.)

A similar experience greeted me at a guest lecture I gave several months ago in a friend's philosophy class. My topic was, of course, Bertie. Chastened by my experience at McMaster, I decided not to assume that the students would be familiar with Russell. So I decided to introduce Russell via some of the interesting names in his life, names that the students would *have* to recognize. How many students, I began by asking, have ever heard of Bertrand Russell?

The response did not surprise me. Not a single hand was raised. So I tried the indirect tactic. Well, how many of you have ever heard of John Stuart Mill (Russell's godfather)? Still no dice. How about Jean-Paul Sartre (co-convenor with Russell of the International War Crimes Tribunal)? Nada. (To be fair, one student did tell me after class that she now remembered something about the famous existentialist from another class.)

OK, so philosophy is not the forte of this class. Time to switch to literature, I reasoned. How many of you have ever heard of T.S. Eliot (who studied with Russell at Harvard, then lived with him while getting his literary career of the ground)? Nothing yet. How about Virginia Woolf (who hung out with Russell during his Bloomsbury days)? One or two hands were raised (by female students, naturally). One more time. How about Joseph Conrad (after whom Russell named both of his sons)? The blank stares I received in response reminded me of nothing so much as Bailey, my girlfriend's sister's dog (a lovable animal, but not as well-schooled in western philosophy as she should be).

I think these stories constitute good evidence that Bertrand Russell is not a household name today. The BRS, to be sure, has its work cut out for it. This society was founded four years after Russell's death, and was honored to have Russell's only daughter, Katherine Russell Tait, as one of its founding members. (Both Tait and Russell's surviving son, Conrad, are

currently Honorary Members of the Society.) The Society is now in its 29th year, and still going strong. Local chapters, like the GRRS, offer further promise of what the Society could accomplish, but also make plain how much work there is to do. And more members mean more resource to help this work along. (This is your cue to do all you can to drum up membership, of course.)

I'd like to close with a personal observation about what I find so fascinating about Russell. I came to him, like many people, through his criticisms of religion. I heard a talk on Russell at the Unitarian Church while in high school, and was fascinated by the man from the start. Unlike many people, however, the first book by Russell I read was not *Why I Am Not a Christian* or *Marriage and Morals*, or even *Sceptical Essays*; it was an old copy of *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare* upon which I stumbled at a used bookstore. Not only did Russell speak to my adolescent misgivings about religion; he also had much to say to my continuing fears about the U.S. military-industrial complex. But the diversity of interests to which Russell can appeal only tells half the story. Studying Russell's life and thought leads one into the realms of philosophy, mathematics, politics, science, education, British history, American history, literature—the list seems endless. And that's the reason I continue to devote so much time to Russell; through him, a person can get quite an education about modern civilization. Russell's own life demonstrates that such an education is possible; and studying his life provides an excellent starting point for the pursuit of such an education today. Humanists and liberal-minded people everywhere thus have good reason to pay attention to the not-so-long-departed Bertrand Russell.

Erratum

The May 2002 issue of the *BRSQ* (#114), while exemplary in many respects, suffered from two small layout mistakes. Pages 4 and 37 got switched around (along with their page numbers, as the error would have been spotted otherwise), and a text box meant to appear on page 20 somehow got shifted to page 21, obliterating some text. The *BRSQ* has not yet identified those responsible for the mistakes; current suspects include Bishop Manning, Lyndon Johnson, and Dr. Albert C. Barnes.

Letter from the Chairman

Members who have papers or presentations to give on Bertrand Russell have at least four dates to keep in mind in addition to the Annual Meeting of the BRS.

- Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association, December 27-30, 2002, Philadelphia, PA, Philadelphia Marriott. Submissions for this program are now past due, but please try attend if you are in the Philadelphia —South Jersey area over Christmas. The BRS usually hosts a table at the evening receptions. You do not have to be a member of the APA to attend the convention.
- Pacific Division, American Philosophical Association, March 26-30, 2003, San Francisco, CA, St. Francis Hotel, Union Square.
- Central Division, April 24-26, 2003, Cleveland, OH, Renaissance Cleveland.

The Eastern Division plans to meet in Washington, DC in 2003 and Boston, MA in 2004, always during the week after Christmas. Papers or detailed abstracts should be submitted by the previous April 1. Papers for the Pacific and the Central programs may be submitted anytime before October 1, 2002. Session chairs and commentators are needed as well as presenters.

- May 18. The Center for Inquiry in Buffalo will again host a "Bertie's Birthday" event, on or about May 18, 2003. There was a great show of international support by members this year, and we look forward to an even better turnout next year. If you cannot make the Buffalo event, why not stage a birthday event in your area?

Finally, if you know of other Russell related events, or if you would like to participate any of the above, by all means write or email:

David E. White
Department of Philosophy
St. John Fisher College
3690 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14618
dwhite@sjfc.edu

BRS Board Elects New Officers

At the 2002 Annual Meeting, the BRS Board of Directors elected David White as its new Chairman. It also reelected as Secretary of the Society and Board Chad Trainer, who was appointed to the position earlier this year after the previous officeholder, Steve Bayne, resigned. The *BRSQ* congratulates David and Chad and also thanks Ken Blackwell, outgoing Chair, and Steve Bayne for their service to the Society.

Call for Nominations BRS Board of Directors

This fall, the Bertrand Russell Society will be holding elections to fill eight of the 24 positions on its Board of Directors. The time has come for nominations for those positions. Members are encouraged to send their nominations to **Chad Trainer**, BRS Secretary, 1006 Davids Run, Phoenixville, PA 19460, Stratoflampsacus@aol.com.

Please note that **the deadline for nominations is October 1**. The ballots will be sent out in the November issue of the *BRSQ*. Any member of the BRS may run for a seat on the Board. The eight members of the Board with expiring terms may be renominated and reelected. Members may nominate themselves; if you do this, please include a short (one-paragraph) statement about yourself and why you should be on the Board. A complete list of current Board Members is included below; please don't nominate any current Board member whose term does not expire this year.

Directors of the BRS

Officers of the BRS, elected annually, serve *ex officio* on the Board of Directors.

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2000 - Dec. 31, 2002: Steve Bayne, Jan Loeb Eisler, Keith Green, Nicholas Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Bernard Linsky, Peter Stone

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2001- Dec. 31, 2003: Kenneth Blackwell, Dennis Darland, John R. Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, Laurie Endicott Thomas, David White

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2002-Dec. 31, 2004: Kevin Brodie, Rosalind Carey, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich

2003 BRS Award Search Begins Proposals Welcome

The BRS Awards Committee will soon begin its search for a person or organization to receive the 2003 BRS Award. This award is given annually to one or more people or organizations for outstanding achievement in one or more areas of concern to Bertrand Russell. The award may reflect achievements in either the academic or social and political realm, and achievements made in the recent past or over a lifetime. The award may also be given for extraordinary acts that, by the character they display, are particularly reminiscent of Russell at his best.

Members of the BRS are invited to propose individuals or organizations to the BRS Awards Committee to be considered for the 2003 BRS Award. Proposals should be sent to BRS Awards Committee Chair **Kevin Brodie**, 54 Cedar Swamp Road, Storrs, CT 06268, kevin.brodie@lebanonct.org.

The Committee will begin deliberating in the early fall, so please get your proposals to the Committee as soon as possible.

For those interested, the following is a list of previous BRS Award recipients:

| | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| 1980 Paul Arthur Schilpp | 1992 Karl Popper |
| 1981 Steve Allen | 1993 Harry Ruja |
| 1982 Henry Kendall | 1994 (none) |
| 1983 Joseph Rotblat | 1995 Zero Population Growth |
| 1984 Dora Black Russell | 1996 W.V.O. Quine |
| 1985 Robert Jay Lifton and Lester Denonn | 1997 (none) |
| 1986 People for the American Way | 1998 Irving Copi |
| 1987 John Somerville | 1999 Henry Morgentaler |
| 1988 Paul Kurtz | 2000 Stephen Jay Gould |
| 1989 Paul Edwards | 2001 Stephen Toulmin |
| 1990 (none) | 2002 Studs Terkel |
| 1991 Planned Parenthood Federation of America | |

***BRSQ* Expands!**

To accommodate a tremendous flow of Russell-related materials, the *BRSQ* is expanding to 48 pages on a trial basis. We are pleased to see so much interest in Bertie and the *BRSQ*. Keep those articles, pictures, reviews, and Russell-related stories coming!

The BRS T-Shirt Saga Continues

Our latest t-shirt story arrives courtesy of BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, who not coincidentally is also in charge of t-shirt production. Plymouth State College, at which Ray teaches, recently invited veteran peace activist Jonathan Schell to campus as part of an endowed lecture series on war and peace. At the last moment Schell informed Ray that he was experiencing driver's license problems and would not be able to rent a car at the airport (in Manchester, NH) for the 60-mile drive to the college. As chair of the lecture series, Ray thus had to pick Schell up. As neither man had ever met the other, Ray decided that he needed some distinguishing feature for which Schell could keep an eye out. He decided to use, of course, a yellow Bertrand Russell t-shirt. (Schell has great respect for Russell the peace activist, and so the choice was particularly appropriate in this case.) It worked like a charm. Ray unfortunately did not have a BRS t-shirt handy to give Schell, although he did provide Schell with a copy of his new book *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor* (Open Court, 2001).

Don't you be caught without something distinctive to wear! BRS t-shirts always make you stand out in a crowd (except at BRS Annual Meetings). So why not order yours today? The shirts are available for \$10 each plus \$3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Please make checks out to the BRS, and send them to BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, 854 Battle Street, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color. Shirts are available in black, yellow, or white. Any questions about the shirts can be directed to Ray at perkrk@earthlink.net.

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserv, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserv is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. To join the list, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively send the message


subscribe

to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserv's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

The 2002 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society

Pictures from the Annual Meeting



Quotable Quotes from the Annual Meeting

"He's got universals going all over the place."

-Gregory Landini

"It mentions Socratizing."

-Edgar Boedegger


"Wittgenstein never elaborates."

-Alan Schwerin

...and the Editor's personal favorite...

"There is no definitive 'Froggy Went a Courtin'.'"

-Tim Madigan



Minutes of the 2002 BRS Annual Meeting Chad Trainer, BRS Secretary

The Bertrand Russell Society met for its 29th annual meeting at Lake Forest College in Lake Forest, Illinois. The meeting was from Friday, May 31 to Sunday June 2. Lake Forest College is located in a community that is very upscale, rather detached and quiet—one might say conducive to philosophic contemplation. In attendance were Kenneth Blackwell, David Blitz, Alan Bock, Pat Bock, Edgar Boedeker, Rosalind Carey, Peter Friedman, David Goldman, Nick Griffin, David L. Henehan, Kevin Klement, Gregory Landini, Dean Larson, Lou Lombardi, Timothy Madigan, Steve Maragides, Edward McClenathan, Nancy Mitchell, John Ongley, Karen Perkins, Ray Perkins, Stephen Reinhardt, Alan Schwerin, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, David White, and Linda White.

On Friday, there was registration and a book table from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. From 6 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. there was a buffet and Ken Blackwell gave a talk about "Notable Passages from Recent Selections of Russell's Letters." This was followed by the BRS board meeting from 8:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (See "Minutes of the 2002 Annual Meeting of the BRS Board of Directors.") and then the Greater Russell Rochester Set's hospitality suite/salon.

The Saturday morning program began with Greg Landini presenting his paper on "Russell's Distinction Between Logical and Semantic Paradoxes," followed by David Blitz's "Russell and Peace in the Middle East," and Chad Trainer's "Earth to Russell: The Limits of Russell's Views on Space Exploration" was the last paper of the morning.

After lunch, the BRS held its 2002 annual Business Meeting from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. Alan Schwerin began the meeting by informing the members of the previous evening's developments at the board meeting.

Then the subject of fostering greater awareness of the BRS was discussed. Edward McClenathan mentioned the services of Elderhostels as something to be considered. Steve Reinhardt mentioned a catalog of services that provide lectures for senior citizens and could be to the Society's avail. David Blitz suggested paper contests, but Alan Schwerin countered that the efforts already made along these lines had not borne results in spite of the lucrative prizes. Steve Maragides insisted on the futility of such efforts. Ray Perkins stressed that people who have students need to do more work soliciting Russell papers. And Peter Friedman, while concurring with Perkins, pointed out the need for discovering ways and means in this area

and effectively getting on various "bandwagons" for exposure.

As a possible way to get greater attention, Alan Schwerin mentioned advertising in the American Philosophical Association publications. David Blitz proposed having a specific topic designated in soliciting papers. Ed Boedeker expressed concern that such designated topics might unduly limit submissions. Peter Stone and Peter Friedman said they saw no problems with specified topics for papers. David Goldman suggested specifying limited time periods for completing papers.

Alan Schwerin brought up for consideration, as a means to better attendance and exposure, the idea of having the BRS annual meeting during the academic year. Tim Madigan pointed out the problem with available dormitory space that would result. Schwerin raised the option of using hotels, instead. Peter Stone mentioned that the Center for Free Inquiry site in Los Angeles (a much discussed possible place for a meeting) didn't offer dormitories anyway and could attract UCLA students. Alan Schwerin said that off-college sites could reduce student attendance. Tim Madigan, however, saw no practical impact resulting, and Ray Perkins agreed. Ray reiterated that paper submissions were the best way to draw students into the BRS. David White said an advertisement for a spot on the APA programs was a good idea. And the Greater Russell Rochester Set spoke of how they could invite students to speak. Peter Stone said publication of papers in the *Quarterly* was an option. There was agreement that the Russell Prize Committee would be the proper group to address the matter. Greg Landini suggested free transportation to the APA conventions as a good incentive.

Peter Stone then encouraged the weekend's presenters to submit their papers to the *BRS Quarterly*. He also explained that he had membership forms and free copies of the *BRSQ* to circulate and improve awareness and scholarship in the field of Russell. Alan spoke of how membership is a precondition for delivering a paper to the BRS, and he requested a greater number of submissions for the meetings, which, he said, would relieve the burden on the professionals.

The topic of getting greater publicity for the BRS was revisited, with Greg Landini focusing on the merits of documentary audio/visual materials, public access channels, and the like. Alan Schwerin mentioned the value of "philosophical corners" in student newspapers that would use quotations from Russell. Chad Trainer suggested that the BRS work more closely with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation by reciprocally promoting each other in their respective publications. Peter Stone indicated his openness to

the idea, and Ray Perkins said he had connections with the Foundation's publication, *The Spokesman*, that could be of avail.

Ray Perkins also mentioned that, considering developments between Pakistan and India, as well as the new nuclear policy of Bush, a statement from the BRS to the U.S. is in order urging the elimination of nuclear weapons. He moved that the Society endorse the following statement: "We urge the US to negotiate, with the nations of the world, a treaty leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. And, in order to reduce the danger of accidental nuclear war, we also urge the US forthwith to: (1) pledge 'no first use' of nuclear weapons, (2) de-alert its ICBMs, (3) ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and (4) preserve the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty."

Peter Friedman replied that other governments should be similarly urged. Greg Landini disagreed with the idea of the U.S. discarding nuclear weapons. Alan Schwerin asked if those present at the meeting were entitled to speak on behalf of the Bertrand Russell Society at large. Perkins said this was permissible since a quorum was present, and he emphasized the importance of acting promptly on the issue rather than delaying the matter indefinitely. Peter Stone then asked what exactly would be done with the resolution. Ray Perkins replied that the resolution would be given to the press. David White expressed opposition to the resolution on grounds that it was disrespectful to the American military, as well as insensitive to opinions Pakistan has publicized. David Blitz proposed perhaps a shorter version of the resolution. Peter Stone, while acknowledging the importance of the actual wording, said that, as a practical matter, world leaders are indifferent to what Russell thought, let alone what the BRS thinks. Much debate ensued, and Alan Schwerin raised the question of what to do on the matter considering that the meeting's allotted time was running out. David Goldman suggested voting on the issue and repudiating the verdict should the membership at large disapprove of the vote.

First, there was a vote on "whether or not to vote on the matter of the BRS issuing Ray Perkins' resolution." There were twelve votes for proceeding with a vote, and four votes against. Ray Perkins then reread his resolution. There were fifteen votes in support of the BRS issuing Ray's resolution and six votes against Ray's proposal. The meeting then concluded at 2 p.m. with Alan Schwerin explaining that the exact recipients of Ray's resolution would have to be addressed at a later time.

The Saturday afternoon presentations began with Ed Boedeker's paper: "Russell's Distinctions between Pure and Applied Logic." This was

followed by a panel discussion on Ray Perkins' *Yours Faithfully*, *Bertrand Russell* with David White, Rosalind Carey, and Peter Stone as presenters and Ray Perkins as a respondent.

After some free time, the Red Hackle hour followed with some Red Hackle courtesy of Don Jackanicz. The Red Hackle hour started off with a bang attended, as it was, by no less than the distinguished author and journalist Studs Terkel, recipient of the Society's Annual Award. Studs Terkel regaled everyone with anecdotes regarding his personal encounters with Russell. Studs Terkel's vim and verve, combined with the generous amount of time he talked, certainly set a positive tone for the evening's festivities. A full interview of Russell by Terkel was played, as well. There was the banquet, and then the evening was topped off again with the Greater Russell Rochester Set's hospitality suite/salon.

The Sunday morning papers began with Kevin Klement's "Russell's anticipation of the Lambda Calculus," followed by Alan Schwerin's "Russell and the Early Wittgenstein on Scepticism," and then Tim Madigan's "Russell's Influence on Music Theory."

**Minutes of the 2002 Annual Meeting of the
Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors
Chad Trainer
Secretary, BRS Board of Directors**

At 8:30 p.m., on Friday, May 31, the BRS Board of Directors held its annual meeting. In attendance were Directors Ken Blackwell, Rosalind Carey, Nicholas Griffin, Peter Friedman, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, Alan Schwerin, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, and David White. Steve Maragides, a longtime BRS member but not a director, was also present. Ken Blackwell opened the meeting with five items: next year's meeting site, the question of whether or not candidates for BRS awards should be restricted to those willing to appear at the annual meeting, a possible new award for editing, encouragement of potential new members by a waiving of their dues, and elections for the coming year.

Before delving into these subjects, the subject of "outreach" was brought up. Peter Friedman explained his visions of promoting the BRS through a news site service that, while charging other organizations for its services, would not charge the BRS. The BRS, it was explained, would also profit from building relationships with related links and working with an advertising agency. Peter Friedman explained, however, that lack of

progress on this front was attributable to insufficient resources. Ken Blackwell then suggested that the BRS' Web page be examined with a view to recommending improvements, and Steve Reinhardt suggested advertising in the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*.

Peter Stone pointed out the propriety of addressing last year's Treasurer Report and Minutes. Alan Schwerin moved to accept last year's Treasurer Report and Ray Perkins seconded the motion. Steve Maragides was asked to send thanks to Dennis Darland for the quality of Dennis' work as Treasurer, and there was discussion of Dennis' high value in this role, especially in adding stability to the Society. Ray Perkins made a motion to accept last year's minutes and Peter Stone seconded it.

The location of next year's meeting was then addressed. Ken Blackwell expressed regret that planning for a meeting at the Center for Inquiry's Los Angeles site had not come to fruition. Peter Stone brought up the Greater Russell Rochester Set's relationship with the Center for Inquiry, and David White said that Paul Kurtz has indicated complete support for the BRS using the Center. Nevertheless, the lack of an active member in California was considered a stumbling block. Peter Stone mentioned that Charles Weyand could be useful for outreach in this matter. Alan Schwerin asked how strong our support was in California. Peter Stone mentioned the increasingly aged status of the people in California, and Ken Blackwell pointed out that nobody from California attended last year's meeting.

Ray Perkins volunteered Plymouth State College of the New Hampshire University as a fall-back site for the annual meeting but said that he would like to see the meeting in California come through. David White suggested California as the location for the meeting in two years so that there would be more preparation time. Alan Schwerin reminded the board of the difficulties last time in getting California to work as the place. Peter Stone pointed out that, in any case, there are advantages to having information on the annual meeting's location as early as the November *Quarterly*.

Alan Schwerin moved to accept Ray Perkins' offer of Plymouth State for next year's meeting and to consider California as a further goal. Rosalind Carey suggested that Lake Forest could be used again, and Peter Stone expressed his support for this idea, saying that Plymouth State or the Los Angeles Center for Inquiry could be considered for 2004. Alan Schwerin then withdrew his motion, and a motion was made by Rosalind Carey for Lake Forest College as the location for next year's meeting, which Alan Schwerin seconded. Concerning future meeting locations, Peter Friedman suggested Princeton but Ken Blackwell said that we need someone on site.

Brief discussion followed of having a meeting at City College of New York so as to provide the institution with a means to, at least, partially atone for its 1940 treatment of Russell. At this point, Ken Blackwell indicated his unease with the *present* officers taking charge of this matter.

The subject of BRS awards was discussed, first, whether the BRS awards should require awardees to attend the meeting at which the award is announced. Alan Schwerin mentioned the disappointment involved in selecting awardees who are no-shows. But then the prospect of the BRS locking itself out from many possible awardees as a result of a change here was considered, and no motions for a change were made. Ken Blackwell clarified that it was only the main award of the BRS that was under consideration here.

The possibility of a new award for editing collections of Russell's papers and letters was brought up. Alan Schwerin stressed the importance of giving recognition to such editors. Tim Madigan suggested calling such an award the "Harry Ruja Award." Ken Blackwell, however, did not think this appropriate, as Ruja was best known as a bibliographer, not an editor. Peter Friedman then suggested calling it the "Russell Scholar Award." Peter Stone noted the already small pool of candidates and was joined in this observation by Nick Griffin. Alan Schwerin proposed an award for Russell editorial scholarship with a committee empowered to exercise discretion as to whether or not to issue an award. Then Ken Blackwell wondered whether a foreign language award would be in order. Alan Schwerin moved that the current book awards committee have the discretion to make an occasional special award for editing. Ray Perkins seconded the motion.

Officer elections were considered next. Ken Blackwell said he was looking forward to retiring as Chair of the Board but would certainly stay on as a director. The directors then elected the following officers by acclamation:

President—Alan Schwerin (nominated by White, seconded by Perkins)
Chair—David White (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Perkins)
Vice President—Ray Perkins (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Stone)
Secretary—Chad Trainer (nominated by Schwerin, seconded by Griffin)
Treasurer—Dennis Darland (nominated by Stone, seconded by Perkins)

The directors expressed their gratitude to Ken Blackwell for his years chairing the Board and the meeting then concluded with Alan Schwerin thanking, on behalf of the Society, David White, Tim Madigan, Peter Stone, and Rachel Murray for the quality of their work with the *BRSQ*.

Studs Terkel at the 2002 BRS Annual Meeting Peter Stone

On Saturday, June 1, 2002, Studs Terkel came to Lake Forest College to accept the 2002 BRS Award. He arrived during the Society's Red Hackle Hour, and drank heartily of Russell's favorite brand of scotch. Alan Schwerin presented him with a box of his favorite brand of cigars as well as Bombay gin, another of Terkel's favorites. Terkel reminisced about Russell with those assembled for about 45 minutes before departing for another engagement.

Peter Stone presented the award to Terkel on behalf of BRS Awards Committee Chair Kevin Brodie, who could not attend the meeting. The short duration of Terkel's stay precluded the delivery of Stone's formal remarks. These remarks are reproduced here, however, because they lay out the justification for giving Terkel the award.

Before proceeding with tonight's award, I'd like to take a moment to acknowledge the loss of a past award recipient. As you all know, Stephen Jay Gould, famed paleontologist and recipient of the 2000 BRS Annual Award, died only a few short weeks ago, after losing his second battle with cancer. (He survived the first, and told the story of it in his book *Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin* to the enlightenment of us all.) There have very few people in the history of science and philosophy who could write both brilliant technical books for the specialist and elegant popularizations for the layperson. Russell was one, Gould was another, there haven't been too many, and so this is a real loss for both the life sciences and the reading public.

And now for tonight's main event. I've served on the BRS Awards Committee for several years now, including a stint as Committee Chair, and I can tell you that selecting a recipient for the BRS Award every year is quite a challenge. Despite our high standards, which require locating someone who exemplifies some aspect of Russell at his best, every year several candidates offer themselves to the committee's attention—an embarrassment of riches, one might say—necessitating a difficult choice.

This year, however, the committee had a wonderful tool for focusing its attention—Location! Location! Location! Once the decision to meet near Chicago was announced, one BRS member told the committee, if you're in Chicago you simply must honor Studs Terkel. And he was right.

Studs Terkel has many qualifications for the BRS Annual Award. For one thing, he had the excellent judgment and good taste to show up and accept the award in person. (Many of our distinguished award recipients in the past have not been so refined.) More seriously, there is a narrow and a broad reason for presenting Terkel with the award. The narrow reason is his important personal connection with Bertie—he conducted a famous interview with the Good Lord in 1962. In describing that interview, Terkel famously remarked that Russell was “The Man Who Shook the Hand of the Man Who Shook the Hand of Napoleon.” I suppose that means that tonight I become the man who shook the hand of the man who shook the hand of the man who shook the hand of the man who shook the hand of the man who shook the hand of Napoleon. I leave it to the logicians of the Society to sort that one out.

The broad reason, like the narrow one, concerns interviews. Interviewing, after all, is what Studs Terkel does. Interviewing everyone from peace activists to cleaning ladies. He interviews people to show us what people think about subjects that matter to us, and then puts it all down in well-written books just to make it all easy for us to try to get a handle on. Well, maybe not easy—the topics he discusses are rarely easy—but certainly a whole lot easier than it would have been without Terkel on the job.

These books have focused on topics like working (*Working: People Talk about What They Do All Day and How They Feel about What They Do*. Pantheon, 1974); race (*Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession*. New Press, 1992); important moments in our history, such as World War II (*The Good War: An Oral History of World War Two*. Pantheon, 1984); and most recently life and death (*Will the Circle Be Unbroken? Reflections of Death, Birth, and Hunger for a Faith*. New Press, 2001). Given Russell’s own ongoing concern with religion and the continuing temptation of people towards irrational faiths, I’m sure this last book will be of great interest to the members of the BRS.

Russell made expert use of the pen to advance the cause of a liberal and enlightened humanity, a cause motivated by his “unbearable pity for the sufferings of mankind.” Terkel has done much the same, but he has incorporated the microphone and the tape recorder, and the many voices they can capture, into the process. For this reason, we are proud to present the 2002 Annual Award to Studs Terkel. The award reads,

**The 2002 Bertrand Russell Society Award to
Studs Terkel
for dedicating his life to the abolition of the suffering of
mankind in the spirit of Bertrand Russell.**

My Memory of Russell Studs Terkel

Note: Studs Terkel told me the story that follows over the phone, and I transcribed it. Since it is a transcribed portrait from memory, there may be some inconsistencies with other accounts of the Terkel-Russell meeting.—Kevin Brodie, BRS Awards Committee Chair

One of the most memorable moments in my life was visiting Russell, in 1962, in his cottage in North Wales, during the Cuban Missile crisis. I went to interview him, but the only thing he wanted to talk about was the crisis. I had a whole list of other things I wanted to discuss with him, but he wouldn’t have it. I sat down before him, and a secretary taps me on the shoulder and says “Only a half an hour.” Meanwhile, I am struggling to get my tape recorder to work. The tape keeps popping out. When I actually get it to stay and I press the record button, the tape won’t move. I am incredibly embarrassed. Russell says to me, “I believe you have problems with technology.” I said, “Lord Russell, technology and I are not empathetic.” He seemed to like that remark, and commented, “Technology is problematic in a number of ways,” and I knew exactly what he meant: the atom bomb.

I then got my tape recorder to work, and we proceeded with the interview, with the secretary tapping my shoulder every ten minutes to remind me of my time remaining. I wanted to ask Russell more general questions about war and the human race, so I broached the subject again. He said to me, “Only if you can trick me,” so I reached into my pocket to find a poem I knew he loved, one by Shelley about youth and age. Of course, I couldn’t find it. I can find everything else—my lunch receipt, a Cubs ticket stub, but not the poem. While I am searching, the secretary taps me again and says “five minutes.” Finally, I managed to locate it, and read it to him. Russell smiled, and said, “Very good, young man, that is one my favorites. You may ask me the question.” I then asked him about the prospects of the human race at this point in history, and he quoted Einstein to me: “Since the split of the atom, we need to find new ways of thinking. We cannot assume that bombs will solve our problems. We must find new ways of solving our problems.”

That is what I remember most: him quoting Einstein, and his remarkable patience with me. Here he is, an intellectual giant, in his nineties, and he never once showed the slightest irritation with me. His intellectual life spanned longer than anyone in history. I mean, he’s talking about nuclear

war, and his grandfather shook hands with Napoleon. That's quite amazing when you think about it. But that's what I remember. Me bumbling around, and his remarkable patience!

The 2002 BRS Book Award

BRS Book Awards Committee Chair Ray Perkins presented the 2002 BRS Book Award to Nick Griffin and Alison Roberts Miculan. In doing so, he made the following remarks:

The competition this year was stiff. I read all the 2001 entries in the New/Forthcoming Books section of the Russell Archives' website (except mine, which should have a 2002 date). However, the choice of the committee was unanimous. Nick Griffin's brilliant epistolary biography of Russell is a delight to read and is an important source of new biographical detail about one of the world's most interesting and important thinkers.

The award plaque reads,

**The 2002 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award to
Nicholas Griffin, assisted by Alison Roberts Miculan, for
*The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell:
The Public Years, 1914-1970,*
which has enhanced our understanding of Russell's life.**

Many members may not be aware of the many prestigious books that have also won the award. To rectify this, we reprint below a complete list of past BRS Book Award winners.

2001—*Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus, 2000), by Thom Weidlich.

2000—*Russell on Ethics: Selections from the Writings of Bertrand Russell* (Routledge, 1999), ed. by Charles Pigden.

1999—*Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory* (Oxford U.P., 1998), by Gregory Landini.

1998—*Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume 10: A Fresh Look at Empiricism, 1927-42. Volume 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 1943-68* (Routledge, 1996, 1997), ed. by John G. Slater and Peter Kollner.

1997—*Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* (Free Press, 1996), by Ray Monk.

1996—*Continuity and Change in the Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy* (Kluwer, 1994), by Paul Hager.

1995—*A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell* (Routledge, 1994), by Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja.

1994—*Bertrand Russell: A Life* (Viking, 1993), by Caroline Moorehead.

1993—*The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume 1, 1894-1914* (Houghton Mifflin, 1992), by Nicholas Griffin.

1992—*Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship* (Oxford U.P., 1991), by Nicholas Griffin.

1991—*Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1990), by Peter Hylton.

1990—*Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with His Contemporaries* (Southern Illinois, 1989), by Elizabeth Eames.

1989—*Bertrand Russell: A Political Life* (Hill and Wang, 1988), by Alan Ryan.

1988—*Bertrand Russell* (Twayne, 1986), by Paul Kuntz.

1987—*The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell* (Allen & Unwin, 1985), by Kenneth Blackwell.

1985—*Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume I: Cambridge Essays 1888-99* (Allen & Unwin, 1983), ed. by Kenneth Blackwell, Andrew Brink, Nicholas Griffin, Richard A. Rempel, and John G. Slater.

Articles:

Celebrating Russell's Birthday

Alan Bock

As every BRS member knows (or should know), May 18, 2002 was the 130th birthday of the noble and illustrious Bertrand Arthur William Russell. In celebration, a 130th birthday party was held at the Center for Inquiry (CFI) in Amherst, New York (across the road from SUNY Buffalo.) The Center for Inquiry is the headquarters of CSICOP (The Committee for the Scientific Investigation of the Claims of the Paranormal) and its magazine, *Skeptical Inquirer*; as well as the Council for Secular Humanism and its magazine, *Free Inquiry*. CFI and its affiliated organizations are the brainchild of Paul Kurtz, an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society, who was prominently featured in the May 2002 issue of the *BRSQ*.

About forty people were in attendance at the event including a goodly number who traveled down from Canada. Among the Canadian contingent were BRS members Ken Blackwell (then Chairman of the BRS Board of Directors), Nick Griffin, and Andrew Bone.

The festivities began promptly at 5:30 PM with the presentation of a Bertrand Russell birthday cake which had been obtained from Wegmans, a local food chain. Wegmans has apparently developed a process whereby minute amounts of colored sugar can be applied to a cake to produce a frosting in the form of a portrait—in this case a portrait of Bertrand Russell. Sort of a digitally remastered frosting portrait, if you will. Bertie would undoubtedly have been impressed that, by the early twenty-first century, science would have progressed to the point where sugar could be transubstantiated into his portrait!

The highlight of the evening was a lecture by Peter Stone, a founding member of the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) and Editor of the *BRSQ*, who spoke on Russell's continuing relevance to the modern world and why, although he has been gone for more than 30 years, he remains a figure of great interest both to those who remember him when he was alive and those who have just discovered him. Peter was introduced by Tim Madigan, a GRRS member and Chair of the *Free Inquiry* Editorial Board.

In his talk, Peter pointed out that some admire Russell's work as one of the founding fathers of analytical philosophy, as well as his seminal

contributions to the philosophy of mathematics. But most remember Russell as a champion of enlightened social ideals in face of some of the darkest moments of the twentieth century. He stood for women's rights, peace, civil liberties, and many other causes. Also, he was not afraid to denounce the principle obstacles to these ideals as he saw them—namely, the fanatical creeds preached by both organized religion and nationalistic political movements. In the face of fanaticism, Russell urged use of reason and resistance to claims of dogmatic authority without succumbing to a paralyzing skepticism.

The Russell family can be traced back to the Tudors, as it was Henry VIII who raised them to the nobility. One ancestor of Bertrand was executed for conspiring against the Stuarts in the Rye House Plot. Historically, the family were Whigs and very liberal. Bertrand's grandfather, Lord John Russell, was twice Prime Minister of Great Britain, and was probably most famous for his efforts on behalf of the Reform Bill. Bertrand's parents, Lord and Lady Amberly, were eccentrics and freethinkers. His father, who was the author of *An Analysis of Religious Belief*, had aspirations for a political career, but these were ended rather suddenly when he announced in favor of birth control. This was nineteenth-century England, which was not yet ready for so radical a politician.

Tragedy struck when Bertrand was only four years old. His mother died of diphtheria. Shortly thereafter, his father also passed away, leaving Bertie and his brother Frank as orphans. Their custody became an issue. Their parents had wanted the boys brought up by a family friend, Douglas Spaulding, a freethinker, but the courts intervened and awarded custody to the grandparents. Shortly thereafter, their grandfather died, and so Frank and Bertrand were raised by their grandmother, who was definitely not a freethinker. She had many good qualities, however, and at the age of seventy had shockingly converted from Scottish Presbyterianism to Unitarianism. At the age of 12, Bertie was given a bible from her inscribed with one of her favorite biblical verses—"Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil" (Exodus 23:2). Bertrand Russell was guided by this biblical phrase for the rest of his life.

As expected, Russell went to Cambridge University, where he studied mathematics but later decided to switch to philosophy. Initially, he was influenced by Hegel; later, however, he claimed that he was a Hegelian until the day came when he actually sat down and read Hegel. He then decided to return to mathematics, which he now found quite exciting. It was in applying certain mathematical techniques to philosophy that he became one of the founders of analytical philosophy. His expertise in math

would eventually lead to his collaboration with Alfred North Whitehead in writing his magnum opus, *Principia Mathematica*. Their financial reward for years of work on this vast project was a financial loss of 50 pounds each!

About this time, Russell married the first of his four wives, Alys Pearsall Smith, but the marriage ended in divorce. He would go on to marry and divorce Dora Black and Peter Spence. His last (and most successful) marriage was to Edith Finch; this marriage lasted until Russell's death in 1970.

Russell bitterly opposed World War I and became active in the Union for Democratic Control and then the No Conscription Fellowship. As a result of his anti-war activities he was fined, dismissed from Cambridge and sent to prison for violating the Defense of the Realm Act (DORA). On the positive side, however, Russell learned to write quickly for a mass audience. He was always a clear writer and had produced a popular work entitled *Problems of Philosophy* in 1912. But now he was prepared for popular writing on a grand scale. He wrote a number of polemical books during the war, including *Justice in Wartime*, *Political Ideals*, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, and *Roads to Freedom*.

After the "Great War," Russell visited Russia, where he had a personal audience with Lenin. He was appalled by Lenin and the communist system, which he thought was as bad, if not worse, than medieval Christianity. He then shocked and alienated many of his friends by writing *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*. After Russia he went to China for a year in 1922. At first he was worried about the offer of a job in China because it came from a person named "Fu Ling Yu," but it was indeed a serious offer. He went there accompanied by his future wife Dora Black. The unmarried couple scandalized the foreign delegations and the missionaries in the country but the Chinese were enthralled by them. While in China, Dora became pregnant with Russell's first child. On their return to England they were married (at BR's insistence) so the child would be legitimate. He was named John Conrad after the author, Joseph Conrad, whom BR admired. (In fact, both of Bertrand Russell's sons were named after Conrad.)

Dora and Bertie then opened Beacon Hill School, a progressive institution by which they hoped to test Russell's theories regarding education. To finance the school, Russell began popular writing and lecturing on a grand scale. At this time he produced many of his popular works for the educated reader. Works on science like *The ABC of Atoms* and *The ABC of*

Relativity. Works on sex like *Marriage and Morals*. Works on education such as *On Education* and *Education and the Social Order*. Works on how to lead a better life like *The Conquest of Happiness*. And works like *Sceptical Essays*, which brought together many of his thoughts on life. One of his most famous lines comes from this book—"I wish to propose for the reader's favorable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it to be true."

Eventually the school floundered, and Bertie's marriage to Dora ended in divorce. He then married Peter Spence. Bertrand Russell had three children, two by Dora Black Russell and one by Peter Spence. His only daughter, Katherine Russell Tait, is an honorary member of the BRS, as is his younger son, Conrad Russell (the current Earl Russell).

In 1940, he was scheduled to take up an appointment at City College of New York, but the appointment was denied by the university due to a well-orchestrated campaign by the clerical fascist set. His work was described by an attorney who filed the case against Russell as "lecherous, libidinous, lustful, venerous, erotomaniac, aphrodisiac, irreverent, narrow-minded, untruthful, and bereft of moral fiber." This case has been chronicled in a recent book entitled *Appointment Denied* (Prometheus, 2000). The book is by BRS member Thom Weidlich, who will be addressing the GRRS in September.

After the City College affair Russell, through Dewey, obtained employment teaching at the Barnes Foundation but this, too, eventually fell apart. However, using the time spent at the Foundation, Russell was able to produce *A History of Western Philosophy*, which turned out to be a huge financial success.

In his later years, Russell became somewhat more respectable, receiving the Order of Merit and the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. He then, however, became active in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the more radical Committee of 100. He was as a result arrested for civil disobedience at the age of 89! He died in 1970 at the age of 97.

A lively question-and-answer period followed the lecture; numerous inquirers tested Peter's encyclopedic knowledge of matters Russellian. It did not appear that anyone left disappointed over not having had their questions answered—usually extensively. At the conclusion of the Q & A period, Paul Kurtz recalled that, while he was a student at Columbia back

in 1950 or 1952, he saw Russell in person at a Columbia-sponsored event. He noted that Russell received a standing ovation from the entire student body. This, of course, was about ten years after the infamous City College case. It was a thrilling scene, Kurtz remembered.

At the conclusion of the question-and-answer period, everyone was invited to tour the CFI library—the most extensive freethought library in the world. Our Canadian visitors seemed to be especially interested in browsing through the stacks and marveling at the collection. A five- or six-volume set containing the collected works of Jeremy Bentham was admired by Ken Blackwell, who informed us that it was an expensive set. While we were still down in the stacks one of our visitors from Toronto entertained us with a very brief but masterful impression of Bertrand Russell.



The tour of the library concluded the formal festivities at the Center. Since it was still early, a dozen or so people decided to go out to dinner. However, since it was Saturday night in Buffalo, attempts to obtain a table for 12 within a reasonable time at either Bennigans or The Olive Garden were unavailing, and so the group had to settle for the alcohol-free IHOP (International House of Pancakes). Despite the absence of a wine list, a very lively time was had by all. At the end of dinner, Paul Kurtz generously announced that the Center would pick up the dinner check for all in attendance. And so a celebration that began with cake ended with dinner.

Alan Bock is an active member of the Greater Rochester Russell Set.

Author Needed for Russell Reference Book

Scarecrow Press, a leading publisher of reference works, is looking for an author(s) to write a volume on Bertrand Russell's Philosophy for its series of Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements. The book should have an introduction, chronology, bibliography and "dictionary." The dictionary comprises entries on famous persons (family, colleagues, critics), places, events, concepts, seminal works, etc. The whole book should run some 250-300 pages. Payment is by royalties. Prospective authors can write to the series editor, Jon Woronoff, 765 Route de Vesegnin, 01280 Preveessin, France. Please enclose a brief c.v. For more information on Scarecrow Press, please visit its website at <http://www.scarecrowpress.com>.

Pictures from the Buffalo Birthday Bash



End the Nuclear Danger: An Urgent Call
Jonathan Schell, Randall Caroline Forsberg,
and David Cortright

The mission of the BRS is in part to champion the causes to which Russell was committed. And few causes absorbed as much of Russell's attention as that of preventing nuclear war. The BRS reaffirmed its support for this cause at its last meeting, where it passed a resolution in support of nuclear disarmament. (See "Minutes of the 2002 BRS Annual Meeting in this issue.) It is in support of this cause that the BRSQ reprints the call below, which appeared in the June 24, 2002 issue of the Nation (along with commentary by Schell). The Nation version appears online at <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020624&s=schell2>.

A DECADE after the end of the cold war, the peril of nuclear destruction is mounting. The great powers have refused to give up nuclear arms, other countries are producing them and terrorist groups are trying to acquire them.

POORLY GUARDED warheads and nuclear material in the former Soviet Union may fall into the hands of terrorists. The Bush Administration is developing nuclear "bunker busters" and threatening to use them against nonnuclear countries. The risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is grave.

DESPITE THE END of the cold war, the United States plans to keep large numbers of nuclear weapons indefinitely. The latest US-Russian treaty, which will cut deployed strategic warheads to 2,200, leaves both nations facing "assured destruction" and lets them keep total arsenals (active and inactive, strategic and tactical) of more than 10,000 warheads each.

THE DANGERS POSED by huge arsenals, threats of use, proliferation and terrorism are linked: The nuclear powers' refusal to disarm fuels proliferation, and proliferation makes nuclear materials more accessible to terrorists.

THE EVENTS of September 11 brought home to Americans what it means to experience a catastrophic attack. Yet the horrifying losses that day were only a fraction of what any nation would suffer if a single nuclear weapon were used on a city.

THE DRIFT TOWARD catastrophe must be reversed. Safety from nuclear

destruction must be our goal. We can reach it only by reducing and then eliminating nuclear arms under binding agreements.

WE THEREFORE CALL ON THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY TO MOVE TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS, STEP BY CAREFULLY INSPECTED AND VERIFIED STEP, TO THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS KEY STEPS TOWARD THIS GOAL, WE CALL ON THE UNITED STATES TO:

§ RENOUNCE the first use of nuclear weapons.

§ PERMANENTLY END the development, testing and production of nuclear warheads.

§ SEEK AGREEMENT with Russia on the mutual and verified destruction of nuclear weapons withdrawn under treaties, and increase the resources available here and in the former Soviet Union to secure nuclear warheads and material and to implement destruction.

§ STRENGTHEN nonproliferation efforts by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, finalizing a missile ban in North Korea, supporting U.N. inspections in Iraq, locating and reducing fissile material worldwide and negotiating a ban on its production.

§ TAKE nuclear weapons off hairtrigger alert in concert with the other nuclear powers (the U.K., France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel) in order to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use.

§ INITIATE talks on further nuclear cuts, beginning with U.S. and Russian reductions to 1,000 warheads each.

To sign the statement, go to <http://www.urgentcall.org> or send name, organization/profession (for ID only) and contact information to Urgent Call, c/o Fourth Freedom Forum, 11 Dupont Circle NW, 9th Floor, Washington, DC 20036. We also need tax-deductible donations, made to Urgent Call, to disseminate this call.

*This call was drafted by Jonathan Schell, Harold Wilens Peace Fellow of the Nation Institute and the author of *The Fate of the Earth*; Randall Caroline (Randy) Forsberg, Director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies and author of the 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race,' the manifesto of the 1980s nuclear weapons freeze campaign; and David Cortright, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and former Executive Director of SANE.*

Russell "Beyond the Fringe"
Peter Stone

On March 27, 2002, British comedian Dudley Moore passed away. Moore is remembered for, among other roles, his part in the British Comedy series "Beyond the Fringe." As a tribute to Moore, the BRSQ offers the following short article concerning Russell and "Beyond the Fringe."

In the 1960s, the British TV comedy series "Beyond the Fringe" (a precursor to "Monty Python's Flying Circus") once ran a skit about Bertrand Russell. The skit has floated around and appeared at various times, most recently on a January 14, 2001 broadcast of "The Spirit of Things," which runs on Australian Broadcasting Corporation's network Radio Nation. That episode of "The Spirit of Things" was entitled "The Unexamined Life Is Not Worth Living." Its transcript, including the Russell skit, is at <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/relig/spirit/stories/s233447.htm>. The brief but charming skit runs as follows:

We have in the studio Bertrand Russell, who talked to us in the series 'Sense, Perception and Nonsense: Number 7, Is this a dagger I see before me?' Bertrand Russell.

Bertrand Russell: One of the advantages of living in Great Court, Trinity I seem to recall, was the fact that one could pop across at any time of the day or night and trap the then young G.E. Moore into a logical falsehood by means of a cunning semantic subterfuge. I recall one occasion with particular vividness. I had popped across and had knocked upon his door. 'Come in', he said. I decided to wait awhile in order to test the validity of his proposition. 'Come in', he said once again. 'Very well', I replied, 'if that is in fact truly what you wish'.

I opened the door accordingly and went in, and there was Moore seated by the fire with a basket upon his knees. 'Moore', I said, 'do you have any apples in that basket?' 'No', he replied, and smiled seraphically, as was his wont. I decided to try a different logical tack. 'Moore', I said, 'do you then have some apples in that basket?' 'No', he replied, leaving me in a logical cleft stick from which I had but one way out. 'Moore', I said, 'do you then have apples in that basket?' 'Yes', he replied. And from that day forth, we remained the very closest of friends.

**Library's William Ready Division of Archives and
Research Collections Division Receives AAO Award**
Carl Spadoni

The article below was posted June 25, 2002 on the "Daily News" page at McMaster University's website. It may still be available online at <http://dailynews.mcmaster.ca/story.cfm?id=1489>. Given the central importance of McMaster's Archives to Russell studies, the BRSQ is happy to reproduce it here. We also offer our congratulations to Carl Spadoni and the Archives for receiving this honor.

The Archives Association of Ontario (AAO) has presented its Institutional Award for 2002 to the Library's William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections.

The award is for outstanding service to the community and providing an exemplary model for other archival programs.

Carl Spadoni, research collections librarian, accepted the award on behalf of McMaster University Library at AAO's annual conference on June 20.

The citation for the award praised the William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections for:

- acquiring major archives and building collections for research purposes;
- fostering the Bertrand Russell archives as an international resource base for Russell scholarship;
- making fonds [*sic—ed.*] and collection descriptions and finding aids available electronically;
- providing quality reference service to the public;
- the work of the conservators and McMaster's co-op conservation program for other institutions;
- scholarly commitment of the division's staff to academic life at McMaster;
- and the staff's participation in archival organizations.

Road Tripping with the GRRS

Peter Stone

GRRS members Phil Ebersole, Tim Madigan, Peter Stone, and David White traveled in May to the quarterly meeting of the Conference for the Study of Political Thought's Upstate New York Chapter, held at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, NY. (In addition to editing the *BRSQ*, Peter also coordinates meetings for this chapter.) David, Peter, and Phil decided to take the scenic route and visit a number of used bookstores along the way.

The trip turned up a number of Russell-related references. One store had a copy of *The American Revolution*, by George Otto Trevelyan (Abbreviated edition of 6-volume work. Ed. by Richard B. Morris. New York: David MacKay, 1964). George Otto Trevelyan was nephew by marriage to Thomas Babington Macaulay, one of Britain's most famous historians, and father of George Macaulay Trevelyan, another historian and good friend of Bertie. Another store had a copy of *Sex in Civilization*, ed. by V.F. Calverton and S.D. Schmalhausen (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Company, 1929). This thick tome, a collection of liberal essays on sex, is

dedicated to these women who have led in the struggle for sex emancipation and a freer civilization.

Mary Wollstonecraft
George Sand
Ellen Key
Olive Schreiner
Lilli Braun
Isadora Duncan
Aletta Jacobs
Alexandra Kollantai
Mary Stopes
Dora Russell

The most notable Russell references, however, appeared in *Freedom, Not License*, by education reformer A.S. Neill (New York: Hart, 1966). This book contains a series of responses by Neill to letters written to him by the general public. In the course of it, Neill refers to Russell three times. First, when answering a question about the need for children to show respect, Neill emphasizes that respect must be earned, by parents like anyone else.

He writes, "I respect Bertrand Russell because of his philosophy, his humanitarianism, but that respect has no fear or envy in it. If you want to be respected by your child, act in a manner that the respect comes naturally—which means deservedly—and not because your child fears reprisal" (p. 36).

Second, Neill later writes that

According to the believers, Bertrand Russell will roast forever in hell, while Billy Graham will sit at the right hand of God. Punishment without let up is to be the doom of a man who has enriched mankind with his creative mathematics. Such is the unfeeling God the young are supposed to believe in—a God who is cruel and unremittingly tortures a good man who never harmed anyone but who just didn't pronounce the proper mumbo-jumbo (p. 84).

Neill does, however, part company with Russell in his third reference. In the course of explaining that "Freedom Does Not Make Rebels," he writes that "Free children are not propagandizing rebels; they often wear anti-nuclear badges, but none was arrested for sitting down with Bertrand Russell in Trafalgar Square" (p. 92).

And of course, several books by Russell (notably *Conquest of Happiness*, subject of the GRRS's May meeting) could be found during the trip, although nothing the GRRS had not seen before.

Solution to May 2002 Russell-Crypt

This quote comes from a September 28, 1932 column by Russell, entitled "On Astrologers," written for the Hearst newspapers. The entire essay is at http://www.santafe.edu/~shalizi/Russell/Hearst_Essays/On_Astrologers.html

In schools and universities information of all sorts is ladled out, but no one is taught to reason, or to consider what is evidence for what.

The Russell "Clan"

The BRSQ reprints with permission the following short article on the Russell family name. The article appears at "Rampant Scotland," a website devoted to "everything about Scotland." The site features an entire section devoted to helping people trace their Scottish ancestry. The website is at <http://www.rampantscotland.com/clans/blclanrussell.htm>. The BRSQ thanks Alan Scott ("Scottie") for permission to reprint this article.

Clan/Family Histories - Russel/Russell

This name is probably derived from "rous" meaning red and early bearers of the name no doubt had red hair—and were probably of Norman or French extraction. While the name is by no means confined to Scotland, it is within the top 50 most frequently found names in the country.

The name is one of the earliest surnames recorded in Scotland, the first being a Walter Russell who witnessed a charter in Paisley Abbey some time between 1164 and 1177. John, son of Robert Russel of Duncanlaw granted land to found a Hospital between 1180 and 1220. Robert Russel of Berwickshire was a big enough landowner to be required to sign the Ragman Roll and pay homage to Edward I in 1296.

Russels can be found in Aberdeenshire where Rozel, an English baron who had fought at the siege of Berwick and the Battle of Halidon Hill in 1333, obtained an estate at Aden. The family was described as "Russel of that ilk" implying that they were substantial landowners. As such, Russel is one of the clans and families of Scotland with a coat of arms recognised by the Lord Lyon.

Not all Russells were recorded for their good works. Jerome Russell, a monk, was burned at the stake in the High Street, Glasgow, for heresy in 1539.

There was a significant family of Russels in Selkirkshire in the Scottish Borders and many entered military service in India in the 18th and 19th centuries.

In England, a family which began with a Rufus (another form of Russell) rose to become the Dukes of Bedford. The 3rd son of the 6th Duke of Bedford studied at Edinburgh University where he was greatly influenced

by the independent and democratic philosophy taught there. He became a great Reformer and was an architect of extending the franchise for the Westminster parliament. His grandson, the 3rd Earl Russell, was also an independent thinker, better known as the philosopher Bertrand Russell.

Russell was the 47th most frequent surname at the General Register Office in 1995.

Russell-Related Book Sought for Archives Peter Stone

Bernard Quaritch Ltd., a noted antiquarian bookseller (with a website at <http://www.quaritch.com>) is currently offering a copy of James Harkness and Frank Morley's *Introduction to the Theory of Analytic Functions* (London: Macmillan, 1898) in its summer 2002 catalog. The copy was once owned by Bertrand Russell, and contains his extensive marginalia. Apparently, Russell gave or loaned it to the mathematician G.H. Hardy, and it was by way of Oxford University (who received Hardy's papers after his death) that the book has found its way to market.

The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University is anxious to obtain the book. It provides the first known evidence of Russell's discovery of Weierstrass, whose work was to contribute much to Russell's own mathematical work. (Russell's debt to Weierstrass is discussed in, among other works, Nick Griffin's *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship* (Clarendon, 1995).) Unhappily, the Archives are in no position to handle the £8,500 price tag attached to the book. Any BRS-ers with advice on acquiring the book should contact Carl Spadoni at spadon@mcmaster.ca.

A Conversation with Neil Abercrombie—Update

Many readers enjoyed Chad Trainer's interview with longtime BRS member Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) when it appeared in the November 2001 issue of the BRSQ. Unfortunately, Abercrombie was not one of them, at least not at the time. Chad subsequently ran into the congressman at a legislative conference and asked him what he thought of the issue containing the interview. Abercrombie informed him that he had not received it; because of the anthrax scare that plagued Capitol Hill at about that time, it never reached him. Chad therefore personally handed Abercrombie a copy the next time the two men met, at the National Democratic Club on May 7. Fortunately, after all the storm and fury raised by the delivery process the congressman liked what he saw.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- Reviews of Nick Griffin's *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970* (Routledge, 2001) continue to appear. The *Hamilton Spectator*, newspaper of McMaster University's hometown, reviewed the book in its December 22, 2001. The review, by Andrew Vowles, contains a brief interview with Griffin.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- In several issues in April and May 2002, the *Nation* ran an ad for its digital archive, access to which is available for purchase by individuals and public libraries. The ad featured a variety of covers from past issues of the *Nation*—including a cover featuring the following headline: "Soviet Russia—1920, by Bertrand Russell. 'I went to Russia believing myself a Communist, but—'" This cover story, according to the *Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*, ran in the July 31, 1920 issue of the *Nation*, the first of a two-part article.

Source: Peter Stone

- The April 14, 2002 issue of the *New York Times* contained an interesting article on library collections in its "Education Life" section. The article, written by Lev Grossman, was entitled "Catalog This: Dante's Dust, Poe's Hair, Taft's Underwear. Oh, my. What's a Librarian to Do?" It detailed some of the odd items that get donated to libraries through bequests of books and papers. Among the topics discussed is the fact that "Carl Sandoni [sic] of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University in Ontario is the uneasy curator of two Vietnam-era cluster bombs, deactivated but perfectly genuine." Carl Spadoni is presumably grateful for the attention given to McMaster's most important collection, though no doubt he wishes they'd gotten his name right.

Source: Tim Madigan

- William H. Pritchard has reviewed Carole Seymour-Jones' *The Life of Vivienne Eliot* (London: Constable Robinson, 2001; New York: Doubleday, 2002). His review, which appears in the April 21, 2002 issue of the *New York Times Book Review*, takes exception to the

voluminous detail Seymour-Jones provides about the Eliots and the people in their lives. "Admittedly," he writes, "one needs to know about the affair Vivienne had with Bertrand Russell not long after she married Eliot—an account that does Russell no credit. But do we need to hear all about Russell's relations with Constance Malleston, another of his mistresses?" Oddly, there appear to be people out there who do in fact tire of hearing about Russell's many liaisons.

Pritchard's review is largely negative. A more favorable review by Robert Craft appeared in the *New York Review of Books* on May 23, 2002. The review also discusses Vivienne's affair with Bertie, and mentions his conclusion about the Eliots that "their troubles were what they most enjoyed." The most memorable line from the review comes from Virginia Woolf, who wrote the following about Eliot's conversion to Anglicanism: "There is something obscene about a living person sitting by the fireside and believing in God."

Sources: Phil Ebersole, Tim Madigan, & Peter Stone

- Tariq Ali, Russell's former comrade-at-arms in the movement against the Vietnam War, recently engaged in a highly-publicized debate with Christopher Hitchens over the question of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. A report of the debate appeared in the May 3, 2002 issue of the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. The report itself, by Penn State English Professor Michael Bérubé, is rather snotty, and should be taken with a grain of salt.

Source: Peter Stone

- The June 7, 2002 issue of the *Chronicle of Higher Education* contains an article entitled "The Life and the Mind." The article, by Danny Postel, discusses the recent upsurge in philosophical biographies over the last twenty years. "Since 1982," Postel writes, "more than 30 biographies of philosophers have appeared. Of those, 20 have been published in the past decade, a dozen just since 1999. And more are in the works." The article then debates the relevance of biography to an understanding and appreciation of philosophical work.

Russell, of course, received prominent mention. The article begins with the famous image (taken from the *Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*) of Russell's mystical experience upon seeing Evelyn Whitehead in intense pain. The article also provides a list of key philosophical biographies written since 1980. The list includes of

course Alan Ryan's *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life* (Hill and Wang, 1988) as well as Ray Monk's two-volume biography, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, 1872-1921* (Free Press, 1996) and *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness, 1921-1970* (Free Press, 2001). It conspicuously fails, however, to mention Caroline Moorehead's excellent *Bertrand Russell: A Life* (Viking, 1993). The list also includes such Russell-related biographies as Brian McGuinness' *Wittgenstein, A Life: Young Wittgenstein, 1889-1921* (University of California Press, 1988); Monk's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (Free Press, 1990); Ryan's *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (Norton, 1995); Ben Rogers' *A.J. Ayer: A Life* (Grove Press, 1999); and Malachi Haim Hacohen's *Karl Popper, the Formative Years, 1902-1945: Political and Philosophy in Interwar Vienna* (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

The article is at <http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i39/39a01601.htm>.

Source: Phil Ebersole & Tim Madigan

- The *Times Literary Supplement* recently ran a review of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*, a new electronic version of "all the manuscripts, typescripts and dictations of philosophical work that Wittgenstein bequeathed to his rather bemused heirs." ("Nachlass" apparently means "literary remains.") The review appears in the June 14, 2002 issue, and is by Wittgenstein biographer Brian McGuinness. Russell is mentioned only in passing for his help in preparing (with G.E. Moore) some of Wittgenstein's pre-*Tractatus* notes on logic.

Source: Ken Blackwell & Dan Kervick

- *Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus, 2000) has received several customer reviews at Amazon.com's website. Among the reviewers of this book is Warren Allen Smith, who asks, "If the Vatican can apologize for Galileo, one wonders when will the Episcopalians apologize for their egregiously narrow-minded bishop?" Smith, like *Appointment Denied* author Thom Weidlich, is a BRS Board member who lives in New York City. Members may wish to read the review at <http://www.amazon.com> (just search for "Appointment Denied") and indicate how useful they found the review.

Source: David White

- Michael Albert, Founding Co-Editor of Z Magazine, has co-written an essay entitled "Conspiracies or Institutions: 9-11 and Beyond" with Stephen R. Shalom. The essay, available at Z Magazine's companion website at <http://www.znet.org>, argues against the significance of conspiracy theories for leftist political analysis. (A shorter version of the article appears in the July/August 2002 issue of Z.) The essay makes extended use of a story attributed to Russell as follows:

There is an apocryphal story about Bertrand Russell giving a public talk and afterward an elderly woman walks up and says, "You got a lot right, but about the universe, you missed the point. Everything we see is on the back of a giant turtle." And Russell pondered a moment and says, "Well, okay, what's holding up the turtle?" And she replies, "another larger turtle." And Russell asks what supports that one. And she replies: "It is turtles all the way down."

"Conspiracy theorizing," Albert and Shalom conclude, "is often quite like that. If at first one conjured claim doesn't work, no matter, manufacture another."

Albert and Shalom take issue not only with contemporary conspiracy theories concerning September 11, but also with more "established" conspiracy theories, such as those surrounding JFK's assassination. Here their views complement those of BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky, who wrote a book downplaying the political significance of the JFK assassination entitled *Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and American Culture* (South End Press, 1993). (They also diverge from Russell's own perspective on the assassination as a member of the Who Killed Kennedy Committee.) This should not be surprising, given that Albert and Chomsky are longtime friends and collaborators.

Incidentally, the apocryphal "turtles all the way down" appears in Stephen Hawking's *A Brief History of Time* (Bantam Doubleday, 1998), as well as numerous places online (many of whom cite Hawking as their source). While a less colorful version of the story appears in Russell's famous "Why I Am Not a Christian," the original source for the "turtles all the way down" quote remains a mystery. Any Russellian who tracks down the source should inform the BRSQ.

Source: Peter Stone

News from the Humanist World

- The Buddhiwadi Foundation, a humanist organization in India (see “News from the Humanist World,” *BRSQ* #112, November 2001), has taken an interest in the BRS. After receiving a complimentary copy of the *BRSQ*, the foundation expressed the desire to receive future issues, and offered in exchange copies of their own English-language publications. It also translated part of a letter from the *BRSQ* editor into Hindi and published it in their publication *Buddhiwadi*. A number of its members will be receiving complimentary copies of the *BRSQ*, and the *BRSQ* has received a copy of the foundation’s latest publication, Dr. Ramendra’s book *M.N. Roy’s New Humanism and Materialism*. A review of this book will hopefully appear in a forthcoming *BRSQ*. The Foundation next plans to publish Dr. Kawaljeet’s book *Total Revolution and Humanism*. For more information on the Buddhiwadi Foundation, check out its website at <http://www.buddhiwadi.org>.
- Rationalist International’s campaign to save the life of Zafran Bi Bi (see the May 2002 *BRSQ*) has succeeded. Zafran Bi Bi is a rape victim in Pakistan who was sentenced to death by stoning. In response to tremendous public pressure, the Federal Shariat Court in Islamabad cleared her off all charges on June 8, 2002. General Musharraf, president of Pakistan, reportedly received over 3,000 e-mails in opposition to the death sentence. Moreover, the Council of Islamic Ideology, Pakistan’s highest authority on matters of religious faith, has agreed to review the adultery law under which the conviction occurred and see if it is truly “in accordance with the Koran.” The campaign to abolish Pakistan’s barbaric adultery laws. (Zafran Bi Bi claimed she was raped by her brother-in-law, but Pakistan’s religious laws governing adultery do not distinguish between consensual and non-consensual sex) continue.
- Also continuing is the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU)’s campaign to save the life of Dr. Younis Shaikh, a Pakistani academic sentenced to death on August 18, 2001 for blasphemy. A report on the case can be found at the IHEU’s website at <http://iheu.org/Shaiikh/>. The IHEU asks opponents of religious fanaticism to protest the sentence to Pakistani President Musharraf and request Dr. Shaikh’s release. President Musharraf can be reached via e-mail at ce@pak.gov.pk or via any Embassy of Pakistan. Please send copies of any letters sent to the IHEU at campaign@iheu.org.

- American Atheists has called for a “Godless Americans March on Washington,” to take place on November 2, 2002. The march has been endorsed by the Council for Secular Humanism, among other humanist organizations. For more information, contact D.J. Grothe at (716) 636-7571 ext. 314 or djgrothe@centerforinquiry.net.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- On May 20, 2002, the BRS lost one of its esteemed award recipients. Stephen Jay Gould, esteemed paleontologist and 2002 BRS Award recipient, died of lung cancer. He will be sorely missed. Obituaries and tributes devoted to Gould appeared in the following publications, among others: the *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Seattle Times*, *St. Petersburg Times*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *Toronto Star*, *USA Today*, *Washington Post*, and *Newsday* (May 21); the *Independent*, *Guardian* and *Boston Globe* (May 21 and 22); the *Times*, *Scotsman*, *Hartford Courant* (a must-read), and *Daily Telegraph* (May 22); the *Plain Dealer* (May 25); the *Washington Post* (May 26); *Newsday* (May 28); and the *Nation* (June 17).
- Fortunately, Gould was able to finish his magnum opus before his death. Harvard University Press has just published Gould’s *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory*. This book, 1,464 pages in all, presents a mature statement of the changes Gould believed have become necessary in Darwinian theory since the Modern Synthesis took place over half a century ago.

An article on Gould and his new book appeared in the March 15, 2002 issue of the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. The article contains a brief interview with Gould, in which he declared, “I never write a second draft. I almost never shift a paragraph. I add something if something new comes up. But I’m a believer in the old-fashioned technique of outlining—that is, you don’t sit down and write until you pretty much know how it goes, what the logical structure is.” Gould apparently shared his method of writing, in addition to his devotion to science and humanism, with Russell.

Another review of the book appeared in the June 10, 2002 issue of the *Nation*. This rather odd review, by David Hawkes, suggests that Gould was fundamentally anti-Darwinian, which is somehow good because of Darwin’s intellectual debt to Adam Smith.

Also published shortly before Gould's death was *I Have Landed: The End of a Beginning in Natural History* (Harmony Books, 2002), the tenth and final collection of Gould's columns from *Natural History* magazine. Reviews discussing both *I Have Landed* and *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* have appeared in May 12 issue of the *San Diego Union Tribune* and the May 25 issue of the *Guardian*.

- On a related note, the Spring 2002 issue of the *Gay and Lesbian Humanist* quotes Stephen Jay Gould as follows:

We are here because one odd group of fishes had a peculiar fin anatomy that could transform into legs for terrestrial creatures; because the earth never froze entirely during an ice age; because a small and tenuous species, arising in Africa a quarter of a million years ago, has managed, so far, to survive by hook and by crook. We may yearn for a "higher" answer—but none exists.

The quote appears in "Gossip from across the Pond," a regular column written by the BRS's own Warren Allen Smith. The column is online at <http://www.galha.org/glh/213/gossip.html>. The quote originally appeared in the December 1988 issue of *Life*, in an article entitled "The Meaning of Life," and seems an appropriately Russellian line by which BRS-ers can remember Professor Gould.

- Studs Terkel, recipient of the 2002 BRS Award, was recently honored when the city of Chicago declared May 16 to be Studs Terkel Day. The honor, which was conferred by mayoral proclamation, was bestowed to mark Studs Terkel's 90th birthday. (Note that Terkel's birthday falls two days before Russell's.) Fortunately, the event took place before the BRS Annual Meeting; otherwise, it would have doubtlessly seemed rather anticlimactic. (Once you've received the BRS Award, what higher honor is there left to achieve?) An announcement of the award appeared in the June 10, 2002 issue of the *Nation*.

Terkel, however, does not rest on his laurels any more than Russell did. He recently wrote an article promoting Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) as a possible presidential candidate in 2004. The article, which appeared in May 6, 2002 issue of the *Nation*, features excerpts from an interview Terkel conducted with Kucinich in 1978, when the latter was mayor of Cleveland. The article has provoked some controversy within the pages of the *Nation* due to Kucinich's opposition to abortion rights, a position with which Terkel himself disagrees.

- Those interested in learning more about Terkel may wish to check out the interview with him at <http://www.grandtimes.com/studs2.html>. The title of the interview, "Studs Terkel: An Interview with the Man Who Interviews America," brings to mind Terkel's famous description of Russell as "the man who shook the hand of the man who shook the hand of Napoleon." The interview, slightly dated now but still accurate, was conducted by Kira Albin for *Grand Times*, a "unique weekly Internet magazine for seniors." The *BRSQ* thanks BRS Librarian Tom Stanley for locating this interview.

- Terkel also put in an appearance in the May/June 2002 issue of the *Utne Reader*. Terkel's picture appears there, along with a quote from an article on him in the March/April 2002 issue of *Sojourners* magazine. The quote, which runs as follows, demonstrates well why Terkel received the 2002 Award:

I'm interested in bottom-up history. The stories of the people you don't hear about in other books. There's a poem by Bertolt Brecht that says "Who built Thebes of the seven gates?" In it he asks, who hauled the rocks up there? When they were building the pyramids, what did the workers eat for lunch? In 1588, when the Spanish Armada sank and the Queen of Spain cried, who cried the other tears? That's what I'm interested in, the other tears.

- BRS Vice President for Outreach Peter Friedman found a highly obscure appearance by Studs Terkel in a 1953 short film by Encyclopedia Britannica entitled "Beginning to Date." The film, just under 11 ½ minutes long, features Terkel as a swimming coach trying to inspire one of his students with the confidence to ask a girl out on a date for the first time. Those with a high toleration level for saccharine can find the film online at <http://www.archive.org/movies/bytitle.html>.
- BRS Honorary Member Taslima Nasrin visited India in April 2002, receiving extensive coverage in the *Times of India*. On April 4, the *Times* announced that she would be visiting for personal reasons, but that her friends were reluctant to provide further information or even confirm that the visit was taking place (a sensible precaution, given the death sentence hanging over her head). The April 20 issue reported on Nasrin's attacks on efforts to rewrite history in her home country of Bangladesh. The next day, an article by Nasrin appeared in which she expressed sorrow at her inability to return to her own country. (Bangladesh has refused to let Nasrin return, even to visit her own

mother on her deathbed; Nasrin had to sneak into the country in order to bid her mother farewell.) Nasrin also expressed a desire to settle in India, citing the gracious hospitality shown to her. The *Times* discussed this desire in an article dated April 28; it indicated that Nasrin would raise the matter in a meeting with the chief minister of West Bengal. The articles are at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com>.

- *Life Extension Magazine*, a magazine that promotes alternatives to traditional medicines, features an article entitled "Vindication for Linus Pauling" in its May 2002 issue. The article, written by William Faloon, deals with Pauling's work on the dangers of radioactive fallout and on the benefits of Vitamin C. It asks how Americans can "stop persecuting today's Linus Paulings" because of their controversial claims. The award notes Linus Pauling's status as the only person to win two undivided Nobel prizes—but fails to note his honorary membership in the BRS.
- BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky will be at McMaster University on November 11-14. He will be visiting under the aegis of the Centre for Peace Studies, the Labour Studies Programme—and of course, the Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Chomsky's schedule has not yet been worked out, but it should include both large public lectures and smaller seminars. For more information, contact Nick Griffin at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University, 1280 Main St West, Hamilton, ON, L8S 4M2, Canada, ngriffin@mcmaster.ca.
- Noam Chomsky will also speak at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), to be held in Boston over Labor Day weekend. Chomsky has been invited to the meeting by the Caucus for a New Political Science—an organized section of the APSA that promotes radical approaches to the study of politics—in conjunction with two other sections, Human Rights and Transformational & Ecological Politics. Chomsky's talk will take place at 8 PM on Saturday, August 31. For further information, contact John Martin, APSA Program Coordinator for the Caucus, at the Division of Social Sciences, Dowling College, Oakdale, NY 11769, martinj@dowling.edu.

BRS Member Reports

- Shortly before his trip to Geneva (see "Road Tripping with the GRRS" in this issue), David White read his poem "Whereof We Cannot Speak" (*BRSQ* #110, May 2001) at an open mike night at St. John Fisher College. David admittedly had to explain to the crowd beforehand who Bertrand Russell was, but at least one member of the audience enjoyed the spectacle. "Hysterical," she told David, "I didn't know Bertrand Russell had a sex life." News apparently takes a while to reach St. John Fisher College...
- The May 2002 issue of *Splash!*, newsletter of the St. Petersburg Largo Area Secular Humanists (SPLASH), announced a SPLASH speaker session on May 18, Bertie's birthday. The meeting featured Diane Wilkinson, a philosophy graduate student at the University of South Florida, speaking on Russell's "Why I Am Not a Christian." *SPLASH!* is edited by former BRS Vice President Jan Loeb Eisler, and subscriptions can be obtained by sending \$40 (\$20 for students and low-income persons) to SPLASH treasurer, P.O. Box 8099, Madeira Beach, FL 33738-8099 USA.

Rustlings Gerry Wildenberg

"Rustlings" is the new name of my column, "Russell-Crypt," in which I present a simple substitution cipher based on the writings of Bertrand Russell.

Below is today's coded quote in which each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EIHFRYY,

O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quote below uses a different code.

After you've solved it, see if you can identify the source.

UFMBGUFMWTJ UFO PG AGLWRGA FJ MBG JKPXGTM EBGVG
EG RGQGV DRHE EBFM EG FVG MFZDWRY FPHKM, RHV
EBGMBGV EBFM EG FVG JFOWRY WJ MVKG.

The solution will appear in the next issue of the *BRSQ*.

The Hunt for Red Hackle

Undeterred by the underwhelming societal response to his recent call for a global Red Hackle search, *BRSQ* Editor Peter Stone has reached out to others outside the BRS in hope of assistance at obtaining the devilishly rare Scotch whisky brand so near and dear to Bertie's heart. He mentioned, for example, the hunt for Red Hackle in a recent exchange with Alan Scott ("Scottie"), proprietor of the "Rampant Scotland" website. (See "The Russell 'Clan'" in this issue.) Scott did a little searching, and pointed the editor to <http://www.scotchwhisky.com/latest/phillipsauctionlist.html>. This webpage offers information on a Scotch whisky auction held by Phillips Auction House in August 2000. This auction featured, among others, the following lot for bids:

Lot 603 Four Old De Luxe Blends Highland Queen 'Grand 15'; 26 2/3 fl.oz @ 70· proof; a de luxe expression of this once-famous blend bottled in the 1960's. Red Hackle reserve, 12 Years Old; 26 2/3 fl.oz @ 70· proof; a de luxe expression of what was once Glasgow's favourite blend, bottled in the 1960's. Mackinlay's Legacy, 12 Years Old; 75cl @ 75; an early 1970s bottling. Bell's Royal Reserve 20 Years Old; 26 1/3 fl.oz @ 70· proof. (4)
£70-100

It's good to hear that Russell's favorite Scotch was also once "Glasgow's favourite," and while this particular auction may be over, others might offer future purchasing opportunities. (Interested parties may wish to get on scotchwhisky.com's e-mail list by visiting the site.)

The BRS is still willing to reimburse members who can obtain bottles of Red Hackle for the Society at a reasonable price. (The Society will pay up to \$40 a bottle, 4 bottles maximum, for the premium blend of the scotch.) Any member who secures Red Hackle for the BRS will also receive a FREE BRS t-shirt. (See "The BRS T-Shirt Saga Continues" in this issue.) And the *BRSQ* continues its call for volunteers to join in this epic quest.

Pose with Bertie!



BRSQ Associate Editor Tim Madigan poses with the famed bust of Bertie at Red Lion Square, London. Madigan took this photo during a September 1999 visit to the British Isles. The *BRSQ* would like to see the entire world pose with Bertie, so if you're in London, have your picture taken with Bertie, and send us a copy! (Tim assures us that there are usually many people at Red Lion Square who would be willing to take a picture of you if you have a camera handy. Some of them will even give you your camera back.)

BRS Business and Chapter News:

**Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2nd Quarter Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow, 4/1/02 Through 6/30/02**

Compiled 7/9/02 by Dennis J. Darland,
BRS Treasurer (djdarland@qconline.com)

| Category Description | |
|-----------------------|-----------|
| BALANCE 3/31/02 | 8,519.36 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contrib-BRS | 350.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 350.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 155.00 |
| Renewals | 1,015.00 |
| TOTAL Dues | 1,170.00 |
| Other Income | 60.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 1,580.00 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 9.18 |
| Library Expenses | 9.81 |
| Meeting Expenses* | 185.10 |
| Newsletter | 810.92 |
| Other Expenses | 257.82 |
| RUSSELL Subscriptions | 2,669.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 3,941.83 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -2,361.83 |
| BALANCE 6/30/02 | 6,157.53 |

* The Expense & Income for the Annual meeting are mostly not included.
They will be included in the 3rd Quarter Treasurer's Report.

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Five Years of Monthly Russell
Meetings Open to the Public

GRRS Gets Recognition

City Newspaper, Rochester's independent weekly, published a discussion of the Greater Rochester Russell Set in its "Metro Ink" column. The article, by Jack Bradigan Spula, appeared in the May 29-June 4, 2002 issue of the paper, and features of picture of GRRS-er Tim Madigan leaning against a tree.

Program, Fall 2002

Aug. 8 "Russell the Anti-Communist"
Guest Speaker: Andrew Bone

Sept. 12 "The City College Case"
Guest Speaker: Thom Weidlich

Oct. 10 *Celebrities in Hell*
Guest Speaker: Warren Allen Smith

Nov. 14 "Russell on Pythagoras"

Dec. 12 *The ABC of Armageddon*

Jan. 9 *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell*

Note: All dates and topics are subject to change.

New Meeting Location!!!

Daily Perks Coffee House

389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY

For information, contact Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or
tmadigan@rochester.rr.com. Or visit
<http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~dwhite/grrs>.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

November 2002

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Thom Weidlich in Rochester

Thom Weidlich (right) signs a copy of his new book for **ORRS**-er Gerry Wildenberg during his visit to Rochester. **Read** the full story of Thom's visit inside!

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY
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IT'S TIME TO RENEW!!!
See Page 6 for Details!

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.usps.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>
Webmaster: John Lenz, jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone
Associate Editors: Phil Ibarra, Tim Madigan,
Rachel M. Murray, David White

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:

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Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Chairman of the Board | David White |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Ray Perkins |
| Secretary | Chad Trainer |
| Treasurer | Dennis J. Darland |

QUOTE OF THE QUARTERLY

"My main interest is defending humanism as an alternative morality, of happiness here and now, of autonomy and individual freedom and dignity, and of the value of the exuberance of this life."

BRS Honorary Member Paul Kurtz, quoted in Dintia Smith, "A Vigorous Skeptic of Everything but Fact." *New York Times*, June 19, 2002, p. E1. (See also "Updates on Awards and Honorary Members" in this issue.)

Kurtz at his most Russellian.

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IT'S TIME TO RENEW!!!
See page 6 for details!

From the Editor:

Dinner at Louie's

Right after I joined the BRS back in 1990, I benefited from some amazing luck. The first BRS Annual Meeting to take place after I joined (1991) was held at Lehigh University, in my hometown of Bethlehem (Pennsylvania, not Israel). I was an undergraduate at Penn State University at the time, and didn't have much of a conference budget, and so this coincidence gave me the opportunity to attend.

A year later, I was a summer intern at SANE/FREEZE: Campaign for Global Security, a peace organization based in Washington, DC (later renamed Peace Action). Still lacking much money (my internship "paid" the princely sum of \$50 a week), I had enjoyed my first BRS Annual Meeting and was anxious to attend my second. Fortunately, the BRS made it easy for me again; the 1992 Annual Meeting was held at American University in Washington that summer.

Admittedly, my luck ran out the following year; the 1993 Annual Meeting, held in San Diego, is the only meeting I've missed since I joined the Society. Still, my luck had held strong in allowing a poor student to attend two annual meetings in a row on a shoestring. But I think the most valuable piece of good fortune I enjoyed in those days took place even before I attended my first Annual Meeting. For in the spring of 1991, I received an invitation to attend a special event in honor of Russell, one that made quite an impact for me.

"PRAISE THE LORD!" read the postcard. "Lord Russell, of course," it went on. The card invited me to attend a celebration of Russell's birthday, to be held in Allentown that May. (Allentown, for those unfamiliar with Pennsylvania geography, sits right next to Bethlehem.) The meeting took place at Louie's, a quaint Italian restaurant downtown, and was organized by longtime BRS mainstay Lee Eisler and his new wife, Jan. Also attending were BRS members Glenn Moyer and his wife, along with a few others that Eisler and Moyer had dragged along. (Much of dinnertime was taken up with explaining whose birthday we were celebrating.) This was to be the first of several yearly birthday parties for Russell that I would attend at that restaurant, and I would always come away with interesting stories to tell, although I also learned to be careful telling them. (Note to all 19-year-old boys out there: never admit to other 19-year-olds that you've attended a birthday celebration for a dead British philosopher.)

There hasn't been a birthday party for Russell held in Bethlehem for several years now. Lee Eisler, who kept the BRS running smoothly for years as both Vice President for Information (it was he who responded to my initial expression of interest in the BRS) and editor of the *BRSQ*'s predecessor, the *Russell Society News* (I have succeeded him; I cannot replace him), passed away in 1998. Jan Loeb Eisler, currently a Board Member of the BRS, now resides in Florida. But to this day, I retain a lot of fond memories of those dinner parties. They surely helped cement my commitment to the BRS as much as the Annual Meetings or even Lee's fine newsletter.

And yet the fact remains that I was incredibly lucky to have such an annual celebration held right in my own backyard. Although the BRS has members scattered throughout the world, it has provided few opportunities outside the Annual Meeting for members to interact. Granted, it has a growing presence on the programs of the American Philosophical Association. But these programs are traditionally oriented towards professional philosophers; events aimed at the Russellian-in-the-street are few and far between.

The situation improved dramatically six years ago, when the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) was formed. Starting from humble beginnings, when meetings of four (three of whom were the organizers of the group) were not uncommon, the group has grown to the point where its local gatherings rival the BRS Annual Meeting in size. It has also taken a leadership role in the national society, with one of its founding members (David White) currently serving as Chairman of the Board and another (yours truly) editing the *BRSQ*. It has even begun to attract emulators, slowly but surely; a New York City chapter has formed, a Boston chapter has been explored, and there has been talk of a chapter in Indianapolis.

But while the GRRS can do many things, it cannot be everywhere at once. Our meetings offer regular opportunities only to the denizens of upstate New York. In order to get a Russell "fix" between Annual Meetings, one either has to be very lucky in where one resides—as I had been back in Bethlehem—or willing to put up with one heck of a commute. (At least one BRS member has expressed a willingness to attend GRRS events provided we can pay his plane fare from England. His request, along with every other request made to the GRRS that would require a budget, is still pending.)

Ultimately, if Russell-related events are to cover the land one day, they will have to come about through the initiative of the membership. If you would like to see the BRS become more visible in your area, there are many things you can do. You don't have to start a full-scale chapter (although if you'd like to give it a try, the GRRS will provide all the advice and assistance it can.) Arrange a speaking engagement for a distinguished Russellian in your town. Borrow an audio or video recording of Russell from the BRS Library, and set up a public viewing. Or, if even these events are beyond your resources, keep it low key. Throw a birthday party for Bertie. Find a nice restaurant (doesn't have to be Italian), invite some friends, and have a ball. If it goes well, there are plenty of other Russell-related milestones throughout the year to celebrate. You may discover that you have more energy for spreading the good word about the BRS than you initially thought.

One more thing. Once you've decided to hold a Russell-related event, let us know about it. The *BRSQ* would love to publicize your event, and will happily publish articles and photographs dealing with them. Consider it our own small way of keeping alive the memory of dinner at Louie's.

Abercrombie and Iraq

On October 10, 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 296-133 to authorize President Bush to carry out military action against Iraq. (Three House members did not vote, and three House seats were vacant at the time.) The following day, the Senate approved the same measure by a 77-23 vote. Among the courageous minority opposing the President was Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), the only member of Congress to belong to the BRS. The *BRSQ* would like to thank Rep. Abercrombie for remembering the words of Exodus 23:2—"Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil." Bertrand Russell's grandmother inscribed those words on a Bible she gave to him as a birthday present when he was a boy. They are as sound today as they were then. We salute Rep. Abercrombie's courage and good sense, and hope he will continue to work for peace as best he can.

(These views reflect only the opinions of the *BRSQ* Editorial Board. The BRS plays no role in partisan politics and endorses no candidates.)

Letter from the Chairman

Our Society is a strange one, as special interest groups go. We have an excellent mix of people with different kinds of interests in Russell, and we serve as a link between the pulse-beat of popular culture and the most dry-as-dust scholarship. The membership seems pleased with the revived *BRSQ*, and the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS) continues to sponsor impressive programs month after month. Perhaps not everyone is aware of the many other opportunities that come with membership in the BRS. Not only are full manuscripts welcomed by the editors of the *BRSQ*, but members may also care to submit ideas for a story or brief reports on local events. This December we have a program at the American Philosophical Association (APA) meeting in Philadelphia. Attendance by all members is very much encouraged. A program has also been prepared for the San Francisco meeting of the APA, March 26-30. Please consider, also, attending a birthday celebration on or about May 18. (See the editorial in this issue.) That would be a great time to volunteer to lead a book discussion at your local school or library. "Nobel Prize Winner" is often a good hook for getting attention. If you plan to be in New York, by all means get in touch with Warren Allen Smith about meeting with the second U.S. Chapter of the BRS. (See "The Greater New York City Chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society" in this issue.) The GRRS is full of ideas for those who want to start their own local chapter. Finally, there are many members who do not attend the Annual Meeting. This year the meeting will again be at Lake Forest College at the end of May. So far as I know, everyone who has attended these meetings has had a good time. Lake Forest (outside of Chicago) is a great location for a family vacation. I hope to see many of you at these events.

David E. White
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GRRS-cr Joins *BRSQ* Staff

Phil Ebersole, an active member of the GRRS, has joined the *BRSQ* team as an associate editor. Phil is a retired journalist who wrote for the Rochester *Democrat & Chronicle*; his skills should thus prove very valuable to us. Welcome aboard, Phil!

IT'S TIME TO RENEW!!!

All BRS memberships (except Life and Honorary memberships) expire at the end of the calendar year. And so if you haven't renewed your membership already, now is the time! To renew your membership, just use the handy membership form in the center of this issue. Indicate on the form that this is a renewal. Please return it to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. You can pay by check (payable, in U.S. Dollars, to "BRS") or money order. You can also pay by credit card using Paypal on the web. Just go to <http://www.paypal.com>, and open a free account. Then pay your dues using brs-pp@qconline.com as the recipient's e-mail address when prompted. There is no charge to make a Paypal payment, which (foreign members take note) will be handled in U.S. dollars. In the e-mail message that Paypal will send from you to our treasurer (Dennis), be sure to state the purpose of the payment (membership renewal). Do not include your credit card info in the message. Do include any change in your name and address. Dennis will send you an e-mail receipt, and update the membership records accordingly.

Unsure if you've renewed already. The *BRSQ* endeavors to make things as easy as possible. Just check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following four-digit numbers on it:

- 2002** means you are paid through 2002, but still need to renew for 2003.
- 2003** means you have indeed renewed for 2003, and so are all set for the year.
- 7777, 8888, or 9999** means you are a Life Member, Honorary Membership, or receiving the *BRSQ* as a courtesy. In any case, you never need to renew.

Check for your number, and you'll always know your status.

If you have any questions about your membership, feel free to write to Dennis at djarland@qconline.com.

The BRS is constantly looking for ways we can make it easier for you to keep your membership current. We'd hate to lose any member because of a misunderstanding over the timing of a dues payment. If you have any suggestions to help us improve the process, please drop the *BRSQ* a line.

The 2003 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL) May 30-June 1, 2003

After arranging a very successful BRS Annual Meeting at Lake Forest College last year, BRS Board member Rosalind Carey has agreed to host the 2003 BRS Annual Meeting at Lake Forest as well. The BRS is very appreciative of her hard work, both this year and next.

BRS President Alan Schwerin is currently preparing a website with information about the conference and a call for papers. In the meantime, members may also submit paper proposals to Alan at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ 07764 USA, (732) 571-4470, aschweri@monmouth.edu. Please direct all other questions about the conference (concerning housing, food, travel, etc.) to Rosalind Carey, Department of Philosophy, Durand Hall, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045 USA, carey@hermes.lfc.edu. Particulars will appear in the February 2003 *BRSQ*, or on BRS-List if they are available sooner. (See "Are You on BRS-List?" below.)

The *BRSQ* encourages every member to attend and participate in our second meeting at Lake Forest! See you there!

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserve, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserve is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. To join the list, visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively send the message

subscribe

to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserve's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

Note that BRS-List is **not** the same as Russell-I, a listserve run out of McMaster for the purpose of discussing all things Russellian. Please keep this distinction in mind when posting to one or the other list.

BRN Board Elections – Vote Now!

It's time for the BRN to fill the eight seats on its Board of Directors that fall vacant at the end of the year. Please cast your vote for up to 8 of the 9 candidates whose statements appear below. You may also write in candidates if you wish. Candidates must be members of the BRS in good standing.

A ballot appears at the center of this issue (right under the renewal form). Please return your completed ballot to BRS Librarian Tom Stanley at Box 434, Wilder, VT 05080 USA, or at tom.stanley@vallet.net. If a couple has a joint membership, each member of the couple is entitled to a vote; just photocopy the ballot and send one copy for each member. All ballots must include the name and signature of the member voting. (Ballots will be viewed only by the Elections Committee and the Secretary.) All ballots must be received by **December 31, 2002**.

Board Candidate Statements

Andrew Bone is Senior Research Associate at the Bertrand Russell Centre at McMaster University. He worked on an ad hoc basis for the old Bertrand Russell Editorial Project before joining it full time in January 1997. He first seriously engaged Russell's life while researching the emergency legislation under which Russell was charged in the First World War. (He conducted this research for his Ph. D. thesis in Modern British History.) He was an assistant editor on Volume 15 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* and is the editor of Volume 28, *Man's Peril, 1954-55* (currently at press) and Volume 29, *Détente or Destruction, 1955-57* (in progress).

David Goldman has been a member of the BRS for nearly 20 years. A psychiatrist and psychoanalyst affiliated with the Department of Psychiatry at New York University Medical Center and the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Center, respectively, he has focused on dealing with depression as a major source of personal unhappiness and with the psychiatric consequences of the threat of nuclear war. In these endeavors, he has been interested in the effect of rigid moral systems, dogmatic religious indoctrination, and political strictures on the development of healthy personalities and socially just societies. He is a Director of the National Coalition of Mental Health Professionals and Consumers, which fights against managed care abuses, loss of patient rights of confidentiality, and for the preservation of professionals' decision-making autonomy. He belongs to numerous progressive organizations, and once organized a

"Psychiatric Consequences of Nuclear War Conference" for the New York Chapter of the Physicians for Social Responsibility in the early 80's, one of the first efforts to deal with dangerous Reagan first-strike policies. In 1987, he addressed the BRS Annul Meeting on the inherent tendencies for positive and life-enhancing behavior against a prevailing psychological theory that the depressive position was the more truthful basic framework for perception and action. He is also currently preparing a talk for the BRS 2003 Annual Meeting on Russell's impact on psychiatry. As a Director, he would work to expand membership in psychiatric societies, urge greater visibility for BRS on the public issues of to-day, and work to develop cooperative ventures for public radio and TV informational programs with the Center for Inquiry.

Nick Griffin is a philosopher at McMaster University who is interested in logic, epistemology, and Bertrand Russell. He has edited two volumes of Russell's *Selected Letters*, co-edited two volumes of his *Collected Papers*, and is the author of *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship* as well as many articles on Russell's life and work. He is currently general editor of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* and the Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster, where he is working on an online edition of Russell's complete correspondence.

David Henehan has been a practicing lawyer ("solicitor" in Russell's parlance) for over 35 years. He has been a secular humanist since childhood, and currently serves on the Center for Inquiry, Inc. and its affiliated corporate boards as well as on a local Rotary handicapped children's camp board. A former Unitarian, he has also served the First Unitarian Church of Rochester as a board member, Vice-President and President. He has belonged to the BRS for many years, attending many annual meetings of the society and participating actively in the GRRS. A graduate of Hamilton College and Cornell Law School, he thinks it is important for the Board of Directors to consist not only of academics but other interested professionals and persons with business experience. He further believes that lawyers are uniquely qualified to serve on non-profit boards.

Justin Leiber (B.Phil., Oxford; Ph.D., University of Chicago) is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. His books include *Noam Chomsky: A Philosophic Overview*; *Structuralism*; *Can Animals and Machines Be Persons?*; *An Invitation to Cognitive Science*; *Paradoxes*; *Beyond Rejection*; *Beyond Humanity*; and *Beyond Gravity*. (Most of these works are also available in translation.) He has also published over fifty papers in philosophy and cognitive science journals, including papers on

Russell, Wittgenstein, J. I. Austin, Helen Keller, and Moju (a recently deceased chimpanzee). More information about him is available at <http://www.hfac.uh.edu/phil/leiber/leiber.htm>.

Chandrakala Padia is the Director of the Banaras Chapter of the BRS. She started this chapter in 1989, and since then she has been actively involved in propagating and disseminating the humanist ideas of Bertrand Russell. Under her leadership, the Banaras Chapter organizes its own annual conference every year, along with many other talks by distinguished scholars. Her book, entitled *Liberty and Social Transformation: A Study in Bertrand Russell's Political Thought*, has been widely acclaimed. She completed this book at the Russell Archives at McMaster University. Since then she has published many papers in renowned journals, including one in *Russell*. Presently, she is Professor of Political Science and Director of Center for Women Studies at Banaras Hindu University. She holds many key positions in the academic world and has been made member of various national bodies; recently, for example, she was named National Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla. Her most recent book is entitled *Feminism, Tradition, and Modernity*, and has been published by the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla.

Cara Rice was brought up with a respectful attitude towards secular humanism. Bertrand Russell's *Why I Am Not a Christian* figured prominently in the family library. She has, however, always avoided taking the merits of her upbringing for granted. She attended undergraduate school at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where she was politically active. She is currently preparing to be certified for teaching high school English, as a Masters of Science in Education candidate at the University of Pennsylvania. There she is incorporating Russell into her studies and plans to utilize his thought in her student teaching as well. She is studying Dewey and Russell's philosophies of education and has completed two projects this year based largely on Russell's *Education and the Social Order* and the *History of Western Philosophy's* critique of Plato's *Republic*, respectively. In addition, she is planning to write a term paper that will discuss Dora and Bertrand Russell's Beacon Hill School experiences. She originally got her husband, Chad Trainer, involved in the BRS by giving him a membership as a 1998 holiday present. She and Chad live in Pennsylvania several miles from Russell's World War II residences, which they periodically visit. She is interested in continuing to attend the Society's annual meetings and in presenting at some of them.

Peter Stone is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. His research includes critical and democratic theory in addition to Russell. He has been a Board Member of the BRS since 1997, and was Secretary of the Society and Board from 1998-2001. He has also chaired the BRS Awards Committee from 1998-2001, and served an additional year as committee member. He is currently chairman of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* Committee, and in that capacity serves as editor of the *BRSQ*. He is also a founder and active participant in the GRRS. He hopes to make membership outreach a top priority for the BRS.

Ruilu Ye received her Ph.D. in Computer Science from the City University of New York (CUNY). Her dissertation topic was a first-order logic formalization of belief with names. She is currently an assistant professor at CUNY and a co-chair of the newly-founded Greater New York City Chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society.

In Memoriam: Harry Ruja

On February 28, 2002, Harry Ruja died of complications from a stroke suffered last December. He was 90. Harry was for years a mainstay of both Russell Studies and the BRS. He co-edited with Ken Blackwell the massive three-volume *Bibliography of Bertrand Russell* (Routledge, 1994), and chaired the BRS Board of Directors. He will be sorely missed. A tribute to Harry will appear in a forthcoming *BRSQ*.

BRS Receives Bequest

The BRS recently received a check for over \$1000 from the life insurance policy of Artie Gomez, a longtime member of the BRS. An obituary of Mr. Gomez, a resident of Pittsfield, MA, appeared on March 27, 2002 at <http://www.iberkshires.com/community/obituary/obituary.php3?person=1790>. The *BRSQ* would like to acknowledge this generous gift and extend our sincerest best wishes to Mr. Gomez's family and friends.

A Russellian is Born—Update

The February 2002 issue of the *BRSQ* carried news of the birth of Sophia Russell Spike, named (of course) after Bertie. It now appears that Sophia's father, Jeffrey Spike, has joined the BRS. The *BRSQ* welcomes him into the BRS and trusts that he will read to Sophia from our newsletter at bedtime.

Articles:

**Author Reports a Shocking Encounter with BR
David White**

Warren Allen Smith and Ken Blackwell noticed a Russell anecdote in Doris Grumbach's *The Pleasure of their Company* (Beacon Press, 2001), which the publisher has been advertising as "a shocking encounter." Here is the full text (which appears on pages 83-84):

In the first year at the *Forum*, and for the second time in my short life, I came, in a humorous sort of way, close to greatness. Peter Blake had been a tutor to Bertrand Russell's young son, Conrad, in England. When Russell was invited by Albert Barnes to lecture at his house in Merion, Pennsylvania, Peter and I once met him at the station on his return to the city and took him to his hotel in New York, where he stayed until it was time to give his Rand lecture in the city.

The manager at the Lafayette, at Tenth Street in Greenwich Village, seemed delighted to welcome Lord Russell. I remember watching him sign the register with a flourish and wondered if he were being accorded free privileges. It was probably not so, because after our drinks at a marble-topped table in the coffee shop, we went upstairs to Russell's room, a tiny cell of a place without a private bath.

When Peter went down the long hall to the men's room, I was alone with Russell. The seventy-two-year-old philosopher closed the door, pushed me down on the bed, opened the buttons of his fly, and climbed atop of me. He was a small but amazingly virile chap. Fortunately, by the time he had succeeded in reaching through the layers of my clothes, Peter had returned and interrupted the proceedings.

Russell was most nonchalant at being interrupted, Peter pretended not to notice as the great man closed his buttons and I, much relieved, rearranged my skirt and sweater. We said good night to Russell, he to us (I think I

remember he kissed us both sedately on the cheek), and we left. As we walked down the stairs I thought, I remember clearly: this is as close as I am ever likely to come to having sex with a Nobel Prize winner.

Intrigued and confused, the *BRSQ* wrote to Ms Grumbach as follows:

September 30, 2002

Dear Ms. Grumbach,

An article submitted to our journal contains a reference to the story you tell about Bertrand Russell in *The Pleasure of Their Company*. Our fact checker has raised some issues about the anecdote. Our present intention is to include an editorial note pointing out the apparent discrepancies, but we would like to hear from you or your publisher if there is an explanation.

You do not give a date for the alleged incident, but the reference to your first year at the *Forum* (p. 83) and to Russell working for Barnes and giving his Rand lecture (p. 84) all point to a date late in 1942. You then mention that Russell was seventy-two, but he was only seventy in 1942. Far more significantly, you say "I remember clearly: this is as close as I am ever likely to come to having sex with a Nobel Prize winner." (p. 84) The trouble is that Russell's Nobel Prize was not until 1950, so you could not have had that thought as you "walked down the stairs" in 1942.

Here is a transcription of the prompt reply we received:

Memory is a slippery slope. I erred by 2 years on Russell's age (not a serious error). I remember thinking of R's celebrity as I left the hotel. The thought about the Nobel Prize must have come later. Mea culpa...Sixty years is a long, long time to hold events fast in memory.

Doris

P.S. All else is exact, I believe.

**Irving Copi Remembered
Peter Stone**

On August 19, 2002, Irving Marmer Copi died at the age of 85. A retired University of Hawaii philosophy professor, Copi is best known for his numerous books on logic— notably *Introduction to Logic*, which has gone through 11 editions to date. In 1998, Copi received the BRS Annual Award “in recognition of his exemplary contributions to logic and philosophy in the Russellian tradition” (to quote from his award plaque).

At the time Copi was given the award, I was chairing the BRS Awards Committee. I therefore had the privilege of both offering Copi the award and then sending him the plaque once he had accepted it. In response, I received a lovely handwritten postcard which I still have. In tribute to Professor Copi, I reproduce the text from the postcard below.

August 4, 1999

Dear Dr. Stone,

Thank you and the Bertrand Russell Society for the beautiful plaque sent to me last month. I am indeed honored! I was very lucky to have participated in Russell’s Seminar at the University of Chicago in 1938-39. He was indeed an inspiration to me, and to many others who attended it. They included Profs. Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris, Sr. (of the Math or Chemistry Dept.) and others in that enormous lecture hall to which the seminar was ultimately moved from the tiny seminar room for which it was originally scheduled.

Russell was an easily approachable teacher who set aside one evening a week at his apartment in Chicago for interested students to come and discuss philosophy with him. His beautiful young wife “Peter”, a flirtatious redhead, was a charming hostess. One night he perched himself on the arm of a sofa and showed how he worked as coxswain of the boat that engaged in weekly racing at Cambridge. He shouted: “By the HOLY left leg of the HOLY lamb of God—STROKE!” A delicious memory now sixty years old!

I saw Russell again around 25 years later when I spent part of a sabbatical in England. He had been retired for some time and spent part of his time in London and part in the West of England. It was a pleasant visit. I was somewhat surprised to find him set in his “super-

empiricist” convictions, but we didn’t really argue the issues but were satisfied to make as clear as we could to each other what our different convictions were. He was a beautiful old man and I was sorry not to be able to agree with what he said.

These are old memories of a man much older and wiser than myself. I think of him with deep affection and reverence. I think it fair to say that I did and still do love him—as a teacher, a friend, and an inspiration!

Yours Very Sincerely,

Irving M. Copi

Russell is an inspiration to many of us, but there are increasingly few people alive who can claim to have derived that inspiration in person. Copi will be dearly missed.

**Stephen Jay Gould
September 10, 1941-May 20, 2002
Warren Allen Smith**

Recently, we noted the death of Stephen Jay Gould, recipient of the 2000 BRS Award (see “Updates on Awards and Honorary Members,” BRSQ #115, August 2002). In this issue, we present a report on the memorial service held for Gould in New York City by a longtime BRS-er.

Stephen Jay Gould’s memorial was memorable for its wit, humor, and appreciation of his having so successfully popularized paleontology and evolutionary biology.

On May 30, 2002, the New York City Fire Department’s Color Guard and Pipes and Drums commenced the memorial by performing outside New York University’s Vanderbilt Hall. Then to the slow beat of a single snare drum, Mrs. Rhonda Gould along with members and friends of the Gould family marched solemnly into the auditorium. Several hundred had already assembled, filling the room to capacity.

The first to speak was Philip Furmanski, chairman of New York University’s Biology Department. He recalled how the two had co-taught biology, how Gould had been a cherished colleague with profound feelings of the responsibilities a scientist has both to his science and to the public.

But he was not just Bahamian Conlon snails, fossils, and the punctuated equilibrium theory. Gould, he said shifting his tone, also loved W. C. Fields, Mae West, and the Yankees baseball team. Toward the end of his life, suffering from the mesothelioma that would kill him, Gould valiantly had wanted to live long enough to finish two books he still had in him. Regretfully, this was not to be.

Niles Eldredge, of the American Museum of Natural History and author of *The Triumph of Evolution and the Failure of Creationism*, explained some of Dr. Gould's basic and admittedly controversial views. The two had suggested that evolutionary change does not involve a steady process of slow change but, rather, fossil records show it came in fits and starts. During millions of years, for example, species changed little or not at all. But intermittently species did change, and new forms appeared in the fossil record, punctuating the rapid change, leading to their theory's being called *punctuated equilibrium*. Gould, he said, was "arguably the most famous scientist of our time" and his passing "will leave a void that nobody can fill." One paleontologist Gould did not agree with, said Eldredge to everyone's amusement, was the paleontologist and Jesuit priest, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

Richard Burger, a childhood chum, told tales of their riding the "F" train together, Gould easily memorizing all the subway stops. At Jamaica High School, in the city's Borough of Queens, Gould had sung folksongs with the school's leftists and, a sign of his genius, had declared joyfully that all reasonable people *had* to be atheists, not believers. Later in life, Gould had a habit of carrying twenty-seven or so pens in his shirt pocket, Burger noted, adding with a smile that probably eighteen of them were bone dry.

Gould's stepson, London Shearer Allen, related what an inspiring mentor his step-father had been and how as a teenager he had been encouraged to study reptiles, had even been taken on a memorable trip to Costa Rica's jungles to study flora and fauna. Mourners were amused when he reported that his stepfather had been a great help and an ideal person to proofread some of his student research papers at NYU.

Oliver Sacks, a neurologist and friend, called Gould a polymath, humanizing him by saying he loved humor, parties, Gilbert and Sullivan, baseball, but, above all, dinosaurs.

One of Stephen's two sons, Ethan Gould, said he and his father bonded with their interest in baseball. "I promised Dad I would read one of his books," he said, admitting that he was not the academic genius his father

was. "I never did read one of his books. But I will now," he added to everyone's amusement.

Alan Dershowitz, the lawyer, sent a message that was read, one in which he detailed his own appreciation for Gould's many scientific findings.

Two selections were then sung by The Boston Cecilia—"Funeral Sentences for the Funeral of Queen Mary" by Henry Purcell and "The Blue Bird" by Charles Villiers Stanford. Over the years, Gould had enjoyed singing with the group, and the memorial ended with the two songs, following which the single snare drummer led Mrs. Gould and the immediate family out of the auditorium.

"Why," the musical group's conductor was asked, "was the Purcell music with its theistic overtones chosen? Why not something like Haydn's 'Creation,' which Gould once told reporter Alexander Star has a text right out of the heart of the Enlightenment, one praising reason, knowledge, and liberal values." Well, replied Barbara Bruns, the family had agreed to the two selections, one secular and one religious, and Dr. Gould himself had sung the Purcell selection with the group in the past. "But he was a naturalist, a non-believer!" she was told. The musical conductor had no further explanation but was informed that, for many who had assembled, the equilibrium of the memorial had been *punctured* by the choice of the one religious work, not *punctuated*.

GRRS Visited by Distinguished Russellians Alan Bock

The late summer and early fall of 2002 was a period of unprecedented activity for the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS). During this period three guest speakers, one from McMaster University and two from New York City, journeyed to Rochester to address our local group, now housed in new quarters at the Daily Perks Coffee House.

The first to arrive was Andrew G. Bone, who motored down to Rochester from Hamilton, Ontario in August to talk on "Russell and the Communist-Aligned Peace Movement in the Mid-1950s." Russellians will recall that Andy had presented a paper with this title at the 2001 Annual Meeting at McMaster, subsequently published in *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies* (Summer 2001).

As has become customary for our out of town guests, a pre-lecture dinner party was provided by various members of the steering committee. Kim's Asia House restaurant was the scene of our August repast attended by (in addition to Andy) David Heneman, Peter Stone, Phil Ebersole, David and Linda White, and Pat and Alan Bock.

In a well-researched presentation, Andy pointed out that Russell's outlook on international politics had been greatly altered by the Soviet Union's successful atom bomb test in 1949 but that there was considerable delay before his anti-communism softened perceptibly. However, by the time of his famous broadcast on "Man's Peril" just before Christmas 1954, Russell had long since passed his most belligerent anti-Communist phase. This turnabout came mainly through external factors: a crisis within western Communism and the emergence of broadly based movements for peace that could not easily be tainted by their critics as "pro-Soviet."

In an exhaustive historical analysis, Andy went on to discuss how Russell and Russia went from confrontation to coexistence; Russell's anti-anti-communism during the McCarthy period; and finally the Russell-Einstein manifesto that ultimately led to the Pugwash Conferences.

Russell, Andy concluded, demonstrated a shrewd understanding of the delicate balance that had to be struck between accommodating and excluding pro-Soviet elements in the wider peace movement. This, according to Ronald Clark, "was a tricky operation which only the aristocrat would have attempted with equanimity and which Russell, almost alone among living men, had the background and resolution to carry out with some chance of success."

September saw the first of two visitors from New York City—Thom Weidlich, author of *Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus, 2000). This book discusses the famous court case whereby Russell was denied a teaching appointment at City College of New York (CCNY).

A week and a half before Thom's arrival, a preview of his talk (of sorts) was provided via a live telephone interview on Rochester's PBS AM station WXXI. On Wednesday, September 4, 2002, Thom was interviewed from NYC by local radio host Bob Smith on his show "The 1370 Connection." The interview lasted from noon to 1 PM. Smith had obviously read *Appointment Denied* recently and was well-versed on the facets and nuances of the case. A recurring theme throughout the program was the relevance of the case in today's world. Thom admitted that when

he first started researching for the book he thought the case so bizarre that it was unique; ultimately, however, he concluded that such a situation could repeat itself today given the right circumstances. Smith, too, thought it was astounding and deplorable that one of the greatest living philosophers, a future Nobel Prize winner, could be denied a teaching appointment because his radical views on sex and other matters were turned into a political football. However, Smith thought that the whole thing added to Russell's luster in the long run since his views (e.g. companionate marriage) which were so shocking in 1940 had by the 1960s become common-place and "ho hum."

Smith's probing questions throughout the interview brought out all the major facts of the case: Bishop Manning's antagonism toward Russell's sexual politics; the public outcry over Russell's radical views; his surprised and overwhelmed defenders in academia; the political chicanery of Tammany Hall politicians itching to get at their nemesis LaGuardia (who, in the end, chose to drop the "hot potato" of academic freedom); and, finally, the court fight brought about by the "purchase" of a plaintiff, Mrs. Jean Kay of Brooklyn, who claimed that her daughter would be corrupted by Russell's teaching even though, ironically, this would have been impossible given that the day sessions at CCNY in which Russell would have taught were at that time restricted to male students.

On Thursday, September 12, 2002, Thom flew from JFK to Rochester for a whirlwind 24-hour visit. He was met at the airport by Tim Madigan; the two were then joined for lunch by BRS members Pat and Alan Bock. After lunch Thom was shown one of Rochester's most famous landmarks—the George Eastman House, home of the founder of the Eastman Kodak Company. In addition to being a historic site, this building now houses a photographic museum. Many of the rooms in the mansion contained plaques describing the life and times of George Eastman. During a tour, we learned, among other things, that Eastman gave much of his great fortune to charity; that he instituted one of the very first employee profit-sharing plans anywhere; and, interestingly, that he was a rationalist who did not believe in the hereafter or in traditional religion.

A few hours later, what has now become the traditional "pre-talk" dinner was held at the Beale Street Café and was attended by all the "usual suspects" of the GRRS. At 7 PM, we all promptly trooped over to Daily Perks, where a "good crowd" of about 30 people (including many new faces) joined us. Thom was introduced by Tim Madigan, who informed us that he has known Thom for about 15 years. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the famous case, Thom published an article in CCNY on the

subject in *Free Inquiry*. Tim Madigan and others at the magazine at the time then suggested that Thom write a book on the subject. That book was completed and published by Prometheus Books ten years later.

The City College case, in Thom's view, was an incredible story with a fascinating cast of characters. First of all there was Russell himself, viewing the proceedings with increasing frustration in far-off California. While his writings and lifestyle were "what the case was all about," he himself would only play a bit part as the case unfolded. Next, there was the Episcopal Bishop of New York, William T. Manning, who started it all with his letter to New York's major newspapers objecting to the Russell appointment. He was a strange mixture of liberal altruism in social welfare matters and rigid, uncompromising conservatism in all matters pertaining to sex. He, of course, was appalled by Russell's lifestyle. Thom thought that both men were "preachers"—Manning championed dogmatic theology, Russell twentieth-century secularism. Thom also artfully introduced the large cast of supporting players—Ordway Tead, Chairman of the Board of Education governing CCNY; various other members of the Board, holding widely divergent views; Morris Cohen, John Dewey, Sidney Hook and other academics who came to Russell's defense; the students, almost unanimous in support of the Russell appointment, who were led by Robert Klein, president of the student council; James J. Lyons, the flashy Bronx Borough President and a number of Tammany Hall politicians; the Catholic diocese's new bishop, Francis Spellman, who worked mainly behind the scenes (which became one of his trademarks); Joseph Goldstein, the lawyer who brought the suit on behalf of Mrs. Kay and her daughter; the Honorable John E. McGeehan, the Tammany judge, whose willingness to ignore proper legal procedure and rule as he did was an important factor; and, finally, the "Little Flower," Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Mayor of the City of New York who failed to stand behind his own Board of Education.

Years later, in 1957, Russell would recall that "In New York Christian churches, Episcopalian and Roman Catholic accused me of offenses of which I was not guilty, and, when their libels were repeated in a law court, succeeded in preventing me from denying the accusations on the technical ground that I was not an interested party." In taking exception to a review of "Why I Am Not a Christian" in which the reviewer claimed that individual Christians often act with merit, Russell agreed but said his main concern was with Christianity as a social force and wrote "Your reviewer thinks that the kind of Christianity which I criticize ended with the end of the Regency, but George IV had been dead some time in 1940."

Warren Allen Smith made his second visit to Rochester in October 2002. Last year, he discussed his monumental *Who's Who in Hell* (Barricade Books, 2000); this year his subject was his new paperback, *Celebrities in Hell* (Barricade Books, 2002). Last year he appeared on the "Brother Wease" radio show; this year, like Thom Weidlich, he was interviewed live from New York City by Bob Smith on the latter's "1370 Connection."

I tuned in a little early and was pleasantly surprised to catch the last five minutes of an interview with Salman Rushdie on the preceding program. I could not help thinking how appropriate it was that the author of *The Satanic Verses* should be a prelude (of sorts) to the author of *Who's Who in Hell*. As W. C. Fields might have said: "How FORTOOITUS!" Later in the week, Rushdie gave a lecture at the University of Rochester attended by both Warren and our own Tim Madigan. At a reception afterward, Warren gave Rushdie a copy of Taslima Nasrin's latest book.

Nasrin, who is prominently featured in *Who's Who in Hell*, has been called the "female Salman Rushdie," as the two have had similar experiences with Islamic fatwas. She is a physician as well as a poet-novelist-journalist and was recently convicted of blasphemy (in absentia) in her native Bangladesh and sentenced to one year in jail. (See "News from the Humanist World" in this issue.) Encouragingly, Rushdie told Warren that he did not think that Nasrin would have any security problems during a forthcoming book tour of North America and that he wished her well.

The "Smith on Smith" program proved to be a lively one, with many interested callers representing diverse points of view. Fred, the first caller, almost sounded like a "set-up" when he dropped the phrase "no atheists in foxholes" giving Warren the opportunity to describe his experience on one of the world's most famous foxhole sites, Omaha Beach, in 1944. Warren also noted that Sir Arthur C. Clarke, among many others, was a famous "atheist in a foxhole." Perhaps Warren might consider doing some future compilation of "Atheists in Foxholes." The second caller, "Jim from Canandaigua," proved to be none other our own Jim Judkins, a regular attendee of GRRS meetings. He provided some rationalist quotes and a short poem by Barbara Smoker. Warren gave him an A+ on his quotes and informed him that Barbara Smoker can be found on page 1027 of *Who's Who in Hell*. Halfway through the program, Smith and Smith broke for a commercial from the program's sole sponsor—"Northeast Seminary of Roberts Wesleyan College, offering masters of divinity and masters of theology degrees." The next caller, Mary, registered some surprise at the program's sponsor and then went on to take Warren to task for making fun of religion when he used the phrase "Holy Spook." He explained that he is

an inveterate humorist and would continue to be so. What is humor to some is blasphemy to others which is no laughing matter. Martha (from Fairport) had a friendly and pleasant voice and articulated numerous concerns she had, as a Christian, with Warren's point of view which she thought was the "flip side" of religion. Originally raised as a Catholic, she had been an atheist for a while but had been brought back to religion by reading the works of C.S. Lewis and was now a Methodist (Warren's old religion). However, she saved her most effusive praise for her current literary interest—Thomas Cahill, author of *Desire of the Everlasting Hills: The World before and after Jesus*. Martha obviously likes to read and, no doubt, will continue to evolve. The whole hour seemed to fly by.

Warren flew into Rochester on Thursday, October 10, 2002. Conveniently, the pre-lecture dinner was held at McGregor's Restaurant, which is right across the street from Daily Perks. For the third month in a row, our meeting attracted a crowd of more than 25 people. At the outset, Warren reported that he and Thom Weidlich are starting a Bertrand Russell group in New York City (see "The Greater New York City Chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society" in this issue), and that they have been much encouraged by the success of the Greater Rochester Russell Set (whose sixth anniversary approaches). He recalled that he had begun writing to celebrities more than fifty years ago and, to his surprise, received replies from many of them (but not from Einstein—perhaps he should have written in German). This, of course, was the genesis of *Who's Who in Hell*. He told us that he consulted the publisher Lyell Stuart, who set the price at \$125, and that 300 copies have been sold to libraries, including the Vatican Library. (Even the FBI has a copy.)

Warren also discussed many of the figures listed in *Celebrities in Hell*, providing surprising bits of new trivia. For example, the great actress Sarah Bernhardt had a wooden leg and was once asked by the opera composer Gounod if she prayed. When she answered "No, I'm an atheist," Gounod (who vacillated between mysticism and voluptuousness) fell to his knees and prayed. More interesting was the news that Charlie Chaplin was inspired by Robert Ingersoll and that he once wanted to play the title role in a movie about the life of Christ. The movie mogul who turned him down said that "it would have been the greatest religious picture ever made but he would have been run out of Indianapolis." We also learned that Isaac Asimov knew all the lyrics to Tom Lehrer's "The Vatican Rag." Warren regaled us with interesting stories of many other celebrities including Marlon Brando, Jesse Ventura, George Carlin, Ted Turner and George Clooney. After Warren took questions, Linda and David White invited all present to a reception at their house; many attended.

Book Reviews:

The Continuing Influence of *Why I Am Not a Christian*

We here reproduce a review of *Why I Am Not a Christian* that appeared in the BMJ (formerly British Medical Journal) two years ago. The review was written by Dr. Simon Chapman, an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Health and Community Medicine at the University of Sydney and (ironically enough, given Russell's devotion to his pipe) one of Australia's leading anti-smoking advocates. The BRSQ would like to thank the BMJ for permission to reproduce this article.

Reprinted from BMJ 2000; 320: 1152 (22 April).

A Book That Changed Me

Why I am not a Christian
Bertrand Russell
Routledge, £9.99, pp 208
ISBN 0 415 07918 7

In 1969, at the age of 17, and after eight schooners of lager and a night of murderous vomiting to celebrate my final matriculation exam, I left my home in rural New South Wales and moved to a university hall of residence in the parental Gomorrah of Sydney. In the room opposite me was an earnest man from Hong Kong, 10 years my senior, who late at night would tap on my door to invite me to play chess and drink jasmine tea. He was studying for a Ph.D. on the mathematical philosopher Gottfried Leibnitz, and his room was full of books with titles that both frightened and excited me at the prospect of all I would need to know now that, overnight, I was no longer a child. On the first night I entered his room the title of one burnt into my brain—Bertrand Russell's *Why I am not a Christian*.

Such profanity promised to fit well with other unwritten books that swirled in my callow head: *Why I No Longer Live with My Parents*; *Things to Do with Naked Girls*; *Mind Altering Drugs for Beginners*. I asked if I could read it, and I recall switching off my light at 3 30 a.m., drunk with excitement at the eloquent defilement that I'd just consumed. Not since I'd wolfed down *Lady Chatterley's Lover* in an afternoon at the age of 13—after being handed it by a conspiratorial librarian with pearls and hair in a bun—had I had such joy from a book.

I'd been brought up in the high Anglican church, and God had been a problem for me ever since I, at about age 10, had asked my parents, "If God made the world, who made God?"—something that Russell now informed me was the naïf's way of phrasing the argument from first cause. The imperious canon from our cathedral was invited home for afternoon tea to plug the dyke of the boy's worrying scepticism: staring at me with that look, he said there was simply no need to keep on asking the question—it all just started with God. "Sure...right," I thought. Church for me had been the pageantry, the lusty singing on cold Sunday mornings, the scented mothers fussing with scones and jam after the service, but especially the chance to pash choirgirls after practice on Thursday nights. I'd had little truck with the theology, and the stuff about heaven seemed patent anthropocentric wish fulfillment, clasped to the bosoms of the mostly aged parishioners who seemed determined to believe in it all.

The shackles of the afterworld fell off that night, and in rode the exhilarating awareness that my gut level scepticism in fact had whole tribes of authors to support it. Russell's book was soon followed by Joachim Kahl's *The Misery of Christianity: Or a Plea for a Humanity Without God*. This catalogued the horrors wrought in the name of religion, while championing the values that many religions wanted to claim as their own. Jean Paul Sartre's essay *Existentialism and Humanism* consolidated the rift while securing the importance of taking responsibility for your beliefs and values. It also gave me a French philosophical badge that I wore as an undergraduate, along with my pretentious Gitanes cigarettes and taste in excruciating films by Bresson, Renoir, Resnais, and Truffaut.

Russell's book, and much of what I learnt about his life, embodied two of the most important things in my later life—passion for justice and intellectual scepticism. It'll be in my own 17 year old's Christmas stocking this year.

Simon Chapman, *associate professor*.
Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Sydney, Australia

New in Russell Studies!

Would you like to find out what's new in Russell Studies? Then visit the "Forthcoming, New and Recent Works in Russell Studies" page at the website of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. The page is at <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/forthnew.htm>.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- Edmund Blair Bolles has edited a book entitled *Galileo's Commandment: 2,500 Years of Great Science Writing* (W.H. Freeman, 1999). The book contains essays by several figures associated with Russell, such as Einstein, Popper, Gould, and Chomsky. It also contains an essay by Russell entitled "What Einstein Did." The essay consists of a selection from Russell's book *The ABC of Relativity*.

Source: Peter Stone

- The September 2001 issue of *Monthly Review* contains a review of the second edition of Morton Sobell's *On Doing Time* (Golden Gate National Park National Parks Association, 2001). The review, by Lawrence Kaplan (whose wife is Sobell's cousin) mentions Russell's involvement with the campaign to free Sobell:

The FBI was troubled by the existence of the Sobell Committee, which tried to effect his release and educate people about the case. The agency did its best to infiltrate the Committee, to impede its work and to discredit famous people—such as Bertrand Russell—who spoke out in support of Sobell.

The review is at <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0901kaplan.htm>.

Apparently, the book itself contains no mention of Russell, although it does contain a photograph of Russell welcoming Sobell's wife, Helen, into his home in 1963. Helen Sobell, incidentally, died in April 2002. An April 25 obituary in the *Guardian* mentioned the work by Russell, as well as Pablo Picasso, in support of Sobell. The obituary is by Godfrey Hodgson.

Those interested in learning more about Sobell (who was convicted with the Rosenbergs of espionage in the midst of the worst hysteria of the Cold War) might wish to check out two of Russell's public letters on the case that are included in Ray Perkins' *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor* (Open Court, 2001).

Source: Ken Blackwell & Ray Perkins

- The Canadian magazine *Westworld BC* ran a travel article in its February 2002 issue entitled "Ode to an Iguana." The author, Ian Hannington, details his various excursions to Puerto Vallarta. In the course of his musings, he mentions his favorite sculpture in the city, a recent work by Sergio Bustamante entitled *En Busca de la Razon* ("In Search of Reason). The statue depicts a "gownclad being with a large head shaped like an inverted triangle" standing "with arms and mouth open, giving up at a ladder that reaches into the sky, up which are climbing two similar but smaller characters." "On a plaque at the base" of this picturesque work, Hannington notes, "is a partial quote from Bertrand Russell's *The Conquest of Happiness*, in Spanish, which suggests: 'Rationality consists in the main of internal harmony. The man who achieves it is freer in his contemplation of the world.'"

Source: Peter Stone

- The February 9, 2002 issue of the *Vancouver Sun* featured an article by Annabel Lyon entitled "The Invention of Love: In Shaping Our Understanding of Love, Literature Can Be as Insidious as It Is Eloquent, as Fickle as It Is Sincere." Lyon castigates the great writers for bamboozling the public with so much advice on love, much of it contradictory. Great literature suggests that love is "essential, unsatisfying, portentous and exasperating. It provokes cynicism, defensiveness, joy and sincerity." To prove her point, she selects eight quotes from great writers, and invites the readers to match them to their authors. One of them comes from Russell's *Conquest of Happiness*. (Russellians will have to check out the article to discover which one, although it's not hard to guess by keeping in mind that Russell wasn't a poet.)

Source: Peter Stone

- Rabbi Dr. Chaim Simons, of Kiryat Arba, Israel, has published a book online entitled *A Historical Survey of Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine 1895 - 1947*. Among the proponents of transfer discussed are David Ben-Gurion, Franklin Roosevelt—and, at one point at least, Bertrand Russell. The discussion of Russell reads as follows:

Bertrand Russell was an English philosopher and mathematician. In his later years, Russell was actively engaged in the campaign for nuclear disarmament. For his numerous writings, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

In 1943, Bertrand Russell wrote about his views regarding a future Jewish State. With regard to the Arab question, he distinguished between the theoretical solution and the practical realities.

For the theoretical solution, he put forward the idea of transfer. He wrote that "it should be possible to offer adequate compensation for any disturbance, and to cause the Arabs voluntarily to surrender inconvenient rights in return for perhaps more valuable concessions elsewhere."

However, in practical terms, he concluded that the problem was much more complex. This was not because he felt transfer was unethical or wrong, but because "the question is inflamed by the very general rise of Asiatic self-consciousness, and a determination to assert the rights of Asia as against the white man." Even in the eyes of the most enlightened Indian inhabitants, Russell considered that Zionism appeared as an ally of British imperialism. He did not feel that there was "the faintist [*sic—ed.*] justification for this view;" however since it was widely held, it was politically important.

In support of his claims, the author cites the following works: Bertrand Russell, "Zionism and the Peace Settlement." *The New Palestine* (June 11, 1943); Bertrand Russell, "Zionism and the Peace Settlement." *Palestine: A Jewish Commonwealth in Our Time* (1943); and Dina Porat, "Bertrand Russell on the Jewish State: 1943," *Zionism* 3 (Spring 1981).

The book, which offers a not-so-subtle defense of less-than-voluntary transfers (otherwise known as "ethnic cleansing") by Israel today, is online at <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/7854/>.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- Reviews of Carole Seymour-Jones' *Painted Shadow: The Life of Vivienne Eliot* (London: Constable Robinson, 2001; New York: Doubleday, 2002) continue to appear. The *Times Colonist* of Victoria, British Columbia ran a review by Sheldon Goldfarb on June 23, 2002. Goldfarb bemoans the length of the book, which makes for a rather monotonous read given how little of note actually happened in Vivienne Eliot's life. Goldfarb even concludes that "somehow

Seymour-Jones manages to make even the sex a bit tedious after a while, though it is interesting to discover that Bertrand Russell slept with just about everybody; it makes one want to reread his book *The Conquest of Happiness*."

In another review that appeared in the September 30, 2002 issue of the *New Yorker*, Louis Menand takes a swipe at Russell in his review of Carole Seymour-Jones' *The Life of Vivienne Eliot* (New York: Doubleday, 2002; earlier reviews of this book are discussed in the "Odds and Ends" section of the August 2002 *BRSQ*). Menand, whose review of Seymour-Jones' book is largely negative, describes Russell as "a sexual predator who permitted himself to become temporarily infatuated with the women he seduced." In Russell's defense, however, he notes that Russell's affair with Vivienne was one that "her husband [T.S. Eliot, of course] either tacitly condoned or was remarkably obtuse about." The most memorable line, however, is probably the opening one, which asks a question we've all asked ourselves at least once—"T. S. Eliot's sex life. Do we really want to go there?"

Source: Peter Stone & Phil Ebersole

- *The Historian*, magazine of the Historical Association, featured an article in its Summer 2002 issue on Russell's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The article is by a student named Victoria Martin. The article reviews various perspectives on Russell's role; however, it generally takes for granted the U.S. position on the Cold War and the missile crisis, and so the overall judgment of Russell is negative.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- The September 2002 edition of the *Atlantic* features a review by Christopher Hitchens of Martin Amis' *Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million* (Talk Miramax Books, 2002). The review is entitled "Lightness at Midnight: Stalinism without Irony." In the course of the review, Hitchens mentions that Amis takes George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Fabian socialism, and the Bloomsbury group all to task for their "indulgence shown toward Stalinism." At this point Hitchens, in turn, takes Amis to task as follows:

Amis, who briefly mocks the gullibility of the Bloomsbury and *New Statesman* tradition...forgets that the grand prix for prescience here belongs to the atheist, socialist, and anti-

imperialist Bertrand Russell, whose *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920) was the first and in many ways the most penetrating critique.

Read this at <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/09/hitchens.htm>.

Source: Chad Trainer

- The September 2002 issue of the British magazine *Prospect* features an article by Russell scholar A.C. Grayling entitled "Lives of the Mind." Grayling discusses the recent surge of interest in philosophical biography (and taking a moment to promote his forthcoming biography of Descartes). His article has several interesting things to say about Russell and Wittgenstein—two prime subjects of philosophical biography—including the following:

It must be admitted, however, that most philosophical biographies suffer from one of two shortcomings. Either they are well written, because written by professional writers, but fail to give an adequate account of their subjects' thought; or they succeed in doing the latter because written by philosophers, but reflect all too well the latter's stock-in-trade—the dry academic paper...

By chance, the two biographies that spring to mind as examples of success on both fronts are about Wittgenstein: Ray Monk's excellent *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* and the peerless *Young Ludwig* by Brian McGuinness, the first of two projected volumes whose sequel, alas, seems destined not to appear.

Monk's biography of Wittgenstein is deservedly well known. Written with grace and clarity and buoyed by Monk's admiration for his subject, it is also a useful introduction to Wittgenstein's main ideas. It is better for a biography that its author feels sympathy for its subject (although best of all is tolerant objectivity) and Monk is a Wittgenstein sympathiser. One result is that his Wittgenstein, who, in reality, was an egregiously difficult character—arrogant, resentful and egocentric—is painted as a tortured genius who should, in Monk's view, be forgiven much. Compare Monk's two-volume account of Bertrand Russell's life. Monk self-confessedly hates Russell, and his increasingly hysterical distortions of the life threaten to reduce his account to a mountain of waste-paper.

Go to <http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk> for the article.

Source: Dan Kervick

- On September 17, 2002 the CBC rebroadcast a TV interview with Russell by Elaine Grand. The rebroadcast was part of the CBC's 50th birthday celebrations. The interview took place in October 1958 and was originally broadcast the following January. The BRS Library owns a copy of the interview. (See "The BRS Library" in this issue).

Source: Nick Griffin & Ken Blackwell

- On October 14, 2002, the *Boston Globe* ran a review by Ed Siegel of three plays currently being performed in the Boston area. A Berkshires-based acting troupe called Shakespeare & Company is putting on the plays as part of "The Vienna Project," a series of cultural events highlighting the contributions of Viennese artists. One of the plays is entitled "Wittgenstein v. Popper: The Main Event." The play describes the famous confrontation between Wittgenstein and Popper that also provided the substance to the recent book *Wittgenstein's Poker* (see "Odds and Ends," *BRSQ* #112, November 2001 and #114, May 2002). Siegel describes these events, as depicted in the play, with the following:

Standing in Karl Popper's corner is Bertrand Russell, who has watched Wittgenstein absorb everything he taught him. But with a mixture of awe and anger Russell then watched Popper turn that knowledge on its head.

Much is debated in this hour, including the limits of philosophical inquiry. But at the heart is the impossibility of using knowledge to declare a thing objectively good or evil. Without that, the world becomes an unspeakably awful place for Russell (and for us?). But Wittgenstein, like Undine and Friedl, the protagonist in the first piece, is determined to follow what he sees as the truth, no matter how lonely the path.

The article is available online at the *Boston Globe*'s website at http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/287/living/Works_reflect_the_sadness_of_a_centuryP.shtml.

Source: David White

- Bent Soup, a rather twisted online humor magazine, features a page spoofing efforts to educate teens about sex and drugs. The article discusses, among other drugs, marijuana, which it indicates is "also known as grass, suck weed, naughty lipsticks, Bertrand Russell's pipe of peace, retarded dandelions, technicolour tobacco." The *BRSQ* would welcome speculation (productive or otherwise) as to how the connection from Russell to marijuana was made. The Bent Soup page is at <http://www.bentsoup.com/teen.html>.

Source: Gerry Wildenberg

- Russell Press Limited, established in Russell's lifetime by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, has recently issued a new brochure, complete with a photograph of BR. The Press, which was established to "provide a supportive and cost-effective printing service to the voluntary sector," is on the web at <http://www.russellpress.com>.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- An international organization known as the Principia Cybernetica Project (PCP) has a website at which it declares its mission to "tackle age-old philosophical questions with the help of the most recent cybernetic theories and technologies." The website is at <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DEFAULT.html>. The website contains an article that further explains its mission by comparing it with that of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*, the inspiration for the project. Russell and Whitehead, the article explains, "applied mathematical methods to the foundation of mathematics itself, formulating the laws of thought governing mathematical reasoning by means of mathematical axioms, theorems and proofs." "Our contention," the article continues on behalf of the PCP, "is that something similar should be done with cybernetics: integrating and founding cybernetics with the help of cybernetical methods and tools." The article on *Principia Mathematica* and Principia Cybernetica is at <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/PRMAT.html>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- The website Find a Grave offers information on Russell's memorial plot. (Russell was cremated, and thus has no literal "grave.") The listing for Russell features a brief biography and pictures and is at <http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=21194>.

The site also allows visitors to leave electronic "flowers" and a note for the deceased described on the site.

Source: Ken Blackwell & Dennis Darland

News from the Humanist World

- Another sentence of death by stoning requires the attention of humanists everywhere. According to the Rationalist International's September 19, 2002 bulletin, a woman named Amina Lawal Kurami faces becoming the first person to be executed by stoning since the northern states of Nigeria have implemented Sharia (Islamic law). Amina is an unwed mother-to-be who confessed her pregnancy to authorities without understanding the consequences under the current regime of holy fascism. (Needless to say, she had no attorney present.) An appeal of the decision has been filed. Other capital cases are also being entered in Sharia courts.

Sharia is illegal under the constitution of Nigeria, an ethnically and religiously diverse country. However, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo is reluctant to act. He needs to hear from rational people around the world that Nigeria must not be allowed to follow in the footsteps of the Taliban. Rationalist International is asking everyone to contact President Obasanjo, urging him to stop the execution of Amina and ban the Sharia courts of northern Nigeria. President Obasanjo can be reached by e-mail at webmaster@nigeria.gov.ng or by regular mail at The Presidency, Federal Secretariat, Phase II, Shehu Shagari Way, Abuja, Nigeria. Copies of any messages sent to him should be sent to Rationalist International at HQ@rationalistinternational.net. Rationalist International is at <http://www.rationalistinternational.net>.

- The Center for Inquiry International (Amherst, NY) is pleased to announce the opening of a new Center for Inquiry in Florida (CFI FL). The center is the fourth of its kind, joining others in Amherst, Los Angeles, and the New York metropolitan area. Like its sisters, the CFI FL will host conferences, seminars, family-oriented programs, and perform secular celebrations such as marriages, memorials, and namings, as well as generally encourage the development of critical thinking.

For more information, contact the CFI FL at P.O. Box 8099, Madeira Beach, FL 33738-8099, (727) 209-2902, vanpelt@tampabay.rr.com.

The *BRSQ* thanks Paul Kurtz (BRS Honorary Member and CFI International Chair) for announcing the opening of the new center, and Jan Loeb Eisler (past BRS Vice President and CFI FL Chair) for passing the news along.

- The *BRSQ* continued to correspond with the Buddhivadi Foundation (See *BRSQ* #112, November 2001, and #115, August 2002), a humanist organization based in India. The Foundation attended a meeting of FIRA (Federation of Indian Rationalist Associations) in September, during which it distributed copies of the *BRSQ* to interested individuals and organizations. Further information about the Foundation and its activities will appear in a forthcoming *BRSQ*.
- The Campus Freethought Alliance (CFA) has a new website featuring an online forum as well as downloadable flyers and other resources aimed at the student activist for humanism. The site is at <http://www.campusfreethought.org>.
- Those with a suitably blasphemous sense of humor may enjoy Heresy House, which offers original cards, posters, and t-shirts for the discriminating atheist. The one-man company, which bills itself as "Funnier than Hell, and much cooler..." is online at www.heresyhouse.com. The site features numerous quotes by famous freethinkers, including the following gem: "So far as I can remember, there is not one word in the Gospels in praise of intelligence." The author of that line is well-known and loved by all of us.
- Russellians might also enjoy Battleground God, an online computer game dealing that asks participants a series of questions about their beliefs about God, religion, and morality, and then rates the consistency and palatability of the answers given. The game is located at TPM Online, "The Philosopher's Magazine on the Internet, at <http://www.philosophers.co.uk/god.htm>.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- On June 14, 2002, the *Guardian* announced that a group of prominent writers, academics, and artists had endorsed a statement opposing the U.S. government's ongoing response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The article was by Duncan Campbell. The statement, entitled "Not in Our Name," condemned the U.S. government because it has "declared a war without limits" and "instituted stark new measures of

oppression." Signatories of the statement described in the article included Ed Asner, Martin Luther King III, Tony Kushner, Edward Said, Gloria Steinem, Alice Walker—and BRS Honorary Member Noam Chomsky. The statement, with an expanded list of signatories, appeared subsequently in the September 19 *New York Times*.

The statement is currently available online at <http://www.nion.us/>. That site also contains a complete list of signatories to date, and provides an opportunity for additional individuals to sign the statement. (The initiators are also collecting donations for further promulgation of the statement.) Among the signatories on the complete list is Russell's former secretary Ralph Schoenman, identified (with Mya Shone) as part of an organization entitled the Council on Human Needs.

- On June 19, 2002, the *New York Times* ran an article entitled "A Vigorous Skeptic of Everything but Fact." The subject? BRS Award Recipient and Honorary Member Paul Kurtz. The article, by Dinitia Smith, features an interview with Kurtz that mentions the Center for Inquiry, *Skeptical Inquirer* and *Free Inquiry* magazines, and Prometheus Books. The article focuses on Kurtz's concern that the media is uncritically promoting the paranormal—through sympathetic depictions of astrology and communing with the dead, for example. Russell puts in an appearance when Smith describes a "strange painting" gracing the Center for Inquiry's walls. The painting, Smith reports, is "based on 'The Last Supper,' with Susan B. Anthony, Sidney Hook, Charles Darwin, Leonardo da Vinci, Bertrand Russell, Voltaire and other atheists and humanists seated around the table instead of the apostles."

Also noteworthy is the recent two-part interview with Kurtz (entitled "The Bull Fighter: Skeptic Paul Kurtz Leads the Struggle to Open American Minds") in *City*, the most prominent free weekly newspaper in Rochester, NY. The interview ran in the September 18-24 and September 25-October 1, 2002 issues of the paper, and featured Kurtz's views on mediums, crop circles, the media, the Pledge of Allegiance, and numerous other subjects. The interviewer, Ron Netsky, mentions the "strange painting as well," but without mentioning Russell's presence in it. Netsky does, however, describe the prominent display cases at the Center for Inquiry honoring Russell, Carl Sagan, and Karl Popper.

- Speaking of Popper, the July 26, 2002 issue of *Chronicle of Higher Education* features an article on a pair of conferences being held to commemorate the centenary of his birth. The article, entitled "Giving Karl Popper His Propers" and written by David Cohen, notes the slow and steady rise in Popper's reputation in recent years. The review notes the recent book *Wittgenstein's Poker* (discussed in several recent "Russell-Related Odds and Ends" columns in the *BRSQ*) in discussing the relationship between Popper and Wittgenstein, as well as the relationship of both to Russell. Popper was both an Honorary Member of the BRS and the winner of the BRS Award in 1992.

- On August 29, 2002, the *Hindustan Times* ran an editorial denouncing the decision by the Bangladeshi government to ban *Utal Hawa* (Gusty Wind), the latest book by BRS Honorary Member Taslima Nasrin. The *Hindustan Times* editorial should still be available online at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/printedition/290802/detED103.shtml>.

More recently, BBC News reported that Nasrin had been tried *in absentia* by a Bangladeshi court for derogating Islam in her writings. (The BBC correspondent in Dhaka, Moazzem Hossain, spelled her name "Nasreen.") The court sentenced her (*sans* any ability to offer a defense on her part) to a year in prison. The full story is at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2324245.stm.

- The September 1, 2002 issue of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* noted the death of Irving Copi, recipient of the 1998 BRS Award. (See "Irving Copi Remembered" in this issue.) His obituary quotes a colleague of Copi as follows: "I doubt that any philosopher since (Bertrand) Russell, and maybe not even Russell, has sold more books than Irving Copi." See it at <http://starbulletin.com/2002/09/01/news/story11.html>.
- The September 30, 2002 issue of the *Nation* ran a short piece on BRS Honorary Member Nelson Mandela's September 9 interview with *Newsweek*. In the interview, Mandela sharply criticized U.S. foreign policy and concluded that "the United States of America is a threat to world peace." The complete *Newsweek* interview is online at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/806174.asp>.
- Also appearing in the September 30 *Nation* was a review of *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* (Harvard University Press, 2002) by BRS Award Recipient Stephen Jay Gould. The review, by H. Allen

Orr, attempts to measure how much of Gould's radical theory of "punctuated equilibrium" still stands after 3 decades of criticism. Orr makes an interesting attempt to link Gould's approach to science with his admiration of Thomas Kuhn's classic work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

Speaking of reviews of Gould, David Hawkes' rather idiosyncratic review of *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* in the June 10, 2002 issue of the *Nation* (see the "Updates" section of the August 2002 issue of the *BRSQ*) attracted a huge number of responses, most of them highly critical. Some of these responses appeared in the October 14 issue of the *Nation*, along with a response by Hawkes; a longer version of the exchange has been posted to the *Nation's* website at <http://www.thenation.com>.

Who's New in Hell

Due to popular demand, the BRSQ will run an occasional new feature entitled "Who's New in Hell." (Well, actually there was no demand—but no one objected to the idea.) This feature will update BRS-ers on news regarding Warren Allen Smith's encyclopedia of non-believers, Who's Who in Hell (Barricade, 2000). It will report on new people to be "added" to hell, news coverage concerning the work, and other insights which will hopefully delight the nonbeliever in all of us. (Any Russellian must have a little bit of unbeliever in them, whether or not she or he follows a religion. When Russell's jailer learned of his agnosticism during his imprisonment in World War I, he reportedly shrugged and said, "Well, we all worship God in our own way." Perhaps Russellians all fail to worship God in their own way as well...)

- *Who's Who in Hell* and its abbreviated successor, *Celebrities in Hell* (Barricade, 2002) have each attracted media attention. For example, the February/March 2002 issue of *Irish America* features a short piece by Marilyn Cole Lownes entitled "Who's Irish in Hell?" The *National Enquirer*, of all places, ran an article on *Celebrities in Hell* in its February 19, 2002 issue. In addition, Greenwich Village's *Villager* (not to be confused with the *Village Voice*) mentioned *Celebrities* and the *Enquirer* article the week the latter came out. (Warren Allen Smith is a longtime fixture in the Village.) And the April 1, 2002 issue of *Library Review* featured a brief review of the work by Manya Chylinski. The review was largely favorable, though it found Warren's reasons for including Bo Derek in the book to be "a bit questionable."

- *Celebrities in Hell* has also received attention in the humanist press. *The Humanist* ran a favorable review of the book by Fred Edwards in its September/October 2002 issue. The review chides Warren for failing to include a number of important humanist-oriented celebrities, including Leonard Bernstein, Phil Donahue, Theodore "Dr. Seuss" Geisel, Yoko Ono, and Gene Roddenberry. Warren promises that a subsequent edition of the book will right all wrongs. A less favorable review by BRS member Tom Flynn appeared the fall 2002 issue of *Free Inquiry* under the title "Gossip on the Half Shell."
- Warren Allen Smith himself has also received his fair share of media attention as of late. On May 19, 2002—the day after Bertie's birthday—the *New York Times* ran a short article entitled "A Mentor Shares a Secret that Really Wasn't." The article, by Charlie LeDuff, details a recent meeting between Warren, a retired high school teacher, and one of his former students, a photographer. At the meeting, Warren learned that his efforts to conceal his gay identity during his tenure as a teacher were less-than-completely-successful. (The student, by the way, was Ed Keating, a photographer who won a Pulitzer Prize for his pictures of the World Trade Center. It was Warren's letter to Keating congratulating him on his work that led to the meeting. Keating supplied the pictures for the article.)

In addition, Warren has a listing in the 2002 volume of *Contemporary Authors* (volume 195), which lists among his many life achievements his membership on the BRS Board of Directors since 1973—no small feat, given that the BRS was founded in 1974.

- *Celebrities in Hell* lists a number of humanist-related organizations in its directory of "Organizations of Interest to Freethinkers." For each organization, Warren also includes a "representative example of someone associated with that label, although not especially a label of the person's choosing." The directory lists the BRS prominently, and includes *BRSQ* Editor Peter Stone as a "representative example" of a BRS member. It also provides links to the BRS Homepage as well as the Russell Archives at McMaster University.
- Richard Lingeman's new biography *Sinclair Lewis: Rebel from Main Street* (New York: Random House, 2002) contains the following reference to Warren and his research project that culminated in *Who's Who in Hell*:

When a writer and editor named Warren Allen Smith sent [Sinclair Lewis] a questionnaire asking him to choose from several definitions of *humanism* the one most congenial to him, Lewis selected naturalistic (scientific) humanism. To an earlier query about his religion, he contended that people raised without religious belief seemed as happy and as ethical as those who did have a faith (p. 447).

- The title of Warren's *magnum opus* appears to be more popular than Warren could have imagined. An Englishman named Robert Chalmers has just seen his first novel published—under the title *Who's Who in Hell* (Grove Press, 2002). The novel tells of the life and loves of a young man so obsessed with the darker side of the celebrity obits page that he begins compiling a book entitled... *Who's Who in Hell*.

In case that wasn't confusing enough, one of Warren's friends recently reminded him that Peter Ustinov wrote a play entitled *Who's Who in Hell*. The play debuted on Broadway in December 1974 at the Lunt-Fontanne Theater, but closed after only 8 performances—despite a cast that included Beau Bridges, Olympia Dukakis, and Ustinov himself. (Ustinov, of course, is featured prominently in both *Who's Who* and *Celebrities in Hell*.)

For current information on *Who's Who in Hell*, visit the author's website at <http://wasim.ws>.

On the Lighter Side...

Having nothing better to do with its time, the GRRS has taken to collecting limericks about Russell as well as composing some of its own. The best of these little gems will appear occasionally in the *BRSQ*. We begin with a little ditty by the *BRSQ*'s own Tim Madigan.

There once was a fellow named Bertie
Whose manner was likeably flirty.
To L. Wittgenstein
He was just an old swine,
But WE love him for being so dirty!

Any BRS-ers who think they can do better than this are welcome to submit their own poems, limericks, haikus, etc. about BR. Try—I repeat, TRY—to keep the filth to an absolute minimum. Thanks for your understanding.

Pose with Bertie!



The last issue presented a picture of *BRSQ* Associate Editor Tim Madigan posing with the renowned bust of Bertie at Red Lion Square, London. Tim, however, was not idle on his visit. He invited others to join in the newly-inaugurated tradition of "posing with Bertie." This photo depicts Anja Steinbauer (left) and Rick Lewis, editors of the magazine *Philosophy Now*, in appropriately reverential poses beside the Good Lord. The *BRSQ* would like to encourage other Russellians to help make this a tradition by posing with this renowned bust and sending us pictures of the event. There's no easier way for a tourist in London to break into the *BRSQ*!

BRS Business and Chapter News:

**The Greater New York City Chapter of the
Bertrand Russell Society (GNYCCBRS)
Warren Allen Smith**

On 1 August 2002, the Greater New York City's chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society became the second such chapter in the United States, following the lead of the one in Rochester, New York.

The GNYCCBRS was founded by Mr. Warren Allen Smith, Mr. Thom Weidlich, and Ms. Ruili Ye for the purpose of holding informal get-togethers for those interested in various aspects of Lord Russell's philosophy, including his statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925).

The first meeting was held in Manhattan on 4 September 2002 at the New York Ethical Culture Society, 2 West 64th Street. An overflow crowd in Mortimer Adler's library heard Mr. Smith discuss his just-published *Celebrities in Hell* (Barricade Books, 2002, paperback 288 pages, \$14.95). "Hell," Russell once wrote, "is a place where the police are German . . . the motorists French . . . the cooks, English." Smith added that Hell also is a silly theological invention, and his book lists from A to Z numbers of boldface people in the entertainment and show business world who have gone on record as agreeing, from Larry Adler, Luis Buñuel, and George Carlin to Bruce Willis, Frank Zappa, and Nick Zedd.

Future meetings will be held in the five boroughs and nearby in Connecticut and New Jersey.

In September Mr. Weidlich spoke to the Rochester chapter about his book, *Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell*, telling about the 1940 incident in which Russell was denied a teaching position at City College in New York City because of his views about morality. In October, Mr. Smith spoke to the Rochester chapter about his book, *Celebrities in Hell*. Bob Smith, of Radio WXXI, interviewed both about their respective books.

Future meetings will be informal, will devise activist projects, and will provide a way to meet other philosophically-minded individuals.

The chapter publicized the 26 October 2002 Sidney Hook Conference at the CUNY Graduate Center. Also, it made plans to entertain Dr. Taslima Nasrin when she arrives from Sweden on a book-signing tour to speak November 7th at Columbia University and be interviewed by CNN and a city radio station, after which she will travel to Yale, the University of Connecticut, Dartmouth, Harvard, the University of Charleston in South Carolina, and the University of California.

Individuals wishing to become members or be on the chapter's e-mail list are invited to contact Warren Allen Smith, 31 Jane Street (Box 10-D), New York, NY 10014, wasm@mac.com.

The BRS Library

Starting with this issue, the BRSQ will run semi-regular updates on the BRS Library. We begin in this issue with a catalogue of the Library's collection.

Founded in 1975, the BRS Library comprises donations from members, publishers and broadcast organizations. The Society's book sales program offers a selection of current and out-of-print titles at a discount. A lending library—containing both books by or about Russell and audio cassettes of Russell's speeches, debates, and interviews—is available to Society members.

To inquire about sale or loan of a book or tape, please contact Tom Stanley, BRS Library, Box 434, Wilder VT 05088 USA, thomas.stanley@valley.net, or visit the BRS Library webpage at <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268/>.

Books for Sale:

The Bertrand Russell Dictionary of Mind, Matter and Morals \$ 5.00
by Lester Denonn. Citadel Press. Paper.

Bertrand Russell: A Political Life \$ 5.95
by Alan Ryan. O.U.P. Paper.

The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 1 \$12.95
by Nicholas Griffin. Houghton-Mifflin. Cloth.

| | |
|---|---------|
| <i>Bertrand Russell: A Life</i> by Caroline Moorhead. Viking. Cloth. | \$14.00 |
| <i>Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology</i> edited by Savage and Anderson. University of Minnesota Press. Cloth. | \$ 8.95 |
| <i>Bertrand Russell</i> by John Slater. Thoemmes Press. Paper. | \$19.00 |
| <i>The Life of Bertrand Russell in Pictures and His Own Words</i> edited by Christopher Farley and David Hodgson. Spokesman. Paper. | \$10.95 |
| <i>History of the World in Epitome</i> by Bertrand Russell. Gaberbocchus Press. Paper. | \$ 1.25 |
| <i>Authority and the Individual</i> by Bertrand Russell. Unwin-Hyman. Paper. | \$ 7.95 |
| <i>In Praise of Idleness</i> by Bertrand Russell. Routledge. Paper. | \$ 8.95 |
| <i>Political Ideals</i> by Bertrand Russell. Unwin-Hyman. Paper. | \$ 7.95 |

Prices are postpaid. Please pay by check or money order to "The Bertrand Russell Society."

Books for Loan:

Catalogs and Bibliographies of Russell's Works:

- Blackwell, K. and C. Spadoni. *A Detailed Catalog of the Second Archives of Bertrand Russell*
Denonn, L. *The Bertrand Russell Collection of Lester Denonn*
Martin, W. *Bertrand Russell: A Bibliography of His Writings, 1895-1976*

Collections of Quotations from Russell:

- Denonn, L. *The Bertrand Russell Dictionary of Mind, Matter & Morals*
Egner, R. *Bertrand Russell's Best*
Eisler, L. *The Quotable Bertrand Russell*

Books by Russell:

- The ABC of Atoms*
The ABC of Relativity
The Amberly Papers
The Analysis of Mind
The Art of Philosophizing & Other Essays
Authority and the Individual
The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind
Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare
The Conquest of Happiness
Education and the Social Order (Education and the Modern World)
On Education Especially in Early Childhood (Education and the Good Life)
Essays in Scepticism
Fact and Fiction
Freedom Versus Organization
Has Man a Future?
German Social Democracy
The Good Citizen's Alphabet
History of Western Philosophy
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits
Human Society in Ethics and Politics
Icarus or the Future of Science
The Impact of Science on Society
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
New Hopes for a Changing World
The Prospects of Industrial Civilization
In Praise of Idleness
Justice in Wartime
Marriage and Morals
Mysticism and Logic
My Philosophical Development
Nightmares of Eminent Persons
An Outline of Philosophy (Philosophy)
Philosophical Essays
Political Ideals
Portraits from Memory
Power: A New Social Analysis
The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (Bolshevism: Theory and Practice)
*Principia Mathematica to *56*

The Principles of Mathematics
Principles of Social Reconstruction (Why Men Fight)
The Problem of China
The Problems of Philosophy
Religion and Science
Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism (Proposed Roads to Freedom)
Satan in the Suburbs
Sceptical Essays
The Scientific Outlook
Unarmed Victory
Understanding History
Unpopular Essays
War Crimes in Vietnam
Which Way to Peace?
The Will to Doubt
Wisdom of the West
Why I am Not a Christian

Collections of Russell's Papers:

Blackwell, K., et al. *Cambridge Essays 1888-99*
 Eames, R. and K. Blackwell. *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*
 Egner, R. and L. Denonn *The Basic Writings Of Bertrand Russell*
 Fienberg, B. and R. Kasrils. *Bertrand Russell...A Selection of His Correspondence with the General Public 1950-1968.*
 Griffin, N. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume I*
 Marsh, R. *Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950*
 Pears, D. *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*
 Rempel, R., et al. *Contemplation and Action 1902-14*
 Rempel, R. *Prophecy and Dissent 1914-16*
 Ruja, H. *Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell's American Essays 1931-1935*
 Russell, B. *The Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell*
 Seckel, A. *Bertrand Russell on Ethics, Sex, and Marriage*
 Slater, J. *Logical Atomism and Other Essays 1914-19*
 Slater, J. and B. Frohmann. *Essays on Language, Mind and Matter 1919-26*

Books about Russell:

Aiken, L. *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals*

Andersson, S. *In Quest of Certainty: Bertrand Russell's Search for Certainty in Religion and Mathematics*
 Ayer, A.J. *Russell*
 Blackwell, K. *The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell*
 Brink, A. *Bertrand Russell: The Psychobiography of a Moralist*
 Chomsky, N. *Problems of Knowledge: The Russell Lectures*
 James, R. *Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with his Contemporaries*
 Garciadiego, A. *Bertrand Russell and the Origin of the 'Set-Theoretic' Paradoxes*
 Grattan-Guinness, I. *Dear Russell-Dear Jourdain*
 Griffin, N. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*
 Hager, P. *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy*
 Hill, C. *Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell*
 Hylton, P. *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*
 Ironside, P. *The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell*
 A.D. and G. Wedekiny *Russell and Analytic Philosophy*
 Jager, R. *The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*
 Jourdain, P. *The Philosophy of Mr. B*rr*and R*ss*ll*
 Kilmister, C.W. *Russell*
 Kuntz, P. *Bertrand Russell*
 Leithauser, G. *Principles and Perplexities: Studies of Dualism in Selected Fiction of Bertrand Russell*
 Lewis, J. *Bertrand Russell: Philosopher and Humanist*
 Meyer, S. *Dewey and Russell: An Exchange*
 Nath, R. *The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*
 Park, J. *Bertrand Russell on Education*
 Patterson, W. *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism*
 Pears, D.F. *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy*
 Rodriguez-Consuegra, F. *The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*
 Vellacot, J. *Bertrand Russell and the Pacifists in the First World War*
 Weimer, D. *The Rhetorical Approach of Bertrand Russell: A Study in Method*

Tributes to Russell:

Coates, K. *Essays on Socialist Humanism in Honor of the Centenary of Bertrand Russell*
 Klemke, E.D. *Essays on Bertrand Russell*
 Savage, C. and C. Anderson *Rereading Russell*
 Schlipp, P. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*
 Slater, J. *Bertrand Russell*

Winchester, I. and K. Blackwell *Antinomies and Paradoxes*

Biographies of Russell:

Clark, R. *The Life of Bertrand Russell*
Clark, R. *Bertrand Russell and His World*
Cooke, A. *Six Men*
Crawshay-Williams, R. *Russell Remembered*
Darroch, S. *Ottoline: The Life of Lady Ottoline Morrell*
Feinberg, B. and R. Kasrils *Bertrand Russell's America, 1945-1970*
Gottschalk, H. *Bertrand Russell: A Life*
Lamont, C. *Yes To Life: Memoirs of Corliss Lamont*
Monk, R. *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*
Moorehead, C. *Bertrand Russell: A Life*
Russell, D. *The Tamarisk Tree: My Quest for Liberty and Love*
Tait, K. *My Father Bertrand Russell*
Wood, A. *Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic*

Audio Tapes for Loan:

Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech 1950 45'
Mind and Matter 1950 52'
Bertrand Russell in Australia 1950 55'
Living in an Atomic Age 1951 90'
Life Without Fear 1951 34'
Portrait from Memory: Whitehead 1952 15'
Leonardo's Day-And Our Own 1952 30'
Man's Peril 1954 15'
Russell Einstein Manifesto 1955 30'
The World and the Observer 1958 30'
Kalinga Prize Press Conference and Acceptance Speech 1958 48'
Address to the CND 1959 30'
The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore 1959 42'
Address to the Vietnam Teach-In 1965 14'
Appeal to the American Conscience 1966 29'
Is Security Increasing? 1939 30'
Russell-Copleston Debate on the Existence of God 1948 20'
The Attack on Academic Freedom in Britain and America 1952 30'
Bertrand Russell 1952 30'
Face to Face 1959 30'
Bertrand Russell Speaking 1959 52'
Woodrow Wyatt Interviews, Series 2 1959 52'
Woodrow Wyatt Interviews, Series 3 1959 52'

Close-Up CBC 1959 30'
Speaking Personally: Bertrand Russell 1961 90'
Open End 1962 90'
Studs Terkel Interview 1962 39'
On Nuclear Morality 1962 32'
Interview on Vietnam 1965 10'
Merv Griffin Interview 1965 24'
Bertrand Russell 1975 15'
Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher 1980 15'
Bertrand Russell 1986 100'
Portrait of the Philosopher as Father 1980 30'
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Education 1990 15'
Bertrand Russell's Pacifist Stance in World War I 1992 30'
Russell vs. Dewey on Education 1992 115'
The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell 1962 40'
Beatrice Webb on the Russells/Russell on the Webbs 1966 35'
Sound Portrait of Bertrand Russell 1980 60'
Bertrand Russell: A Reassessment 1980 43'

Rustlings
Gerry Wildenberg

"Rustlings" presents a simple substitution cipher based on the writings of Bertrand Russell. Below is today's coded quote in which each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFFRYYY, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quote below uses a different code. After solving the cipher, try to identify the source of the quote it conceals. The solution will appear in the next issue.

HFD HK ZVD NDGOUOZDFZ MDYCOUHFO HK RQFTUFM UO
ZVQZ OHRD ODXZUHFO HK ZVD VCRQF GQXD QGD RHGQYYP
SDZZDG ZVQF HZVDGO.

Solution to Rustlings Puzzle, August 2002

"[M]athematics may be defined as the subject where we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true."

Bertrand Russell, in "Recent Work in the Philosophy of Mathematics." *International Monthly*: 4 (July 1901): p.83-101. Reprinted as "Mathematics and the Metaphysicians" in *Mysticism and Logic* (Norton, 1929), ch. V.

Bertie and the Bomb 1984 40'
 Religion and Science 1994 132'
 What I Believe: 3 Complete Essays on Religion 1995 145'
 Bertrand Russell and A.N. Whitehead 1996 150'

**Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
 3rd Quarter Treasurer's Report
 Cash Flow, 7/1/02 Through 9/30/02**

Compiled 10/9/02 by Dennis J. Darland
 BRS Treasurer (djdarland@qconline.com)

| Category Description | |
|----------------------|----------|
| BALANCE 6/30/02 | 6,157.53 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contrib-BRS | 1,027.09 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 1,027.09 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 100.00 |
| Renewals | 763.57 |
| TOTAL Dues | 863.57 |
| Other Income | 82.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 1,972.66 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 9.35 |
| Library Expenses | 8.24 |
| Meeting Expenses | 445.88 |
| Newsletter | 734.13 |
| Other Expenses | 23.25 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | 1,220.85 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 751.81 |
| BALANCE 9/30/02 | 6,909.34 |

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell
 Meetings Open to the Public

GRRS Receives Attention at McMaster

In August, the GRRS's monthly meeting featured a guest speaker - Andrew Bone, Senior Research Associate at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University. See "GRRS Visited by Distinguished Russellians" in this issue. Bone's highly successful appearance has received welcome coverage at the Centre's website. Check it out at <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~russell/whatsnew.htm>.

Program, Winter & Spring 2002-2003

| | |
|---------|--|
| Dec. 12 | <i>The ABC of Armageddon</i> |
| Jan. 9 | <i>Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell</i> |
| Feb. 13 | <i>Wittgenstein's Poker</i> |
| Mar. 13 | Russell and the Prisoner's Dilemma |
| Apr. 10 | "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish" |
| May 8 | Russell on Video (Celebration of Russell's Birthday) |

Note: All dates and topics are subject to change.

Daily Perks Coffee House

389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY

For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or write tmadigan@rochester.rr.com or visit http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~wildenbe/grrs/russell_poster.html.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February 2003

No. 117



Don't Miss out on the Excitement!

**Register Today for the 2003 Annual
Meeting of the BRS!**

See Page 9 for Details.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

c/o David White
Philosophy Department
St. John Fisher College
3690 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14618 USA

MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1406 26TH ST.
ROCK ISLAND IL 61201-2837



HAVE YOU RENEWED YET?
See Page 8 to find out!

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Webmaster: John Lenz, jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone

Associate Editors: Phil Ebersole, Tim Madigan,

Rachel M. Murray, David White

Rochester Correspondent: Alan Bock

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:

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3690 East Avenue, Rochester, NY 14618 USA, dwhite@sjfc.edu.

Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

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President

Alan Schwerin

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Chad Trainer

Treasurer

Dennis J. Darland

QUOTE OF THE QUARTERLY

"Perhaps we should thank the Taliban for finishing the task the Crusades began nine hundred years ago—proving beyond further dispute that Religion is incompatible with Civilisation."

Arthur C. Clarke, Letter to
Warren Allen Smith, June 22, 2002

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

February 2003

No. 117

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From the Editor:

Bertrand Russell & John Dewey

On January 5, 2003, BRSQ Editor Peter Stone gave a talk with this title at the Unitarian Universalist Church of the Lehigh Valley, in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 36 people attended the event, many of whom took literature about the BRS as well as free sample copies of the BRSQ. The talk was a revised version of a presentation Stone gave at the CFI to mark the 50th anniversary of John Dewey's death. (See "Russell and Dewey at the CFI" in this issue.) The editorial below offers highlights from Stone's remarks.

Today I'd like to compare Bertrand Russell and John Dewey and make their contrasting attitudes towards religion clear. It's worth doing because while both are considered icons among humanist/rationalist types (among many others), they were very different in their approaches to these issues of concern to rationalists and humanists. A clear example of this can be found by comparing their best-known works on religion. It is not an accident, as I shall show, that Russell wrote an essay entitled "Why I Am Not a Christian," while Dewey wrote a book entitled *A Common Faith*. (I am grateful to Michael Rockler and John Novak, whose debates at past BRS Annual Meetings helped make the differences between the two philosophers clear to me.)

There's a lot of biography that would be helpful in understanding these two men. However, covering the life and work of either Russell or Dewey—much less both—is impossible in an hour. And that's a good thing; after all, if all the merit in Russell's life could be summed up in an hour, what room would that leave for a society devoted to him? So rather than talk about their lives in any detail, I shall confine myself to a few words about their respective approaches to philosophy and religion, and how these approaches reflected their very different temperaments and approaches to life.

Bertrand Russell was one of the founders of analytic philosophy. This school of thought advocated the use of rigorous techniques to analyze traditional philosophical problems—in effect breaking them down into smaller components in order to solve them. Russell was particularly concerned to apply these techniques to the foundations of mathematics. The result was *Principia Mathematica*, a massive three-volume *tour de force* co-authored with friend and mentor Alfred North Whitehead. The system laid out in this work was rigorous—so rigorous that the proposition

"1+1=2" could not be proven within it until the middle of the second volume. Russell's goal, in mathematics as in all areas of philosophy within which he worked, was to clear up philosophical difficulties and put knowledge upon certain foundations.

John Dewey was one of the founders of pragmatism. The name of this school is derived from the Greek word *pragma*, meaning "practice," or so I'm told by people who know more Greek than I do. This school of thought advocates answering philosophical questions by inquiring into the difference they make in practice. If they make no difference in practice, why waste time thinking about them? Dewey most famously applied this philosophy in his work on education, though it guided his work in all areas of philosophy.

With these different approaches to philosophy in mind, let's move on to Russell and Dewey as critics of religion. The two men agreed completely on one of the most important points relating to this issue—traditional religion is false. Where they differed is in the response they recommended to this conclusion, as well as their more personal attitudes towards life in light of it.

First, consider their recommended responses. Russell was characteristically clear and succinct in stating his. "I think all the great religions of the world," he wrote in "Why I Am Not a Christian," "both untrue and harmful." Religion was an unmitigated bad in the modern world that people would do best to discard. Dewey, in contrast, took pains to separate *religion* (which made factual claims about the world, claims not supportable by intelligence) from the *religious* (a feeling that some aspects of the world are deeply valuable, even "sacred" and worthy of reverence). He hoped to reconstruct religious thinking so as to jettison the troublesome claims of religion while saving religious language for the values he wished to salvage.

It is interesting to consider these different responses in light of their attitudes toward the falsity of religious claims, to which I shall now turn. Some valuable insight can be gained by looking at another thinker who has commented on both Russell and Dewey—Martin Gardner, noted science writer and theist.

In his collection of essays *The Night is Large* (St. Martin's, 1996), Gardner discussed both Dewey and Russell a number of times. (I should mention that those interested in the philosophical exchanges between these two philosophers can find a helpful list of the most important references in

Gardner. See *The Night is Large*, p. 478, n. 3.) But the most important discussion of the two comes in the final essay, entitled "Surprise."

To understand this essay, it's worth explaining that the title of Gardner's book comes from a line by Lord Dunsany—"The night is very large but full of wonders." In the last chapter, Gardner elaborates on the idea expressed in this phrase, and articulates the religious argument for God based on a feeling of wonder at the universe—an emotion Gardner, following Rudolf Otto, describes as "numinous." "For Otto," Gardner continues, "the essence of the emotion is an awareness of what he called the *mysterium tremendum*, the tremendous mystery of the wholly other" (p. 556).

Gardner takes both Russell and Dewey to task for their attitudes towards the numinous, but in very different ways. The "problems" he sees in their attitudes are very revealing.

According to Gardner, Russell was keenly aware of the numinous. He quotes Russell as expressing this awareness as follows: "But if there be a world which is not physical, or not in space-time, it may have a structure which we can never hope to express or to know." However, Russell is quick to add that in setting down such thoughts he has "lapsed into mystical speculation" and left the realm of serious philosophy (p. 558). This angers Gardner, who finds that far too quickly the atheistic Russell "dismisses the *mysterium tremendum* as unworthy of worship or prolonged contemplation" (p. 559).

In Russell, Gardner recognizes a man aware of the numinous but unwilling to draw conclusions about religion from it (as Gardner himself does). In Dewey, Gardner discerns something much more alien. He writes,

Among more recent philosophers John Dewey seems to me the outstanding example of an atheist for whom a sense of the numinous was minimal. I have been unable to find a single passage in all of Dewey's writings that strikes me as a memorable expression of wonder about the mystery of being. Nothing seems ever to have mystified Dewey. Never, so far as I can recall, did he see anything tragic or comic or absurd about the human condition. We are all organisms interacting with our environment, and that's that (pp. 559-560).

Speaking personally, I should add that this is the side of Dewey that I have always admired the most. Dewey simply never felt tempted to draw any

conclusions (such as the belief that God exists) from his numinous feelings because he never *had* any such feelings. Russell, by contrast, was quite prone to such feelings; he simply resisted their siren call, and refused to draw any conclusions about the human condition from them.

The result is somewhat ironic. Russell was a militant agnostic, author of "Why I Am Not a Christian." But he also experienced intense numinous feelings, feelings that lead many people (such as Gardner) to religion. But Russell did not believe that any religious beliefs not congenial to reason was worthy of worship. This firm dedication to truth led him to an attitude towards the human condition that could be quite despairing. (This despair saw expression in such works as "A Free Man's Worship." The title is not accidental, and the tone radically different from that of "Why I Am Not a Christian.") One could quite reasonably interpret his broader philosophical project as an effort to discover some sort of truth about the universe that would be unshakeable by reason and worthy of veneration.

Dewey, by way of contrast, felt no such drive for something upon which to bestow awe or reverence. Like Russell, he was a strong believer in intellectual honesty, and so would not worship any god that reason could not recognize. But while he saw no reason to believe in the god to whom the numinous had driven others, he also felt no need for a substitute of any kind. He was quite content to make do without any sort of philosophical certainty; and indeed, a lack of certain philosophical foundations is one of the distinguishing marks of pragmatism. But at the same time, Dewey was much more tolerant of religious language. There was never a chance that Dewey would find himself embracing unjustifiable religious beliefs out of a desire to grasp the *mysterium tremendum*, and Dewey knew this. Therefore, he saw nothing wrong with taking the terminology people often associate with this feeling, and putting it to other, more gainful employment.

Here, I think Dewey does go a little off the mark. He tries, as Gardner points out, to have the "religious" without the supernatural (p. 560). It is all well and good for Dewey to use terms that pose no temptation of abuse for him. What he fails to understand is that those same terms *do* pose such a temptation for many people drawn by the numinous and less intellectually respectable than the old pragmatist. By sanctioning the maintenance of religious language, he provides a cover behind which intellectually bankrupt ideas can flourish. (Still, Dewey is way ahead of Gardner, who has no problem with people drawing conclusions of fact from feelings of awe—something along the lines of, the sky is lovely tonight therefore I should go beat up fags. This may seem ridiculous, but it is no less

ridiculous than many conclusions people have drawn under the cloak of religion.)

To summarize, both Russell and Dewey rejected the desire to believe in something supernatural for intellectually disreputable reasons. (This desire has quite appropriately been dubbed by Paul Kurtz the "transcendental temptation.") This rejection was easier for Dewey than it was for Russell, as the former experienced no such desires, unlike the latter. How this should affect one's relative judgment of the two men I'll leave for others to consider.

Letter from the Chairman

As Chairman of the Board of our Society, I would like to thank all who ran for Board membership and to congratulate the winners. I look forward to seeing all Board members at the Annual Meeting this May. (See "The 2003 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society" in this issue.) There are very few "special interest groups" that do as well as we do at bringing together academics and non-academics for meetings that are intellectually serious and socially relevant. Board members, and indeed all members, are invited to suggest items for the agenda of our next Board meeting. My main concern is membership. We have neither recruited nor retained as many people as would benefit from membership in the BRS. The Annual Meeting is fun, but it would be more fun if more people attended. The APA sessions have gone well, but there have been some empty seats. The Rochester chapter has put on terrific monthly programs, but there are still some who attend those regularly without joining the BRS. We have a lot of talent available to us in the Society, but we need to find better ways to serve the common good. Another matter of grave concern is russell-l. This is a privately owned mailing list, but many of the recent exchanges can only serve to deter prospective members. One way or another, the society needs to develop a service that will use the web to attract new members and retain old ones.

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Letters to the Editor

November 30, 2002

Editor:

In the November issue of the *BRSQ* on page 27, there is a piece on the issue of transfer of Arabs from Palestine. At the end, there is a note that contains a reference to the present-day activities of Israel in moving Arabs out. I find the parenthetical comment, "otherwise known as 'ethnic cleansing,'" to be so far off the mark as to wonder if the person who wrote it thought about what he was saying. Is he saying that the Israelis are methodically killing as many Arabs as possible in order to eradicate all Arabs from the face of the earth? Does he think it is the same situation as in WWII or in Bosnia? I don't think anyone would say that. Transfer is very different from ethnic cleansing. There may be much discussion about whether or not that is the right thing to do, but I don't think any rational person, of whatever persuasion, would seriously call it "ethnic cleansing," particularly if they knew what that meant. I think you should say something about this in the next *BRSQ*.

Terry Zaccone
Saratoga, California

The BRSQ stands by its choice of wording. The expression was used in conjunction with the proposal (enjoying disturbing levels of support in some sectors of Israeli society today) that Israel forcibly remove an entire ethnic group (Palestinians) from the occupied territories. If the terms of this proposal do not constitute "ethnic cleansing," then what could?

New in Russell Studies!

Would you like to find out what's new in Russell Studies? Then visit the "Forthcoming, New and Recent Works in Russell Studies" page at the website of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. The page is at <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/forthnew.htm>.

Have You Renewed Yet?

All BRS memberships (except Life and Honorary memberships) expire at the end of the calendar year. And so if you haven't renewed already, **now is the time!** Don't delay and risk missing a single issue of the *BRSQ*!

Forgotten whether or not you've renewed already? Just check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following 4-digit numbers on it:

- 2002** means you are paid through 2002, but still need to renew for 2003.
- 2003** means you have indeed renewed for 2003, and so are all set for the year.
- 7777, 8888, or 9999** means you are a Life Member, Honorary Membership, or receiving the *BRSQ* as a courtesy. In any case, you never need to renew.

Check for your number, and you'll always know your status.

To renew your membership, just use the handy membership form in the center of this issue. Please return it to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. You can pay by check (payable, in U.S. Dollars, to "BRS") or money order.

You can also pay by credit card using Paypal on the web. Just go to <https://www.paypal.com> and open a free account. Then pay your dues using brs-pp@qconline.com as the recipient's e-mail address when prompted. There is no charge to make a Paypal payment, which (non-U.S. members take note) will be handled in U.S. Dollars. In the e-mail message that Paypal will send from you to our treasurer (Dennis), be sure to state the purpose of the payment. Include any change of name or address, but do NOT include credit card info. Dennis will send you an e-mail receipt, and update the membership records accordingly.

If you have any questions about your membership, feel free to drop Dennis a line at djdarland@qconline.com.

The BRS is constantly looking for ways we can make it easier for you to keep your membership current. We'd hate to lose any member because of a misunderstanding over the timing of a dues payment. If you have any suggestions to help us improve the process, please drop the *BRSQ* a line.

The 2003 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL) May 30-June 1, 2003

The BRS's 2002 Annual Meeting was held at Lake Forest College, in Lake Forest, Illinois (about 30 miles north of Chicago, near Northwestern University). That meeting went so well that the BRS will be returning there for its 2003 Annual Meeting. The BRS thanks Rosalind Carey, an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Lake Forest who handled arrangements for the 2002 Annual meeting, for volunteering to play host yet again.

The BRS encourages everyone to **submit papers and register to attend** the Annual Meeting. Paper submissions, as well as queries regarding the submission process, can be sent to BRS President Alan Schwerin, Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ 07764 USA, (732) 571-4470, aschwerl@monmouth.edu. The paper submission deadline is **May 1, 2003**.

Registration for the meeting—including buffet, banquet, papers, and other conference materials—costs \$60 for members, \$75 for non-members, and \$40 for students. Those interested in skipping the meals may register for one day of the conference for \$20 or both days for \$35. (This rate applies to members, non-members, and students.) Dorm-style accommodations are available on campus for \$49.50 for the weekend (plus \$10 for linens if needed). There are hotels in the area for those uninterested in the dorm experience. Checks for registration and/or housing should be made out to "Bertrand Russell Society" and sent with the conference registration form (located at the center of this issue of the *BRSQ*) to the conference organizer, Rosalind Carey, Department of Philosophy, Durand Hall, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045 USA, carey@hermes.lfc.edu. (Registrants may also pay via credit card using PayPal, as detailed in "Have You Renewed Yet?" p. 8.) Anyone paying in this way must still send a registration form to Rosalind. Please direct all questions about the conference that do not relate to the program to Rosalind as well. Or visit <http://www.lfc.edu/~carey/index2003.html>, the conference's webpage.

The *BRSQ* encourages every member to attend and participate in our latest meeting! See you in Lake Forest!

Congratulations...

Tom Stanley, acting Chair of the Elections Committee, has tallied the ballots from the Society's recent election for the Board of Directors. Secretary Chad Trainer has confirmed the results.

25 members voted in this election, which featured 9 candidates. The final tallies are listed below. The 8 highest vote-getters, all of whom have won seats on the Board, are in italics.

Andrew Bone 22, Peter Stone 22, Nick Griffin 21, Ruili Ye 16, David Goldman 15, Cara Rice 15, Justin Leiber 14, Chandrakala Padia 14, David Henchan 13.

All 4 incumbents seeking re-election won. So did Ruili Ye, who has served the Society in the past as a Board member as well. The *BRSQ* congratulates these candidates, and welcomes newcomers Andrew Bone, David Goldman, and Cara Rice to the Board. The *BRSQ* would also like to acknowledge outgoing Board members Steve Bayne, Jan Loeb Eisler, Keith Green, and Bernard Linsky for their service to the BRS.

...and a Note of Thanks

The BRS would like to acknowledge the following members, each of whom donated money to the Society over and above their regular membership dues in 2002:

- *Patron (\$250 and up)*: David S. Goldman.
- *Sponsors (\$100 and up)*: Neil Abercrombie, Robert A. Riemenschneider, Warren Allen Smith.
- *Sustainers (\$75 and up)*: James Bunton, Rich Guilfoyle.
- *Contributors (\$50 and up)*: Jay Aragona, Dong-In Bac, Whitfield Cobb, D.M. Daugharty, John J. Fitzgerald, James Gordon, Earl Hansen, Carol A. Keene, Gregory Landini, Gladys Leithauser, Stephen J. Reinhardt, Michael A. Sequeira, Susan Berlin Vombrack.
- *Other Donors*: David Blitz, Edgar Boedeker, James E. McWilliams, Benito Rey, Laurie Endicott Thomas.

The *BRSQ* thanks these members for supporting the BRS.

The BRS Needs YOU...at the APA!

The Bertrand Russell Society is recognized by the American Philosophical Association and allowed to participate in their programs, but the BRS is also responsible for selecting its own speakers. Members of the BRS who are also members of the APA are urged to get in touch with David White (dwhite@sffc.edu). We need people to give papers, to comment, to chair sessions, and, most importantly, to fill seats. We are now accepting proposals for the Eastern Division meeting (Due May 1, 2003) at the Washington, DC, Hilton, December 27-30, 2003, and for the Central Division meeting at the Palmer House in Chicago, April 22-25, 2004.

All members who can are asked to attend the following sessions already scheduled with the APA. On Saturday, March 29, Jane Duran (University of California, Santa Barbara) will chair a session at which Justin Leiber (University of Houston) will speak on "Russell and Wittgenstein: A Study in Civility and Arrogance," with comments by David White (St. John Fisher College) at the Westin St. Francis on Union Square, San Francisco. Then on Thursday, April 24, at the Renaissance Cleveland, Cleveland, Derek H. Brown (University of Western Ontario) will give a paper on "Russell and Perceptual Relativity Arguments," with comments by David White, and Rosalind Carey (Lake Forest College) will speak on "Russell's Use of Diagrams for the Theory of Judgment," with comments by John Ongley (Northwestern University).

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserv, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserv is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. Just go to <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively, send the message

subscribe

to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserv's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

Articles:

Bertrand Russell's Relevance Today

Judy Toth

Judy Toth, leader of the Ethical Society of St. Louis, delivered the following talk on March 28, 1999. Paul Doudna provided the BRSQ with a transcription, which the BRSQ reprints here with slight editing for length. For more on the Ethical Society, visit <http://www.ethicalstl.org/>.

It's been a joy to read Bertrand Russell's *Autobiography* and gain insights into not only Russell's accomplishments, but who he was as a person.

At one point, Russell had been touring the U.S. and visited an amusement park where there were mechanical sharks. The reporters asked him, "What should we do with those who want to war?" He said:

I think every big town should contain artificial water-falls that people could descend in very fragile canoes, and they should contain bathing pools full of mechanical sharks. Any person found advocating a preventive war [and if you want to read Kosovo into this, go right ahead] should be condemned to two hours a day with these ingenious monsters.

I found that two or three Nobel prizewinners listened to what I had to say and considered it not without importance. Since then I have published it in Part II of my book, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*...I have heard that it has affected many people more than I had thought, and I find that quite gratifying.

This talk is part of a series, interestingly enough. Three years ago I spoke about Albert Einstein, as one of my ethical heroes. What has evolved is an "Ethical Heroes" series, and last year I did Albert Schweitzer, and this year we have Bertrand Russell. So I find it so interesting to go back into these folk's lives and find out not only what they think about life and their achievements in terms of their world view. How do they view the ethical dimension of life and how that view speaks to us?

Recently my friends Lynn and Todd came into town to teach relationship building. Todd said to me, "Did you know that Bertrand Russell is in *Time* magazine as one of the 100 most influential people of this century?" So I went there and found a summary of Bertrand Russell in two paragraphs.

Bertrand Russell:

In more than 50 books, penned over 74 years, Bertrand Russell set the terms of the debate in logic and philosophy in the first part of this century—most notably with *Principia Mathematica*, written with philosopher Albert North Whitehead.

He also married four times, lost three elections to Parliament, founded a school and led the movement for nuclear disarmament. He was twice jailed and dismissed from three jobs for his pacifism and unconventional views on sex. He won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950 and died two decades later at 97, a humane rationalist to the last.

So with that kind of framework, I'm going to spend a little time talking about Bertrand Russell. Russell's personal life, as for all of us, shaped and influenced who he was not only as a thinker, but as a feeler, as a father, and as a husband. He was orphaned at an early age and raised by his grandparents, who were quite strict and Victorian.

He spent a very lonely childhood with governesses and nurses—with little contact with children his own age—and at the age of eleven began studying Euclid and he called this "one of the greatest moments of my life, as dazzling as my first love." From that moment until he was thirty-eight years old (and had finished *Principia Mathematica*), mathematics became his chief interest and source of happiness. As an adolescent he said his interest was divided between, math, religion, and sex. He studied languages and literature and philosophy and in one of the most profound paragraphs of his *Autobiography*, he says he became an atheist at the age of fifteen, and abandoned the concept of God. "I found to my surprise that I was quite glad to be done with the subject."

He went to Cambridge and said that upon entering it he was a shy prig but by the fourth year he had become a gay and flippant student. He learned the virtue of intellectual honesty and absolute freedom to speculate about anything and everything. He finished his fellowship in 1897 and wrote the *Foundations of Geometry*; in 1901 wrote yet another book on mathematics, while working with his wife on suffragette causes (even though he had very mixed feelings about his wife at this point).

Russell's humor was always present. He had many colleagues, including Whitehead at his professorship school. Russell's friend G.H. Hardy, who was Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, once told him that if he could

find a proof that Russell would die in five minutes time, he would naturally be very sorry to lose him, but the sorrow would be quite worthwhile for the pleasure of the proof. Russell, wise in the way of mathematics professors, observed, "I entirely sympathized with him and was not at all offended."

The period from 1910 to 1914 was a time of deep transition for Russell. He said, "I felt as sharply separated from the people of England as Faust's life before and after he met Mephistopheles." The Great War made him think afresh on the fundamental questions of life. Back in Cambridge, living with high emotional tension, he could not emotionally face the disaster the war would bring to his people. He was appalled that 90% of the population were excited and energized about the war and he said, "It caused me to review my own thoughts about human nature."

However, love of England was his strongest emotion. He was tortured by wanting to be a patriot but abhorred the violence of war. Ostracized for his pacifist views, he wrote in 1915 *Why Men Fight*, and it was a huge success. His pacifism, however, caused him to lose his job, and he was sent to jail for writing antiwar articles. He wrote in prison that he actually enjoyed the experience. It was a holiday from responsibility.

He emerged from that experience no longer just an academic, deciding that he needed to write a broad range of books. He became less rigid and less prudish, remarried, and his first child was born in 1921. He and his wife decided to found their own school, to school their own children and he found his ambition to write books revived.

In 1938 he became a professor at UCLA and subsequently completed his *History of Western Philosophy*, which became the major source of his income. Russell was to struggle throughout his life with financial trouble—especially during the first half of his life.

He would often travel between England and America and in a poignant section called "Christmas at Sea," written in 1931, he says:

I am learning much about growing old. Thirty-five years ago I was lately married, childless, very happy, and beginning to taste the joys of success. Family appeared to me as an external power hampering to freedom: the world, to me, was a world of individual adventure. I wanted to think my own thoughts, find my own friends....I felt strong enough to stand alone....Now, I realize, [this was just due to my vitality and youth.]

Time, they say, makes a man mellow. I do not believe it. Time makes a man afraid, and fear makes him conciliatory, and being conciliatory he endeavours to appear to others what they will think mellow. And with fear comes the need of affection, of some human warmth to keep away the chill of the cold universe. When I speak of fear, I do not mean merely or mainly personal fear: the fear of death or decrepitude or penury....I am thinking of a more metaphysical fear. I am thinking of a fear that enters the soul through experience of the major evils to which life is subject: the treachery of friends, the death of those whom we love, the discovery of the cruelty that lurks in average human nature.

During the thirty-five years since my last Christmas on the Atlantic, experience of these major evils has changed the character of my unconscious attitude to life. To stand alone may still be possible as a moral effort, but is no longer pleasant as an adventure. I want the companionship of my children, the warmth of the family fire-side, the support of historic continuity, and the membership of a great nation. These are ordinary human joys, which most middle-aged persons enjoy at Christmas. There is nothing about them to distinguish the philosopher from other men; on the contrary, their very ordinariness makes them the more effective in mitigating the sense of sombre solitude.

And so Christmas at sea, which was once a pleasant adventure, has become painful. It seems to symbolize the loneliness of the man who chooses to stand alone, using his own judgment rather than the judgment of the herd. A mood of melancholy is, in these circumstances, inevitable, and should not be shirked.

But there is something also to be said on the other side. Domestic joys, like all the softer pleasures, may sap the will and destroy courage. The indoor warmth of the traditional Christmas is good, but so is the South wind, and the sun rising out of the sea, and the freedom of the watery horizon. The beauty of these things is undiminished by human folly and wickedness, and remains to give strength to the faltering idealism of middle age.

He went back to Cambridge to teach, where his career flourished. But he was always beset by money problems that continued to pile up even as his income increased, as well as by social ostracism for his radical views. Russell says that traditional religion is the source of much evil; he viewed it with scorn for its negative effect. Needless to say, he was attacked for

these views and had to defend his position. He talked about fear in religion, yet another theme in his writing.

Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly on fear. It is partly the terror of the unknown, and partly the wish to feel that you have a kind of elder brother who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes. Fear is the basis of the whole thing—fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death. Fear is the parent of cruelty, and therefore it is no wonder if cruelty and religion go hand in hand.

When asked about God's existence in 1947, Russell became sarcastic.

There is a rather repulsive smugness and self-complacency in the argument that man is so splendid as to be evidence of infinite wisdom and infinite power in his creator. Those who use this kind of reasoning always try to concentrate our attention on the few saints and sages; they try to make us forget the Neros and Atillas and Hitlers....And even what is best in us is apt to lead to disaster. Religions that teach brotherly love have been used as an excuse for persecution, and our profoundest scientific insight is made into a means of mass destruction.

I can imagine a sardonic demon producing us for his amusement, but I cannot attribute to a being who is wise, beneficent, and omnipotent, the terrible weight of cruelty, suffering, and ironic degradation of what is best: that has marred the history of man in an increasing measure as he has become more master of his fate.

His humor shows up in the area of religion too. "How would you describe Hell, Lord Russell?" he was asked. "Hell is a place where the police are German, the motorists French, and the cooks English."

He was also asked, "Lord Russell, have you missed anything by not being religious?" Russell replied as follows:

I don't feel I've missed anything through not believing in religion. I think, on the contrary, that the religious people have missed a very great deal. They've missed the kind of pride that stands upright and looks at the world, and says, "Well, you can kill me, but anyway, here I am. I stand firm." And they miss that. And I think that's a very valuable thing that a person should have.

I shouldn't like at all to go through life in sort of a creepy-crawly way, full of terror, and being bolstered up all the time as if I were a fainting lady being kept from sprawling on the ground...because no human being whom I can respect needs the consolation of things that are untrue. He can face the truth.

How, then, would you view death without a religious context for it?

I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will survive. I am not young and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is nonetheless true happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has borne himself proudly on the scaffold; surely the same pride should teach us to think truly about man's place in the world. Even if the open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigor, and the great spaces have a splendor of their own.

Facing continued attacks for his pagan views and his failure to subscribe to traditional religion, Bertrand Russell wrote his own ten commandments. He called them a "Liberal Decalogue," and said, "Perhaps the essence of the liberal outlook could be summed up in a new decalogue, not intended to replace the old one but only to supplement it. The Ten Commandments that as a future I should wish to promulgate, might be set forth as follows:"

A Liberal Decalogue

1. Do not feel absolutely certain of anything.
2. Do not think it worth while to proceed by concealing evidence, for the evidence is sure to come to light.
3. Never try to discourage thinking for you are sure to succeed.
4. When you meet with opposition, even if it should be from your husband or your children, endeavor to overcome it by argument and not by authority, for a victory dependent upon authority is unreal and illusory.
5. Have no respect for the authority of others, for there are always contrary authorities to be found.
6. Do not use power to suppress opinions you think pernicious, for if you do the opinions will suppress you.
7. Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.
8. Find more pleasure in intelligent dissent than in passive

agreement, for, if you value intelligence as you should, the former implies a deeper agreement than the latter.

9. Be scrupulously truthful, even if the truth is inconvenient, for it is more inconvenient when you try to conceal it.

10. Do not feel envious of the happiness of those who live in a fool's paradise, for only a fool will think that is happiness.

These lines are taken from a *New York Times* article called "The Best Answer to Fanaticism—Liberalism," in 1951.

If Russell was so anti-religious, how did he view humanism? It is interesting to consider his point of views on that subject.

Those who attempt to make a religion of humanism, which recognizes nothing greater than man, do not satisfy my emotions. And yet I am unable to believe that, in the world as known, there is anything I can value outside human beings....Not the starry heavens, but their effects on human percipients, have excellence; to admire the universe for its size is slavish and absurd; impersonal non-human truth appears to be an delusion. And so my intellect goes with the humanists, though my emotions violently rebel.

Russell was subsequently asked to comment on human beings, on human nature, and character values. How does he view those kinds of things?

I don't know what human nature is supposed to be. But your nature is infinitely malleable, and that is what people don't realize. If you compare a domestic dog with a wild wolf you will see what training can do. The domestic dog is a nice comfortable creature, barks occasionally, and he may bite the postman, but on the whole, he's all right; whereas the wolf is quite a different thing. You can do exactly the same thing with human beings. Human beings, according to how they're treated, will turn out totally different, and I think the idea you can't change human nature is silly.

What traits then would an ideal character have?

Four characteristics seem to me jointly to form the basis of an ideal character: vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence. I do not suggest that this list is complete, but I think it carries us a good way. Moreover, I firmly believe that by proper physical,

emotional, and intellectual care of the young, these qualities could all be made very common.

But then, since you are a rationalist, Mr. Russell, how can love and rationality be reconciled?

I regard love as one of the most important things in human life, and I regard any system as bad which interferes unnecessarily with its free development. Love, when the word is properly used, does not denote any and every relationship between the sexes, but only one involving considerable emotion, and a relation which is psychological as well as physical. It may reach any degree of intensity. Such emotions as are expressed in *Tristan and Isolde* and in accordance with the experience of countless men and women. The power of giving artistic expression to the emotion of love is rare, but the emotion itself, at least in Europe, is not.

The three main extra-rational activities in modern life are religion, war, and love; all of these are extra-rational, but love is not anti-rational, that is say, a reasonable man may reasonably rejoice in its existence.

As mentioned before, Russell was a pacifist. He founded the Bertrand Russell Foundation for the purpose of promoting world peace. And it is important to him that we look at war's destruction and find it unacceptable. He once said the following about peace:

Our own planet, in which philosophers are apt to take a parochial and excessive interest, was once too hot to support life, and will in time become too cold. After ages during which the earth produced harmless trilobites and butterflies, evolution progressed to the point at which it has generated Neros, Genghis Khans, and Hitlers. This, however, I believe is a passing nightmare; in time the earth will become again incapable of supporting life, and peace will return.

After the formation of Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Russell received a letter from UN Secretary General U Thant, which said:

It is good to know that it is proposed to start a Foundation in the name of Lord Russell, to expand and continue his efforts in the cause of peace. Lord Russell was one of the first to perceive the folly and danger of unlimited accumulation of nuclear armaments.

When we look at Russell's life and what he strived for, what we see is a degree of excellence which he endeavored and strived for and attained in so many fields—whether philosophy or mathematics or world peace or looking at the structure of religion and what it can mean to us as human beings. So he was always looking at what is excellent. He once said:

It would be necessary to the creation of [a society of excellence] to secure three conditions: first, a more even distribution of the produce of labor; second, security against large-scale wars; and third, a population which was stationary or very nearly so.

Until these conditions are secured, industrialism will continue to be used feverishly, to increase the wealth of the richest individuals, the territory of the greatest empires, and the population of the most populous nations, no one of which is of the slightest benefit to mankind. These three considerations have inspired what I have written and said [in terms of how to strive for excellence in our society.]

But then what would you, Lord Russell, hope to see the world achieve?

I think I should put first, security against extreme disaster such as threatened by modern war. I should put second, the abolition of abject poverty throughout the world. Third, as a result of security and economic well-being, a general growth of tolerance and kindly feeling. Fourth, the greatest possible opportunity for personal initiative in ways not harmful to the community.

All these things are possible, and all would come about if men chose. In the meantime, the human race lives in a welter of organized hatreds and threats of mutual extermination. I cannot but think that sooner or later people will grow tired of this very uncomfortable way of living.

He received the Nobel Prize for Literature for his book *Marriage and Morals*, interestingly enough—in 1950. And what is the essence of a good marriage? It only took Russell four wives to come to this conclusion.

The essence of a good marriage is respect for each other's personality combined with a deep intimacy, physical, mental, and spiritual, which makes a serious love between man and woman the most fructifying of all human experiences.

Russell's fame continued to grow throughout his life. He lectured around the world. He was constantly pursued for interviews, especially in his last years. At one point in China, he had a serious illness and he refused to grant interviews. A resentful press decided to carry the news in Japan that he had died. Russell appealed to them but they refused to retract the story. On his way home he stopped in Japan and the press again sought to interview him. His secretary handed out a printed announcement to the reporters that said, "Since Mr. Russell is dead, he cannot be interviewed."

He was once asked, "What has given you the greatest personal pleasure?"

That's rather a difficult question, isn't it? Passionate private relations perhaps would come first of all. I get immense pleasure from natural beauty. And intellectual pleasure, understanding something that has been puzzling, and the moment comes when you understand it, that is a very delightful moment.

Russell's relevance today I think is quite obvious. He continues to challenge us to face and destroy all false beliefs and illusions that keep us from being free in thought and action and capable of self-responsibility. He challenges us to think about war, to stop nuclear proliferation, and create a safe, peaceful world. He began his *Autobiography* with a foreword, which I think really sums up Bertrand Russell very well.

Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, the unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind. These passions, like great winds, have blown me hither and thither, in a wayward course, over a deep ocean of anguish, reaching to the very verge of despair.

I have sought love, first, because it brings ecstasy—ecstasy so great that I would often have sacrificed all the rest of life for a few hours of this joy.

I have sought it, next, because it relieves loneliness—that terrible loneliness in which one shivering consciousness looks over the rim of the world into the cold unfathomable lifeless abyss.

I have sought it, finally, because in the union of love I have seen, in a mystic miniature, the prefiguring vision of the heaven that saints and poets have imagined. This is what I sought, and though it may seem too good for human life, this is what—at last—I have

found.

With equal passion I have sought knowledge. I have wished to understand the hearts of men. I have wished to know why the stars shine. And I try to apprehend the Pythagorean power by which number holds sway above the flux. A little of this, but not much, I have achieved.

Love and knowledge, so far as they were possible, led upward toward the heavens. But always pity brought me back to earth. Echoes of cries of pain reverberate in my heart. Children in famine, victims tortured by oppressors, helpless old people a hated burden to their sons, and the whole world of loneliness, poverty, and pain make a mockery of what human life should be. I long to alleviate the evil, but I cannot, and I too suffer.

This has been my life. I have found it worth living, and would gladly live it again if the chance were offered me.

My closing words are from Russell's *New Hopes for a Changing World*.

Man, in the long ages since he descended from the trees, has passed arduously and perilously through a vast dusty desert, surrounded by the whitening bones of those who have perished by the way, maddened by hunger and thirst, by fear of wild beasts, by dread of enemies, [and] at last he has emerged from the desert into a smiling land, but in the long night he has forgotten how to smile. We cannot believe in the brightness of the morning. We think it trivial and deceptive; we cling to old myths that allow us to go on living with fear and hate—above all, hate of ourselves, miserable sinners. This is folly.

Man now needs for his salvation only one thing: to open his heart to joy, and leave fear to gibber through the glimmering darkness of a forgotten past. He must lift up his eyes and say: "No, I am not a miserable sinner; I am a being who, by a long and arduous road, have discovered how to make intelligence master natural obstacles, how to live in freedom and joy, at peace with myself and therefore with all humankind." This will happen if men choose joy rather than sorrow. If not, eternal death will bury man in deserved oblivion.

Russell and Dewey at the CFI

Alan Bock

John Dewey, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, was the subject of a four-hour discussion and luncheon at the Center for Inquiry in Buffalo, New York on Sunday, November 10, 2002.

Two BRS members, Tim Madigan and Peter Stone, were among the featured speakers at the event, aptly titled "The Legacy of John Dewey (1859-1952)." Also discussing various aspects of Dewey's contributions to twentieth-century thought were Paul Kurtz, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Buffalo, founder of the Center for Inquiry, and an Honorary Member of the BRS; Robert Talisse, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee; Lee Nisbet of the Medaille College Philosophy Department; and John Novak, Professor of Philosophy at Brock University.

In his opening remarks, Kurtz described Dewey as the most important humanist philosopher and promoter of liberal thought in the nineteen thirties and forties. Charles Darwin was an important influence on his philosophy of pragmatism, and led Dewey to attempt to employ the scientific method to all human experience. He was a naturalist who believed that we must abandon the theological/mystical approach to knowledge and apply scientific inquiry to ethics. This led Dewey to a naturalistic ethics and to the defense of a "naturalistic religion" in his *A Common Faith*. In addition, Dewey was a believer in fallibilism, holding that we must always be willing to change our opinion on the basis of new evidence.

The primary purpose of education, according to Dewey, was to develop intellectual growth and critical intelligence, or, in other words, how to think. This could be done by the development of habits of thought, although it should never be done in such a manner as to thwart creative impulses. Unfortunately, many of Dewey's views on education would, in later years, be misinterpreted and distorted by his critics.

Professor Kurtz informed us all that he attended Dewey's ninetieth birthday party at Columbia University and actually met the great man on two or three occasions. According to Kurtz, Dewey was the most "saintly" of philosophers who rarely uttered an unkind word about anyone. Interestingly, the most acerbic remark he ever made about another philosopher was directed at Bertrand Russell, who, according to Dewey,

misunderstood and frequently misrepresented the philosophy of pragmatism in many of his writings. In exasperation after reading one of these critiques, Dewey said of Russell, "He makes me sore."

Tim Madigan confessed that philosophy never made any sense to him *until* he read John Dewey. That experience led him to the study of philosophy and eventually to Paul Kurtz as a philosophical mentor. Madigan noted that Sidney Hook had been a student of Dewey's and that Paul Kurtz had been a student of Hook's and wryly observed that if Hook could be considered Dewey's "philosophical son" and Kurtz his "philosophical grandson," then, by extension and keeping it "all in the family", Madigan could be a sort of "bastardized philosophical great-grandson" of the great John Dewey.

Madigan observed that Dewey's classes at Columbia during the 1917-1918 academic year were audited by two people with whom he (Dewey) would have unusual relationships—Anzia Yeziarska, with whom the "saintly philosopher" would have his only illicit (and unconsummated) love affair; and Albert Barnes, an eccentric millionaire and the inventor of Argyrol (a cure for infant blindness). Years later Barnes would figure prominently in the life of another philosopher, Bertrand Russell.

It has come to light that in 1918 Dewey (rather secretively) wrote a lot of poetry which he kept out of sight by stuffing the papers in his desk or throwing them in his wastebasket at his office at Columbia University. Some of these works were discovered by a junior colleague in the Philosophy Department who inherited Dewey's office and desk. Others were recovered when Columbia's librarian, aided by the janitor, went through Dewey's wastebasket and discovered some of these poems. These eventually came into the possession of Dewey's widow after his death and were subsequently published by Jo Ann Boydston as part of Dewey's *Collected Works*. Interestingly, Professor Boydston authenticated the poetry by researching the life of Anzia Yeziarska, a novelist, who had included some of these poems in her fictional works. While Yeziarska was attending his class, Dewey, who had been separated and estranged from his wife at the time, apparently became quite fond of her. This amorous relationship lasted several months and inspired Dewey's poetry. Eventually, the relationship with Anzia soured and Dewey, who found marriage an inescapable burden, returned to his wife. Boydston described the relationship as a tragedy of two romantics.

Also auditing Dewey's classes in 1917-18 was Albert C. Barnes with whom Dewey, rather surprisingly, would have a life-long friendship

(surprisingly since Barnes was an uncommonly bad tempered fellow who ended up quarrelling with practically everyone who crossed his path.)

Barnes, a self-made millionaire, was also an avid art collector, and in 1922 would establish the Barnes Foundation to bring the blessings of his vast art collection to those he deemed worthy of viewing it. One needed his permission to see the collection and this was apparently given very selectively. He appointed Dewey the Foundation's educational director and encouraged him to study art and aesthetics.

Barnes had a fondness for cranks, and was something of a crank himself. He engaged in behavior that was "way out" such as sending out letters signed in his dog's name. It is something of a mystery as to how a man like Dewey could have tolerated such an oddball as Barnes, but it appears that Dewey had a taste for oddballs of all kinds. Dewey seems to have found him more entertaining than disagreeable. Although very formal with most people, Dewey even allowed Barnes to call him "Jack!" In the final analysis it seems that Barnes merely added a needed spice to Dewey's life.

At the outset of his talk Peter Stone made the "usual pitch" for the Bertrand Russell Society. It would be interesting to determine how many members of BRS have resulted from his tireless proselytizing.

He informed the group that he wished to discuss Dewey and Russell in a rather roundabout fashion by talking about the interrelationships of these two great philosophers with William James, Noam Chomsky, and Martin Gardner.

William James, like Dewey, was one of the founders of pragmatism. He was perhaps more widely read than Dewey because, unlike the latter, he could write with some clarity and was known for clever turns of phrase such as the "cash value" of a proposition. Of Dewey's writing it was said by James that, not only was it damnable, it was "God damnable."

James was also known for applying pragmatism to religion, most prominently in his "Will to Believe" where he seemed to suggest that making a "leap of faith" is the "virile" and "manly" thing to do. At the root of this argument, it seems, was the idea that one can decide to treat a proposition as true regarding religion if not believing it would be depressing. Needless to say, this drove a lot of philosophers and freethinkers up the wall—most notably Bertrand Russell, who devoted some of his earliest essays to attacking pragmatism as an obvious travesty of truth. Russell thought that we should have a "desire to know" rather than

a "will to believe;" he even entitled a short book *The Will to Doubt*.

Unfortunately, James' application of pragmatism to religion seemed to color Russell's attitude toward the philosophy as a whole, causing him to caricature it relentlessly by suggesting that it argued that a belief was true if the consequences of believing it are pleasant. Russell's caricatures, especially when coupled with his razor-sharp wit, really annoyed the normally even-tempered Dewey. As a result the relationship between two of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers was much less fruitful than it could have been.

Noam Chomsky, a seminal linguist, philosopher, and radical activist, is an admirer of both Bertrand Russell and John Dewey and, in fact, has a large poster of Russell in his MIT office. He is also an honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society.

Chomsky was well aware of the disagreements between the two great philosophers, but he still saw a lot of common ground between them, especially when one ventured beyond philosophy into politics. Both Dewey and Russell were in agreement in defending the classical ideas of the Enlightenment; both saw these ideals as something we could not comfortably assume that we had already attained today. This is especially evident right now, as the U.S. appears ready to attack a country without actually asserting anything like a credible reason for doing so.

It is particularly interesting the Russell and Dewey both reached such radical conclusions in their politics despite their differences in philosophies; this raises questions about the relationship between philosophy and politics. Bertrand Russell was an emotivist, but also wrote an essay entitled "Philosophy and Politics." For John Dewey, the relationship was clearer—a more worked-out and clear version of the ideas in "Philosophy and Politics." (Of course, with Dewey, "clear" is always a relative term.) Today there exist some pragmatists, like Richard Rorty, who argue for no linkage between philosophy and any particular political perspective.

Finally, there was a fundamental similarity in the attitudes of Russell and Dewey toward religion, although they differed in their personal attitude towards it and especially in their recommended responses. For Russell, all religion was false as well as harmful. Dewey, on the other hand, distinguished between "religion" and the "religious" and tried to reconstruct religion so as to salvage the important part of it.

Martin Gardner is a science writer perhaps best known for his book *Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science*. He is also a theist and, from this standpoint, provides some insight into the religious attitudes of Dewey and Russell. In his book *The Night is Large*, Gardner promotes the idea that nature justifies religious belief because of the feeling of awe and wonder that overcomes one when contemplating the universe. Gardner describes this feeling as "numinous" and takes both Dewey and Russell to task for their attitudes towards it.

Russell was not deaf to this kind of emotion—he simply resisted it. He was an agnostic as well as the author of "Why I Am Not a Christian," but he had an intense desire for a god of some sort to justify the awe and reverence traditionally assigned to the deity. He never found it but he was always troubled by it. Fortunately, he was simply too smart and intellectually honest to believe something just because it would satisfy him emotionally. This may explain his vehement reaction to James as well as how thoroughly this reaction colored his thoughts on pragmatism in general.

On the other hand, nothing ever mystified Dewey, and he had no need for certainty, awe, or reverence. He was quite content to do without them, and he debunked claims about them in such masterful works as *Reconstruction in Philosophy* and *The Quest for Certainty*. However, he was much more tolerant of religious language. It is telling that Russell's main work on religion was "Why I Am Not a Christian," whereas Dewey's was *A Common Faith*.

In summarizing, Stone observed that a discussion of William James reveals that Russell and Dewey were both intellectuals deeply committed to reason despite serious disagreements as to how reason actually worked. A discussion of Chomsky reveals that both were also committed to radical social action derived from classical liberal ideals, though both differed as to what philosophical foundations, if any, existed for these ideals. And a discussion of Gardner brings out that both rejected the "transcendental temptation" and the desire to believe in something supernatural for intellectually disreputable reasons.

BRS Honorary Member on Tour
Warren Allen Smith & Peter Stone

Taslima Nasrin, an Honorary Member of the BRS, has written *Meyebela, My Bengali Girlhood* (Steerforth Press, 308 pages, \$26.00). The work describes her Muslim childhood and, although there is a word for the childhood of boys but none for girls, she coined the word *Meyebela* (pronounced MAY-bull-ah), underlining how language plays a part in the oppression of women.

The book has received favorable reviews in a number of quarters. The November 18, 2002 issue of the *Nation* carried a review by Meredith Tax entitled "Taslima's Pilgrimage." The review is available online at <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20021118&ts=tax>. Another review, entitled "One Woman Lifts the Veil on Her Islamic Life," appeared in the November 17 *Los Angeles Times*. The review, by Gina B. Nahai, is at <http://www.calendarlive.com/books/bookreview/clbk-nahai17nov17,0,578424.story?coll=cl%2Dbookreview>.

Nasrin's writings have received less favorable attention from other quarters as of late. In September, a magistrate in Gopalganj, Bangladesh, found Dr. Nasrin guilty of offending the sentiments of Muslims through her writings. She was sentenced to one year in prison. Because of her imposed exile, the trial was in absentia and, because she was not informed of trial dates, she was not defended by counsel.

In October 2002, Nasrin started a book-signing tour at the International Festival of Authors in Toronto. Her appearance there was publicized by an article by Cristina Campbell in the October 24, 2002 issue of the *Eye*, one of Toronto's numerous free weeklies. The article featured a review of *Meyebela*. After speaking in November at the "godless march on Washington, D.C.," During her tour, Nasrin spoke to various human rights groups, giving an interview to CNN International and speeches to non-believer and academic groups in Cincinnati; New York City; Charleston, SC; Yale University; the University of Connecticut; Dartmouth College; Boston University; Harvard University; University of California at Irvine; and Los Angeles. In San Diego, she received the "Freethought Heroine" award given by the Freedom from Religion Foundation. And all along the way, she continued to receive publicity. For example, an article on her appearance in New York City appeared in the *Village Voice's* November 13-19, 2002 issue. The article, by Thulani Davis, is entitled "Taslima Nasrin Speaks (Still)," and can still be found online at

<http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0246/davis.php>. Nasrin's visit to New York did not escape the attention of the Indian press, either. The *News India-Times* covered the event in its November 15, 2002 issue. The coverage appeared in an article by Jyotirmoy Datta entitled "Taslima Nasrin Defends Controversial Works," which is online at <http://www.newsindia-times.com/2002/11/15/women-31-top.html>. Upon her return to Europe in December, Nasrin received in Germany the Erwin Fischer Award from the IBKA (Internationaler Bund der Konfessionlosen und Atheisten). She also gave a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France on December 17, 2002. The speech, entitled "I Will Never Be Silenced," was published in the February 2003 issue of *International Humanist News*, publication of the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU). (Nasrin was a member of the IHEU's UNESCO NGO delegation from 1999 to 2000.)

Those interested in more information on Nasrin and her recent activities should consult her website at <http://taslimanasrin.com/>. The website is under construction but still up and running for BRS-ers to visit.

Reviews:

Jan Dejnozka. *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance*. Ashgate, 1999.

Dan Kervick

It is widely believed that Bertrand Russell was no friend of modality. In one well-known study of the subject, Nicholas Rescher argued that Russell's views on modality were both highly negative and "massively influential," and helped to bring about two generations of "stunted development" in modal logic (Nicholas Rescher, "Russell and Modal Logic," in George W. Roberts, ed., *Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume* (George Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp. 146-48). Jan Dejnozka sums up this popular perception of Russell's relationship with modal logic like this:

View V: Not only did Russell not have a modal logic, he ignored modal logic, and was even against modal logic.

The avowed purpose of Dejnozka's *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance* is to refute view V.

Dejnozka says that although "there is much that is true and important in view V," it is still "not the whole truth" (p. 21). Yet the ultimate thrust of

his argument would appear to be that view V is not even part of the truth, but just dead wrong. For according to Dejnožka, Russell “developed his own modal logic” (p. 1), based upon a “rich and sophisticated theory of modality” (p. 2).

These are surprising claims, and if true they are important ones. Yet it is no easy matter to determine what Dejnožka means by them. In one place, Dejnožka summarizes Russell’s approach to modality and modal logic as follows:

Russell’s idea is simple: to use notions of ordinary quantificational logic to define and analyze away modal notions. Modal notions are eliminated across the board. The individual (“existential”) and universal quantifiers are used to simulate and replace modal notions. These quantifiers are interpreted as functioning as if they had modal meanings-in-use. They do not in fact have modal meanings-in-use. Literally speaking, Russell has banished modality from logic. Yet functionally speaking, Russell has achieved a modal logic based on a rich and sophisticated theory of modality. And all of this without having to assume any modal entities or even modal notions. The modern moral is that a modal logic is as a modal logic does. This is modal logic without modal metaphysics (pp. 1-2).

Dejnožka claims Russell is engaged in “dialectical accommodation.” While Russell “refuses to allow ontological status to modal entities, and refuses to admit modal notions as logically primitive,” he “finds modality important enough not only to give a philosophical theory of modality, but also to show how to formalize it as a modal logic” (p. 2).

These characterizations of Russell’s approach to modality are provocative, and raise a host of questions. How is it that Russell can at the same time banish modality from logic, yet possess a rich and sophisticated theory of modality? Reconciling this conflict would seem to depend on understanding the difference between “literally speaking” and “functionally speaking.” What do these expressions mean for Dejnožka? In what sense are modal notions “eliminated” yet “simulated?” What is involved in their being “replaced?” And what does the previously unrecognized Russellian modal logic look like? Where is it formalized, and what is the result? What are its theorems and its fundamental principles?

Unfortunately Dejnožka often fails to provide clear answers to these and other important questions. *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance* is a confusing and difficult book, and not all of the difficulty is due to the difficulty inherent in the subject. The presentation is disorganized and unwieldy. Tangential or subsidiary issues are discussed at great length, while crucial matters of formulation of the main claims and arguments for those claims are often given amazingly scant attention. This reviewer often found it difficult to determine exactly what views were being attributed to Russell.

In order to evaluate view V and the contrary view defended by Dejnožka, one needs to know what, for the purposes of this study, we are to understand by the expressions “modal logic,” “having a modal logic,” and “developing a modal logic.” Yet it is difficult to glean from *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance* any precise sense of how these expressions are being used. At times, Dejnožka seems to suggest only that Russell has an *implicit* modal logic. In other passages it is asserted that the modal logic is explicit. An example is the passage quoted above in which Russell is said to “find modality important enough ...to show how to formalize it as a modal logic.” But Dejnožka himself never presents this formalization.

There also appears to be some confusion between modal *logics* and modal *languages*—that is, natural or artificial languages employing modal idioms. Dejnožka says that he will attribute a modal logic to Russell if either “(i) it is more reasonable than not to paraphrase Russell’s thinking into the modal logic, or (ii) it is more reasonable than not to suppose that Russell would have substantially assented to the modal logic as a paraphrase of his thought” (p. 61). Yet the appropriate medium for *paraphrases* of Russell’s thinking or thoughts would presumably be some sort of fully interpreted language, rather than a logic.

For a comparison, consider the case of a first-order set theory such as ZF. For a given philosopher, we might ask whether that philosopher’s informal pronouncements about sets can be captured by the language of ZF. Now while ZF is written in a first-order language, it is not a first-order logic. It is an interpreted first-order theory. Of course, there is some sense in which the language of that theory has an *underlying* first-order logic. Similarly, the thoughts or written pronouncements of some philosopher may be expressible in some interpreted language containing modal operators, and that language may have a more-or-less definite underlying modal logic.

So, is it the case that some of Russell’s explicit discourse can be

regimented in an artificial language containing modal operators? Presumably, yes. But if this is all there is to the claim that Russell possessed a modal logic, then Russell's possession of a modal logic is an unsurprising and uncontroversial fact. Like all other English speakers, Russell used a whole host of modal idioms in what we can assume is a coherent, systematic way, and one may attempt to recover an underlying modal logic (or rather a family of underlying modal logics) from that mass of modal discourse. Russell may be said in this sense to possess a modal logic. In the same sense, Oscar Wilde, Queen Victoria and at least three of the Marx brothers possessed modal logics. It is even possible for a strident philosophical *opponent* of modality and modal logic to "possess a modal logic" in this weak sense, for it may well be that the philosopher makes free and systematic use of modal idioms such as "must," "can't," "may" and "can" even while denouncing modality.

From a logical and grammatical point of view, "modality" denotes a broad subject area. It encompasses temporal and epistemic modalities, deontic modalities, logical modalities and others. What Rescher and others have found Russell to be hostile toward is modality of a particular kind, the kind involved in the typical philosophical use of expressions such as "necessary truth" and "contingent truth." The relevant notion of necessity is sometimes referred to as *broadly logical necessity*. Russell calls it the "traditional" notion of a necessary proposition.

What were Russell's explicit views on the traditional modal notions? Perhaps his most extended and direct treatment of the topic of modality occurs in an early, unpublished paper entitled "Necessity and Possibility" (CPBR 4, pp. 508-520.) This paper plays a key role in Dejnozka's reading of Russell. He calls it "Russell's fundamental paper on modality" (p. 1), and finds in it the "first and main appearance" (p. 6) of both Russell's theory of modality and the logic allegedly based upon it. But I believe that Dejnozka has not paid adequate attention to Russell's main conclusions.

In "Necessity and Possibility," Russell considers "the characteristics which ought to belong to a doctrine of necessity and possibility on the traditional theory," along with various suggested definitions of the concept of a necessary proposition. Russell concludes that while each of the defined distinctions has *some* of the required characteristics, none of these definitions marks a distinction that has *all* of the required characteristics. Thus each of them fails as an analysis of the traditional notion of a necessary proposition.

After failing to find an adequate definition of necessity, one might expect

Russell to conclude only that either we must keep looking for a better one, or acknowledge the traditional modal distinction between necessary and non-necessary propositions as fundamental and indefinable. Indeed, he says: "it is likely that there are other possible definitions of necessity which are more satisfactory than those that I have discussed." But ultimately, Russell draws a more negative conclusion. He believes that the modal distinctions among propositions are "based on error and confusion." After rejecting each of the suggested definitions, Russell proposes the following:

...The feeling of necessity that we have is a complex and rather muddled feeling, compounded of such elements as the following:

- (1) The feeling that a proposition can be known without an appeal to perception;
- (2) The feeling that a proposition can be proved;
- (3) The feeling that a proposition can be deduced from the laws of logic;
- (4) The feeling that a proposition holds not only of its actual subject, but of all subjects more or less resembling its actual subject, or, as an extreme case, of all subjects absolutely.

Any one of these four may be used to found a theory of necessity. The first gives a theory whose importance is not logical, but epistemological; the second makes the necessary coextensive with the true. The third and fourth give important classes of propositions; but the third class (propositions deducible from the laws of logic) is better described as the class of *analytic* propositions, and the view underlying the fourth is more readily applicable to *propositional functions* than to propositions (ibid., p. 520).

"Necessity and Possibility" then closes with the following words:

I conclude that, so far as appears, there is no one fundamental logical notion of necessity, nor consequently of possibility. If this conclusion is valid, the subject of modality ought to be banished from logic, since propositions are simply true or false, and there is no such comparative and superlative of truth as is implied in the notions of contingency and necessity (p.

This is an unmistakably skeptical conclusion. Where defenders of the traditional distinction have taken their uses of “necessity,” “necessarily,” etc. to refer to some important logical or ontological attribute of propositions, Russell finds only a complex, muddled feeling springing from a variety of psychological sources.

All of Russell’s later statements about modality echo the discussion in “Necessity and Possibility,” and sound the same disparaging note toward the traditional modal distinctions among propositions. He appears never to have abandoned the view that those traditional distinctions are based upon confusion, although his account of the precise nature of the confusion does change. Dejnoška cites the relevant passages, but sees them as further elaborations of Russell’s theory of modality. The skepticism is downplayed or ignored.

According to Dejnoška, Russell’s modal logic is based on three definitions, which Dejnoška refers to collectively as “MDL”:

1. $F(x)$ is necessary with respect to $x = Df F(x)$ is always true
2. $F(x)$ is possible with respect to $x = Df F(x)$ is sometimes true
3. $F(x)$ is impossible with respect to $x = Df F(x)$ is never true

The MDL definitions appear to characterize a concept of *relative* necessity, applicable to propositional functions. While these definitions are supposed by Dejnoška to provide the basis for Russell’s modal logic (pp. 2-3), so far as I have been able to determine they are not found in Russell’s writings. What can be found instead are some similar but significantly different definitions. In the crucial passages cited by Dejnoška, Russell presents a set of definitions of certain *non-relative* distinctions said to hold among propositional functions. Sometimes these definitions are coupled with definitions of certain *relative* distinctions holding among *propositions* (see, e.g., *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, p. 96). The non-relative distinctions can be put as follows:

For any propositional function F :

1. F is necessary if and only if F is always true;
2. F is possible if and only if F is sometimes true;
3. F is impossible if and only if F is never true.

The expressions “always true,” “sometimes true” and “never true” are

familiar from “On Denoting,” *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* and other works in which Russell presents his account of quantification. To say that ‘ x is mortal’ is sometimes true, for example, is just to say that for some x , x is mortal. Call the three definitions in the above group the *Set I* definitions.

The Set I definitions define non-relative attributes of propositional functions. They entitle us to say of a propositional function *not* that it is necessary or possible or impossible with respect to this or that—as the definitions in MDL seem to require—but that it is necessary *simpliciter*. However, in “Necessity and Possibility,” Russell does define a relative distinction holding among *propositions*. Though a proposition may not properly be said to be necessary *simpliciter*, it may be necessary *with respect to* some constituent c of that proposition (pp. 518-19). Formalizing just a bit, let $\textcircled{1}(c)$ be any proposition containing the constituent c , and let $\textcircled{1}(v/c)$ denote the result of replacing the constituent c in the proposition $\textcircled{1}(c)$, everywhere it occurs, with some variable v that does not already appear in $\textcircled{1}(c)$. Then we have:

For any proposition $\textcircled{1}(c)$:

1. $\textcircled{1}(c)$ is necessary with respect to c if and only if $\textcircled{1}(v/c)$ is always true
2. $\textcircled{1}(c)$ is possible with respect to c if and only if $\textcircled{1}(v/c)$ is sometimes true
3. $\textcircled{1}(c)$ is impossible with respect to c if and only if $\textcircled{1}(v/c)$ is never true.

Call these definitions the *Set II* definitions.

The Set I and Set II definitions are both different from the set of definitions called ‘MDL’ by Dejnoška. The Set I definitions entitle us to say such things as that the propositional function “if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried” is necessary, since for all x , if x is a bachelor then x is unmarried. And the Set II definitions license the claim that “If Tony Blair is a bachelor, then Tony Blair is unmarried” is necessary *with respect to Tony Blair*, since the propositional function derived from abstracting on “Tony Blair”, namely “if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried,” is necessary *simpliciter*. But, so far as I know, Russell gives us no account of such locutions as “it is necessary with respect to x that if x is a bachelor, then x is unmarried.” I could find no such account in the passages cited by Dejnoška.

Although Dejnoška never explicitly presents Russell’s modal logic, he has given it a name: it is called “FG-MDL.” What is FG-MDL, and how is it related to MDL? In fact, one can find two different accounts of Russellian

modal logic implicit in the text of *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance*, although Dejnožka does not clearly separate them.

One of the accounts is based Russell's definition of *analyticity*. That notion is connected with Russell's notion of logical truth (not the contemporary notion). A logical truth is a fully general true proposition, a true proposition containing only "logical terms," and an analytic truth is a proposition that results from a universal fully general proposition via universal instantiation. Thus the proposition "Every philosopher who quibbles is a philosopher" is an analytic truth because it is an instantiation of "For all F, for all G and for all x, if x is F and x is G then x is F," and the latter is a logical truth. (Later, Russell added a further condition for logical truth—to be an analytic truth a sentence must also be a tautology, true in virtue of its form. But what truth in virtue of form amounted to was something about which Russell confessed puzzlement. See *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, pp. 204-205.)

Dejnožka cites with approval Gregory Landini's formulation of Russell's notion of analyticity:

Analytically true (A) = Df ($F_1, \dots, F_m, x_1, \dots, x_n$) $A_{F_1, \dots, F_m, x_1, \dots, x_n}$

Here the expressions $F_1, \dots, F_m, x_1, \dots, x_n$ are variables substituted in A for predicate and individual constants. But Dejnožka also seems to be aware that Russell quite definitely *rejects* the identification of the traditional concept of necessity with the concept of analyticity. In "Necessity and Possibility" after considering the hypothesis that a necessary proposition is an analytic proposition, Russell says:

But the *feeling* of necessity does not answer to this definition; many propositions are felt to be necessary which are not analytic. Such are: "If a thing is good, then it is not bad", "If a thing is yellow, it is not red", and so on. *Bad* does not mean the same as *not-good*, and therefore mere logic will never prove that *good* and *bad* are any more incompatible than *round* and *blue*. Hence, though the class of analytic propositions is an important class, it does not seem to be the same as the class of necessary propositions ("Necessity and Possibility," p. 517).

And then in the *Analysis of Matter*, after claiming that "It was generally held before Kant that necessary propositions were the same as analytic

propositions," Russell says that "even before Kant the distinctions were different, even if they effected the same division of propositions." Russell then repeats his negative view of modality, as applied to propositions:

I do not think that much can be made of modality, the plausibility of which seems to have come from confusing propositions with propositional functions. Propositions may, it is true, be divided in a way corresponding to what was meant by analytic and synthetic; this will be explained in a moment. But propositions which are not analytic can only be true or false; a true synthetic proposition cannot have a further property of being necessary, and a false synthetic proposition cannot have the property of being possible (*An Analysis of Matter*, pp. 169-170).

I said that Dejnožka *seems* to be aware that Russell did not identify analyticity and necessity. In a discussion of an argument from *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, Dejnožka says:

Naturally, the meaning of "necessary" can scarcely be identified with the meaning of "analytically true." Otherwise the theory that all necessary truths are analytic would not be significant ... This is perhaps why Russell does not explain logical *necessity* in terms of analyticity, tautology, or truth in virtue of form, *pace* the early Wittgenstein (p. 26).

Yet there is a surprise in store when Dejnožka turns in Chapter 6 to the comparison of the alleged Russellian modal logic, FG-MDL, with S5 and other well-known modal systems. For FG-MDL, it turns out, is based on reading "it is necessary that P" as *it is analytically true that A!*

The second account of Russellian modal logic may be called the *modality as quantification* account. It can be put simply: With MDL, Russell has defined certain modal concepts purely in terms of quantification. In fact, these modal concepts just *are* quantification by another name. The logic of *Principia* is clearly a logic of quantification. Thus, the logic of *Principia* is itself a modal logic.

The modality as quantification account is intermittently present in Dejnožka's book, particularly in the Chapter 8 discussion of the motives and origins of Russell's modal views, where it is defended against various

objections.

But if this is all that Russell's "modal logic" amounts to, then the claim that Russell possessed a modal logic is both misleading and uninteresting. The term "modal logic" has a fairly well defined use, according to which it studies and formalizes logical relations holding among the sentences in a language employing certain kinds of sentential operators and verbal auxiliaries. These locutions are used to express certain traditional distinctions among propositions, along with a large family of other similar and related notions. The idiosyncratic usages of "necessity" and "possibility" understood according to MDL appear to have little to do with modality. (The same holds for the Set I and Set II definitions that Russell actually presents.)

One cannot turn a non-modal notion into a modal notion simply by re-labeling it as "necessity" or "possibility." Dejnozka resists this claim. He says that "to say that MDL is not a modal theory is exactly as absurd as to say that Russell has no theory of existence when he holds that existence is a property of propositional function." But there is an important difference. Russell uses his concept of existence applicable to propositional functions to analyze sentences in which existence appears to be attributed to individuals. But, in my view, the Russellian "modal" notions applicable to propositional functions do not provide a similar favor for sentences in which the traditional modal notions of necessity, possibility and impossibility are attributed to propositions. Nor do I believe that they were intended by Russell to serve that purpose.

Dan Kervick is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Plymouth State College.

Jan Dejnozka. *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. Pp. viii + 241.

Causal Republicanism Sydney, Australia; 14-16 July 2003

This conference, organized by the Centre for Time and the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, marks the 90th anniversary of Russell's celebrated attack on causation in his paper "On the Notion of Cause." For further details, go to <http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/events.htm> or e-mail Richard Corry at Richard.Corry@philosophy.usyd.edu.au.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- *Rutgers Focus*, Rutgers University's paper for faculty and staff, recently published a biographical article on Colin McGinn. McGinn is one of Rutgers' most well-known philosophers and the author of 14 books, including the recent memoir *The Making of a Philosopher* (HarperCollins, 2002). The article, by Douglas Frank, described one stage of McGinn's philosophical development as follows:

As he proceeded through his education, he encountered the works of Bertrand Russell, who "made the life of the mind seem like a heroic adventure, not the monkish confinement to dusty libraries. It was reading him that persuaded me that I wanted to become a full-time, card-carrying philosopher," recalls McGinn.

The review may still be online at <http://ur.rutgers.edu/focus/>.

Source: Alan Schwerin

- On December 9, 2002, McMaster University's *News Daily* published a short article by Rowena Muhic-Day on the ongoing project to place Russell's correspondence online. The article quoted Nick Griffin, Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster and a longtime mainstay of the BRS. The article is online at <http://dailynews.mcmaster.ca/story.cfm?id=1739> and can also be accessed at the site of the McMaster Faculty of Humanities at <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/News/russell.html>.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- The website iafrica.com recently reviewed the fourth edition of Alex Comfort's classic *The Joy of Sex* (Crown Publishing Group, 2002). The review, entitled "'The Joy of Sex,' 30 Years on." appeared on December 10, 2002, and was written by Frederique Prise. It mentioned Comfort's association with Russell twice, both times in terms of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. (Comfort and Russell once shared a jail cell because of their work for the cause.) Check it out at <http://iafrica.com/loveandsex/features/157030.htm>.

Source: Gerry Wildenberg

- A somewhat vacuous article on atheism appeared in the online magazine *Slate* on December 23, 2002. The article, by Jim Holt, is entitled "The Atheist Christmas Challenge: Can you prove God doesn't exist?" It describes the views of several self-professed atheists, such as Christopher Hitchens, Katha Pollitt, and Gore Vidal. It further notes that "Bertrand Russell, who occupied the same ground as Hitchens, was careful to stress that he was agnostic, not atheist: 'An atheist, like a Christian, holds that we *can* know whether or not there is a God. ... The agnostic suspends judgment, saying that there are not sufficient grounds either for affirmation or denial.'" The article is at <http://slate.msn.com/id/2075653/>.

Source: Warren Allen Smith

- On December 27, 2002, the website ZNet published an article by Dave Edwards entitled "Professional Servility and How to Overcome It." This article, the first in a two-part series, criticizes the mainstream media to task for uncritically accepting the political assumptions of the powerful. This happens, Edwards writes, because journalists are

afraid of the implications of what we and our readers have to say for their sense of who they are. Bertrand Russell explained this with great force in an essay published in 1916:

Men fear thought more than they fear anything else on earth - more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tryed wisdom of the ages...

But if thought is to become the possession of many, not the privilege of the few, we must have done with fear. It is fear that holds men back - fear lest their cherished beliefs should prove delusions, fear lest the institutions by which they live should prove harmful, fear lest they themselves should prove less worthy of respect than they have supposed themselves to be. (Bertrand Russell, from *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, 1916. Quoted Erich Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, pp.34-5)

Nothing is more fearsome to liberal journalists.

The article (Russell quote and all) appears at <http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/200212/27edwards.cfm>.

Source: Peter Stone

- On December 31, 2002, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation wrote to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, inquiring about a disturbing report in the British press that the U.S. had intercepted Iraq's report on weapons of mass destruction and removed over 8,000 pages (!) of the approximately 11,800-page report, before passing it along to the U.N Security Council. The Foundation also wrote to all the members of the Security Council and to (BRS Honorary Member) Nelson Mandela, attempting to solicit his intervention in the matter. In an article by Ken Coates, the Foundation expressed grave concern about this maneuver by the U.S. government, which appears to have no basis in international law. (How the U.S. obtained the report first is still unclear.) This article is on the Foundation's website at <http://www.russfound.org/UNSecCouncil.htm>.

Source: Ken Blackwell

Rustlings Gerry Wildenberg

"Rustlings" presents a simple substitution cipher based on the writings of Bertrand Russell. In the coded quote below, each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFFRY Y, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quotes below use different codes. In the cipher below I have made the puzzle harder by disguising the word separations and any punctuation and capitalization. The grouping into 5 letter "words" is meant only to help readability and does not relate to the actual quote.

PDLTN KPKED VNLBK EPKAH UKEDL BVWXA HPDLA VPKXA
EXZWX BLNAL UNXOL XAPDL XALDV ABTQP DLLFJ LCCLA
JLXZP DLKNO DKCXE XDLNE VABXA PDLXP DLNDV ABTQP
DLKNJ XAPLW OPZXX ODKCX EXODQ KATXP DNLEO LJPEP
DLQED XIPDL KNIKE BXW

News from the Humanist World

- The first “Godless March on Washington,” organized by American Atheists and endorsed by (among others) the Council for Secular Humanism, attracted 2,000-3,000 atheists, agnostics, and secular humanists to Washington on November 2, 2002—along with about 60 Christian counterdemonstrators. (An announcement of the event appeared in “News from the Humanist World,” *BRSQ* #115, August 2002.) The *Washington Post*’s report on the event, authored by Caryle Murphy, appeared on November 3, 2002. It can be found on the web at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59379-2002Nov2.html>. The International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) also ran an article on the march by Larry Jones in the February 2003 issue of *International Humanist News*.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- BRS Honorary Member Ibn Warraq condemned a recent biographical documentary on Mohammed for its hagiographic depiction of the founder of Islam. In an article in the *New York Sun* by Jacob Gershman (“PBS Documentary Labeled Islamic Propaganda,” December 18, 2002, p. 3), Warraq takes *Mohammed: Legend of a Prophet* to task for its generally uncritical attitude, which makes reform of Islam more difficult.
- Tributes and obituaries to Stephen Jay Gould, winner of the 2000 BRS Award, continue to appear. The December 30, 2002-January 6, 2003 issue of *Time*, which reviewed the past year, ran a tribute to Gould in a section entitled “The People Who Left Us in 2002.” The tribute, by Michael D. Lemonick, was entitled, “A Scientist for Everybody.” It concludes by noting that Gould “delighted his fans and set his enemies’ teeth gnashing, but even the latter had to admit he forced them to think.” (Much the same could be said of Russell, of course.)

BRS Member Reports

- Ever eager to further the Russellian cause, Thom Weidlich has even brought his book, *Appointment Denied: The Inquisition of Bertrand Russell* (Prometheus, 2000) right to City University of New York (CUNY), the institution where Russell’s appointment was famously “denied.” Thom read excerpts from the book at a public event in the archives of the university’s library on September 21, 2000.

An article on the event appeared in *Circum Spice*, a publication of the City College Library of CUNY. The article was featured in issue number 61 (Fall 2000), p. 3. The article appears online at <http://www.ccnycuny.edu/library/News/CircumSpice/cs61-3.html>. The article contains a picture of Thom—although the caption under the picture reads “Bertrand Russell.” Whether *Circum Spice* was trying to honor or slander Thom is still a point of contention.

Coincidentally, the article describing Thom’s appearance appears alongside an article on a different Russell—Russell Banks, who gave the 3rd Annual William Matthews Memorial at CUNY earlier that year.

- Warren Allen Smith’s column in *Gay & Lesbian Humanist* has been retitled “Stateside Gossip” as of the magazine’s Autumn 2002 issue. The column that appeared in that issue is online at <http://www.galha.org/glh/221/gossip.html>.

Russell on the Web

This column will feature brief reports on various Russell-related tidbits on the Web that stumble across the editor’s computer screen.

- Wikipedia, a free online open source encyclopedia (i.e., one that can be updated by its users) has an entry on Bertrand Russell at http://www.wikipedia.com/wiki/Bertrand_Russell. BRS Vice President for Outreach found the site, past Chairman of the Board Ken Blackwell updated its content slightly—and *BRSQ* Editor Peter Stone added a link to the BRS’s website.
- Russellians with a passion for Harley-Davidsons may enjoy checking out the Bertrand Russell Motorcycle Club at <http://www.cpcug.org/user/ackerman/>. The site is run by Bob Ackerman, a longtime BRS member.
- Past BRS Chair Ken Blackwell recently decided to check out the web address <http://www.bertrandrussell.com>. He discovered, to his considerable amusement, that the address is indeed taken—by a website featuring the computer game “Asteroids” (Version 1.2). The game is fully playable, and has been tested by the Editor of the *BRSQ*.

- Those with access to the web might consider checking out some of Russell's works in e-book format. For example, both *Analysis of Mind* (1921) and *Proposed Roads to Freedom* (1918) are available as e-books. For the former, there are actually 11 formats, with prices ranging from \$1.75 up to \$7.95, available at <http://www.ebookmall.com/alpha-titles/a-titles/Analysis-Mind.htm>. For the latter, there are 10, available at <http://www.ebookmall.com/alpha-titles/p-titles/Proposed-Roads-Freedom.htm>. The *BRSQ* thanks Ken Blackwell for this information.

Who's New in Hell

Warren Allen Smith, author of *Who's Who in Hell* (Barricade, 2000) and *Celebrities in Hell* (Barricade, 2002) recently presented the *BRSQ* with a list of the libraries in the U.S. that currently own one or both books. The *BRSQ* reprints the list of libraries carrying *Celebrities in Hell* below; the list of libraries carrying *Who's Who in Hell* will appear in the next issue. Members should consider checking to see if their local library is listed below. If not, ask the library to purchase the books—or, if you're in a generous mood—consider donating copies. (Of course, the *BRSQ* assumes that all BRS-ers are making sure their local libraries have all the essentials of Russell studies.)

The following 60 libraries currently have *Celebrities in Hell*:

Flagstaff City-Coconino County Public Library (Flagstaff, AZ)
 Huntington Beach Public Library (Huntington Beach, CA)
 Los Angeles Public Library (Los Angeles, CA)
 Orange County Public Library (Orange County, CA)
 Oxnard Public Library (Oxnard, CA)
 Stanislaus County Library (Stanislaus County, CA)
 Jefferson County Public Library (Lakewood, CO)
 Pikes Peak Library District (Colorado Springs, CO)
 Library of Congress (Washington, DC)
 Brevard County Libraries (Brevard County, FL)
 Jacksonville Public Library (Jacksonville, FL)
 Leon County Public Library (Tallahassee, FL)
 Oak Lawn Public Library (Oak Lawn, IL)
 Robert Morris College (Chicago, IL)
 William Rainey Harper College (Palatine, IL)
 Elkhart Public Library (Elkhart, IN)
 Valparaiso University (Valparaiso, IN)

Davenport Public Library (Davenport, IA)
 Topeka and Shawnee County Public Library (Topeka, KS)
 Jefferson Parish Library (Metairie, LA)
 Harvard University, Divinity School (Cambridge, MA)
 Lakeland Library Cooperative (Grand Rapids, MI)
 Minneapolis Public Library (Minneapolis, MN)
 St. Paul Technical College (St. Paul, MN)
 Mid-Continent Public Library (Independence, MO)
 St. Louis University (St. Louis, MO)
 Mercer County Library (Lawrenceville, NJ)
 Somerset County Library (Somerset County, NJ)
 ABC News Research Center (New York, NY)
 Buffalo and Erie County Public Library (Buffalo, NY)
 Nassau Library System (Uniondale, NY)
 St. John Fisher College (Rochester, NY)
 University of Rochester (Rochester, NY)
 Fayetteville State University (Fayetteville, NC)
 Cleveland Public Library (Cleveland, OH)
 Columbus Metropolitan Library (Columbus, OH)
 Cuyahoga County Public Library (Cuyahoga County, OH)
 Lakewood Public Library (Lakewood, OH)
 Marion Public Library (Marion, OH)
 Southwest Public Libraries (Grove City, OH)
 Southwestern Ohio Regional Library Center (Fayetteville, OH)
 State Library of Ohio (Columbus, OH)
 Wright Memorial Public Library (Dayton, OH)
 Metropolitan Library System (Oklahoma City, OK)
 Corvallis-Benton County Public Library (Corvallis, OR)
 Multnomah County Library (Portland, OR)
 Salem Public Library (Salem, OR)
 South Dakota School of Mines and Technology (Rapid City, SD)
 Nashville Public Library (Nashville, TN)
 Montgomery County Memorial Library System (Conroe, TX)
 University of Texas at Austin (Austin, TX)
 Salt Lake City Public Library (Salt Lake City, UT)
 University of Richmond (Richmond, VA)
 Bellingham Public Library (Bellingham, WA)
 Kitsap Regional Library (Kitsap County, WA)
 McNeil Island Correctional Center (Steilacoom, WA)
 Seattle Public Library (Seattle, WA)
 Washington Correctional Center (Gig Harbor, WA)
 Ohio County Public Library (Wheeling, WV)
 Milwaukee County Federated Library System (Milwaukee, WI)

BRS Business and Chapter News:

The BRS Library

The catalog of the BRS Library printed in the previous issue of the *BRSQ* failed to list the variety of film and video recordings owned by the BRS and available for loan to members. These recordings are listed below.

For further information, or to inquire about sale or loan of a book or tape, please contact Tom Stanley, BRS Library, Box 434, Wilder VT 05088, **thomas.stanley@valley.net** or visit the BRS Library webpage at **http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/4268/**.

Dialogues with Russell:

These dialogues with Russell were filmed for television during four and one-half days in the spring of 1959. Transcripts were published in *Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind* (World Publishing, 1960). Each runs 14 minutes.

- "Bertrand Russell discusses Philosophy" (16mm)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Religion" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Taboo Morality" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Great Britain" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Fanaticism and Tolerance" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Communism and Capitalism" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses the 'H' Bomb" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses War and Pacifism" (VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Happiness" (16mm)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Power" (16mm)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses the Role of the Individual" (16mm)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Mankind's Future" (16mm)
- "Bertrand Russell discusses Nationalism" (VHS)

Other Recordings Featuring Russell:

- "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell" (BBC, 1962. 40 min. 16mm)
- "Bertie and the Bomb" (BBC, 1984. 40 min. VHS)
- "Bertrand Russell" (NBC, 1952. 30 min. 16 mm) Interview with Romney Wheeler.
- "Close Up" (CBC, 1959 30 min. VHS) Interview with Elaine Grand.

**Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
4th Quarter 2002 Treasurer's Report
10/1/02 Through 12/31/02**

Compiled 1/13/03 by Dennis J. Darland
BRS Treasurer (**djdarland@qconline.com**)

| Category Description | |
|----------------------|----------|
| BALANCE 9/30/02 | 6,909.34 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contrib-BRS | 95.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 95.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 72.18 |
| Renewals* | 479.70 |
| TOTAL Dues | 551.88 |
| Other Income | 10.00 |
| TOTAL INCOME | 656.88 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Advertising | 57.78 |
| Bank Charges | 7.85 |
| Library Expenses | 16.37 |
| Newsletter | 742.05 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 824.05 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -167.17 |
| BALANCE 12/31/02 | 6,742.17 |

* 2003 renewals will appear in 2003.

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2002 Annual Treasurer's Report
1/1/02 Through 12/31/02

Compiled 1/13/03 by Dennis J. Darland
 BRS Treasurer (djdarland@qconline.com)

| Category Description | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/01 | 7,307.19 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Uncategorized Contributions | 0.42 |
| Contrib-BRS | 1,705.31 |
| Misc. Contributions | 0.67 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 1,705.98 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 497.18 |
| Renewals* | 3,756.79 |
| TOTAL Dues | 4,253.97 |
| Library Income | 38.70 |
| Meeting Income | 53.77 |
| Other Income | 264.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 6,316.84 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Advertising | 57.78 |
| Bank Charges | 34.04 |
| Library Expenses | 50.47 |
| Meeting Expenses | 630.98 |
| Newsletter | 3,146.02 |
| Other Expenses | 293.57 |
| RUSSELL Subscriptions | 2,669.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 6,881.86 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -565.02 |
| BALANCE 12/31/02 | 6,742.17 |

* 2003 renewals will appear in 2003.

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell
 Meetings Open to the Public

GRRS Member Speaks in Toronto

On March 14, GRRS Member Peter Stone will address the Humanist Association of Toronto (HAT). His talk, entitled "Bertrand Russell's Politics & Humanism," will be held at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) Building, 252 Bloor Street West, Toronto. The talk will begin at 7 PM. For more information, contact the GRRS or visit HAT's website at <http://humanists.net/hat/index.html>.

Program, Winter & Spring 2003

| | |
|---------|--|
| Mar. 13 | Russell and the Prisoner's Dilemma |
| Apr. 10 | "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish" |
| May 8 | Russell on Audio (Celebration of Russell's Birthday) |
| June 12 | <i>Practice and Theory of Bolshevism</i> |

All meetings are held at **Daily Perks Coffee House**, 389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY, at **6:30 PM**. **Note New Meeting Time!**

All dates and topics are subject to change. For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or write tmadigan@rochester.rr.com or visit http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~wildenbe/grrs/russell_poster.html.

Solution to *Rustlings* Puzzle, November 2002


"One of the persistent delusions of mankind is that some sections of the human race are morally better than others."

Bertrand Russell, in "The Superior Virtue of the Oppressed", an essay from the collection *Unpopular Essays*.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

May 2003

No. 118



Lake Forest College,
Site of the 2003 BRS Annual Meeting
May 30-June 1, 2003

Register for the Meeting Today!
See Page 7 for Details.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

c/o David White
Philosophy Department
St. John Fisher College
3690 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14618 USA



MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1406 26TH ST.
ROCK ISLAND IL 61201-2837

LAST CHANCE TO RENEW!

See page 6 for details!

From the Editor:

Fundamentalism Then and Now

Recently, I had the opportunity to address a meeting of the Humanist Association of Toronto. My talk was entitled "Bertrand Russell's Politics and Humanism." (An account of this talk will appear in a forthcoming issue of the *BRSQ*.) The question-and-answer period following this talk generated a lively discussion about Russell. One question in particular, however, stands out in my mind. One attentive listener was genuinely perplexed by a quotation from Russell (one of my favorites) that I used during my talk: "I think all the great religions of the world—Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Communism—both untrue and harmful" (Introduction to *Why I Am Not a Christian*). The listener had no doubts about the falsity or harmfulness of religion (this was a gathering of humanists, after all), but she could not understand why Russell included Communism in his list of religions.

The question raised by this listener is an important one, and while I suspect most readers of the *BRSQ* will have some idea of what Russell meant, it is worth discussing the point in some detail here.

Throughout his life, Russell took great pains to stress that where belief was involved, what mattered was not *what* you believed but *how* you believed it. This was true regardless of the subject area involving belief, whether it be religion, physics, or economics. For example, he famously began the first essay of his collection *Sceptical Essays* (1928) with the following injunction:

I wish to propose for the reader's favourable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true.

Russell clearly believed that this "subversive" doctrine had implications for what one believed. He argued in "Why I Am Not a Christian" and many other works that there was no ground whatever for believing in the existence of God. This did not prove God's nonexistence—this is why Russell considered himself an agnostic and not an atheist—but when talking about unicorns, minotaurs, or compassionate conservatives, one does not normally have to prove their nonexistence; the mere lack of any

evidence of existence is sufficient reason not to believe in any of them (Incidentally, 2003 marks the 75th anniversary of the publication of *Sceptical Essays*, one of Russell's most widely read collections of essays. In the next issue of the *BRSQ*, I shall have more to say on this book so as to mark its birthday with the proper amount of respect.)

Russell applies this concern with the methods used to generate and maintain beliefs to questions of politics. In his book *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938), he discusses the presence of fanatical creeds, and their alleged social usefulness. Unity around political programs, held without thought and reflection, is often thought to be necessary if a nation is to survive in this dog-eat-dog world. Russell subjects this claim to a searching analysis, and finds it wanting.

The dogmatic approach to religious belief that Russell decried is as alive now as it was when "Why I Am Not a Christian" was first published, even if atheism and agnosticism have grown marginally more respectable in public circles. However, now more than ever it is intertwined with other equally unsavory and equally destructive belief systems that command assent based on faith rather than on evidence. For example, the Indian feminist and political activist Vandana Shiva recently observed that "Two forms of fundamentalism seem to be converging and becoming mutually reinforcing and mutually supportive" in many parts of the world today. One is the familiar "politics of exclusion emerging in the form of political parties based on 'religious fundamentalism'/xeno-phobia [sic]/ethnic cleansing and reinforcement of patriarchy and casteism." This sort of fanatical creed will be familiar to traditional opponents of bigotry. The second is the "market fundamentalism of globalization itself," or at least the version of globalization promoted by western elites for their own advantage. This form of fundamentalism holds, despite all available evidence, that the free market can do everything better than both traditional social networks and democratic political institutions (Shiva's essay "Globalisation and Its Fall Out," is at <http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2003-04/02shiva.cfm>.)

The convergence of these two fundamentalisms is not accidental. Countries that embrace the free market fundamentalism offered by corporate-led globalization simply cannot guarantee their own people a decent standard of living. If those people cannot meet their basic needs, they will embrace any political project, no matter how wild, that offers them some hope of improving their lives. This includes all the species of religious and racial bigotry presently sweeping the globe. It is no accident that in India the rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), a far-rightist party whose government

has presided over vicious anti-Muslim pogroms, coincides almost exactly with India's embrace of the "structural adjustment" programs of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Nor is it a coincidence that IMF-led reductions in educational spending in Pakistan led many parents to send their children to the madrasas, schools that provided an education in Muslim fanaticism. These schools were financed by the CIA (through the Muslim groups it armed to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan) and rich Saudi fanatics like (also not a coincidence) Osama bin Laden.

And there is yet another side of the fanaticism that sweeps the globe today. Naomi Klein, a leading critic of globalization, describes the way the IMF has tried to force Argentina to maintain and strengthen its agreements to abide by free market fundamentalist dogma. "But there is another criterion," writes Klein, that Argentine leaders must meet "to merit foreign capital: They must show that they are willing to use force to control those sectors hurt by such agreements" ("No Peace without a Fight," *Nation*, March 31, 2003). In other words, free-market fundamentalism also goes hand in hand with the development of military force. And military force invariably brings another kind of fanaticism in its wake.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the U.S.'s current war on terrorism, most recently manifested as "Operation Iraqi Freedom." There is no denying that the current U.S. government embraces Christian fundamentalism, a near-obsessive concern with expanding the reach of the corporate-led marketplace, and a militaristic jingoism that blithely disregards any language but that of force. The connections among the three run very deep; people who can think critically about privatization of prisons are also likely to be able to see through lies about both "faith-based initiatives" and the virtues of duct tape.

What would Russell think about the current political situation in the United States? I suspect he'd ponder whether his description of the political situation in the 1930s mirrored the ongoing face-off between George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden.

A collection of lunatics, each of whom thinks he is God, may learn to behave politely to one another. But the politeness will only last as long as each God finds his omnipotence not thwarted by any of the other divinities. If Mr. A thinks he is God, he may tolerate the pretensions of others so long as their acts minister to his purposes. But if Mr. B ventures to thwart him, and to provide evidence that he is not omnipotent, Mr. A's wrath will be kindled, and he will perceive that Mr. B is Satan or one of his ministers.

Mr. B, of course, will take the same view of Mr. A. Each will form a party, and there will be war—theological war, bitter, cruel, and mad. For "Mr. A" read Hitler, for "Mr. B" read Stalin, and you have a picture of the modern world. "I am Wotan!" says Hitler. "I am Dialectical Materialism!" says Stalin. And since the claim of each is supported by vast resources in the way of armies, airplanes, poison gases, and innocent enthusiasts, the madness of both remains unnoticed (*Power: A New Social Analysis*).

I also suspect he'd ponder whether the American attitude toward the "Axis of Evil"—three countries whose ruling ideologies have nothing in common, two of which are traditional enemies—resembles a scenario described in "Outline of Intellectual Rubbish"—

Give me an adequate army, with power to provide it with more pay and better food than falls to the lot of the average man, and I will undertake, within 30 years, to make the majority of the population believe that two and two are three, that water freezes when it gets hot and boils when it gets cold, or any other nonsense that might seem to serve the interest of the state. Of course, even when these beliefs had been generated, people would not put the kettle in the refrigerator when they wanted it to boil. That cold makes water boil would be a Sunday truth, sacred and mystical, to be professed in awed tones, but not to be acted on in daily life. What would happen would be that any verbal denial of the mystic doctrine would be made illegal, and obstinate heretics would be 'frozen' at the stake. No person who did not enthusiastically accept the official doctrine would be allowed to teach or to have any position of power. Only the very highest officials, in their cups, would whisper to each other what rubbish it all is; then they would laugh and drink again. This is hardly a caricature of what happens under some modern governments (*Unpopular Essays*).

Above all, he would probably want to ask hard questions about the reasons for attacking Iraq earlier this year, an attack for which the justification changed week by week.

Russellians should of course be mindful of Russell's excellent and entertaining critiques of organized religion and its detrimental consequences for human life. But they should also remember that the lessons of these critiques apply far more broadly. When the belief not based on evidence prevails in other areas of life, the results are no less devastating for the world we share.

Last Chance to Renew!

All BRS memberships (except Life and Honorary memberships) expire at the end of the calendar year. The BRS sends everyone with expired memberships the first two *BRSQ* issues of the year (February and May), but those who have not renewed by August will not receive the third issue of the year. And so if you haven't renewed already, **now is the time!** If you don't, the BRS will have to send you an individualized reminder, and that takes time, money, and energy the BRS could better use elsewhere.

To find out whether or not you have renewed as of this issue, please check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following four-digit numbers on it:

- 2002** means you are paid through 2002, but still need to renew for 2003.
- 2003** means you have indeed renewed for 2003, and you are all set for the year.
- 7777, 8888, or 9999** means you are a Life Member, Honorary Membership, or receiving the *BRSQ* as a courtesy. In any case, you never need to renew.

Check for your number, and you'll always know your status.

To renew your membership, just use the handy membership form in the center of this issue. Please return it to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA. You can pay by check (payable, in U.S. Dollars, to "BRS") or money order.

You can also pay by credit card using Paypal on the web. Just go to <http://www.paypal.com>, and open a free account. Then pay your dues using brs-pp@qconline.com as the recipient's e-mail address when prompted. There is no charge to make a Paypal payment, which (non-U.S. members take note) will be handled in U.S. dollars. In the e-mail message that Paypal will send from you to our treasurer (Dennis), be sure to state the purpose of the payment. Include any change of name or address, but do NOT include your credit card info in the message. Dennis will send you an e-mail receipt, and update the membership records accordingly.

If you have any questions about your membership or the renewal process, feel free to drop Dennis a line at djdarland@qconline.com.

The 2003 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Lake Forest College (Lake Forest, IL) May 30-June 1, 2003

The BRS's 2002 Annual Meeting was held at Lake Forest College, in Lake Forest, Illinois (about 30 miles north of Chicago). That meeting went so well that the BRS will be returning there for its 2003 Annual Meeting. The BRS thanks Rosalind Carey, an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Lake Forest who handled arrangements for the 2002 Annual Meeting, for volunteering to play host yet again.

The BRS encourages everyone to **register to attend** the Annual Meeting. Registration for the meeting—including buffet, banquet, papers, and other conference materials—costs \$60 for members, \$75 for non-members, and \$40 for students. Those interested in skipping the meals may register for one day of the conference for \$20 or both days for \$35. (This rate applies to members, non-members, and students.) Dorm-style accommodations are available on campus for \$49.50 for the weekend (plus \$10 for linens if needed). There are hotels in the area for those uninterested in the dorm experience. Checks for registration and/or housing should be made out to "Bertrand Russell Society" and sent with the conference registration form (located at the center of this issue of the *BRSQ*) to Rosalind Carey, Department of Philosophy, Durand Hall, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045 USA, carey@hermes.lfc.edu. Registrants may also pay via credit card using PayPal, as detailed in "Last Chance to Renew!" p. 6). Anyone paying in this manner must still send a registration form to Rosalind. Please direct all questions about the conference to Rosalind as well. There is also a website devoted to the conference at <http://mypage.campuspipeline.com/brsam2002/indexbrsam2003.html>. See you in Lake Forest!

2003 BRS Award to Be Given to Katha Pollitt

Kevin Brodie, Chairman of the BRS Awards Committee, has announced that the 2003 BRS Award has been offered to Katha Pollitt, longtime columnist for the *Nation* and author of *Reasonable Creatures: Essays on Women and Feminism* (Vintage Books, 1995) and *Subject to Debate: Sense and Dissents on Women, Politics, and Culture* (Random House, 2001). Ms. Pollitt has indicated that she will accept the award but will be unable to travel to the 2003 Annual Meeting for this purpose. She will instead issue a statement of acceptance to be read at the meeting.

The BRS Needs YOU...at the APA!

The Bertrand Russell Society is recognized by the American Philosophical Association and allowed to participate in their programs, but the BRS is responsible for selecting its own speakers. Members of the BRS who are also members of the APA are urged to get in touch with David White (dwhite@sjfc.edu). We need people to give papers, to comment, to chair sessions, and, most importantly, to fill seats. We are now accepting proposals for the Eastern Division meeting at the Washington, DC, Hilton, December 27-30, 2003, and for the Central Division meeting at the Palmer House in Chicago, April 22-25, 2004. The deadline for proposals for the Eastern Meeting is May 31.

Buy a BRS T-Shirt Today!

Don't you be caught without something distinctive to wear! BRS t-shirts always make you stand out in a crowd (except at BRS Annual Meetings, of course). So why not order yours today? The shirts are available for \$10 each plus \$3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Please make checks out to the BRS, and send them to BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, 854 Battle Street, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color (black, yellow, white). Any questions about the shirts can be directed to Ray at perkrk@earthlink.net.)

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserv, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserv is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. Just visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively send the message

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to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserv's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

Articles:

Reflections on Russell's Politics in the Light of Editing His Letters Nicholas Griffin

The BRSQ is very pleased to run this brief article by Nicholas Griffin, Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, in which he discusses various issues raised by the volume he recently edited, The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970 (Routledge, 2002).

For me, Russell's last political campaigns were one of the glories of his life. I first got to know of him in the early sixties through the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and my interest in his philosophy developed from my admiration for his political stand on nuclear weapons. Most of the large final section of my book is devoted to Russell's politics and I wondered, as I started work on it, whether my early, youthful enthusiasm would survive a close encounter with the archival record. Well, youthful enthusiasm is hard to sustain in middle age, but on the whole, I thought Russell held up rather well—better, overall, than I was expecting. And indeed there was one respect in which my middle-aged weariness and political despair taught me an altogether new respect for him.

There's a marvelous letter in the book to Gamel Brenan, written in 1945, in which he says that as he gets older it becomes more difficult to balance hope against memory. That phrase stayed with me as I worked through the thousands of letters which he devoted to the perils of nuclear war over the next 25 years. Through that long period—which began when he was already past normal retirement age—he tried one means after another to tame the monster, placing his hopes in the neutral nations, direct appeals to world leaders, the nuclear scientists, the Labour Party, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, civil disobedience. Though thwarted at every turn, he never gave up. As a youthful supporter of CND, having no experience, I had no idea how difficult it would be to balance hope against experience. But here was a man whose hopes had survived—not Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan—but two world wars, the great slump and Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini.

It was not that he was a great optimist; his assessment of the dangers and of his chances for success were as bleak as could be. But he simply refused to give up. He clung to his cause through every setback, through illness,

personal tragedy, and increasing physical frailty. I found this extraordinarily impressive. In his relations with women, one might think that he allowed hope to over-balance memory too easily. But in politics it was admirable.

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There was a lot I learnt for the first time about Russell's political campaigns. For example, I had no idea of the sheer size of his campaign for political prisoners, mostly in Eastern Europe. In the book, I cover only one of the cases he took up from beginning to end, and even then there was not enough space to include everything and the book gives no impression of the variety of ways in which Russell and his aides brought pressure to bear on the Romanian government for the release of the two men involved.

And this was only one case among many; Russell's files on political prisoners in Romania alone include well over 100 cases. He got two other Romanian appeals in the same month as the one I covered. Of course, he was not always successful, but there were scores, if not hundreds, of people in Eastern Europe who owed their freedom to him.

Russell did not publicize this work, though to have done so would have been useful to him in answering the frequently made charge that he was pro-Soviet. But the effectiveness of his appeals to the various Soviet bloc governments depended upon their being made quietly.

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I find myself, therefore, in total disagreement with Ray Monk's dismissal of Russell's political work in the second volume of his biography (*Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness*). It's not always easy to reply to Monk, because it's not always clear what exactly his complaints are.

Monk complains, for example, about the intellectual shallowness of Russell's political pamphleteering. But it's important to realize that Russell was not writing political philosophy. His concern here was to change the world, rather than to understand it. When it came to understanding the world, Russell put his hopes in physics. I doubt that he ever found political theory as interesting as physical theory, and I'm quite certain that he never thought that producing a political theory was as important as the simpler, but more difficult task, of stopping people from killing one another.

At one point, Monk claims that Russell was prepared to say anything

merely to keep in the public eye. But this is ridiculous. With his opposition to the war in Vietnam, Russell lost whatever access he had had to the mainstream media. Left-wing news sheets would publish his statements, but not the mainstream press. He was reduced to mass mailing press releases in the hope that some small paper somewhere might publish it.

If his only desire had been for publicity, it is not difficult to see what he should have done. He should have declared himself in support of the Americans in Vietnam, denied that they were committing atrocities, and warned (as he had so often done in the past) about the miseries inflicted by communism. He could have done it. It would have confirmed his reputation as a political maverick. It would have got huge press attention. The op-ed pages of every major newspaper in the West would have been open to him. And he would have found himself being flattered by the American ambassador, not the Cuban one. (Monk is never quite clear why he thinks Russell was so anxious to be flattered by the Cuban ambassador.)

In part, Monk seems to believe that it was absurd for Russell to think he might influence world events. As I've suggested, Russell was under no illusions as to how difficult that would be, but he thought the dangers were so great that he had to try anyway. Moreover, on many smaller matters—like the release of political prisoners, which Ray entirely ignores—he did affect events and in an almost entirely good way.

Even on some of the big issues he was taken seriously by the principals. As I show in the book, both Nehru and Zhou Enlai took him seriously on the Sino-Indian border dispute. Any peace initiative between warring nations is likely to emerge out of officially deniable, diplomatic back channels, often opened by the use of academics and intellectuals. The 1993 Middle East peace agreement, now in ruins, emerged in just such a way. And not long after Russell sent Ralph Schoenman and Pat Pottle on a shuttle diplomacy mission between New Delhi and Beijing, Henry Kissinger, then a mere Harvard professor with infinitely less moral and intellectual clout than Russell, shuttled between Washington and Paris to feel out the Vietnamese. No one calls Kissinger's mission absurd.

If Russell's involvement in politics was as absurd as Monk pretends, it is hard to understand why it was taken so seriously. Not just among the thousands of ignorant and unwashed—like myself—who marched and demonstrated with him, but by people in power like Khrushchev and Nehru and Zhou Enlai. Would Zhou have had *Unarmed Victory* translated into Chinese for his own use, sent the Chinese chargé d'affaires in London to North Wales for discussions, and have written Russell respectful six-page

letters explaining how, in *Unarmed Victory*, he had misconstrued Chinese foreign policy, if he had thought that Russell was entirely without influence or importance? And given that both public and politicians granted Russell some influence, don't we have to admire Russell for working so hard to use it for goals that he thought were right?

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It has often been claimed that in old age Russell was entirely taken over by a group of much younger assistants who used his name in ways of which he had no knowledge and did not approve. His secretary Ralph Schoenman is often cited in this regard. In view of all this talk, I was somewhat surprised, on working through the archival materials, to find how close a control Russell kept on the political activities carried out in his name.

Of course, many letters were written for his signature by other people. His correspondence ran at 100 letters a day; it would have been impossible for anyone to keep up such a pace without that sort of help. But when letters were written for him it was much more often by Edith, his wife, than by Ralph Schoenman. (The two of them write quite differently, so you can tell their work apart. And of course, both write quite differently from Russell, who retained his distinctive style even in extreme old age.)

Moreover, many of the letters which were drafted by others were drafted according to Russell's instructions. We often have the notes to prove it. Russell was far too practical a man in political matters to worry much about style and wording, and he frequently let infelicities pass that he would never have been responsible for himself. He did, however, concern himself, often quite minutely, with content, and there is evidence of letters being changed by him, often in quite small details, when they did not express exactly what he wanted. Though, again, as a practical man, he realized that it was often more important to issue a crudely drafted statement quickly, than to take so long producing timeless prose in which no one was interested. Russell could produce timeless prose quickly, but not so quickly that the press lost interest in a story.

I cannot, of course, maintain that all the letters he signed said exactly what he would have wished, or that his name was never used for purposes of which he would not have approved. But the papers in the Bertrand Russell Archives make it clear that this occurred much less frequently than has been alleged.

The most controversial of all Russell's late political efforts was his

International War Crimes Tribunal on Vietnam. There were, indeed, many things about the organization of the Tribunal which could have been improved. But I persist in my view that the Tribunal was an important and well-conceived effort to make known the facts about the Vietnam War that was systematically derailed by a hostile press, which tried and condemned the Tribunal in advance of its taking place.

Comparisons to the Nuremberg Trials were, I suppose, inevitable—but they were unfortunate. Nuremberg was an actual trial conducted before judges with the defendants and their lawyers. No such trial could be held for the American government. The Russell Tribunal was essentially a citizens' commission of inquiry to discover the facts about the American conduct of the war. There is no general requirement that such commissions be bipartisan or that they be conducted by strict legal principles—let alone those of a criminal trial.

The Tribunal did assemble a great deal of scrupulously collected evidence about atrocities in Vietnam. Press reports gave no indication of the high standards of evidence required by the Tribunal, nor of the overwhelming quantity of evidence that it assembled. American atrocities in Vietnam were not widely known at that time in the West and the Tribunal's evidence deserved much more attention than it received. Its conclusions were essentially validated two years later, when details of the My Lai massacre finally became public knowledge.

I can't help but admire Russell's determination to do whatever he could to make the truth about the Vietnam War known. He spent a fortune creating the Tribunal and assembling the evidence for it to hear. He endured months of vilification in the press. He was accused of being senile and a Communist; it's hard to judge which charge was the more farfetched.

Is it absurd for a 95-year-old philosopher to take it upon himself to charge a nation with war crimes? Perhaps. But faced with subsequent atrocities in Rwanda, the Balkans, and now Palestine, one regrets that (counting Chomsky as a linguist) no contemporary philosopher has the will, the ability, or the courage to do likewise.

Earth to Russell: The Limits of Russell's Views on Space Exploration

Chad Trainer

...the generations of men...observed how the array of heaven and the various seasons of the year come round in due order, and could not discover by what causes all that came about. Therefore their refuge was to leave all in the hands of the gods....And they placed the gods' habitation and abode in the sky...

-Lucretius (99-55 BCE)
De Rerum Natura 5.1170ff

In the first ages of the world, the islanders either thought themselves to be the only dwellers upon the earth, or else if there were any other, yet they could not possibly conceive how they might have any commerce with them, being severed by the deep and broad sea, but the aftertimes found out the invention of ships....So, perhaps, there may be some other means invented for a conveyance to the Moone....We have not now any Drake or Columbus to undertake this voyage, or any Daedalus to invent a conveyance through the aire. However I doubt not but that time who is still the father of new truths, and hath revealed unto us many things which our ancestors were ignorant of, will also manifest to our posterity that which we now desire but cannot know.

-John Wilkins (1614-1672 CE)
The Discovery of a World in the Moone.

Bertrand Russell has been one of the best at chronicling and lampooning history's opponents of science. Surprisingly, though, he expressed opposition to the exploration of space. This paper details and critiques the four lines of argument Russell employs in attacking the space program.

I. Introduction:

Bertrand Russell regularly noted the demerits of living in the past both as a danger in old age and as an obstacle to an entire culture's progress. In general, much is said in his writings about the merits of scientific exploration and the importance of realizing the planet Earth's minute place in the cosmos. In the light of all this, it might seem a safe conjecture that

Russell would enthusiastically support the space program. He did not. For Russell was also a self-described Cassandra doomed to prophesy evil and not be believed. As early as 1924, he speaks of how his long experience of statesmen and governments has made him skeptical: "I am compelled to fear that science will be used to promote the power of dominant groups, rather than to make men happy. Icarus, having been taught to fly by his father Daedalus, was destroyed by his rashness. I fear that the same fate may overtake the populations whom modern men of science have taught to fly" (*Icarus*, p. 5). It was in such a vein that Russell expressed his concerns over space exploration.

Passing remarks about exploring space are scattered throughout Russell's writings, but the bulk of his proclamations on this topic can be found concentrated in three pieces: a 1958 article for *Maclean's Magazine*, a filmed 1965 interview of Russell by Ralph Miliband, and some 1966 comments for *Paris Match*. Russell had essentially four criticisms of space exploration:

- The space program was not undertaken in a spirit of scientific impartiality;
- The exploration of space could result in the spread of human foolishness;
- It would be better to expend energy addressing terrestrial problems before involving ourselves in celestial affairs; and
- The actual increase in human understanding that could result was questionable.

While I consider all of Russell's arguments here to be unacceptable, I view them as unacceptable to considerably varying degrees.

II. An Absence of Scientific Impartiality:

Russell's first contention is that space exploration was not being undertaken in a spirit of scientific detachment: "I am afraid that it is from baser motives that Governments are willing to spend the enormous sums involved in making space-travel possible" (*Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, p. 18).

In fairness to Russell, he lived during the dawn of the nuclear age. Today, people do not always appreciate the extent to which space exploration was associated with the arms race during the Red Scare. In its time, Sputnik conjured up fears of nuclear annihilation. Given Russell's concern with

human welfare and the predominantly military nature of the nascent space program's purposes, his skepticism is understandable, even if knowledge pertaining to space exploration has not always been gleaned for just the grimmest purposes. Even if early space exploration has been thoroughly military and devoid of anything in the way of scientific detachment, the ensuing deluge of data and experience become available to all, including the "sufficiently scientifically detached." When Galileo, for example, presented his spyglass to the doge, "Galileo was... more concerned with the rewards to be reaped from the earthly advantages of an improved instrument than with any celestial advantage" (Van Helden, Introduction to *Galileo Galilei's Sidereus Nuncius*, p. 9). Yet this has hardly prevented the telescope from eventually being employed for the purest and loftiest purposes.

In any case, Russell could well have feared the human race destroying itself before any advances of military technology could accommodate the "scientifically impartial."

III. The Spread of Human Foolishness:

Russell's second argument against the space program was that it could lead to the spread of human follies. "Before long, if we do not destroy ourselves, our destructive strife will have spread to those planets" (*The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, vol. III, p. 186). "[W]hen I read of plans to defile the heavens by the petty squabbles of the animated lumps that disgrace a certain planet, I cannot but feel that the men who make these plans are guilty of a kind of impiety" (*Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, pp. 19-20). It might be argued by some that Russell harbored no objections to space exploration as long as it took the form of mere astronomical observation and was not militarily oriented. However, the evidence suggests that Russell would have been wary even of astronomical observation chiefly because of the military missions that might be concealable under the guise of mere "exploration."

It is interesting to ponder to what degree Russell thought the planet's atmosphere should be off-limits. Would he have objected to Albert Abraham Michelson's interferometer, notwithstanding its establishment of light's speed as a universal constant? Or would Fitzgerald and Lorentz's experiments with radio waves be deemed objectionable in spite of the wireless telegraphy such experiments spawned? How about Orville and Wilbur Wright's aeronautical innovations? All such developments are subject to misuse. Yet Russell can be assumed to have appreciated such advances profoundly as only befits a man who both sung the praises of

scientists and took theologians to task for superstitious behavior ranging anywhere from condemning Benjamin Franklin's lightning rod to protesting advances in medicine. It is against this backdrop that charges of space exploration perpetrating "a kind of impiety" appear out of character. Nevertheless, Russell was certainly right about the intrusion of militarily-oriented missions into space.

IV. Prosperity of the Earth vs. the Space Program:

Russell's third argument against exploring space is that we need "a little more wisdom in the conduct of affairs on earth before we extend our strident and deadly disputes to other parts" ("Let's Stay off the Moon"). Russell seems guilty of a false disjunction here. Substantial progress in the space program is not necessarily a net setback for our terrestrial prosperity. Space exploration has helped this planet and could well have been predicted to do as much. The amount of money required by NASA amounts to a small portion of the U.S. budget. In addition, space satellites have had more than military applications. Many military enterprises ultimately redound to civilians' economic and social benefit.

The Topex/Poseidon satellite has enabled oceanography researchers to observe major patterns of surface circulation. Satellite radar measurements were able to inform scientists about El Niño and satellite maps are expected to help us in comprehending the distribution of mineral resources on the planet's seafloor. Nowadays specialized maps can be used, for example, to "predict crop yields, model optimal lumber harvests, or chart ever changing wetlands" (John D. Bossler, "Mapmaking: Redrawing the Boundaries" in the *1995 Britannica Book of the Year*, p. 154). Satellites have also aided in detecting ancient remains.

Satellite technology has assisted us in exploring the science behind the planet's single ecosystem and helped us comprehend global environmental changes. Satellites have given meteorologists enough detail to foresee big storms all over the planet. They have enabled us to provide disaster warnings. They have provided navigational aid for the maritime and trucking industries. To bring matters a little closer to home, the Global Positioning System (GPS) has not only become the basis of modern navigation and mapmaking but GPS devices in automobiles significantly assist directionally-challenged people (like the present writer) in finding obscure locations such as those of philosophy conferences.

Thousands of communication satellites circling the Earth enable television to broadcast between nations and continents and also provide long-distance

telephone service. But perhaps considering the amount of time people spend watching TV or talking on cell phones, Lord Russell might not have considered these as advances.

While there may be little to no disadvantage to the foregoing *civilian* technologies, the net gain or loss for human welfare would seem to depend, ultimately, on the fate of the *military* applications of this technology. Some of these technologies do serve a function in the realm of arms control when it comes to verifying or abiding by international treaties. But whether the science will be used to "make men happy" or to "promote the power of dominant groups" remains to be seen.

V. Wisdom to Be Derived from Space Exploration?

Russell's fourth and final argument against space exploration was that "There is no reason whatever to suppose that the new possibilities of travel will do anything to promote wisdom" ("Let's Stay off the Moon"). That Russell objected to space exploration not just on the grounds of prudence but also because it did not offer anything of cerebral value seems clear enough from the Miliband interview:

MILIBAND: You wouldn't put this [space exploration] in the department of the search for truth?

RUSSELL: Oh no, no.

MILIBAND: The thirst for knowledge?

RUSSELL: It is just fantasy.

It may not be clear what Russell meant by saying "It is just fantasy." But, given his remark in the same interview that "it's quite all right to have space science. Only it doesn't happen to appeal to me," it seems reasonable to conclude that, at the very least, Russell did not think there was interesting information to be discovered in this realm.

Such declarations seem in complete contradiction to the overall tone and texture of Russell's philosophy. For example, Russell criticizes Hegel as entirely too terrestrial in his thinking and speaks of how "if you want to get a sound philosophy, you must have astronomy well in your head and realize that this planet is a very unimportant and trivial part of the universe. And what happens on it, from a cosmic point of view, isn't very important" (Bertrand Russell interviewed by Mike Tigar; broadcast on KPFA, November 2, 1962). Also, "Vitalism..., and evolutionism,...[o]ptimism and pessimism, as cosmic philosophies, show the same naïve humanism....All such philosophies...are best corrected by a little

astronomy" (*Why I Am Not a Christian*, p. 55). To be sure, Russell credits Halley and Newton with their respective discoveries dispelling superstition about comets. He has nothing but scorn for their obscurantist contemporaries (*Cf. In Praise of Idleness*, pp. 168-170.). In saying that the space program has nothing to offer when it comes to "the search for truth," Russell himself seems to be guilty of an obscurantism of sorts. Even the most cursory surveys of the space program's history yield insights of the highest order.

To take a few examples, in 1989 the European Space Agency launched the Hipparchos satellite, the results of which included positions of more than 100,000 stars being charted with a precision "100 times better than ever before achieved on Earth" (See Kenneth Brecher's articles on astronomy for *Encyclopedia Britannica's* yearbooks). Also, the Hubble Space Telescope has helped solve a variety of astronomical riddles. To name but a few things, Hubble has revealed proof of black holes, given us a direct look at Pluto's surface, and was particularly helpful in viewing the 21 fragments of comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 that collided with Jupiter. A host of extrasolar planets have been discovered some of which "raise many questions about the late stages of stellar evolution, not to mention the origin of planets around old pulsars" (Brecher). And evidence has been discovered of conditions for past or present life on Mars, one of Jupiter's moons, and extrasolar planets.

In 1998, sightings of the brightness of fairly distant exploding stars afforded evidence for the "cosmological constant" (a kind of "cosmic repulsion force" first postulated by Albert Einstein in 1917 in his equations of general relativity). During 2001, new studies were reported of the most distant supernova found to date, which yielded the best evidence ever that the expansion of the universe is certainly accelerating.

In 1993, a U.S.-Australian team verified Einstein's prediction that gravity bends light. By the end of 1993, there had been four reports of massive compact halo objects in outer areas of the Milky Way. "Even though the amount of matter represented..., if extrapolated to other galaxies, was insufficient to close the universe, the observational technique did open a new channel for detecting dark matter in the universe" (Brecher).

The case is becoming increasingly strong that the universe has substantially more matter than can be seen in the way of stars and galaxies. The matter's gravitational effects indicate its existence. Astronomers in search of so-called dark matter can now argue more cogently that the universe is closed.

Finally, space research has enabled astronomers to estimate the age of the universe as ranging anywhere from 7 billion to 14 billion years.

Would Russell have really said that there is no increase in wisdom following from such revelations? While the net worth of space exploration for our terrestrial welfare remains to be seen, the volume of our knowledge or wisdom on this front is *plainly and simply increased*. One would think Russell would have relished the increasingly more informed accounts of the cosmos that enable us to more thoroughly refute the misguided metaphysics of the past.

From the days of old, a determination to view celestial phenomena as of an inviolably different order than terrestrial phenomena has been an obstacle to scientific progress. Instead, Galileo's assumption that the laws of physics applicable to earth are on a continuum of sorts with those to be applied to the heavens seems to have pointed us toward a proper approach. And for Russell to be dismissive of space exploration's merits brings to mind the Jesuits who cantigated Galileo for peering through his telescope.

In fine, to discount the firmament as a source of wisdom seems grimly reminiscent of the very obscurantism Russell never tired of deriding and vilifying.

VI. Conclusion:

Overall, Russell's disapproval of space exploration can be assessed as being 1) understandable in the context of the early Cold War arms race; 2) well-founded regarding the specter of militarizing space; 3) an open issue in calculating our ultimate earthly welfare; and 4) inaccurate in its denial that there is any wisdom to be derived from its discoveries.

We should accept Russell's second argument to the extent of realizing the increased extent to which space has become militarized but be prepared for a possibility he would not accept, namely, that the increased extent to which space has become militarized could nevertheless be a price worth paying for our broadened horizons. We should accept his first argument as a respectable one for its time but just that—a dated argument. While it may be difficult to marshal evidence to this effect, my hunch is that anywhere from, say, thirty to seventy percent of space exploration these days could be credibly deemed "scientifically impartial." We should reject the third argument if it is to be understood as flatly denying terrestrial benefits ever coming from the space program. If, however, such benefits are not doubted but said to be not worth it, the matter becomes partially valuational (in

which case I don't share Russell's values in this area) and partially empirical (in which case once the framework of values is given an objective reference the matter becomes subject to the ongoing and apparently endless findings of science). We should completely reject the fourth argument because wisdom/knowledge is not only attainable in this area but its attainment is quite desirable and a cause for celebration.

In our own day and age, we are faced with challenges relating to such uncharted territory as electronic surveillance, genetic testing, and the like. The most helpful philosophers here would seem to be those proposing the best uses to which new technology can be put and suggesting specific abuses against which we should be on our guard. What are not helpful are philosophers simply dismissing new discoveries as "fantasy," or "impiety," and suggesting that we simply try to close Pandora's Box, or put the genie back in the bottle.

It may have been such reflections combined with a spirit of British compromise that prompted Russell in 1966 to outline conditions that would allay his misgivings about people exploring space as a "sacrifice to science." He remarks in the *Paris Match* piece that, first of all, "[t]he man must be willing to take the risk. In the second place, he must be a scientist able to report validly on his new environment. In the third place, he must be unarmed and the expense of his journey must be shared, at any rate, by America, Russia and China. It is above all important that he [the astronaut] should not be the advance guard of a military expedition by one of the existing powers."

Russell's denial that worthwhile information can be derived from the space program's discoveries are particularly striking in view of the fact that he opens his autobiography citing "the search for knowledge" as one of his life's three governing passions. But another of the three passions was "unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind." When it came to the exploration of space in Russell's day, he must have envisioned these two passions on a collision course. He opted to side with the welfare of mankind even at the cost of placing obstacles in the way of man's search for knowledge. In the twilight of his life, as his campaign for nuclear disarmament mounted, Russell took a different perspective on his life's greatest achievements. Regarding even his contributions to mathematical logic, which are typically viewed as his greatest accomplishments, Russell reflected, "What is the truth on logic does not matter two pins if there is no-one alive to know it" (*Compass and Fleet* interview, December 1964). The same can safely be said to have been Russell's view concerning "the truth on astronomy." "Material progress has increased men's power of

injuring one another, and there has been no correlative moral progress" (*The Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, p. 74). Hence Russell's interest and success in launching the Pugwash Movement. Ray Monk (a man not exactly known for his charitable interpretations of the aged Russell) hails the Pugwash Movement as one which enjoys "an impeccable reputation as a sober and respectable body that governments could trust, listen to and learn from, and...is widely credited with having been responsible for the partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1964" (*Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness*, p. 380).

In conclusion, perhaps we can bear in mind Ray Monk's point that "Looked at like this, in the last ten years of his life, though Russell wrote no more on philosophy—indeed, precisely in not writing any more on philosophy—he was perfectly fulfilling the duties of a philosopher" (*Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness*, p. 387).

Chad Trainer is an independent scholar, engaged in a study of ideas and arguments from the history of philosophy. He would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of the Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections at McMaster University Library, especially Carl Spadoni. He would also like to thank Ray Perkins, Jim Daily, Cara Rice, Lee Trainer, Mark Trainer, Charles Tuller, Debbie Winfield, and especially Ken Blackwell for their assistance, as well as the Greater Russell Rochester Set for its interest in this paper. He presented an earlier version of this paper on June 1, 2002 at the 29th Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society. An abbreviated version of this article appeared in the March/April 2003 issue of Philosophy Now, and is available online at <http://www.philosophynow.org/40trainer.htm>.

Chomsky at McMaster Michael Potter

Noam Chomsky's visit to McMaster University at the behest of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre was most appropriate, as Nick Griffin noted when introducing the celebrated linguist and philosopher. After all, Chomsky is one of a select group who can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Russell as both a thinker and a political activist. Russellians also like to think of Chomsky as an heir of sorts to Russell's throne. Chomsky was inspired by Russell's philosophy and by his political activism, and in many ways Russell's torch in these areas was passed along to him. Were Russell alive today, he and Chomsky might have some quibbles over language and knowledge, but they would be united in their practical causes.

In town for the week of November 11th-15th, 2002, Chomsky offered semi-private seminars for academics—"Language and the Rest of the World," "Anarchism Today," and "9-11 and the Future of Progressive Social Change"—and two public lectures—"Is There Intelligent Life on Earth? The Role of Intellectual Culture and Institutions" and the Bertrand Russell Peace Lecture, "The Emerging Framework of World Order."

Like Russell, Chomsky is famous and infamous in disparate circles and attracts a diverse audience. Tickets for his public talks in Hamilton were snapped up minutes after being made available. Hundreds of people hoping for a chance to see Chomsky went home disappointed; they were too late for tickets, some having arrived only one hour early. Consequently, I was only able to attend one of the public lectures, "The Emerging Framework of World Order," and the seminar on language given to the folks in the departments of modern languages and linguistics, and philosophy.

The latter half of "Language and the Rest of the World" dealt with language and intentionality. In the 1920s, Chomsky said, a confident Russell asserted that the laws of chemistry had been reduced to the laws of physics. Chemistry had become a mere "calculating device." As it turned out, the laws of chemistry could not be reduced to the laws of physics—because the laws of physics were wrong. Eventually, the new, radically-revised physics that emerged out of the first half of the twentieth century was reunited with its old friend chemistry.

At present, we find an analogous controversy in the philosophy of mind over the attempt to reduce the "psychological" approach to the explanation of intentional systems to terms of the "neurophysiological" approach. Although they must be related in some way, he conceded, the proper explanation may come not through attempts to reduce one approach to the other, but rather through efforts to rethink one or both approaches.

Chomsky also made brief mention of Russell's principles of non-demonstrative inference, noting that Russell believed they were uniquely human and made knowledge possible. Although Chomsky believes such principles are most likely unique to human beings, he insisted that we might find counterparts in other species—even insects—that are adequate given the needs of each species. Each species-specific structure is likely to have no more of these principles than it needs. The task of the "minimalist program" is to discover such principles.

Those who attend Chomsky's talks do so for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, attendees may be split into two general groups—those who

genuinely want to hear what he has to say and those who hope to upstage him. At "Language and the Rest of the World," representatives of the latter group were more prominent—an eager bloodthirst in their eyes as they asked questions they'd spent hours preparing, only to endure Chomsky's calm deflection. At "The Emerging Framework of World Order," on the other hand, those genuinely interested in Chomsky's ideas seemed to dominate, a delightful potpourri of the skeptical and the credulous.

Those attending the "The Emerging Framework of World Order" were forced to make their way through a throng of salespeople, activists, and protesters (salespeople of a different sort). The latter were primarily representatives of B'nai Brith Canada, handing out pamphlets and making the same charges Chomsky had responded to earlier in a *Hamilton Spectator* article—that he "trivializes" genocide in Cambodia, supports the work of a Holocaust denier, and lies about Israel. Indeed, Chomsky has responded to these charges several times in the past. But the B'nai Brith stands its ground, refusing (perhaps on principle) to undertake the hour or so of research needed to discover what Chomsky has actually said about matters near and dear to them.

Among the merchandise and propaganda offered for purchase at Hamilton Place, some gems could be found. The activists attracted to Chomsky's ideas tend to be young, passionate idealists—as were the activists attracted to Russell's crusades in the 1960s. Many peace activists took advantage of this opportunity to reach more people at one event than they'd normally reach in a year—they busily recruited attendees, spread the word about forthcoming protests, and dispensed information about the danger not posed by Iraq.

The information distributed by the peace activists was prepared just as the world came to the appalling realization that Bush was serious about waging war on Saddam. And it is Chomsky's prescient discussion of the causes and consequences of possible war with Iraq that is now the most relevant aspect of Chomsky Week. He spent most of his talk discussing Iraq, oil, and the traditional stance of American governments toward human rights violations—all in the wittily informative spirit best embodied by Russell.

After the events of September 11th, 2001, the belief that "nothing would ever be the same" became commonplace. The same sort of belief was common at the end of the Cold War. But then, as now, events continued as they probably would have in any event. What changed, in both cases, Chomsky argued, were the pretexts, doctrines, and tactics used in the

inevitable pursuit of power. At best, he predicted, 9/11 accelerated trends already in motion. The only thing that can keep a nation as powerful as the United States from bullying the rest of the world is the deterrent effect of other nations in possession of weapons of mass destruction.

At present, war against Iraq is justified by appeal to the threat of Saddam's (likely imaginary) "weapons of mass destruction" and the terrible human rights violations for which his regime is responsible. Chomsky spent a fair amount of time addressing the latter, moral justification.

There is a significant correlation between American arms transfers, Chomsky maintained, and human rights violations. If you wish to find atrocities, just follow the arms transfers; that those "in the know" don't notice the trail of bodies, destruction, and terror is, at best, self-deceit. When Turkey was the leading recipient of American arms, in the 1990s, it used them to terrorize its Kurdish population—driving millions from their homes, torturing and killing tens of thousands. An estimated 80% of the arms used in these activities were provided by the Clinton administration, an administration that doled out more arms in eight years than were transferred during the entire Cold War.

In 1997, when the *New York Times* claimed that American foreign policy was entering its "noble" phase, Turkey was praised for its "counter-terrorism"—that is, terrorism approved by the United States. A similar euphemism was used by the Nazis; whoever "we" may be, Chomsky wryly insisted, "our" atrocities are always *counter-terror*.

Colombia, Turkey's successor as leading American arms recipient, hasn't yet succeeded in crushing its own people, though it managed to achieve the worst record of human rights violations during the 1990s, with 10-20 political murders per day.

The horrific events of 9/11 made no difference when it came to the noble tradition of supporting brutal regimes. But it did affect the Bush administration's attitude toward Iraq. Chomsky recognized back in November, along with many others then and since, that Iraq poses no major threat to anyone. Yet, to hear Bush tell the tale, in the post-9/11 world, Iraq poses an "imminent" threat to the existence of all decent people on this planet. So the message was sent: Iraq is primarily interested in killing Americans, and it may do so at any time. Presumably he wasn't interested in killing his neighbors, since they didn't consider him a threat. But those living in the Middle East do live in fear, Chomsky noted, of the United States.

Like Russell, Chomsky appears to be a consequentialist; what we should do is, roughly, what is most likely to lead to the best consequences. No sane person wants the United States, or any other country, to suffer more terrorist attacks. We must recognize, Chomsky urged, that certain actions are likely to reduce the risk of further terrorist attacks, and others are likely to increase it. War with Iraq practically guarantees an increase in terrorism against the United States. He referred to reports that the CIA warned the Bush administration that an attack on Iraq would lead Saddam to ally himself with terrorist organizations, would lead to a new generation of Iraqis bent on revenge, and accelerate already-existing plans for further terrorist attacks. We must conclude, Chomsky suggested, that the "radical nationalist leadership" is pursuing ways to increase the risk of further terrorist attack with "vigor and determination."

One course of action almost guaranteed to decrease the risk of more terrorist attacks is shut out of the debate entirely. And that is to stop participating in it. In the words of the head of Israeli secret police, "Those who want victory against terror want an unending war, unless they address the underlying grievances." But, Chomsky pointed out, the Bush administration shows little interest in doing this—since it would, after all, entail admitting that the United States has supported, and continues to support, terrorism.

Sounding much like Russell, Chomsky declared that the "aim of practical politics" is to use imaginary hobgoblins to frighten members of the public until they beg you to lead them to sanctity. It's an old strategy—Hitler used it—that manages to "transform mass discontent into fervent nationalism by inventing an external enemy." "All of this," Chomsky explained, "is second nature to the recycled Reaganites" in power. The formula is simple: find a weak enemy, inflate the danger it poses to a monstrous degree to scare people, then quickly and decisively crush it. The public feels happy and secure and you still have their support. Problems begin to arise if the hobgoblin won't die on schedule.

No one is left to watch the watchmen, as it were. The United Nations, a prototype of the world government Russell insisted we must one day create, is helpless in the face of Bush's military superiority and open disregard for the rules of the international game. The U.N. functions "just as far as the great powers allow it to function." The only "great power" left is the United States, and it has no interest in an international democracy of nations. "How many U.N. resolutions would Iraq be violating if it had veto power?" Chomsky asked. None at all. Those who violate the most security resolutions are those who veto them—and the United States gets the gold

in this regard. Great Britain takes silver. In fact, three weeks before Chomsky's talk, only two countries opposed United Nations resolutions banning chemical weapons and the militarization of space: the United States and Israel. There was "zero coverage" of this event in the American press.

That his talk was sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Research Centre is appropriate, Chomsky said, because Russell is an exemplary model of the committed and responsible democratic citizen. In fact, he told the assembled masses, "there could hardly be a more inspiring model for what can and must be done."

Asked to state his message for today's youth in one sentence, he responded, "Be like those people who, throughout history, worked to create a world that was better than the one before." Russell would no doubt have agreed.

Michael Potter is a PhD student at McMaster University.

Buddhiwadi Foundation: Aims and Activities Dr. Kawaljeet Kaur

Several months ago, the BRS became acquainted with the Buddhiwadi Foundation, a humanist organization in India. Since then, they have been sending our society copies of their English-language publications, and we have reciprocated with copies of the BRSQ and other literature. We recently asked them to send us a few words about their organization, and their response is included below.

Buddhiwadi Foundation is a registered, non-profit, educational trust for promoting rationalism-humanism and for eradicating blind faith and superstition. It was established in June 1996 by Dr. Ramendra Nath, who is also the founder of Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj, or Bihar Rationalist Society (<http://bihar.humanists.net/>). I have been working as its Managing Trustee since its inception. Dr. Kiran Nath Dutta is the third founder-trustee of the organization.

Over the last six years, Buddhiwadi Foundation has published books and booklets in Hindi and English for achieving its aims. Till now, the Foundation has published five titles in Hindi and two in English. In English it has published *Is God Dead?* and *M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism*, both written by Dr. Ramendra. This October the

Foundation will be publishing J.P.'s *Total Revolution and Humanism*, written by me. In addition, the Foundation has taken over maintenance and distribution of titles published earlier by Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj. A total number of sixteen titles, including four in English, are at present distributed by the Foundation. The list includes Dr Ramendra's *Why I Am Not a Hindu & Why I Do Not Want Ramrajya* and *The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*. The Foundation is also distributing Hindi translation of Prof. Paul Kurtz's *A Secular Humanist Declaration*, which was published earlier by the Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj.

Buddhiwadi, an eight-page Hindi quarterly, is also now being published by the Buddhiwadi Foundation. Earlier, it was being published by the Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj. The journal is still being sent free to the members of the Society. The Foundation has been bringing out *Buddhiwadi* in English as an occasional publication. From May 2002, we have also been bringing out an electronic version of the newsletter as well.

Buddhiwadi Foundation has also been maintaining a website since 1998; it can be found at <http://www.buddhiwadi.org>. The site contains information about the aims, activities and publications of Buddhiwadi Foundation. The site also contains information about Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj. It also includes brief biographies of the trustees of the Buddhiwadi Foundation, and links to several national and international organizations with similar or complementary aims. One of the highlights of the website is the online publications of Dr. Ramendra and as well as my own. In addition to *Why I Am Not a Hindu* and *Is God Dead?*, "The Ethical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell," a paper based on Dr. Ramendra's book of the same title, is also available online. My own "How I became a Rationalist" also could be of interest to readers. Through the website, the Foundation has been able to establish an international presence, and develop contacts with several organizations including the Secular Web and the Bertrand Russell Society.

Buddhiwadi Foundation has also established a Buddhiwadi Study and Research Centre in cooperation with the Buddhiwadi Samaj. Rationalist and Humanist literature—books, booklets and journals in Hindi and English, published by various rationalist, humanist, atheist and secular organizations—are available at the centre for study and reference. An important research-project for preparing a book titled *Rationalism, Humanism and Atheism in Twentieth Century Indian Thought* was undertaken by Dr Ramendra in collaboration with me. This has been a major preoccupation of the Buddhiwadi Foundation for the last few years. The first draft of the book has now been completed. The book contains

brief life-sketches and philosophies of eight twentieth-century Indian thinkers—Periyar, M. N. Roy, Ambedkar, Gora, Kovoov, A.B. Shah, Narsingh Narain and Ramswaroop Verma. It also contains an introductory chapter on "Rationalism, Humanism and Atheism." The concluding chapter contains critical comments on the thinkers discussed. The Foundation hopes to raise funds and to publish this important work soon.

Since its inception, the Buddhiwadi Foundation has been closely associated with the Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj, which is a membership-organization for promoting rationalism, humanism, atheism and secularism. Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj is also an associate-member of the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU).

In the past, publishing was a major activity of the Society. However, with this activity now being taken over by the Foundation, the Society has been concentrating on increasing membership and on networking. To supplement the networking effort of the Buddhiwadi Samaj, the Buddhiwadi Foundation published in the year 2000 a Hindi directory of rationalist-humanist organizations in India. The directory contains information on fifty Indian organizations, including Hindi and English literature published by some of them. We have been exchanging our journal and literature and cooperating in different ways with several of these organizations. We have also been publishing introductory articles on them in the *Buddhiwadi*. In the October issue, we will be publishing an introductory article on the Bertrand Russell Society.

On September 15, the Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj hosted a meeting of the National Executive of the Federation of Indian Rationalist Associations (FIRA). Several rationalist and humanist organizations from different Indian states are associated with the FIRA. The meeting was attended by B. Premanand, editor of *Indian Sceptic*, who is the convener of the organization, and representatives of rationalist organizations from Tamilnadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Gujarat, W. Bengal, Haryana, Jharkhand and Bihar. We took the opportunity to distribute complimentary copies of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* to those interested. Mr. Premanand also performed three "Miracle Exposure Programs" in and around Patna, including one in Buddhiwadi Seminar Hall.

Thus, Buddhiwadi Foundation and Bihar Buddhiwadi Samaj have been undertaking several kinds of activities, including publication, organizing meetings, seminars, conferences, writing letters in newspapers, issuing press statements, circulating articles and networking, etc., for promoting rational humanism.

The Case of Dr. Yunis Shaikh Phil Ebersole

The BRSQ has already published brief mentions of the dire predicament facing Dr. Yunis Shaikh (See "News from the Humanist World," #113, February 2002; #114, May 2002; and #115, August 2002). However, given the seriousness of the issue we thought that a more in-depth treatment of the issue was warranted. Bertrand Russell was, after all, denied a teaching appointment at City College of New York due to a lawsuit from a mother concerned that her daughter would be "corrupted" by studying with Russell—despite the fact that her daughter could not possibly have attended one of Russell's classes. (Courses at the college were segregated by sex at the time.) The parallels with Dr. Shaikh's case are clear, although Shaikh faces a much more terrible fate than Russell did.

Bertrand Russell was known for writing letters on behalf of political prisoners and victims of persecution. If he were alive today, he would surely take an interest in the case of Dr. Yunis Shaikh, a Pakistani humanist medical lecturer being held in solitary confinement under sentence of death on charges of blasphemy.

Dr. Shaikh's alleged crime was to have stated, in answer to a question, that neither Mohammed nor his parents could logically have been Muslims prior to Mohammed receiving his revelation from God. For this offense he was arrested on Oct. 4, 2000, and placed in solitary confinement, then tried and sentenced to death on Aug. 18, 2001. His appeal to the High Court of Pakistan was heard late last year, but, as of this writing, no decision has been issued. The fact that the decision so long in coming may indicate the court has some doubt about the merit of the case against Dr. Shaikh. This is a good sign, but nevertheless Dr. Shaikh is still in solitary confinement. If the verdict and sentence are upheld, he has one more right of appeal, to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, before the sentence can be carried out.

There is some question as to whether Dr. Shaikh actually made the statements he is accused of making. It has been proven that none of the accusers or witnesses were present in his class at the time they said he made the alleged statement. And I doubt if any intelligent Muslim would consider Dr. Shaikh's statement, even if theologically incorrect, to be disrespectful of Islam or its Prophet. But the larger issue is that at the dawn of the 21st century, a respected humanitarian and lecturer is to be put to death for the peaceful expression of his religious beliefs. Nor is this, unfortunately, a unique or isolated case.

What would Bertrand Russell do? As the record in Ray Perkins' *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell* (Open Court, 2001), clearly shows, he would make his objections known. Courteously worded letters of protest should be sent to (1) Ambassador Shamstad Ahmad, Pakistan Mission to the United Nations, 6 East 65th Street, New York, NY 10021 USA or (2) Dr. Malecha Lodhi, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2315 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20008 USA. Protest letters can also be sent to other embassies of Pakistan. Letters of concern also may be sent to (3) Dr. Abdul Fatleh Amor, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 8-14 Avenue de la Paix, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, or (4) Mr. David Abramson, Officer in Charge of Pakistan, Office of International Religious Freedom, DRL/RF, Room 4829, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

The campaign on behalf of Dr. Shaikh is being led by the International Humanism and Ethical Union (IHEU), which is based in London. Updates on his case may be found on the IHEU web site at <http://www.iheu.org/Shaikh/>. It is helpful to e-mail copies of letters sent on behalf of Dr. Shaikh to the IHEU at campaign@iheu.org.

Review:

Richard Mann. "The Poker" Warren Allen Smith

Richard Mann's one-act play "The Poker" was presented to an SRO audience at Saint Ann's School in Brooklyn Heights, New York, on 10 March 2003. The play is loosely based on the book *Wittgenstein's Poker*, by David Edmonds and John Eidinow (Ecco, 2001).

Featured were Bertrand Russell (played adroitly with pipe by mathematics teacher and playwright Richard Mann); Ludwig Wittgenstein (played amusingly by fellow mathematics teacher Paul Lockhart); Robert Braithwaite (played convincingly by history teacher William Everdell); and Karl Popper (played tempestuously by another mathematics teacher, Dan Finkel). Mr. Everdell is a member of the Bertrand Russell Society.

The plot, as developed by Mann, not only was well-researched but also is precisely what can entertain as well as educate teenagers and adults. That a private school's faculty and several of its well-directed students performed the work so engagingly is refreshingly remarkable.

At issue in the play is the 1946 encounter between Wittgenstein and Popper. Did something involving a fireplace poker occur? The play provides several answers. Suffice it to say that each poked at the other in one way or another. Some of the stabs were intellectual, almost everyone getting jabbed; some of Bertrand's ideas were pierced by Ludwig; and one student willingly thrust himself at Ludwig (a scene not even implied in past high school presentations).

Memorable lines: "Popper was trying to ask me about my chicken" (Russell); "One should not threaten visiting professors with a poker" (Popper); "Meaning is not fixed in any Platonic sense" (Wittgenstein).

Saint Ann's is a 34-year-old private school, offering classes from pre-kindergarten through 12th grade, with around one thousand students. Two of its alumni have won Academy Awards for "A Beautiful Mind"—screenplay writer Akiva Goldsman and actress Jennifer Connolly.

In an ideal world, the cast and crew would find it profitable to perform "The Poker" in schools around the country and abroad!

Warren Allen Smith is a longtime BRS member and founding member of the Society's New York City Chapter, the GNYCCBRS. For more information on this play, contact William Everdell at everdell@aol.com.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- Roger Kimball, author of the left-bashing *Tenured Radicals*, has discussed Russell in print several times. (See, e.g., Peter Stone's "Russell and Hegel" in *BRSQ* #110, May 2001.) The lengthiest of these discussions is probably "Love, Logic & Unbearable Pity: The Private Bertrand Russell," which appeared in September 1992 *New Criterion*. While the article begins with the line, "It must have been extraordinary, being Bertrand Russell," Kimball is quite critical of Bertie. Interestingly, Kimball takes the position (rare among students of Russell) that Russell had no mystical side—indeed, that many of his failings stemmed from his totally anti-mystical nature. The review is at <http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/11/sept92/brussell.htm>.

Source: Peter Stone

- In his book *How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest* (Prometheus Books, 1995), Peter Singer discusses the problem (raised by fellow philosopher Richard Taylor) of the mortality of human creations. Citing Shelley's *Ozymandias*, he asks how people could find meaning for their lives in acts of creation when the products of those acts invariably decay and crumble in time. He further notes that

Bertrand Russell was fond of making a similar point, emphasizing our cosmic insignificance by pointing out that our entire world is only one planet circling around one star in a galaxy that contains about 300,000 million stars, and is itself only one of several million galaxies. The sun will eventually grow cold, and life on earth will come to an end, but the universe will continue, utterly indifferent to our fate (pp. 216-217).

Quoting Bertie in response, Singer then writes, "while 'the realization of the minuteness of man and all his concerns' may at first strike us as oppressive, and even paralyzing, 'this effect is not rational and should not be lasting. There is no reason to worship mere size'" (p. 217).

Singer here quotes Russell's "The Expanding Mental Universe," from *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell*, ed. by Robert Egner and Lester Denonn (Allen & Unwin, 1961). (Singer incorrectly spells BRS Honorary Member Denonn's name as "Dononn.") He also mentions "What I Believe," from same volume. Curiously, he does not mention "A Free Man's Worship," despite its relevance to the theme.

Source: Peter Stone

- In 1996, the *Nation* published a review by Arthur C. Danto entitled "Picasso and the Portrait." This review discussed an exhibition of Picasso portraits at the Museum of Modern Art that year. The review opens with an insightful comparison of Russell and Picasso. Danto was provoked into finding parallels between the two men through "reading Ray Monk's forthcoming biography of Bertrand Russell." One assumes that Danto had a draft copy of the book; otherwise, reading a forthcoming book is a little like being married to a bachelor. (It also had to be Volume 1, as Volume 2 would have been little more than a gleam in Ray Monk's eye at that point.) The review is at <http://www.tamu.edu/mocl/picasso/news/nation.html>.

Source: Peter Stone

- On January 20, 2003, *Slate* magazine ran a crossword puzzle by Matt Gaffney entitled “The Penn Is Mightier than the Sword.” (An ongoing theme throughout many of the clues was Sean Penn’s recent trip to Baghdad, as well as his views on President Bush’s war plans regarding Iraq.) The clue for entry 34 down read, “Bertrand Russell became one in 1931.” The answer, of course, is “EARL.” The puzzle is at <http://slate.msn.com/id/2077060/>.

Source: Peter Stone

- On March 27, 2003, the *Daily Princetonian* announced that

Professor John Bahcall, a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study and a lecturer at the University, has been awarded the Dan David Prize for the Future of Cosmology and Astronomy for his long-term groundbreaking work in astrophysics. The prize, which includes a \$1 million award, is “granted to individuals or institutions with proven, exceptional, and distinct excellence in the sciences, arts, and humanities that have made an outstanding contribution to humanity,” according to the Dan David Prize website.

Most impressive of all is the fact that Dr Bahcall indicated in the article that “he was first inspired to study astrophysics by a quote from philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell.” The article, written by Eric T. Yanagi, can be found at <http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2003/03/27/news/7703.shtml>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- The *National Post*, a prominent Canadian newspaper, recently ran an obituary for Donald Coxeter, a British-born mathematician best known for his work on multidimensional geometric shapes. Coxeter, who spent 60 years of his professional career at the University of Toronto, was taken by his father to meet Bertrand Russell. Russell was sufficiently impressed by the young man’s abilities as to put him in contact with the mathematician E.H. Neville, who in turn recommended private tutoring. The obituary ran on April 5, 2003 and can be found at <http://www.nationalpost.com/national/story.html?id=4C3576E1-43E1-4297-8BD7-B23BCF8842FE>.

Interestingly, according to another obituary of Coxeter—appearing in

the April 7, 2003 *New York Times*—Coxeter has another, more indirect Russell connection. “As a student at Cambridge,” the obituary notes, Coxeter “was one of five students selected by Ludwig Wittgenstein to attend his philosophy of mathematics classes.” (The *BRSQ* would love to hear who the other four were.) The *New York Times* obituary does not mention Russell, however.

Source: Peter Friedman

- On April 7, *USA Today* ran a brief article on the search for evidence of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that allegedly justified the attack on that country (evidence that still somehow remains “elusive”). The article included a sidebar on the origins of term “weapons of mass destruction.” (Its first known use appeared in the *London Times*.) The sidebar goes on to point out that

The term became an arms-control catchphrase, used by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein in 1955: “In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction.”

This quote comes from the first paragraph of the Russell-Einstein manifesto. The conference mentioned there would, of course, turn into the Nobel Prize-winning organization Pugwash.

The article is at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-07-unmask-usat_x.htm.

Source: Peter Friedman

- The online Dictionary of Unitarian & Universalist Biography features an entry on the Russell family. The article, by Wesley Hromatko, focuses on Bertie, his grandmother, and his uncle Francis (“Rollo”). While noting that Bertrand Russell was an agnostic throughout most of his life, it does point out that he did sign the membership register at a Unitarian church as a boy, and continued to attend until he was 18 (though privately he had abandoned religion at 15). The entry is at <http://www.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/russellfamily.html>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- The more paranoid among the ranks of the BRS will be pleased to learn that Lyndon LaRouche's classic diatribe, "How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man," is now available at http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_91-96/943a_russell_lhl.html. The essay originally appeared in the Fall 1994 issue of *Fidelio*, a house organ of LaRouche's political "empire." You can also find Russell-bashing in a brief biography of LaRouche available at the website of his 2004 presidential campaign, <http://larouchein2004.net/>. If critics of LaRouche are more your style, you can find a list of LaRouche quotes at the Public Eye, website of Political Research Associates, which monitors organizations on the extreme Right. LaRouche is quoted there at <http://www.publiceye.org/larouche/nclc4.html> as blaming the legacy of Russell and H.G. Wells (as well as the Club of Rome, and the World Wildlife Fund) for "pushing the world toward war" in the 1980s.

Source: Peter Friedman

News from the Humanist World

- Humanists and human rights advocates have been asked to support the case of Sreeni Pattathanam. Mr. Pattathanam is General Secretary of the Bharateeya Rationalist Association, the Kerala affiliate of the Rationalist Association of India. (The Rationalist Association of India is a member of the International Humanist and Ethical Union, or IHEU, to which the BRS also belongs.) He also edits the Malayalam-language rationalist monthly *Yukthirajyam*. In 2002, he published a book in Malayalam entitled *Matha Amruthandamayi—Divya Kadhakalum Yatharthiavum* ("Matha Amrithanandamayi: Sacred Stories and Realities"). The book is an effort by Mr. Pattathanam to debunk the claims of Mata Amritanandamayi (née Sudhamani, 1953), a prominent Kerala-based faith healer who claims to heal people through her hugs. (She is known as the "hugging mother.") The book also proposes that the police investigate several suspicious deaths that have occurred around the faith healer's ashram.

Unfortunately, this "healer" enjoys the favor of the BJP, the Hindu fundamentalist party currently governing India, as well as powerful officials in Kerala. Instead of heeding calls to investigate the "hugging mother," the government moved to prosecute Mr. Pattathanam for making "objectionable references" to a spiritual leader, and for "hurting the religious sentiments of her devotees."

A public outcry against the proposed prosecution caused the government to back off, but the danger of prosecution is still very real. The IHEU is asking concerned citizens everywhere to write to the following officials and demand that they keep their hands off Mr. Pattathanam and respect free speech and skeptical inquiry:

- A.K. Anthony, Chief Minister of Kerala (Fax: 91-0471-2333489; e-mail: cmkerala@vsnl.net and chiefminister@kerala.gov.in)
- The governor of Kerala (Fax: 91-471-2720266)
- The director general of the Kerala police (Fax: 91-471-2726560; e-mail: dgp@scrb.com)
- The principal home secretary (Fax: 91-471-2327582; e-mail: prisecy@home.kerala.gov.in)

Please send copies of any e-mails sent to humanism@iheu.org. For more information, visit <http://www.iheu.org>.

- The Center for Inquiry—Florida (CFI Florida), held its inaugural conference on February 7-9 2003, at the Radisson Hotel in Pinellas Park, Florida. Paul Kurtz, chairman of the parent CFI Amherst (NY) and an Honorary Member of the BRS, spoke at the event. The CFI Florida, which joins sister centers in Amherst, Los Angeles, and the New York City metropolitan area, is chaired by Jan Loeb Eisler, a longtime BRS member and past Vice President.

The CFI Florida replaces the St. Petersburg-Largo Area Secular Humanists (SPLASH). Those interested in supporting the new Center may become a friend of the Center for \$45/year (or \$55/year for families), a supporting friend for \$100/year, or a regent of the Center for \$500/year. For more information, contact Toni Van Pelt, Executive Director of the CFI Florida, at PO Box 8099 Madeira Beach, FL 33738-8099, (727) 209-290, vanpelt@tampabay.rr.com. Or visit the CFI Florida's website at <http://www.CFIFlorida.org>.

- The Center for Inquiry Institute will once again hold a full 2-week summer session of educational programs available for undergraduate credit through the State University of New York. The summer session will be held at the Center, in Amherst, New York, on July 6-20, 2003. The summer session will feature courses on the Psychology of Belief and Reason and Ethics. Assistantships are available. The registration deadline is May 30. For further information, visit www.centerforinquiry.net/summer2003.htm.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- A new 74-minute documentary, entitled *Power and Terror: Noam Chomsky in Our Times*, presents Chomsky's critical response to U.S. foreign policy in the wake of the September 11 attacks. A selection of reviews of this documentary can be found at <http://www.metacritic.com/film/titles/powerandterror/>. Reviews also appeared in *Spirituality & Health* (November), the *Austin American-Statesman* (January 10), the *London Free Press* (January 20), the *Boston Herald* (January 31), the *Chicago Sun-Times* (February 7), the *Melbourne Age* (February 27), and the *Sydney Morning Herald* (March 6). (The BRS would welcome a review of this film.) Reviews also appeared in such Left periodicals as the online *Dissident Voice* (December 2, http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Articles/MickeyZ_Chomsky.htm), and *Socialist Worker* (December 13, http://www.socialistworker.org/2002-2/433/433_13_Chomsky.shtml). An article on the making of the film appeared in a Japanese paper, the *Daily Yomiuri*, on September 26, 2002 under the title "Filming the 'Rebel without a Pause.'" The article is by Asami Nagai. (This paper also reviewed the film on the same day. The film was made in Japan, and features what the *New York Daily News* describes as "really bad Japanese pop music.")

The film, released on November 22, 2002, may be at a theater near you; to find the nearest cinema playing it, visit its distributor, First Run Features, at <http://www.firstrunfeatures.com/>.

- A long article on Chomsky appeared in the *New Yorker* on March 31, 2003. The article, by Larissa MacFarquhar, was entitled "The Devil's Accountant." (The title comes from a phrase used by philosopher Avishai Margalit to describe Chomsky, and refers to his single-minded focus on the consequences—in terms of people killed, etc.—of U.S. foreign policy.) The article reviews Chomsky's politics, but devotes much of its attention to Chomsky's work in linguistics and private life, the latter being a topic Chomsky normally demands be kept off-limits. (It describes, for example, the occupations of Chomsky's children.)
- A detailed article on Dr. Henry Morgentaler, Canadian champion of abortion rights and winner of the 1999 BRS Award, appeared in the *Toronto Globe and Mail* on January 18, 2003. The article's title captures the general approach taken—"Why Doesn't This Man Have the Order of Canada?"

- The Spring 2003 issue of *New Humanist* included two features relating to BRS Honorary Members. Noam Chomsky had an article entitled "The People in Gravest Danger" that dealt with the perilous situation of Iraqi Kurds. And David Hall had a review of *What the Koran Really Says*, edited by Ibn Warraq (Prometheus, 2002).
- Speaking of Warraq, the April 2003 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* features an essay by Christopher Hitchens on recent books dealing with Islam—including Warraq's *Why I Am Not a Muslim* (Prometheus, 1995). Hitchens describes this book as his "favorite book on Islam."

Russell on the Web

- At <http://www.britannica.com/nobel/> can be found the Britannica Guide to the Nobel Prizes, which needless to say features Russell. It even has a small video feature whereby one can view Russell briefly discussing the value of clear thinking. Other video and audio features involve other Nobel laureates with ties to Russell, including Einstein, Pauling, Eliot, and Shaw.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- Top Telemedia, Ltd., an Indian "Infotainment" company, has a website featuring biographies of many famous persons, including philosophers like Bertrand Russell. The Russell biography features some high-quality pictures of the good lord as well as quotable quotes and downloadable Russell screensavers and wallpaper. Top Telemedia is at <http://www.toptelemedia.com>.

Source: Russell-I

- Those wanting to know more about the women in Russell's life should check out the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. Its archives are currently home to the papers of Dora Russell, Bertie's second wife. The Institute has an index of these papers at <http://www.iisg.nl/archives/gias/r/10767897.html>.

Source: Ken Blackwell ;

- Those wishing to know even *more* about the women in Russell's life should visit http://www.oilonlinen.com/essay_herworld.htm, which features an essay entitled "Anne Harvey and Her World." The

essay, by Henry Lessore, details the life of the daughter of Dorothy Dudley, sister of Helen Dudley. Russell had a brief affair with Helen that ended quite badly, and the Dudley family enjoyed a number of close ties to Russell, his first wife Alys, his second wife Dora, and Ottoline Morrell. Many of these ties are discussed in the essay, which was apparently written as promotional material for a show at the New York School of Drawing Painting and Sculpture. (The show, entitled "Family Ties," featured drawings and paintings by Anne, her brother Jason, and Jason's son Steven. In another interesting tie-in, Jason and probably Anne attended Beacon Hill school at the time when both Bertie and Dora were running the place.)

Source: Ken Blackwell

- There is a weblog (an internet "diary" containing the musings of its creator as well as various links) entitled "Half the Sins of Mankind" at <http://www.bertrandrussell.blogspot.com/>. Unfortunately, the creator of the weblog (or "blogger") declined to place his or her name on the site anywhere. The name of the magazine apparently refers to a line from *The Conquest of Happiness*—"Boredom is a vital problem for the moralist, since at least half the sins of mankind are caused by the fear of it."

Source: Thom Weidlich

- The website BrainyQuote lists many Russell quotes (though without documenting the sources for these quotes) at <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/b/a125713.html>.

Source: Ken Blackwell

Who's New in Hell

The last issue of the *BRSQ* (February 2003) offered a list of libraries that presently own a copy of Warren Allen Smith's *Celebrities in Hell* (*CH*, Barricade, 2002). This issue includes a list of libraries that possess Warren's magnum opus, *Who's Who in Hell* (*WWH*, Barricade, 2000). As with *Celebrities*, the *BRSQ* urges BRS-ers to see if their own local libraries are on this list and, if they are not, request that they obtain the book.

The following 156 libraries in the United States and Canada are known to have *Who's Who in Hell*:

Birmingham Public Library (Birmingham, AL)
 City of Mesa Library (Mesa, AZ)
 Northern Arizona University (Flagstaff, AZ)
 Phoenix Public Library (Phoenix, AZ)
 Tucson-Pima Public Library (Tucson, AZ)
 University of Arizona (Tucson, AZ)
 Berkeley Public Library (Berkeley, CA)
 Beverly Hills Public Library (Beverly Hills, CA)
 California State University, Northridge (Northridge, CA)
 Los Angeles Public Library (Los Angeles, CA)
 Napa City-County Library (Napa, CA)
 Orange County Public Library (Orange County, CA)
 Sacramento Public Library (Sacramento, CA)
 San Jose Public Library (San Jose, CA)
 University of San Francisco (San Francisco, CA)
 The Webb Schools (Claremont, CA)
 Yolo County Library (Yolo County, CA)
 Denver Public Library (Denver, CO)
 Jefferson County Public Library (Lakewood, CO)
 Pikes Peak Library District (Colorado Springs, CO)
 University of Northern Colorado (Greeley, CO)
 Darien Library (Darien, CT)
 New Canaan Library (New Canaan, CT)
 Library of Congress (Washington, DC)
 Charlotte-Glades Library System (Charlotte County, FL)
 Edison Community College (Lee County, FL)
 Florida International University, Biscayne Bay Campus (North Miami, FL)
 Jacksonville Public Library (Jacksonville, FL)
 Palm Beach County Library System (West Palm Beach, FL)
 Santa Fe Community College (Gainesville, FL)
 Seminole County Public Library (Seminole County, FL)
 University of West Florida (Pensacola, FL)
 Volusia County Public Library (Volusia County, FL)
 University of Guam (Mangilao, GU)
 Arlington Heights Memorial Library (Arlington Heights, IL)
 DePaul University (Chicago, IL)
 Oak Park Public Library (Oak Park, IL)
 Prairie Trails Public Library (Burbank, IL)
 Skokie Public Library (Skokie, IL)
 University of Illinois (Urbana & Champaign, IL)
 Evansville Vanderburgh Public Library (Evansville, IN)
 Indiana University (Bloomington, IN)
 Indianapolis-Marion County Public Library (Indianapolis, IN)

Valparaiso University (Valparaiso, IN)
Wabash College (Crawfordsville, IN)
Cedar Rapids Public Library (Cedar Rapids, IA)
Davenport Public Library (Davenport, IA)
University of Northern Iowa (Cedar Falls, IA)
Benedictine College (Atchison, KS)
Kansas State University (Manhattan, KS)
Pittsburg State University (Pittsburg, KS)
Topeka and Shawnee County Public Library (Topeka, KS)
Jefferson Parish Library (Metairie, LA)
Loyola University (New Orleans, LA)
Portland Public Library (Portland, ME)
Boston Public Library (Boston, MA)
C/W Mars, Inc. (Paxton, MA)
Harvard University, Divinity School (Cambridge, MA)
Harvard University, Harvard College Library Technical Services
(Cambridge, MA)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA)
Minuteman Library Network (Framingham, MA)
Noble, Inc. (Danvers, MA)
Old Colony Library Network (Braintree, MA)
Lakeland Library Cooperative (Grand Rapids, MI)
Michigan State University (East Lansing, MI)
Southfield Public Library (Southfield, MI)
University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI)
Western Michigan University (Kalamazoo, MI)
Minneapolis Public Library (Minneapolis, MN)
University of Minnesota (Minneapolis, MN)
Ozarks Technical Community College (Springfield, MO)
St. Louis University (St. Louis, MO)
Phillips Exeter Academy (Exeter, NH)
University of New Hampshire (Durham, NH)
Drew University (Madison, NJ)
Felician College (Lodi, NJ)
Princeton University (Princeton, NJ)
Somerset County Library (Somerset County, NJ)
Woodbridge Public Library (Woodbridge, NJ)
San Juan College (Farmington, NM)
Buffalo and Erie County Public Library (Buffalo, NY)
Center for Inquiry (Amherst, NY)
Columbia-Greene Community College (Hudson, NY)
Columbia University (New York, NY)
Fordham University (Bronx, NY)

New York Law School (New York, NY)
New York Public Library-Research Libraries (New York, NY)
New York Public Library-Jefferson Market Branch (New York, NY)
Niagara Falls Public Library (Niagara Falls, NY)
Nioga Library (Lockport, NY)
Pratt Institute (Brooklyn, NY)
Ross School (East Hampton, NY)
St. John Fisher College (Rochester, NY)
Sarah Lawrence College (Bronxville, NY)
Suffolk Cooperative Library System (Bellport, NY)
University of Rochester (Rochester, NY)
White Plains Public Library (White Plains, NY)
Appalachian State University (Boone, NC)
Duke University (Durham, NC)
Guilford Technical Community College (Jamestown, NC)
North Carolina Community College System (Raleigh, NC)
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (Chapel Hill, NC)
Akron-Summit County Public Library (Akron, OH)
Columbus Metropolitan Library (Columbus, OH)
Cuyahoga County Public Library (Cuyahoga County, OH)
Lane Public Library (Hamilton, OH)
Mansfield/Richland County Public Library (Mansfield, OH)
Marion Public Library (Marion, OH)
Southeast Ohio Automation Consortium (Caldwell, OH)
Southwest Public Libraries (Grove City, OH)
State Library of Ohio (Columbus, OH)
Toledo-Lucas County Public Library (Toledo, OH)
University of Cincinnati (Cincinnati, OH)
Phillips Theological Seminary (Tulsa, OK)
Tulsa City-County Library (Tulsa, OK)
Corvallis-Benton County Public Library (Corvallis, OR)
Linfield College (McMinnville, OR)
Multnomah County Library (Portland, OR)
Southern Oregon University (Ashland, OR)
Washington County Cooperative Library (Hillsboro, OR)
Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA)
La Salle University (Philadelphia, PA)
Manor College (Jenkintown, PA)
Moravian College (Bethlehem, PA)
New Castle Public Library (New Castle, PA)
Westmoreland County Community College (Youngwood, PA)
University of Rhode Island (Kingston, RI)
College of Charleston (Charleston, SC)

Furman University (Greenville, SC)
 Vanderbilt University (Nashville, TN)
 Austin Public Library (Austin, TX)
 Collin County Community College (Plano, TX)
 Dallas Public Library (Dallas, TX)
 Houston Public Library (Houston, TX)
 Irving Public Library (Irving, TX)
 Montgomery County Memorial Library System (Conroe, TX)
 Southwestern University (Georgetown, TX)
 Texas A&M International University (Laredo, TX)
 University of Texas at Austin (Austin, TX)
 University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT)
 Weber State University (Ogden, UT)
 Central Rappahannock Regional Library (Fredericksburg, VA)
 FBI Academy (Quantico, VA)
 Library of Virginia (Richmond, VA)
 Fort Vancouver Regional Library System (Vancouver, WA)
 King County Library System (Issaquah, WA)
 North Olympic Library System (Port Angeles, WA)
 Seattle Public Library (Seattle, WA)
 University of Washington (Seattle, WA)
 Shepherd College (Shepherdstown, WV)
 West Virginia Wesleyan College (Buckhannon, WV)
 Hedburg Public Library (Janesville, WI)
 Milwaukee County Federated Library System (Milwaukee, WI)
 Outagamie Waupaca Library System (Appleton, WI)
 University of British Columbia (Vancouver, BC)
 McMaster University (Hamilton, ON)

Libraries outside North America known to have *WWH* include the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow; The Atheist Centre in India; the Ethical Society Library in London; the Vatican Library in Vatican City; and the Alexandria Library in Egypt.

In addition, Warren is proceeding to collect new information relevant to the two books. In the latest installment of his "Gossip across the Pond" column (*Gay and Lesbian Humanist*, Winter 2002-2003), he lists some of the many individuals that readers of *WWH* and *CH* have pointed out were omitted from the first two books. The list includes such diverse figures as Anthony Blunt, Nadine Gordimer, Studs Terkel (winner of the 2002 BRS Award), and Idi Amin. Warren has promised to include them all in the second edition of *WWH* (should one ever appear). The complete column is at <http://www.galha.org/glh/222/gossip.html>.

Pose with Bertie!



Our latest installment in this series features BRS Honorary Member Taslima Nasrin posing with the bust of Bertie at Red Lion Square, London. The *BRSQ* thanks Warren Allen Smith for the picture, and encourages other BRS-ers visiting London to get their pictures taken with Russell and send copies to the *BRSQ*!

BRS Business and Chapter News:

**The Greater New York City Chapter of the Bertrand
Russell Society (GNYCCBRS)
Warren Allen Smith**

The Greater New York City Chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society (GNYCCBRS, pronounced guh-NYKA-burrs by members) held a planning brunch on Sunday, March 16th, with Tim Madigan, longtime steering committee member of the Greater Rochester Russell Set (GRRS).

At the meeting, it was disclosed that GNYCCBRS has increased its rolls by 20%, from 5 to 6 members. Even the GRRS cannot claim to have increased its membership by that phenomenal percentage over the same period of time!

Chapter activist projects in the works include (a) placing an Arthur C. Clarke plaque at the Hotel Chelsea on 23rd Street, where he wrote *2001* (Clarke was not a devotee of Russell, however); (b) placing Sidney Hook's name on the Celebrity Walk at the Brooklyn Botanical Gardens; (c) working to devise new homepages for Taslima Nasrin and ASIBEHU, the Costa Rican-based association of Spanish-speaking ethical humanists; and (d) maintaining contact with BRS Honorary Members Paul Edwards, Ibn Warraq, and Taslima Nasrin.

On the latter subject, GNYCCBRS can make the following reports:

- Dr. Edwards, now retired from New School University, continues to work on his book *God and the Philosophers* (Prometheus).
- Taslima Nasrin's father died on February 25, 2003. She has received a Harvard fellowship in the fall, partially due to the assistance received from Herb Silverman, Tom Ferrick, Tim Madigan, and Warren Allen Smith. In March she spoke in Belgium at a government conference about women and democracy, then attended a poetry festival in Paris, an authors' festival in Hong Kong, and a secular women's conference in Germany. She is interviewed and pictured in the Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Society. The interview is at <http://www.secularislam.org/skeptics/taslima.htm>.
- Ibn Warraq has received a visa to stay in the United States. He was met when he arrived from Europe in April by Warren Allen Smith.

- Britain's *Gay & Lesbian Humanist*, for which Warren is a columnist, reviewed Warraq's web site in its Winter 2001-2002 issue. The review is at <http://www.galha.org/glh/212/webwatch.html>. The magazine also published an article about "Islam and Homosexuality"; it is at http://www.galha.org/briefing/2003_03.html. Warren asked Warraq to comment on the accuracy of this article; the latter responded by e-mailing the article's author, Dr. Stephen Moreton (a member of the Gay and Lesbian Humanist Association). "You have done a good job," wrote Warraq, "It seems accurate to me. Well done."

**Rustlings
Gerry Wildenberg**

"Rustlings" presents a simple substitution cipher based on the writings of Bertrand Russell. In the coded quote below, each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFFRYYY, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quote below uses a different code. Today's quote will be familiar to many Russellians. After solving the cipher, try to identify the source.

ARFPGB CPUUATB UTQN BGPAIGA PI RFA UMGR RFMR PRB
UJICMNAIRMV CMRM MTA UAAVPIZB MIC ANQRPQIB, IQR
HATGAHRB.

Solution to *Rustlings* Puzzle, February 2003

"The British are distinguished among the nations of modern Europe, on the one hand by the excellence of their philosophers, and on the other hand by their contempt for philosophy. In both respects they show their wisdom."

Bertrand Russell, in "Philosophy and Politics", an essay from the collection *Unpopular Essays*.

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
1st Quarter 2003 Treasurer's Report
1/1/03 Through 3/31/03

Compiled 4/10/03 by Dennis J. Darland
 BRS Treasurer (djdarland@qconline.com)

| Category Description | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/02 | 6,742.17 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contrib-BRS | 437.75 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 437.75 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 171.88 |
| Renewals | 2,308.33 |
| TOTAL Dues | 2,480.21 |
| Library Income | 13.95 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 2,931.91 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 11.32 |
| Library Expenses | 16.60 |
| Newsletter | 741.67 |
| Other Expenses | 0.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 769.59 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 2,162.32 |
| BALANCE 3/31/03 | 8,904.49 |

New in Russell Studies!

Would you like to find out what's new in Russell Studies? Then visit the "Forthcoming, New and Recent Works in Russell Studies" page at the website of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. The page is at <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/forthnew.htm>.

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell
 Meetings Open to the Public

2003 Program

- | | |
|----------|--|
| May 8 | Russell on Audio (A Celebration of Russell's Birthday) |
| June 12 | <i>The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism</i> (by Bertrand Russell) |
| July 10 | Ambrose Bierce Monologue, Written and Performed by Ed Scutt. |
| Aug. 14 | <i>Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Private Years, 1884-1914</i> |
| Sept. 11 | <i>Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970</i> |
| Oct. 9 | The Bertrand Russell Research Centre <i>Guest Speaker: Nicholas Griffin</i> |
| Nov. 13 | "Nice People" (by Bertrand Russell) |
| Dec. 11 | Lord John Russell |

All meetings are held at **Daily Perks Coffee House**, 389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY, at **6:30 PM. Note New Meeting Time!**

All dates and topics are subject to change. For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or write tmadigan@rochester.rr.com or visit http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~wildenbe/grrs/russell_poster.html.

Causal Republicanism
Sydney, Australia; 14-16 July 2003


This conference, organized by the Centre for Time and the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, marks the 90th anniversary of Russell's celebrated attack on causation in his paper "On the Notion of Cause." For further details, see the conference website at <http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/events.htm> or e-mail Richard Corry at Richard.Corry@philosophy.usyd.edu.au.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August 2003

No. 119

The Fun Never Stops...



...at the Annual Meeting of the BRS!

Read the Whole Exciting Story Inside!

Cover Photo by David Goldman

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

c/o David White

Philosophy Department

St. John Fisher College

3690 East Avenue

Rochester, NY 14618 USA

MR. DENNIS J. DARLAND /9999
1406 26TH ST.
ROCK ISLAND IL 61201-2837



THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work and writing of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE

<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

Webmaster: John Lenz, jlenz@drew.edu

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Editor: Peter Stone

Co-Editors-Elect: Rosalind Carey and John Ongley

Associate Editors: Phil Ebersole, Tim Madigan,

Rachel M. Murray, David White

Rochester Correspondent: Alan Bock

Letters and unsolicited articles, book reviews, etc. are welcome. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to:

Rosalind Carey, Philosophy Department, 360 Carmen Hall, Lehman College-CUNY, 250 Bedford Park Blvd West, Bronx, NY 10468 USA.

Opinions expressed in the *Quarterly* are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bertrand Russell Society or any other individual or institution.

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Chairman of the Board | David White |
| President | Alan Schwerin |
| Vice President | Ray Perkins |
| Vice President/Outreach | Peter Friedman |
| Secretary | Chad Trainer |
| Treasurer | Dennis J. Darland |

QUOTE OF THE QUARTERLY

Just in case anyone was still unsure of Russell's views on the subject...

"I don't see any harm in sex—I like it."

Bertrand Russell, in "The Life and Times of Bertrand Russell," BBC Interview with Robert Bolt, May 1964.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August 2003

No. 119

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From the Editor:

The Continuing Value of Skepticism

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the publication of Bertrand Russell's classic *Sceptical Essays*. (Russell accomplished so much in his life that there's always some momentous anniversary associated with him to celebrate.) In recognition of the occasion, a few thoughts on the continuing value of skepticism in the modern world are in order.

The quest to provide enough intellectual gymnastics to prove God's existence continues unabated in the modern world. Just last year, as Emily Eakin reported in the May 11, 2002 issue of the *New York Times*, philosopher Richard Swinburne attempted to establish the truth of the essential claims of Christian faith using probability theory. Armed with Bayes' Theorem, which details how to calculate conditional probability values (i.e., the probability that X is true given that Y is true), Swinburne calculates that the probability the Resurrection occurred is approximately .97! No doubt the Hindu, Buddhist, and atheist statisticians of the world will want to double-check these calculations.

The article, entitled "So God's Really in the Details?" provides a response to Swinburne's argument by mentioning Russell's famous retort to true believers. "Asked what he would say if God appeared to him after his death and demanded to know why he had failed to believe," Eakin writes, "the British philosopher and staunch evidentialist Bertrand Russell replied that he would say, 'Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence.'"

Actually, Eakin didn't get the quote exactly right. For the record, the source of this line attributed to Russell comes from an article by Leo Rosten published in the February 23, 1974 issue of *Saturday Review/World*. In this article, Rosten reminisces about meeting Russell in hopes that he would agree to an interview about his agnosticism. (The interview was subsequently published as "What Is an Agnostic?" in the November 3, 1953 issue of *Look*, and is included in Volume 11 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (CPBR)* and numerous anthologies.) Rosten gives the following account of the exchange:

I asked, "Let us suppose, sir, that after you have left this sorry vale, you actually found yourself in heaven, standing before the Throne. There, in all his glory, sat the Lord—Not the Lord Russell, sir: God." Russell winced. "What would you think?"

"I would think I was dreaming."

"But suppose you realized you were not? Suppose that there, before your very eyes, beyond a shadow of a doubt, was God. What would you say?"

The pixie wrinkled his nose. "I probably would ask, 'Sir, why did you not give me better evidence?'"

This delicious story demonstrates not only Russell's razor-sharp wit, but more importantly, his fearless skepticism, his unwillingness to accept conventional wisdom when there was no good reason for doing so. This attitude shines forth throughout the Rosten interview, but one particularly choice line from it is worth repeating here. "If there is, in fact, a Supreme Deity," Russell informs Rosten, "which I doubt, I think it most unlikely that he... would possess so uneasy a vanity as to be offended by my views about his existence."

In "What Is an Agnostic," Russell demonstrates further this skepticism with regard to God's existence. He writes as follows:

I think that if I heard a voice from the sky predicting all that was going to happen to me during the next twenty-four hours, including events that would have seemed highly improbable, and if all these events then produced to happen, I might perhaps be convinced at least of the existence of some superhuman intelligence. I can imagine other evidence of the same sort which might convince me, but so far as I know, no such evidence exists.

What strikes me about the passage is the commonsensical attitude that Russell demonstrates in it. If someone made a claim for the existence of anything unrelated to matters religious, wouldn't that person have to produce evidence for that claim, at about the level Russell would require here? The only reason this standard remains controversial with regard to religion is the continuation, in our supposedly secular age, of a taboo against subjecting religious authority to the same searching criticism to which all other areas of life are subject. (If this taboo were not still so strong in so many people's minds, the Catholic Church could probably not have gotten away for so long with the lack of accountability its recent crises have made plain.)

Well, almost all areas. The same issue of the *Saturday Review/World* containing Rosten's reminisces about Russell also contains a review of

Bertrand Russell's America: Volume One 1896-1945 (Viking, 1974). The review, entitled "In Search of a Peerless Democracy," is by well-known right-wing pundit Norman Podhoretz. Podhoretz found little of value in the volume, concluding that it "for the most part gives us Russell at his village-atheist worst." I suspect Podhoretz's dislike of the book had less to do with Russell's atheism (in villages or elsewhere) and more to do with the "vituperative anti-Americanism" to which, Podhoretz declares, Russell surrendered "almost ecstasically" in the last years of his life. This "vituperative anti-Americanism" was more often than not simply Russell's skepticism at work again, demanding that the actions of the U.S. in Vietnam, which looked surprisingly like mass murder, be treated as moral abominations unless a compelling argument against this position could be articulated. This argument was never produced, only bitter denunciations of anyone unwilling to respect the taboo shielding American power from close scrutiny.

One can learn much about Podhoretz's own views from an October 30, 1983 editorial Podhoretz wrote for the *New York Times*. In it, he celebrates the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and bemoans the "sickly inhibitions against the use of military force" that kept the U.S. from backing then-General Ariel Sharon more enthusiastically in his depredations in Lebanon. (Given Sharon's current position, it is all the more important to expose his apologists and what they stand for.) The phrase Podhoretz uses here brings to mind Russell's exchange with "North Staffs" during World War One, in which Russell repeatedly suggested that his opponent simply enjoyed war for its own sake. This claim went unanswered by Russell's pseudonymous opponent, as a similar claim against Podhoretz almost certainly would. (Russell's contributions to the exchange appear in Volume 13 of the *CPBR*.) In the end, Russell would no doubt agree with Anthony Lewis' assessment of Podhoretz, which took the form of a quote from Walter Lippmann: "I don't agree with people who think that we have got to go out and shed a little blood to prove we're virile men...I don't think old men ought to promote wars for young men to fight. I don't like warlike old men" (Quoted in the November 7, 1983 issue of the *New York Times*).

In politics, philosophy, and of course religion, Russell was what Eakin describes as an "evidentialist." Evidentialists "accept the Enlightenment doctrine that a belief is justified only when evidence can be found for it outside the believer's own mind." Or, to borrow another line from Russell, they believe "that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true" (*Sceptical Essays*). Oddly enough, Swinburne also considers himself an evidentialist as well. Personally, I'll take Russell's version any day of the week.

One final note. This issue of the *BRSQ* is my last as editor. I have enjoyed being editor, but duty calls (not to mention a tenure-track job, which will soon consume all my spare time). Beginning with the next issue, the co-editors will be Rosalind Carey and John Ongley. To submit materials for the *BRSQ*, or to make inquiries, please contact Rosalind Carey, Philosophy Department, 360 Carmen Hall, Lehman College-CUNY, 250 Bedford Park Blvd West, Bronx, NY 10468 USA, 914-682-7439.

My thanks to Alan Bock, Giovanni de Carvalho, & Thom Weidlich for directing my attention to the sources used in this editorial.

Letter to the Editor

15 May 2003

Dear Editor,

I was distressed to discover from reading the latest issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* that I and my political friends are as non-existent as unicorns and minotaurs. For I have for thirty or more years been a member of the Conservative Party (of the UK) and I do not see my self or my fellow members as conspicuously less compassionate than my fellow members.

Yours,

Antony Flew

Professor Flew is an Honorary Member of the BRS.

Are You on BRS-List?

BRS-List is the BRS's official listserv, used to send members information about Society activities and to discuss Society business. The listserv is open only to members of the BRS, and all members are encouraged to join. Just visit <http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/listinfo/brs-list> and fill out the form. Alternatively send the message "subscribe" to brs-list-request@mailman.mcmaster.ca.

Any questions regarding BRS-List can be directed to the listserv's owner, Ken Blackwell, at blackwk@mcmaster.ca.

New and Improved BRS Membership Form

The hardworking folk at the *BRSQ* have dramatically revised and improved the Society's membership form. We're so proud of our work that we're including a copy of it at the center of this issue.

If you're a member, and you're receiving this issue, you've already renewed for 2003, so you don't need to send us the form at this time (although you're certainly welcome to renew early for 2004—remember that all contributions to the BRS are tax-deductible, so give generously). Your mailing label should say either 2003 (meaning you've paid through this year), or 7777, 8888, or 9999 (meaning that you're a Life Member, Honorary Member, or receiving the *BRSQ* as a courtesy). If you don't have a mailing label, that means you're not yet a member. So why not join today? Just fill out the membership form and send it to the address listed on it. It's that easy! Questions can be directed to our treasurer, Dennis Darland, at djdarland@qconline.com.

As our diligent efforts on the membership form prove, the BRS is constantly looking for ways we can make it easier for you to keep your membership current. We'd hate to lose any member because of confusion or misunderstanding of any sort. If you have any suggestions to help us improve the process, please drop the *BRSQ* a line.

Wanna Bust of Bertie?

A sculptor named V.M. Heyfron has produced a bust of Bertrand Russell. It's about 11 inches (30 cm) tall, and can be viewed online at <http://www.portraitsculptures.com/>. At the moment, Heyfron does not have any left in stock, and would have to recast the mould in order to make more. However, he is willing to do this if there is sufficient interest. That's where we come in.

The price for a single bust of Bertie is US \$550. The per-unit price of multiple busts, however, will be lower. The more orders placed, the lower the cost.

BRS Vice President Ray Perkins is currently seeking expressions of interest in the bust. At the moment, all that is desired is an expression of interest—there's no obligation to buy. Once Ray has a head count, he can discover what the cost per bust will be. Ray can be reached at 854 Battle Street, Webster, NH 03303, USA, perkrk@earthlink.net.

Call for Nominations BRS Board of Directors

This fall, the Bertrand Russell Society will be holding elections to fill 8 of the 24 positions on its Board of Directors. The time has come for nominations for those positions. Members are encouraged to send their nominations to **Chad Trainer**, BRS Secretary, 1006 Davids Run, Phoenixville, PA 19460, stratoflampsacus@aol.com.

Please note that **the deadline for nominations is October 1**. The ballots will be sent out in the November issue of the *BRSQ*. Any member of the BRS may run for a seat on the Board. The 8 members of the Board with expiring terms may be renominated and reelected. Members may nominate themselves; if you do this, please include a short (1 paragraph) statement about yourself and why you should be on the Board. A complete list of current Board Members is included below; please don't nominate any current Board member whose term does not expire this year.

Directors of the BRS

Officers of the BRS, elected annually, serve *ex officio* on the Board of Directors.

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2001- Dec. 31, 2003: Kenneth Blackwell, Dennis Darland, John R. Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, Laurie Endicott Thomas, David White

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2002-Dec. 31, 2004: Kevin Brodie, Rosalind Carey, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich

3 Year Term, Jan. 1, 2003 - Dec. 31, 2005: Andrew Bone, David Goldman, Nicholas Griffin, Justin Leiber, Chandrakala Padia, Cara Rice, Peter Stone, Ruili Ye

New in Russell Studies!

Would you like to find out what's new in Russell Studies? Then visit the "Forthcoming, New and Recent Works in Russell Studies" page at the website of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. The page is at <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/forthnew.htm>.

2004 BRS Award Search Begins Proposals Welcome

The BRS Awards Committee will soon begin its search for a person or organization to receive the 2004 BRS Award. This award is given annually to one or more people or organizations for outstanding achievement in one or more areas of concern to Bertrand Russell. The award may reflect achievements in either the academic or social and political realm, and achievements made in the recent past or over a lifetime. The award may also be given for extraordinary acts that, by the character they display, are particularly reminiscent of Russell at his best.

Members of the BRS are invited to propose individuals or organizations to the BRS Awards Committee to be considered for the 2004 BRS Award. Anyone wishing to make a proposal should contact the Kevin Brodie, BRS Awards Committee Chair, 54 Cedar Swamp Road, Storrs, CT 06268 USA, kevin.brodie@lebanonct.org

The Committee will begin deliberating in the early fall, so please get your proposals to the Committee as soon as possible.

For those interested, the following is a list of previous BRS Award recipients:

| | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| 1980 Paul Arthur Schilpp | 1992 Karl Popper |
| 1981 Steve Allen | 1993 Harry Ruja |
| 1982 Henry Kendall | 1994 (none) |
| 1983 Joseph Rotblat | 1995 Zero Population Growth |
| 1984 Dora Black Russell | 1996 W.V.O. Quine |
| 1985 Robert Jay Lifton and Lester Denonn | 1997 (none) |
| 1986 People for the American Way | 1998 Irving Copi |
| 1987 John Somerville | 1999 Henry Morgentaler |
| 1988 Paul Kurtz | 2000 Stephen Jay Gould |
| 1989 Paul Edwards | 2001 Stephen Toulmin |
| 1990 (none) | 2002 Studs Terkel |
| 1991 Planned Parenthood Federation of America | 2003 Katha Pollitt |

The BRS Needs YOU...at the APA!

The Bertrand Russell Society is recognized by the American Philosophical Association and allowed to participate in their programs, but the BRS is responsible for selecting its own speakers. Members of the BRS who are also members of the APA are urged to get in touch with David White (dwhite@sjfc.edu). We need people to give papers, to comment, to chair sessions, and, most importantly, to fill seats. We are now accepting proposals for the Pacific Division meeting in Pasadena, CA, March 24-28, 2004, and the Central Division meeting in Chicago, IL, April 22-25, 2004. The deadline for proposals is October 1.

Buy a BRS T-Shirt Today!

Don't you be caught without something distinctive to wear! BRS t-shirts always make you stand out in a crowd (except at BRS Annual Meetings, of course). So why not order yours today? The shirts are available for \$10 each plus \$ 3 postage. U.S. funds only, please. Please make checks out to the BRS, and send them to BRS Vice President Ray Perkins, 854 Battle ST, Webster, NH 03303, USA. Please specify size (M,L,XL) and color. Shirts are available in black, yellow, or white. Any questions about the shirts can be directed to Ray at perkrk@earthlink.net.

Our Apologies

The last two cover photographs of the *BRSQ* were given to us courtesy of David Goldman—psychiatrist by day, Russellian photographer by night. David is a member of the BRS Board of Directors as well as the Greater New York City Chapter of the BRS (GNYCCBRS). He continues to provide the *BRSQ* with a variety of pictures—including those from the 2003 BRS Annual Meeting contained in this issue. Unfortunately, the last two cover photos were run without giving David credit for his pictures. We regret our omission.

A Philosophical Tongue Twister

While preparing his presentation on *Wittgenstein's Poker* for the 2003 BRS Annual Meeting, the editor was moved to write the following:

Peter passively pandered to people pondering Popper's poker problem.

Try saying *that* one five times fast.

Promoting BR on the Lecture Circuit

BRSQ Editor Peter Stone has given a number of public lectures this year on the topic of Bertrand Russell. On January 5, he presented a talk entitled "Bertrand Russell and John Dewey" at a breakfast forum held at the Unitarian Universalist Church of the Lehigh Valley, in Bethlehem, PA. This talk was a modified version of the remarks Peter made at the "Legacy of John Dewey" conference held at the Center for Inquiry (Amherst, NY) last year. (See Alan Bock's report on this meeting, "Russell and Dewey at the CFI," *BRSQ* #117, February 2003.)

On March 14, Peter addressed a meeting of the Humanist Association of Toronto. He followed up this talk by addressing the Center for Inquiry-Florida, in Tampa, on May 17 (the day before Russell's birthday). On both occasions, his talk was entitled "Bertrand Russell's Politics and Humanism." He then gave a similar talk on June 22 during a return visit to the Unitarian Universalist Church of the Lehigh Valley. This talk was entitled "Bertrand Russell, Skeptic."


A picture of Peter at the first talk in Bethlehem appears below. A report on the Toronto talk by Alan Bock appears later in this issue. The *BRSQ* would welcome reports (with or without pictures) on other Russell-related events.



The 2003 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society

Pictures from the Annual Meeting

(All photographs in this section courtesy of David Goldman)



Rosalind Carey kept the meeting running smoothly.


The gang's all here.



The favored beverage of the meeting.



"Russell's pipe was THIIIS big!"



Tim Madigan explains Russell's views on the Warren Report (shortly before mysteriously disappearing).

Quotable Quotes from the Annual Meeting

"How much did Russell weigh?"

"When?"

"Now!"

-Rosalind Carey & Peter Friedman

"Wow, philosophy is alive and well in Iowa."

-Warren Allen Smith

"What's going on with the n-operator?"

-Kevin Klement

"I'm happy that if I talk to you about it some portion of it can be understood."

-Gregory Landini

"2 times 3, we all know, is 6."

-Gregory Landini

"I want my infinity, doggonnit."

-Landini again

"You can charge a lot for syntactic therapy."

-Peter Friedman

"Yeah, I should stop...soon."

-Anthony Anderson

"Let's pick on Frege for a little while."

-Kevin Klement

"I think I have a question, but I think I have to ramble for a minute to get to it."

-Thom Weidlich

"Given three minutes for a potty break, you know what Russell would do?"

-Dave Henehan

Minutes of the 2003 BRS Annual Meeting Chad Trainer, BRS Secretary

The Bertrand Russell Society returned to Lake Forest College in Illinois for its 30th annual meeting. The meeting was from Friday, May 30 2003 to Sunday, June 1. In attendance were Anthony Anderson, Alan Bock, Pat Bock, Rosalind Carey, Dennis Darland, Peter Friedman, Phil Ebersole, David Goldman, David Henehan, Alvin Hofer, Kevin Klement, Gregory Landini, Tim Madigan, Steve Maragides, John Ongley, Stephen Reinhardt, Cara Rice, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, David Taylor, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich, David White, and Linda White.

On Friday there was registration and a book table from 4 pm to 6 pm. From 6 pm to 8 pm there was a buffet. This was followed by the BRS board meeting from 8:30 pm to 9:30 pm (See "Minutes of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors.") and then members enjoyed the Greater Rochester Russell Set's hospitality suite/salon.

The Saturday morning program began with Gregory Landini presenting his paper on "Tractarian Logicism," followed by Anthony Anderson's "The Axiom of Infinity in Russellian Intensional Logic," and Kevin Klement's "Russell and Wittgenstein on Type-Theory and Russell's Paradox" was the last paper of the morning.

After lunch, the BRS held its 2003 annual Business Meeting from 1pm to 2pm. David White began the meeting by explaining that he had been elected to serve as president *pro tem* as a result of President Alan Schwerin's absence. The Treasurer's report was mentioned, as well as its having already been reported in the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*. The current balance was said to be \$8,804.18. Warren Allen Smith asked for a clarification of membership loss. Dennis Darland explained that, while more people are renewing their memberships, there is a lower

amount of new members joining. Presently, the Society has approximately a hundred members (discounting about fifty people who are probably renewing); whereas there was once a high of three-hundred members.

Peter Stone mentioned membership forms available in collections of the May *BRS Quarterly (BRSQ)*. On the subject of the *BRSQ*, he asked the presenters to consider submitting to the *BRSQ* versions of the papers being presented that weekend.

David White brought up Ken Blackwell's interest in developing guidelines for the "chapterization" of BRS locals, specifically, the advantages of coming up with a five-step approach that could be of use for those interested in trying to form local chapters of the Society. There was discussion of the base of experienced people in attendance from Rochester and New York City, the fate of the one-time Philippine chapter of the BRS, and the like.

The five-step program then, as outlined and recommended by David White was:

- 1) Stage events with a built-in audience, as part of a program with organizations that already have a following.
- 2) Make joining as easy as possible, and supply new members with a membership kit. (This was done in the past.)
- 3) Keep a record of all activities of the BRS and its chapters in a form that is easy to distribute.
- 4) Make clear to members what your main aims are, e.g., humanitarianism, anti-war movement, philosophical clarity, fellowship, letter-writing, Russell studies, teaching Russell, social drinking. Each chapter should be built about the interests of its members and not try to take on everything at once. Likewise, all members should be clear on what resources are available to them, e.g., Bertrand Russell Archives, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, BRS Library, other chapters, and other organizations.
- 5) Make as much use as possible of free publicity. Certainly keep sending material to *BRSQ*, but also to bookstores, UU churches, and newspapers.

While no vote was taken, the consensus was that BRS members are free to form "autonomous" chapters and that, except in cases of express permission from the BRS, local chapters are to refrain from speaking on behalf of the Society or in any way entangling the BRS in obligations. David Goldman proposed having meetings of the Greater Rochester Russell Set audio- or videotaped for general distribution.

Next mentioned was the subject of recruiting members for the BRS via the Internet. Thom Weidlich explained that, with different people wanting different things, there would be advantages to a dedicated e-mail list for providing a weekly e-mail with a Russell quote and membership encouragement. Tim Madigan and David White spoke of the need for a website URL simpler than John Lenz's, especially considering that the related costs of such reforms are well within what the President could authorize without further action. Peter Friedman said that, in addition to making the BRS site more "user-friendly," provisions should be considered for both an automated "sign-up" procedure for would-be BRS members and a regular inclusion of BRS related news. The consensus of those present was that John Lenz would probably not be averse to enabling others to manage the site.

The meeting then concluded at 2 pm.

The Saturday afternoon presentations began with Chad Trainer's paper: "Bertrand Russell's Assessments of René Descartes' Philosophy." This was followed by this year's Prize Paper, David Taylor's "Causal Processes: A Realist Approach." The next presenter was Rosalind Carey with "Logic and Psychology in Russell's Doctrine of Belief: An Overview and a Special Case" and then John Ongley's "Russell's Slow Progress to Realism."

After some free time, there was the Red Hackle hour with the eponymous beverage provided courtesy of Don Jackanicz. There was then the banquet where the Bertrand Russell Society's 2003 Award was given in absentia to Katha Pollitt. The Book Award was given to Ray Perkins for the book he edited of Russell's letters to the editor, *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell*, and a statement from Ray Perkins acknowledging the award was read by Rosalind Carey. Warren Allen Smith and Tim Madigan provided some very entertaining "piano comedy" next with Warren Allen Smith acting as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Tim Madigan acting as Bertrand Russell. The evening was then topped off again with the Greater Rochester Russell Set's hospitality suite/salon.

The Sunday morning papers began with Cara E. Rice's "The Beacon Light of Beacon Hill Shines On," followed by Tim Madigan's "Warrant Report: The Philosophical Analysis of 'The Warren Report' by Bertrand Russell, Josiah Thompson, and Richard Popkin." Finally, we concluded with a joint presentation by Peter Stone and David White: "Is This Game Played? A Conversation on *Wittgenstein's Poker*."

Minutes of the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors

Chad Trainer
Secretary, BRS Board of Directors

The annual meeting of the Society's Board of Directors was held on Friday, May 30 at 8 pm. Directors present were Rosalind Carey, Dennis Darland, Peter Friedman, David Goldman, Tim Madigan, Steve Reinhardt, Cara Rice, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich, and David White. David White called the meeting to order and reviewed the meeting's agenda. Members present who are not Directors were Anthony Anderson, Alan Bock, Pat Bock, Phil Ebersole, David Henehan, Alvin Hofer, Kevin Klement, Gregory Landini, Steve Maragides, and David Taylor.

Election of Officers was taken up first. All incumbents were elected by acclamation:

President: Alan Schwerin (nominated by Chad Trainer and seconded by Peter Stone);

Vice President: Ray Perkins (nominated by Thom Weidlich and seconded by Peter Friedman);

Vice President for Outreach: Peter Friedman (nominated by Warren Allen Smith and seconded by Cara Rice);

Secretary of the Society and Secretary of the Board: Chad Trainer (nominated by Cara Rice and seconded by Thom Weidlich);

Treasurer: Dennis Darland (seconded by Thom Weidlich);

Chairman of the Board: David White (nominated by Warren Allen Smith and seconded by Cara Rice).

The absence of Alan Schwerin from the meeting was noted along with the consequent need to nominate a temporary president for Saturday's "Business" meeting. Thom Weidlich nominated David White who won by acclamation.

After the election of officers, the American Philosophical Association Committee was brought up. The nature and procedures of the APA sessions was explained. A report was given on the BRS's sessions at the APA Eastern meetings (which have been occurring every year), as well as its sessions at the APA's Central, and Pacific meetings (which have not occurred quite as regularly). Attendance at the sessions was described as "sailing pretty closely to the wind" but "sufficient." Success in people

signing up for the BRS at a Central Division meeting was also mentioned. The position of APA Committee Chairman was then brought up for consideration. Thom Weidlich nominated David White for the position and Peter Stone seconded it.

The subject of the Book Award Committee was addressed next. Specifically, the issue raised was whether there should be a third category for books written in languages other than English (in addition to the first category for authors of books written in English and the second category for edited editions of Russell's writings). Furthermore the question was posed whether it is necessary for the Committee to be empowered to apply standards to such books different from those it applies to ones written in English. Steve Maragides said that, while he saw no problem with the Committee being empowered to consider books according to several categories, it would be presumptuous to assume members of the Committee would be in a position to judge books written in foreign languages. Phil Ebersole explained that, as a member of this Committee, he has no way of judging such books that get passed over. While Ebersole said that he was not "wedded" to the idea of a change here, he said it would be "rude" to expressly reserve the terms of the award to books written in English even if that is the nature of the situation by default. There was discussion of whether the only way to be fair to books written in languages other than English is to have a separate category for the Book Award Committee's prize and whether this would simplify the Committee's work. Ed Boedeker remarked that French, German, and English should be the implicit languages of books under consideration and that this implicit criterion, along with the Committee's competence in the award process, should be made as explicit as possible. Thom Weidlich indicated his support for a Foreign Language Award, and Gregory Landini said it was bad public relations for the awarding criteria to be unabashedly confined to books written in English. David White mentioned merits to having ad hoc members and consultants here and made a motion to empower the committee to have this third, "foreign languages" category, should it deem itself competent to judge here. But then Thom Weidlich moved to "shelve" the issue and Peter Stone seconded this motion.

Next on the agenda was the editorship of the *BRS Quarterly* (*BRSQ*). This was a matter to be addressed as a result of Peter Stone's desire to be relieved of this position as a result of his now being on a tenure-track position at Stanford University. It was announced that Rosalind Carey and John Ongley have come forward as willing candidates to co-chair the *BRSQ* Committee. The Board proceeded to appoint Rosalind and John to these positions. Peter Stone was thanked for his excellent work as Editor of

the *BRSQ* and getting the whole cycle of the newsletter's release back on track. The Chair also made reference to a forthcoming three-day celebration of Peter Stone's work along these lines.

The Chair then brought up Ray Perkins' suggestion of a "Promotional Items Committee" of sorts charged with handling the sale and distribution of BRS t-shirts and aided by the creation of a related URL, but attention was also drawn to potential copyright complications in Russell attire. Steve Maragides encouraged the Society to look into Bertrand Russell calendars as well. Peter Friedman moved to create such a committee. Thom Weidlich seconded the motion and it passed unanimously.

The locus of the 2004 Annual Meeting was the following topic on the docket. Mention was made of Ray Perkins' willingness to host the meeting at Plymouth State College in New Hampshire. California was also cited as a future possibility, especially in light of Peter Stone's upcoming move to the state. However, Stone hastened to stress the busy personal schedule he foresaw for at least the next couple of years. Stephen Reinhardt then made a motion to have New Hampshire as the site of next year's meeting. Peter Stone seconded the motion and it passed unanimously. The advisability of seriously considering future sites at least a couple of years ahead was mentioned. Gregory Landini offered the University of Iowa as a candidate where the BRS meeting could be arranged so as to dovetail with the university's annual Wittgenstein/Russell Conference. Chad Trainer countered that previous suggestions of the BRS meetings being held during the academic year had typically eventuated in the specter of less affordable rooming rates for the participants. Rosalind Carey encouraged people to bear in mind the possible perks that can accompany the hosting of conferences and instanced a \$5,000 donation from an alumnus to Lake Forest's Philosophy Department as a consequence of last year's meeting.

A proposal to translate Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy* into Armenian was then addressed. The would-be translator in this case is a man who has already translated into Armenian *Why I Am Not a Christian* and who has a publisher satisfied with and on board for this translation of Russell's *History* but who acknowledges budgetary complications in such an undertaking. David White explained that, while the BRS is hardly in a position to provide financial assistance for this endeavor, genuine possibilities to be considered by the BRS are a letter of support for the translations, a commitment from the Society to purchase a given number of copies, and a donation of space in the Society's quarterly newsletter to advertising the translation. After explanations by Steve Maragides and Dennis Darland of a grant previously made to McMaster University for

Russell-related work, Peter Friedman suggested the utility of corresponding with whatever local chapters of the BRS are to be found in Armenia. Friedman made a motion to have a letter of commendation drafted for the Armenian translation project. Peter Stone then proposed as an amendment to this motion that the Executive Committee be empowered to promote the Armenian translation project provided it does not result in any financial cost to the Society. This amended motion passed unanimously.

Concern with impressing upon the Directors the crisis of declining membership, its causes, and remedies were next on the agenda. David White suggested as a partial solution to membership decline prolonging the membership of those who have not paid in a timely fashion. Dennis Darland argued, instead, for such an approach quite possibly compounding the problem. Peter Stone inquired about the repercussions for membership volume of including membership forms in the quarterly newsletter and Darland indicated that such results were negligible. The possible merits of free memberships were discussed. Friedman stressed the propriety of distinguishing between a financial crisis and a membership crisis. Chad Trainer encouraged the Society to consider membership information that could be provided on something the size of a business card and so presentable to potential members in a fashion less awkward than that involved in trying to give them standard membership forms. Possible new designs for membership forms were considered and then, in response to an inquiry from Thom Weidlich, Darland furnished the Society with a report on membership trends. Friedman pondered the possibilities of book inserts for BRS membership in Routledge's publications. He pointed to Routledge's obviously vested interests in the promotion of Bertrand Russell, as well as the distinct possibility of their interest in Russell-related events. Peter Stone cited the hitherto negative reaction from Routledge on these fronts. There was, however, general discussion of Routledge's catalog possibly including as filler ads for the BRS. Cara Rice and Chad Trainer asked about the possibilities of BRS members volunteering to insert promotional material for the Society at their local corporate bookstores in the stores' relevant books. David White and Peter Stone countered that it was basically unheard of for stores to permit such a thing and White said that opportunities for postings on such stores' bulletin boards are a more realistic area to explore. Peter Stone explained that, generally speaking, *slight* changes to present practices in promoting membership tend to be more realistic and practical than the grandiose, visionary approaches that, while abounding in ideas lack "people attached to the ideas." David Henehan explained what he saw as the shortcomings of the Society's newsletter regularly including renewal forms vis-à-vis

individually mailed dues notices. David White responded that a modification here entails a whole additional realm of activity and so an individual willing to do it. The possibility of having people volunteer to contact those whose membership has lapsed was next discussed and then the advantages of readily reproducible membership forms in the Society's mailings. It was then discussed how extensions of membership for those who are behind on their dues is most appropriately left for an "executive" decision. Dennis Darland mentioned the possibility of advertising the BRS in the *Nation* magazine and around college campuses. Peter Stone explained that it was precisely by means of campus advertisements that he himself got involved in the Society. Peter Friedman mentioned the possibly cheap rate of advertising in the "far-right column" of Google but the possibly minimal rate in the area of \$500 was considered as well. Peter Stone drew attention to the operative role of John Lenz and while not foreseeing a need to put money forth on website developments indicated his willingness to make the relevant inquiries along these lines. Thom Weidlich mentioned the value generally to increased Internet activity for the BRS in making membership more attractive.

Peter Stone then moved to adjourn the meeting. Cara Rice seconded.

The 2003 BRS Award

This year, the BRS Awards Committee decided to give the BRS Award to Katha Pollitt. Kevin Brodie, BRS Awards Committee Chair, offered the following remarks in support of this decision:

Katha Pollitt is an award-winning journalist, who is a regular columnist for the *Nation*. She is the author of several books, including *Reasonable Creatures: Essays on Women and Feminism* (Vintage, 1995) and *Subject to Debate: Sense and Dissents on Women, Politics, and Culture* (Random House, 2001). Throughout her career, she has been an articulate and vociferous champion of those who are disenfranchised and oppressed throughout the world. She has also been one of the foremost spokespersons for feminism and reproductive rights. She has also expressed skepticism regarding religious dogma, and has frequently criticized religious leaders for using their influence to repress freedom, particularly as it relates to women.

Upon learning that she had received the award, Ms. Pollitt proclaimed she was "thrilled to be associated with Bertrand Russell, whom she admired, and was a hero to her parents."

The text of the award reads as follows:

**The 2003 Bertrand Russell Society Award presented to
Ms. Katha Pollitt
for intellectual courage and indubitable wit in the spirit of Bertrand
Russell.**

The 2003 BRS Book Award

The BRS Book Award Committee decided to give the 2003 BRS Book Award to Ray Perkins for his edited collection Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor (Open Court, 2001). (As Awards Committee Chair, Ray abstained completely from the decision-making process this year because his book was a candidate for the award.) Ray Perkins was unable to attend the 2003 Annual Meeting to accept the award in person; however, he did send the following remarks that were read at the meeting:

My collection of Russell's letters to the editor has been a long labor, but truly one of love. As some of you may know, my editorial interest in Russell's letters began back in the early 70s soon after I became aware that Ken Blackwell and Harry Ruja were collecting them for the Archives. But in fact my interest in Russell's letters really goes back to my encounter with his 1967 book *War Crimes in Vietnam* which reprinted his passionate exchange with the editor of the *New York Times* regarding US chemical weapons in South East Asia. What these letters show, and what I think his public letters generally reveal, is the practical wisdom of a great intellect come down from the ivory tower of academia to do battle with the forces of ignorance and cruelty and to infuse public policy with reason and compassion. As we witness the unfolding of the new Pax Americana and the resurgence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Russell's public letters, especially those since World War II, take on a renewed relevance, and his example as practical philosopher and public gadfly continues today to teach and inspire us all.

I'd like to thank the Society for honoring me with this prestigious award. It's one of which I am very proud and one which I shall long cherish. And I want to add a special "thank you" to the Bertrand Russell Archives and especially to Ken Blackwell without whose assiduous work over nearly three decades these letters would not have been obtainable. Again, thank you all very much.

Sincerely (or should I say "Yours faithfully"?),

Ray Perkins, Jr.

The Award Plaque that Ray will receive is engraved with the following words:

**The 2003 Bertrand Russell Society Book Award to
Ray Perkins, Jr. for *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell:
A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor,*
which has deepened our understanding of Russell's life and work.**

Below follows a complete list of all previous BRS Book Award winners:

2002

The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970 (Routledge, 2001), ed. by Nicholas Griffin, assisted by Alison Roberts Miculan.

2001

Appointment Denied (Prometheus, 2000), by Thom Weidlich.

2000

Russell on Ethics: Selections from the Writings of Bertrand Russell (Routledge, 1999), ed. by Charles Pigden.

1999

Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory (Oxford U.P., 1998), by Gregory Landini.

1998

Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume 10: A Fresh Look at Empiricism, 1927-42. Volume 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 1943-68 (Routledge, 1996, 1997), ed. by John G. Slater and Peter Kollner.

1997

Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude (Free Press, 1996), by Ray Monk.

1996

Continuity and Change in the Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy (Kluwer, 1994), by Paul Hager.

1995

A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell (Routledge, 1994), by Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja.

1994

Bertrand Russell: A Life (Viking, 1993), by Caroline Moorehead.

1993

The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume I, 1894-1914 (Houghton Mifflin, 1992), by Nicholas Griffin.

1992

Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship (Oxford U.P., 1991), by Nicholas Griffin.

1991

Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, 1990), by Peter Hylton.

1990

Bertrand Russell's Dialogue with His Contemporaries (Southern Illinois, 1989), by Elizabeth Eames.

1989

Bertrand Russell: A Political Life (Hill and Wang, 1988), by Alan Ryan.

1988

Bertrand Russell (Twayne, 1986), by Paul Kuntz.

1987

The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell (Allen & Unwin, 1985), by Kenneth Blackwell.

1985

Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume I: Cambridge Essays 1888-99 (Allen & Unwin, 1983), ed. by Kenneth Blackwell, Andrew Brink, Nicholas Griffin, Richard A. Rempel, and John G. Slater.

Quiz on Bertrand Russell

The following quiz was offered at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the BRS by meeting organizer Rosalind Carey. The person scoring highest at the meeting was awarded a complimentary lunch at the dining commons at Lake Forest College (total value: \$6.66). The prize was won by Edgar Boedecker. (The *BRSQ* Editor, who was in the running, is a very poor sport, and still has several protests lodged.)

Question #1: What famous statement by Quine about *being* did Russell probably coin?

Question #2: Where does Russell say, "Not only the Bible but even the works of Marx and Engels contain demonstrably false statements. The Bible says that the hare chews the cud, and Engels said that the Austrians would win the war of 1866."

Question #3: What aspect of his first wife first repelled Russell, when he saw her on a bicycle?

Question #4: In what year did Russell first read William James?

Question #5: What gifts did Wittgenstein occasionally bring Russell, when they first knew each other?

Question #6: Who published the first edition of *Principia*?

Question #7: What did Russell say when asked about being rescued from a plane crash?

Tiebreaker Question #1: How old was Bertrand Russell when he first read John Stuart Mill's *Logic*?

Tiebreaker Question #2: Where did Bertrand Russell go the day after the night he and Ottoline Morrell became lovers?

Answers to the quiz can be found on page 42.

Articles:

Russell in Toronto

Alan Bock

More than one hundred people attended the March 2003 meeting of the Humanist Association of Toronto to hear a talk by Peter Stone on "Bertrand Russell's Politics and Humanism."

Stone began his talk by noting that Russell was a prolific writer of English prose, but there are a few lines that really seem to capture what he thinks "in a nutshell." One of these is the opening line of his (3-volume) autobiography—"Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind." There is also the classic line from Russell's essay "What I Believe"—"The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." That line is the official motto of the Bertrand Russell Society. But for purposes of the talk, Stone concluded, the most appropriate Russell quote summarizing his philosophy appears at the beginning of the first chapter of one of his best-known essay collections, *Skeptical Essays*:

I wish to propose for the reader's favourable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true.

"I think that the philosophy embodied in this quote," Stone said, "is just as wildly subversive now as it was when he wrote it 75 years ago. [By an extraordinary coincidence, it's the 75th anniversary of the publication of *Skeptical Essays* this year, as this issue's editorial notes—ed.] And it really summarizes BR's ideas on politics and humanism very well. To say that he lived by it—which he did, by and large—is one of the best things that can be said about him, either in his eyes or in our own."

Stone then examined Russell's humanism with this quote in mind. Though Russell did not consider himself a humanist, argued Stone, "Nevertheless, his views regarding religion and the good life are classically those of a humanist. Through those ideas Bertrand Russell expressed his core conviction not to believe without evidence and he did not mince any words."

For example, right at the start of the collection *Why I Am Not A Christian* Russell announces that

I think that all the great religions of the world—Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Communism—both untrue and harmful.

According to Stone, the primary problem Russell found with religion was that it required faith, and an abandonment of the "wildly subversive" doctrine of not believing without evidence. Russell thought that there was no reason for believing any of the things religions ask us to believe, but he would certainly add that there were, in many cases, no reasons to believe the opposite either. Just because we have no evidence that God exists does not mean we have evidence that God does not exist. Therefore, Russell considered himself technically an agnostic, not an atheist. But he also added that for practical purposes, he was an atheist. For those who think that agnosticism is some sort of concession to the religiously minded, Russell has the following words of advice in his essay "What I Believe":

I do not pretend to be able to prove there is no God. I equally cannot prove that Satan is a fiction. The Christian God may exist; so may the Gods of Olympus, or of ancient Egypt, or of Babylon. But no one of these hypotheses is more probable than any other: they lie outside the region of even probable knowledge, and therefore there is no reason to consider any of them.

So all of the reasons for accepting belief in God (and other traditional religious ideas, like an afterlife) are suspect.

It should be pointed out, Stone hastened to add, that "Russell himself was at an emotional level predisposed to belief in something like God. He really wanted some kind of *certainty*." When, as a teenager, he abandoned belief in religion he did seek a substitute in philosophy. Much of his reputation stemmed from his efforts at finding a rigorous philosophical foundation for mathematics, but ultimately, he decided that mathematics did not offer him absolute truth about the world. This was a real blow for him. "Nevertheless," Stone said, "intellectual honesty was too important for him to believe things simply because they were comforting. Nowhere is this clearer than in what he has to say about life after death." Russell was blunt about this in "What I Believe."

I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will survive. I am not young, and I love life. But I should scorn to

shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is nonetheless true happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has borne himself proudly on the scaffold; surely the same pride should teach us to think truly about man's place in the world. Even if the open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigor, and the great spaces have a splendor of their own.

Turning to politics, Stone noted that much of what Russell said is difficult to square with his views about moral judgments. Russell was an emotivist, meaning that, in Stone's words, "statements involving ethics or morality didn't literally say anything" but "simply expressed an emotion on the part of the person speaking them." One would think that this would preclude much of a discussion about ethical and political questions. However, Stone added, "being an emotivist never stopped Russell from expressing moral outrage in the world of politics, from World War I (during which he was imprisoned for an antiwar article he wrote) to the crusade for nuclear disarmament (during which he was also imprisoned, this time for civil disobedience at the age of 89)."

But at other times, Russell displayed an attitude very much like that of Karl Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, a book Russell greatly liked. He wrote an essay on a similar topic himself called "Philosophy and Politics" where he expressed the idea that the enemy in politics, as in religion, is the holding of beliefs without evidence. Russell called it adhering to a fanatical creed. He also saw, in Stone's words, that "the idea of refusing belief without evidence, common to science and philosophy, also underlay all that was good about the western democracies." This skepticism, Stone concluded, was a commodity sorely needed in the present day.

The Humanist Association of Toronto has become a popular venue for BRS members. Warren Allen Smith has advised us that he had previously spoken before this group and had the same large audience as Stone, two of whom are still in e-mail communication with him. At the time of his talk Smith donated a copy of *Who's Who in Hell* and it was auctioned off. The winner, said Smith, had arrived by motorcycle and it was fun to see him riding off with the "Good Book" strapped to his back.

Poetry

The first BRSQ published out of Rochester featured an original poem on Russell. (David White, "Whereof We Cannot Speak," BRSQ #110, May 2001) It seems fitting, then, to include another such poem in the last (for the time being) BRSQ to be published there. May the BRSQ always prove such an accommodating home to the fine arts.

Enlightenment

Kathy Duggan

This story is a little watery round the edges.
It was a study weekend.
In a room, as it were, on his deathbed,
Bertrand Russell. He was naked, though
covered to some extent by a cloth,
larger than life with his feet hanging over
the edge of an empty bath. His talk was in
full flow, as though nothing happened.

I knelt down next to him to be friendly,
take his hand, but ran out of things
to say, so he kindly tried a bit of a joke,
posed a problem. Would it be best
to fill the bath with an Archimedes Screw
or the Hydraulic system, which would bring
a very thin and cooling line of water.
I chose the latter.

Soon the bath, surprisingly, was full
to overflowing and warm. "It's O.K."
I said, "You'll like this." So Bertrand soaked,
turned from monochrome to pink,
stepped out, said: "Death interrupted me,
I have a lot to say, so I'll
see you later, you can follow me
into lecture room A."

Well, two students were having
a spat at the back, it was embarrassing,
I told them to put a sock in it,
Bertie couldn't even begin to speak.

I walked blindly down the theatre,
almost sat on someone's knee,
by mistake—stumbled on,
found myself in the front row where
people in long dresses and long coats
began duelling and dancing.

I wanted to join in, hold hands
with Madame de Stael,
Quesnay and La Rochefoucauld.
My Laura Ashley dress with burgundy
watered silk puff sleeves and
black velvet bodice would have been ideal.

The BRSQ thanks Peter Friedman for finding this poem. His story of its discovery is entertaining enough to be worth reproducing below.

Finding “Enlightenment”
Peter Friedman

One of the UK's top poetry teachers runs an annual seminar, and for each of these seminars he organizes a reading at which the present crop of students could present their work. I was in attendance at The Poetry Society HQ in London on Saturday the 21st of June for one of these readings.

With me was my mother, a professional painter. She had been sketching some portraits of Russell at home, and had met me at the reading in order to give them to me for scanning. Both of us were astonished to hear one of the seminar students read a poem that contained an amusingly surreal fantasy about Russell. The poem generated mirth and applause from a notoriously subdued audience of regular Poetry Society devotees.

Immediately after the reading was over, my mother sprang to her feet, approached the poet, and negotiated an exchange of one of her Russell portraits in return for a copy of a transcript of the poem, which she promptly took home, photocopied, and mailed to me.

Regular Features:

Russell-Related Odds and Ends

- In its March/April 2003 issue, *Book Source* magazine ran a short article entitled “The Lore and Lure of Manhattan’s Historic Book Row.” The article, by Marvin Mondlin and Roy Meador, contains many anecdotes concerning the eclectic assortment of used bookstores that used to clutter around Manhattan’s Fourth Avenue. Among the stories assembled there is the following gem:

Sonja Mirsky, who became a librarian, began venturing to Fourth Avenue in 1939, and soon was spending hours every day browsing at the Strand. In the 1940s, when she was majoring in mathematics at college and with no funds to purchase Bertrand Russell’s *Principia Mathematica*, she began taking the three volumes down from the high shelf at the Strand and using them at the store to do her homework. This behavior was noticed, and she heard a clerk tell founder Ben Bass, “She’s never going to buy those books.” Bass said leave the browser be: “When she has the money she’ll buy them.” [sic] Buy them she did when she graduated in 1948 from City College of New York and received \$50 from an uncle. She offered the money directly to Ben Bass for the \$35 set. Bass examined the books and said, “They’re quite shelf worn. Why don’t we make it \$25.”

Face it—the anecdote just wouldn’t be the same if Mirsky had been a student anywhere but City College.

Source: Peter Stone

- The April 2003 journal of *Ethics* contains a Centenary Symposium on G.E. Moore’s *Principia Ethica*. Anyone spotting Russell references in the symposium should send them to the *BRSQ*.

Source: Peter Stone

- Another review of Carole Seymour-Jones’ book *Painted Shadow: A Life of Vivienne Eliot* has appeared, this time in the April 3, 2003 issue of the *London Review of Books*. The review is entitled “In the Hyacinth Garden,” and is by Richard Poirier. The review discusses Bertie’s relationship with Vivienne extensively, and not too favorably.

(Poirier thinks highly of Ray Monk's treatment of the subject.) Poirier's overall view of the relationship is expressed as follows:

If he [Russell] exploited the Eliots and allowed them to exploit him, it was in the hope that he might thereby repair the losses and emotional damages that had resulted not only from [Ottoline] Morrell's defection but from the loss of two others with whom he had forged an intense intellectual as well as emotional bond: Wittgenstein, who had repudiated Russell's work in philosophy, and D.H. Lawrence, who had become contemptuous both of his writing and of his character.

Source: Tim Madigan

- On April 17, 2003, the Australian newspaper the *Age* ran an article by Mark Mordue entitled "The Forgotten Parent?" The article refers to Ian Samson's book *The Truth about Babies: From A to Z* (Granta Books, 2002) and notes a reference by Samson to Russell as follows:

I read with cautionary distress Sansom's contrasting use of Bertrand Russell's pleased notes on fatherhood in his *Autobiography* (1967-69) with his daughter Katherine Tait's observations later in *My Father Bertrand Russell* (1975): "He played at being a father...and he acted the part to perfection, but his heart was elsewhere and his combination of inner detachment and outer affection caused me much muddled suffering."

The article is at <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/17/1050172678763.html>.

Source: David White

- On April 19, 2003, *News Today* (a prominent evening newspaper of southern India) ran an article entitled "Crank's Corner" (apparently an installment of a regular feature) by K. Balakumar. The article dealt with the phenomenon of Short Messenger Service (SMS), and opened with the following grammatically-challenged anecdote:

"The good thing about this SMS is that you cannot read it on your mobile," the mobile beeped and blinked with intriguing insouciance.

It seemed more paradoxical than Bertrand Russell's barber one.

The article is at <http://newstodaynet.com/19apr/ss1.htm>.

Source: David White

- The most creative recent use of a Russell quote probably belongs to Monica Anderson in an article she wrote for the *Fort Worth Star-Telegram* that appeared on April 20, 2003. In the article, entitled "Boys, Boys, Can I Have My Dreams Back?" Anderson writes the following:

In the words of Bertrand Russell, "Ethical metaphysics is fundamentally an attempt, however disguised, to give legislative force to our own wishes."

I don't have the slightest idea what that means, except maybe I need to go shopping by myself.

The article is at <http://www.dfw.com/mld/startelegram/living/5663839.htm>.

Source: David White

- At <http://www.rnw.nl/special/en/html/030423wmd2.html> there is an article (in English) about a program on the Dutch radio Station "Radio Nederland" called "Weapons of Mass Destruction 2—Russell and Einstein." The program, the second in a series on the history of the very worst of weapons, focuses on Russell's role in sparking the antinuclear movement in the 1950s. It includes extensive interview segments from Joseph Rotblat, of the Pugwash Conferences, and Ken Coates, of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, as well as brief clips of Russell himself speaking on the dangers of nuclear war. There is also a link at the article that allows access to the program itself. The article originally appeared on April 23, 2003.

Source: Peter Friedman

- The Indian website mid-day.com ran an article in which Mahmood Farooqui cites Russell in support of his criticisms of the Israel's continued control over the Occupied Territories. Russell is quoted as saying the following about Israel: "There has been no nation which

won world support so quickly, only to lose it as quickly.” (No source is given for the quote.) The article, entitled, “Why I Am Outraged by this Conflict,” is at <http://web.mid-day.com/news/world/2003/april/51228.htm>. It originally appeared on April 27, 2003.

Of course, were Russell witness to the recent U.S. war against Iraq, he would probably revise his assessment as to who should hold the record for squandering international goodwill.

Source: David White

- The May 5, 2003 issue of the *Guardian* featured an article by Stuart Jeffries entitled “Oh, You Are Awful.” The article reviews a recent 3-part British TV program on the history of the sitcom. In the course of the review, Jeffries discusses a common theme in British sitcoms—the “eternally frustrated desire” on the part of working-class folk to “better” themselves “through some nebulously conceived Culture.” As an example of this, he cites a moment in an early sitcom entitled “Hancock” “in which the eponymous, aspirant hero filled his pipe, put on his smoking jacket and opened a book by Bertrand Russell but was doomed to remain baffled on its first page.” (Presumably, the book wasn’t *A History of the World in Epitome*.) The article is at http://www.guardian.co.uk/tv_and_radio/story/0,3604,949488,00.html.

Source: David White

- The May 8, 2003 issue of the *Japan Times* ran an article by Rowan Hooper on recent debates surrounding the moral status of stem cells—debates situated in a longer philosophical argument about the question of “what it means to be human.” The article, entitled “Ethicists Bid to Unscramble Egg Argument,” opens as follows:

It’s often been said that philosophy lags behind science. Bertrand Russell’s *The ABC of Relativity*, for example, was published in 1926, 21 years after Einstein published his Special Theory of Relativity.

We’ll give them a break, those poor philosophers. It must be hard to come up with the philosophical implications of, say, quantum mechanics, when only a specialized handful of physicists themselves can understand it.

Hooper goes on to suggest that philosophers should have an easier time on the stem cell debate, as the argument about “what it means to be human” has been going on for millennia. It is still doubtful, however, that anyone will be coming out with *The ABC of Human Life* any time soon.

The article is online at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fe20030508rh.htm>.

Source: David White

- An article that appeared in the *Guardian* on May 26, 2003 contained the following Russell reference:

Back in the 1920s, the *Guardian* editor CP Scott feared the worst when he heard the name chosen for the new invention. “Television? No good will come of this device. The word is half Greek and half Latin.” While Bertrand Russell reportedly warned Grace Wyndham Goldie, a radio pioneer who was preparing to move to television, “It will be of no importance in your lifetime or mine.” She survived until 1986, but long before that Russell should have been eating his words.

The article was entitled “Get a Grip on Reality” and was written by Nick Clarke. It is available online at <http://media.guardian.co.uk/mediaguardian/story/0,7558,963361,00.html>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- *FrontPage Magazine*, online journal of lunatic right-winger David Horowitz (formerly of the New Left) recently featured an article mentioning Russell. The article, a rather shrill diatribe by Rafe Champion, is entitled “George Orwell, Economic Illiterate.” Before proceeding to attack Orwell, Champion begins his article with the following paragraph:

As we celebrate the anniversary of one of the most honest and courageous men of the 20th century it is important to temper our praise with the recognition that he had a very serious limitation. He was an economic illiterate. In company with many other intelligent anti-totalitarians of his time, like Bertrand Russell (to

the age of 90) and Leonard Woolf, he called himself a socialist. In their eyes, all that could be expected of “unfettered competition” were boom and bust cycles, monopolies, exploitation of the workers and unemployment. (In fairness to Bertrand Russell, his first serious engagement in politics was to defend free trade from opponents in the British Liberal Party, circa 1905.)

The article appeared on July 3, 2003, and is available at <http://frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=8738>.

Source: Peter Friedman & Ken Blackwell

- In an interview for the *Guardian*, philosopher Bryan Magee described Bertrand Russell as “the most impressive individual he met.” He believed this, Magee said, “because of his extraordinary intelligence. Anything you say about it will sound like a cliché, but it was extraordinary.” Karl Popper, BRS Honorary Member, was also acknowledged as a major influence. In discussing Popper, however, Magee adds that “I hugely valued my relationship with him, but to be honest I never really liked him.” The interview, entitled “I Think, Therefore I Write,” was conducted by Nicholas Wroe, and appeared on June 7, 2003. It is online at <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/interviews/story/0,11660,972650,00.html>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- The June 20, 2003 issue of *Forward* noted that the 2003 Jerusalem Prize had been awarded to playwright Arthur Miller. The Jerusalem Prize, notes the article, is “Israel’s only international literary award,” and “honors an author whose works best express the idea of the freedom of the individual in society.” The article, by Elli Wohlgelemler, also noted several previous winners of the prize, including Bertrand Russell, who won in 1963. The article can be found at <http://www.forward.com/issues/2003/03.06.20/news13.html>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- A recent two-part radio documentary was broadcast by the BBC entitled “From This Moment On.” The documentary, narrated by Nigel Wrench, “examines two seminal moments from the 1960s and ’70s”—the shooting of antiwar demonstrators at Kent State and

the formation of the Committee of 100 by Bertrand Russell and Ralph Schoenman. The segment on the second event bears the title “When the Philosopher Sat Down.” Included in the documentary are excerpts from Russell’s famous “Man’s Peril” speech and an interview with Schoenman. (He claims to have been inspired with the idea for the Committee by reading about the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, who made use of similar committees.) The documentary is at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/news/thismoment.shtml>.

Source: Tom Stanley

- Sadly, the recent biography of Nikita Khrushchev by William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (Norton, 2003) does not mention Russell in its index at all. (Any member who finds mention of Russell in the text should send them to the BRSQ.)

Source: Peter Stone

- Those interested in Russell’s former secretary Ralph Schoenman should visit <http://www.wbaifree.org/takingaim/>, the website of the radio show “Taking Aim.” This show airs on WBAI (99.5 FM) in New York City every Tuesday from 5-6 PM, and is co-hosted by Schoenman and Mya Shone. The site provides information about the show as well as an archive of past shows. There is also an order form through which one can order shows as well as books by Schoenman, such as *Death & Pillage in the Congo* and *The Hidden History of Zionism*. (The text of the latter is also available.) Oddly, Schoenman’s relationship with Russell is mentioned only once in passing.

Source: David Goldman

- For more on Schoenman, visit the website of “Cloak & Dagger: Talk Radio for SPIES!” This show airs on Thursdays at 11 PM on Mojo Radio (640 AM). Schoenman has appeared as a guest on the show numerous times, and so the show’s website features a brief biography of him, along with downloadable audio files for the shows on which he appeared. Along with the biography, the site features a picture of Schoenman marching with Bertie and Edith in the 1960 Hiroshima Vigil March held in London. The show’s website is at http://www.cloakanddagger.ca/guests/ralph_schoenman.asp.

Source: Tom Stanley

- Shakespeare & Company (a theatrical troupe based in Lenox, MA) recently performed a play entitled *The Fly Bottle*, by David Egan. This play in seven scenes features an ongoing philosophical debate between Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Bertrand Russell. It begins with the famous 1946 encounter between Popper and Wittgenstein—the one chronicled in the recent book *Wittgenstein's Poker* (Ecco, 2001)—and proceeds forwards and backwards (through flashbacks) from there. The play ran from May 16 (two days before Russell's birthday) to August 24.

At least three reviews of the play have appeared. The first, by Frances Benn Hall, claims that "Russell brings a welcome note of levity into the play with his assertions concerning the importance of sex in philosophy." It appeared in [newberkshire.com](http://www.newberkshire.com), an online magazine dealing with "arts, entertainment, & the Berkshires," at <http://www.newberkshire.com/reviews/03/sco-fly.html>. The second, by Elyse Sommer, claims that "Russell emotionally abused his children and grandchildren." It appeared in CurtainUp™, "The Internet Theater Magazine of Reviews, Features, Annotated Listings," at <http://www.curtainup.com/flybottle.html>. The third review, by James Yeara, bears the creative title "Philosophy by Force." It features the following exchange between Popper and Russell:

"I think a good book is worth several Panzer divisions if it gets to the right people," Popper states, to which Russell replies, "Not if the Panzer division gets there first."

Yeara's review appeared in Metroland Online, "The Alternative Newsweekly of New York's Capital Region." The address is <http://www.metroland.net/theater.html>.

Source: Peter Friedman

- A short story on the web entitled "Bringing down the House" features the following exchange concerning Russell:

The evening arrived, and everyone piled into Helen's SUV for the ride to Temple Ahavat Israel.

"Now listen, Daria...please don't make wisecracks through the service. I know you just love to humiliate me, but this is very important to me." asked Quinn, a whine in her voice.

"Don't worry. I brought reading material, and if worse comes to worse I'll get a nap in."

"I hope you didn't bring one of your books on serial killers to read...that would be so embarrassing..."

"Nope, I've got a book of essays by Bertrand Russell right here in my bag."

"That wouldn't be *Why I Am Not A Christian*, would it?"

"I'm sure that wouldn't be looked at askance amongst Jews, who have their own axe to grind against Christianity. But no, it's the Portable Bertrand Russell. Your new-found interest in philosophy and other scholarly matters is interesting to say the least."

The story is at <http://www.msgeek.com/fanfic/bringdownhouse.html>. For the record, there is no known book with the title *The Portable Bertrand Russell* (but there should be).

Source: Omar Rumi & Russell-1

- There is a British online exhibition of documentary sources on World War I entitled "The First World War: Sources for History." It is at <http://www.pro.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/index.htm>. The exhibition is offered through a partnership between the Public Record Office (the National Archives) and the Imperial War Museum, and funded by the New Opportunities Fund. Among other resources available at the site is a collection of materials relating to the antiwar movement. This collection includes a letter Bertrand Russell wrote to his brother Frank while imprisoned for his antiwar work. There is both a reproduction of the original letter and a transcription.

Source: Ken Blackwell

- A website dedicated to Graham Whettam, a British composer, indicates that Whettam dedicated his *Sinfonia Contra Timore*, originally known as Symphony No. 4, "to Bertrand Russell and all other people who suffer imprisonment or other injustice for the expression of their beliefs or the convenience of politicians and bureaucracies." The dedication apparently kept the symphony, first

- Freethinkers in the New York City area may wish to check out “Equal Time for Freethought,” a radio show aimed at getting out the freethinker’s point of view. It airs on WBAI (99.5 FM) every Sunday at 6:30 PM for half an hour. It features news, analysis, and interviews. It’s online at <http://www.foody.org/freethoughtradio.html>. One can listen to the show live online at this site, or listen to a variety of past broadcasts. The *BRSQ* thanks David Goldman for bringing the show to its attention.

Updates on Awards and Honorary Members

- In June 2003, *Harper’s Magazine* ran a review of Stephen Jay Gould’s *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* (Belknap Press, 2002). The reviewer, David Quammen, began his review with the following Russell reference:

Not long before publishing his first book, the young Bertrand Russell received some advice about literary technique. It came from his future brother-in-law, Logan Pearsall Smith, the aesthetic and slightly loopy brother of Alys Pearsall Smith, who became Russell’s first wife. Seven years older than Bertrand, Logan had studied the classics at Balliol and hung with artists in Paris; he was an imposing if dubious source of postures and opinions. Years afterward, in an essay entitled “How I Write,” Russell recollected that Alys’s brother “was at that time exclusively interested in style as opposed to matter,” and although Russell had opposite priorities, he was impressionable. Logan confidently offered various rules, of which Russell mentioned only a few: Place a comma after every four words; never use “and” except at the beginning of a sentence. “His most emphatic advice was that one must always rewrite,” Russell remembered. “I consciously tried this, but found that my first draft was almost always better than my second. This discovery has saved me an immense amount of time.” With experience, Russell found his own congenial literary methods, partly grounded in his devotion to mathematics and his early determination “to say everything in the smallest number of words in which it could be said clearly.” Perfect clarity was the ultimate style. A sentence should be as lean as an equation. He would correct mistakes of substance, recasting entire passages, but never second-guess a first draft on grounds that were merely stylistic. In 1945, after half a century of steady literary output, he published *A History of Western Philosophy*, his

romping survey of thinkers from Thales to himself, a book that’s witty and terse at 836 pages. Five years later he won the Nobel Prize for literature. So much for a brother-in-law’s advice.

Quammen goes on to compare Russell’s writing technique with that of Gould, who also avoided rewrites, and demonstrates how the technique served Gould well—at first. Unfortunately, Quammen argues, it failed Gould by the time he wrote the 1433-page *Structure*. Best line of the review, which is entitled “The Man Who Knew Too Much?” “What sort of person writes a gigantic book, filled with history and biology and cultural arcane, staking his personal claim to be the Second Coming of Charles Darwin, and then congratulates *himself* in the dedication? Well, there is no such ‘sort’ of person. Stephen Jay Gould was like nobody else.” Gould received the 2000 BRS Award, largely because of his Russellian ability to popularize technical ideas through writing.

Rustlings Gerry Wildenberg

“Rustlings” presents a simple substitution cipher based on the writings of Bertrand Russell. In the coded quote below, each letter stands for another letter. For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFRRYY, O=B, R=E, et cetera. The quotes below use different codes.

In the cipher below I have made the puzzle harder by disguising the word separations and removing any punctuation. The grouping into 5 letter “words” is meant only to help readability and does not relate to the actual quote. (I have had to change one hyphenated word to the more contemporary, nonhyphenated spelling.)

BIZJB ZPZZK JKSZT RNKJW RXSBZ EJABO ZWATZ IKJFM
 IKMHR TMGZB RXXOZ
 TZBKT FZFM I KMNTR SZBRX XOZPI ABJJA MMAQK LKJFM
 IKMMI ZIZTA RJZKX
 BKLPW KGXMX ZPPXL FTZPP ZFRJP QRMZA WRJNT ZFROX
 ZMTRO GXKMR AJPBR
 XXZSZ TVZIK QQRXL MAXRW ZXAJV OXRPP BRMIM IZIZT A

Russell on the Web

- Those interested in the writings of Russell's (first) mother-in-law, Hannah Whitall Smith, can find some of them online at the "Christian Classics Ethereal Library" at http://www.ccel.org/s/smith_hw/. As the site name suggests, Russell and his mother-in-law did not see eye to eye on matters of theology.

Source: David White

- Yet another attack on Bertrand Russell by Lyndon LaRouche's political machine can be found at the website of the "American Almanac." This site features articles originally published in the "American Almanac" insert of the *New Federalist*, a LaRouche-controlled newspaper. The website features a lengthy piece by Carol White entitled "H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, Mackinder, Rhodes—Britain's Plot to Destroy Civilization: The New Dark Ages Conspiracy." (Conspiracy theorists love lengthy titles.) The article consists of excerpts of chapter one of White's book *Britain's Plot To Destroy Civilization: The New Dark Ages Conspiracy* (Ben Franklin Booksellers, 1980). (Amazon.com has the two parts of the title—before and after the colon—switched, but does it really matter?) The excerpts were published on June 20, 1994. The chapter is entitled "Russell Walks Out," a reference to Russell's decision to leave the "Coefficients," a liberal British political club. View it at http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/newdark.htm.

Source: Peter Friedman

- There are a number of references online to the 1967 Indian film *Aman*, directed by Mohan Kumar and starring Rajinder Kumar, Saira Banu—and Bertrand Russell, who plays himself. Kumar plays a doctor who, horrified by the health dangers of atomic weapons, asks Russell for advice. Russell provides it. *Aman's* plot is summarized at <http://us.imdb.com/Plot?0233193> and its director is interviewed at <http://in.news.yahoo.com/020529/57/1p3c1.html>. A DVD version of the film was apparently put out by Worldwide Entertainment Group in 1999, although it is currently unavailable.

Source: Peter Friedman

BRS Business and Chapter News:

The Greater New York City Chapter of the Bertrand Russell Society (GNYCCBRS)



The GNYCCBRS's latest happening occurred at the Ben Ash & Roxy Deli (857 Seventh Avenue) on Sunday, June 29. At this meeting, out-of-towners were feted with very large sandwiches. The gathering included (clockwise around the table, from left) David Goldman, Tim Madigan (from the GRRS), John Lenz, Peter Stone (also from the GRRS), Thom Weidlich, Warren Allen Smith, and Frank Stone (Peter's dad). The *BRSQ* thanks Tim Madigan for this picture immortalizing the event.

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2nd Quarter Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow, 4/1/03 Through 6/30/03

Compiled 7/10/03 by Dennis J. Darland,
 BRS Treasurer (djdardland@qconline.com)

| Category Description | | |
|-----------------------|--|-----------------|
| BALANCE 3/31/03 | | 8,904.49 |
| INFLOWS | | |
| Contributions | | |
| Contrib-BRS | | 70.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | | 70.00 |
| Dues | | |
| New Members | | 200.90 |
| Renewals | | 719.85 |
| TOTAL Dues | | 920.75 |
| Meeting Income | | 50.00 |
| Other Income | | 10.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | | 1,050.75 |
| OUTFLOWS | | |
| Bank Charges | | 10.93 |
| BRS Paper Award | | 223.44 |
| Library Expenses | | 16.66 |
| Meeting Expenses | | 58.30 |
| Newsletter | | 785.72 |
| Other Expenses | | 15.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | | 1,110.05 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | | -59.30 |
| BALANCE 6/30/03 | | 8,845.19 |

Greater Rochester Russell Set

Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell
 Meetings Open to the Public

GRRS Inspires Poetry (of a Sort)

For several months now, the GRRS's monthly meeting has been followed by a poetry forum called Pure Kona Poetry. Some of the poets arrive early, and have taken an interest in Russell. In fact, two of the poets were sufficiently inspired to call their new act the Urknee and Bjurton Russell Show. They've even produced a CD of their poetry set to music; it's a hoot.

2003 Program

- Aug. 14 *Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Private Years, 1884-1914*
- Sept. 11 *Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970*
- Oct. 9 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre
Guest Speaker: Nicholas Griffin
- Nov. 13 "Nice People" (by Bertrand Russell)
- Dec. 11 Lord John Russell

All meetings are held at **Daily Perks Coffee House**, 389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY, at **6:30 PM. Note New Meeting Time!**

All dates and topics are subject to change. For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184 or write tmadigan@rochester.rr.com or visit http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~wildenbe/grrs/russell_poster.html.


Solution to *Rustlings* Puzzle, May 2003

"Ethics differs from science in the fact that its fundamental data are feelings and emotions, not percepts."

Bertrand Russell, in *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

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THE LETTERS AND LOGIC ISSUE

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EDITORS: Rosalind Carey and John Ongley.
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Ray Perkins Jr

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SINGLE ISSUES may be obtained for \$5 by sending check or money order to Dennis Darland. BACK ISSUES are also \$5 each. For availability of current and back issues query: Tom Stanley, BRS Librarian, at: tom.stanley@valley.net.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work, and writings of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY:
Board Chair: David White
President: Alan Schwerin
Vice President: Ray Perkins Jr.
Secretary: Chad Trainer
Treasurer: Dennis J. Darland

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY HOMEPAGE may be viewed at: <http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

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THE LETTERS AND LOGIC ISSUE

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On the Cover: Gottlob Frege (1848-1925).

IT'S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP TO THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

All BRS regular memberships expire at the end of the year. So if you haven't renewed your membership, now is the time to do it! Just fill out the membership form in the center of this issue, and send it, with a check or money order payable to *The Bertrand Russell Society*, to the BRS Treasurer: Dennis Darland, 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL 61201-2837, USA.

You can now also pay by credit card, using PayPal on the web. Just go to the PayPal website at <http://www.paypal.com> and open a free account. Then, when PayPal prompts you for the recipient's email address, have your dues sent to Dennis at: brs-pp@qconline.com. Be sure to state the purpose of the payment – membership renewal – in the email message that accompanies this payment to the BRS from PayPal. Do not include your credit card information in this message, but do include any changes in your name or address. Dennis will send you an email receipt and update your account accordingly.

To determine if you need to renew, just check the mailing label on this issue. It will have one of the following 4-digit numbers on it:

2003 means that you are paid up through this year, but need to renew for 2004;

2004 means that you have already renewed for 2004, and so are set for the coming year;

7777, 8888, or 9999 mean that you are a Life Member, Honorary Member, or receiving the BRSQ as a courtesy, and that you do not need to renew.

If you have any questions about your membership, please feel free to contact Dennis at: djdarland@qconline.com.

IN THIS ISSUE

In 1988, an old file in the storeroom of a Viennese real-estate dealer was found to contain a number of letters written to Ludwig Wittgenstein. Among them were some written to Wittgenstein by Gottlob Frege. The letters from Frege to Wittgenstein were published in German the following year, and since then, various extracts from them have been published here and there in English. In this issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, new English translations of the four most philosophically interesting of these letters are published in full. They concern Frege's comments to Wittgenstein on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Richard Schmitt, the translator, provides an introduction to the letters that includes detailed bibliographic information clearing up many murky references to them that have occurred in earlier standard works on Wittgenstein. The letters themselves are stunning in the acuteness and sheer mental power that Frege displays in them. It is a pleasure to have a translation that brings these characters back to life for us with such force and vividness.

Letters of a different kind will be a regular feature in the *Quarterly* beginning with this issue, namely, Russell's urgent letters to the world in the form of his numerous and famous Letters to the Editor. In this issue, we see one of Russell's early letters on the subject of Israel's relations to the Arab world. Ray Perkins, the general editor of this series, provides an introduction to the letter, giving the general background to its creation.

Did Russell have a modal logic? In a previous issue of the *Quarterly* (February 2003) Dan Kervick reviewed Jan Dejnozka's controversial book, *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance*, in which Dejnozka argues in the affirmative. In his review of the book, Kervick raised some questions about the thesis and expressed some doubts about it. The subject returns in this issue with Dejnozka's reply to Kervick's review. It is not clear that we have yet gotten to the bottom of the matter, so the issue may return to these pages in future issues.

Kevin Klement reviews an anthology of selections from Frege and Russell on *Logicism and the Philosophy of Language*, and along the way, provides us with some insight into the nature of logic itself. We hope the reader will take some time to look over this interesting review.

SOCIETY NEWS

REMINISCENCE OF A SYMPHONY PERFORMANCE. In the last issue of the *Quarterly*, KEN BLACKWELL and TOM STANLEY related the story of how British composer GRAHAM WHETTAM had dedicated his 4th symphony, *Sinfonia Contra Timore* "to BERTRAND RUSSELL and all other persons who suffer imprisonment and other injustice for the expression of their beliefs or the convenience of politicians and bureaucracies." This dedication had apparently kept the symphony off the BBC until protests by Russell and other public figures got it performed on that network. ROBERT DAVIS, one of the original founders of the BRS and Society President from 1975-82, writes to tell us more about the symphony, as well as to correct some mistaken rumors about his health:

Regarding the note in Issue 119 of Graham Whettam and his symphony #4 dedicated to Russell: we played this for members interested in hearing it at the 1978 Annual Meeting. I had learned of it and the troubles getting it aired on the BBC and contacted Whettam. I met with him on one of my visits to Britain and he gave us a master tape. WARREN SMITH, at the time a recording mogul with his own studio, transcribed it to a tape and we played it at a lunch for those interested. It has no direct connection to Russell other than the dedication. It was a very "modern" piece, very dissonant. I usually loathe that sort of thing but I found it "interesting" none the less. DON JACKANICZ, with a more sophisticated if masochistic taste in modern music, liked it. Unfortunately no one else did and I had people complain I had subjected them to it even though it was an entirely volunteer experience. In a 1978 letter to me when he sent the tape Warren stated that he was keeping the master until directed to send it to either the BRS Library or the Archives. I assume we did so and probably to the Archives which is where I think it belongs. Ken Blackwell or Tom Stanley may know. After 25 years, it may be of interest to be played at a meeting again.

On a completely unrelated matter I wish to report my health is OK. Shortly after the Annual Meeting, DENNIS DARLAND called to check on me. Someone had told him at the meeting that I had cancer. I do not. The confusion probably stems from the fact that I had a spinal tumor and many people assume all tumors

are cancerous. The tumor almost made me a quadriplegic; almost killed me. I was under the knife for 8 hours – with LIZ TAYLOR's surgeon, "he gets the tough ones" – in March 2001. Then 8 days in intensive care and then another week in the rehabilitation center AKA the "Snake Pit". I'm OK now but in a certain sense still recovering after 30 months in that I still make occasional gains in energy and stamina which have been curtailed by the operation."

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HEAVEN AND HELL. Also in the last *Quarterly*, PETER STONE reminded us of LEO ROSTEN's interview of Russell concerning Russell's agnosticism. Rosten asked Russell what he would think if, upon dying, he found himself in Heaven and before The Lord. ANTHONY FLEW writes and asks why Rosten wondered about Russell finding himself in Heaven, for "surely any old-fashioned Jew, Christian or Muslim would expect Russell, like the rest of us, to find ourselves in *Hell*." Flew also writes to suggest that a letter from him published in the last *Quarterly* was misprinted. The original letter has gone missing, and the editors are still struggling to come to grips with all the details of this typographical mystery, but this much is clear: In his May 2003 editorial, Peter quoted Russell's famous statement that "it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing that it is true." Peter then went on to elaborate on this doctrine by explaining: "when talking about unicorns, minotaurs, or compassionate conservatives, one does not normally have to prove their non-existence; the mere lack of any evidence is sufficient reason not to believe in any of them." Flew then wrote to point out that in more than thirty years experience as one, he has not observed his fellow Conservatives to be conspicuously less compassionate than members of other parties. We think that even in its first form, Flew made his point with his usual incisiveness.

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MORE FLEW NEWS. On the 50th anniversary of the famous 1948 Copleston-Russell debate concerning the existence of God, William Craig and Anthony Flew met in Madison, Wisconsin to publicly debate the issue anew. That anniversary debate is now being published by Ashgate in a volume entitled *Does God Exist: The Craig-Flew Debate*, edited by Stan Wallace. The volume, as well as containing the edited transcript of the debate, also contains chapters critiquing the debate and discussing the

issues raised by it. The volume is to appear in 2004. The original Copleston-Russell debate, as well as occurring in the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* (v. 11), has been published in the British, but not the American edition of *Why I Am Not a Christian* (the U.S. Jesuits would not give Father Copleston permission to publish it here), *Bertrand Russell on God and Religion* (1986), and numerous student anthologies.

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RE-ORIENTALISM. New York City ROUÉ and BRS Founding Member WARREN ALLEN SMITH sends us this report on two Honorary Members of the BRS. TASLIMA NASRIN, he tells us, is now a Guest Researcher at Harvard's JFK School of Government, using the University's libraries to research such subjects as patriarchy, Islamism, and rationalism. Nasrin is also featured in a new documentary film *Fearless: Stories from Asian Women—The Price of Freedom*, which had its U.S. premiere Friday, October 17th at the 7th Annual Hollywood Film Festival. Her new webpage is at : <http://taslimanasrin.com>. And BRS Honorary Member IBN WARRAQ had an article on the editorial page of *The Wall Street Journal* (Monday, September 29, 2003), in which, following the recent death of Columbia University's EDWARD SAID, Warraq accused Said of "having practically invented the intellectual argument for Muslim rage." Warraq goes on to further criticize Said's classic work *Orientalism*, in which Said first made the arguments to which Warraq takes exception.

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SUPPORT THE SOCIETY – ATTEND THE APA! There will of course be a Russell Society session again this year at the Eastern Division Meeting of the AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. Please be sure and attend if you can. This year, the Eastern APA is meeting in Washington D.C., December 27-30, at the Washington Hilton and Towers. The BRS session will be on Sunday, December 28, from 9-11 am. Speakers there will be SORIN COSTREIE (University of Western Ontario) speaking on 'The Epistemological Difficulty of Russell's Theory of Denoting Concepts', with KEVIN KLEMENT (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) giving the commentary, and DEREK H. BROWN speaking on 'Russell on Appearance, Reality, and Color', with JUSTIN LEIBER (University of Houston) giving the commentary. Derek Brown will chair the session.

Also at this year's Eastern APA will be a Colloquium on Russell and Frege. This will be on Tuesday, December 30, from 11:15 to 1:15. The first speaker, at 11:15, will be MATTHEW MCKEON (University of

Massachusetts-Amherst) speaking on 'Russell and Logical Ontology', with EDGAR BOEDEKER (University of Northern Iowa) giving the commentary, and at 12:15, JOONOL KIM (University of Notre Dame) speaks on 'Are Numbers Objects? Part II', with CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK (Purdue University) giving the commentary. KEVIN KLEMENT will chair the first session and STEVE GERRARD the second.

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ANNUAL MEETING NEWS!

THE 2004 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY will be hosted by long-time BRS member RAY PERKINS JR and Plymouth State University. Ray is preparing a website with information about the conference. Questions about the conference concerning housing, food, travel, etc. can be directed to Ray at: perkrk@earthlink.net. Details of the conference will be included in the next *Quarterly*, posted at the conference website, and announced on the BRS-LIST in the near future. We hope that everyone will attend this meeting in the beautiful hill and lake region of New Hampshire.

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CALL FOR PAPERS: Paper proposals for the next Annual Meeting can be sent to BRS President ALAN SCHWERIN at: aschweri@monmouth.edu. The deadline for submissions is one month before the Annual Meeting. (The date of the AM has not yet been determined.) Talks should be about 20 minutes in length. There are no subject limitations other than the need to deal with issues that relate to Russell's life and thought. Further details for submissions will be posted soon at the meeting website, the BRS website, and on the BRS-LIST.

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BRS BOARD ELECTIONS – BE SURE TO VOTE!

VOTING HAS BEEN SIMPLIFIED this year – you have eight votes to cast and seven candidates to choose from. You can't go wrong! Originally, there had been eight nominees, but LAURIE ENDICOTT THOMAS withdrew her nomination, as she has not been feeling well for a while, and was not sure that she would be able to serve if elected. However, she reports that she has been feeling much better recently due to a new treatment she has been trying. We hope that she continues to improve and that we will see her at the 2004 Annual Meeting this summer in New Hampshire.

To continue with election news, those desiring a more competitive race may write-in for candidates who are members of the

BRS in good standing. KEN BLACKWELL has proposed DAVID BLITZ, a research fellow at the Russell Archives at McMaster who is on leave this year from Central Connecticut State, as a write-in candidate. David has agreed to serve if elected. His biography is listed below with those of the regular nominees. Other write-in candidates are similarly acceptable.

Ballots are located in the center of this issue. Please return them to TOM STANLEY, Box 434, Wilder, VT 05080 USA or email your vote to Tom at tom.stanley@valley.net. Tom is this year's election committee. Each member of a couple with joint membership is entitled to vote. All ballots must include the name and (in the case of written ballots) the signature of the member voting, and must be received by December 31, 2003.

The nominees for the 2004-2006 term of the BRS Board of Directors are: *KENNETH BLACKWELL* (nominated by Chad Trainer), *DENNIS DARLAND* (nominated by Chad Trainer), *DAVID HENEHAN* (nominated by Warren Allen Smith), *STEPHEN REINHARDT* (nominated by Chad Trainer), *DAVID WHITE* (nominated by Chad Trainer), *TOM STANLEY* (nominated by Peter Stone), *JOHN LENZ* (nominated by Peter Stone).

BOARD CANDIDATE BIOGRAPHIES AND STATEMENTS:

KENNETH BLACKWELL, a founding member of the BRS, has served as Chairman of the Board of Directors and has hosted several Annual Meetings of the Society at McMaster University. He edits the academic journal *Russell*.

DENNIS DARLAND graduated from Augustana College with a B.A. in mathematics, physics, and philosophy. Since then, he has spent most of his life as a software engineer, and has independently pursued the academic subjects he studied at Augustana. In philosophy, he is particularly interested Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, Whitehead, and Dennett. He has served both as Board member and as Society Treasurer for many years.

DAVID HENEHAN has been a practicing lawyer for over 36 years. A graduate of Hamilton College and Cornell Law School, he thinks it is important for the Board of Directors to consist not only of academics but other interested persons with business experience. He further believes that lawyers are uniquely qualified to serve on non-profit boards. He has been a BR admirer and member of the BR Society for many years and has attended many annual meetings. He is a longstanding member of the BR

currently serves on the Center for Inquiry, Inc. and its affiliated corporate boards as well as on a local Rotary handicapped children's camp board. In the past, when he was a Unitarian-Universalist, he served the First Unitarian Church of Rochester as a board member, Vice President, and President. He would be honored to serve if elected.

JOHN LENZ is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Classics at Drew University in Madison, NJ. A former President of the BRS (1995-99), host of the 1996 Annual Meeting, presenter of papers and author of a little article in *Russell*, he has been an officer or board member since 1984. He is currently the webmaster of the BRS webpage, but is in the process of turning this over to someone else. Although he would be willing to serve, he also welcomes new blood.

STEVE REINHARDT is the only BRS member to have attended every Annual Meeting to date. He is retired from the legal staff of Dupont. He is a long time Board member, and has served as Treasurer and on the Society's Bylaws Revision Committee.

TOM STANLEY has been the Society librarian since 1984, and a director since 1985. He and his wife operate *Stanley Books*, specializing in the fine arts.

DAVID WHITE holds a PhD in philosophy from Cornell University and has been teaching philosophy at St. John Fisher College in Rochester for twenty-five years. He has been reading *Russell* since the fall of 1966, is a founding member of the Greater Rochester *Russell* Set, has served as an editor of the BRS *Quarterly*, and is now Chair of the BRS Board. Most recently, he did a promotion of the BRS at the World Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul, and over the past few years, he has organized sessions on *Russell* for the American Philosophical Association. White was the "cover-boy" for the August 2003 issue of the BRSQ.

DAVID BLITZ, whose name has been put forward by Ken Blackwell as a proposed write-in candidate and who has agreed to serve if elected, is a Philosophy Professor at Central Connecticut State University who focuses on *Russell's* views on war and peace. He is also editor of volume 30 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*. He is currently on sabbatical leave at the Russell Research Centre and Archives at McMaster University.

THE *QUARTERLY'S* EDITORIAL OFFICE MOVES TO NYC. After two and a half years of service, PETER STONE has stepped down as editor of the BRS *Quarterly* in order to accept a teaching position at Stanford and concentrate on research. The new editors are Rosalind Carey and John Ongley, and the new address for the editorial office, located at Lehman College-CUNY in the Bronx, is at the front of this issue of the *Quarterly*. The Bertrand Russell Society wishes to thank Peter for the excellent service he provided the Society for so long as editor of the *Quarterly* and to wish him much luck and happiness in California. The Society also wishes to thank Peter's Rochester crew – PHIL EBERSOLE, TIM MADIGAN, RACHEL MURRAY, DAVID WHITE, and ALAN BONE – for the able work they did for so long in assisting Peter with the *Quarterly*. The new editors especially want to thank Peter and David White for all the help they gave with the transition of the *Quarterly's* editorship.

FEATURES

RUSSELL ON THE ISRAELI / PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Selected, and with an Introduction by RAY PERKINS JR

What follows is a previously unpublished letter to the editor by Bertrand Russell. It was written for publication in *The New Outlook*, but either was never sent to that journal, or else was sent but never published by them.

The New Outlook, known simply as *The Outlook* before 1932, is a left of center Israeli publication which has been around since 1902. At the time of Russell's writing, the Arabs and the Israelis were between wars – between the 1956 Arab-Israeli war and the six day war of 1967 by which Israel underwent significant de facto territorial expansion. Israel's population was growing fast during this period, and the Arab territorial "conviction", referred to by Russell, would prove true in the wake of the '67 war. Russell identifies the (Palestinian) resettlement problem as central to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he recommends a remedy which, as he says, would require a "magnanimous gesture" on the part of Israel. Of course, Israel has long been sensitive about the "demographics problem", and it's no surprise that Russell's proposal would fall on deaf ears. But some, like this editor, might say that had the sort of suggestion made by Russell been accepted by Israel in 1963, the coming war – and all the problems of the "occupied territories" which that war has engendered – could have been avoided.

Russell's writings on Palestine and the Middle East are relatively thin compared to his main points of public focus in the 50s and 60s, viz. nuclear weapons and the war in Vietnam. But his basic position was clear. Regarding the creation of the State of Israel he wrote on June 15, 1960: "I think it was a mistake to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, but it would be a still greater mistake to try to get rid of it now that it exists."¹ On the 1956 Suez War, he wrote in the same letter: "I thought the Suez War a blunder and a crime, and said so publicly at the time."² His views on the 1967 war and its aftermath are recorded in his last public

¹ B. Feinberg and R. Kasils, eds. *Dear Bertrand Russell...* (Houghton-Mifflin, 1969), p. 48

² *Ibid.* See also Russell's public letters at the time in my *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell* (Open Court, 2002). pp. 248-51

document written a month before his death.³ In it he agrees with I.F. Stone's description of the Palestinian refugee issue as "the moral millstone around the neck of world Jewry." And he concludes that "Justice requires that the first step towards a settlement must be an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in June, 1967." RP

The New Outlook, Karl Netter 8, Tel Aviv, Israel, (4th February, 1963)

Dear Sirs,

I am very grateful to you for your kind cable and I am greatly encouraged by the efforts you make to bring about friendship between Israel and the Arab World.

I consider the main difficulties to consist of the disposition of the refugees and of the Arab conviction that Israel cannot absorb its expanding population without expanding its boundaries. It seems to me that if Israel were to make a magnanimous gesture, which might take the shape of agreeing to accept the return of all Arabs who have left Israel and to finance the re-settlement of all those refugees who did not wish to return – then it might be possible to have serious talks with Arab Governments, which could lead to the normalisation of relationships. A further point would be a non-aggression pact, guaranteeing that Israel accepts her present boundaries to be final.

I am writing in this way, because I believe that the Arabs feel themselves to have been fundamentally wronged and are, therefore, not able to take the initiative. It is in Israel's fundamental interest quickly to settle her dispute with the Arab world. It is, therefore, for Israel to make several generous steps which would remove the major source of grievance without endangering the basic Israeli requirement of acceptance.

I accept the honour you do me in identifying yourselves with my remarks in your recent Symposium. Please keep me informed of your efforts.

With good wishes,
Yours sincerely,

Bertrand Russell

³ See *Yours Faithfully*, pp. 411-12.

RUSSELL ON MODALITY: A REPLY TO KERVICK

JAN DEJNOŽKA

Dan Kervick, in his review of my *Bertrand Russell on Modality and Logical Relevance*, finds the book “confusing and difficult.” For example, Kervick says, “At times, Dejnožka seems to suggest only that Russell has an implicit modal logic. In other passages it is asserted that the modal logic is explicit” (Kervick 2003: 31). However, I indicate many times in the book that the logics are implicit (my 1999: 16, 17, 61 twice, 62, 66, 96), and there is an entire chapter devoted to paraphrasing Russell’s modal texts into implicit logics. I found it otiose to add “implicit” every time I wrote “logic.” Besides, it is obvious that Russell never expressly states any modal logics. I never thought anyone would think otherwise. Take it from me, I am talking about implicit modal logics.

Kervick does not understand what I mean when I say Russell rejects modal entities and modal notions, yet “functionally” has a modal logic – a logic which “behaves as if it were” based on modal entities or modal notions, which “simulates” a modal logic which is based on modal entities or modal notions (Kervick 2003: 30).

The idea is simple, and it is Russell’s. I am finding implicit in Russell logical analyses of the same sort that Russell is always doing. Namely, Russell finds that often, “supposed entities can be *replaced* by purely logical structures [which] *substitute* [for the supposed entities] without altering [the truth-value] of the ... propositions in question” (Russell 1971: 326, my emphasis). The two most famous examples in Russell are his definition of numbers as classes of classes in *Principia Mathematica*, and his logical analysis eliminating definite descriptions in “On Denoting.”

Russell’s greatest achievement was to develop a logic which “functions” as, “substitutes” for, or “replaces,” mathematics. He analyzes all arithmetical expressions away, and uses logical expressions in their place. No arithmetical entities are assumed, and no arithmetical notions are involved. Arithmetical entities and notions are eliminated across the board. Yet Russell can say and do everything in his logic that arithmeticians can say and do in arithmetic. This is just how I describe Russell as analyzing all modal expressions away and using quantificational

expressions in their place (my 1999: 2). Russell does not alter truth-values in modal logic when he rejects modal entities any more than he alters truth-values in arithmetic when he rejects numbers. He expressly preserves arithmetic, and if my formalization is right, he implicitly preserves modal logic, though I believe this is “surely unintentional on Russell’s part” (my 1999: 97).

Kervick says that I seem “to be aware” that the concept of logical necessity and the concept of analyticity are “quite definitely” different for Russell (Kervick 2003: 36-37). “Yet,” he proclaims, “there is a surprise in store when Dejnožka turns [to define the implicit necessity operator of implicit FG–MDL]. For FG–MDL, it turns out, is based on reading “it is necessary that P” as *it is analytically true that A*” (Kervick 2003: 37, Kervick’s emphasis).

The eliminative analysis of necessity as analyticity is Russell’s (1994: 519), not mine. And once again, his idea is simple. Far from being a problem, such a difference is a necessary requirement of a successful logical analysis. For a logical analysis to be significant (informative), the analysans and analysandum must differ in connotative meaning; otherwise the analysis would be circular. In Russellian analysis, the sense in which they must be the same is extensional *salva veritate*, and the sense in which they must differ (prior to defining) is intensional. This is known as the paradox of analysis.

Imagine noting that the concept of a number and the concept of a class are “quite definitely” different for Russell, and then proclaiming “Yet there is a surprise in store when Russell comes to define number. For *Principia*, it turns out, is based on reading ‘number’ as *class of classes!*”

Kervick asks, “And what does the previously unrecognized Russellian modal logic look like? Where is it formalized, and what is the result? What are its theorems and its fundamental principles?” (Kervick 2003: 30). “But Dejnožka never presents this formalization” (Kervick 2003: 31).

I state the formalization three times in chapter 6:

- S1. $P \rightarrow \Diamond P$
- S2. $\Diamond(P \ \& \ Q) \rightarrow \Diamond P$
- S3. $(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond Q)$
- S4. $\Diamond \Diamond P \rightarrow \Diamond P$
- S5. $\Diamond P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond P$

I state it three times so as to cover seven implicit modal logics – three alethic, one causal, one epistemic, and two deontic. I state that all seven implicit logics have the same S5 formalization, and differ only as to interpretation of the modal operators (my 1999: 80). And I carefully discuss the paraphrase of Russell into each implicit logic one formal axiom at a time.

Kervick also says, “There also appears to be some confusion between modal logics and modal languages.... [T]he appropriate medium for paraphrases of Russell’s thinking would presumably be some sort of fully interpreted language, rather than a logic” (Kervick 2003: 31). Not at all. I say “logic” more times than I would care to count—thirty-six times in chapter 6 alone. Nor are the logics lacking an interpretation. Strictly speaking, describing Russell’s implicit interpretation is not necessary to my task of showing an S5 logic implicit in Russell. But I also describe Russell’s intended model for his quantified logic twice (my 1999: 72, 101).

Kervick goes on to observe that everyone uses casual modal language, even, say, the Marx Brothers, and that it would be otiose to delineate whatever modal logic might be implicit in the casual modal talk of the Marx Brothers (Kervick 2003: 32). This is disingenuous. I am paraphrasing a great logician’s technical theories concerning philosophical topics of modality, including several expressly stated semi-formal logical analyses, not the comedy routines of a vaudeville act.

Kervick says that modalities in MDL are not “relative to” specific variables (my term is “with respect to”), but apply non-relatively or *simpliciter* to entire propositional functions (Kervick 2003: 34). He says our interpretations of MDL are “significantly different” (Kervick 2003: 34), but does not explain why.

In fact Kervick’s interpretation of MDL is definable in terms of mine. For a propositional function is MDL-necessary *simpliciter* just in case it is MDL-necessary with respect to every specific variable it contains. But still my interpretation of MDL is the correct one. Russell describes MDL possibility as follows:

When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of ‘existence’. You may express it by saying that there is at least one value *of x for which* that propositional function is true. Take ‘x is a man’, there is at least one value *of x for which* this is true. That is what one means by

saying that 'There are men', or that 'Men exist'. (Russell 1971: 232, my emphasis)

Note that where I say "with respect to x ", Russell twice says "of x for which". This is a "smoking gun" text showing that MDL-possibility always binds a specific variable. The text is semi-formal and is thus more perspicuous than the casual talk of "any propositional function" in the same passage. Kervick's repeated reliance on casual language is not a good idea for reading Russell. Russell is not an ordinary language philosopher, and what counts is how he formalizes things. Obviously, Russell would formalize this text as existential quantification, and as we know, the existential quantifier binds ("is relative to") specific variables.

Let us think about the implications of this famous text. The text states that existence and MDL-possibility are defined as being the very same notion, *not always false*. Thus existence and MDL-possibility are interchangeable *salva veritate*, even *salva analyticitate*. Thus Kervick's account implies that existence is predicated of propositional functions as *simpliciter* as MDL-possibility is. And that is absurd. The heart of the Frege-Russell logical revolution, multiple nested quantifiers, would be destroyed. And all the subtlety of MDL as I interpret it would be correspondingly lost, since the corresponding multiply nested modal operators would be destroyed.

Many modal statements are not even expressible on Kervick's interpretation of MDL. For example, "Logical analysis is endless," i.e., "Everything is a logical constituent of something", or " $(\forall x)(\exists y)Cxy$ " (compare Russell 1971: 202). On my account of MDL, this is synonymous with " $(\Box x)(\Diamond y)Cxy$ ", but in Kervick-MDL, it is unwritable. Due to Russell's repeated identification of existence and MDL-possibility as the same "fundamental logical idea" (Russell 1971: 232; 254), Kervick cannot even write " $(\forall x)(\exists y)Cxy$ "!

We may now distinguish four logical stages. Stage 1 is my version of MDL, on which a propositional function is necessary with respect to a variable it contains if it is always true with respect to that variable. This stage is faithful to Russell's equation of possibility with existence, and of necessity with universality, since his existential and universal quantifiers are applied with respect to, i.e., *bind*, specific variables.

Stage 2 is Kervick's version of MDL, on which a propositional function is necessary *simpliciter* if and only if it is always true with

respect to every variable it contains. The previous sentence defines stage 2 in terms of stage 1, thus showing how to get along without stage 2, the only stage Russell never expressly defines.

Stage 3 is Russell's definition in "Necessity and Possibility" and "On the Notion of a Cause" of a proposition as necessary with respect to a determinate constituent if, when we replace that determinate constituent with a variable, the resulting propositional function is always true. Stage 3 is definable in terms of either stage 1 or stage 2; in fact, the previous sentence states the definition, which may be taken either in Kervick's way or mine.

Stage 4 is Russell's analysis of a necessary proposition as analytic, where "Analytic propositions have the property that they are necessary *with respect to* all of their constituents except such as are what I call logical constants" (1994: 519, my emphasis). Clearly, stage 4 is definable in terms of any of the preceding stages. Thus all four stages are distinct only in reason.

We may also speak of a mix-and-match matrix. Stages 1 and 2 apply to propositional functions, while stages 3 and 4 apply to propositions. Stages 1 and 3 make modalities "relative to" specific variables or determinate constituents, while stages 2 and 4 do not.

Kervick calls MDL, or associates MDL with, my "second account of Russell's modal logic," my "modality as quantification account" (Kervick 2003: 37). He then criticizes MDL because it applies, and is intended by Russell to apply, modal notions to propositional functions, not propositions, and thus does not study logical relationships among propositions prefixed by modal operators (Kervick 2003: 38). Folks, MDL is not a modal logic! I indicate that eight times (my 1999: ix, 3, 16, 62, 80, 96, 194, 196). MDL is never on the list of seven modal logics (my 1999: 16, 80). "MDL is not the modal logic" (my 1999: 196), but the "basic element" (my 1999: 16), the "building block" (my 1999: 96, 194), the "stepping-stone" (my 1999: 3). MDL is stage 1. Only stage 4 is a modal logic, the early alethic FG-MDL. Kervick claims I give two accounts of FG-MDL, one analytic and one MDL-quantificational. But FG-MDL-analyticity is just what is definable (eliminable) in terms of MDL quantificational notions. This is just how FG-MDL functions as a modal logic without using modal notions. There is no second account.

Russell describes and rejects stages 1 (MDL), 3, and 4 (FG-MDL) in his landmark early paper, "Necessity and Possibility," ca.

1903-1905. In that paper, Russell finds that no one theory captures all our modal intuitions, and concludes that the topic of modality ought to be banished from logic (my 1999: 112; see 6). But if we stop there, we miss the big picture. Russell basically banishes modal entities and notions from then on. But the banishment of the topic ends the very next year when Russell accepts eliminative logical analysis MDL as his own theory of modality. Russell accepts MDL in eight published works from 1906 to 1940, a period of thirty-six years. Russell evidently accepts MDL from 1906 to the end of his life. And FG-MDL is definable in terms of MDL according to Russell's own definition of "analytic" in "Necessity and Possibility." Thus Russell implicitly accepts FG-MDL from 1906 until 1914, when he implicitly modifies FG-MDL into FG-MDL* by adding the requirement of truth in virtue of logical form (my 1999: 8). Thus Russell implicitly holds mature logic FG-MDL* from 1914 to the end of his life, a period of fifty-six years. That is the big story of the tenth of the book Kervick reviewed. The FG-MDL* necessity operator is implicitly the *Principia* thesis assertion sign, construed as iterable; and so is the relevance logic entailment operator, implied by Russell's repeatedly stated whole-part "containment" theory of logical deduction, which Anderson-Belnap overlook.

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BOOK REVIEW

FREGE AND RUSSELL ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE

KEVIN C. KLEMENT

Review of *Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell*, Arthur Sullivan, ed. Toronto: Broadview Press, 2003. 298 pp. \$24.95 paperback.

This new anthology brings together 15 pieces by the most prominent defenders of logicism: Russell, and his German predecessor Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). Logicism is the position in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical truth is a species of logical truth. According to logicists, when properly analyzed, the truths of mathematics reveal themselves to be expressible in the vocabulary of logic alone, and deducible from purely logical premises. This position dates back to the 17th century, and was first championed by Leibniz, but prior to the late 19th century, the study of logic had not advanced sufficiently for this thesis to be fully tested. Frege, one of the chief innovators in the turn-of-the-century advance in logic, was the first to develop a thoroughly axiomatic calculus for logic. Therein, he hoped to show that the truths of arithmetic could be proved using axioms of logic alone. Working independently, Russell developed views remarkably similar to Frege's, and although Russell later discovered problems with Frege's logical system, he went on to develop his own extensive attempt to reduce mathematics to logic.

Their works during the years 1879-1925 not only represent contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics, but as the title of the anthology suggests, have also had a considerable impact on the philosophy of language. Building upon what they had learned in developing their logical calculi and attempting to analyze the statements of arithmetic therein, both Frege and Russell faulted traditional Aristotelian logic for taking the subject/predicate analysis of grammar as a guide in understanding logical form. Frege went on to argue for a sense/reference dualism in meaning, and for analyzing all language in terms of the notions of function and argument typically only applied to

mathematical formulae. Although he rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, Russell too argued that the apparent grammatical form of statements was systematically misleading about logical form. For instance, with his influential Theory of Descriptions, Russell argued that statements of the form "the so-and-so is such-and-such" must actually be analyzed as complicated existentially quantified propositions.

The anthology contains nine works by Frege. They include firstly an excerpt from his 1879 classic *Conceptual Notation*, in which Frege first presented his logical system, followed by two additional papers from the early 1880s in which he informally explains the advantages to his function calculus over rival systems. The next item is the introduction to Frege's 1884 *Foundations of Arithmetic*, in which he lays out some methodological principles used in his philosophy of mathematics. Next, the anthology includes three pieces from the early 1890s, together considered to be Frege's most important contributions to metaphysics and philosophy of language: "Function and Concept," "On Concept and Object," and "On Sense and Reference." Here Frege describes his function/argument analysis of both natural and logical languages, and describes his views on meaning. The last two pieces by Frege are 1904's "What is a Function?," in which he clarifies his understanding of the nature of functions, and highlights some misunderstandings in the work of some of his contemporaries, and 1919's "The Thought", in which Frege discusses his views on the nature of truth, and argues for a "third realm" of abstract senses and thoughts, distinct from both the physical and the mental realms.

The anthology only contains six works by Russell. First is the 1901 essay "Mathematics and the Metaphysicians," in which he describes how recent work by mathematicians has helped to solve some longstanding philosophical puzzles about the nature of number and infinity. Next is the classic 1905 paper "On Denoting," in which Russell first outlined the theory of descriptions and argued against the rival positions of Frege and Meinong. This is followed by the 1911 essay, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," which describes some epistemological and other philosophical developments related to the theory of descriptions. The next entry is a chapter entitled "Logic and the Essence of Philosophy," taken from 1914's *Our Knowledge of the External World*, in which Russell explains how past misunderstandings in logical analysis have led to philosophical

mistakes. The final two contributions are from Russell's 1919 *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*: first, the chapter on descriptions, and second, the final chapter in which Russell explores some still undecided questions about the nature of logic itself.

Although all the works in the anthology have been published before, and most are readily available elsewhere, the anthology is the first of its kind to focus exclusively on the works on Frege and Russell together, and therefore may serve to partly fill a void in instructional materials for courses dedicated to these figures. Depending on one's purposes, however, it would very likely need supplementation. For undergraduate students, together these 15 works would serve as a good introduction to Frege's and Russell's views on logical analysis and the philosophy of language. When it comes to logicism itself, they contain very little information about the details of their views on the nature of numbers, or their methodology for reducing mathematics to logic. In fact, many of the works included are polemical pieces in which they attempt to convince readers to read their other works, and/or compare their merits with those of others. At least some familiarity with the details of their programs beyond what the anthology contains would be necessary to draw any *informed* conclusions about the virtues and/or shortcomings of logicism. For beginners, it could be supplemented with relatively informal full-length treatments such as (the remainders of) Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* and Russell's *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. For advanced students interested in the details of their logical systems, the difficulties they faced (such as Russell's paradox of sets), their methods of overcoming them (e.g., Russell's Theory of Types), and the details of their logicist arguments, one would need to turn to more technical writings such as Frege's *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, Russell's "Mathematical Logic As Based on the Theory of Types," or Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. Unfortunately, nothing from these technical writings is contained in the collection.

The anthology also includes a 75-page introduction by the editor, which aims to provide an overview to the historical background of their writings, their main philosophical positions and points of disagreement. While the introduction may be helpful to many students, and does a particularly good job at discussing some of the shortcomings of pre-Fregean logic, a number of cautionary notes are in order.

Firstly, certain of the views of Frege, Russell and others are

oversimplified. For example, the naïveté of early modern philosophers with regard to philosophical logic is exaggerated; Kant is given too large a place, and also portrayed much more psychologically than he in fact was. Both Russell's and Frege's views on the nature of logic as an *a priori* science are distorted, and too closely tied to "inference". The changes in the views of Frege and Russell over time are not mentioned or clarified. For example, both Russell's early metaphysics of propositions and his later fact-based theory are discussed at different points, but it is not mentioned that these views are incompatible, and that, historically, one was succeeded by the other.

A number of the issues discussed in the introduction are presented somewhat sloppily. Distinctions between linguistic items and their meanings are often not kept straight, especially in the discussion of Frege's views on the nature of functions. A logical form is defined as a "sentence-schema", whereas both Russell and Frege took great pains to distinguish the logical forms of objective propositions and thoughts from anything linguistic. The editor often talks about such things as "the meaning of a proposition" or the "meaning of a concept," whereas propositions and concepts are not things *with* meanings; they themselves *are* the meanings.

On a number of points, the introduction gets the views of Frege, Russell, or both subtly wrong. For example, it makes such claims as that Frege's quantifiers are limited to a "contextually relevant domain", and that Russell believed that quantifiers are functions from predicates to truth-values, neither of which is true. The editor claims that Frege thought that logical operators were functions from "sentences to sentences", a claim Frege never made. (For Frege, logical connectives refer to functions, but it is doubtful that they themselves are functions.) He claims that both Russell's and Frege's logical systems were extensional, when in actuality only Frege's system is extensional by modern standards. The editor presents the Theory of Types as a hierarchy of different types of sets with different types of members; however, Russell's mature logic actually eschewed commitment to sets as entities altogether, and the Theory of Types was actually one of different ranges of significance for what Russell called "propositional functions", which Russell used to analyze away apparent commitment to classes or sets.

It also oddly claims that Russell, contra Kant, wanted to restore the "analyticity" of arithmetical claims, whereas Russell actually claimed

that *both* logic and mathematics were *synthetic a priori*. In the Introduction, the editor alleges that Frege's theory that senses exist in a third realm apart from the mental and physical is obscure, and not fully explained. However, he neglects to mention exactly what he finds lacking or unclear about Frege's position, and so the discussion comes off as nothing more than an uncharitable jab. The editor also insinuates that Russell never fully engaged with dualistic theories of meaning (those that draw a distinction between sense or meaning and reference or denotation), which is easily shown false by a study of his 1903-1905 manuscripts.

Finally, he wrongly claims that there is a consensus among experts that logicism has been refuted by Gödel's incompleteness results. Gödel showed that not all arithmetical truths can be captured in a single deductive system. While this shows that the Frege-Russell form of logicism was perhaps somewhat naively strong, it does not touch the core of logicism. Similar results show that not all higher-order logical truths can be captured in a single deductive system, so Gödel's results do not point the way to any difference between logical and mathematical truth.

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RUSSELL IN THE NEWS

In his review of COLIN MCGINN's new autobiography for *The New Statesman*, NICHOLAS FEARNs has this to say about McGinn and Russell. While an undergraduate in philosophy at Manchester University, McGinn, whose heroes at that time were JOHN LENNON and BERTRAND RUSSELL, began smoking Russell's favorite brand of pipe tobacco in the hopes that it would make him as brilliant as Russell. We find it hard to believe that McGinn actually thought that it was smoking a particular brand of pipe tobacco that made Russell brilliant, when everyone knows it was the RED HACKLE that did it.

Fearn's also says that McGinn was recently introduced to the film actress JENNIFER ANISTON at a HOLLYWOOD PARTY. Aniston was apparently quite impressed to meet a professional philosopher, but the encounter ended in embarrassment when she proved never to have heard of KANT, DESCARTES, or Russell. McGinn agonized for a long time over the "interpersonal discomfort" he had caused the poor multimillionaire movie star to suffer. – *New Statesman*, June 9, 2003

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The 53rd Annual PUGWASH CONFERENCE returned to Pugwash, Nova Scotia for the first time in 44 years this past July. The original Pugwash Conference had been called into being by the multimillionaire and Pugwash native son CYRUS EATON. Eaton had been impressed by the famous 1955 manifesto, signed by EINSTEIN, Russell, and others, that demanded that governments on both sides of the iron curtain renounce nuclear weapons, so he wrote to Russell offering to host and finance a conference on nuclear disarmament, and the famous 1957 Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs was born. Thirty-eight years later, it received the Nobel Peace Prize. By 1959, the annual conference had outgrown Pugwash and it moved on to bigger centers, although smaller workshops continued to be held there over the years. One of the original Pugwash participants, and last surviving signatory of the 1955 manifesto, JOSEPH ROTBLAT, attended the most recent Pugwash Conference. It was a bittersweet visit for him: "It's a bit lonely now" the 94 year-old Polish-born nuclear physicist said. Rotblat was the 1983 recipient of the BRS Annual Award. – *McCleans*, July, 2003.

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The Cold War CIA funding of the liberal anti-communist CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM has been gone over again by the press, this time in

the *New York Times*. CIA funding for the Congress was first disclosed in 1967, but a large amount of historical evidence recently made available allows for a more complete understanding of the events. British intellectuals were suspicious of the Congress from the start, and its founding conference – in West Berlin in 1950 – was constantly interrupted by interventions from Hugh Trevor-Roper and A.J. Ayer, who objected to the organizers' excessive anti-communism. Nevertheless, the Congress was soon a regular part of British intellectual life.

The author of the *Times* article, Hugh Wilford, asserts that Russell was one among "several eminent intellectuals who remained mistrustful of the CCF", and that he was "at the center of several embarrassing public rows about McCarthyism with the CCF's U.S. affiliate, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. This culminated in 1957 with his noisy resignation from one of the CCF's honorary chairs." Wilford also asserts that "most of the British intellectuals involved in the CCF's operations knew all along about the organization's links to the U.S. government."

Along with recent allegations by Timothy Garton Ash that Russell published three books (*Why Communism Must Fail*, *What is Freedom?*, and *What is Democracy?*) knowing that their publication was financed by the British Foreign Office, such allegations, however one might evaluate and interpret them, show a complexity to Cold War politics that was much more difficult, if not impossible, to discern while we were in its midst. – *Times Education Supplement*, July 4, 2003

~*~

In *The Spectator*, Paul Johnson's nostalgic complaint about "old-fashioned Englishmen" and pipe smoking has this to say about Russell: "In my *New Statesman* days in the Fifties, pipes were common among the intelligentsia, being seen as 'democratic'. Did not Uncle Joe smoke one? Bertrand Russell certainly did, adding another dimension to the compound aroma of sartorial fustiness, halitosis and cerebral dandruff he carried around with him. The most technological of the smokers was Ritchie Calder, appropriately our science correspondent. He assembled with other luminaries every Monday at 10:30 a. m. for our editorial conference. There were Dr Balogh and Barbara Castle, Professor Patrick Blackett, the defence expert ... and Gerald Gardiner, later lord chancellor, with others including Russell himself, though he was not often asked as Kingsley Martin, the editor, thought him 'too disruptive'."

– *The Spectator*, August 23, 2003

Traveler's Diary/Conference Report

In mid-August, I traveled to the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, held in the village of Kirchberg am Wechsel. The conference is held in the village grade school, noteworthy for the gym on its top floor – a large hall with peaked roof, floor-to-ceiling plate glass windows opening out onto the Alps, and bars, ladders, ropes, and rings for the children. It was in this room that we adults crowded for the plenary lectures (sweating in the European heat wave), while other, less notable speakers met in the smaller but cooler classrooms on the lower floors.

Kirchberg is neighbor to Trattenberg, the town in which Wittgenstein retired to teach school children, satisfied that he had cleaned up the problems of philosophy. Perhaps he taught them in a school not unlike that in Kirchberg; a bus trip to Trattenbach—which I missed—allows one to learn more. But Kirchberg itself was quite revealing: bread, butter, cheese, sausage (i.e. franks) and beer; a culturally ingrained Catholicism; a pronounced, lilting accent: it made sense of Wittgenstein to me (no pun intended), or at least why he would wish to retire there.

As for the conference itself, only about a sixth of the hundred papers presented during the week-long conference were devoted to Wittgenstein, the others addressing the general theme of the year, knowledge and belief. Patrick Suppes spoke on Bayesian Epistemology, Robert Audi on Philosophy of Religion, Crispin Wright on Skepticism, Certainty, Moore, and Wittgenstein, Hans-Johann Glock on Wittgenstein on Truth, and Michael Heller on whether the universe can explain itself! For the most part, I attended papers on Wittgenstein, many of them quite good, and to my relief, most of them in English. Two on the *Tractatus* that especially stood out were Danièle-Moyal-Sharrock's on nonsense and Maija Aalto's on sense and substance.

I was on a budget; the taxis from my *Gasthaus* high in the Alps to the valley and village of Kirchberg were expensive; the highlight of the trip for me was an early morning meal of bread and butter (like the lunch Wittgenstein is said to have eaten in his 40s, with chocolate), and a long hour and a half hike down breathtaking hills to the village and conference below. A summer slide (like a *luge*, but not one) winds down the mountain, and a summer lift (like a ski-lift, but not one) runs up it; walking down the mountain I would sometimes have day trippers passing above, their feet dangling only yards from my head. – Rosalind Carey

RUSTLINGS! - Three Russell-Related Word Puzzles

By Gerry Wildenberg

Numbers 1 and 2 comprise coded quotes in which each letter stands for another letter. (For example BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFFRYY, if O=B, R=E, et cetera.) In cipher number 2 word separations are disguised and punctuation removed. The grouping into 5 letter "words" is meant only to help readability and does not relate to the actual quote. These two quotes will be familiar to some Russellians; after solving them, try to identify the source.

Puzzle number 3 is not a substitution cipher. Instead, this quote has been permuted slightly by means of exchanging some of the letters with nearby letters. (For example, "The puzzle below" might be changed to: tuhepzlezelwo.) At the same time, spaces and punctuation have been removed!

1. YJI YV CAI UYNC WUZYFCPJCIHIUIJCN YV NGLLINN WJ
QILYUWJM P UPJ YV MIJWGN WN CY HIPFJ CAI PFC YV
RIJGJLWPCWYJ.

2. PUXNA NHRGW KNLLP WVXWJ VLLU BHRUR GWQEW
JWHRL VFNHR WVAGN HXKWV HRHUK UEWGR VHVJA
GUPVJ RNAAU PPWAR NUHUZ RWAGH NAVPR WEKJV HLECP
WJUZI FPPUX NJRNA NHZWE WHAW

3. OENOFHTEODDEFEFSTCOFMHEITPOATRNCWEHACHEICOHF
USAATTCHTSEOHSMIESFILTTAHWEETNDTMIOAIGNEORUW
NDOOGORLVIEFORUTBETONETEHPURPOESOFTOHERPEOPAE
SLTCIONS

RUSTLINGS! – SOLUTIONS TO LAST ISSUE'S PUZZLES

When we see an American film, we know beforehand that virtue will be rewarded, that crime will be shown not to pay, and that the heroine, always faultlessly dressed in spite of incredible tribulations, will emerge happily to lifelong bliss with the hero. – BR, 'Political and Cultural Influence of the U.S.A.', *The Listener*, December 8, 1949. Reprinted in *Bertrand Russell's America*, v. II, 1945-1970, edited by Feinberg and Casrils.

INSERTED into scanned documents 7/18/2015
by Dennis J. Darland (who scanned them)

Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process.
Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY INC.

3RD QUARTER TREASURER'S REPORT
CASH FLOW, 7/1/03 - 9/30/03*Category Description*

| | |
|---------------------|-----------|
| BALANCE 6/30/03 | 8,845.19 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contributions BRS | 230.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 230.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 187.36 |
| Renewals | 291.66 |
| TOTAL Dues | 479.02 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 709.02 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 13.50 |
| Meeting Expenses | 653.74 |
| Newsletter | 653.16 |
| Other Expenses | 5.00 |
| RUSSELL Subsidy | 2,601.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 3,926.40 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -3,926.40 |
| BALANCE, 9/30/03 | 5,627.81 |

Compiled 10/8/03 by Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer, djarland@qconline.com

GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET

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Open to the Public

2003-2004 PROGRAM

| | |
|-------------|---|
| November 13 | "Nice People" (by B. Russell) |
| December 12 | Lord John Russell |
| January 8 | Humor in Russell |
| February 12 | Problem of Continuity |
| March 11 | The Scientific Outlook |
| April 8 | Cheerful Pessimism |
| May 13 | Portraits of Russell from Memory: A Panel Discussion |
| June 10 | Defenders of God |
| July 8 | International War Crimes Tribunal |
| August 12 | Satan in the Suburbs |
| September 9 | Lady Ottoline |
| October 14 | D.H. Lawrence |
| November 12 | Why I Am Not a Christian |
| December 9 | Marriage and Morals |

All meetings are held at Daily Perks Coffee House, 389 Gregory Street, Rochester, NY, at 6:30 PM. (Note new meeting time.) For information call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184, email tmadigan@rochester.rr.com or visit http://sun1.sjfc.edu/~wildenbe/grrs/Russell_poster.html. All dates and topics are subject to change.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL
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THE ANALYTICAL RUSSELL

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, as well as essays and discussions pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

EDITORS: Rosalind Carey and John Ongley.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Ray Perkins Jr

SUBMISSIONS: All communications to the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, including manuscripts, book reviews, letters to the editor, etc., should be sent to: Rosalind Carey, Philosophy Department, Lehman College-CUNY, 250 Bedford Park Blvd. West, Bronx, NY 10468, USA. Or by email to: rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work, and writings of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925)

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February 2004 / number 121

THE ANALYTICAL RUSSELL

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On the Cover: Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) in the 1930s.

❧ *A GREAT AFFAIR IN A SCENIC SETTING* ❧

The 31st
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
ANNUAL MEETING

June 18-20, 2004
Plymouth State University ❧ Plymouth NH

REGISTRATION

Members: \$60 Non-Members: \$75 Students: \$40
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Papers only (no meals): One day: \$20 Two days: \$35
Students are invited to hear papers free of charge

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TO REGISTER

Send checks—payable to the Bertrand Russell Society—to:

Ray Perkins, Jr.
Department of Philosophy
Plymouth State University
Plymouth, NH 03264

The website for the BRS Annual Meeting can be found at: <http://oz.plymouth.edu/~rperkins/>. Additional information concerning the event is forthcoming on the website.

Please direct any questions concerning the 31st Annual Meeting to the convener of this year's meeting, Prof. Ray Perkins, Jr., at perkrk@earthlink.net ❧

CALL FOR PAPERS

&

NEW! CALL FOR RUSSELL MASTER-CLASSES

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
31ST ANNUAL MEETING

To present papers or lead seminars on some aspect of Russell's thought or life at the forthcoming Annual Meeting, send abstracts *no later than April 30, 2004* to BRS President Alan Schwerin at aschweri@monmouth.edu. Limit papers to 20 minutes (roughly 10 pages). Below is a list of papers already accepted:

Academic Papers

"Russell and Fiction" Tim Madigan (U. of Rochester Press)
"Russell and the Stoics" John Lenz (Drew University)

New! A series of "Master Classes" will be held this year at the Annual Meeting. The papers and seminars accepted for presentation so far are:

Master Classes (conducted by the scholars listed below)

Class 1: "Russell's Logical Atomism and Empiricism"
Gregory Landini (University of Iowa)

Class 2: "Durant and Russell"
Peter Stone (Stanford University)

Class 3: "Russell and the Soul"
Alan Schwerin (Monmouth University)

If you have a favorite paper or chapter by Russell that you would like to explore with others in a seminar setting, let Alan know what the text is and he will have copies made available in advance – either online or in hardcopy – for those attending the meeting. The session will involve a short introduction by you, followed by contributions from the audience who will have done their homework before the seminar. This is a great opportunity to share research, and to reach out to others who might be interested in your Russell scholarship.

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IN THIS ISSUE:

In the last issue of the BRSQ, we provided some historical documentation about early analytic philosophy – letters, translated from the German by Richard Schmitt, in which Frege put hard questions to Wittgenstein about the *Tractatus*. Richard also provided a thorough report on the history of the letters themselves. In this issue, our feature article moves away from the historical to engage in philosophical inquiry itself, with a light and lucid exercise in linguistic philosophy by Rui Zhu, whose son, Bertrand, will be ten months old in March.

In the essay, Rui looks at a debate about language between Russell and Quine, and seeks a solution that lies somewhere in between them. Both accessible and original, the essay shows how one can use principles from transformational grammar to suggest new ways of solving philosophical problems concerning language.

In the second major piece in this issue, Kevin Klement appears again with a marathon review of *every single essay* in the new *Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*. From this review, you can begin to get an idea of whether the *Companion*, long and impatiently awaited by the Russell world, has been worth the wait. Kevin provides a highly informative report on every aspect of Russell's work covered in the *Companion*, and the reader, specialist and non-specialist alike, is likely to learn more than a few things about Russell's thought in reading the review. Apart from one lively opinion on Amazon.com, this is the first review of the *Companion* we know of. We feel that Klement has gotten its critical appraisal off to a sharp and perceptive start.

As usual, gossip, Russell news, and Society business are to be found in abundance in 'Society News'. This is followed by another in our series of Russell's letters to the editor, again selected and introduced by the series editor, Ray Perkins Jr. This issue's letter gives an especially comprehensive statement of Russell's views on the threat of nuclear weapons. And finally, we continue to provide historical documentation of Russell and those closely related to him in 'Russell in the News', which reproduces early news clippings about Russell and his first wife, Alys. Here, the emphasis is on Russell the public man and public intellectual. Future issues will

take a further turn towards the public Russell, with articles on Russell and the Cold War, his continuing influence in China, more reviews and gossip, and even further stories on Russell's affairs of the heart.

CORRECTIONS AND ELABORATIONS: In the last issue of the *Quarterly* (November 2003, no. 120), we erroneously stated the publication history of Russell's February 4, 1963 letter to the editor of the Tel Aviv *New Outlook* (item c63.10b in *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*, edited by Blackwell and Ruja). Kenneth Blackwell points out that that letter was previously published as 'A Message from Lord Russell' in the March-April issue (v.6, no.3, p.2) of *New Outlook*, and was reprinted in Hebrew in *al-Hamishmar*, Tel Aviv, circa March 8, 1963. The journal in which it was first published, *New Outlook*, was not the same journal which changed its name to *The New Outlook* in 1932, but rather one that began in July 1957 and was in its sixth volume in 1963. (Aubrey Hodes, an editor at *New Outlook*, had been in touch with Russell since 1959, and in that year, informed Russell that the journal was two years old.) In the last paragraph of his letter, Russell alludes to remarks of his that were published in "your recent Symposium". This is a reference to another writing by Russell (item c62.49a in Blackwell and Ruja) in the November-December issue of the same journal to which the 1963 letter was a follow-up. We thank Kenneth Blackwell for this information, and also thank the Bertrand Russell Archive for permission to publish the letter. Peter Stone points out that the item in the 'Russell in the News' section of the November *Quarterly* on Russell and the Cold War was based on an article in the July 4, 2003 London (not New York) *Times Educational Supplement*. We thank Peter for correcting this mistake.

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SOCIETY NEWS

OUR MAN IN ISTANBUL. Last summer, David White, BRS Board of Directors Chair, traveled to the Bosphorus Straits to tell the people there about the Bertrand Russell Society. Here is his report:

My travels this summer were in two parts. I first spent three weeks in England, doing research at the British Library and preparing for my presentation on Lord John Russell by hanging out at the Lord John Russell Pub, which is a short walk from the library. From there I went to Istanbul for the World Congress of Philosophy. It was at the previous World Congress, five years ago in Boston, that I first learned the term "conference junkie." A "conference junkie" is someone who enjoys attending conferences, and especially associating with other conference junkies. I really didn't learn much about Lord John Russell at the pub named for him. The only association item I could find was a picture, admittedly hung right above the center of the bar.

I do wish the BRS could have made more of a showing at the World Congress. My one disappointment was that not one colleague, family member, or Rochester Russell Setter was willing to join me for the outing. Terrorists have been doing their worst for a long time, but I can't see making plans around them when bathtubs and basement stairs are so much greater hazards. Of course, I ended up with plenty of company in London and in Istanbul. All my travel plans went off without a hitch.

I was lodged in a nice enough hotel, but in a neighborhood where other establishments took advantage of tourists. The conference people had made sure we were clearly warned about them, and about the con artists in the area who would buddy-up to take advantage of tourists' reluctance to give them the brush-off right away for fear they might be an innocent citizen just trying to be friendly (they never were).

I came prepared to chair a round-table on Dewey's *A Common Faith* and to present my own paper in the Philosophy of Religion section. However, someone dropped out of another panel, so I was asked to do a presentation on the Bertrand Rus-

sell Society, aimed at people who might want to start their own philosophical club. Then there were some people who did not show up at all, so I mounted the stage and gave a fourth presentation. Having gone that far by myself, I was determined to make it worthwhile. My talk on the BRS had quite a large audience (100+), and was well received.

A lot of my time at the Congress was spent hanging out at the *Philosophy Now* booth – an excellent opportunity to connect with other conference junkies. I would urge anyone who enjoys BRS meetings or reading the BRSQ to subscribe to *Philosophy Now* magazine, since Rick Lewis, the editor, has proved a great friend to the Society.

As usual, the press made light of philosophers meeting, but truly the World Congress was no more and no less than what one chose to make of it. After I returned home, I gave my Lord John Russell talk, which turned out to be the last session of the GRRS at Daily Perks. We have now moved to Writers & Books.

~ * ~

THE MYSTERY OF THE MISSING SYMPHONY (CONCLUDING EPISODE). BRSQ readers will recall that in the August BRSQ (#119), Ken Blackwell and Tom Stanley informed us that British composer Graham Whettam had dedicated his Symphony No. 4 (*Sinfonia Contra Timore*) to BR and “all other people who suffer imprisonment of other injustice for the expression of their beliefs or the convenience of politicians and bureaucracies”, and that this dedication apparently kept the symphony off the BBC until protests by Russell and others got it performed by that network.

Robert Davis (founding member of the BRS and president of the Society from 1975-82) then wrote in and told us, in the November BRSQ (#120), that this symphony had actually been played during lunch at the Society’s Annual Meeting in 1978, but that, being a modern piece, there were some complaints from the membership in attendance about having been subjected to it. Davis said that he had heard of the symphony, contacted Whettam, and met him on a visit to England, where Whettam gave him a master tape of the symphony. Davis subsequently turned the master over to Warren Allen Smith, who had a recording studio at the time, and Warren

transcribed it to the tape they played during lunch at the ‘78 Annual Meeting. Warren meanwhile notified Davis that he would keep the master tape until notified to send it either to the BRS Library or the BR Archives.

And that is the last anyone heard of it, until we received a communication from Warren just this week (mid-February). In it he says that Whettam, who was born in 1927 in East Germany, sent a stereo tape of his *Sinfonia Contra Timore* to the BRS in 1977, and that the BRS Librarian, Don Jackanizc of Chicago “sent the tape to board member Warren Allen Smith, who had the facilities in his New York City recording studio – Variety Recording Studio – to play the tape and master it into commercial LPs if needed. Herr Whettam, however, thought the Society operated much as a label and also a distributor. He wanted details as to how and when he would be paid. He was informed that, with his permission, the BRS would gladly make a special Bertrand Russell edition of the LP but that any profits after expenses would be entirely for the Society. He could, however, arrange for a different edition of the same work elsewhere. Whettam declined, and Smith still has the original tape.”

Warren then says “the tape itself is probably worthless and is on a 10 1/2” large reel that is playable only on professional equipment. Any suggestions as to who might want the tape or where it should be sent?” The symphony is available on the web from Crotchet for \$8.99 or from Amazon.com for \$16.97. So we now know where the tape is, but are holding our breath in excitement over what will finally happen to it, and hope to have the full details for you in the next issue of the BRSQ.

~ * ~

NEW YORK CITY POWER LUNCH. The most recent meeting of the GNYCCBRS (pronounced guh-NYKA-burrs by the acronymically gifted) took place over lunch at Ben’s Kosher Deli—at W. 38th Street and 7th Avenue—on the Saturday afternoon following Thanksgiving. At the very far end of its vast main room, Ben’s possesses several longish tables linked together; these make a very good place to plot, and talk. The table included Tim Madigan, Peter Stone and his father Frank, Thom Weidlich, Ruili Ye, John Ongley, David Goldman, Warren Allen Smith (our host), Dennis Middlebrooks, Peter Ross, Taslima Nasrin, Taslima’s sister and niece, and

myself. At one end sat W.A.S, presiding in style, at the other end sat Taslima, guest of dishonor, and her relatives. (Ms. Nasrin is an anti-Muslim dissident in exile from Bangladesh and doing research at Harvard.) I was closer to her end than the other and therefore able to spy, or at least eavesdrop while our resident psychiatrist, David Goldman, probed Ms. Nasrin's memories of childhood. What influence in her past caused her to cast off the traditional Muslim female role? I didn't quite make out the answer, focused as I was on the menu. While those among the cognoscenti ate some soup-like dish, I ordered something utterly forgettable. But we were there to talk. Peter was within shouting range, and managed to convey his satisfaction with his new position at Stanford. Weidlich sat across from me and had to endure questions from me about writing books. Being profoundly socially inept I really only felt comfortable talking to Taslima's niece. About 11 or so, she goes to school in New York and is embarrassed by her name (which means something like *passionate flower of longing*). Been there (age 11), done that, have the t-shirt.

After lunch, after coffee, came a period of fidgeting and shifting about: everyone changed places or stood, a phone-camera appeared from somewhere, and Taslima was invited to speak. As a speaker, Taslima is surprising rather than charismatic and powerful, and she managed to assert some extraordinary things. For example, when I asked her to discuss her attitude towards religiously moderate Muslims she immediately shot back that no Muslim is moderate—or rather, that to be a true Muslim is to be an extremist—because the true Muslim reads and follows the Koran, and the Koran is irredeemably extremist. I knew what she meant, but wanted to ask her why she permits the extremist Muslim to define “religion” or “Muslim”. At one point during the long, pleasant afternoon, Taslima related her most recent collision with the government of Bangladesh. The current flap is due to a memoir in which she describes her sexual relationships with various men, who she identifies. This new book is causing great consternation among most Bangladesh men, who have either been “outed” or take issue with any expression of female sexuality. RC

(Society News is continued on page 54)

FEATURES

ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: A LETTER TO THE EDITOR BY BERTRAND RUSSELL

Selected, and with an Introduction, by RAY PERKINS, JR.

BR's letter to the Assistant Editor of *Maariv* (S. Rosenfeld, spelled 'Rosenfield' by Russell), a Israeli daily newspaper, is published here for the first time. This powerful letter was written January 26, 1963, only three months after the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust. It is one of Russell's most forceful public condemnations of the immorality of nuclear weapons, not only because of what H-bombs are likely to do, but also because of what their deployers are willing to do.

In the letter, Russell draws some striking parallels between the evils of Nazism and the East-West policy of nuclear deterrence which, he says, rests on the “willingness to commit genocide”. The letter is a stark reminder that the forces that produced anti-Semitism and its horrors are still very much with us and, when combined with nationalism and technology, threaten to produce even greater catastrophe. His reference to “... napalm, mass bombings and chemical ... weapons” brings to mind the concurrent American oppression in Vietnam, a matter that Russell was following closely in the press and would soon raise his voice against (See *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell*, Open Court, 2002, pp. 360-95).

26 January 1963

S. Rosenfeld, Assistant Editor
Maariv, Israel

Dear Mr. Rosenfeld,

Thank you for your letter which my work has prevented being answered earlier. I can not send a full contribution at this time but I should wish to send to you the following:

“Nazism and Fascism draw on responses which can be found in all cultures and all human beings. In a world of napalm, mass bombings, chemical and nuclear weapons we see clearly enough the capacity for murderous aggression and the atrophy of conscience possible in men. Every major Government of East and West tolerates a national policy worse in consequence than that of Adolf Hitler. One hydrogen bomb can kill more people than perished in the concen-

tration camps.

The cruelty and aggression inherent in man are often organised and directed towards victims who are easily attackable. Particularly where no clear and rational answer to complex problems is available to distraught peoples, the scapegoat is a convenient psychological alternative. This phenomenon exists in every organised society. When it combines with nationalism and technology the result is something such as the world saw under Hitler.

I think it is of absolute importance to remember that the same conditions which gave rise to Hitler pertain in organised states today. Individuals feel helpless to stop barbarism and therefore gradually acquiesce and even justify it. Nuclear policy is based on the willingness to commit genocide. Every individual who accepts such a policy or allows it to continue without personal protest is assuming the role of Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann is becoming a euphemism for Everyman.

I have little patience for the exploration of the evil of Nazism which avoids recognising the conditions which made it possible and the extent to which those conditions are with us now. Every country which persecutes a minority in the name of national security is guilty. The guilt is the weakness and blindness to cruelty which, when widespread, permit every and any atrocity.

I say that the treatment of a society's worst offenders and most hated members is an indication of its own moral standard. If a society can in all conscience permit the cruel treatment of any man, ultimately it will allow it for all.

Anti-Semitism focused on a small community in a minority, easily attacked because weak, and easily hated because cohesive and independent. The Jews were the example but they were and are when persecuted only a symbol of the ease with which mankind sinks into barbarism and the scarcity of individuals who truly stand out against it. When mass incineration of nuclear war descends upon us it will be too late to learn this lesson. The time, as always, is now."

I wish this to be used in its entirety, if it is used at all, and I should be most grateful to you for confirmation of its use. I hope to hear from you.

Yours sincerely,

Bertrand Russell

AMBIGUITY, DISSIMILARITY, AND CONJUNCTION FAILURE

RUI ZHU

When a general term is used to describe *very different things*, may we still treat it as the *same* general term? This question has survived centuries of debate in ontology. Plato's problem of the being of non-being is a product of his positive answer to it. Russell thinks that Plato's problem can be avoided by treating some key general terms as ambiguous. Although the ontological context is no longer relevant today, the issue remains interesting, for it still challenges our intuition concerning what counts as a legitimate sentence. In this paper, I will discuss a group of sentences such as "The chair and question are hard" that use a general term to describe (or subsume) drastically different objects. While there is an obvious quaintness with such a sentence, what shall we do with it? Shall we disallow it for the reason that its general term is ambiguous (Bertrand Russell thinks so), or shall we deem it permissible, only with its quaintness attributed to the dissimilarity of the objects (Quine thinks so)? I will argue that such a conjunction is not permissible, but Quine might be right that there is no ambiguity involved in the general term itself. Instead of attributing the conjunction failure to the ambiguity of the term, I will construct a rule (based on the rule of contraction in transformational grammar) to bar such conjunctions.

1. PLATO'S PUZZLE

In *The Sophist*, Plato compares

- (1) The not-great is not-great,
- (2) The not-beautiful is not-beautiful,
- (3) The not-being is not-being.¹

The trifling innocence of (1) and (2) is contrasted with the horror felt by the Eleatic stranger over (3), for it contradicts Parmenides' teaching, 'Non-being never is.' The indisputable truth of (1) and (2) forces both the stranger and his interlocutor, Theaetetus, to agree

¹ *Sophist*, 258

that

In the same manner [à la (1) and (2)] not-being has been found *to be* and is not being. (Italics added)²

Besides his reluctant discovery that non-being has being, the stranger verges on saying that non-being is assured of the same kind of being as being itself, as the not-great and the not-beautiful are assured of the same kind of being as their opposites. It is apparent that Plato sees no difference in the tokens of 'is' in (1) – (3). 'Is' has the same meaning in all three occurrences and ascribes being to the subject of the sentence in which it is embedded.

2. A RUSSELLIAN AMBIGUITY

When Russell of 1912 considers the issue of being, he is not addressing the puzzle over non-being. Instead, the existence of universals in contrast with the existence of particulars occupies his attention. Compare

- (4) Chairs and rocks exist,
- (5) Numbers exist.

According to Russell, the word 'exist' has different meanings in (4) and (5). Numbers as universals do not exist in the same way as particulars such as chairs and rocks do. The existence of universals is timeless and belongs to a realm of *subsistence*, while the existence of chairs and rocks is fleeting and constitutes the ordinary meaning of existence.³

Supposing that Plato's non-being belongs to Russell's class of universals, the being of non-being would be taken as the subsistence of non-being – the original air of absurdity would go by the board. This is the benefit of Russell's ambiguity verdict.

3. NOT ABOUT ONTOLOGY

With the introduction of quantification, the ontological quirkiness of the occurrences of 'is' or 'exist' in a sentence ceases to be fascinating. But trouble is often a possessive spirit – it chooses to appear

² Ibid.

³ *The Problems of Philosophy*, Dover Publications, 1999, p. 71.

in a different body if the original fails it. Forget ontology, but one can still ask whether the word 'existent' means the same in the following equivalent renditions of (4) and (5):

- (6) Chairs and rocks are existent,
- (7) Numbers are existent.

At this moment, insistence on the fact that 'existent' is not a predicate (therefore, it does not have any meaning) only delays the problem. For it shows up again in this example of Quine's

- (8) The chair is hard,
- (9) The question is hard.

Is the word 'hard' ambiguous in (8) and (9)? Could one claim, in the way Russell does with 'existent' in (6) and (7), that 'hard' has different meanings in (8) and (9)? The apparent awkwardness of

- (10) The chair and question are hard

seems to support the ambiguity verdict.

4. QUINE'S OBJECTIVAL DISSIMILARITY

Quine dismisses the Russellian diagnosis as baseless. In his own words, Quine says that he is baffled by philosophers' maintenance that 'true' said of logical laws and 'true' said of confessions (or 'hard' said of the chair and 'hard' said of the question, or 'existent' said of chairs and rocks and 'existent' said of numbers) are two usages of an ambiguous term instead of the same very general term.⁴ He demands evidence for the ambiguity verdict. With regard to the air of peculiarity of (10), Quine attributes it to the drastic dissimilarity between chairs and questions. 'Hard' is the same general term in (8) and (9), and there is nothing wrong with (10) itself. What causes discomfort is not the feared illegitimacy of (10), but the dissimilarity in objects – which is not a concern for logicians.

5. FAILURE OF CONJUNCTION

Indeed, Russell's ambiguity explanation of such odd sentences does not apply here. But Quine's attitude is all too cavalier. Although I

⁴ *Word and Object*, MIT Press, 1960, p. 131.

would like to agree that there is no foundation for one to claim that the meaning of 'hard' is different in (8) and (9), their conjunction (10) offends us just a little more than we can bear. Compare (10) – (12) (call them 'Group A')

- (10) The chair and question are hard,
- (11) John's arthritis and punch are deadly,
- (12) The ball and landing are soft

with

- (13) Her eyes and the fountain are pure,
- (14) The boy and monument are tall,
- (15) His personality and the mud are soft.

While (13) – (15) (Group B) are also awkward and involve drastically different things, they do not abuse our linguistic taste to the same extent as do (10) – (12). The difference between the two groups lies not just in the familiarity of existing similes evidenced by Group B, but also in the *absolute* incomparability of the pairs of things in Group A. Most languages allow a comparison between a pair of eyes and a fountain, and some languages (e.g. Chinese) allow comparing an individual's character to mud.⁵ But it is no accident that no language allows comparing a hard question to a hard chair, a punch to arthritis, or a landing to a ball. An English speaker may be amused by some unexpected exotic comparisons (like Mencius' comparing an indolent mind to a weedy road), but a comparison between a question and chair is far from amusing.

In my opinion, Quine's analysis applies to sentences of Group B, but not to those of Group A. Conjunctions of Group A affront us not just in the dissimilarity of their conjuncts, but also in their semantic propriety. When an English speaker decides against a sentence like (10), what motivates her is not so much the pragmatics of English as a sense of semantic propriety that underlies all languages. As a matter of principle, conjunction should be barred with respect to a hard chair and a hard question, or a punch and arthritis.

How could Group A be disallowed, if we agree that 'hard' means the same in (8) and (9), or 'deadly' means the same (the very general term, 'deadly,' meaning 'capable of causing death') in 'John's arthritis is deadly' and 'John's punch is deadly'?

⁵ Jia Bao-yu, the playboy from *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, famously compares men to mud and women to water.

6. SEMANTIC FRAMES

Conjunction failure under the same predicate presents such a dilemma: there are two things such that we can use the same general term to describe them, but they are absolutely incomparable *with regard to this term*, and conjunction fails as a result. Before one can conjoin the two terms, one has to see if one sentence's "semantic frame" clashes with that of the other. If the semantic frames of two sentences clash, such conjunction shall be barred.

Unfortunately, given the paucity of our knowledge of semantic frames, it is impossible to formalize the constraints over conjunction. The best we can do is examine the concrete examples we have seen above in order to illustrate the way the subject and predicate of a sentence interact with each other which leads to a formation of a semantic frame. Intuitively speaking, the semantic frame of a sentence functions like a box. When the semantic contents inside the boxes of two sentences have nothing in common, conjunction is barred. Before we get bogged down in a swamp of speculation, let us turn to the examples again:

- (i) The subject imposes a referential frame on the predicate. For instance, compare, 'His punch is deadly' and 'His arthritis is deadly.' Because 'deadly' said of the punch refers to other people than the boxer himself, whereas 'deadly' said of the arthritis refers the patient himself but never to others, the conjunction 'His punch and arthritis are deadly' would cause violent semantic spasm.
- (ii) The subject imposes a dynamic frame on the predicate. Compare: 'The ball is soft' and 'The landing is soft.'
- (iii) The subject imposes a strict mental or physical frame on the predicate. Compare: 'The chair is hard' and 'The question is hard.'

Note that the whole matter is largely intuitive and frustratingly vague because we do not have a working concept of semantic frames. Not all conjunctions are ruled out because of the clash of the frames. Sentences of Group B are examples of permissible conjunctions. It seems that a term can still be used to describe drastically different things as long as there is no clash of semantic frames.

Although this "whistle in the dark" approach helps nothing, we may not take flight and refuse to acknowledge possible conjunction failure under the same predicate. Healthy greed for clarity should not blind us to real problems.

7. CONTRACTION

Since we do not really know what a semantic frame is, and whether it belongs to the pragmatics or semantics or syntax of a language, we end up with many questions and no clear solutions in hand. What I will propose in the following is to treat conjunction after the model of contraction in transformational grammar and form a constraint on conjunction which our intuition about semantic frames captures but fails to deliver. It should not come as a surprise that we treat conjunction after the model of contraction because of the similarity in the two operations. But I must add the disclaimer that I am not treating conjunction as a particular case of contraction.

In transformational grammar, a rule of deletion concerning contraction says:

(Contraction-Rule) Contraction is blocked if there is a missing constituent after the item concerned.⁶

For examples of contraction, we have in the following, where the 'is' of (16) is contracted into the 's' of (17):

- (16) It *is* a jolly good day,
 (17) It's a jolly good day.

Or where 'had' is contracted into 'd':

- (18) He had a jolly good day,
 (19) He'd a jolly good day.

But a similar contraction would fail between (20) and (21):

- (20) A jolly good day (that) it is,
 (21) A jolly good day (that) it's.

Or between (22) and (23):

- (22) A jolly good day (that) he had,

⁶ See *Transformational Syntax*, by Andrew Radford, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 263.

(23) A jolly good day (that) he'd.

While (17) and (19) are grammatical, (21) and (23) are not. The explanation from transformational grammar points out the fact that there is a trace of a *wh*-pronoun that is left behind after the *wh*-movement of the constituent following 'is/had' in (21) and (23). The D-structure of (20) is

(24) A jolly good day (that) it is *which*

Now move the *wh*-phrase and get the S-structure:

(25) A jolly good day *which* (that) it is

Delete the *wh*-phrase and get the surface structure, which is (20):

(20) A jolly good day (that) it is

Because 'which' is the missing constituent after 'it is' in (20) but still exists in the D-structure, (24), contracting 'is' to 's' is blocked according to the contraction rule. The same account applies to the ungrammaticality of (23).

Out of the same account, Chomsky explains the 'wanna' contraction failure of contracting

(26) Who do you want to die

into

(27) Who do you *wanna* die (ungrammatical)

in virtue of the fact that there is a missing constituent of 'who' in between 'want' and 'to' in the D-structure of (26)

(28) (That) you want *who* to die.

That is to say, the trace of 'who' in between 'want' and 'to' blocks the contraction of 'want to' into 'wanna'.⁷

8. CONJUNCTION RULE

I suggest that we treat conjunction failure along the similar line of contraction failure. Perhaps we might want to say something like this

⁷ See Chomsky, *Rules and Representations*, Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 158-160.

(Conjunction-Rule) Conjunction is blocked if there is a missing constituent after the general term concerned.

If so, we must look for the missing constituents in sentences such as

- (8) The chair is hard,
(9) The question is hard,

so that we can block

- (10) The chair and question are hard.

In fact, we might have what we want here. But first let us compare

- (29) John's arthritis is deadly

and

- (30) John's punch is deadly.

We see that arthritis is deadly only to John himself while his punch is deadly to someone other than John. When an English speaker hears (29) and (30), she understands them in the manner of (31) and (32), respectively,

- (31) John's arthritis is deadly [to John himself]
(32) John's punch is deadly [to someone other than John]

Because of this tacit knowledge, she would not accept (33), the conjunction of (29) and (30)

- (33) John's arthritis and punch are deadly.

The parallel between the failure of contraction and that of conjunction in (33) is striking. In both cases, a competent speaker sees something still functioning in her linguistic understanding (or the D-structure) but missing in the surface structure of the sentences concerned. The missing constituents are often unconsciously filled up by the competent speaker whenever she comes upon those sentences. In fact, if we spell everything out, it is very easy to see why conjunction in (33) fails. Compare (31), (32) and (33) to (31'), (32') and (33'):

- (31') John's arthritis is deadly to him,

- (32') John's punch is deadly to him,
(33') John's arthritis and punch are deadly to him.

We can see that the pronominal 'him' in (31') and (32') refers to different persons (to John himself in (31'), to someone other than John, say, Fred in (32')). And (33') is blocked because the two occurrences of 'Deadly to him' are not the same type of general term, for one is 'Deadly to John' while the other is 'Deadly to Fred.'

Conjunction can fail as long as one of the sentences has a missing constituent. (10), 'The chair and question are hard,' is illegitimate because there is also a missing constituent in (9). When one reads (9), 'The question is hard,' she must tacitly understand it as an abbreviation of

- (34) The question is hard [to solve].

Otherwise, suppose (9) is complete as it is, it must allow a nominal transformation such as

- (35) The question's hardness

or

- (35') The hardness of the question

just as (8) allows

- (36) The chair's hardness

or

- (36') The hardness of the chair,

so that a question like 'Does the chair have hardness?' or 'What about the hardness of the chair?' can be posed. But (35) and (35') are unacceptable. In no circumstance can one make sense of the question 'Does the question have hardness?' or 'What about the hardness of the question?' This shows the incompleteness of the term 'hard' in (9). If we complete it as (to repeat (34))

- (34) The question is hard [to solve],

its nominal transformation (37) and (37') would be acceptable, awkward as it is,

- (37) The question's hard-to-solveness,
(37') The hard-to-solveness of the question.

Sometimes the incompleteness of the term stems from the inseparable bond between the adjectival and nominal phrases because of the existence of an idiom-like phrase. Let us examine (38) and (39)

- (38) The landing is soft,
 (39) The moon is new.

The particularity of the two sentences lies in the fact that each predicate is somehow *attached to* the nominal phrase in the subject position. The propriety of using 'soft' to describe 'landing' depends on the presence of the idiom 'soft landing,' while the acceptability of 'The moon is new' presumes the idiom or quasi-idiom or 'complex noun-phrase' 'new moon.' The evidence of this tight predicate-subject bond is the insubstitutability of the general terms in question by their exact synonyms. (38') and (39') are unacceptable,

- (38') The landing is impressionable (or easily yielding to pressure),
 (39') The moon is novel.

In contrast, (40) and (41) allow such substitutions:

- (40) The ball is soft,
 (40') The ball is impressionable (or easily yielding to pressure),
 (41) The garage is new,
 (41') The garage is novel.

As such, (38) cannot be conjoined with (40), forming 'The landing and ball are soft'; nor can (39) with (41), forming 'The moon and garage are new.' A native speaker always understands (38) and (39) under the influence (often subliminal) of complex noun phrases like 'a soft landing' and 'a new moon.' And it is this tacit registration of the fact that terms like 'soft' and 'new' in such contexts *cannot stand by themselves* the prevents substitutions of the kind shown in (38') and (39').

The Conjunction Rule needs to be modified because of the obvious counterexamples such as 'The first and second landings are soft,' 'January 15th's and February 15th's moons are new,' or even 'John's punch and hepatitis are deadly.' In the last case, when John's punch and hepatitis are both deadly to Fred, nothing can prevent

such a conjunction. So, the modified Conjunction Rule should be

(Conjunction-Rule)* Conjunction is blocked if there is a missing constituent after the general term concerned and the general terms of the two sentences are not identical after all the missing components are added on.

9. CONCLUSION

Our position stands between Russell and Quine. Russell bars conjunctions like 'The chair and question are hard' on the ground that 'hard' is ambiguous, whereas Quine acknowledges the identity of 'hard' in its two occurrences and therefore sanctions the conjunction. We agree with Quine that 'hard' is indeed the same general term meaning a certain degree of impenetrability, but with Russell's conclusion that the conjunction should somehow be prohibited. In fact, it is not difficult at all to find a footing in the middle ground. One could say that, although the different occurrences of predicates like 'hard' are of the same type of a general term, they have different implications in different contexts such that the conjunctions would be barred because of the divergence in implicature. This pragmatic approach should work, but misses the important general feature shared by the sentences that thwart such conjunctions. We have tried to capture this general feature by offering a syntactic explanation for an intuitively semantic impropriety.

We do not fancy that our explanation, which is produced after the model of contraction failure in transformational grammar, must be correct or even has great explanatory power. If it has any success at all, it must be limited. For instance, we still have to let such an odd conjunction, 'The night and wooden beam are long' (from 'The night is long' and 'The wooden beam is long') pass as legitimate.⁸ There is no ground for us to object to this sentence, for

⁸ This example is discussed in the ancient Chinese Mohist writings dated between the 4th and 3rd century BC. Similar examples discussed by Mohists include: 'His wisdom and grains are plentiful', and 'His official position and the price are high'. According to Mohists, one should not compare wisdom and grains (or title and price) in this way because they do not belong to the same type. Applying our Conjunction-Rule* to these sentences, we would legitimize 'His wisdom and grains are plentiful' but not 'His official position and price are high' due to the fact that 'high' is idiomatically attached to 'position' in the sentence 'His position is high'.

we cannot possibly say something like "The predicate 'long' in 'The night is long' is somehow incomplete." This might be a great discomfort for us, for the sentence 'The night and wooden beam are long' is just as weird as 'The chair and question are hard.' It is up to the reader's judgment whether or not to deem the sentence 'The night and wooden beam are long' as a decisive counterexample to our Conjunction Rule*.

Our best case is the example of (33) 'John's arthritis and punch are deadly' out of (29) 'John's arthritis is deadly' and (30) 'John's punch is deadly.' It is very clear that the two tokens of 'deadly' are of the same general term, meaning 'capable of causing death.' But it is equally clear that (33) 'John's arthritis and punch are deadly' is unacceptable. We must come up with a theory, which should be different from either Quine's or Russell's, to explain this conjunction failure. Our Conjunction Rule* is the first attempt toward offering an explanation. Like every other initial experiment, its significance is fortunately largely independent of its explanatory success.

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REVIEW

A FAITHFUL COMPANION

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Review of *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*, Nicholas Griffin, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 550 pp. + xvii. \$75 hardcover, \$26 paperback.

We can at last release our breath: the long-awaited Russell volume in the popular *Cambridge Companion* series has finally arrived. It contains fifteen chapters written by well-known Russell scholars dealing with a wide array of Russelliana, along with a quite extensive introductory essay by the volume editor. It is not difficult to see what took so long. Russell's corpus, even considering only his philosophical writings, outstrips in both breadth and volume almost all the other figures covered in the *Cambridge Companion* series. A further complication in Russell's case is his characteristic habit of so frequently changing his mind even about fundamental issues. Dealing with such a vast amount of information must have required a tremendous amount of sustained collaboration. Obviously, the volume could not cover everything; but the editor and authors have done a tremendous job selectively choosing topics and themes within Russell's philosophical work to focus on. While falling short of perfection, the result is a collection of pieces that together provide the sort of sophisticated introduction to a complex philosopher that is able to make his work accessible to relative beginners without disguising the subtlety, complexity and still controversial nature of his views.

Griffin's introductory essay provides the requisite biographical information on Russell, along with a summary of the evolution of his philosophical views. His discussion of those views is terse, but this is understandable given that most are treated in greater length in the pieces that follow. The value of the introduction is that it provides an overall framework and chronology in which to situate the more detailed discussions that follow.

(1) The first chapter is entitled "Mathematics In and Behind Russell's Logicism, and Its Reception," written by Ivor Grattan-Guinness. It describes how Russell first became interested in the

foundations of mathematics in the 1890s, and how his interests were transformed in 1900 and the following years by the influence of Giuseppe Peano, his associates, and others, to grow into Russell's logicist project. It also describes the changes in Russell's thinking brought about by the discovery of the set-theoretic paradoxes plaguing his initial formulations of logicism, his realization that his earlier proofs of an actual infinity were fallacious, and the changes to his treatment of mathematical functions with the discovery of the theory of descriptions. Grattan-Guinness also discusses the details of Russell's collaboration with Whitehead, the writing process of *Principia Mathematica*, and its reception and influence among mathematicians in the decades following its initial publication.

(2) This first chapter is nicely complemented by the second chapter, entitled "Russell's Philosophical Background," by Griffin. Here we find discussion of Russell's inculcation into the mindset of British (largely neo-Hegelian) idealism during his study at Cambridge, and detailed treatment of Russell's positions during his early idealist phase. The essay immediately shows the subtlety and complexity of Russell's philosophical thinking even during this early period, and helps counterbalance the tendency—promulgated by later Russell himself—to think of this early idealist work as simply a host of confusions engendered by rejecting relations. Russell's positions on such matters as the nature of relations, the debate over monism and pluralism, the dependency of mathematical and geometrical truths on the mind or experience, and so on, are far more sophisticated than is generally acknowledged, as Griffin aptly demonstrates.

(3) The next piece, by Richard Cartwright, is entitled "Russell and Moore, 1898-1905." This entry discusses the break with British idealism made by Russell and Moore in the late 1890s and their adoption of a robust realism, including commitment to propositions as mind-independent objects of belief. Russell credited Moore as leading the way in the development of this "new philosophy" (as he called it in 1903). Cartwright discusses how further investigations into the nature and make-up of propositions developed into Russell's doctrines of philosophical logic explicated in the *Principles of Mathematics*, and outlines certain major features of these doctrines with regard to ontological commitment, the nature of relations, necessity and change.

(4) Michael Beaney follows with a similarly titled entry, "Russell and Frege." Frege and Russell are together often heralded as the two primary founders of analytic philosophy, and the two primary forces behind logicism in the philosophy of mathematics and the "revolution in logic" that lead to the abandonment of Aristotelian syllogistic logic in favor of modern quantificational logic. Beaney charts Frege's main contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics, such as the development of quantificational theory capable of treating multiple generality, the definitions of hereditary properties and ancestrals of relations, the analysis of equinumerosity in terms of one-one correspondence, and the resulting definition of cardinal number. He then discusses their relationship to Russell's views, and compares and contrasts their views on the importance of relations and order, Russell's paradox, the unity of propositions or thoughts, and the nature and purpose of philosophical analysis. Beaney also discusses their joint influence on analytic philosophy.

Disappointingly, the entry does not discuss much regarding the influence of the two philosophers upon one another (even negatively), nor does it delve into their very interesting correspondence beyond the initial letters concerning the contradiction in Frege's logical system. In the first chapter, Grattan-Guinness had suggested that many commentators exaggerate the influence of Frege on Russell. Perhaps Beaney would agree since he does not mention a single way in which Russell's views changed due to his reading of Frege. While it is no doubt correct that Russell did not adopt many views directly from Frege, and the most well known points of overlap between them are views they developed independently, Russell's confrontation with Frege's views in the years 1902-1905 lead him to rethink many of his own views on the nature of classes, functions and meaning, and while the final views Russell adopted do not coincide with Frege's, it is unlikely they would have taken the form they did without Frege's influence. (See, e.g., Klement 2003.)

(5) The fifth chapter bears the title "Bertrand Russell's Logicism," and is co-authored by Martin Godwyn and Andrew Irvine. It begins with a brief discussion of earlier logicist theorists, then sketches (what the authors take to be) Russell's "new" type-theoretic form of logicism, which attempts to solve the contradictions plaguing Frege's form, moves on to a discussion of Russell's on-

tological commitments, or lack thereof, to such entities as numbers, propositional functions and classes, and ends with a discussion of Russell's epistemology of mathematics. For example, while Russell thought that mathematical claims such as " $2 + 2 = 4$ ", could, when properly analyzed, be deduced from purely logical axioms, he thought that, epistemologically, the mathematical truths were more certain, and that indeed, non-self-evident logical principles are sometimes to be justified in virtue of the epistemological status of their logical consequences. Russell therefore did not share the epistemological goals of those other logicians who hoped to secure the epistemological status of mathematics by showing it to be reducible to self-evident logical principles.

However, much of the remainder of the essay is either redundant or out of sorts with other chapters on related topics in the volume. The chapter begins with a discussion of Leibniz, Frege and Dedekind, but does not make it clear to what extent the details of Russell's logicism were influenced by these figures, and in any case the discussion seems redundant given Grattan-Guinness's more sophisticated look at the historical background to Russell's logicism. The descriptions of both simple and ramified type theory are unrecognizable when compared to Russell's actual writings, and seem to owe more to later formulations of type-theory by logicians such as Tarski and Church than to Russell's own work. Their claim that Russell's 1908 "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types," abandoned Russell's 1905 "no-classes theory" in favor of a new approach directly contradicts Landini's claim later in the *Companion* that the substitutional theory (a direct descendent of the 1905 "no-classes theory") undergirds the logical system of that paper. Their acceptance of Quine's criticism that *Principia Mathematica*'s second-order logic is based on a confusion of use and mention, and therefore, no more a reduction of mathematics to logic than a reduction of mathematics to set theory, ignores the responses made by sympathetic commentators in the past few decades (see, e.g., Sainsbury 1979, Chap. 8; Hylton 1990, pp. 217-218; Landini 1998, Chaps. 9-10, Linsky 1999, Chap. 6).

(6) This is followed by a chapter written by Peter Hylton entitled "The Theory of Descriptions." This entry begins with a summary of the mechanics of Russell's influential analysis of descriptive phrases within first-order logic, then attempts to place Rus-

sell's 1905 discovery of this theory within the context of his developing philosophical views. Rival theories such as Frege's distinction between *sinn* and *bedeutung* and even Russell's own earlier theory of denoting concepts involve an indirect sort of representation according to which the thoughts or propositions we entertain, instead of containing the entities they are about, contain intermediate entities (senses or meanings) that represent the entities they are about. These theories are out of sorts with the direct realism Russell had adopted in his rejection of idealism, and according to Hylton, this is Russell's primary motivation for adopting the theory of descriptions in their stead. Perhaps wisely, however, Hylton devotes only a paragraph's worth of discussion to the arguments found in the infamous Gray's Elegy passage of "On Denoting" against theories similar to the theory of denoting concepts, noting that space constraints rule out full consideration of the argumentation there. Instead, Hylton moves on to address the importance of the theory of descriptions for Russell's philosophy after 1905, and finally discusses a number of influential objections to Russell's theory which have surfaced since 1950. Interestingly, one lesson Hylton conveys is a warning against the traditional interpretation that Russell's primary motivation for the theory of descriptions was the avoidance of ("Meinongian") ontological commitment to non-existent entities such as the round-square, the present King of France, the planet Vulcan, and so on, noting that this seems like the central motivation only in retrospect. This lesson is apparently still worthwhile, given that even other authors in *Companion* still focus on this aspect of the theory when presenting it (e.g., Beaney in Chapter 4, p. 162).

(7) The seventh chapter, by Gregory Landini, is entitled "Russell's Substitutional Theory," and deals with the highly original and interesting logical system adopted by Russell from 1905-1907 to solve the paradoxes facing logicism in which the notion of ontological substitution of one entity for another within propositions as objective complexes is taken as fundamental. Specifically, it employs a four place relation written " $p/a;b!q$ ", which means that q results from p by substituting b for a . For example, this relation would hold when p is the proposition *Socrates is wise*, a is Socrates, b is Plato, and q is the proposition *Plato is wise*. (Here we are dealing with the substitution of the *man* Plato for the *man* Socrates within a mind-independent proposition, and not the substitution of

one name for another within a sentence.) This logical system is strictly speaking type-free and employs only one style of variable—ranging over all entities whatever (including propositions)—and yet is able to proxy or do all the work required of a higher-order logic employing a simple theory of types, including providing a replacement for talk about sets or classes.

Landini sketches in some detail the origin and nature of Russell's substitutional logic, as well the changes that it underwent as he encountered certain problems: e.g., the abandonment of quantified propositions as entities in his 1906 "On 'Insolubilia' and their Solution by Symbolic Logic," as a way of resolving certain contradictions present in his initial formulations of the theory. Landini goes on to discuss that which eventually lead Russell to abandon the substitutional theory. However, against many traditional interpretations, Landini argues contentiously that certain key doctrines explicitly realized in the substitutional theory, such as the doctrine of the unrestricted variable, are maintained in a disguised form even in *Principia Mathematica* when one properly understands its semantics. Landini concludes that the substitutional theory is the "conceptual linchpin" connecting Russell's work in the *Principles of Mathematics* with his mature logical system, and thus any proper understanding of the latter must involve an understanding of its relationship with the substitutional theory.

(8) Alasdair Urquhart follows with a contribution entitled "The Theory of Types," which aims to summarize Russell's type-theory, its historical roots and influence within logic, mathematics and computer science. It begins with a short discussion of Russell's early 1903 theory of types found in Appendix B of the *Principles of Mathematics* and its demise, mentions briefly Russell's intermediate non-type-theoretic solutions to the contradictions attempted from 1902-1907, and then moves on to a discussion of the more complicated ramified theory of types found in *Principia Mathematica*. Urquhart notes the importance of the "vicious circle principle", stated by Russell as the principle that "whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection," in providing philosophical support for ramification. I think Urquhart perhaps gives it too large a place and applies it too sweepingly, given that for Russell the principle was not thought to be "itself the solution of the vicious-circle paradoxes, but merely the result which a theory must

yield if it is to afford a solution of them" (Russell 1906, p. 205). While Russell accepts the vicious-circle principle, it is not the philosophical rationale or explanation of ramification, but a result of it.

Urquhart moves on to a summary of the technical details of ramified type-theory, but explicitly bases his exposition not on Russell's own, but instead on later formulations of ramified type-theory given by Church, Myhill and others, explaining that the "original presentation in *Principia Mathematica* is both imprecise and notationally clumsy, ... [and] there is no precise presentation of the syntax of the system" (p. 295). Given that the *Companion* is supposed to provide a philosophical entrée to Russell's own work, this decision is disappointing. Whitehead and Russell's exposition of the details of their logical language is lacking when compared to modern standards, but this does not mean that an exact statement of what they had in mind would be impossible. There is unfortunately a long precedent of ignoring Russell's own presentation of his type-theory, and an equally long precedent of attributing to him views he did not hold on the basis of later logicians' formulations. Thankfully, in recent years there has been a movement away from the precedent. However, Urquhart ignores these attempts to understand Russell on Russell's own terms, and neglects to mention recent findings and debates about the extent to which *Principia's* formal system can be assimilated to later formulations (see e.g., Landini 1998; Chap. 10; Linsky 1999).

Urquhart's exposition of ramified type-theory also weds that theory to precisely the sort of metaphysics of propositions Russell held prior to adopting the multiple-relations theory of judgment circa 1910. His rationale is that Russell still describes propositions as the *values* of propositional functions, and therefore they are required as part of the very motivation of the system. However, this is odd given that Russell's acceptance of ramification seems to coincide chronologically *almost exactly* with his eschewal of a metaphysics of propositions. Again, Urquhart ignores recent attempts to clarify Russell's seemingly-inconsistent position (see, e.g., Sainsbury 1980; Cocchiarella 1987, Chap. 5; Rodriguez-Consuegra 1989; Landini 1998, Chap. 10).

Urquhart then discusses the simplifications to ramified type-theory that were developed in the decades following *Principia's* publication, especially the simple type-theories developed by

Ramsey, and later, by Russell himself for the 2nd edition of *Principia* (1925). He lastly discusses the fate of type-theory in more recent mathematical and logical work, noting that while axiomatic set theories, based on the work of Zermelo others, are far more popular in contemporary mathematics, the ideas behind type-theory continue to play a role in inspiring certain advances in the foundations of set theory, as well as in the theoretic foundations of programming languages and study of algorithms.

(9) Next we find Paul Hager's "Russell's Method of Analysis," which describes Russell's self-conscious methodology for philosophical research. This methodology is a two phase process. In the first phase, one begins with a certain body of knowledge or set of "data", conceived of as propositions within a certain domain of discourse which are thought to be obvious or self-evident, but somehow vague, in need of clarification or unification. The bulk of the first phase, the phase of "analysis", consists in attempting to discover a number of logically more simple, but less self-evident, premisses or principles, employing a smaller vocabulary, in which a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge is thought to be possible. The second stage of method, the "synthetic" stage, consists in building, reconstructing or demonstrating the original body of knowledge—or at least the indispensable part of it—from the premisses and concepts discovered in the analytic phase. Mathematical examples of this methodology are easily found in Russell's early work, and Hager goes on to describe Russell's much later *Human Knowledge* as an example of this methodology applied to scientific knowledge. Hager argues that this methodology can be seen as representing the strongest continuous thread running through Russell's philosophical work. Hager makes note of certain misunderstandings regarding the nature of analysis and its relation to language, such as the construal of analysis as having solely to do with the relationship between wholes and their parts, or thinking that analysis does not have to do with *both* language *and* the world. He argues that such misunderstandings underlie certain misconceptions about Russell's work, most recently exemplified in Ray Monk's well-known biography.

(10) The tenth chapter is entitled "Russell's Neutral Monism," written by R. E. Tully. Here we find a lengthy treatment of Russell's consideration of neutral monism: the theory that there is

only one kind of stuff making up reality, which is itself neither fundamentally mental nor physical, but out of which both mind and matter can be thought of as being formed. Tully begins with some philosophical background to Russell's confrontation with the theory as found in the work of James and others, followed by discussion of Russell's initial reaction and arguments against it in the early 1910s, stemming mainly from worries regarding its ability to explain fully the nature of first hand experience and its compatibility with the nature of acquaintance. Tully then discusses Russell's gradual acceptance of the theory, at first provisionally in the late 1910s, and then explicitly in his writings in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the maturation and changes to the doctrine in such works as *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth*, *An Outline of Philosophy* and *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth*. He goes on to describe the role the theory has, even when not mentioned by name, in later works such as *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth* and *Human Knowledge*.

There are a number of passages of the essay that are somewhat unclear, and parts, especially when discussing Russell's earlier views, in which Russell's doctrines are misleadingly stated. To focus on a single example, on p. 348, Tully suggests that Russell's multiple relations theory of judgment was a reaction against a doctrine according to which "propositions are entities occupying an intermediate position between the minds and facts," a doctrine "associated with Meinong." In fact, neither Russell nor Meinong ever held such a view. Russell's early view of propositions did not make them out as being intermediates between the mind and facts, and indeed, on that theory, facts and true propositions were identified. (This point is aptly made in the *Companion* itself by other contributors, e.g., by Griffin on pp. 27-28, by Cartwright on pp. 110-111, by Landini on pp. 253-255, etc.). The advance of the multiple relations theory was not that it allowed, as Tully suggests, "treating propositions as objects in their own right separate from facts." Instead, it was that it allowed not treating propositions as singular objects *at all*. There are similar difficulties elsewhere in the essay; but such small difficulties—given the aim of Tully's essay—are perhaps forgivable. However, more problematically, nowhere does Tully offer the non-specialist a simple overall statement of Russell's neutral monism, nor a simple explanation of how Russell or others believed that either physical objects or minds should be conceived on this

position. (For this the reader has to wait until Grayling's contribution later in the *Companion*, pp. 461-463.) Tully mainly concerns himself with details of the theory, problems within it, or changes to it without giving a simple description of the overall theory.

(11) Next we find a chapter called "The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism," written by Bernard Linsky. Linsky discusses in general Russell's characterization of philosophy as an "atomism," arguing that this should primarily be understood as commitment to analysis as a method coupled with a rejection of idealistic monism, rather than a pretense to have discovered the genuine metaphysical "atoms" making up the world of facts, or even the belief that such a discovery is possible. Linsky also discusses the epistemological aspects of Russell's logical atomism, his notion of logical construction, as well as a number of related questions regarding the nature of Russell's metaphysical views on propositions, propositional functions, universals, extensionality, atomic facts and the relationship between logical constructions and eliminative metaphysics, not all of which can be discussed in detail here. I will restrict my comments to two relatively small points. First, Linsky oddly claims that Russell introduces the name "logical atomism" in his 1918 lecture series *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, whereas in actuality, that phrase first occurred in Russell's writings at least as early as the 1911 "Analytic Realism" paper (see Russell 1992, p. 135). Secondly, Linsky seems to assume that giving a nominalistic reading of Russell's use of higher-order propositional function variables in his logic would amount to ascribing to Russell a nominalism about universals. However, these two issues are unrelated. On my own interpretation of Russell, he became a nominalist about "propositional functions" as early as 1905, but was never throughout the period in question a nominalist about universals. At least prior to his having been influenced by Wittgenstein, Russell never equated in his mind the propositional function " \hat{x} is red" with the universal of *redness*—as Linsky knows full well (see Linsky 1999, chap. 2)—and so a realism about the later would not entail a realism about the former. However, I cannot fully elaborate this point here.

(12) William Demopoulos's contribution, "Russell's Structuralism and the Absolute Description of the World," appears next. Demopoulos sketches Russell's "structuralism", i.e., his view that perception alone provides us directly at most with knowledge of

structural features of the physical world—a view Russell held explicitly from 1919 through 1948, and perhaps implicitly as early as 1912. Demopoulos discusses its relation to Russell's theories about propositional understanding, and how these lead him to consideration of difficulties regarding the proper interpretation of scientific theories, as well as Russell's solution taken from the standpoint of the program of logical construction. Demopoulos also discusses certain questionable assumptions within Russell's position. For example, he sketches Russell's subjectivist treatment of color vocabulary according to which color predicates such as "yellow" or "blue" are to be understood as first and foremost representing qualities of subjective percepts or sensations, upon which our understanding of these predicates as applied to external surfaces is thought to be derivative. Demopoulos contrasts this with a "relativist" view, according to which while it is admitted that our initial understanding of such predicates is given in terms of perceptual criteria, with the advancement of our scientific understanding of color, this understanding is replaced by an "absolute form" of description that abstracts away from the particularities of our perceptual systems. The pre-theoretic and post-theoretic understandings can nevertheless be co-extensional. Demopoulos sketches certain other difficulties with Russell's position, and while he does not find Russell's position to be incoherent, he suggests that his rival position accommodates much of Russell's insights while ending up as less revisionary with regard to our ordinary discourse and conception of the physical world.

(13) The thirteenth chapter is written by Thomas Baldwin and has the title "From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Description." Baldwin charts over 35 years' worth of the development of Russell's epistemology, beginning with 1912's *Problems of Philosophy* and the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. He then proceeds to discuss the changes to Russell's conception of *a priori* knowledge first made explicit in the 1918 *Philosophy of Logical Atomism* lectures brought on by his rejection of logical objects due to the influence of Wittgenstein, and his movement towards a more linguistic notion of analyticity and *a prioricity*. Baldwin continues on to discuss the more radical changes to Russell's epistemology from 1921's *Analysis of Mind*, when Russell abandoned his former understanding of ac-

quaintance as a relation between the mind and non-mental objects in line with his newly adopted neutral monism. Baldwin also discusses how Russell's epistemological work during this period anticipates later discussions in the theory of knowledge such as the debate between internalism and externalism, as well as the causal and reliabilist theories of knowledge. Baldwin continues on to consider further changes to Russell's epistemological doctrines in *An Outline of Philosophy* (1928), and *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940), finally concluding with a discussion of the role causation plays in Russell's final epistemology in *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (1948). In particular, Baldwin discusses what Russell calls "weakly *a priori*" truths such as the principle of induction. Unlike standard *a priori* truths, our belief in these principles cannot be justified by reason alone; however, our belief in them is at least amenable to a sort of causal explanation that shows it to have a kind of validity based on the fact that it reliably leads to other true beliefs.

(14) The penultimate chapter, "Russell, Experience and the Roots of Science," contributed by A. C. Grayling, sketches Russell's long-running project of attempting to explicate the relationship between sense experience and scientific knowledge. Grayling argues that it should be understood quite differently from the traditional Cartesian project of attempting to *justify* scientific claims on the basis of experience. Russell's task was rather to clarify how the objects of the sensible world and of scientific discourse relate to the data of immediate experience. He first discusses Russell's approach to the issue in *Problems of Philosophy* and works of that period, in which Russell conceived the problem as having to do with how we are able, beginning only with our direct acquaintance with sense-data, to achieve "knowledge by description" of the objects of the external world. He then proceeds to sketch how Russell reconceived the project after initially accepting neutral monism, when he abandoned both the distinction between the act of sensing and what is sensed, and the distinction between sense-data or sensations and objects themselves. Baldwin then discusses Russell's later return to an inferential view about our knowledge of physical objects in *The Analysis of Matter*, and finally Russell's naturalistic epistemology in *Human Knowledge*. The chapter overlaps heavily in theme and substance several previous chapters in the *Companion* (specifically,

those by Hager, Tully, Demopoulos and Baldwin), but Grayling does an admirable job tying together the various themes discussed by others into a unified account of the development of Russell's philosophy from the 1910s through the 1940s.

(15) In the final chapter, "Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or Unphilosophical Moralist?", Charles Pigden switches gears and examines Russell's contributions to moral philosophy. Pigden outlines six phases in the development of Russell's ethical theorizing, challenging the views of many that Russell's writings in this area were mostly derivative by highlighting significant points of originality, including influence on Moore's ethical work, as well as anticipations of both Mackie's error theory and the emotivism of Ayer and Stevenson. Even more contentiously, Pigden argues against Russell's own evaluation of his popular writings on political and moral themes as being unphilosophical, noting by way of example that Russell's call for world government involved a number of philosophically interesting convictions and arguments.

Finally, it should not escape mention that the volume also contains an up-to-date and extensive 36 page bibliography, with separate listings of Russell's own book-length works, prominent articles, collections, as well most of the important monographs and articles in the secondary literature. The bibliography of course is not comprehensive—remember that the extensive bibliography of Russell's own writings published by Kenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja in the mid-90s was itself a three volume affair! The bibliography also contains some minor mistakes: for example, in the listing of Russell's philosophical articles, those that actually appear in Volume 4 of the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* are all erroneously listed as appearing in Volume 3. Nevertheless, the bibliography provides an invaluable resource for anyone wishing to pursue further research on any aspect of Russell's philosophy covered in the *Companion*.

In summation, the *Companion* consists of four essays addressing Russell's logic and philosophy of mathematics, three essays primary concerned with Russell's philosophical background and interactions with other philosophers, three essays concerned with Russell's metaphysics and theory of meaning, four essays addressing Russell's epistemology, philosophy of science and theory of philosophical methodology, and one essay dealing with Russell's

ethics. If Pigden is right that much of Russell's writings concerning political, social and moral affairs constitute philosophy, then much of Russell's philosophy is not covered in the *Companion*, from his early writings on German Social Democracy to his later writings on nuclear warfare and disarmament. No doubt, these omissions will disappoint certain die-hard Russell fans. However, I think by and large the choices regarding coverage were wise. The titles in the *Cambridge Companion* series are aimed primarily at working philosophers and philosophy students. The topics chosen are those that are most likely to be of use to that audience. While in a perfect world, a "companion" volume to Bertrand Russell would have covered all of Russell's work, in reality, this would have doubled its size and price and left it without a single identifiable market.

Even if largely restricted to works easily and uncontroversially "philosophical" in the mainstream sense, the *Companion's* coverage is by no means limited to the "usual suspects". While Griffin apologizes in the introduction that Russell's later philosophy is given "relatively sketchy treatment" (p. 46), in fact by comparison to other treatments of Russell's philosophy, the *Companion* contains a number of chapters that contain serious engagement with Russell's philosophical writings from the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Even among Russell's earlier philosophical career, the *Companion* covers areas of Russell's thought that are not widely known, such as the works of his idealist period and the substitutional theory.

If I were to give any criticism of the coverage of the anthology, it would be a small complaint about the lack of a single piece tracking the development of Russell's thinking about truth, perhaps in connection with his views on representation and judgment. While these topics are covered in a piecemeal fashion in various selections, a single exposition of the changes in Russell's views would have served to reconcile some otherwise contradictory-seeming statements found in chapters dealing with different phases of Russell's thought—and indeed, would also have shed light on those few instances in which the statements made by the authors are in fact at odds with one another. Room for this might have come from eliminating one of, or amalgamating, either the two chapters on Russell's logicism or the two chapters on Russell's epistemology.

With regard to quality, most of the entries are both well-written and show an excellent grasp both of Russell's writings and

their historical situation. Certainly, some of the chapters fare better than others in this regard. I have noted some minor difficulties in my discussion above, and with one or two chapters there are some more systemic difficulties which space limitations preclude me from elaborating upon here. However, such problems are far outweighed by the strengths of the *Companion* as a whole. Moreover, while there are some disagreements and even direct contradictions between the various authors on certain points—some of which I've noted above—I do not take this to be a fatal flaw of the *Companion*. While sometimes the disagreements are straightforwardly due to a misreading by one of the authors which could be cleared up by consulting the primary texts, more often they reveal the sort of disagreements about interpretation that are inevitable when engaging with a highly original and productive philosopher such as Russell. A good introduction to a philosopher need not and should not hide the fact that there remains serious contention about certain aspects of his work. Instead it should highlight the unresolved disputes in a way that invites the interested reader to investigate them for her or himself. This is the spirit of many of the more controversial passages in several of the chapters, though there are a few occasions in which a contentious point is made without attention being drawn to it.

It should perhaps be noted that the *Companion* is not—nor do I think the authors intended it to be—an anthology containing new and cutting edge research. Indeed, there is remarkable overlap between it and previous writings by the same authors. The chapters by Griffin and Landini are largely just summaries of their respective books (Griffin 1991, Landini 1998), and the information contained in the chapters by Grattan-Guinness, Hylton, Hager, Linsky and Pigden overlap heavily with their previous writings (see Hager 1994, Hylton 1990, Linsky 1999, Grattan-Guinness 2000, Pigden 1999). Specialists already familiar with these authors' works won't find anything remarkably new here, but it is certainly convenient and useful to have a single source-book bringing all the recent secondary literature together in a summary form. As it reads on the back cover of the book, the *Companion* aims to be a "conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Russell," and in this regard it certainly fulfills its aim.

Yet in the end, it is not specialists for whom the collection

will be most useful. Currently, there is nothing to compare to it in providing an accessible but comprehensive introduction to Russell's philosophy for advanced students, particularly, intelligent undergraduates and graduate students capable of doing work on Russell at a high-level. To be sure, there are some introductions on the market, but most are usually too short or too unsophisticated to give students a sense of the nuances and detailed rigor of Russell's philosophy. Most of the writings in the *Companion* are pitched at a level that make them accessible to someone with a solid background in analytic philosophy and only minimal exposure to Russell's own writings. Some of the contributions are pitched higher than others (e.g., those by Grattan-Guinness, Landini, Urquhart and Demopoulos), but in general these are precisely those dealing with topics that would likely only be tackled by relatively more advanced students and specialists. I can speak from first hand experience from having taught a graduate seminar on Russell's philosophy in the most recent term; the *Companion* had appeared just in time for me to recommend it to my students. Their feedback was nearly uniformly positive, and this, perhaps more than anything else, speaks to the quality of Griffin's anthology.

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AT THE HOTELS

—James Coats of Providence is at the Waldorf.
 —Ex-Mayor W.G. Thompson of Detroit at the Holland.
 —Prof H.G. Jessop is at the Windsor.
 John D. McDonald and T.R. Hoyt of Boston are at the Plaza.
 —Commander E. T. Strong, United States Navy, is at the Park Avenue.
 —Maj H. Scobell of the Scots Guards of England is at the Hoffman.
 —F.E. Warren of Boston and John B. Greer of Newport are at the Everett.
 —Bishop Bickersteth of Tokio, Japan, and Congressman W.W. Grout of Vermont are staying at the Murray Hill.
 —H.H. Glassford of Chicago, W.W. Birdsall of Toledo, and C.F. Riely of Albany are at the Metropole.
 —Henry M. Booth of Albany, E.F. Warner of Philadelphia, and J.G. Lundy of Troy are at the Normandie.
 —J.L. McVey and Edward L. Mulholland of Philadelphia and John C. Schroeder of Rochester are at the Imperial.
 —Grove L. Johnson of Sacramento, W.B. Gordon of Cleveland, and J.W. Rudd of Richmond, Va., are at the Marlborough.
 —W.C. Ralson of San Francisco, M.D. Helm and G.W. Ashley of Baltimore, and J.S. Tolman of Boston are at the Manhattan.
 —Senator George W. McBride of Oregon, Brinsley Sheridan of London, F.T.S. Darley of Philadelphia, and Joseph Jefferson are at the Fifth Avenue.
 —F.W. Hoeninghaus and F. Honginghaus of New York; William L. Harris of Washington D.C.; Mrs. M.G. Worthington, Philadelphia; Mr. and Mrs. Bertrand Russell, and Miss Amos of London are at the Brevoort.

Dec 25, 1896

A SUFFRAGIST CANDIDATE**Women at Wimbledon Put One Up Against Harry Chaplin**

LONDON, May 2—The woman suffragists have decided to oppose the election to the House of Commons of Harry Chaplin, ex-president of the Local Government Board, who is the Unionist candidate for the seat for Wimbledon made vacant by the resignation of Charles E. Hambro, Conservative. The Liberals are not contesting the seat, and Mr. Chaplin thought he had a walkover, but the veteran anti-suffrage leader was today confronted by an active woman suffragist campaign on behalf of Bertrand Russell, brother and heir presumptive of Earl Russell. Mr. Russell's wife, a daughter of Robert Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia, has been closely identified with women's political work.

NYT May 3, 1907

RATS AS POLITICAL AGENTS Used Successfully to Break Up Woman Suffrage Candidate's Meeting
Special Cablegram

LONDON, May 11—A new use has been found for rats. They have been drafted into politics, and have shown themselves marvelously efficient in the line of work to which they have been assigned. Out at Wimbledon the Hon. Bertrand Russell, woman suffrage and Liberal candidate for Parliament, decided to open his campaign with a public meeting. The hall was crowded, mostly with women. The meeting was no sooner opened than a plain, organized attempt was made to break it up.

"We are here tonight to pledge ourselves to a worthy candidate," said the Chairman in opening the meeting.

"Really," exclaimed a man in the back of the hall, and then there were guffaws, shouts, shrieks, catcalls, and toots on motorcar horns.

"I trust we will have order in this meeting," pleaded the Chairman.

"Will you please sit down?" demanded a man with a megaphone, and then came a great uproar, which lasted five minutes. So the meeting progressed, until candidate Russell rose to speak. He had said about three words, when the man with the megaphone shouted:

"Let 'em loose."

That was the signal for the rats to make their debut in British politics. An instant later, forty whopping big fellows were scampering over the floor, terrorizing the audience, and especially the women. To say that the meeting adjourned in great disorder is an extremely conservative statement. In subsequent meetings in Mr. Russell's interest it was notable that a small number of women were present.

NYT May 12, 1907

CHAPLIN AN M.P. AGAIN**Chamberlain's Candidate Beats Woman Suffragists' Candidate**

LONDON, May 15—At the bye-election at Wimbledon yesterday the Right Hon. Harry Chaplin, Unionist, ex-president of the Local Government Board, whose candidacy was opposed by the woman suffragists, was elected by the great majority of 6,964 out of a total vote of 13,562. Mr. Chaplin was Mr. Chamberlain's first lieutenant throughout Mr. Chamberlain's protectionist campaign.

Bertrand Russell, the candidate of the woman suffragists, was heavily handicapped by the fact that the Liberals declined officially to nomi-

inate a candidate for the vacancy caused by the resignation of Charles E. Hambro, Conservative, and many liberals declined to support the nominee of the suffragists.

NYT May 16, 1907

YALE NAMES LECTURERS**Student's Registration 3,263—Gifts of \$89,000 reported**

NEW HAVEN, Conn., Oct. 20.—The Rev. Hastings Rashall, Canon of Hereford, England, the Hon. Bertrand Russell, a fellow of the Royal Society, and Prof. Etienne Boutroux, of the University of Paris, were appointed Woodward Lecturers at Yale at the regular meeting of the Yale corporation today. Arthur D. Dewing, of Boston, was also appointed lecturer on Corporation Economics.

The preliminary list of students in all departments shows a registration of 3,263, exactly the same number as last year. A considerable gain is shown in the college, with decreases in the law and medical schools.

Gifts aggregating \$89,000 were reported since the Commencement meeting of the Corporation.

NYT Oct 21, 1913

Bertrand Russell Here to Lecture.

The Hon. Bertrand Russell of Trinity College, Cambridge, one of the foremost lecturers on philosophy, arrived yesterday on the Cunarder Mauretania to lecture at Harvard University under the Lowell trust. This work will cover thirteen months he said. Mr. Russell, who is heir presumptive of Earl Russell, married Alys Smith, the second daughter of R. Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia, in 1894.

NYT Mar 14, 1914

OFF FOR EUROPE TODAY**Some of the Passengers Sailing on Two Steamships—The Arrivals.**

Transatlantic liners sailing today and some of those booked to leave on them are:

BERLIN (Naples)—Count Charles Bonde, Mr. and Mrs. O. M. Clark, Mrs. Allen Curtis, Miss Evelyn Curtis, Mr. and Mrs. A. B. Emmons, Dr. and Mrs. C. W. Fox, W. Gadsby, Dr. W. H. Hennings, Miss A. G. Ervine, Lester H. King, Dean C. Molleson, Miss Caroline L. Morgan, Mrs. F. Peck, Mrs. H. Richmond, Mrs. A. Rowditch, Mrs. H. M. Tweed, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Whitney, Dr. and Mrs. P. B. Wyckoff.

DANUBE (Southampton via West Indies).—T. H. Bettys, C. H. Buswell, C. C. Carpenter, H. W. Castle, S. G. Farwell, Mr. and Mrs. H. Hughes, A. D. Irving, Jr.; R. H. Russell, W. Murray, Mr. and Mrs. F. W. Stillman, W. D. Walcott, C. J. Landon, James Willis, Mr. and Mrs. Herbert J. Giddons.

CAMERONIA (Glasgow).—Mr. and Mrs. Robert Buchanan, Mr. and Mrs. J. A. Doyle, Miss Kathleen Irwin, C. L. Mitchell, Mrs. F. R. Peters, Miss Marion J. Peters, Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Whipple.

Transatlantic liners arriving yesterday, and some of their passengers, were:

MAURETANIA (Liverpool).—Mrs. D. Alexander, Sir Hugh and Lady Bell, E. W. H. Bealon, Capt. Charles E. Boote, Mr. and Mrs. F. T. Busk, Miss M. L. Cameron, Mr. and Mrs. L. W. Campbell, Mrs. H. A. Cushing, W. C. Davison, H. L. Dudley, Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Fares, Mr. and Mrs. Albert French, John C. Goold, Mrs. H. T. Harkness, Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Iselin, F. Orr Lewis, J. T. Lenfesty, J. H. McFadden, J. A. Nelson, Miss G. Moreland, S. R. Parsons, W. J. Paynter, William Prime, Miss M. A. Robb, Dr. and Mrs. J. T. Rogers, the Hon. Bertrand Russell, Mr. and Mrs. F. Morse Smith, Mr.

and Mrs. Benjamin Stein, Mrs. R. E. Strawbridge, Mr. and Mrs. H. Van Dam, Capt. E. C. T. Warner, Earl de la Warr, Mrs. N. Whitehouse, Mrs. L. G. Young, Sir Francis Younghusband, K. C. I. E., E. C. Otis, W. Woods, C. A. Tillson.

CHICAGO (Havre).—Roger Flory, F. Florence, Mrs. F. F. Hurd, Miss Hurd, W. Jamison, Clement Heaton, C. Furban, M. Werner, Leon Thebaud.

NYT Mar 14, 1914

COLUMBIA TO GIVE METALS.**Recipients of the Barnard and Butler Prizes Chosen.**

It was announced at Columbia University yesterday that the Barnard gold medal for meritorious service to science and the Butler gold and silver medals for contributions to philosophy and education would be awarded at commencement.

The Barnard gold medal for meritorious service to science, established and endowed by the will of the late President Barnard, is awarded every fifth year, on the recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences. The award for 1915 is made to William H. Bragg, D. Sc., F. R. S., Cavendish Professor of Physics in the University of Leeds, and to his son, W. L. Bragg of the University of Cambridge, for their researches in molecular physics and in the particular field of radio-activity.

The Butler gold medal, established by an anonymous donor a year ago, also is awarded every fifth year. On the recommendation of a Committee of Advice, consisting of Dean Woodbridge, Professors Adler, Bush, Dewey, Russell, Suzzallo, and E. L. Thorndike, the medal is to be awarded to Bertrand Russell, F. R. S., Lecturer and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for his contri-

bution to logical theory. The contributions to educational administration.

The Butler silver medal is to be awarded to Professor Ellwood Patterson Cubberley of Leland Stanford, Jr., University for his contributions to educational administration.

NYT May 19, 1915

English Suffragist to Speak

A representative English suffragist, the Honorable Mrs. Bertrand Russell of London, who is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Constitutional Suffragists of England under the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, of which Mrs. Henry Fawcett is president, is to speak on "Why English Women Need the Vote in Time of War," tomorrow at 4 o'clock, at Rumford Hall, 50 East Forty-first Street. The lecture is under the auspices of the Educational Section of the New York State Woman Suffrage Party, whose members are Mrs. Winston Churchill, Chairman; Mrs. John W. Alexander, Mrs. John Blair, Mrs. Bourke Cockran, Mrs. Magee Ellsworth, Mrs. Reginald Fincke, Mrs. Philip Lydig, Miss Marjorie Nott, Mrs. Ernest Peele, Mrs. Joseph S. Stevens, Mrs. Edgerton L. Winthrop, Jr.

NYT Mar 14, 1916

Mrs. Bertrand Russell to Speak.

Mrs. Bertrand Russell of England is to speak on the subject of "Why English Women Need the Vote in Time of War" in Rumford Hall, 50 East Fortieth Street on Wednesday afternoon at 4 o'clock. The speaker, who is known in England as the Hon. Mrs. Russell, has come to America as a representative of the National Union, whose president is Mrs. Henry

Fawcett, wife of the late Postmaster General.

She speaks here under the auspices of the Educational Section of the New York State Suffrage Party. Mrs. Howard Mansfield is Chairman of that section. Mrs. Russell is an American by birth, the daughter of Mrs. Hannah Whittall Smith, a Quakeress, and pioneer suffragist here. She is the cousin of Miss M. Carey Thomas, President of Bryn Mawr College and of Mrs. Simon Flexner of New York.

NYT Mar 20, 1916

WANTS OLD MEN TO FIGHT.**Mrs. Bertrand Russell Favors Armies Made Up of the Aged.**

Mrs. Bertrand Russell, suffrage worker and philanthropist, daughter of the pioneer suffragist of America, Hannah Whittall Smith, and wife of the English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, speaking on the subject, "Why English Women Need the Vote in Time of War," at Rumford Hall, 50 East Forty-first Street, yesterday afternoon said she did not believe in women fighting or drilling and that she would not send any except the older men to the battlefield.

It was at the close of the address that a woman in the audience asked Mrs. Russell if the English and French women had followed the example of the Slav women of going to the front with the men.

"Some of the French women have done it, but I am thankful to say no Englishwomen have done so," said Mrs. Russell. "It would be the end of all things if the women were allowed to fight. For the women even to practice shooting is

a great mistake. We don't want to increase the number of combatants. If I had my way, I'd say, 'don't let any of the men go to the battlefield before they are 60 or 70.' We don't want to lose our healthiest and youngest. It would be perfectly fair, wouldn't it, if everyone did the same?"

Mrs. Russell continued:

"The women in England are very capable, and as we win battles not only with the men in the field, but with the workers at home, the Englishwomen have answered the question that I have argued so many times with army and navy men that women should not vote because they cannot fight. We cannot fight and I am glad of it, but we can work." Mrs. Winston Churchill presided.

NYT Mar 23, 1916

CAMBRIDGE DROPS RUSSELL.

Rector, Who Married American, Convicted Under Defense of Realm Act.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Friday, July 14—The Times says the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, has removed the Hon. Bertrand Russell from his rectorate in logic and principles of mathematics in consequence of his conviction under the Defense of the Realm act.

Russell was fined at Mansion House on June 5 for making statements in a leaflet issued in the "No Conscription Fellowship" which were intended to prejudice recruiting.

Russell married Alys Smith of Philadelphia.

The Hon. Bertrand Arthur William Russell, who is the heir of Earl Russell, was fined \$500 and costs, with the alternative of sixty-one days' imprisonment, for having written a leaflet defending the "Conscientious Objector" to service in the British Army.

He is well known in this country, having been for several years visiting lecturer on mathematics and philosophy at Harvard University, while his wife is the daughter of a Quaker merchant and preacher in Philadelphia, R. Pearsall Smith. Her mother was the famous Hannah Whitall Smith, author of "A Christian's Secret of a Happy Life," which has been translated into many languages and has reached a circulation of more than 1,000,000. During March she was here delivering a series of lectures on behalf of the National Union of Women Suffrage Societies.

The Hon. Bertrand Russell was a lecturer and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and had a most distinguished career at the university. While a student there he took the first class in mathematics and moral sciences, and has since written a number of widely read books, the last of which, published in 1914, was "Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy."

He is one of several of the "intellectuals" of England who have gone on record as opposed to conscription. Others of these are Professors Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University; C. P. Trevelyan, M. P., son of the private secretary of the late Queen Victoria.

NYT Jul 14, 1916

COMMENTARY ON RUSSELL'S FIRST AMERICAN NEWS REPORTS

JOHN ONGLEY

The Problem of History

These newspaper articles from the *New York Times* are that paper's earliest reports on Bertrand Russell. They cover both mundane and important events, but even the most banal clippings provide glimpses of Russell's fin-de-siecle world in England and America before the war.

The first article, from 1896, is drawn from the society pages of the *Times*, and lists the notable people staying in New York hotels that day, including Russell and his wife. Note that as well as listing the people themselves, it also lists *the very hotel* they are staying at. Even by today's celebrity media standards, this careful attention to the comings and goings of "notables" seems to refute the idea that the cult of celebrity is a recent invention.

Leaping ahead eleven years, the next news articles, from 1907, concern Russell's run for Parliament that year. Russell was the first person to run on a women's suffrage ticket in England, and the event was a genuinely newsworthy one. Following this are three articles concerning Russell's 1914 visit to America and the award of a prize to him by Columbia University in 1915. At this time, Russell is an intellectual celebrity and the articles appeared mainly for that reason.

The next three articles concern Alys Russell's 1916 visit to America to lecture for the woman's suffrage movement. As the articles reproduced here show, Alys possessed a bit of celebrity status in her own right — there seems to have been a real interest in her by the press apart from her position as Russell's wife. The last article, also from 1916, announces Russell's dismissal from Cambridge University for anti-war activities. It is just the first in a long series of press reports about Russell and the war.

One of the things of interest in these news clippings is the fact that they are so full of (what are now known to be) obvious errors, and even contradictions, as well as containing many assertions that beg further examination and explanation. Such news clippings are part of the historian's primary data, and these show clearly what

the real data of history are like for most historians most of the time – confused and confusing contradictory reports, and other puzzling anomalies.

In most cases, one can tell that the articles contain errors only by comparing one questionable source with other equally questionable ones. Often, looking more carefully at the record will only produce a quagmire of ever more conflicting information and you just pick the most authoritative looking claims, though other times, you are lucky enough to find one version that fits the known facts better than the other versions, and that becomes the “truth”. With that in mind, here is a list of what seem to be the major errors or questionable claims in these newspaper articles, as nearly as can be determined.

The Rats

The biggest whopper in these articles *may* be in the second article from 1907 (May 12th). It tells a somewhat questionable story of 40 live rats being let loose at Russell’s first public meeting at Wimbledon in his campaign for Parliament there as a woman’s suffrage candidate. According to this report, the flood of rats terrorized the women and effectively broke up the meeting. The article also suggests – with a broad wink to the “fellows” out there – that considerably fewer women attended Russell’s later campaign meetings.

Russell himself supports this version of the story by retelling it in his 1967 *Autobiography*. There, he not only repeats the story as told in the papers – and in fact, publishes a news account of it in the *Autobiography* from some paper other than the NYT – but also elaborates on it a little, saying: “At my first meeting, rats were let loose to frighten the ladies, and ladies who were in the plot screamed in pretended terror with a view to disgracing their sex.”¹

But don’t close the case yet, because Russell tells a quite different story in a letter written to Helen Flexner on June 7th, just three weeks after the incident – whatever it was. In that letter, Russell says “[The campaign] was a funny time – partly horrid, partly amusing. The first meeting was the worst – a huge hall absolutely

¹ *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1872-1914*, Bertrand Russell. (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1967, p. 246.)

packed, about half violently hostile, and come only to make a row, whistling, cat-calling, getting up free fights, pretending to have fits, and getting carried out – everything imaginable to make speaking inaudible. The papers averred that rats were let loose, and the myth grew – I never saw them, and no one I asked did, until at last I found a man who said two had been let loose at the very end, and he had seen one dead.”²

Yet another version of the events comes from Ray Monk’s recent biography of Russell. While Monk simply repeats the rat story as described in the papers and Russell’s *Autobiography*, he also asserts that Russell’s meetings were well attended, thus contradicting the newspaper story that attendance at them, at least by women, dwindled after the rat debacle.³ Since the newspaper’s reported lower attendance mid-campaign, it is unreliable, though it is not clear how much more reliable Monk’s assertion of good attendance at the meetings is, as he does not give his evidence for the claim.

As for the rats, which story should be believed – the one in Russell’s 1907 letter to Helen Flexner or the press accounts of 1907 and Russell’s 1967 *Autobiography*? Had Russell simply come to repeat the press accounts by 1967 because they made a better story, although the more modest 1907 version he gave in his letter to Helen was closer to the truth? Or did later reflection and further evidence force Russell to admit that the press accounts, which he was not willing at that time to credit, were actually true?

In the same article in which the rat story appears (May 12th), Russell is referred to as a “Liberal” candidate. But as Monk tells it (p. 189), the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies asked Russell to stand for election when the Liberals had declined to even field a candidate at Wimbledon because it was such a strong Tory district. This is also the version told in the May 3rd newspaper report. Griffin elaborates on this view (p. 313), saying that the Liberals gave Russell no official recognition during the campaign. And this last claim is supported by the next newspaper clipping from the

² The letter is published in *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell*, vol. one, Nicholas Griffin (ed.) (Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1992, pp. 313-314.)

³ *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude 1872-1921*, Ray Monk. (The Free Press, New York, 1996, pp. 189-190.)

Times, of May 16th, which contradicts, or corrects, the previous one, but affirms the one before that, by claiming that “the Liberals declined officially to nominate a candidate for the vacancy”, thus supporting Monk’s and Griffin’s stories. It doesn’t appear as though Russell was a Liberal candidate.

Russell’s American Tour

The next three articles concern Russell’s 1914 trip to America. The first of these (Oct 21, 1913) adds some information to what is already known about the trip, and raises new questions. The article reports that Russell was appointed a “Woodward Lecturer” at the October 20th meeting of Yale’s governing board, without specifying what the responsibilities of a Woodward Lecturer are. Getting a position to teach one or several courses for a term or more is commonly referred to as an “appointment”, so that it sounds as though Russell is being hired for at least a semester, to teach a course or two.

But we know that Russell gave only one lecture at Yale while in America. Moreover, numerous other people who likewise received such Woodward Appointments also only delivered one lecture there that year. It is likely, then, that the Yale appointment announced in the paper was just for the one lecture there that Russell in fact gave.

In a discussion of this article, Jack Clontz has pointed out that the name of one of the lecturers referred to in the Yale announcement is misspelled. It should say that Hastings Rashdall (not Rashall) will also lecture there. Kenneth Blackwell found a copy of the *Yale Daily News* for May 15, 1914 in the Russell Archive at McMaster University which reports that the title of Russell’s Yale talk was ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’. Nicholas Griffin points out that the chronology of vol. 8 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* identifies the lecture as essentially the same as Chapter 4 of *Our Knowledge of the External World*. And Robert Riemenschneider adds that according to Victor Lenzen’s notes from Russell’s 1914 Harvard lectures, Russell made some significant changes in his views on the construction of time (and potentially of space) from those expressed in *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In particular, Russell no longer treated simultaneity as a primitive relation, but defined it in terms of precedence –

roughly, x and y are simultaneous iff x does not precede y and y does not precede x and x does not equal y . These changes were made prior to his Yale lecture, so Russell may have included them in the Yale talk as well. However, when Russell revised *Our Knowledge of the External World*, for the 1926 English and 1929 American editions, he did not incorporate these changes into the text.⁴

The next of these articles, from May 14, announces Russell’s arrival in the States to lecture at Harvard. It reports Russell saying that he will be there for thirteen months, when he actually planned on staying, and actually did stay, for just three months. For example, he writes in a March 19, 1914 letter to Ottoline Morrell that he plans to depart for Europe on June 6th.⁵

On the same day that the article above was published (March 14th), the *Times* published a list of all of the notables departing for or arriving from Europe and includes Russell on the list of those arriving on the *Mauretania*. In his *Autobiography*, Russell gives this account of the trip: “I sailed on the *Mauretania* on March 7th. Sir Hugh Bell was on the ship. His wife spent the whole voyage looking for him, or finding him with a pretty girl. Whenever I met him after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, I found him asserting it was on the *Lusitania* he had sailed.” Besides its more colorful points of interest, this account confirms that the *Times*’ spelling of *Mauretania* was likely the correct one.⁶

Many of the articles here make reference to Russell’s “American wife” and indicate a certain fascination on the part of the press with this fact. Though Alys’ family was itself notable, and Alys similarly had her own celebrity status, this fascination by the press in Russell having an American wife is no doubt also due to the great interest Americans had marrying their daughters to European aristocrats. Just in the March 14 list of notables arriving from or departing for Europe, one can spot three pairs of mothers and daughters traveling together to or from that continent.

⁴ In the internet discussion group Russell-I. See Clontz, Blackwell, Griffin, Riemenschneider, and Ongley email messages, Feb 14-16, 2004.

⁵ Griffin 1992, p. 497.

⁶ Russell 1967, p. 346.

The *New York Times* article from May 19, 1915 announces an award to Russell from Columbia University for his logical work. Its appearance indicates the extent to which Russell had already become an intellectual celebrity and how quickly *Mathematica Principia* was recognized as being a major intellectual achievement. The previous three articles, about Russell coming to America and lecturing in 1914, also indicate this, as the trip itself is only newsworthy because it was Russell who has come to lecture.

An Infamous Rector

The next three articles, from March 1916, are about Alys' visit to New York to speak on woman's suffrage. The first of these (March 14th) seems to get the date she was to speak wrong, while the second corrects the date but gets the address of the Hall where she was to speak wrong, and only the third article finally gets them both right at once.

Cambridge gave Russell the boot in 1916 for his anti-war activity. That notorious decision is reported in the last of these articles from the *New York Times* (July 14th). The article refers to Russell as a "rector" who was removed from his "rectorate" at Cambridge, though he was instead a lecturer removed from his lectureship. The article also errs in claiming that Russell had been a visiting lecturer on mathematics and philosophy at Harvard for several years, when he had in fact been a visiting lecturer on logic and theory of knowledge there for only a few months, though in the same paragraph, the writer is now at least calling Russell a lecturer rather than a rector.

So much for our adventures in reading primary data. Readers who note other errors, contradictions, or anomalies in these articles are welcome to write to the *Quarterly* about them. We will print all such corrections in future issues.

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ongley@iit.edu

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

I'm not afraid of planes, but I am sick of them. Instead of flying to the Eastern Division of the APA, this year I took the celebrated Acela, luxury liner of trains, a futuristic beauty with clean, comfy seats, and all the stretching and walking room you long for while airborne. I reached Washington D.C., where the conference was to be held, three hours after leaving New York's Penn Station. Washington is a lovely city: spacious, clean, and calm compared to New York's thronging masses, dirt, and anxieties. Our hotel, however, was like every other, and so was the conference—with one exception. The check-in: What! *No Conference Programs!* The Conference Aide explained that a delivery from the warehouse was overdue; I offered to get the programs from the warehouse myself, but apparently no one thought I was serious. Lacking a program, I felt aimless, out-of-it, deaf. I huddled in my room.

Next morning – rise and shine, grab coffee, and rush to an early morning meeting on—Russell! The session was well attended, better than recent years, and I took the opportunity to display Society related materials. Though David White couldn't attend (he'd spent all his travel money on his trip to Istanbul), I spotted other Society members in the audience and among the speakers. The papers were worth hearing and the discussion sessions especially so: Sorin Costreie (University of Western Ontario) gave the first talk, "The Epistemological Difficulty in Russell's Theory of Denoting Concepts"; Kevin Klement (University of Massachusetts—Amherst) was commentator. Next up was "Russell on Appearance, Reality and Color", delivered by Derek Brown (University of Western Ontario) and with commentary by Justin Leiber (University of Houston).

At the APA, days tend to blend into one another. Was it the first or second day that I heard the Joongal Kim speak on Frege ("Are Numbers Objects?"), while Christopher Pincock responded? At this session, Matthew McKeon's paper "Russell and Logical Ontology" prompted a longish informal conversation on Russell in which Gregory Landini grabbed the floor, patiently but urgently demanding the disentangling of problems bearing on Russell's epistemology from those belonging to his logic, and in general adding many points of clarification. The papers here segued interestingly into the last session I attended at the conference: a symposium between Peter Sullivan (University of Stirling) and

Thomas Ricketts (University of Pennsylvania), with Michael Friedman (Stanford University) chairing and Michael Kremer (University of Chicago) commenting. Both speakers at this symposium addressed how to read Frege—as a man whose work is philosophical, and who is not simply a mathematician, or as a mathematician to be understood only by looking at the history of mathematics—and neither quite got around to the topic of the symposium: Analytic Philosophy: Past and Future. On this, the last day, I spent considerable time (which, we all know, is money) at the book booths, returning with aching arms and bursting bundles to the DC terminal for the quick and quiet, civilized trip home. RC

MORE SOCIETY NEWS (continued from page 10)

RUSSELL IN ROCHESTER. In December, the Greater Rochester Russell Set met at Daily Perks for the last time. As of January, it has been meeting at Writers & Books in Rochester (740 University Ave, ph: 585-473-2590). Meetings are at 7 pm on the second Thursday of each month. Admission is \$3, free to members of W&B (for those who attend regularly, basic membership in W&B costs less than paying at the door). David White says that W&Bs is Rochester's best-known literary institution and is expected to be an excellent venue for the GRRS. W&B faculty are all published authors or university professors, but since W&B does not give "credit" or award degrees, the tuition charge is far less than at colleges and universities.

~ * ~

As indicated on the cover, the BRS *Quarterly* is now published with the support from the Humanities Division at Lehman College, City University of New York. Specifically, it has received a grant from the Dean of Humanities at Lehman College, Marlene Gottlieb, for \$3000. We hope to use the extra money to make small improvements in the *Quarterly* throughout the following year.

~ * ~

The editors of the *BRSQ* would like to thank BRS Treasurer Dennis Darland for all the help he has given them since they began editing the *Quarterly* in August. Only when they started working on the *Quarterly* did they discover how much work Dennis does for the Society, and how he is always there for people when help is needed with Society business. We feel lucky to have Dennis managing the Society's day-to-day business.

SPECIAL THANKS TO THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THE BRS IN 2003. Twenty people contributed money to the BRS last year over and above their regular membership fees. We would like to thank them for the concrete and substantial support that have given the BRS. Such contributions are essential to the continued vitality of the Society, and we appreciate this support very much. The contributors were:

Patron (\$250 and up) David Goldman,
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Other Donor, Ricard Flores.

~ A CALL FOR PAPERS ~

THE 2004 MEETINGS OF THE EASTERN, CENTRAL, AND
 PACIFIC DIVISIONS OF THE APA

The Bertrand Russell Society requests submissions for talks to be given at the BRS session of the 2004 Eastern Division* APA meeting in Boston next December.

Submissions should

1. fit within a 20-30 minute time frame
2. bear on any aspect of Russell's philosophy or related issues
3. be sent by email as a Word document to:
rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu
4. be received no later than: May 21, 2004*

Suggestions for panel meetings and/or "author meets critics" sessions are also welcome.

*Those wishing to present talks at the Central or Pacific division meetings should submit abstracts to rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu no later than June 15, 2004.

ELECTION RESULTS – A PREORDAINED LANDSLIDE TAKES PLACE
ON SCHEDULE.

With only seven nominations and one well announced write-in candidate for eight three-year term positions on the BRS Board of Directors, results were not entirely unforeseen. Those elected for the 2004-2006 term are: Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, David Henehan, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, Tom Stanley, David White, and David Blitz.

Here are the votes for each: Ken Blackwell: 29, Dennis Darland: 29, David Henehan: 25, John Lenz: 29, Stephen Reinhardt: 27, Tom Stanley: 29, David White: 23. The number of write-in votes are as follows: Edgar Boedeker: 2, David Blitz: 12, Don Jackanicz: 1, Kevin Klement: 2.

Congratulations and best of luck to the 2004-06 Directors. Thanks also to Tom Stanley for being the election committee and collecting and counting all the votes and to Chad Trainer for verifying them.

~ * ~

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(2004-2006) Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, David Henehan, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, Tom Stanley, David White, David Blitz

≡ **RUSTLINGS!** ≡ by Gerry Wildenberg

Numbers 1 and 2 below are coded Russell-quotes in which each letter stands for another letter. (E.G., BERTRAND RUSSELL could be coded as OREGENAQ EHFFRYYY, O=B, R=E, etc.) The quotes below use different codes. After solving them, try to identify the source.

1. SEXJIU YC E ZYGN BZZMFYIK WN EP
BFFXICCYDI EXUN CIXDYPT OSEG EUBMPGC GB EP
BMGCYKI FBOIX

2. In the cypher below the word separations are disguised and punctuation is removed. The grouping into 5 letter "words" is meant only to help readability and does not relate to the actual quote.

IXBPA XKVAJ VYUIO CXMPB WRKXU KPWRJ HMQMP
UJRRJ UPWSJ SAPQJ HWVYX YHSAJ KNAAP VYUBJ
SUKQQ PUUCK HMBUP XMJKU HOQAY BNMBN SAPRY
SSPX B JCRJF PXSOM BMBWM Y

3. The puzzle below is not a substitution cipher. The quote below has had its spaces and punctuation removed and some of the letters have been exchanged with nearby letters. For example, "The puzzle below" might be changed to: tuhepzlezbewo

ihaveevrymysapthiywthyoruhiswotcovnretroy
fainceetfeerhtoughthihtinkwoheevrathtyouhsd
uloexeirsrseoscentuaionasregdrasesuxalalbcmk
ali

Last Issue's ≡ **RUSTLINGS!** ≡

1. *One of the most important elements of success in becoming a man of genius is to learn the art of denunciation.* – "How to Become a Man of Genius" in Columns From the Hearst Newspapers, 1932.

2. *Logic, in the Middle Ages, and down to the present day in teaching, meant no more than a scholastic collection of technical terms and rules of syllogistic inference.* - *Our Knowledge of the External World* 1914, 1928.

3. *One of the odd effects of the importance which each of us attaches to himself is that he tends to regard our own good as evil, because to the purpose of the world he is a hindrance.* Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind in *Empire* 1980, 1985.

INSERTED into scanned documents 7/18/2015
by Dennis J. Darland (who scanned them)

Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2003 ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT

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|-------------------------------|-----------------|
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| Contrib. BRS <i>Quarterly</i> | 850.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 1,617.75 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 560.14 |
| Renewals | 3,486.17 |
| TOTAL Dues | 4,046.31 |
| Library Inc | 13.95 |
| Meeting Inc | 50.00 |
| Other Inc | 47.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 5,775.01 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 52.16 |
| BRS Paper Award | 223.44 |
| Library Exp | 72.16 |
| Meeting Exp | 712.04 |
| Newsletter | 3,396.06 |
| Other Exp | 20.00 |
| RUSSELL Sub | 2,601.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 7,076.86 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -1,301.85 |
| BALANCE 12/31/03 | 5,440.32 |

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4TH QUARTER 2003 TREASURER'S REPORT
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| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| Contrib. BRS | 30.00 |
| Contrib. BRS <i>Quarterly</i> | 850.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 880.00 |
| Dues | |
| Renewals* | 166.33 |
| TOTAL Dues | 166.33 |
| Other Income | 37.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 1,083.33 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 16.41 |
| Library Expenses | 38.90 |
| Newsletter | 1,215.51 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 1,270.82 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -187.49 |
| BALANCE 12/31/03 | 5,440.32 |

* 2004 dues will appear in 2004

Compiled 1/15/04 by Dennis Darland
BRS Treasurer, djarland@qconline.com

GREATER ROCHESTER RUSSELL SET

Celebrating Six Years of Monthly Russell Meetings
Open to the Public

2003-2004 PROGRAM

| | |
|-------------|---|
| January 8 | Humor in Russell |
| February 12 | Problem of Continuity |
| March 11 | The Scientific Outlook |
| April 8 | Cheerful Pessimism |
| May 13 | Portraits of Russell from Memory: A Panel Discussion |
| June 10 | Defenders of God |
| July 8 | International War Crimes Tribunal |
| August 12 | Satan in the Suburbs |
| September 9 | Lady Ottoline |
| October 14 | D.H. Lawrence |
| November 12 | Why I Am Not a Christian |
| December 9 | Marriage and Morals |

Meetings are held at Writers & Books' Verb Café, 740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY, at 7 pm (note new meeting time and place). Admission is \$3, free to members of Writers & Books. For information, please call Tim Madigan at 585-424-3184, or email him at: tmadigan@rochester.rr.com. Dates and topics are subject to change.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Number 122 / May 2004



A DIFFICULT MAN

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of the life, work, and writings of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." (*What I Believe*, 1925) THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY can be viewed online at: <http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ>

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

May 2004 / number 122

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On the cover: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Cambridge, 1929.

Plymouth State University – Plymouth NH June 18-20, 2004

**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
31ST ANNUAL MEETING**

Schedule of Events

FRIDAY

- 4-5:45 **REGISTRATION**, Robert Frost House
6-7:00 **BUFFET**, Prospect Hall
7:15-8:45 **Russellian Surprise**, Robert Frost House
8:45-9:15 **BRS BOARD MEETING**, Robert Frost House

SATURDAY

- 7:30 **BREAKFAST**, Prospect Hall

Papers in Robert Frost House

- 9-9:45 Alan Schwerin, Monmouth U, "Russell & the Soul"*
10-10:45 Irem Kurtsal, Syracuse U,
"Russell on Matter and Our Knowledge of the External World"
11-11:45 James Connelly, York U,
"Russell and Wittgenstein on Propositions"
12-12:50 **LUNCH**, Prospect Hall
1-1:40 **GENERAL BRS MEETING**
1:50-2:30 David Blitz, Central Conn. State U,
"Russell and Kant on War and Peace"
2:40-3:20 Henrique Ribeiro, U of Coimbra,
"Russell and Wittgenstein on 'A believes "p"'"
3:30-4:10 Jane Duran, U California, Santa Barbara
"Russell on History and Intrinsic Value"
5:30-6:15 **RED HACKLE HOUR**, Robert Frost house
7:45-8:30 **Award**

SUNDAY

- 7:30 **BREAKFAST**, Prospect Hall
9-9:40 Peter Stone, Stanford U, "Durant and Russell" *
9:50-10:30 Iva Apostolova, U of Ottawa,
"From Acquaintance to Neutral Monism"
10:40-11:20 Chad Trainer, Independent Scholar,
"Russell's Pennsylvania"
11:30-12:10 Kevin Klement, U Mass.,
"The Propositional Functions Version of Russell's Paradox"

- 12:20-2:00 **COOKOUT-LUNCH**, Robert Frost House

***MASTER CLASSES:** Materials provided online at:
<http://oz.plymouth.edu/~rperkins/>

IN THIS ISSUE

The past two issues of the BRS *Quarterly* have focused on ideas – what did Frege think of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, what are we to think of Russell's and Quine's views about a general term that subsumes wildly different kinds of things, did Russell have a modal logic, etc. In this issue, the focus shifts to personalities, with Justin Leiber exploring the very different intellectual styles of Russell and Wittgenstein. Justin takes exception to Ray Monk's characterizations of these two outsized individuals in Monk's Russell and Wittgenstein biographies, and argues for his own, different view of their personalities.¹ By way of providing evidence for his case, Justin relates a few stories about his own philosophical education which give us some insight into how analytic philosophy was practiced and understood in its heyday.

Moving back to philosophical issues, Jane Duran provides an illuminating comparison of Russell's arguments against both neo-Hegelian idealism and pragmatism. She demonstrates that Russell viewed the two schools as sharing the same underlying assumptions and weaknesses, and so subjected them to the same criticisms.

We continue our series of letters by Russell – this one is a 1942 letter to the editor of *Time Magazine* on Gandhi's demand at that time for immediate Indian independence. Ray Perkins has written an introduction to the letter that sheds further light onto Russell's thinking on the issue. Also concerning India, Phil Ebersole reviews a biography of the Indian intellectual and adventurer M.N. Roy, while Chad Trainer reviews Peter Denton's recent examination of Russell's views on science, religion, and war. Both reviews are highly informative.

This issue's conference report is by Gregory Landini, who covered the recent History of Early Analytic Philosophy Conference at Purdue University for us. The conference seems to have been packed with exciting work, and those of us who missed it hope

¹ Monk's Russell biography is the two volume *The Spirit of Solitude: 1872-1921* (1996) and *The Ghost of Madness: 1921-1970* (2000); his Wittgenstein biography is the 1990 *The Duty of Genius*.

that these papers will appear in print sometime soon. Arthur Sullivan writes about logic and language in his reply to Kevin Klement's review of Arthur's recent anthology of writings by Frege and Russell.

In 'Society News', Tony Simpson of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has sent an account of a recent "citizen's" tribunal in Brussels modeled on Russell's Vietnam Tribunal and Phil Ebersole of the GRRS reports on the recent resolution of Dr. Tunis Shaikh's persecution in Pakistan for blasphemy. Finally, Gerry Wildenberg, also of the GRRS, provides us with yet another *Rustlings!* crypto-cipher, and in addition, offers some advice on how to solve them. Note: Of the three puzzles Gerry writes for *Rustlings!* each month, the third is a kind recently devised by Gerry, who has not yet had an opportunity to try solving one himself. He wonders how "solvable" people find them. Has anyone solved one of these sorts of puzzles yet? Send us an email and let us know. February's Russell letter to the editor was reprinted with the permission of the Bertrand Russell Archive of McMaster University.

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SOCIETY NEWS

WORLD TRIBUNAL ON IRAQ. A series of citizens' tribunals on Iraq, modeled on Bertrand Russell's Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, are occurring in cities around the world now and in the coming year. One of them, which took place this April in Brussels, was in fact called 'The BRussells Tribunal' in honor of Russell's inspiration for this form of public forum. The idea for the Iraq tribunals seems to have occurred spontaneously in a number of places around the globe, but the specific details for them were worked out in June 2003, at a conference of the European Network for Peace and Human Rights that was sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Tony Simpson of the BRPF attended both the Brussel's tribunal and another BRPF conference of the European Network held in Brussels later that month. Here is his report of the two conferences:

April proved to be a fine month to visit Brussels, twice. The sun shone, and people gathered outdoors in the parks and the squares. Meanwhile, far away in Iraq, the siege of Falluja was claiming hundreds of lives, and in Baghdad the horrors of Abu Ghraib prison were already well known to General Taguba, the Red Cross, and Ambassador Bremer, even if President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Prime Minister Blair were trying to look the other way. But what was really happening in Iraq?

My first journey to Belgium was to attend the BRussells Tribunal. The organisers had deliberately wished to invoke the tradition of earlier Russell Tribunals – hence the pun. The organisers, and in particular, Lieven de Cauter, himself an independent philosopher, seemed keenly aware of a responsibility to "prevent the crime of silence" with respect to Iraq, as Russell had been with Vietnam a generation before.

The subtitle of their Tribunal was 'A hearing on the Project for the New American Century'. It proved remarkably faithful to its purpose in probing the activities of that neo-conservative think-tank. Jim Lobe and Tom Barry, for the defence, manifested an encyclopaedic knowledge of the public statements and backdoor connections of this highly influential

lobby. Hans von Sponeck, who along with Tribunal Commissioner Denis Halliday resigned his UN post in Iraq in protest at the severe sanctions regime to which the country was subjected, provided candid testimony of the long gestation of the wars on Iraq, and the involvement of the United States in arming the country during its war with Iran in the 1980s. François Houtart presided gently over the proceedings and the Tribunal Commission, whose judgment can be found on the web (www.brusseltribunal.org). One Commissioner, the Egyptian feminist writer Nawal El Saadawi, recalled her visit to Russell at his home in Wales long ago, in 1960.

One revelation of the Tribunal concerned what is really happening in Iraq. Ghazwan Al-Mukhtar, an Iraqi scientist and writer, testified that, contrary to claims, there is no appreciable reconstruction to benefit the civilian population. In fact, when Iraqi engineers offered to help restore the electricity, water and telephone services, their offer was turned down flat. Instead, workers are brought in from abroad, mainly disappearing inside the stockades and garrisons of the occupying armies. Living conditions are desperate. Meanwhile, the killing at Falluja was claiming hundreds of lives. Opposition to the occupation was spreading throughout Iraqi society. Such well-informed Iraqi testimony to the Tribunal threw a sharp light on the true state of Iraq, and in so doing contributed to the wider process of the World Tribunal on Iraq, of which the Brussels hearing was one of a series of scheduled international sessions, destined to conclude in Istanbul in 2005.

By the time I returned to Brussels at the end of April for the conference of the European Network for Peace and Human Rights, the death toll in Falluja was reckoned at more than 600. Stark video evidence of the slaughter taking place there had reached us just in time. Al Jazeera television had promptly responded to a request from the Russell Foundation for film of the siege of Falluja to show at the Network's conference in the European Parliament in Brussels. This was a truly shocking documentary which troubled all those who saw it. Opposition to the war is clearly gathering strength, and we're bound to wonder how long its perpetrators can continue in their chosen

course. Tony Simpson, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, www.russfound.org 28.05.04

Further information about the World Tribunals on Iraq can be found at the following websites: www.worldtribunal.org www.worldtribunal-nyc.org and www.brusseltribunal.org

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THE ORDEAL OF DR. SHAIKH. Past issues of the BRS *Quarterly* have reported on the ordeal of Dr. Yunis Shaikh, who was tried, convicted, and jailed for blasphemy in Pakistan, and members of the BRS have written letters in protest of his treatment. Dr. Shaikh's ordeal finally seems to be at an end. Phil Ebersole gives us this report.

Dr. Yunis Shaikh, a humanist who was under sentence of death in Pakistan on charges of blasphemy, has been freed by an appeals court. He had been imprisoned, mostly in solitary confinement, for three years. Appeals for his release were made by humanist groups and publications all over the world, including the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly.

Dr. Shaikh, a medical lecturer, was a controversial figure in Pakistan, partly because of his advocacy of a peace settlement with India. He was arrested in October, 2000, and accused of stating in class, in response to a student's question, that Mohammed could not logically have been a Muslim prior to his receiving his revelation from God, nor could Mohammed's parents, who died before he received his revelation.

The complaint was lodged by leaders of an organization called the Committee for the Protection of the Prophethood, an organization of fundamentalist Muslims who harass and attack Muslims they believe to be unorthodox. None of his accusers were present in the classroom when Dr. Shaikh allegedly made his remarks. The threat of violence at his trial was so great that the court's last two sittings were held in camera in the premises of the Adiala Jail where Dr. Shaikh was being held.

Dr. Shaikh was convicted and, on Aug. 18, 2001, sentenced to death. He appealed to Pakistan's High Court, the second highest court below the country's Supreme Court, and was tried in July, 2002. No decision was made because the

judges could not agree. A new trial was held and Dr. Shaikh was acquitted on November 21, 2003.

This decision did not invalidate Pakistan's blasphemy laws. Rather the court found there was no proof that Dr. Shaikh said what he was alleged to have said. Dr. Shaikh said his accusers were simply lying.

Dr. Shaikh was released from jail in secret. He was offered, but refused, a police bodyguard. He went into hiding for several weeks, meeting with family and friends and participating incognito in a discussion of human rights. His release was not generally known until early this year. He is now living in Europe.

His case is not an isolated one. More than 100 other Pakistanis are currently in prison on blasphemy charges and in jeopardy of the death penalty. They include not only humanists, but Christians, members of minority Muslim sects, and members of other religions, as well as victims of personal vendettas. This must have a chilling effect on any honest discussion of political or religious issues.

Bertrand Russell devoted much effort to interceding on behalf of prisoners of conscience. BRSQ subscribers who wrote letters on behalf of Dr. Shaikh were acting in the best Russellian tradition. More information about Dr. Shaikh may be found at www.iheu.org

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OBITUARY. Long time west coast member of the BRS, Shohig Sherry Garine Terzian died in Los Angeles on July 12, 2002, at the age of 86. Born in 1915 in Constantinople of Armenian parents, she came to the United States with her parents at age six and grew up in New York City. As a student at Radcliffe College, she wrote her senior thesis on 'George Santayana and the Genteel Tradition', corresponded with Santayana, compiled the bibliography for *The Philosophy of George Santayana* – volume two of Paul Schilpp's *Library of Living Philosophers* – and revised the bibliography for a subsequent edition of the work. A medical librarian by profession, Ms. Terzian contributed articles to the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, *The Santayana Society Bulletin*, the *Armenian Ararat Quarterly*, and numerous letters to the *Los Angeles Times*.

BRS MEMBERSHIP REPORT. Here are the current membership figures for the BRS. As of June 5th, there were 115 members who had paid for 2004, with another 30 (honorary members, life members, and freebees) in the database who also get the BRS *Quarterly*. As well, there are 37 members who paid for 2003 who haven't yet paid for 2004. Here is how these figures compare with BRS membership at this time last year.

| <u>Year</u> | 2003 | 2004 |
|---|------|------|
| Paid for the year: | 97 | 115 |
| Honorary, Life, or Freebees: | 28 | 30 |
| Paid for previous year but not present year: | 48 | 37 |

Dennis Darland, Treasurer, BRS

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CALL FOR PAPERS. The Bertrand Russell Society will be holding sessions at the American Philosophical Association again in the coming year. The deadline for submitting abstracts of talks for the Eastern Division meeting is already past, but anyone interested in giving a talk on any aspect of Russell's philosophy or related issues at either the Central meeting of the APA (to be held in Chicago April 27-30, 2005 at the Palmer House) or the Pacific meeting (to be held in San Francisco March 23-27, 2005, at the St. Francis Hotel in Union Square) should submit an abstract to Rosalind Carey at rcarey@lehman.cuny.edu no later than November 1, 2004.

We hope everyone will plan on attending these sessions in the coming year, but west coast members of the BRS are especially encouraged to attend the Pacific meeting in San Francisco. We will have a regional meeting of the BRS there, with lunch or dinner after the talks and meeting. The west coast session promises to be a real jamboree, so mark your calendars and be sure to attend.

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NEW BRSQ WEBSITE ADDRESS. The BRS *Quarterly* has a new web address. It is: <http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ> so please delete your old bookmarks for this site and bookmark the new page. And visit it often, as the content is constantly being updated.

FEATURES

RUSSELL AND WITTGENSTEIN A STUDY IN CIVILITY AND ARROGANCE*

JUSTIN LEIBER

In 1956, when I was a callow sixteen-year-old sophomore early entrant to the University of Chicago, I read my first twentieth century philosophical book, A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*. While I had already gorged on the Russian novelists, read through the then obligatory Hemingway and Faulkner, consumed Freud and a raft of popular sociologists, and managed to get myself expelled from my tenth grade social science class for issuing disparaging quotes from Marx and Schopenhauer, I was only then being introduced to classical philosophical and scientific texts through the marvelous and soon-to-be-by-stages-dismantled Robert Hutchins' three year great books curriculum, in which the Natural Sciences sequence began with Aristotle's *Physics*, Bk. II, continued with Galileo's *Dialogue*, selections from Newton's *Principia*, and on to papers by Laplace, Mach, Jeans and Einstein. Mathematics ABC was a simplified version of whole stretches of *Principia Mathematica*, the content of Russell's great work having become common collegial culture for logicians and mathematicians.

I soon read some of the less technical works of Russell, whom Ayer cast as Hamlet to his own humble Horatio, and of David Hume, whose skeptical contentions Ayer claimed merely to update and cast into a linguistic vein. With the further help of Hume and Russell, I emended Rene Descartes's insufficiently skeptical "I think, therefore I am" to the minimalist "There are experiences". I wryly chuckled in agreement with Russell's saucy contention that the only materialists in the world were Russian commissars and

* An earlier draft of this paper was read at The Bertrand Russell Society session of the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 2003, with Professor David White commenting.

American behavioral scientists. Common sense realism about physical objects leads to science, which inevitably refutes naïve realism.

Disaster and apostasy loomed in my first concerted encounter, at the graduate course level, with 20th century Anglo-American philosophy. Young, newly-appointed Vere Chappell – a confident Yale acolyte of ordinary language philosophy – assigned us two G. E. Moore essays that comfortably asserted common sense realism, “proving” the existence of the external world of objects by raising one hand, and then, to make it plural, the other, and then stoutly insisting that he was surer of their existence than of any dissenting assertion. Taking this to be an argument comparable to Samuel Johnson’s here-to-fore impossibly crude “refutation” of Berkeley, which consisted of kicking a stone, I submitted a scornful and confident critique of Moore to Professor Chappell, who gave me a failing grade of C and appended the comment “cavalier” in his neat red script.

Next up we read Russell’s 1918-19 *Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, which I soon realized was supposed to exemplify the very worst sort of building houses out of cards, just the sort of language-on-holiday scientific popularizing poppycock that Wittgenstein’s *Investigations*, our final reading, righteously scourged, Wittgenstein now cast in the role of fully-realized Savior to Moore’s John the Baptist. Philosophy, my would-be profession, now had nothing to do with science! Rather, “doing philosophy” had now become an esoteric form of linguistic psycho-analysis that fought off the mind’s bewitchment by language, and left everyday experience and our common old city as it is, undistorted by grand card-house illusions. Indeed, it guarded the world of everyday experience from the arrogant and improper intrusions of science.

While the *Investigations* and his lecture books make clear Wittgenstein’s skepticism about set theory and introspective psychology, we must be grateful for Ray Monk’s copious demonstration, in his 1990 biography of Wittgenstein, *The Duty of Genius*, that in his more informal comments, Wittgenstein came to disparage, despise, and condemn science in general as perhaps the chief evil of our age. Aside from mentioning that Wittgenstein disdained Russell’s attempts to write philosophy for the general

reader, Professor Chappell never said anything about Russell’s vigorous and radical political and moral advocacy, but it was obvious to us that such gadfly-on-the-body-of-the-state activity was, conveniently, neither professional nor philosophical, and indeed the furthest thing from “doing philosophy”.

While I had first understood my C grade rather as the third grader in a Catholic school understands how “three can be one” after the nun has suitably ministered to his knuckles with her ruler, I soon learned to do linguistic analysis in Professor Chappell’s ordinary language manner. I received an A+ on my term paper, and “paradigm case argument” and “don’t look for the meaning, look for the use!” soon slipped as easily from my lips as “you can’t get an ought from an is”. Even in the full throes of conversion, I did notice a few incongruities. Professor Chappell wore three-piece J. Press suits, Wittgenstein, scruffy leather jackets (although Monk tells us these and the rest of his wardrobe were very carefully selected in shopping expeditions). And when I briefly took to following Wittgenstein’s example in my philosophical prose, writing short conversational sentences, addressing my reader as “you”, dropping erudite footnotes, and avoiding all technical, scholarly, or philosophical terminology, the reaction was far more negative than the earlier “cavalier”.

And why were people trying to extract philosophical theses, theories, arguments, and general views, from a text that relentlessly disavowed and railed against such activity – to ascribe a *philosophy of language* to a man whose unsystematic sketches displayed our linguistic, perceptual, and cognitive life as full of incoherence, families of resemblances, and illusions that tempt us to specious philosophical card house building? Further, Wittgenstein perpetually claimed, from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations*, that philosophy was a trivial, non-genuine, deluding, and deeply pointless enterprise (except perhaps as practiced by himself). Going from Hamlet to a minor Horatio, I am reminded of a frustrated 1983 Oxford graduate student who remarked, after hearing another demolishing lecture from linguistics Professor Roy Harris, that it was hard to study a subject – linguistics – that her professor denied existed. But Wittgenstein cast such a magnetic spell that those who did not walk out generally fell under it.

J. L. Austin claimed that a good motto for a philosopher is “neither a be-all or an end-all be”. Wittgenstein’s remarkable arrogance is that he was always trying to do both. In the *Tractatus*, after confessing that perhaps his “expressive craftsmanship” might have occasionally faltered, Wittgenstein said:

On the other hand the *truth* of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved... The value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved. (Wittgenstein 1922, p. 29)

Hard to be more be-all and be-endian than that. In the preface to the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein says he has decided to publish because his

results, variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in circulation. This stung my vanity. (Wittgenstein 1953, p. v-vi)

Latterly, he adds,

if my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, – I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property. (Wittgenstein 1953, p. vi)

This is of course the proud statement of an artist or poet, insisting on the inimitable trademark of his style, his voice. But it is inappropriate to a common collegial enterprise.

Although he did enjoy having students, Wittgenstein, as the quotes above from the *Investigations* suggest, did not want philosophical disciples who would spread his views any more than a Jackson Pollock would want to spawn a second generation of Pollockians or a Faulkner, Faulknerian novelists. Nonetheless Wittgenstein did get disciples, lots of them. There are Wittgensteinians, just as there are or used to be Whiteheadians, Hegelians, Marxists, and so on. But there are no Russellians in the relevant sense. When Ayer said he was happy to be Horatio to Russell’s Hamlet, he was speaking for the collective field of logical

positivism or, better, analytic philosophy more generally.

It could be said that Russell originated analytic philosophy, but the collegial and civil Russell wouldn’t have said or thought this. Russell, in fact, handsomely credited Gottlob Frege for much of the initial work; indeed Frege might well have rested in obscurity had not Russell publicized his work. And through the 1910s, Russell frequently said that Wittgenstein was his natural successor at Cambridge and would take the next great steps in philosophical logic. It is impossible to imagine Wittgenstein behaving in this way: previous philosophy, of which he read little and found what little he read full of errors, was hopeless; and there was for him no good prospective for subsequent philosophy – at least in the near future. While Russell might enthusiastically refer to Wittgenstein as his natural successor in mathematical logic, it is impossible to imagine Wittgenstein regarding anyone as his worthy successor. Indeed he clearly did not feel he was engaged in a common enterprise to which one or another might make contributions to a collective project.

Monk, in *The Duty of Genius*, quotes a poem of I. A. Richards about Wittgenstein, appropriately titled ‘The Strayed Poet’,

Few could long withstand your haggard beauty,
Disdainful lips, wide eyes bright-lit with scorn,
Furrowed brow, square smile, sorrow-born
World-abandoning devotion to your duty.¹

And Monk adds:

Wittgenstein’s lecturing style, and indeed his writing style, was curiously at odds with his subject-matter, as though a poet had somehow strayed into the analysis of the foundations of mathematics and The Theory of Meaning. He himself [Wittgenstein] once wrote: ‘I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said:

¹ Monk 1990, p. 290; Richards 1990, pp. 159-162.

philosophy ought to be written as a *poetic composition*.'
(Monk 1990, pp. 290-91)

A keen example of this is Wittgenstein's relationship with Friedrich Waismann, an Austrian Jew of the Vienna Circle but latterly an ally in, and public representative of, Wittgenstein's attack on set theory and formalism in mathematics. Waismann followed Wittgenstein to England and Cambridge, and assiduously worked with Wittgenstein on co-authoring an account of his new philosophical views. Wittgenstein let him proceed with the project for some time but eventually detached himself, apparently telling Waismann that he must proceed on his own. The ensuing book, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, was in galley proofs in the late 1930s when Wittgenstein finally put his foot (or jackboot) down, using his considerable influence on Waismann and the press to stop publication. (Waismann continued to painstakingly work, rework, and expand the galleys until his death in 1959, and the book was finally published in 1965.) Wittgenstein also made a passing effort to, unsuccessfully, prevent Waismann from getting a philosophy post in England.

This story may be profitably compared to the more well-known case of Wittgenstein's attempt to get the *Tractatus* published shortly after the end of World War I. After several rejections, Wittgenstein pleaded with Russell to write an introduction so that a publisher might take a chance on publication, given the endorsement of a world famous philosopher. Russell dutifully complied, only to have Wittgenstein thunder that he had completely misunderstood the work. Russell went on to ensure its publication. A decade later Russell also cooperated with G. E. Moore in helping Wittgenstein get a teaching position in Cambridge.

For his long and intermittent philosophical career, Russell worked within a common collegial community, respectfully reading and referring to other philosophical work. There is a common myth, abetted by Wittgenstein's disciples among others, and occasionally by Russell himself, that Russell's serious philosophical work, as opposed to popularizations and political and social commentary, ceased shortly after World War I. Nonetheless, Russell returned to technical philosophy in the late 1930s and the 1940s and did innovative and important work. Monk notes incredulously that

W.V. Quine opined that Russell's 1940 *Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth* was "Russell's most important book" (Monk 1990, p. 144). Initial drafts of *Inquiry* were delivered to a University of Chicago class attended by Rudolph Carnap, Charles Morris, and others; Carnap later recalled, "Russell had the felicitous ability to create an atmosphere in which every participant did his best to contribute to the common task" (Monk 1990, p. 221). *Inquiry* was followed in 1948 by *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, in which Russell emphasized the importance of empirical science to philosophy – a view that many then found hopelessly dated but which now appears prescient.

Wittgenstein, by contrast, was not only a poetical artist, he was specifically an epigrammist. In perhaps the best essay written on Wittgenstein's work, Stanley Cavell likens him to La Rochefoucauld (Cavell 1962, p. 92). That is decidedly the point of Wittgenstein's famous comment that his worthy "sketches" were trademarked as his own. Russell, on the other hand, occasionally wrote idiosyncratically in his least philosophical pieces – and he did write short stories. But his most philosophical writing, as Carnap's remark suggests, is part and parcel of a common philosophical tradition (which is perhaps why my University of Chicago Mathematics ABC course contained no specific Russellian prose).

In 1955, *The Prisoner* appeared, a movie in which Alec Guinness played a Polish Cardinal and Jack Hawkins his communist inquisitor/confessor (Grenville 1955). Roughly conforming to historical fact, the Hawkins interrogator, through sleeplessness and ingenious questioning, manages to convince the Cardinal that he is a proud and vain man who can only expiate his sinfulness to a working class populace through confessing to collaborating with fascists during and after World War II. Captivated inquisitorially, caught by memories of his childhood and distaste for his humble origins, the Cardinal confesses in open court. His suave confessor then has the best line in this remarkable, and remarkably political, movie. He says of the Cardinal, "A proud man would have been more skeptical."

The same might be said respecting Russell in Monk's increasingly insistent indictment of him as a monstrously vain and prideful egotist. To invert Churchill's remark that modest Clement

Atlee had much to be modest about, Russell had much to be proud of. But what is extraordinary in Russell's history are the instances in which he humbly submitted to a younger and less accomplished inquisitor who impressively insisted to Russell that he, Russell, was fraudulent, incapable of serious thought, lacking moral or person integrity or genuineness. Russell fell for this gambit most famously to Wittgenstein, but also to D. H. Lawrence and, to a lesser degree, others.

After Russell completed *Principia Mathematica*, his next substantial philosophical work was *The Theory of Knowledge*, but Wittgenstein's attack in 1913 on this and his other work, affected Russell so deeply that he felt, for many years, that he was incapable of serious technical philosophical work (the manuscript itself was not published until years after Russell's death). Russell turned to writing on political and social topics and fiction. Through the Bloomsbury circle he came under the spell of D. H. Lawrence. For a time Russell was inspired by Lawrence's wild, fascist talk and his penchant for criticizing Russell. But when war came, Russell eventually turned away from Lawrence's anti-democratic and blood thirsty views. One of Lawrence's parting shots may have seriously wounded Russell, "You are too full of devilish repressions to be anything but lustful and cruel. I would rather have the German soldiers with rapine and cruelty, that you with your words of goodness...It is *not* the hatred of falsity which inspires you. It is the hatred of people, of flesh and blood" (Monk 1996, p. 426). Doubtless a proudly cruel man would have been more skeptical.

And presumably a proudly cruel man would have been less engaged. While Monk might have found the suggestion for his title in Richards' line, "World-abandoning devotion to your duty," Monk saws off "world-abandoning" part and adds "of genius" to get his title *The Duty of Genius*. We know Wittgenstein deplored Russell's attempt to write about philosophy for the general public and we may suspect that he was no more pleased with Russell's attempts to address the general public about moral and political matters. Familiarly, Russell vigorously campaigned for a quick and equitable end to World War I, losing many of his friends and his Cambridge lectureship, and spending six months in prison. Wittgenstein, on the other hand dutifully joined the Austro-

Hungarian army, eventually becoming termed the "bible soldier" because of his attempts to recommend Tolstoy's version of the Gospels. Tolstoy's version avoids attributing any supernatural actions to Christ. Subsequently, Wittgenstein vigorously defended a view of religion that made it irrefutable to any scientific discovery, and his scorn for science was matched by his respect for religion. After his manifest failure as a schoolteacher, Wittgenstein sought to become a monk but was discouraged in this venture. "World-abandoning" does seem appropriate.

When Russell visited the Soviet Union in 1920, he deplored the totalitarian regime long before Stalin's ascendancy. Wittgenstein, however, held a rather romantic view of the Soviet Union long into the Stalinist era, even seeking jobs there as common labor for himself and one of his student companions. This was rather to the consternation of the Soviet authorities, who, in suspicion and puzzlement, were inclined to suggest an academic position to Wittgenstein.

Monk's remarks at the beginning of his second volume on Russell suggest that he is aware that someone else might put together the many facts he collected in a very different picture. That is certainly true. Yet Monk is perplexed that Russell's apparently rational and intelligent daughter Kate sees a near wholly admirable Russell while more intimately contemplating the same data that Monk finds so appalling. Again he reports with astonishment that Russell's first wife Alys retained a marked affection for Russell to her death several decades after their separation.

What seems to particularly outrage Monk was Russell's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis and his subsequent highly public anti-American activities. Or, even more, what enrages Monk is his belief that Russell might think his actions had any influence on the world's events and that a professional philosopher should disgrace himself and the profession by egotistically engaging in public affairs. There is more than a little of Professor Chappell's attitude in Monk's screed against Russell. Philosophers shouldn't address the general public, particularly about political matters, and they should never have the gall to believe that they can ever have any effect on political matters. Just as for Professor Chappell, no gadflies on the body of the state, please!

When the Cuban missile crisis brewed up, with the USSR clearly trying to give Cuba some protection against repeated US invasion attempts, JFK produced a naval blockade of Cuba and demanded the removal of the partially installed missiles. Both actions were acts of war and ones without the slightest support from international law or the UN. Russell dispatched telegrams to Kennedy and Khrushchev, suggesting what in fact became the eventual solution – namely, that the US should forswear the invasion of Cuba and that the USSR should in turn remove its missiles, with the eventual removal of US missiles in Turkey. Khrushchev responded with a telegram to Russell, seemingly as an informal way of announcing his sentiments to the world. Kennedy did not address Russell directly, aside from the response to a reporter's question that Russell did not speak for the Free World. Monk is quite right to insist that there is no credible evidence that Russell's intervention had an effect on the event. However, there is no obvious evidence that it had no positive effect whatsoever. It may not be the duty of genius but it is the duty of anyone to speak out to the degree that they can for legality, morality, and peace in human affairs. Russell had a loud voice and took it as his duty to make it as loud as he could and use it rationally and well. Surely, in the Cuban missile crisis he did the best a man in his position could do. He also spoke civilly and with worldly concern to his fellow citizens about common concerns.

Wittgenstein's reaction to the atomic bomb was rather different. Monk writes "In a curious sense he even welcomed the bomb" and he quotes Wittgenstein as saying:

The hysterical fear over the atom bomb now being experienced, or at any rate expressed, by the public almost suggests that at last something really salutary has been invented. The fright at least gives the impression of a really effective bitter medicine. I can't help thinking: if this didn't have something good about it the philistines wouldn't be making an outcry. But perhaps this too is a childish idea. Because really all I can mean is that the bomb offers a prospect of the end, the destruction, of an evil, – our disgusting soapy water science.... there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and

that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. (Monk 1990, p. 485)

Monk goes on to remark, "Thus, his 'dream' of the coming collapse of science and industry was an anticipation of an age in which his type of thinking would be more generally accepted and understood. It is linked with his remark to Drury: 'My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age ... Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am writing.'"

Toward the end of *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919) Russell committed one of his few deviations from standard philosophical prose, remarking that he would stress the ambiguity of the verb "to be" even if he were dead from the waist down and not "merely in prison." Much latter, in his eighties, Russell was briefly jailed for his opposition to British possession of nuclear weapons. This led to an immortal cartoon in *Punch* in which we see gadfly Russell between two large bozos in prison uniform against a prison wall with a large hole in it. Surrounding them are several thick-headed policemen of whom one says "Now who's the brains behind this?" Arrogantly "world-abandoning" Russell was not. Socratic philosopher he was.

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PHILOSOPHER'S HOPE

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF *TIME MAGAZINE**

by BERTRAND RUSSELL

INTRODUCTION

by RAY PERKINS, JR.

Russell's involvement in India's struggle for civil liberty and national independence has gone largely unnoticed by all his official biographers, even though Russell was Chair of the India League in London during the 1930s and penned five letters to the *Manchester Guardian* in support of Indian social reforms and in general sympathy with the aspirations of Gandhi's National Congress Party. While in the US during World War Two Russell continued to concern himself with Indian politics and wrote five more letters to the editor during the war.¹

At the time of this letter to *Time* magazine, the Cripps' mission had been initiated by Churchill to secure Indian cooperation in the war in exchange for Indian independence at the war's end. But negotiations broke down, and Gandhi's demand for immediate independence and British withdrawal from India led to his arrest in August. Russell had already expressed disapproval of Gandhi's position in a letter to the *New York Times* in early August.²

In this letter, to my knowledge not published in full since its initial appearance in *Time* magazine, Russell compliments *Time's* account of Indian events, explains the rationale for the British position and expresses his hopes that a compromise may be yet reached.

* Reprinted with the permission of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

¹ See *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell*, pp. 182-90.

² *Yours Faithfully*, pp. 182-83.

PHILOSOPHER'S HOPE

Time Magazine
September 28, 1942

Sirs, I have read with much interest the account of Indian events and persons in *Time*, Aug. 24. I admire the impartiality with which highly controversial matters are treated. I deplore the present conflict in India, but I do not think it would be possible, as the Congress party demanded, to hand over the Government to a professedly representative collection of Indians hastily assembled in the middle of a war, and bitterly at odds among themselves on many important questions. Apart from the difficulties necessarily involved in a change while a Japanese invasion is imminent, the replies to Sir Stafford Cripps made clear that a British withdrawal now would leave India in chaos and anarchy, if not actually in civil war, which would result in an easy conquest of India by Japan.

I still hope that a compromise may be reached, perhaps by the British Government inviting suggestions from commissioners appointed by the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China, such suggestions to be made after conference with Indian leaders. Such articles as yours are extremely useful in helping American readers to understand the very complex problems involved.

Bertrand Russell

Malvern, Pa.

RUSSELL ON MONISTIC THEORY

JANE DURAN

ABSTRACT: In comparing Russell's two short essays, 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' and 'Pragmatism', it is shown that Russell finds similar problems with the notion of truth used both in neo-Hegelian idealism and pragmatism, and that he also finds an unacceptable murkiness in the ideas of each.

Two essays by Russell collected in his 1910 *Philosophical Essays*, 'Pragmatism' (1909) and 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' (1906-07), are remarkably united in a way that seems to ask for commentary.¹ While 'Pragmatism' has received extensive comment from an enormous range of sources, the relatively encapsulated views of 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' have not been given the same amount of attention. Since each piece is brief, light shone on the two of them simultaneously may help to elucidate some of the main points of both.

I.

In 'The Monistic Theory of Truth', Russell continues his lengthy project of turning the tables on neo-Hegelianism by making it clear that simply setting out what it is that H.H. Joachim and other neo-Hegelians actually hold will destroy their argument. This is so, Russell claims, because some sort of correspondence theory of truth – even if unacknowledged – is required in order to make even minimal sense of the "coherentist" or "monistic" position that the neo-Hegelians espouse. For example, in Part I of 'The Monistic Theory of Truth', Russell sums up his larger argument against the

¹ References throughout this paper are to the 1966 Simon & Schuster edition of *Philosophical Essays*.

cohering side with four brief points, the last of which is as follows:

In order to prove that there can be only one coherent whole, the theory is compelled to appeal to "experience", which must consist in knowing particular truths, and thus requires a notion of truth that the monistic theory cannot admit. (p. 139)

As Russell has argued at an earlier point in the text, the proposition "Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder" cannot be meaningfully experienced unless we can assign a truth-value to it, but the monistic theory, an earlier sort of super-holism, asks us not to assign a truth value to isolated propositions because such an assignment is "no help towards constructing the whole of truth". (p. 138) Because, as Russell claims, this position ultimately undermines itself, it cannot be maintained.

This same line of argument is used in 'Pragmatism'. The crux of both essays, though this is perhaps more obvious in 'Pragmatism', revolves around the notions of truth and correspondence – Russell believes in correspondence and pragmatists don't, or in Rortian terminology, Russell believes in mirrors, and the pragmatists do not. Russell's argument here is similar to that used in 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' – the pragmatists' conception of truth not only abuses natural language, but must somehow be less than straightforward. It would appear to rest on a correspondence notion of what would count as true. On Russell's view, any anti-foundational theory of truth – such as those espoused by both the pragmatists and the neo-Hegelians – fails to capture what modern logic has shown, e.g., about the nature of truth and of assertions of truth.

II.

Part of what Russell aims to do in 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' is to show – by establishing the incoherence of what the monists are calling the "axiom of internal relations" – that no sense whatsoever can be made of the doctrine. This is comparatively easy to do; Bradley, Joachim and the others assume that since all is

ultimately one, no meaningful predication can be made of the parts of the totality. Russell is able to show convincingly that without meaningful predication at some lower level (such as that needed to state the axiom), no predication can be made of the whole, so that the doctrine of internal relations is incoherent.

In typical close analysis, he exposes the inconsistencies of the doctrine while allowing the reader to wonder how it is that grown adults ever came to formulate such a theory in the first place. For example, he writes with respect to the "axiom":

A more searching argument against the axiom of internal relations is derived from a consideration of what is meant by the 'nature' of a term. Is this the same as the term itself, or is it different? If it is different, it must be related to the term, and the relation of a term to its nature cannot without an endless regress be reduced to something other than a relation. Thus if the axiom is to be adhered to, we must suppose that a term is not other than its nature. In that case, every true proposition attributing a predicate to a subject is purely analytic, since the subject is its own whole nature, and the predicate is part of that nature. (pp.144-145)

Thus, contra the idealists and their axiom of internal relations, there *is* predication between a term and its "nature" (or really, between expressions of them). As Russell goes on to explain, this analysis also destroys the notion that coherence can meaningfully be predicated of the collection of propositions as a whole, since the very notion of predication is under attack.

Again, the point of Russell's analysis is to establish that which is now taken for granted philosophically, and that is that predication and propositional content are relations, and that we can characterize those relations. Because this notion is so familiar to us, we find it difficult to distance ourselves from it sufficiently to come to grips with the novelty of what Russell is saying. Both 'Pragmatism' and 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' are attacks on doctrines that imply that there is some meaning to 'truth' other than a correspondence relationship. But if truth is not understood as

correspondence with things, no proposition can be examined with respect to experience and assigned a truth-value, and all doctrines become unintelligible. The Bradleyan system under examination in 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' is incoherent and nonsensical; the pragmatist tradition, as presented in Russell's examination of it, is probably slightly less nonsensical but cannot survive much scrutiny.

Russell himself sometimes draws the two doctrines of idealism and pragmatism together, as when he says,

I do not observe that idealists distinguish these two meanings [of the notion of 'relation']; indeed, speaking generally, they tend to identify a proposition with its consequences, thus embodying one of the distinctive tenets of pragmatism. (pp. 141)

If there is no correspondence notion of truth – no conception that propositions can be examined with respect to experience and then assigned a truth value – there can be no intelligible doctrine of either consequences or of the nature of things. But in order to come to this conclusion, Russell must engage in a close analysis that has devastating ends for his opponents.

III.

In addition to difficulties with theories of truth that do not live up to their billing, Russell has an understandable difficulty with what might charitably be termed philosophical vagueness, and both 'The Monistic Theory of Truth' and 'Pragmatism' attack their opponents on these grounds.

The charge of vagueness is related to the lack of development of any kind of view of truth, but it is possible to at least minimally make some distinctions between the two. One of the areas that Russell finds the least praiseworthy in the work of Joachim is the appeal to "organic"; it is this very organicity, as Russell repeatedly maintains, that prevents the doctrine from being comprehensible in such a way that it can be clearly articulated, let alone maintained. (p. 132) As Russell himself says, his opponents frequently characterize his own philosophical work as "crude";

what they must really dislike is that it is so clear that it can actually be understood. (p. 132) On his view, a philosophical doctrine ought to be able to be clearly grasped and articulated. Russell abhors any sort of philosophical view that proceeds as if it is so intellectually sophisticated that it cannot be understood. As he says of the neo-Hegelian stance, "The position which I have been trying to represent is always considered, by those who hold it, a very difficult one to apprehend...." (p. 132)

Although Russell does not find the pragmatists guilty of the same degree of imprecision, he does find it difficult, in many cases, to delineate the precise claim being made. With the Jamesian version of pragmatism, it is not clear, Russell contends, whether it is the actual will to believe, the pragmatist temper, that is constitutive of the doctrine, or whether the doctrine stands independently. As he notes,

[The] essay on the will to believe is important, because it has been widely read and much criticized, both adversely and favorably, and because it affords a good introduction to the pragmatist temper of mind. Some practice in the will to believe is an almost indispensable preliminary to the acceptance of pragmatism; and conversely pragmatism, when once accepted, is found to give the full justification of the will to believe. (p. 83)

In each case, then, part of what causes, for Russell, the lack of appeal of the doctrine in question is that it is very hard, ultimately, to come clear as to just what that doctrine is. For the "monistic theory", there is apparently no such thing as an individual truth, even though, as Russell notes, the full-scale "organic" doctrine would require such a notion were it able to make any predication of any kind, including of its organic whole. In what the "organicity" consists is left more or less to the reader's imagination, in the same way that the conclusion of a novel or literary work might not be fully set out. Although the pragmatists in general have been somewhat more specific, it is not clear whether some emotional dynamic drives the establishment of the epistemological

portion of the doctrine, or whether it can be maintained independently of the emotional dynamic.

Russell quite rightly excoriates this lack of clarity, and the more scathing parts of his rebuttal, particularly in 'The Monistic Theory', are actually quite humorous and fully up to his usual standard. A good deal of levity informs the following part of 'The Monistic Theory of Truth', even though it is employed to make a philosophical point:

As for the *deus ex machina*, the ideal experience in which the whole of truth is actualized, I will merely observe that he is in general somewhat discredited, and that idealists themselves are rather ashamed of him, as appears by the fact that they never mention him when they can help it, and that when they do, they introduce him with apologetic words, such as 'what is true *in the end*, – as though what is true 'in the end' were anything different from what is true. (p. 138)

Although we may be laughing so hard that we lose track of Russell's greater point here, the crux of the matter is, of course, that there is no way to unpack the "monistic theory" that leaves it with any credibility.

IV.

In both essays, then, Russell makes use of the modern predicate calculus, ignored, as he sees it, by both sets of philosophers, to make the point that the doctrines in question do not make sense. Part of the pretentiousness of the belief systems, as I have indicated here, resides in their vagueness, and Russell is easily able to criticize the vagueness since it appears early on given close examination. The monistic view has a certain Leibnizian appeal, for example, but unlike some parts of Leibniz' views which can be at least set out explicitly, the monistic view cannot be adequately stated, since any attempt to state it clearly undermines it. The variety of views subsumed under pragmatism are not quite as easily undermined, but as Russell is at pains to make clear, it is not at all

obvious what motivates them, or at what philosophical goal they aim.

Russell is also clear on how it is that a philosophy should hang together, if in fact it does hang together. As he says at the very outset of 'The Monistic Theory of Truth', logical monism is related to ontological monism. (p. 131)

If it is indeed the case that it is the metaphysical monism that is the driving force here – and this, apparently, is what the thinkers in question would like us to believe – then that part of the view should be patently clear and susceptible of ready articulation. But it should also be related to logical monism, and it is the attempt to set out the logical monism that undoes the view. Russell is not only on sure ground here; the clarity and brilliance of the essay derive from the fact that logical monism is used to destroy the notion of the metaphysical monism that is, allegedly, the heart of the doctrine.

Insofar as pragmatism is concerned, Russell remarks that

[The pragmatists] point triumphantly to the influence of desire upon belief, and boast that their theory alone is based upon a true psychological account of how belief arises. With this account we have no quarrel; what we deny is its relevance to the question: What is meant by 'truth' and 'falsehood'? (pp. 96-97)

In other words, it might well be thought that the one set of questions precedes the other, but as Russell makes clear, the pragmatists do not seem to show that they have understood this.

I have argued here that there is a close tie between the comparatively brief essays in question. But that argument has not been difficult to make. The clarity of Russell's work, the time period, the development of logic, and a number of other features all bring the writings of this period together. Of greater interest, perhaps, is a feature that might initially be thought to be non-philosophical. There is a great humanism behind these essays, a humanism which informed Russell's life. It is a humanism that refuses to swallow the murky and superficially palatable for the sake of some purported wondrous goal. Insofar as that clarity and

concern for the general intellectual welfare dominated most of Russell's life, thought, and work, the two essays in question are – and one hesitates to use the word – merely “parts” of the great driving work that consumed Russell throughout his life and motivates our admiration to this day.

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REVIEWS

M.N. ROY'S HUMANIST ODYSSEY

PHIL EBERSOLE

Dr. Ramendra Nath. *M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism*. Buddhiwadi Foundation (216-A, Sri Khrisnapuri, Patna-800001, India), 2001. Pp. 144. 100 rupees/US \$5.

Bertrand Russell is a fascinating subject for study because he was not only a significant thinker in his own right, but was also involved with so many of the controversies and key people of his time. The same might be said of the Indian thinker M.N. Roy (1887-1954).

Roy's intellectual odyssey took him from militant Hindu nationalist to communist to humanist and radical democrat. He was acquainted with Einstein and Gramsci, collaborated with Lenin, inspired Nehru, and was a political opponent of Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek and Gandhi. I confess I was ignorant of Roy's life and ideas until I read Dr. Ramendra Nath's new book, *M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism*, published by the Buddhiwadi Foundation.

M.N. Roy's New Humanism and Materialism provides a succinct and clear exposition of Roy's thought and a brief but fascinating sketch of his life. Roy became an active nationalist at the age of 14 and left India in 1915 in a quest to buy arms for a planned uprising against British rule. He wandered through most of eastern Asia and then came to the United States, where he discovered the thought of Karl Marx in the New York Public Library. In 1919, he was in Mexico and participated in the founding of the Mexican Communist Party. He was invited to Russia in 1920 for the second conference of the Communist International (Comintern), where Lenin asked him to present his own thesis on national liberation movements. By 1926, Roy was a member of all four policy-making bodies of the Comintern—the Presidium, the Political Secretariat, the Executive Committee, and the World Congress.

The Comintern sent him to China in 1927 with the mission to forge an alliance between the communists and the Kuomintang nationalists. His arrival coincided with the massacre of the communists by the Kuomintang forces of Chiang Kai-shek. He returned to Russia in disfavor, and was expelled from the Communist International in 1929. He said the real reason he was expelled was his claim to the right of independent thought.

He returned to India in 1930, and was jailed in 1931. While in prison, he wrote some of his major works, in which he tried to work out a humanist and democratic philosophy appropriate to Indian conditions. He joined the Indian National Congress when he was released in 1936, but resigned in 1940 because he opposed Gandhi's Quit India campaign. Roy's view was that the war against the Axis powers temporarily took priority over the independence struggle.

In 1944, Roy prepared a draft constitution for India, emphasizing decentralization, devolution of power and a kind of syndicalism or Jeffersonian democracy, consistent with his humanistic desire to restore sovereignty to the individual in society. He founded the Indian Renaissance Institute in 1946, and published *New Humanism: A Manifesto*, whose 22 theses are included as an appendix to Dr. Ramendra's book. Roy rejected both Communism and capitalism, and put forth a philosophy of decentralized "radical democracy" as an alternative to parliamentary democracy.

In 1948, he launched the Radical Humanist Movement, a nonpartisan political movement, to make India what he considered a true democracy. He was a founding vice president of the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU); the Radical Humanist Movement was one of the original IHEU member organizations. The IHEU has in his honor created the M.N Roy Human Development Campus in Mumbai (Bombay).

Dr. Ramendra places Roy's ideas in the context of the history of materialist philosophy, including a tantalizingly brief mention of Lokayat or Charvaka, an ancient Indian school of materialist thought. While Roy opposed the glorification of India's so-called spiritual heritage, he favored a rational and critical study of ancient Indian philosophy. He thought it might do for India what the rediscovery of ancient Greek thought did for Europe in the Renaissance.

Roy's version of materialism was an ethical philosophy. He believed that human beings have the power to make free and rational choices, and that they have a duty to do this without debasing themselves before imaginary supernatural beings.

Dr. Ramendra explains how Roy's thought differed from Marxian materialism. According to Roy, Marxian determinism did not allow for human freedom and it neglected ethics. Like Bertrand Russell, Roy perceived there is no logical connection between Marx's philosophical materialism (there is no supernatural reality) and his historical materialism (everything in history has economic causes).

Roy preferred to call his philosophy "physical realism," meaning that the physical world comprises all of reality, and a supposed supernatural or spiritual realm is not necessary to explain the world. He did not think the discoveries of modern physics invalidate physical realism. The universe may not be mechanistic, but it is still understandable through rational inquiry, according to Roy.

Dr. Ramendra points out there is the same logical disjunction within M.N. Roy's thought that Roy observed in Karl Marx, in that physical realism neither contradicts nor supports Roy's new humanist political philosophy. While this is true, I would add that there is a psychological, if not a logical, connection between the two aspects of Roy's ideas. The person who is able to reject supernatural beliefs and apply his own understanding to the physical world is a person likely to desire political freedom and the right to apply his own understanding to society.

Dr. Ramendra deserves credit not only as a writer but as a publisher. He and his wife, Dr. Kawaljeet Kaur, together with relatives and friends, founded the Buddhiwadi Samaj (the Bihar Rationalist Society or BRS) in 1985, following a wave of religious riots and killings sparked by the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh guards. They have persevered through the years to give a voice to humanism. One can only guess at the difficulty of their effort.

They launched the Buddhiwadi Foundation in 1996 as an independent affiliate of the BRS. The foundation publishes books and newsletters in Hindi and English, and maintains a humanist

library and research center. At present Dr. Ramendra and Dr. Kawaljeet are collaborating on a new work – *Rationalist, Humanist and Atheistic Trends in Twentieth Century Indian Thought*, a study of seven leading Indian thinkers.

The Buddhiwadi Foundation web site at <http://www.buddhiwadi.org> is well worth a look. It contains, among other things, 10 online essays by Dr. Ramendra and two by Dr. Kawaljeet in English. Dr. Ramendra is very much in the Bertrand Russell tradition. He says in his online essay “Is God Dead?” that Bertrand Russell is his favorite philosopher. His Ph.D. thesis was on the ethics of Bertrand Russell, and is available from the Buddhiwadi Foundation. A briefer essay on Russell’s ethics is available online. Another online essay, “Why I Am Not a Hindu,” was partly inspired by Russell’s “Why I Am Not a Christian.”

I would particularly recommend the essay, “Why I Am Not a Hindu,” to North American humanists. We North American humanists sometimes think of Indian philosophy in terms of swamis and yogis, and to give them the benefit of the doubt which we do not extend to the Christian religion. Dr. Ramendra’s book on M.N. Roy reminds us that there is another tradition in Indian philosophy, one which it would behoove us to learn about.

DENTON ON SCIENCE AND RELIGION AND NOT ON THE NEXT WAR

CHAD TRAINER

Peter H. Denton. *The ABC of Armageddon: Bertrand Russell on Science, Religion, and the Next War*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. pp. xxvi, 174.

The British philosopher Bertrand Russell will probably be remembered most through the ages for his contributions to mathematical logic at the beginning of the 20th century. But the First World War proved to be a watershed event for Russell personally. He spoke of how one of the war’s effects on him was to render the world of abstract ideas “thin and rather trivial” in the light of the suffering perpetrated by the prevailing havoc.

Peter Denton is Assistant Professor in the Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies at the University of Winnipeg. In his book *The ABC of Armageddon: Bertrand Russell on Science, Religion, and the Next War*, he treats Bertrand Russell’s interwar period relative to the problem that Denton never tires of describing as “the old savage in the new civilization”. To be sure, Russell had brooded over how science liberated us from needs in certain areas, on the one hand, while, on the other, fostering an industrial culture that is less free. Above all, Russell had warned that “Material progress has increased men’s power of injuring one another, and there has been no correlative moral progress.” And Denton explains that, however disinclined Russell had become to the “abstract world of ideas”, he had hardly “become a disciple of Henry Ford.” Rather “[t]he misrepresentation of science as nothing more than technique, in which the value of knowledge was measured not by its truth but by its utility, aroused Russell’s ire throughout the interwar period.”

Denton begins his book with a discussion of Russell’s contemporaries who also addressed science’s role in society. Chapter 2 is basically a synopsis of Russell’s *Prospects for Industrial Civilisation* and *The Scientific Outlook*. Chapter 3 covers

Russell's views on religion and the implications for religion of the then new revelations in physics. Chapters 4 and 5 are about the philosophical implications of the advances in physics for the rivalry between science and religion and how Russell saw the differences between science and religion as ultimately irreconcilable. Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 are a discussion of how the endeavors of Russell to cope with "the old savage in the new civilization" were doomed to failure because of his philosophy's lack of an "operational metaphysic".

The ABC of Armageddon is highly readable. The footnotes are good, and many helpful summaries are provided. This enables the book to be used as a convenient guide for the relevant primary source material. In the book's preface, Denton expresses his hope that, by concentrating on Russell's "largely neglected" contribution to the public discussion of the world's state between the world wars, as well as the assorted notions to which Russell was responding, he can contribute to "a similar conversation at the start of our century". The book's biggest disappointment, however, is that it ultimately fails to make any headway in providing such a contribution.

Rather than propose fresh insights into the 21st century's counterparts to such problems, Denton is content to have his narrative culminate in contentions that Russell's irreligion prevented a coherent context for checking the growth of science as technique. As Denton would have it, "Russell's support of the inevitable conflict between science and religion...doomed his attempt to distinguish science as the pursuit of knowledge from science as the application of technique." Again, "In considering religion primarily as a social phenomenon, and in criticizing the social and historical role of Christianity in western culture, [Russell] robbed himself of a basis on which to discuss the universal character of 'values'....Russell found himself without defensible reasons for maintaining the interests of the individual against the organization of the State." And, finally, "Russell's failure to articulate a functional social morality other than one based on power may be attributed to his separation of facts from values, a separation of the knowledge proper to science from the values proper to ethics."

While it is one thing to claim (however debatably) that Bertrand Russell's philosophy suffers from the foregoing defects, it is altogether another thing to suggest that Russell himself experienced any such misgivings about his own philosophy. Indeed, Denton's narrative in this area is ambiguous enough that readers not directly familiar with Russell are easily led into believing that Russell himself experienced misgivings about his philosophy that are in reality only Denton's. While Denton's reservations about Russell's philosophy are enough to render his book suspect, Denton's tendency to imply that his own misgivings about Russell's philosophy were shared by no less than Russell himself make this work all the more so.

DISCUSSION

REPLY TO KLEMENT

ARTHUR SULLIVAN

In his review of my anthology *Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell*, Kevin Klement raises some fair criticisms. For example, he points out that the anthology does not contain nearly enough philosophy of mathematics to give beginners grounds for informed conclusions about the logicist thesis. (p.41) I agree, and I did struggle with this point (see p. 9 of my Preface). Given the constraints I was working under, including budget restrictions, I chose to cover the philosophy of language as well as possible, rather than to cover some philosophy of language and some philosophy of mathematics.

The main aim of this note is to briefly discuss two of Klement's criticisms of my Introduction: [1] "It ... oddly claims that Russell, contra Kant, wanted to restore the 'analyticity' of arithmetical claims, whereas Russell actually claimed that *both* logic and mathematics were synthetic *a priori*" (pp. 42-3); and [2] "The editor ... insinuates that Russell never fully engaged with dualistic theories of meaning ... which is easily shown to be false by a study of his 1903-1905 manuscripts." (p. 43)

[1] Klement is right that Russell (1903, p. 457) claims that both mathematics and logic are synthetic *a priori*. However, by 1919, Russell's view had evolved considerably: "It is clear that the definition of 'logic' or 'mathematics' must be sought by trying to give a new definition of the old notion of 'analytic' propositions." (Sullivan, p. 296) To get to the bottom of this would require extensive investigation of such matters as precisely what Russell means by 'synthetic' in 1903, precisely what he means by 'analytic' in 1919, and precisely which factors lead to this change of doctrine. In any case, in this short note, I respond to this charge of uttering a falsehood by pleading guilty to the lesser charge of oversimplifying this complex issue.

The reason why I stress connections between logicism and analyticity in my Introduction is that I have found these connections to be helpful for illuminating and clarifying various things. For instance, Russell's rejection of an idealist philosophy was one of the crucial factors that lead him to the logicist thesis, and, on many questions concerning logic, mathematics, and their relation, Russell sides with Frege contra Kant. Frege, of course, explicitly argues for the analyticity of the truths of arithmetic – that substantive "conclusions ... are contained in the definitions, but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house" (1884, p. 101). I see much in this germane metaphor with which Russell would agree, both in 1903 and in 1919. My focus in the Introduction is on this crux of agreement and its relations to what would become the philosophy of language.

[2] It is true that Russell spent much time and effort from 1903 to 1905 working on theories that distinguish between two semantic notions, such as meaning and denotation. However, this *per se* is not negatively relevant to my claim (p. 81) that the arguments in 'On Denoting' that Russell directs at Frege's theory do not succeed in engaging with Frege's brand of semantic dualism.

Following Coffa (1991, p. 79), I define semantic dualism as the view that the content of what we say is distinct from the objects, events, and states of affairs that we say it about. A semantic dualist, in this sense, holds that every significant linguistic expression is systematically correlated with two different sorts of entity – something like Frege's senses (i.e., the content of what we say) and references (i.e., what we say it about). Each term expresses a sense, and a sense is a way of representing, or pointing to, a reference.

The arguments in 'On Denoting' do not engage with this type of semantic dualism, in my opinion, because the arguments rely on some assumptions that this dualism explicitly rejects – for instance, that co-referential words make exactly the same contribution to propositional content, or that if a term does not refer to anything actual, then sentences in which it occurs must express nonsense. Indeed, concerning the relevant notion of semantic dualism, Russell made his position perfectly clear in the famous "Mont Blanc" letter to Frege: "I believe that in spite of all its

snowfields Mont Blanc is itself a component of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high'. ... If we do not admit this, then we get the conclusion that we know nothing at all about Mont Blanc" (Frege 1980, p. 169).

So, clearly, in the 1903-1905 manuscripts, Russell engages with several views that deserve to be called 'semantic dualism', in some sense or other. However, by 1905 Russell considers the view that I, following Coffa, call 'semantic dualism' to be a total non-starter – on the questionable grounds that if what we say does not literally consist of what we say it about, then we are cognitively cut off from the worldly referents of our thought and talk. My claim is that no arguments in 'On Denoting' engage with this notion of dualism, I do not see how this claim could be refuted by that anything one might point to in the 1903-1905 manuscripts.

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Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

3RD ANNUAL EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE. Brain child of David McCarty (Indiana University) and Gregory Landini (University of Iowa) while at the Munich Conference celebrating 100 years of Russell's Paradox, the Early Analytic Philosophy Conference convened at Purdue University this year for its third annual meeting. The conference was organized by Christopher Pincock, of Purdue, with support from Rod Bertolet (Chair of Philosophy at Purdue) and Purdue's College of Arts and Sciences. The theme of the conferences, which aim to include talks by advanced graduate students, is early analytic philosophy.

It was a full two days. David Taylor (University of Iowa graduate student) opened the conference with a talk on how to refurbish McTaggart's often forgotten C-series, a series McTaggart invented to explain the nature of time. Taylor did a nice job explaining why McTaggart's admittedly obscure thesis teaches important lessons concerning time. David McCarty then discussed Paul du Bois-Reymond's conception of "completeness". The historical development of these ideas on formal systems of arithmetic is eye-opening; McCarty never ceases to amaze. Next was William Taschek's thought provoking paper on Frege's horizontal and the nature of logic. The paper inspired quite a bit of debate as Frege scholars lined up on different sides of the issues.

The keynote address, which followed these three papers, was 'Quine and the *Aufbau*' by Peter Hylton (University of Illinois, Chicago). The paper generated a wonderful discussion of Quine's philosophy and its departure from Carnap's *Aufbau*. I'm still thinking about the many issues that came out in that discussion.

The second day began with Christopher Pincock (Purdue) reading a paper on Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. Pincock offers a new interpretation that pulls together the work of several current interpretations of the theory. We are eager to learn more of his many interesting ideas in the coming years. Following Pincock, was André Carus (University of Chicago) with an exciting discussion of, dare I say, Carnap's "ontological" development. Investigating the historical papers left by Carnap, Carus explained the very important, and yet often unappreciated, changes occurring in Carnap's philosophy. Carus also heralded the appearance of a new

thirteen volume series, *The Collected Works of Rudolf Carnap* (Open Court), as well as a companion series called *Full Circle: Publications of the Archive of Scientific Philosophy, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh*. The first volumes in the companion series are *Frege's Lectures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes 1910-1914* and *Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena*. Also in the series will be *Intellectual Autobiography*, by Rudolf Carnap, in its original, unabridged form.

Gary Ebbs (Illinois) gave an inspired presentation entitled "Quine and Carnap on Truth by Convention." Ebbs holds that in order to fit logic into a naturalized conception of science, Quine developed a distorted view of Carnap's conception of truth by convention. Correcting the distortion sheds important new light on Carnap's philosophy. In the afternoon sessions, the present author offered a new perspective on the relevance of Russell's type-theory to Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" and Quine's debate with Carnap on ontology. Finally, Chris Tillman (Indiana University graduate student) awakened the audience to a radical new view of the 19th century algebraic tradition in logic and its relevance to Wittgenstein's tractarian conception of calculation.

The conference was run superbly and a very pleasant time was had by all. The open and friendly discussion of issues, despite what are sometimes radical differences of opinion, is refreshing and inspiring. It is hoped that a tradition is developing and the conference on early analytic philosophy will continue next year.¹

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¹ Details of the conference, including abstracts of the talks, can be found at: <http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~cpincock/eap2004.htm>

Gerry Wildenberg's RUSTLINGS!

These coded quotes will be familiar to some Russellians. After solving the ciphers below, try to identify the source.

1. In this puzzle – and number 2 below – each letter stands for another letter. For example, if O = B, R = E, etc., BERTRAND RUSSELL becomes OREGENAQ EHFFRYY.

LY GNRKEYN GF YOGIEWV RKKRHPEY KMRIYHH -
KYMSGKH LMRFJWV - PF ESY IGHY RZ ELR MGEPRFGW
ZYGMH LSPIS LYMY LSRWWV GTHYFE.

2. I have made this cipher harder by disguising word separations and removing punctuation. The letter groups help in reading; they don't relate to the actual quote.

NKFDC UAWUX JBYHC JIXNI XWFIF HFHCJ IXWUX
DWFZN CHHFH CJIIU YWVWZ IWNIK CNDUK NOUHN
CTUOJ BKWFK CBOKU WJAUS UOEOJ ZIWN IZUJ
CMOUS UCIUH WFZEO JZOB CFCF CYJCT TONKK
JCIWU TOJBC HIWNI IWUOU ZFTWI QUKCN DUK

3. The puzzle below is not a substitution cipher. The quote has spaces and punctuation removed and is permuted slightly by exchanging some letters with nearby letters. For example, 'THE PUZZLE BELOW' might permute to: 'TUHEPZLEZBELWO'.

INIFSIPTEOYALLFOFREUFOSTRGARVEURCELTYVEDELO
SPALATATEARGTEHEMATTREMATETRUMTTEBAKEVNE
RYESRIOUYSNDNAEAITWLHTLIKLANIELSENS

NEW! ANSWERS ONLINE

Flummoxed by Gerry's ciphers? Impatient to see the results?

Don't wait till next issue!

See the answers (or just hints) to *current* puzzles
at the *BRSQ Online*, at

<http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ>

Solutions to the February RUSTLINGS! problems are below. They come from *Dear Bertrand Russell*, George Allen & Unwin, 1969.

1. Harlem is a city occupied by an oppressive army serving what amounts to an outside power.
2. Mr. Nehru, who was my friend, pursued policies opposed to the Cold War, although he was not successful in seriously changing the pattern of poverty in India.
3. ...I have every sympathy with your wish to convert your fiancée to free thought... I think however, that you should exercise some caution as regards sexual blackmail...

INSERTED into scanned documents 7/18/2015
by Dennis J. Darland (who scanned them)

Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.

PUZZLED?
Gerry's CIPHER-SOLVING TIPS

HERE are a few techniques for solving simple substitution ciphers with word divisions. In the future I'll give some suggestions for the variety without word divisions.

- (1) Notice the frequency of letters in English text is roughly: *e t a o i n s h r d l u*.

That is, *e* is the most frequent letter and *t* and *a* are also very frequent. Though few passages follow this exactly, this is a starting point.

- (2) Look out for these common letter positions:

Common first letters: The letters *t*, *o* and *a*.

Rare first letters: The letter *e*.

Common final letters: The letters *e*, *t*, *d*, and *s*.

Common letter pairs (in English): The pair *th*

- (3) Look for three- or two-letter words (in text where no attempt has been made to make the solution difficult):

The common three-letter words: *the*, *and*, *are* and *for*.

The two-letter words are often suggestive:

For example, if our code included AB and BC, we would look for (2) two-letter words in which the 1st letter of one was the 2nd letter of the other, as in these cases: *on-to* or *am-my* or *to-it*.

- (4) Look for words containing patterns:

For example, if the pattern is CDD, trying out 'all' and 'off' is a good way to proceed. If the pattern was ABCDBB, some good choices are 'decree' and 'degree' (there are others).

- (5) The following websites contain additional information on ciphers:

<http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/cpsc/cryptography/substitution.html>
http://deafandblind.com/word_frequency.htm

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.

1ST QUARTER 2004 TREASURER'S REPORT
 CASH FLOW 1/1/04 - 3/31/04

Category Description:

| | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/03 | 5,440.32 |
| <hr/> | |
| INFLOWS | |
| <i>Contributions</i> | |
| Contributions BRS | 799.15 |
| Uncategorized | 0.00 |
| Contributions TOTAL: | 799.15 |
| | |
| <i>Dues</i> | |
| New Members | 193.68 |
| Renewals | 2,930.45 |
| Dues TOTAL: | 3,124.13 |
| | |
| <i>Meeting Income</i> | |
| | 150.00 |
| INFLOWS TOTAL: | <u>4,073.28</u> |
| | |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| <i>Bank Charge</i> | 25.63 |
| <i>Newsletter</i> | 681.61 |
| OUTFLOWS TOTAL: | <u>707.24</u> |
| OVERALL TOTAL | <u>3,366.04</u> |
| <hr/> | |
| BALANCE 3/31/04 | <u>8,806.36</u> |

Compiled 4/8/04 by Dennis J. Darland

Dennis J. Darland
 djarland@qconline.com

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Number 123 / August 2004



THE WORLD OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Number 123 / August 2004

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**SEND IN YOUR NOMINATIONS
FOR THE
BRS BOARD OF DIRECTORS!**

Email them to Chad Trainer at:
stratoflampsacus@aol.com

Or mail them to:
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~ DEADLINE: OCTOBER 1 ~

1. Any BRS member may run for a seat on the Board.
2. Members who nominate themselves must send a self-description/statement on why they should be elected.
3. Out-going Board members are eligible for nomination and re-election; they currently include:
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Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland,
David Henehan, John Lenz,
Stephen Reinhardt, Tom Stanley,
David White, David Blitz

ACT NOW!

IN THIS ISSUE

AT THIS YEAR'S ANNUAL MEETING of the Bertrand Russell Society, held June 18-20 in Plymouth, New Hampshire, there were several strong talks by scholars new to the Russell community. Those who missed the annual meeting will be pleased to know that some of these talks will be published in this and future issues of the *Quarterly*. Iva Apostolova, a graduate student from the University of Ottawa, one of these new Russell scholars, spoke on some problems that drove Russell's shift 'From Acquaintance to Neutral Monism'. That talk appears in this issue of the *Quarterly*. In her essay, Iva argues that Russell's problems in accounting for the cognitive faculties of sensation, memory, and imagination within his theory of acquaintance were important factors in his adoption of neutral monism. Look for more of these talks from the most recent BRS annual meeting in future issues of the BRS *Quarterly*.

MCMASTER UNIVERSITY in Hamilton, Ontario is the home of the Bertrand Russell Archives and Bertrand Russell Research Centre. Based on his talk from the 28th annual meeting of the Society (May 25-27, 2001, at McMaster University), Nicholas Griffin, in his essay 'How the Russell Papers Came to McMaster', tells the story of how McMaster University acquired Russell's papers and became the world center for Bertrand Russell studies. As will be seen, it was first of all Russell's involvement in Cold War political struggles that led to the papers going to McMaster.

SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, a growing number of studies have appeared describing Cold War politics in greater detail than has previously been available, telling the story with more complexity than was admitted at the time. This has been particularly true in recent discussions of the role of intellectuals in the Cold War and the effects of the Cold War on them and their disciplines. This discussion begins with Ellen Schrecker's 1986 *No Ivory Tower*, which documents the influence of McCarthyism on American academics, particularly on the dismissal of many academics from their teaching positions, and the general political quiescence on campuses during that period.

Following in Schrecker's footsteps is John McCumber's 2001 *Time in the Ditch*, which considers the effects of McCarthy-

ism on the discipline of philosophy in the 1940s and 1950s. McCumber argues that not only were philosophers dismissed and politically silenced then, but that the philosophy of the period itself became depoliticized and bereft of values and of the possibility of taking a moral stand, and that this accounts for the dominance of analytic philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s, though he admits that the continental philosophy of that period had similar problems.

A more detailed and complex view of the effects of the Cold War on logical positivists and logical positivism, as well as a more sympathetic one which argues that analytic philosophy was more the victim than the villain of the story, is George Reisch's forthcoming book (in 2005, from Cambridge University Press) *How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic*. Other recent works have documented the role that intellectuals themselves played in the Cold War and the role that governments and government funding played in the lives of these intellectuals. Leading this list is Frances Stonor Saunders's 2000 *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, but there have recently been many others of the same sort.

The question for this journal, of course, is what Russell's role in all of this was, and especially what is new and of interest about Russell that we can learn from all of these new materials. The BRS *Quarterly* hopes to review much of this literature in coming issues, in an attempt to work out some of the details of Russell's place in the emerging picture. As an introduction to this subject, Jack Clontz has written a review for this issue of the *Quarterly* of recent charges by Timothy Garton Ash about Russell's cooperation with British government propaganda agencies during the Cold War. In particular, Garton Ash has charged that the publication of three books by Russell was not only financed by the British Foreign Office, but that Russell knew of this at the time. Jack considers the details surrounding these allegations and enlarges on the story.

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE, Thom Weidlich reviews a new play, *Boise*, by David Folwell, which is centered around the sayings of Bertrand Russell, and interviews the author. Tony Simpson, of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, sends us a report from the Boston Social Forum and the plans discussed there to coordinate peace efforts in the U.S. with other such efforts around the world. Ray Perkins has

selected another letter to the editor by Russell, this time, one written to the *Times* arguing for the right to stage an anti-nuclear rally in Trafalgar Square. When the authorities denied permission for the rally, it was held anyway, and with the help of a forceful police response, a melee occurred. Meeting minutes by Chad Trainer from the Board of Directors and General Membership meetings held during the BRS June Annual Meeting, and a Treasurer's Report by BRS Treasurer Dennis round out this issue of the BRSQ.

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**The Bertrand Russell Society
(BRS)**

And

**The History of Early Analytic
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March 23-27, 2005, San Francisco, CA,
Westin St. Francis Hotel, Union Square

Submission Deadline: Nov. 1, 2004

CENTRAL

**The Bertrand Russell Society
(BRS)**

And

**The History of Early Analytic
Philosophy Society (HEAPS)**

April 27-30, 2005, Chicago, IL, Palmer
House Hilton Hotel,

Submission Deadline: Nov. 15, 2004

Send submissions (in Word format) to:
rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu

SOCIETY NEWS

The Bertrand Russell Society celebrated its 30th anniversary in Plymouth New Hampshire this past June 18-20 when it held its 31st Annual Meeting, hosted by Ray and Karen Perkins on the campus of Plymouth State University. The conference was well attended, with 50 Russellians of various stripes there from 4 or 5 different countries. The talks were excellent, as was the company. It was a special affair.

The conference began Friday night with a meeting of the Society's Board of Directors, which passed a resolution on Iraq condemning the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq "as contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter which Bertrand Russell long advocated" and calling for the "immediate withdrawal, under U.N. auspices, of U.S. forces in Iraq and for the concurrent establishment, also under U.N. auspices, of a democratic secular state by the Iraqi people themselves."

On Saturday and Sunday, papers of high quality and great interest were read and discussed. Talks by three young graduate students attending the meeting, Irem Kurtzal of Syracuse University, James Connelly of York University, and Iva Apostolova of the University of Ottawa, were especially strong. Everyone was pleased to have these new Russell scholars in attendance.

The talks began with a "master class", really an open discussion, on Russell and the soul, led by BRS President, Alan Schwerin. Materials for the session had previously been made available, and a lively discussion ensued comparing Russell's views on values, especially on the value of philosophy, to certain aspects of Buddhism.

Irem Kurtzal, one of two BRS Student Essay Prize winners this year (James Connelly was the other) followed with a talk on 'Russell on Matter and Our Knowledge of the External World', in which she argued that in the light of Russell's claims that he never abandoned either a causal theory of perception or realist understanding of objects, his seemingly phenomenalist use of the method of logical constructions in the 1914 *Our Knowledge of the External World*, can be explained by the collapse of his 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* project. James Connelly, the other Student Essay Prize

winner, followed with a talk on 'Russell and Wittgenstein on Propositions', in which he argued that difficulties with Russell's views of propositions in his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics*, and his attempts to solve them, ultimately lead to the picture theory of propositions in Wittgenstein's 1921 *Tractatus*.

After Saturday lunch, David Blitz cut short his own talk on 'Russell and Kant on War and Peace' to present a televised debate between Edward Teller and Russell on the arms race. Blitz has been working at McMaster University this past year collecting such radio and television appearances of Russell and preserving them for the Russell Archives there in digital form.

Henrique Ribiero, of the University of Coimbra in Portugal, followed this with a talk on 'Wittgenstein and Russell on "A believes p"', which was concerned with the *Tractatus's* impact on Russell's views on propositional attitudes. During his talk, Ribiero introduced the idea of a partial semantic holism that he attributed to Russell, and a syntactical holism that he attributed to Wittgenstein. A lively debate ensued about the possible sense and validity of these views. This debate continued in the following weeks in the online discussion group, russell-l, and a further explanation of these ideas will appear in the November issue of this journal. Jane Duran, from the University of California, Santa Barbara, finished the session with a talk 'On Russell on History and Intrinsic Value' concerning Russell's anti-causal view of historical events.

Sunday's talks were equally enjoyable. Iva Apostolova, a graduate student from the University of Ottawa, began the session with a talk entitled 'From Acquaintance to Neutral Monism', in which she argued that Russell's shift from acquaintance to neutral monism was driven by his problems in describing the cognitive faculties of sensation, memory, and imagination with his acquaintance theory. Her talk is published in this issue of the BRSQ. Chad Trainer followed with a delightful talk on Russell's stay in Pennsylvania, based on his own trips to the places Russell stayed while there, together with local newspaper accounts of Russell's stay and reminiscences from people with first hand accounts that Chad contacted on his visits to Russell's old haunts. Kevin Klement finished Sunday's session with a paper on 'The Origins of the Propositional Functions Versions of Russell's Paradox'. Less

narrowly focused than the title might suggest, Klement's talk went a long way to explaining what Russell was doing between 1902 and 1904, when he claimed to have sat before a blank sheet of paper for two years, unable to proceed.

Saturday evening's banquet was a pleasure, and closed with the presentation of awards, and delivery of memorable remarks and stories by the Society's special guests that night. Nicholas Griffin received the BRS Book Award for *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*, which he edited [and which was reviewed in the February 2004 issue of the BRSQ]. Arguably, Nick's introduction to the *Companion* alone qualifies him for the award this year, for in that introduction, one will find as succinct and yet accurate and insightful a description of Russell's life and work as one could imagine. Ronald Jager, author of an early authoritative work on Russell (the 1972 *Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*) that is still the most comprehensive view of Russell's entire work, won a special book award this year. In accepting the award, Jager entertained the audience with a story of his visit to Russell in the early 1960s, where he found Russell to be dauntingly lucid. Honorary Russell Society member, Taslima Nasrin, a special guest at the dinner, was also asked to speak afterwards, and she told of her flight from persecution in Bangladesh, hidden under clothes in the back of a car and in a bare upstairs room without food or water.

The winner of the Annual Bertrand Russell Society Award this year was Daniel Dennett. While Dennett could not attend the evening's ceremonies, he sent the following letter of acceptance, which was read aloud to the assembly after dinner:

To Members of the Bertrand Russell Society:

I am deeply honored to receive the Bertrand Russell Society Award for 2004, and truly regretful that I cannot attend your meeting in New Hampshire – one of my favorite states, where I spent many boyhood summers.

Bertrand Russell was one of my heroes, and I even had the opportunity of corresponding with him once. He was the "Patron" of the Voltaire Society, the student philosophical society in Oxford when I was a graduate student in 1963-5, and it fell to the President of the Society to write a letter to

Russell each term, informing him on the term's program and inviting him to attend. He never attended, but usually sent back a suitably quotable note.

My term as President (Michaelmas Term of 1964) I wrote him the official letter, including the program card for the term. (Our speakers were Alan Anderson on 'Minds and Machines', Richard Hare on 'Searle on Promising', and Peter Geach, with Geoffrey Warnock responding, on 'The Perils of Pauline'.) Russell had just made a big splash in the British press by supporting Mark Lane's book, *Rush to Judgment*, the first of the books criticizing the Warren Commission Report on the assassination of JFK.

I myself was deeply involved in researching the Warren Commission Report, so my letter raised a few points of agreement and disagreement with Russell's views. He responded in a brief message, which I duly read to the assembled members at our next meeting, and then placed in the bulging box of Voltaire Society correspondence that got passed from President to President. On the dissolution of the society that box disappeared for many years, but I found out inadvertently who had it, and asked him if I might have my letter to Russell and his reply for my scrapbook, but he informed me that those letters (and some others I mentioned to him) were no longer in the collection. Alas.

I never met Russell face to face, but saw him often on British telly in those days, and Gilbert Ryle once told me a wonderful story about Russell. When Ryle publicly refused, as Editor of *Mind*, to review Ernest Gellner's book, *Words and Things*, which was viciously critical of ordinary language philosophy and Austin's work in particular, there was a great brouhaha in the papers (this was in 1961 or 1962, as I recall, memorably recounted by Ved Mehta in *The Fly and the Fly-bottle*, which was first published in the *New Yorker*). Ryle told me that in retrospect he realized that he'd made a great mistake, and that it was Russell who had given him the best retrospective advice – and Russell had written the foreword to Gellner's book!: "When you get such a hateful book, don't publicly refuse to review it, you silly man! Wait a year and then publish a brief, critical review with the author's name misspelled!"

I send you all my thanks for the honor you have bestowed on me, and best wishes,

Daniel Dennett
May 11, 2004

The weather through the entire weekend of the annual meeting was clear and temperate during the day and cold at night for good sleeping, and the surrounding hills were covered in early summer greenery. Driving through the hills on the way to and from the conference was an extra scenic bonus. There was a large biker convention occurring in the area on the same weekend, and those driving up to the BRS conference had found themselves traveling in the middle of a seeming endless procession of rumbling Harleys, ridden by bearded American romantics, come to meet together and race their bikes in the state whose slogan is "live free or die". The Russell Society conference ended with a cookout lunch on Sunday afternoon from 12:30 to 2 pm. Those staying to the end of the conference and getting a late start home were again treated to the exotic spectacle of traveling through an endless stream of bikes and bikers, who were heading home from their own conference at the same time.

Sources: Chad Trainer, Ken Blackwell.

~*~

THE BRS *QUARTERLY* is now indexed, and its articles abstracted, in *The Philosopher's Index*, including back issues from November 2003 on. Articles from earlier issues of the BRSQ will be added to *The Philosopher's Index* in the coming months.

FEATURES

FROM ACQUAINTANCE TO NEUTRAL MONISM RUSSELL'S THEORY OF COGNITION 1910-1921

IVA APOSTOLOVA

The focus of my paper is the shift in Russell's view of sensation, memory and imagination in the period 1910-1925 from what is known as the "acquaintance" theory of knowledge to neutral monism. I will argue that the changes in Russell's views about sensation, memory and imagination are crucial to understanding his epistemology in this period, since he considered the theory of cognitive faculties to be the basis of the theory of knowledge. Russell's interest in theory of knowledge after 1910 focused on the theory of acquaintance. However, in 1918 Russell realized that the theory of cognition based upon the acquaintance theory faced insuperable difficulties in explaining how the cognitive faculties work. This resulted in the abandonment of key concepts such as the "subject of cognition", the "cognitive relation between subject and object", and "sense-data" which eventually led to the adoption of a new theory of knowledge altogether, which he worked out in detail in the period 1918-1925. By investigating the development of Russell's theory of cognition and the problems associated with it, I hope to show its importance for this major shift from the acquaintance to the neutral monism theories that his later views of the nature of knowledge, judgment, and philosophy were based on.

I.

In 1910 Bertrand Russell's philosophical interest was directed towards an epistemology based on the analysis of experience. Experience comprises our present experience, or sensations, our past experience, or memories, our imaginings, and our knowledge of properties and relations such as those of logic and mathematics.¹ Our present, past and imaginary experience is described by what Russell called in *Theory of Knowledge* "acquaintance with particulars", while the experience of properties and relations is described by the "acquaintance with predicates".

According to Russell, certain and indubitable knowledge presupposes direct awareness of things without the intermediary of

¹ Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge. The 1913 Manuscript* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 33.

images or of inferences from images to things. Knowledge by acquaintance, as opposed to knowledge by description, provides this direct knowledge of things and is considered the foundation for all other types of knowledge.² Of the two types of knowledge by acquaintance, acquaintance with particulars, or knowledge of things as they appear to us, is for Russell the most certain knowledge which underpins our knowledge of complex facts and truths.³ Three cognitive faculties, sensation (which at this time includes perception, introspection, attention, and anticipation), memory, and imagination (which includes hallucination and dreaming) exhaust the types of acquaintance with particulars.⁴

Russell analyzed acquaintance as a two-term relation between subject and object of cognition, i.e., as a direct relation between the mind and matter (sense-data). Although Russell later abandoned the acquaintance theory and its subject-object structure of knowledge and embraced the theory which states that there is only "one neutral stuff", he did not give up the idea that the faculties of sensation, memory and imagination are the foundation of knowledge, and he continued to explore how they relate to each other to build certainty. I believe that Russell's theory of the cognitive faculties from 1912-1913, as outlined above, helped him realize that the theory of knowledge by acquaintance has flaws which eventually caused its replacement with a theory that could better explain cognition.

II.

As we saw earlier, acquaintance with particulars comprises the three main cognitive faculties of sensation, memory and imagination. Russell defined acquaintance with particulars as acquaintance with objects which are "all present to me at the time when I experience them".⁵ However, the sense in which objects are "present", Russell admitted, is troublesome.⁶ Not all objects of acquaintance are present in the temporal sense. Temporal presence is

² Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 46; *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 5.

³ Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 45-47.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 79, 100.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

problematic for the faculties of memory and imagination. It seems that only the objects of sensation are both present to the mind and present in the sense of being simultaneous with the act of sensation. Objects of memory are in the past, yet somehow they are present to the mind that is acquainted with them; objects of imagination are neither in the present, nor in the past, being imaginary, yet they are somehow present to the imagining mind too.

The difficulty is that the acts of sensation, memory and imagination are all happening now, and so in some sense their objects are all present to them at that moment. But according to Russell's theory, the objects of these acts are in different temporal relations with the subject, so while the objects of sensation are in the present, the objects of memory are in the past, and those of the imagination are in the imagined (not in the real-time) present, past or future.⁷ The problem is that Russell insists that the distinction between the faculties is not based on the nature of their objects but in the temporal relation between object and subject.⁸ But whenever the objects relate to the subject they are present to it. Objects of sensation, memory and imagination are all present to the subject of acquaintance and so the temporal relation of subject and object does not account for the distinction between sensations, memories and imaginings.

Another important issue concerns the faculty of memory. According to the acquaintance theory of knowledge, memory plays a pivotal role in extending acquaintance and so foundational knowledge.⁹ Memory extends knowledge by acquaintance beyond the "specious present" of sensation and thus releases the subject from the trap of the present moment. In other words, the role of memory, as Russell argued, is to connect our momentary awareness with our past experience of things.¹⁰

Apart from the general question of how it is possible to be acquainted with the past at all, that is, how we can be directly aware of past objects and events without the mediation of mental entities such as images, the analysis of the faculty of memory which Russell

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 64-66, 70-72.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 79.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12. See also B. Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 48.

¹⁰ Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 12.

provides in *Theory of Knowledge* raises other difficulties for his theory. The three types of memory for Russell are "physiological", "immediate", and "remote" memory. Physiological and immediate memory are memory by acquaintance, while remote memory is knowledge by description. Physiological memory deals with the most recent past, which nevertheless belongs to the specious present. Immediate memory is also memory of the recent past but its objects do not belong to the specious present. There is something in immediate memory, says Russell, which makes us believe that its objects are in the past and thus are different from sensations or sense-data, even though we are acquainted with them the same way we are acquainted with sensations or sense-data. Unfortunately, Russell does not elaborate on what the role of physiological memory is in his theory of memory, since it virtually belongs to the faculty of sensation. Furthermore, he does not provide a clear account of what distinguishes physiological memory dealing with present objects from immediate memory which deals with recent past objects, and thus does not answer the question of how the objects of memory by acquaintance differ from the objects of sensation (whose objects are in the specious present as well) and imagination (whose objects could be in an imagined recent past).

Another difficulty that arises for the relations between the three types of memory is that Russell does not address the issue of how the objects of the three types of memory differ from one another. If the difference is only in their distance in time, then the objects of physiological and immediate memory which deal with the specious present and recent past, can become in due course objects of remote memory. This leads to the conclusion that knowledge by acquaintance could become knowledge by description, which is a far from desirable outcome for Russell's acquaintance theory.

Yet another problem for Russell's theory of the cognitive faculties concerns imagination. According to Russell's definition, "imagination differs from memory and sensation by the fact that it does not imply (though it does not exclude) a time-relation of subject and object".¹¹ It seems that what Russell has in mind is that although any imagined object is real, it does not exist in physical

¹¹ Ibid., p. 170.

time, which means that its temporal status is imaginary. The problem is how the faculty of imagination is distinguished from sensation and memory. Since imagination neither implies nor excludes temporal relations, there is nothing in the nature of the relation of subject and object to distinguish it from memory or sensation.

In *Theory of Knowledge*, Russell says that the objects of imagination (which include hallucinations and dreams) are usually easily identified because they are unusual and strange compared to the ordinary objects of sensation and memory. Russell acknowledges, however, that this cannot be the basis of distinguishing imagination from sensation and memory because the cognitive faculties are defined by the difference in the relation between the known object and the knowing subject, and not the difference in the objects themselves. Applying Russell's criterion, I will not be able, for example, to distinguish between a memory of my deceased grandmother and my imaginary vision of her, since both objects are experienced as past.

One conclusion to be drawn from the above is that Russell's theory of acquaintance with particulars fails to provide a criterion of distinction between the cognitive faculties which it initially aimed for, because it cannot explain their temporal differences.

III.

The period 1918-1919 is one of change for Russell's epistemology. He realized that the subject-object structure of knowledge which is essential for his acquaintance theory is probably not the steadiest epistemological structure, and certainly not the simplest one. The first important consequence of the abandonment of the acquaintance theory is that Russell no longer believes that we are directly aware of the things around us. Images and inferences of things from images of them, which were rejected as intermediaries between the subject and the object of knowledge in the previous theory, are now acknowledged to be "the only ingredients required in addition to sensation" to build up our cognitive picture of reality.¹²

Secondly, the concepts of "subject" and "object" of cognition which were regarded as separate entities in the acquaintance

¹² Bertrand Russell, *Analysis of Mind* (London, Routledge, 1997), p. 144.

theory, are now deemed dispensable for the analysis of knowledge. And so, sensation, memory and imagination, with all other "mental occurrences" such as introspection, attention, and anticipation, are no longer conceived as cognitive relations between subject and object. The direct awareness of things provided by sensation is not considered knowledge per se, since knowledge requires habit and the association of images which involve elements foreign to sensation. However, it is important to note that the three faculties of sensation, memory, and imagination were still believed by Russell to be the basis of knowledge. This line of thought began with *The Analysis of Mind* and persisted throughout the remainder of Russell's life.¹³

IV.

In Russell's new 1921 "neutral monism" theory of knowledge, perceptual knowledge, which he still regarded as the basis of knowledge, is now explained without appeal to an irreducible duality between a mental subject and material object. The first consequence for the theory of the cognitive faculties of 1921, which drops the theory of acquaintance, is that sensation is now conceived as a part of perception and not as a separate cognitive faculty. Sensation is "extracted [from perception] by psychological analysis".¹⁴ Perception constitutes the "actual experience" which involves "sensation", "biography", "perspective", "habit", and application of the so-called "mnemonic laws" which connect the present with the past experience.

Perception now comprises the "momentary experience" of things as well as the different perspectives from which each of us experiences them, which forms what Russell calls our "integral experience of things in the environment".¹⁵ The core of the epistemological analysis, experience, now also includes inter-

¹³ In his article "Russell's Neutral Monism" (*Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*, Ed. Nicholas Griffin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 332-371), Robert Tully argues that Russell's mature neutral monist theory was developed not earlier than 1940. This thesis deserves serious consideration. However, for the purposes of my paper, I will accept Russell's claim in *The Analysis of Mind* that his theory at the time sided with the theory of neutral monism.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹⁵ Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 157.

pretation, expectation, habit, and belief, which were ascribed earlier to knowledge by description. Sensation is indispensable for the faculty of perception, but it is not the bearer of knowledge. The direct awareness of things provided by sensation is not knowledge, since knowledge requires habit and association of images. The view that sensations are transformed into perceptions is not an isolated consequence of the shift, it actually entails a change of the definition of all cognitive faculties and in this way, of the nature of knowledge in general. *The Analysis of Mind* is where Russell lays out the details of his new theory of knowledge inspired by neutral monism to which, with certain modifications, he remained faithful for the rest of his life.

The new theory of knowledge was adopted by Russell as a better explanation of how the human cognitive apparatus works and what the nature of knowledge is. However, Russell did not abandon the search for certain knowledge. In the light of this search, the new theory proved to be attractive because, Russell says, it dispensed with the epistemological concepts of "subject", "object", and the "dual relation between subject and object" which were at the center of the acquaintance theory, and thus offered a simpler picture of knowledge.

I argue that as a result of the failure of the acquaintance theory to distinguish between the cognitive faculties and between the acts and objects of sensing, remembering, and imagining, the task of Russell's new theory was rather to explain the common features that make the faculties a part of the "integral experience" of reality. The focus in the new theory of cognition, is shifted from providing a criterion of distinction to exploring the causal mechanisms of the faculties whose operation is explained by a general theory of habit and association of images.

Russell thus changed his mind considerably concerning the faculty of sensation in his shift from the theory of acquaintance to neutral monism. His conviction that having a sensation of something does not mean being in a cognitive relation to an object grew stronger with time. In *The Analysis of Mind* Russell argues that sensation supplies perception with "data" from the external world but does not amount to knowledge, since knowledge requires an association of images that sensation does not provide.¹⁶ Habit transforms these sensational data into images which can be remembered,

associated, imagined, or expected. The “immediate” and “remote” types of memory work through habit, association, and three types of “feeling”. Through the “feeling of familiarity” images of past events are recognized as memories rather than mere imaginations. Memory is also distinguished from imagination by the “feeling of belief” and “feeling of pastness” which accompany our memory-images but not our imagination-images. Since all our memories are images, they are “wholly analyzable into present contents”.¹⁷ In other words, memories represent past events, but are not themselves in the past, and thus the difficulty of having direct knowledge of the past which the acquaintance theory faced is avoided. From Russell’s analysis it follows that what connects the three faculties is the concept of “image”. Images are “occasioned, through association, by a sensation or another image”, and they are also believed to be “copies of sensations which have occurred earlier”.¹⁸ Thus, through images all data coming from sensation, perception, memory and imagination are turned into an “integral experience” of reality.

V.

I hope to have established two main points. First, the three main cognitive faculties of sensation, memory and imagination should be analyzed together, as elements of one theory of the cognitive faculties which plays a crucial role both for Russell’s acquaintance theory and his post-acquaintance philosophy. Second, overcoming the difficulties which the acquaintance theory faced in defining and distinguishing the three cognitive faculties, while keeping the basic epistemological project alive, was for Russell the attraction of neutral monism.

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¹⁶ Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 160.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 150, 155.

HOW THE RUSSELL PAPERS CAME TO MCMASTER*

NICHOLAS GRIFFIN

In 1967 Bertrand Russell needed money. To be more precise, the peace foundation that Russell had established in 1963 needed funds to establish an International War Crimes Tribunal to investigate the war in Vietnam. Russell’s papers would be highly prized possessions and most likely fetch a sizable sum from libraries, museums and possibly private collectors. Perhaps the papers could serve as the primary source of the needed funds for the tribunal. Thus begins the intriguing story of a famous philosopher, money, a buccaneering librarian, *Newsweek*, and last but not least, a small university with Baptist roots.

McMaster University acquired the papers in 1968. But how did the papers of the world’s most famous campaigner for nuclear disarmament come to be housed at a university that prided itself on its own nuclear reactor and its close association with the nuclear research conducted by Harry Thode, president of McMaster from 1961 to 1972, at Chalk River during the war?¹ Oddly enough, the nuclear reactor is part of the story. During the 1960s, humanities at McMaster, then as now under-resourced and under-appreciated, had been looking for something that would put it on the map in the way the nuclear reactor had put the Faculty of Science on the map. Quite what they had in mind before the Russell papers came on the market, I don’t know. But the Russell Archives, in the minds of several humanities administrators, was the institutional equivalent of the nuclear reactor.

This, of course, only explains why McMaster wanted the papers. It does not explain how it came to get them. A large part of the answer to that question lies in the fact that the University had, in

* I would like to thank Alan Schwerin and Kenneth Blackwell for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, which improved it greatly.

¹ Thode had been a McMaster professor since 1939, but during the war he had worked at the Canadian nuclear research facility at Chalk River, the original purpose of which was to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. After the war, largely through his influence, McMaster became the first Canadian university to have an experimental nuclear reactor

Will Ready, an enterprising and imaginative librarian. Ready had barely been at McMaster a year when the Russell papers came on the market. He had come to McMaster from Marquette University in Wisconsin, where he had already had considerable experience buying archives: he had bought J.R.R. Tolkien's papers and those of Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker movement for Marquette. To describe Ready as enterprising, however, barely does justice to the man. It may seem like an oxymoron to describe a librarian as buccaneering, but such was Will Ready. In his autobiography he takes pride in what he called his "cavalier" and "headlong ways" – and in the trouble they got him into and which he always managed to get out of.

Ready learned the Russell papers were up for sale by accident. He read of it in the newspaper when he was visiting Britain in the autumn of 1967. Apparently with no more than the newspaper article to go on, he returned to Canada and in November persuaded the Ontario Council of University Libraries to support an application to the Canada Council for money to buy the papers. By December he had a promise of \$150,000 from the Canada Council and by the end of that month had returned to Britain to actually see the papers for the first time. However, the money promised by the Canadian Council was far short of the asking price.

The papers were not being sold by Russell himself. Indeed, Russell himself did not own the papers. He had given them to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, and a company, Continuum 1, had been set up to catalogue and sell them. Continuum 1 wanted two hundred thousand British pounds (just over half a million Canadian dollars). Ready returned to Canada for more money. Cyrus Eaton, a wealthy financier and McMaster alumnus, and the Laidlaw Foundation contributed, but the lion's share was put up by the Atkinson Foundation. By the end of March 1968, the money was pledged and Ready was back in Britain to sign the contracts. The papers arrived that summer. It had taken Ready all of six months from learning of the papers' existence to actually completing the sale.

I don't know what support Ready got from inside the University to help acquire them, but sadly, he seems to have had little from the philosophy department. One of my former colleagues told the press at the time that he wouldn't have paid two cents for the

papers. These varying estimates of the papers' worth notwithstanding, it seems to me that at two hundred thousand pounds they were quite a bargain. As Ready himself noted, dealers could have formed a cartel to buy them and made many millions selling them off piecemeal.

The conventional wisdom is that the price was kept low because Russell would not sell to the Americans, who would have paid more for them, because of his opposition to the war in Vietnam. Indeed, I have told this story myself. It turns out, however, not to be true, as I learned by going through the recently acquired papers of Anton Felton, Russell's agent in the sale. The truth is, in fact, much more interesting.

Russell needed to sell the papers to support his political work. In 1963 he had set up the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to continue his work after his death. And in 1967 the Peace Foundation was in urgent need of cash to pay for the International War Crimes Tribunal that Russell was setting up to inquire into American conduct in Vietnam. This was a hugely expensive undertaking and, although there was some hope (never realized) that the Tribunal would be able to raise money for its own expenses, the Peace Foundation was bankrolling the Tribunal throughout its entire existence.

Russell had already given the Peace Foundation the proceeds from his *Autobiography*, the American rights to which were sold by auction (in those days, a rare event). The *Autobiography* had been mostly written much earlier and Russell had intended it to be published after his death. The urgent needs of the Peace Foundation, however, caused him to change his mind. His other main asset at this time was his papers and these, as I've said, he had given to the Peace Foundation to sell.

This, in itself, ruled out certain institutions. The British Museum couldn't afford them, and Cambridge University, which probably could have, sat on the sidelines hoping that Russell would leave them to Cambridge in his will. There was considerable irritation at Cambridge that this didn't happen. Indeed, there was considerable irritation in Britain that the papers were leaving the country. Questions about the sale were asked in Parliament, and the hapless bookseller that McMaster engaged to export the papers was subsequently fined for exporting historical manuscripts without a

licence. This referred not to Russell's own papers, but to some of his family papers, especially those of his grandfather, Lord John Russell, which had been included in the sale and which were over 100 years old. The laws concerning the export of historical manuscripts were subsequently tightened.

Although the Peace Foundation wanted as much money as it could get for them, there were limits on how they would allow them to be sold. I doubt that Russell would ever have allowed them to be bought by a cartel of dealers and sold off individually to collectors, though this would likely have been the most profitable option. Russell wanted them to be housed in a publicly accessible institution, which would look after them and make them available to researchers. With a few exceptions, the sale stipulated that the papers were to be available to whoever wanted to see them. (The exceptions concern some personal documents which were to be embargoed until five years after the deaths of the people concerned. There is very little material still embargoed - most of it concerns Russell's children, his grandchildren, and his third wife, who are still alive.)

Nonetheless, American institutions would likely have paid more for the papers than McMaster did, and, despite the Vietnam war, Russell was not averse to selling to an American university. This was hardly inconsistent: the American universities themselves were, by this time, hotbeds of opposition to the Vietnam war. Indeed negotiations with American universities were underway in 1967, before Ready even knew the papers were up for sale. There was one plan for them to be bought jointly by the University of Chicago and Harvard. Russell had taught at both places. The social and political papers would go to Chicago and the philosophical ones to Harvard. (Given what happened to the Peirce papers at Harvard, as a Russell scholar I am profoundly grateful that they didn't go there.)

But the big player here was the University of Texas at Austin. Backed by Texas oil revenues, Austin would have had no trouble meeting the asking price. It had, moreover, an aggressive acquisitions policy for its Humanities Research Centre, which already had a fabulously rich collection of papers, many of them of direct relevance to Russell. By any objective standards, the Humanities Research Centre at Austin would have been the natural home for the Russell collection.

The University of Texas was already negotiating with Russell's agents before Ready even knew of the papers and would no doubt have concluded the deal, but for a curious mischance. The negotiations, of course, were conducted in private. But news that they were going on was announced in an extraordinary story in *Newsweek*. This would have been bad enough, but *Newsweek* went on to assert that Russell intended to send the proceeds from the sale to North Vietnam to support the war effort. There was absolutely no truth to this claim at all. Russell's lawyers went to work and got the offending issue of the journal pulled from the newsstands in Britain. But the damage had been done. Texas withdrew from negotiations and other potential American buyers backed off.

It is hard to believe that *Newsweek* would publish a completely fabricated story, and it seems most likely that the magazine was set up. By whom is not clear. It could have been a patriotic American, perhaps an employee of the University of Texas, who knew of the negotiations and objected to Texas oil revenues being used to support the War Crimes Tribunal. Or it might have been the American authorities. They were going to extraordinary lengths to prevent the War Crimes Tribunal from taking place. Pressure was brought to bear on the French government to revoke permission for the Tribunal to be held in Paris. And when it finally took place in Stockholm, Walt Rostow publicly berated the Swedish prime minister about it at Konrad Adenauer's funeral. Russell himself was the subject of a campaign of vilification in the American press - some of the worst of it, e.g. an article by Flora Lewis in *Look*, under the auspices of the American embassy in London. The idea that they would plant a false story in *Newsweek* is certainly not beyond the bounds of credibility.

The result of the article was that the papers had become unsaleable in America. The thinking at Continuum 1 was that they should be withdrawn from sale until the fuss had died down. It was at this point that Ready entered the picture. It seems altogether likely that *Newsweek* cost the Peace Foundation many thousands of dollars. By the same token, McMaster got one of the best bargains in its history. It acquired, not only the papers themselves, but copyright in most of Russell's unpublished writings.

McMaster was not unaware of the political controversy surrounding the papers. As Ready forged ahead in his "cavalier"

way, more timid administrators were fearing the criticism that might fall on McMaster for buying the papers of so notorious a rebel. There was no fear that the money would be channelled to Hanoi, but it was known that it would go to furthering Russell's various political causes, and McMaster was quite anxious not to be seen to be directly supporting those. For this reason, McMaster was not willing to buy the papers directly from the Peace Foundation, which owned them, but insisted instead that a company be set up to take possession of the papers and sell them to the University. This was done, and the money was then passed from the company to the Foundation.

So far as I know, McMaster ran into no trouble for allegedly supporting Russell's political causes. It did, however, run into trouble over its very efforts to keep a safe distance between itself and the Peace Foundation. The selling price was supposed to be kept secret, but the day after the deal was completed, *The Observer* published an article speculating on the price and claiming it was a world record sum. It also reported that the money had gone to Russell and not the Peace Foundation. Further reports along similar lines appeared in the press over the next few days.

The impression was given that Russell was only interested in making money from the papers. He was furious. He had, moreover, no doubt that Ready was the source of the stories. Whether Ready had actually revealed the price is unclear, though Russell certainly thought that he had. But the University was so anxious not to appear to be supporting Russell's politics, that it had gone out of its way to insist to all who would listen that it had not bought the papers from the Peace Foundation. The press, not unreasonably, concluded that it had bought them from Russell himself and that he had made a personal fortune from the deal.

Russell wrote sternly to Ready about this:

I have complained to Mr. Felton about the story in *The Observer* of March 31, but should point out to you that the story in the *Daily Telegraph* of 2 April emanated from Hamilton and is in direct breach of the agreement entered into with you not to reveal the price of the archives. This failure appears to me to be entirely your responsibility, and there is nothing in your letter to suggest you recognise this fact.

No serious harm seems to have been done by this last controversy. It did not prevent a second sale to McMaster, after Russell's death, of private and current political papers that had been held back from the first sale and those which had accumulated after it. But it does seem that Ready – a bit like Russell – was unable to keep out of trouble, even in his greatest triumph.

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BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE COLD WAR
ORWELL'S LIST

JACK M. CLONTZ

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Review essay of 'Orwell's List', Timothy Garton Ash, *New York Review of Books*, September 25, 2003.

The embers of a forlorn hope have long smoldered in the breasts of a considerable segment of what might be called "the progressive intelligentsia". This seldom realized hope is that surely there must have been important Western intellectuals who, during the long political struggles of the Cold War, actually belonged to the independent left. However, it is not as easy as it initially seems to give a cogent characterization of what it would mean to be "independent" in the appropriate fashion.

It might seem obvious that an independent leftist should not be employed by government agencies, but this is too restrictive. For example, should we condemn Noam Chomsky for accepting grants from the U.S. Navy to fund some of his linguistic research? Or should Gilbert Ryle be condemned for having been an officer in the British army during World War II?

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A more interesting case is that of the Marxist scholar Herbert Marcuse, who was employed by the U.S. government for about nine years (1942-51). Marcuse first worked for the Office of War Information, then for the Office of Secret Services (the immediate predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency), and finally for the U.S. State Department's Eastern European Division, even at last becoming Acting Head of the Eastern European Division. Claiming to have become disenchanted by U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War, Marcuse resigned, though it is equally true that this was at the time Senator Joseph McCarthy was making his assaults on the U.S. State Department. Marcuse then took successive research and teaching positions at Columbia and Harvard and involved himself in the study of Soviet Marxism. He ended his career in the midst of intense controversy in successive positions at Brandeis University and the University of California, San Diego.

What do these cases have in common? Only that the three intellectuals were somehow being funded or paid by agencies of a national government for certain services. But a crucial difference is that Chomsky and Marcuse are well-known as uncompromising critics of the U.S. government, especially in regard to foreign policy, so that had it been their political writings that had been subsidized by the government, their independence as leftist intellectuals would have at least been suspect. But similar observations do not pertain to Ryle in the U.K., even apart from the fact that Ryle was participating in a war against the odious German Nationalist Socialist regime, for he had no serious reputation as a critic of the West to compromise.

On the other hand, what should we say in the case of Bertrand Russell, an obvious candidate for the role of spokesman for the independent left in the Cold War period? The issue is vexed because there was an apparent radical shift in Russell's views on the Cold War between the end of World War II and the early 1960s, when Russell went from being a zealous anti-communist to being a critic of the West some of whose writings could have emanated from the propaganda machines of one of several communist countries. But it is even more vexed by the fact that only recently have we learned that Russell worked as an agent of propaganda for a secret arm of the British foreign office during one of the most dangerous phases of the Cold War. It appears, then, that our idol had at times feet of clay that were decidedly pointing in different directions, and that Russell had been at different times an abettor of both anti- and pro-communist propaganda machines. As such, it is difficult to maintain confidence in his political judgment. But these are larger issues. Here I shall be principally concerned with the context of Russell's 1953 anti-communist writings that were sponsored by a secret branch of the British Foreign Office.

Timothy Garton Ash, who now has joint appointments at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, has achieved a wide hearing as the polyglot chronicler of the Eastern European anti-communist movements that led to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Much of his commentary on these dramatic events in Eastern Europe was published in such venues as *The New York Review of Books* prior to its appearance in book form.

More recently, Garton Ash has turned his attention to George Orwell's last years when the desperately ill Orwell had just gone through the arduous task of getting *Animal Farm* published and *1984* in publishable form. Although the author of the earlier *Homage to Catalonia* had become a strong opponent of communism, these last major works represented an extremely bitter Orwell who had become the prototypical Cold Warrior. After all, the *Oxford English Dictionary* cites Orwell as the first to use the term 'Cold War', in 1945 and 1946. (Only in 1947 did the term come into common usage, when Walter Lippmann used the expression in the title of his book *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, and the *New York Times* also began using the term. And according to a JSTOR keyword search, only in 1948 did academics begin using the term in scholarly journals.) Nevertheless, Orwell has also frequently been acclaimed as that rare specimen of modern humanity, the genuinely "virtuous man", the term used by the Cold War liberal Lionel Trilling to describe Orwell's character in Trilling's 1952 Introduction to the American edition of Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia*. But such veritable apotheosis becomes almost risible in view of what we now know.

In *The New York Review of Books* of September 25, 2003, Garton Ash published an article called 'Orwell's List'. In this article, Garton Ash gives an account of his research concerning an astonishing list of thirty-eight names of journalists, politicians, and others compiled by Orwell. In some cases, Orwell appended comments, some being anti-Semitic or homophobic, as well as vocational information. Those on the list were generally labeled as "crypto-communists" or "fellow travelers". Others were said to be merely "appeasers" (of the U.S.S.R.), "reliably pro-Russian" or "sympathizers only". Quite a few on the list are well known to those in Russell studies, for they include such figures as E.H. Carr, Isaac Deutscher, Kingsley Martin and J.B. Priestley.

Orwell turned this list over to a secret department of the British Foreign Office on May 2, 1949 through the agency of a close friend, Celia Kirwan, an employee of the department and a woman to whom Orwell was emotionally bound in unrequited love. Orwell had met Celia in 1945 when he spent Christmas in Wales with his friend Arthur Koestler and Koestler's wife Mamaine,

Celia's twin sister. Ironically, Mamaine had once been the object of unwelcome amorous advances from Russell. As a result, relations between Koestler and Russell became strained to the extent that their working together in the anti-communist cause was for a while curtailed.

At the time Orwell sent his list to Celia Kirwan she had recently been employed by the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD). Among other tasks, this secret department was officially charged with conducting what Labor foreign secretary Ernest Bevin, its founder, called "anti-communist publicity". At first the department was primarily engaged in gathering information concerning Soviet and communist misdeeds and sharing this information with sympathetic journalists, politicians and trade unionists. It is therefore unsurprising that the department employed the now well-known historian of Stalinist terror, Robert Conquest, who at one point shared an office with Celia Kirwan. In the course of events, however, the department came to sponsor anti-communist publications. It goes without saying that this sponsorship was hidden from public view.

In particular, the IRD was eager to sponsor publication of anti-communist works by well-known and reputedly "independent" leftists. It is therefore clear why the IRD would be eager to have Russell, a well-known anti-communist on the political left, as one of their authors. At the same time, the IRD was equally eager to weed out prospective authors who were not politically reliable. This is a major reason why the IRD welcomed Orwell's list. For, as Orwell himself said, such individuals should be prevented from writing works under the aegis of the IRD.

But what Garton Ash does not mention is that in case of need, this list was also to be used to ferret out suspicious intellectuals and others, perhaps in a political crisis, though there is no indication Orwell himself knew this. Accordingly, in a telephone interview conducted by Francis Stonor Saunders, Adam Watson, a senior IRD veteran and Celia Kirwan's supervisor, would not categorically deny that the list was to be used against those on it. He would only say in an artfully qualified way that "Its immediate usefulness was that these were not people who should write for us," but went on to add that "[their] connection with Soviet-backed

organizations might have to be exposed at some later date".¹ It thus seems to have been intended that the list could be concomitantly used as a tool of ideological suppression or even political control under certain unspecified untoward circumstances.

Notice, moreover, that it has previously been thought that the U.K. never approximated the virulent and destructive anti-communism dominating American culture and politics at this very time. However, this new information concerning the IRD would suggest the need to slightly revise this received view. In addition, attention is called to the fact that anyone associated with the IRD at this time would almost certainly have been looked upon askance or otherwise considered suspect by those who prize civil liberties and individual human rights. Any liberal-minded observer would pay close heed to the possibility that an individual running afoul of the IRD would at the least run the risk of losing his or her livelihood, as was not unusual in the U.S. in analogous circumstances.

Russell had three short political books published by Batchworth Books in their Background Books series, *Why Communism Must Fail* (1951), *What is Freedom?* (1952), and *What is Democracy?* (1953). And we now know that their publication was financed by the IRD. According to Garton Ash, IRD insiders told him that Russell, unlike some others, knew full well that Background Books was surreptitiously funded by a propaganda wing of the Foreign Office. Presumably, the earnings received by Russell from the sale of these books were funneled through the IRD as well. Even more disconcerting is the fact that Russell chose to reprint two of these short booklets as component essays in his collection *Fact and Fiction*.

Fact and Fiction was published in the U.K. by Allen and Unwin in 1961 and in the U.S. by Simon and Schuster in 1962. It is noted in both editions that the two pieces were revised in 1960. Obviously, this revision was undertaken to take account of what Russell believed were positive changes in the U.S.S.R. in the early post-Stalin period. Nonetheless, it goes without saying that there is no

¹ Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, The New Press, New York, 2000, p 299.

mention of the fact that the original publication by Batchworth Press was subsidized by the IRD.

In my view, the upshot is that Russell compromised himself in two important respects. The first is that he violated his own belief in the paramount importance of the individual being able to make judgments on their merits without societal or political pressure, in the full light of evidence that should be freely available to all. By hiding the fact that he had engaged in surreptitious propaganda Russell deeply compromised himself. He also compromised himself by presenting himself as a detached, independent observer of political trends, one who was not beholden to hidden or special interests. In effect, therefore, Russell lied to his readers by not revealing the provenance of the writing of these works.

Some historians of the IRD, for example, Paul Lashmar and James Oliver in their book on the IRD entitled *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (1998), and Lyn Smith in 'Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department 1947-1977' (in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1980), have asserted that there is no evidence that writers' views were trimmed to fit a particular line, but that Background Books simply picked authors whose independent opinions were congruent with its requirements. (Lashmar and Oliver, p. 102.)

For example, Lashmar and Oliver quote Bryan Magee, who wrote a book for the IRD without knowing of their government affiliation, that "No one had attempted to influence what I wrote, and my book was published just as I wrote it, down to the last comma." (Ibid.) Nonetheless, when he discovered the full truth about IRD Magee was outraged at being used for political ends of which he knew nothing. I shall simply observe that a vast moral chasm opens between Magee and Russell regarding what they had done in writing for IRD, and pass on without even the suggestion of an invidious comparison since the matter speaks for itself.

In contrast to the historians just cited, however, Andrew Bone, of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University, has pointed out (in an email message of 9/24/2003 to the online Russell Studies Discussion Group russell-l) that in Russell's correspondence with his editors at Background Books, Colin Wintle and Stephen Watts, "the ideological thrust of the project comes

across quite clearly." And, moreover, that Russell even received explicit editorial guidelines from Wintle for *What is Freedom?*, namely, that Russell "should accept the proposition that the prospects of freedom are better outside Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and develop arguments to show why this is so."

Thus, as letters in the Russell Archives at McMaster University reveal, Russell clearly wrote anti-communist propaganda on explicit instruction from the anti-communist propaganda machine of a government agency. In addition, in these letters, Russell indicates that he well understands the direct ideological nature of the publications he was to prepare. This gives some reason to believe that what the IRD veterans have said is true and that Russell did know the function of Background Books and the identity of its backers.

The next task would be to analyze *What Is Freedom?*, *What Is Democracy?*, and *Why Communism Must Fail* in order to determine their precise ideological content, and to compare the results with what we now know of the policy of the IRD and other contemporary propaganda agencies. We would thus be in a better position to see concretely how Russell managed the task he was given and to see how strictly he conformed to official policy in writing these three short works in 1951-1953, an ominous period in the history of the Cold War. I hope to present such an analysis in a future issue of the BRS *Quarterly*.

To anticipate, perhaps even worse to say is that further analysis will reveal that the three works are mediocre and as a whole detract from Russell's reputation on purely scholarly grounds. They contribute virtually nothing to political theory or analysis when compared with other anti-communist writers like Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper, *émigré* scholars in Great Britain with at least broadly comparable political views who wrote on similar themes at about the same time. But then, Russell's purpose was not to make a scholarly contribution to political theory or analysis. On the contrary, the purpose was to persuade those intellectually incapable of grasping the limitations of the works they were reading that the views being expressed were both cogent and correct. But the tools of persuasion were little more than the considerable grace with which the works were written and the great intellectual and social prestige enveloping their author.

This episode in Russell's life lamentably once again illustrates that the greatest of figures can yet be guilty of Benda's infamous *trahison des clerics*, and this even in the midst of a world situation redolent of impending cataclysmic. At least Pugwash and the Russell-Einstein Manifesto will fairly soon go far in redeeming Russell's blemished reputation. Nonetheless, it must be said that it would have been much better had Russell at least frankly acknowledged his unsavory association with the IRD. No doubt Russell had his own reasons for not broaching the issue when he had ample opportunity to do so, but to scout such possible reasons would be so speculative as to be tangential to what has been attempted here.

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LETTER TO THE *TIMES*, 4 AUGUST, 1961*

by BERTRAND RUSSELL

INTRODUCTION

by RAY PERKINS, JR.

The Committee of 100, with Russell at its head, came into being in the autumn of 1960 as a means of incorporating civil disobedience into the British anti-nuclear movement. In this letter, hitherto unpublished, Russell speculates on the British government's reasons for denying permission for an anti-nuclear rally in Trafalgar Square on September 17, 1961. A sit-down demonstration resulted in an excessive police response which the Committee was able to use to gain considerable public support in the following months. Russell was not arrested in the September 17 melee because he and Edith were already in prison for an action in Hyde Park on Hiroshima Day, just two days after this letter to the *Times* was written. He and Edith were sentenced to two months in prison, reduced to one week for reasons of health. They were released from prison on September 18.

4 August, 1961

To the Editor of the *Times*: [in BR's handwriting – RP]

Some months ago the Committee of 100, of which I am president, applied for permission to hold a meeting in Trafalgar Square on September 17. No answer was received until a few days ago, and, when received, it was a refusal. It is very much to be hoped that the Authorities will reconsider this refusal.

* This letter is reprinted with kind permission of the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University.

Perhaps what influenced the Authorities was the knowledge that a non-violent demonstration of civil disobedience was likely to occur later on the same day. Such a demonstration, however, would be distinct from the meeting in Trafalgar Square. Moreover, if the legitimate outlets for expressions of opinion are refused, many, who might otherwise hesitate, will be driven to civil disobedience as the only opening left for them.

Another thing which may have influenced the Authorities is that September 17 is Battle of Britain Day.¹ Perhaps they consider it inappropriate that a meeting should be held on that day by those who seek to persuade their countrymen not to permit further suffering, further death – perhaps the complete extinction of the human race and the obliteration of all that the splendidly brave people suffered and died for during that Battle. New times require new methods: and the salvation of Britain is as much our aim as it was that of those, both fighters and civilians, who gallantly endured the perils of that time.

Yours faithfully,

Bertrand Russell

¹ The Battle of Britain Day is a national holiday commemorating the heroic efforts of the British Royal Air Force against Hitler's Luftwaffe from July to November of 1940 in which "Churchill's few" gave the Nazis one of their first defeats of World War II.

REVIEW

BOISE

TOM WEIDLICH

This summer, the Rattlestick Theater in New York City's West Village produced *Boise*, by David Folwell. The play liberally quotes Bertrand Russell and raises issues he was concerned with – marriage, truth, and Judeo-Christian morals versus a more rational code. But the protagonist takes Russell's ideas further than they want to go.

(Interesting, at the same time, and further uptown on Broadway, another play, a revival of Tom Stoppard's *Jumpers*, also invoked Russell throughout. The main character, a moral philosopher named George Moore – no, not *that* one – ponders: "Do I say 'My friend the late Bertrand Russell' or 'My late friend Bertrand Russell'? They both sound funny." To which his wife retorts: "Probably because he wasn't your friend.")

In *Boise*, the main character, Stewart, is a married thirtysomething office worker in the throes of a mid-life crisis. In addition to being dissatisfied with his work, he has lost sexual interest in his wife.

He meets and becomes intrigued with Tara from human resources. He is partly attracted to her because she makes him think – she quotes Bertrand Russell. When Stewart asks who Russell is, Tara replies, "Philosopher, mathematician. He's a cool guy."

Tara and Stewart quote Russell throughout the play. The first invocation is from Tara: "Well, Bertrand Russell said that public opinion is an unnecessary tyrant and we should respect it just enough to avoid starvation and to keep out of prison." She recites, "One symptom of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one's work is terribly important."

Stewart goes out and buys a Russell book (it is not named in the script but on stage he carries around the Liveright paperback edition of *Marriage & Morals*). "He's so funny," Stewart says, and quotes, "Patriotism is the willingness to kill and be killed for trivial reasons."

Most relevantly to the play's theme, at one point Stewart quotes Russell, "We have, in fact, two kinds of morality side by side: one which we preach but do not practice, and another which we practice but seldom preach."

Stewart coaxes Tara out for a drink. ("We both like Bertrand.") They discuss marriage and cheating. Stewart argues that it's okay to cheat out of biological need. He says that, like Russell, he is arguing *for* marriage, though it seems more a ploy to get Tara in bed. Tara says she is opposed to marriage and instead argues in favor of hedonism. Marriage makes people liars, she says.

Tara and Stewart start falling for each other. But she refuses to sleep with him unless he informs his wife. This he is loathe to do.

Meantime, Tara hooks up with Stewart's friend Owen. Tara is evidently Russell's St. Paul, because Owen too is soon quoting the philosopher. ("To fear love is to fear life, and those who fear life are already three parts dead.")

At one point Stewart is in a bar with his wife and encourages her to cruise the bar ("This is what the Judeo-Christian ethic doesn't take into consideration," he says. "That we are still animals, really. These are all strictures enforced on us by an out-moded dogma").

Stewart becomes increasingly unraveled to the point that, in the climax, he makes a play for his unlucky-in-love sister, Jackie. When he conjectures that ancient roaming tribes probably slept with family members, Jackie says, "Those were SAVAGES!" To which Stewart replies, "YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE SO JUDGEMENTAL."

When Jackie cries, Stewart says, "It's hard. It's all new. We are in a new world."

After smashing a computer monitor on a co-worker, Stewart ends up in jail where he continues to read Russell. He says he is happy there and quotes Russell, "To be without some of the things you want is an indispensable part of happiness."

Anita Gates' review of the play in *The New York Times* said, "It's not clear whether Mr. Folwell simply enjoys the ridiculous or wants to say something about contemporary values, the limits of rejecting them and the semiquiet desperation of middle-class white American men."

In early August, David Folwell did a phone interview with the BRS *Quarterly* about his play and Russell's role in it. Following are excerpts.

THOM WEIDLICH: When did you first become aware of Bertrand Russell?

DAVID FOLWELL: I had my first experience with Bertrand Russell in the back of a cab. I was in New York and somebody left *Education and the Social Order* in the cab. So I took it home and I just started reading it and I thought it was really interesting. Like Stewart in the script it made me laugh. Not derisive of course. The stuff he said was so commonsensical and logical and the things that we don't like to think about every day. And just for somebody to say it out loud I really appreciated it.

TW: How long ago was that?

DF: I would say about three years ago maybe. It wasn't that long ago. In college I studied a lot of philosophy. I didn't study any Bertrand Russell because I went to a Catholic school [the University of St. Thomas in Texas]. They didn't want to talk about him. It's a liberal arts school in Texas. As part of the core curriculum you have to study philosophy and theology. And you had to have like 24 credit hours, which is a lot. So I took more philosophy than I did theology. So I've got a little bit of a background in philosophy but it's one of those things. I don't even acknowledge it very much. It's just kind of there. And then every once in awhile I can say something that makes me sound intelligent to people.

TW: How integral is Russell to the theme of the play?

DF: Actually the Russell stuff came in very late. I'd been working on the play for maybe three years and it started off just as an examination of sexuality. I just wanted to write a dirty play. I wanted to write something my mom would be ashamed of. I was married maybe five, six years at the time. I started having these conversations with people. I guess when we get into our thirties we just have these very frank conversations about sex. I remember I met this one lady who was a poet and she started telling me about

her dom. She had just gotten into town and she had met this guy from the *Village Voice*. And she was really excited about this dominant-submissive relationship. Which I thought was fascinating and kind of funny too. I tried to joke with her about it, you know, once she finally broke up with the guy, I said, "Can you do that?" [There is such a character in the play. -TW] We were getting to this point in our lives where sex is something I just really wanted to examine. It was becoming obsessive. And also a theme that I like to think about a lot in my stuff is this idea of people – who they are and what they want to become and this idea that we're kind of just a few steps out of the cave but we have these high ideals for ourselves and we're so disappointed and guilty when we can't achieve them. In the play, it was good but I think most people's reaction was it was a play about a sex addict, which I didn't want. I didn't want it to be about a disease or a disorder. I just wanted him to be a regular guy. I started working with [playwright] Craig Lucas on the play and he really urged me to broaden it, to make it more about a person's mid-life crisis and more of an existential crisis that he's going through. And I think that was right. That's really what I was trying to go for. Really the way Russell came into it was I was looking for something clever for a character to say. So I started looking up quotes and I found a quote and I put it into Tara's mouth. And then I was looking for other things, just random things for people to say. I kept on going back to the Russell quotes. The Russell stuff just worked so perfectly. It's an appealing philosophy to a guy like Stewart because it strips away all the superstitions and what he would consider just bullshit about society. And Russell is somebody who states it plainly and cleverly and I think it really appealed to Stewart. So it just really worked.

TW: But also I was thinking especially with the book, *Marriage & Morals*, that Stewart was carrying around on stage, that's a book where Russell was talking about creating a new morality. Do you see that as a big part of the play?

DF: Yeah, I do. I think that's what Stewart ultimately wanted. All of a sudden he wakes up and sees the world in a new way. In the original version of the script I had him go off – y'know, he makes love to his sister and he goes off and he starts a new society in Boise. They start this whole cult. And people just thought that was

too weird. So when I got up to that point I just kind of changed it. It's actually more reasonable if [Jackie says], "What the hell are you doing, you're trying to drag me down with you." I haven't read *Marriage & Morals*, I have to say. I've only read several essays and parts of books and things like that.

TW: I was wondering about that. I'm not exactly sure where most of the quotes come from. And I was wondering if most of them come from *Marriage & Morals*.

DF: I'm not sure. They're random quotes that I found on the Internet and things like that to tell you the truth. So I am a bit of a fraud. But I think a lot of them had to do with the strictures that societies impose on us. And I think that was appealing to Stewart. But in the end it also was a cover for just bad behavior and having him let his id take over and justify anything by saying, "It's going to be a new morality" and he's going to create something new. I think that's where it kind of goes awry for him.

TW: It's interesting that you say that because that goes further than Russell would go. Do you agree with that?

DF: Oh, I do. And this was one of my concerns because I really like what Russell had to say. I don't want people to think I was blaming Bertrand Russell for this guy's downfall. Because I don't think that's the case. It's a case of a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. What I suffer from as well as the character.

TW: I think the main thing Russell was trying to do in *Marriage & Morals* was create a new morality. He was mostly opposed to Christian morality. Which didn't mean anything goes. Which I think is more where Stewart is heading.

DF: Yes I think so. I think he would have gotten there if he could have. If he could have just looked at it rationally. I think there was so much emotion involved and also guilt. But he didn't really have the mechanism for it. He couldn't really look at it rationally because he was so angry and bitter. And he felt entitled. I think he feels entitled to a better life without having to really work for it. That was a big part of the hubris too.

TW: Right. And that's not something that Russell would agree with.

DF: Oh, no I don't think so at all.

TW: Any other thoughts?

DF: I'm going to be better about reading more Russell. Especially now with all that's going on. I mean, I was watching CNN this morning and it's all about terror alerts and Tom Ridge was on there. This kind hysteria that's building up right now, I think Russell might be a good person to turn to. He'd come up with some sort of solution. Better than just creating this illogical superstition and fear. I was reading in *Unpopular Essays* about how the [clergy] came out against the lightning rod. It was God's domain only to be able to strike people down, and for someone to thwart that is morally wrong. We tend to as human beings slip back into superstition. And I think that's what Russell was trying to do, to strip away those things and force us to look at things logically. We could use a little Russell right this very minute.

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END MATTER

REPORT FROM THE BRPF: BOSTON'S TEA-TIME PEACE PARTY

TONY SIMPSON, July 28, 2004

The keepers of the Peace Vigil gather every Thursday tea-time in Depot Square in the small town of Lexington, a dozen miles north of Boston. 'End the Occupation – Bring the Troops Home Now' is inscribed on one banner; 'The US used to be against Tyranny' on another. The banners are held up by a straggle group of residents who exchange greetings with the passers-by. Drive-time commuters on nearby Massachusetts Avenue honk their support.

'There is overwhelming sympathy for our position,' says a local Democratic Party activist and vigil organiser. This is especially significant as we are on the eve of the Democratic National Convention, or 'DNC', at the Fleet Center in Boston. Kerry/Edwards bumper stickers sprout along Mass Ave.

Whether or not to vote for Kerry was the subject of long debates across town, at the University of Massachusetts, or UMass, where the Boston Social Forum met on the weekend prior to the Convention. The prevailing view appeared to be that getting rid of Bush was the first priority. 'Then the work really starts, on November 3rd', as Lesley Cagan, the canny organiser of United for Justice and Peace, put it. UJP want to fill the streets of New York with protesters on 29th August, the eve of the Republican National Convention. That will pose some interesting questions for the authorities.

In Boston, UJP and others refused to comply with the 'Free Speech Zone' established by the city authorities near to the Fleet Center. This walled cage, allegedly for up to 4,000 people playing 'sardines', was the subject of a legal challenge by the American Council for Civil Liberties. The judge found that the cage was certainly inimical to free speech, but nevertheless upheld that it was necessary to put people in it if they wished to register a protest during the Convention. In response, the UCJ and others refused to be complicit in their own muzzling and caging.

Not surprisingly, Palestinian groups protesting against Israel's wall and land-grab, did decide that the walled cage was a fitting venue and symbol for their own protests. Otherwise, as long-time South African activist Dennis Brutus told the Forum, let's declare 'Free-Speech Zones' all round the city. 'After all, isn't all the US supposed to be a free-speech zone?'

'It's never been easier to talk to people about the war', according to Jim Caplan of the Somerville Teachers' Association, during a workshop on 'Organised Labour Against the War', which receives much of its funding from the US public services union, SEIU. 'More and more people are against it.' Tony Donaghy, President of the RMT, spoke of a similar situation in Britain and Ireland. Mention of Tony Blair elicited loud hisses from Forum audiences

The 'Peace Track' within the Forum was organised by the American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organisation. The impetus for this came initially from Ken Coates and the European Network for Peace and Human Rights (ENPHR), whose meetings in the European Parliament in Brussels were initiated by the Russell Foundation. The European Network had long wanted to strengthen its contacts and establish a dialogue with peace movement organisations in the United States. AFSC picked up the ball and ran with it at the Forum, broadening the participation to include activists from Asia, Africa and Europe, as well as from the United States, under the rubric of 'A World Working Together for Peace'.

War and peace will certainly be amongst the issues to the fore when the European Social Forum comes to London, from 14 to 17 October. Thousands are expected to participate. 'We are many, they are few', as Rae Street of CND reminded the closing session of the Boston Social Forum.

Meanwhile, back in Lexington, where, in 1775, the 'shot' that echoed round the world marked the beginning of the removal of the British from their American colonies, *Fahrenheit 9/11* continues to play to packed houses at the Lexington Flick, just across the street from Depot Square. The US peace movement is becoming altogether harder to ignore.

Tony Simpson works at the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (www.russfound.org).

MINUTES OF THE 2004 BRS BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING

The Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors annual meeting took place Friday, June 18 from 8:45-9:15 p.m. Directors in attendance were Ken Blackwell, David Blitz, Rosalind Carey, Peter Friedman, David Goldman, Nick Griffin, Dave Henehan, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, Cara Rice, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, and Thom Weidlich.

The Board's first item of business was the selection of an interim chair. Ken Blackwell agreed to act in this capacity. Alan Schwerin then moved to approve the Treasurer's report and the minutes from last year's meeting. Rosalind Carey seconded the motion, and they were approved unanimously. Nicholas Griffin moved to re-elect the current members of the executive committee. Ray Perkins seconded the motion, and it was approved by acclamation.

Nicholas Griffin nominated Peter Friedman to the position of vice-president for international outreach. Warren Allen Smith seconded the nomination and it was unanimously approved. Peter Friedman indicated his interest in John Ongley working as a vice-president of outreach in North America. Peter Friedman also explained recent web-based developments and progress that had been made as a result of access to other organizations' membership lists.

Still on the issue of outreach, Alan Schwerin wished to know the United Kingdom's counterpart to the American Philosophical Association, and Nick Griffin answered that it was the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association. Schwerin stressed the need to "tap into this pool". Nicholas Griffin detailed the structural nature and limits of the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, and Alan Schwerin encouraged Peter Friedman to take on the challenge to make some headway in this area, with Ray Perkins noting the reverence Russell still enjoys in Britain. Advertisements as a means of outreach were mentioned, and ads in British journals were discussed.

Rosalind Carey nominated John Ongley for vice-president of North American outreach. Warren Allen Smith seconded the nomination and it passed with acclamation.

The site of next year's BRS annual meeting was discussed next. Nicholas Griffin volunteered McMaster University as the host university so that the BRS could meet alongside the Russell versus

Meinong conference (May 14-18, 2005) commemorating the centennial of Russell's essay 'On Denoting'. Ray Perkins expressed concern with possible scheduling conflicts between the timing of the proposed McMaster meeting and university examination periods in the U.S.

Rosalind Carey mentioned Lehman as an option at some future point, and also mentioned Pace University (John Ongley's school) as a possibility, that, unlike Lehman, possesses dormitories.

Attention was drawn to Gregory Landini's offer at the 2003 meeting to have the University of Iowa host the 2005 meeting. David Blitz suggested that Nick Griffin's presence at the 2004 meeting, and Nick's express willingness to host the meeting, should prevail. Peter Stone suggested that the merits to meeting at McMaster the same year they were commemorating the centennial of Russell's 'On Denoting' essay there were strong and obvious to him, and that Landini would probably concur. Alan Schwerin indicated his willingness to obtain a formal clarification from Landini.

Concern was expressed about excessively technical papers resulting from the Russell vs. Meinong conference's focus on 'On Denoting'. Alan Schwerin assured those concerned that the BRS meeting's papers would in no way be bound by the Russell vs. Meinong conference's criteria. David Blitz moved to have McMaster University designated as the host of the BRS 2005 meeting. Rosalind Carey seconded the motion, and it carried without opposition.

Rosalind Carey indicated concern for the funding of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*. The editors were given to understand that the BRS would contribute about \$750/issue. Following the editors' procurement of a \$3000 grant from Lehman College (received last fall to improve the *Quarterly*), less than \$750/issue of BRS money was used by them on the past 3 issues. The editors wished to clarify their assumption that BRS money, allocated to the *Quarterly* for the year but not used, could be drawn on in the coming year if they wanted to spend upwards of \$750 of BRS money per issue.

An additional reason for thinking more than \$750 of BRS money could be spent in the future was that when discussing how much could be spent per issue David White had said that the editors could go over \$750/issue if it made the *Quarterly* better looking. Right now there is a relative surplus in the BRS account due to the editors having spent less BRS money for the *Quarterly* than usual.

Rosalind Carey expressed her hope that the present surplus of money would not be spent in other ways by the Society but would be saved for them in the coming year. She then indicated her interest in a motion clarifying that residual monies from the production of a given issue of the *Quarterly* could accumulate, or "carry over", to production of subsequent issues, as opposed to a "use it-or-lose it" scenario. Ken Blackwell assured Rosalind Carey that this would not be controversial, Alan Schwerin assured Rosalind Carey that a motion was not necessary, and Rosalind Carey requested that this understanding be made part of the minutes.

The *Quarterly's* editors had expressed their desire to spread out the aforementioned grant because they had not had time this year to look for further funding for next year. (It was explained that such applications have to be made a year in advance.) They reported that they will be looking this summer for more funding for the year after next. They suggested the possibility of a general BRS fundraising drive of which their own efforts to find money for the *Quarterly* would be a part – with perhaps the partial goal of creating an endowment for the BRS. Nick Griffin seconded the motion, and it passed by acclamation.

In order that he could introduce a motion of his own, at this point, Ken Blackwell temporarily removed himself as acting chairman and was replaced by Alan Schwerin. Ken Blackwell explained that it had been 4 years since the BRS last agreed to an increase in the special rate for *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies*. The BRS has been paying \$17 postpaid per member, including most honorary members, and in 2000 that was 63% of the regular individual rate of \$27. In common with many academic journals in the electronic age, *Russell* has lost subscriptions while printing and mailing costs have increased. In 2003 the rate went up to \$32 and in 2004 to \$35. An increase to \$21 would maintain the BRS rate at 60% of the regular rate.

Additional costs include creating an electronic version for direct library reference, and putting all the back issues since 1971 on the web and making them searchable. Ken Blackwell said he is investigating means of doing this, and he further said that it would surely assist the study of Russell, given that very few Society members have journal sets extending back that far. The electronic version may bring new revenue, but that remains to be seen.

Ken Blackwell moved to raise the BRS's special subscription rate for *Russell* to \$21 starting this year. Thom Weidlich seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

The issue of declining membership was raised next. Peter Friedman mentioned that the Russell Society's current Web site (<http://www.users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>) is out of date. To reach "critical mass", regular assistance with his own BRS site, (<http://www.bertrandrussellsociety.org/default.asp?STID=1>), he said, will be necessary.

The overall indication from the Board was that investigation and evaluation of this new site was of genuine interest. Friedman was careful to stress that volunteers would be crucial to the site's maintenance.

Ken Blackwell made a motion to assist Peter Friedman in "creating a new BRS Web site by disclosing the URL to the Board of Directors with the intent that the Board will vote on replacing the current Web site in due course." Peter Friedman seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

Finally, Ray Perkins and Peter Stone made a motion to introduce a motion proposing a resolution from the BRS condemning the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. The resolution read:

The Bertrand Russell Society condemns the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq as contrary to the principles of international law, which Bertrand Russell advocated throughout his long life. Given the shameful role the U.S. government has played in the region – from its years of support for Saddam Hussein to its contemptuous refusal to submit to U.N. jurisdiction in matters of war and peace – the Society is suspicious of any U.S. effort to maintain control of the destiny of Iraq. Accordingly, the Society calls for an immediate withdrawal, under UN auspices, of U.S. forces in Iraq and for the concurrent establishment, also under UN auspices, of a democratic secular state by the Iraqi people themselves.

David Blitz seconded the motion, and it passed by a vote of 13 to 2. Peter Stone moved to end the Board meeting, Alan Schwerin seconded the motion, and it carried without opposition.

Chad Trainer, BRS Secretary

Gerry Wildenberg's

SLING*STUR!



These quotes will be familiar to some Russell fans. After solving the ciphers, try to identify the source.

1. In this puzzle – and number 2 below – each letter stands for another letter. (For example, if O=B, R=E, etc., BERTRAND RUSSELL becomes OREGENAQ EHFRRYY.)

VOZGJPLXB GAO VAZPHGPJL ZOXPPEYL RJH
OHGJQXPHAK OLGPOXB RPGAYIG GAO AOXS YM
OPGAOZ OVYLYUPV YZ UPXPGJZB SYROZ.

2. I have made this puzzle harder by disguising word separations and removing punctuation. The letter grouping help readability; they don't relate to the actual quote.

QVMQB RVMWJ XAWGX CFWGV KQBGW HQXBN QBVMW
TQEED WWKNV VXAQV MMXDE XQDQC VMWZD QRWQN
BXVKV KDDKE WNQ GK LDWRQ BEXCV MQBH

3. The puzzle below is not a substitution cipher. Spaces and punctuation have been removed and the quote has been permuted slightly by exchanging some letters with nearby letters. As an example, "the puzzle below" appears: tuhezplezbelwo.

BGINEINTREESTEDLNREIOGIINELDMEOTLOOINTKQHE
TUTSEIOHOFWNETEHR THEREWASERASNOTIBELOVIET

NOTE: Solutions to *Rustling!* may be found in this issue

BRS 2004 GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING MINUTES

The Bertrand Russell Society held its 2004 general membership meeting after lunch from 1:10-1:30 p.m. (An abbreviated business meeting as a result of making time for the audio-visual presentation of the broadcasted debate between Russell and Teller.) The meeting began with Ken Blackwell asking about the status of membership and the measures being taken to improve it. John Ongley's new position as Vice President of North American Outreach was cited as a factor that could improve membership, and Ongley explained that membership figures are featured at the end of the Russell Society *Quarterly*. These figures indicate that as of June 5th, there were 115 paid up members of the BRS, up from 97 on June 5th, 2003. Ongley also explained that personalized letters encouraging renewal had been sent to ex-members, as well as members.

Alan Schwerin encouraged the membership to reflect upon why decline in membership was really a problem. David Henehan expressed his view that the size of the Society is crucial to getting Russell's ideas out there for society in general. Peter Friedman stressed the propriety of the BRS doing what the historic Russell would want it to do. He stressed the advantages of people being able to become members over the Internet, but he explained his need for volunteers in this area.

Thom Weidlich expressed pleasant surprise at the number of current members while Ken Blackwell pointed to the Society's 312 members in 1990 as grounds for concern regarding current membership levels. Ken did express optimism, though, about the potential of Peter Friedman's new web site and the creation of a second vice president for outreach. Phil Ebersole implied that apathy about membership levels could spell the end of the Society. Friedman also mentioned meetup.com as having encouraging potential, but Peter Stone noted that only 21 people have signed up on meetup.com for the purposes of "meeting up" to discuss Bertrand Russell. David Goldman proposed, as a means of increasing membership, a quota system for professors wherein they would strive to sign up, say, three new members a year.

Next, John Ongley raised the subject of contributions to the Society. Specifically, Ongley thought that greater recognition should be given to those who give the Society money over and

above the cost of the dues. Robert Riemenschneider, a member who had made such contributions, assured Ongley that no such recognition was necessary, or in order.¹ But it was agreed upon by all that the Society should be clear about its gratitude to such contributors.

Peter Stone raised the subject of preserving Russell-related recordings and cited Graham Whettam's *Sinfonia Contra Timore*, which was dedicated to Bertrand Russell. Warren Allen Smith had obtained a master copy of it for use at his recording studio and the possible worth of producing copies of it was noted.

Ray Perkins announced the resolution passed at the Board meeting Friday night condemning U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. He expressed interest in having the resolution put on the BRS web site and was assured that this was feasible.

Thom Weidlich asked for a clarification of whether there had indeed been a vote at Friday night's Board meeting on the site of next year's annual meeting. Chad Trainer explained that, at the Friday night Board meeting, David Blitz had moved to have McMaster University designated as the host of the BRS's 2005 meeting. Rosalind Carey had seconded the motion, and that it had carried without opposition.

Chad Trainer, BRS Secretary

¹ At that same meeting, after hearing that John Ongley had received 2 thank you letters for contributing \$50 to the Lehman College library, David Goldman said that he would contribute \$250 for his 2004 membership fees if he was written 5 thank you letters. The BRS officers accepted this condition and Goldman wrote the Society a \$250 check on the spot. This is at least the 3rd year in a row David Goldman has contributed \$250 to the BRS.

INSERTED into scanned documents 7/18/2015
by Dennis J. Darland (who scanned them)

Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process.
Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.



Solutions to the August *Rustlings!* puzzles by Gerry Wildenberg

All of these quotes were taken from "Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind", the transcripts of a series of interviews on British television.

1. Certainly the Christian religion was established entirely without the help of either economic or military power. (p. 66)
2. I think the power of certain regions in the Middle East to withhold oil if they like is not at all a desirable kind of thing. (p. 66)
3. ...[B]eing interested in religion led me ... to look into the question of whether there was reason to believe it. (p. 19)

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Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2nd Quarter 2004 Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow
4/1/04 – 6/30/04

| | |
|------------------------|-----------------|
| BALANCE 3/31/04 | 8,806.36 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | 15.00 |
| BRS Quarterly† | 950.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 965.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 184.12 |
| Renewals | 403.68 |
| TOTAL Dues | 587.80 |
| Meeting Income†† | 2,840.65 |
| INFLOWS TOTAL | 4,393.45 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 22.06 |
| BRS Paper Award | 400.00 |
| BRSQ | 950.00 |
| RUSSELL Subscriptions | 2,312.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 3,684.06 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 709.39 |
| BALANCE 6/30/04 | 9,515.75 |

† These were for the 1st Quarter BRSQ.

†† From advance registrations. There will be both more income, and expense, for the meeting.

Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer
 ddarland@qconline.com

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ROCHESTER
RUSSELL
SET**




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- June 10 Defenders of God
- July 8 International War
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- Aug. 12 Satan in the Suburbs
- Sept. 9 Lady Ottoline Morrell
- Oct. 14 D.H. Lawrence
- Nov. 11 Why I Am Not a
Christian
- Dec. 9 Marriage & Morals


Topics & dates are subject to change



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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Number 124 / November 2004

BERTRAND RUSSELL IS ALIVE

**Reports of His Death Are Denied by
a Japanese Paper.**

Recent issues of the Japan Advertiser, arriving yesterday, set at rest the rumors of the death of Bertrand Russell, the English pacifist, mathematician and sociologist. The same paper, which had previously published an account of his death in Peking on March 28, now gives an account of his recovery from the supposedly fatal attack of pneumonia.

Mr. Russell's wife, who was Miss Alys Pearsall Smith of Philadelphia, obtained a divorce in England last Thursday. The Japan Advertiser states that he had arranged to marry, on the termination of this English action, his secretary, Miss Belloc, who was with him in China during his lecture tour and had nursed him in his illness there.

New York Times May 9, 1921

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

EDITORS: Rosalind Carey and John Ongley.

ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Ray Perkins Jr.

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SUBMISSIONS: All communications to the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, including manuscripts, book reviews, letters to the editor, etc., should be sent to: Rosalind Carey, Philosophy Department, Lehman College-CUNY, 250 Bedford Park Blvd. West, Bronx, NY 10468, USA, or by email to: rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: The BRS *Quarterly* is free to members of the Bertrand Russell Society. Society membership is \$35 a year for individuals, \$40 for couples, and \$20 for students and those on limited incomes. Membership also includes a subscription to *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies*, published biannually by the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University, and other Society privileges.

INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS to the BRS *Quarterly* are \$20 a year. Send membership dues or subscription fee as check or money order, payable to the 'Bertrand Russell Society', to: Dennis Darland, BRS Treasurer, 1406 26th Street, Rock Island, IL, 61201-2837, USA.

SINGLE ISSUES may be obtained for \$5 by sending check or money order, payable to the 'Bertrand Russell Society' and addressed, as above for subscriptions, to Dennis Darland. BACK ISSUES are also \$5 each. For availability of current and back issues query: Tom Stanley, BRS Librarian, at: tom.stanley@valley.net.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Number 124 / November 2004

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~ANNOUNCING~

THE
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AND

A CALL FOR PAPERS

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Centennial Celebration Only: \$64 (US) \$75 (CAN) Includes Lunches, Refreshments & "OD" Papers. No Banquet.

Banquet for Non-BRS registrants: \$21 (US) \$25 (CAN)
Note: BRS Membership + Registration would include the Banquet & two Journals

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IN THIS ISSUE

BERTRAND RUSSELL is often viewed as having been a phenomenalist in, as well as after, his 1914 work *Our Knowledge of the External World*. Yet in an interview with Elisabeth Ramsden Eames, Russell declared that he had never given up either realism or the causal theory of perception. IREM KURTSAL STEEN explains how these two facts can be reconciled in her article 'Russell on Matter and Our Knowledge of the External World', which she first presented at the BRS annual meeting this past June in Plymouth, New Hampshire. The article carefully disentangles several of the threads running through Russell's work in those years to clarify what Russell was up to in his 1914 work. Whether this is your first reading of *Our Knowledge of the External World* or your fiftieth, you will find this article useful for understanding what is going on in this text.

While Ms. Steen debunks the charge of phenomenalism in Russell's 1914 work, RAY PERKINS selects and introduces another of RUSSELL'S LETTERS TO THE EDITOR—this one, a previously unpublished letter to the *London Times* written in May 1960. The letter contains one of Russell's earliest proposals that Britain unilaterally give up its nuclear weapons. Some scholars—for example, Ray Monk—have said that Russell advocated unilateralism only under the “pernicious” influence of Ralph Schoenman. But Russell wrote this letter before he had met Schoenman, a fact that tells against the view that without Schoenman's influence, Russell would not have adopted unilateralism. As an added bonus, Russell's devastating wit is on full display in this letter.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS ON ART have in the past been a small sideshow in the long-running Wittgenstein circus—little-studied, and poorly understood. Several recent anthologies on Wittgenstein and aesthetics have attempted to rectify this situation and move the sideshow closer to the main ring in the Big Top. In this issue, ERAN GUTER reviews one of those recent anthologies, *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics, and Philosophy* (edited by Peter Lewis), clarifies some of the reasons why scholars have tended to mishandle the notion of aesthetics in Wittgenstein's early and late works, gives

us a good survey of the articles in the anthology, and points us in the direction he feels the field needs to go next.

IS THE INTELLECTUALISM AND RATIONALITY that characterizes Russell's familiar objections to religious and Christian belief necessarily hostile to a treatment of religious belief styled after William James? This is the question that lies behind 'At Cross Purposes: Atheism and Christianity', a review of Michael Martin's recent book *Atheism, Morality, and Meaning*. In this review, ROSALIND CAREY muses over the role of meta-beliefs—beliefs about believing—in shaping the seemingly peculiar way beliefs are sometimes held by religious believers as she reflects on the current state of the dialogue between theists and atheists.

Finally, CHAD TRAINER REVIEWS ALAN SCHWERIN'S RECENT COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON RUSSELL, *Bertrand Russell on Nuclear War, Peace, and Language*. Those who have not yet seen Alan's book will get a very clear picture of its content in Chad's survey of its articles here. And rounding out this issue of the *Quarterly* is information on next spring's BRS Annual Meeting, news of the recent Society election for BRS Board of Directors, Nick Griffin's 'On Denoting' conference report on the centennial celebration conference for 'On Denoting', the Traveler's Diary/Conference Report, Treasurer's Reports, and other Society News.

SOCIETY NEWS

There is much Society News this issue—details of the 2005 BRS Annual Meeting, a call for papers for the Annual Meeting, election results for BRS Board of Directors, details of the conference celebrating the centenary anniversary of 'On Denoting' that is to be held in conjunction with this year's BRS Annual Meeting, a list of donors to the BRS this year, an end-of-the-year membership report, sad news of recently deceased friends of the BRS, and information on BRS sessions at the APA—but first we need to say:

IT'S TIME TO RENEW

REGULAR MEMBERSHIPS IN THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY EXPIRE AT YEAR'S END. For those who have not yet done so, now is the time to renew your membership. Instructions are on page 4.

BRS 2005 ANNUAL MEETING NEWS

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY will hold its 32nd Annual Meeting this coming May 13-15, 2005, at McMaster University in Hamilton Ontario—home of the Bertrand Russell Archives and Bertrand Russell Research Centre. BRS members and their friends are urged not to miss this year's BRS Annual Meeting, as it promises to be an extra special one. The meeting will take place in conjunction with a second conference at McMaster University celebrating the centenary anniversary of Russell's landmark paper 'On Denoting'. Organized by Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette, this second conference will take place May 14-18, 2005, allowing those who attend the BRS Annual Meeting to attend the 'On Denoting' conference as well. To encourage conference crossover attendance, there will be a special reduced registration fee for those wishing to attend both conferences, and those registered for the BRS meeting will be able to attend papers at the 'On Denoting' conference for free prior to the BRS farewell luncheon on Sunday afternoon. Registration details for the annual meeting can be found on pages 2 and 3, and also on the web at URL <http://russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmeeting.htm>. Nick Griffin provides details of the centenary conference in his conference report for the BRSQ, to be found in the back of this issue. Details of that conference can also be found online at <http://denoting.mcmaster.ca>.

CALL FOR PAPERS. You can't have a BRS Annual Meeting without a lot of good talks on Russell. If you are working on, or planning to work on a paper on Russell's thought or his life, please submit an abstract of around 150 words to BRS President, Dr Alan Schwerin, at: aschweri@monmouth.edu.

At the last annual meeting, the Society held "master's classes"—seminars for which members had read material before hand. If you would like to lead such a master's class at the next annual meeting, send Alan Schwerin an email expressing your interest.

BRS BOARD OF DIRECTORS ELECTION RESULTS. The 2004 election for three year positions on the BRS Board of Directors was a lively one, with 11 nominees for 8 seats. Fifty members cast votes in this election, more than have voted in a BRS Board election in recent years. The nominees, with the votes each received, were: Kevin Brodie-32, Rosalind Carey-44, Tim Madigan-39, Ray Perkins-40, Alan Schwerin-37, Warren Allen Smith-33, Chad Trainer-39, Thom Weidlich-36, John Fitzgerald-10, Kevin Klement-1, Marvin Kohl-23, Gregory Landini-23

The eight winners were: Kevin Brodie, Rosalind Carey, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Chad Trainer, and Thom Weidlich. We thank all who voted in the election this year, and especially all who ran as candidates.

SPECIAL THANKS TO BRS SUPPORTERS. The following people made donations to the Bertrand Russell Society in 2004 beyond their regular membership fees. The Russell Society gratefully thanks them for their generosity and support. (Members please note: though dues are not tax-deductible, contributions are.) The donors were:

PATRONS (\$250 and up) David S. Goldman, Frank Jenkins

SPONSORS (\$100 and up) Congressman Neil Abercrombie, Congressman Neil Abercrombie (yes, *twice*), John J. Fitzgerald, Yvonne Jonath, Gregory Landini, Robert A. Riemenschneider, and Benjamin A. Wade

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OTHER DONORS Jay Aragona, Aidha S. Barakat

END-OF-THE-YEAR MEMBERSHIP REPORT, by BRS Treasurer, Dennis Darland. At the end of 2004, the BRS had 165 members, up from 150 members at the end of 2003. For this report, couples were counted as 2 people (in some reports, including the mid-year report, couples have been counted as 1). Honorary members (13) are included in these numbers as well. The number of donors to the BRS also increased this year, from 20 donors in 2003 to 24 in 2004.

THE BRS AT THE APA. The BRS sponsors sessions at each of the division meetings of the American Philosophical Association. This past December, the BRS met at the Eastern division meeting of the APA in Boston with good talks and discussions (see the Traveler's Diary in the back for details).

This spring, the BRS, in conjunction with HEAPS (the new History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society), will be sponsoring talks at the Pacific and Central division meetings of the APA. The Pacific division will meet in San Francisco this year, March 22-27, 2005 at the Westin St. Francis Hotel, Union Square. (The Pacific APA program only calls it a HEAPS session rather than the joint BRS and HEAPS session that it actually is. Nevertheless, the BRS will be there!) Bay Area BRSer Peter Stone will chair the session at the Pacific, Jane Duran will deliver her Annual Meeting talk on Russell on History and Intrinsic Value, with comments by Rosalind Carey, Bruce Frazier will speak on How Analytic Philosophy Inspired the Chomskian Revolution, with comments by Robert Riemenschneider, and finally, Sandra Lapointe will speak on Bolzano On Axioms, 'Grounding', and Synthetic a priori Knowledge (commentator TBA). The Bay Area Russell Society (BARS) will meet there at the same time. If you are in the area, please show your support for the BRS by attending.

The Central APA will meet in Chicago this year, April 27-30, 2005, at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel, and the BRS will be sponsoring talks there as well. Details will be provided in the next issue of the *Quarterly*.

IN MEMORIAM

We note with sadness the recent passing of three very good friends of the Bertrand Russell Society: OMAR RUMI in Kuala Lumpur, PAUL EDWARDS in New York City, and CONRAD RUSSELL in London.

OMAR RUMI, earlier known as Ralph Gainey, a frequent and welcome contributor to the online Bertrand Russell discussion group russell-1, died of a heart attack on October 6, 2004 in Kuala Lumpur, where he lived in retirement. He was 67 years old. Omar stood out in the Russell discussion group as reasonable, skeptical and open-minded, always willing to examine the rationale for any claim until a clear and satisfactory understanding of it had been reached. He was a true Russellian. He is survived by his wife, Somsiah Parman, and his five year old son, Latyn Gainey. Omar is said to be buried in a grove of trees on a hill overlooking a valley. He is missed on the Russell list.

DR. PAUL EDWARDS, editor of *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society, died in his Manhattan home early in the morning of December 9, 2004. He was 81 years old. With nearly 1,500 entries by over 500 contributors, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, published in 1967 by Macmillan, is one of the monumental works of twentieth century philosophy. Published when analytic philosophy was at its peak, it exhibits all the robust muscularity of a great work created at the highpoint of a movement. Edwards' editing, especially his famous intolerance of "confused thinking", contributed much to the power of the work.

The greatness of the *Encyclopedia* became especially apparent after 1998, Routledge published its own *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. The only good way to judge an encyclopedia or dictionary is by comparing its entries with those of a competitor. (Try this for yourself next time you go to Borders to buy a translating dictionary and you will see what I mean.) Though the *Routledge Encyclopedia* is a larger work (10 volumes instead of 8; 2000 entries instead of 1500) on which a great deal of money was spent, and though it sold at a magisterial price (\$3,775.00), it soon became clear, after one compared a few dozen entries in the two en-

cyclopedias, that despite all its efforts to replace Edwards' Macmillan *Encyclopedia*, the *Routledge Encyclopedia* is an ordinary work and the Edwards' *Encyclopedia* is not. The *Routledge Encyclopedia* simply had the effect of increasing the appreciation of Edwards' *Encyclopedia* among philosophers.

Dr. Edwards was a critic of religion, and as well as editing the Macmillan *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, he wrote several entries related to religion for it, including 'Atheism', 'Atheismusstreit', 'Common Consent Arguments for the Existence of God', 'Why', parts of the entry on Russell, and, most intriguingly, an entry entitled 'My Death'. In that last essay, Edwards examined the common view that one cannot imagine or conceive of one's own death though one can imagine and conceive of the death of others, and after careful analysis found the idea "confused" and wanting. He concluded:

It seems quite plain that human beings not infrequently imagine and conceive of their own deaths without the least difficulty, as, for example, when they take out life insurance or when they admonish themselves to drive more carefully. Nor is it at all difficult to explain what a person imagines when he thinks of his own death. "When I die," wrote Bertrand Russell in a famous passage (in *What I Believe*), "I shall rot and nothing of my ego will survive"; and it is surely this that people wish to avoid or put off. A person thinking of his own death is thinking of the destruction or disintegration of his body and the cessation of his experiences.

As well as editing *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edwards was the author of several books, including *Reincarnation: A Critical Examination*, *The Logic of Moral Discourse*, *Heidegger's Confusions*, and numerous articles. Additionally, he is responsible for having collected a number of Russell's writings on religion and publishing them under the title *Why I Am Not a Christian*. In so doing, he changed the lives of thousands of people around the world, including the lives of many in the BRS.

Born in Vienna on September 2, 1923 to Jewish parents, Edwards' family fled to Australia with Hitler's rise to power. Edwards received his B.A. and M.A. from the University of Melbourne, and then moved to Manhattan and received a Ph.D. in

philosophy from Columbia University in 1951. He was a professor at New York University in the 1960s and Brooklyn College from 1966 to 1986, and lecturer at the New School for Social Research from the 1960s to the late 1990s. He also taught at the University of Melbourne, Columbia University, City College of New York, and the University of California, Berkeley.

CONRAD RUSSELL, son of Bertrand Russell and Patricia Spence, and great grandson of Lord John Russell, Liberal Prime Minister of England 1846-52 and 1865-66, died on October 10, 2004 at the age of 67. He had been ill for some time. A professor, author, and member of the House of Lords, the fifth Earl Russell published numerous books and was active in politics as a Liberal Democrat leader. His field of study was primarily 17th century English political and parliamentary history. His publications include *The Crisis of Parliaments: English History 1509 – 1660* (1971), *The Causes of the English Civil War* (1990), and *The Fall of the British Monarchies* (1991). As a revisionist historian of the English civil war, he tended to be skeptical of accounts that explained the civil war in terms of grand sweeping forces. Conrad Russell is survived by his sons Nicholas and John Russell.

FEATURES

RUSSELL ON MATTER AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD *

IREM KURTSAL STEEN

Bertrand Russell's philosophy around 1914 is often interpreted as phenomenism, the view that sensations are not caused by but rather constitute ordinary objects. Indeed, *prima facie*, his 1914 *Our Knowledge of the External World* reduces objects to sense-data. However, Russell did not think his view was phenomenalist, and he said that he never gave up either the causal theory of perception or a realist understanding of objects.¹ In this paper I offer an explanation of why Russell might have undertaken the constructionist project of his 1914 work while not considering the resulting position that objects can be constructed out of sense-data to be phenomenalist.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Russell calls all the sense-data of a given subject at a given time a *perspective*. At any point of view which is not occupied by a subject, there still is a perspective such that had some subject been there, she would have been given that aspect of the world. A momentary state of a common sense thing is a similarity class of sensibilia belonging to different perspectives. Russell tells us that although these sensibilia are real, the momentary object they are supposed to constitute is *just a logical construction*. (Russell 1914a, pp. 95-96)

* I am thankful to Dean Zimmerman for his substantial comments on an ancestor of this paper. Ishani Maitra and my fellow graduate students at Syracuse University have given me helpful comments on earlier drafts. And I thank the Bertrand Russell Society both for the opportunity to discuss the ideas presented here with the participants of the society's 31st Annual Meeting in Plymouth State University, NH, and for the award which made it possible for me to travel there.

¹ Elisabeth Ramsden Eames (1967) describes her interview with Russell, where he told Eames that he never gave up realism or the causal theory of perception.

But then, Russell asks: "This hypothetical picture of the world is free from logical impossibility, and it doesn't conflict with any known facts, but is there any reason to suppose it is *real*?" (Russell 1914a, p. 101) This is a strange question when asked of a construction. Constructions need only to replicate the logical relations between the elements of the system they are substituted for, and those that can do that are all equally good. There is no question as to their reality, as long as the building blocks are real.

Space, on this view, comes in two kinds. Each perspective has its own *private space*. There is also one all-embracing *perspective space* where each perspective is located in a configuration determined by the similarities between perspectives. A momentary thing is likewise located in perspective space, at the intersection of different similarity-series of perspectives. A penny, for example, looks like a thick line in some perspectives, and it looks circular in others. These two kinds of perspectives form two distinct similarity-series. Where these two series intersect in perspective space is the place where the penny is. (Russell 1914a, p. 98)

We are familiar with the sense in which a penny appears circular in some perspective. In Russell's terms, a particular circular appearance of a penny in a particular perspective is an *aspect* of the penny. For every aspect of a thing, two places in perspective space are salient: the place *at* which the aspect appears (the place of the thing in perspective space), and the place *from* which it appears (the place of the perspective of which the aspect is a part). (Russell 1914a, p. 100) Each aspect is a member of two classes: the various aspects of the thing it is an aspect of, and the perspective it belongs to. Physics is occupied with the first kind of classification of aspects, and psychology is occupied with the second kind. Physics and psychology do not have different substances as their subjects, but different organizations of the same substance. (Ibid, p. 100)

Persistence and change are treated in a manner similar to contemporary four-dimensionalist views. A persisting thing is defined as "a certain series of appearances, connected with each other by continuity and by certain causal laws." (Russell 1914a, p. 111)

Soon after the publication of *Problems of Philosophy*, in May 1912, Russell delivered a paper titled 'On Matter'. 'On Matter' is concerned with the question of whether (and how) we can know the existence of matter even though we are not acquainted with it.

(Russell 1912a, p. 81) The view Russell defends in this paper is strikingly similar to his view in *Our Knowledge of the External World*.

Matter is to be understood as that which physics is about. So, matter must be such that the physicist can know its existence. In other words, what physical science is concerned with and makes discoveries about must be a function of the physicist's sense-data. What could that function be? There are only two ways in which we can know the existence of something. "(1) immediate acquaintance, which assures us of the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and sense-data,... (2) general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another." (Russell 1912a, p. 80)

The bridge which relates the physicist's sense-data to matter must correspond to one of these ways of knowing that something exists. If our knowledge of matter can be reduced to what we know by acquaintance, then matter should be understood as a logical construction out of sense-data. Otherwise, it must be by inference that we know the existence of matter. So, according to Russell, the bridge between sense-data and matter is either inference or logical construction. (Russell 1912a, pp. 84-85)

Russell thinks that there is a fact of the matter here, as to what type of bridge really exists between sense-data and matter, and that we can discover what that bridge is. In order to discover what kind of function relates sense-data to the matter of physics, we must examine the ontological commitments of physics, i.e., the entities or values physics endorses as real. If some of those entities or values are not given in our experience, but nevertheless are necessary for the truth of physical hypotheses, then we cannot know the existence of matter by acquaintance alone, and so, inference must be the function that relates physics to matter. If physics is not committed to anything beyond what we are acquainted with, then matter can be constructed from sense-data, and no inference is needed.

Russell explains that physics *does* attribute to matter qualities which are not given in our experience, for example, the distance of a star from the observer. Since the visual sense-datum as of observing a star in the sky does not contain an element corresponding to a distance, distance is not a sensible coordinate. (Russell 1912a, pp. 88-89)

What then is the self-evident principle based on which this coordinate is postulated? Russell thinks that, vaguely put, that principle seems to be *different effects, different causes*. Suppose the physicist were to observe two discs, one red and one yellow, moving on a straight line backwards and forwards from each other, with periodically changing velocities. When they reach the same line of sight, sometimes the red disc disappears and sometimes the yellow one does. The physicist would most likely hypothesize that these sense-data are of two spheres moving in ellipses about their common center of gravity in the same plane as the observer. The observable difference between the case where the red disc disappears and the case where the yellow one does is explained by an unobserved difference in their causes. Russell thinks that a precise version of the *different effects, different causes* principle may just be the principle which justifies the inference from sense-data to matter. (Russell 1912a, pp. 90-91)

All this entails that matter cannot be logically constructed out of our sense-data in a way which would make physics true. "Matter, if it is to be known to exist at all, must be known through some a priori principle assuring us that our sensations in some way 'correspond' with things which can exist without our sensations." (Russell 1912a, p. 92) This means that the gap between sense-data and physics is bridged by inference. But we still need a theory which explains the sense in which our sensations "correspond" with things independent from them. This requires a certain kind of understanding about sense-data.

The first question for Russell is: Can sense-data exist when they are not perceived? Russell never held that for sense-data, to be is to be perceived. In his 1910 essay 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' he states that there is logical room to regard sense-data as mind-independent entities. If a sense-datum is perceived, necessarily it exists, but if a sense-datum exists, it is not necessarily perceived. In his 1911 essay 'Analytic Realism', he holds that, *as a matter of fact*, sense-data never exist when they are not perceived, because their existence seems to require them to be in a causal relationship of acquaintance with a subject. Finally, in 'On Matter' he considers a sense-datum to be an existent in its own right, as an entity that, at a given time, may or may not be causally related to a subject. To become data, they need to be causally related to a subject; but to exist, they need not. (Russell 1912a, p. 85)

Since sense-data give conflicting information about objects, matter cannot be simply identified with sense-data. Neither can we hope to infer the existence of matter as the cause of our sense-data by appeal to the simplicity argument of *Problems of Philosophy*, which relied on the fact that realism is the simplest explanation of the coherence and unity of our sense-data. Russell now thinks that since the principle that simpler hypotheses are more likely to be true is not self-evident or *a priori*, the simplicity argument has no force against skepticism. (Russell 1912a, p. 86)

Next, to understand how our sensations "correspond" with things independent of them, Russell considers naïve realism, which is the direct realist theory of perception. According to this view, experience puts us in direct contact with the external world, instead of providing us with "representations" which mediate between the external world and our knowledge of it. Most epistemology literature identifies naïve realism as the denouncement of "sense-data", where sense-data are commonly understood as being mental and subjective representations of a mind-independent reality. A very clear indication that Russell does not think of sense-data as mind-dependent is the way in which he describes naïve realism.

Both in 'Analytic Realism' and here in 'On Matter' Russell says that naïve realism is *the view which identifies matter with collections of sense-data*. Now, no naïve realist would describe her view in this way. The view which identifies matter with collections of mind-dependent sense-data is phenomenalism, which is as far from naïve realism as any position can be. But Russell did not confuse naïve realism with phenomenalism, because by 'sense-data' he does not mean necessarily mind-dependent things. Russellian sense-data are the real qualities of real things which we directly know.

Sensation appears to be a relation between a subject and a sense-datum, which is the same thing as a "quality"; we know that the subject can exist at times when it is not sensating the particular quality in question, and we naturally assume that the quality can exist at times when the subject is not sensating it. This is the essential axiom of naïve realism. Its difficulties come chiefly, I think, from an assumption which is *not* essential to it, namely that two qualities of the same kind—e.g. two colours cannot coexist in the same thing at the same time. (Russell 1912a, p. 94)

So a tenable naïve realism would be one which affirms both that sense-data are mind-independent qualities of objects, and that conflicting qualities may be at the same place at the same time. (Russell 1912a, p. 93) Such a naïve realism would be “a theory which regards a piece of matter as consisting entirely of constituents of the nature of sense-data, by including everything that could be a sense-datum to any possible observer.” (Russell 1912a, p. 85-86)

The similarities to *Our Knowledge of the External World* are obvious. Although many have regarded the position in *Our Knowledge of the External World* as a form of phenomenalism, surely its precursor, ‘On Matter’, defends a realist, in fact a naïve realist position. In ‘On Matter’, matter is constituted by sense-data and unsensed sensibilia, which are not mind-dependent phenomenal entities. That is, even though Russell reduces the objects of common sense and science to entities like sense-data, he does that not by phenomenalizing the objects, but by objectifying the phenomena. Furthermore, matter is not understood as a mere logical fiction constructed out of sense-data and unsensed sensibilia, but rather is composed of and constituted by them. The mind-independent existence of matter is known by inference, and perception relates us to matter directly.

Before writing his posthumously published 1913 manuscript *Theory of Knowledge*, Russell continued his work on the “problem of matter”. Some of the extant manuscripts of this brief period describe logical constructions very similar to the ones in *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In these manuscripts though, his account of our knowledge of the things of common sense and the matter of physics involve both constructions and inferences.

Letters Russell wrote after he finished ‘On Matter’ show that he worked on the subject for a while, but eventually decided to first work on theory of knowledge. He thought that an adequate treatment of matter requires the treatment of knowledge. Russell might have planned *Theory of Knowledge* to ground the amended naïve realism of ‘On Matter’, the inference of physical objects from sense-data. On the other hand, he also wanted to construct the physical world out of sense-data in order to make physical hypotheses verifiable. The problem of matter had become two-fold: that of explaining how sense-data give us knowledge of mind-independent objects, and that of defining “matter” as a function of sense-data so

that physical hypotheses would be verifiable. Inference is more suitable for the first, and constructions are more suitable for the second.

This hypothesis, that Russell wanted to employ the technique of inference to explain *our* knowledge of the external world and the technique of construction to explain the *physicist's* ability to verify her hypotheses, fits Russell's descriptions of the *Theory of Knowledge* project. Originally, the book was supposed to have two sections, an analytic section on acquaintance, judgment, and inference; and a constructive section where Russell would explain the construction of the world of physics.

Shortly after he described the book project this way, he decided that *Theory of Knowledge* would consist only of the analytic section. However, after he wrote the sections on acquaintance and judgment, and before he began the section on inference, Russell dropped the project because of the criticisms of his theory of judgment made by Ludwig Wittgenstein. He published the chapters about acquaintance in various journals, he never published the chapters on judgment, and he never wrote the chapters about inference. It is most likely that in the face of the failure of his theory of judgment, Russell was unable to give an account of inference.²

It is generally held that the constructionist view which Russell originally planned *Theory of Knowledge* to include later became *Our Knowledge of the External World*. The failure of *Theory of Knowledge* to explain judgment, and thus inference, did not pose a threat to his project of constructing the “world of physics” out of sensed and unsensed particulars, simply because constructions are not inferences. These constructions were originally meant only to be substitutes for the hypothetical objects of physics, so that the hypotheses about these objects would be translated into propositions which are in principle verifiable. When he had to give up the project of showing how we can infer the existence of matter, the constructions had to also take the place of the inferences. That is, the constructions had to explain not just the verifiability of the physicist's hypotheses but also our knowledge of the external world.

² For a detailed description of the *Theory of Knowledge* project and its collapse, see E.R. Eames' “Introduction” to *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. 7.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Russell says:

[C]an we know that other objects, inferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them, exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any other time? This latter problem arises in philosophy as the problem of the “thing in itself,” and in science as the problem of matter as assumed in physics. (Russell 1914a, pp. 82-83)

He has now come to identify the problem of “thing in itself” with the problem of what physics is committed to when it puts forth hypotheses about matter. The thing-in-itself (if there is such a thing) is “something quite unlike [the sensible object we perceive], something which, together with us, and our sense-organs, causes our sensations, but is never itself given in sensation.” (Ibid, p. 92)

Identifying the reasons for believing in the existence of a thing-in-itself thus described would fall under the project of providing an explanation for our knowledge of the external world. The *inferred* naïve realism Russell defended in ‘On Matter’ was a candidate for such an explanation. But in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, the problems of matter and thing-in-itself are addressed all at once, with the method of logical construction. “The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing” is born: “Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.” (Russell 1914b, p. 155)

This new dual role for constructions gives rise to the phenomenalist feel of *Our Knowledge of the External World*, stemming from the reduction of physical objects into sensed and unsensed sensibilia which, in parts of the text, appear to be merely phenomenal. But in the book, Russell also says that although we must admit that the existence of sense-data depend upon the physiology of their subject, and the colored surfaces we see cease to exist when we close our eyes, we should not jump to the conclusion that sense-data are mind-dependent. (Russell 1914a, p. 71)

Again, in writings of the same period Russell says that sense-data are not only mind-independent, but also physical. (Russell 1914b, p. 151) They are among the constituents of the external world of which we happen to be immediately aware. They are not mental except in the sense that we are aware of them. (Russell

1915, p. 143) In ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ Russell states that because sense-data are data, they are important to epistemology. But from the point of metaphysics, sensed and unsensed particulars are all on a par with each other. (Russell 1914b, p. 148)

Our Knowledge of the External World contains a passage where Russell says that there is a sense in which unsensed appearances are merely ideal. (Russell 1914a, p. 117) This claim would seem to entail that a large part of the constructed world is ideal and mind-dependent, and Russell here seems to paint a phenomenalist picture of the world. However, “ideal” turns out not to mean mind-dependent or even mental. Unsensed appearances are “ideal” only in the sense that they are calculated as functions of the sensed appearances. Russell grants this only to secure the verifiability of physics, that is, to show that knowing causal laws does not require knowledge of anything but sense-data. But the world which those laws are about, the world they describe truly need not contain anything ideal. (Russell 1914b, p. 157)

My thesis explains why Russell goes back and forth, calling the logical constructions fictional on one page and talking about them as real entities on another. The pieces of matter that science needed in order to be verifiable could afford to be fictional, in the sense that they were only *logically* constructed, because the objects for which they were substitutes were also going to be inferred, in the manner suggested in ‘On Matter’. When the inferences could not be provided, the constructions were left in a limbo between the real world and the logical space. *Our Knowledge of the External World* is Russell’s attempt to have the constructions do the job of both the inference-based project of ‘On Matter’ and the constructionist project that was originally designed only to supply physics with knowable objects. Rereading *Our Knowledge of the External World* with this mind, we should be able to dispel the thesis that when Russell wrote it, he was trying on phenomenism.

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"HYSTERICAL EMOTIONALISM"

LETTER TO THE LONDON *TIMES*, 8 MAY 1960

by BERTRAND RUSSELL

INTRODUCTION

By RAY PERKINS, JR.

The unpublished letter that follows (in Edith's hand, dated 8 May 1960), from Russell to the London *Times*, is interesting in several respects. It is one of Russell's earliest public proposals of what came to be known as 'unilateralism', i.e., the idea that Britain should unilaterally give up its nuclear weapons and its membership in NATO as a way to stimulate an agreement on nuclear abolition between the super powers. Unilateralism was an idea that Russell vigorously defended later that year (1960) against both Prime Minister Macmillan and the British Labour Party leader, Hugh Gaitskell (see *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell*, pp. 227-29, 235-37). The timing of the letter is also significant, because it was written two months before Russell met Ralph Schoenman, the young American radical whom some Russell scholars see as filling the great old man's head with radical mush. For example, Ray Monk, noticing that there were no signs of unilateralism in Russell's 1959 *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, concludes (*post hoc, ergo propter hoc*) that the idea which appeared in Russell's writings the next year must have come from Schoenman, who entered Russell's life in the summer of 1960 (see *The Ghost of Madness*, Cape, 2000, p. 406). Another reason that this letter is noteworthy is that Russell's Swiftian wit is much in evidence as he responds to the all too common charge that his antinuclear ideas were riddled with hysteria and emotionalism. (Come on, if one can't get emotional over nuclear war, then when and over what can one get emotional? For a more extended discussion of the place of emotion in nuclear politics, see Russell's 1963 letter to the *Times* "Sense and Sensibility" in *Yours Faithfully*, p. 339.)

8 May 1960

To the Editor of *The Times*:

Sir—I find that a desire for one's children to live out the normal span of human life is regarded as hysterical emotionalism. For the purposes of the present letter I shall, therefore, assume that I am devoid of human affection and consequently worthy to be listened to. Two policies are open to the Powers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: one is to go on with present policies and thereby ensure, sooner or later, the extinction of the human race; the other is to seek enforceable agreements for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Both groups of Powers profess to adopt the second policy, but, in fact, whenever there is a prospect of agreement, one side or the other injects some new matter of disagreement as to which it is convinced that agreement is impossible. This shows that both groups of Powers are, in fact, in favour of the first policy, which gets the name of "realism". Some people think that if one important nation were to abandon the alliance to which it belongs and decide neither to have nuclear weapons nor to seek the protection of other Powers which have them, this might induce, among the Powers of the side which is being deserted, a greater readiness to enter into genuine negotiations for disarmament. This is called hysterical emotionalism. As a person devoid of emotion, I am for the present expressing no preference among these policies. I merely ask myself what motive, other than emotion, can induce anybody to prefer anything to anything else. In making a choice, cold reason offers no help.

Russell

AT CROSS-PURPOSES: ATHEISM AND CHRISTIANITY

ROSALIND CAREY

Review of Michael Martin, *Atheism, Morality, and Meaning* (Prometheus Lecture Series). Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2003. Pp. 330. US \$21.00

I

In *On Liberty*, having observed that people tend to abort a chain of thought whose consequences they fear, John Stuart Mill claims that to be genuinely intellectual a person must be willing "to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead."¹ Michael Martin no doubt agrees with Mill's conception of the qualities of an intellectual, and his new book gives ample occasion to reflect on exactly what is involved in pursuing the consequences of a chain of thought, come what may. These are issues of method, however, and any discussion of them presupposes a grasp on the thesis of his book, which can be summed up as follows.

First, Martin presents atheism as (1) able to provide a theoretical basis for a belief in the existence of objective standards of morality, and (2) able to give good grounds for the possibility of living a life that, though finite, has genuine purpose and meaning. Facing him is the contrary Christian claim that atheists—because they deny an almighty Lawgiver whose authority establishes judgments as true or false and a future life which gives their lives meaning—are in danger of becoming ethical relativists and nihilists, people who admit no objective moral standards and for whom life has no purpose or meaning, people for whom nothing matters. Second, Martin upends this Christian argument by saying that it is the *Christian* who is unable to support, and in danger of losing her grip on the notion of an objective morality, and it is the *Christian* who is incapable of explaining how an infinite life has purpose or meaning.

These are strong claims—bound to irritate many believers in the unlikely case that any take up this book and read it—and they need a strong defense. Martin gives one, always exonerating the

¹ J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, (New York: Penguin, 1975), pp. 81-82, 95.

atheist and incriminating the theist, first on the issue of morality (Part I of his book) and then on the matter of life's purpose or meaning (Part II).

II

In Part I, Martin defends non-theistic morality by means of an Ideal Observer theory. This doctrine refers moral decisions (e.g. "Shall I cheat on my taxes?") to the actions of an imaginary or hypothetical moral agent whose moral emotions and reactions (e.g. disapproval) are trustworthy guides to right and wrong because we have supposed her to possess all of the properties (rationality, objectivity, empathy, relevant knowledge and so forth) of a perfect moral agent. Martin denies that his account involves reasoning in a circle. Though that would be the case if moral beliefs were explained in terms of an Ideal Observer's moral beliefs, his theory explains moral beliefs in terms of an Ideal Observer's moral feelings, and is therefore immune to the charge of circularity.

Martin holds up divine command theory as the main Christian alternative to his atheistic account of what grounds the objectivity of moral beliefs. According to divine command theory, "cheating is wrong" is true because God has commanded us not to cheat. Putting aside for now the difficulty of understanding how a non-spatial, non-temporal deity can give commands, Martin objects that a theist cannot avoid the snare of voluntarism: Is cheating wrong because God commands it, or does God command us not to cheat because it is wrong?

If a Christian chooses the former alternative, Martin says, she leaves open the possibility that God might command what we think is wrong, e.g. to kill our children. Presumably we would then *not* be able to endorse the view that what God commands us to do is right. The other alternative leaves us unable to explain why God has moral authority or is conceived of as the source of moral law, since it places laws above and prior to God, who is reduced to the role of a messenger. Readers who doubt whether Christians really emphasize divine command theory as much as Martin seems to think should ask themselves whether Christians can provide any *other* equally clear account on which to base their claim that only they possess the keys to a moral life.

III

The possibility of living a life that has purpose and meaning is the topic of the second portion of the book. Martin begins by asking, what do we mean by saying life has no meaning? In an attempt to get a grasp on this elusive idea, Martin analyzes the notion of life's meaningfulness into one of *purpose* and one of *value*. He proceeds to define the idea, *the meaning of life*, either to signify a life of purpose, or to signify a life of value (he accepts both definitions).

To begin with, purposes must be significant, non-arbitrary, and gratifying, but need not be lasting or even completed in one's lifetime. (Martin does not explain the concept of value so carefully as that of purpose.) Despite disbelief in eternal life, an atheist can live a meaningful life, he argues, if she has a purpose in the above sense. For example, a palliative care nurse, on this view, may have a life of purpose, hence a meaningful life, even if she believes neither in her own nor her patients' eternal life.

The Christian supposes that only belief in an afterlife makes life meaningful, but on Martin's analysis, extension of life is irrelevant to the purpose (or value) of a life, since an eternal life could be without purpose. Indeed, since religious concepts of eternal life do not stand up well under scrutiny, Martin believes that a truly meaningful life is possible *only* when such ideas are excluded from our system of beliefs. He thus rejects Richard Taylor's analysis (in "The Meaning of Life") of Camus' 'Myth of Sisyphus' that life is meaningful only if it results in something of never-ending value, or alternatively, only if it consists in creative activity. Martin asks, is a chef's life without meaning because her products are not lasting? Is a mother's life without meaning?

Moreover, he argues that part of what gives meaning to a Christian is dedication to living a Christ-like life; and in a portion of the book that may make even some atheists wince, Martin argues that it is impossible to derive meaning this way, one, because it is impossible to determine exactly what Christ's standards of behavior are, and two, because his behavior often seems *unworthy* of imitation. (Martin has in mind indications that Jesus indulged in fits of rage, was dismissive of his mother, and so on.) Any conceit that only as a Christian can life can have meaning, he concludes, evaporates upon examination of the grounds—eternal life, a Christ-like life—on which it is based.

IV

J. S. Mill, I remarked above, advocates following a line of reasoning to its conclusion, no matter what the consequences may turn out to be. If we judge by his method in this book, Martin, like Mill, also places a high value on fearless rationality. Yet some readers may see his approach in a less flattering light, as a relentless, pitiless, rational process paired with obtuse literalism. One of Martin's most frequent strategies is to nail down the emptiness of a religious notion by strenuously attempting to make it clear. For example, he points out that a command, divine or otherwise, is a speech act, and speech implies a mouth. But God can't actually give commands since he isn't in space/time, doesn't have a mouth, and can't engage in or make another engage in speech acts. This difficulty applies to any supposed transmission of God's commands to a prophet, and so the Divine Command theory has no way of getting going.

At such points in Martin's text even a hard-core atheist may feel inclined to shout, "Oh come on!" Even Socrates irritates us after awhile with his pursuit of clarity and his stating of the obvious, and, in time, Martin's arguments begin to read as disingenuous, and at fault for being grossly, indeed deliberately, insensitive to symbolic meaning. A religious reader will be even less charitable, and she will, more than likely, take Martin's arguments as evidence of colossal stupidity. "Of course", such a believer might say, "If you think of commands as *literally* as you do, you'll find the whole idea puzzling. But when I say that *God issues commands* I for heaven's sake don't mean that God opens a *big mouth, with teeth behind and so on!*" But to take Martin's side again, what exactly *is* meant by the notion (say) of a *divine command*? And if, at the end of the day, the Christian can't say what she means by it, so much the worse for Christianity and for her claims about it.

What *exactly* do you mean, Martin asks over and over, for he knows that the demand for clarity is a powerful strategy. By insisting on clarity and exactness, Martin wins his case against the Christian every time. On the other hand, despite impeccable reasoning and indubitable evidence, he has *not* won his case where it counts most, for before we open his book we know—and *he* knows—that it has absolutely no persuasive power for a theist.

V

...
Then I'm walking in Memphis
Walking with my feet ten feet off of Beale
Walking in Memphis
But do I really feel the way I feel?

Now Muriel plays piano
Every Friday at the Hollywood
And they brought me down to see her
And they asked me if I would—
Do a little number
And I sang with all my might
And she said—
"Tell me are you a Christian child?"
And I said "Ma'am I am tonight"

...

Walking in Memphis, Marc Cohn—1991

Recall Mill's observation that people often cut short a chain of reasoning if they fear the conclusion to which it may lead. Freud makes a related point when he raises the suspicion that tactics, such as being forbidden "to raise the question of ... [a religious belief's] authenticity" are reserved for beliefs that one suspects will *not* withstand scrutiny.² Such behavior implies that the believer is in the curious epistemic position of believing that what she sincerely believes is true is very likely false. That she has external reasons for refusing to question her religious beliefs—out of concern for social welfare in the absence of religious belief, or perhaps because life seems disappointing without them—makes the matter worse for Freud, since to justify religious belief in this fashion underscores how little genuine belief is involved in the first place.

² Sigmund Freud, *Future of an Illusion* (New York: Norton, 1989), p. 33.

Mill and Freud seem puzzled, incredulous, and more than a little disgusted by this sort of behavior. Though they are right to notice this behavior as typical of religious believers, its very frequency makes me hesitate to applaud their dismissive reaction to it. The fact that many people behave in a certain way does nothing to commend that behavior to us, but it does mean that we should look very carefully at what they are doing. And this we do not find in Freud and Mill.

Many atheists might attribute this peculiar quality of religious belief to weakness in character, irrationality, stupidity, lack of education, or to tradition, culture, and family. But this doesn't match up with the qualities possessed by many of the believers whose beliefs—and whose way of believing—seems utterly foreign to one's own. On the contrary, one often finds behind their passionate defense of particular religious beliefs an equally strong conviction about the value of the way in which they believe. What one finds, I suggest, is a moral stance about belief, a belief about the way belief should be exercised.

What Freud and Mill have noticed is behavior that is explicable in terms of how differing value judgments about the use of belief shape the nature of our particular beliefs in different ways. William James' discussion of the will to believe comes closest to articulating this point. James' examples of two such divergent value judgments *about* belief are "believe truth" and "shun error":³

"Believe truth! Shun error!—These, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance."

I would expand on James' point in the following way. What people judge to be of value about belief comes to the surface when some of their particular beliefs are under attack. Many of my religious

³ William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (Dover, 1956), p. 18.

students, for example, under pressure to defend their religious beliefs, identify allowing that some things are impossible with close-mindedness and value being conceptually open to all possibilities.

Though my students are mature adults, something not unlike this attitude is vividly displayed by the young child who resists the idea that something (an infinite universe, a square circle) is impossible: "But maybe it *could happen*, you don't know!" What this type of thinker believes is *both* that there is value in thinking of all things as possibilities *and* that when setting limits to human knowledge it is wise to be extremely skeptical. Their mantra might be, "we can't know for sure".

To dismiss such attitudes as indulgent or irrational is to fail to see, or to ignore, exactly how believing is ethically constrained for the religious person. It's not that "anything goes" in their intellectual life, but the very opposite is true: their conception of belief is highly constrained by, say, the intellectual value of wonder and humility. If you want to address them successfully, I suggest that you address their beliefs about reasoning and do so without condescension or moral superiority, for otherwise you might simply fail to understand what goes on in the mind of the theist and fail to address them at all.

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**Russell v Meinong:
100 Years after
On Denoting**



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BOOK REVIEW

FROM PACIFISM TO LOGICISM: SAMPLES OF RUSSELL'S
DIVERSE AREAS OF INTEREST AND INFLUENCE

CHAD TRAINER

Review of *Bertrand Russell on Nuclear War, Peace, and Language*.
Alan Schwerin. Westport: Praeger 2002. Pp. xxv, 144

This book is a compilation of papers from two Bertrand Russell Society annual meetings, and a Russell/Wittgenstein conference.¹ The book's editor, Alan Schwerin, harbors no illusions about the general quality of such work: "Papers presented at academic conferences are notoriously dull, tedious and sordid affairs." It is Schwerin's express hope, however, that "the reader will not say the same about the contributions to this volume." And as its title implies, the range of topics addressed is indeed diverse and the papers engaging.

Ray Perkins' piece discusses 'Bertrand Russell and Preventive War'. Perkins concedes that Russell publicly advocated preventive war in early post-World War II years, but hastens to attribute to him a more benign policy than that conventionally ascribed, by emphasizing the *conditional* nature of Russell's preventive war policy. Perkins argues that Russell, unlike other advocates of preventive war, believed the Soviets would probably accede to international controls of weaponry, thereby rendering preventive war unnecessary to actually conduct (a point overlooked by Alan Ryan, Perkins claims, in Ryan's book *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*). However, a private 1954 letter is mentioned by Perkins in which Russell certainly sounds as though he was advocating a more extremist policy, and there is the acknowledgement that "Russell's embarrassment concerning his ... letter and its harsh recommendation may have caused him to obscure the record regarding its content in his later years."

¹ The Russell Society annual meetings were both held at Monmouth University, NJ, June 4-6, 1999 and June 2-4, 2000. The Russell-Wittgenstein conference was held at Oxford University, UK, March 25-26, 2000.

After the Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan in 1946 (the American proposal at the UN for international control of atomic energy), the fate of world peace was anyone's guess, especially as long as more effort was being channeled into propaganda than good-natured resolution of the problems. Andrew Bone, in 'Russell and the Communist-aligned Peace Movement in the Mid-1950s', explains how the organizers of the 1957 Pugwash conference (founded to support the 1955 Russell-Einstein manifesto to promote nuclear disarmament as a first step towards ending war) knew that, in order to have credibility, they would have to preserve an appearance of being impartial and above the fray. As the author of the 1920 anti-communist work, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, Russell was better situated than many and had "no embarrassing record of fellow traveling to disavow." For example, Russell was careful to rebuff certain overtures of the communist Frédéric Joliot-Curie's World Peace Council. Still, this did not prevent the likes of Sidney Hook, one of America's more aggressive intellectual cold warriors, from thinking that the communists manipulated Russell. Russell's political acumen is apparent from his sensitivity to the need for ensuring that no peace pact be perceived as being in the pocket of predominantly Western or Soviet interests.

In 'Russell on Happiness', José Idler-Acosta notes some parallels between Russell and John Stuart Mill, such as their commitment to individuality and their common conviction that unhappiness is located in "selfishness and the lack of a cultivated mind." This contribution is basically an overview of the relevant portions of Russell's *Conquest of Happiness* and *Authority and the Individual*. Idler-Acosta also appropriately draws attention to the latter work's prescience in appreciating the merits of environmentalism.

The latter half of the book is concerned with the subject of language. In Antony Flew's essay, 'Russell, Wittgenstein, and *Cogito ergo sum*', Russell is said to have exaggerated the influence of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* on Oxford linguistic philosophy. What is more, he claims that Russell's criticisms of that movement are partially due to Russell having taken Ernest Gellner's *Words and Things* (a famous diatribe against linguistic philosophy to which Russell contributed a foreword) "as if that polemic actually provides both a faithful representation and a devastating critique of what it purported to represent and to criticize." (p.60)

Far from dealing with trivial matters, Flew argues that the Oxford linguistic philosophy school made relevant contributions to the handling of Kant's "three great questions of philosophy," namely, God, Freedom, and Immortality. The Socratic Club at Oxford, originally founded and chaired by C.S. Lewis, is cited as the catalyst for many pieces in the *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* collection that Flew published in 1955 with Alasdair MacIntyre. The basic thesis of Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* is hailed as "crucially relevant to the question of a future life." Then an apparently ill-tempered quip from Wittgenstein about the peculiarity of the sentence "*Cogito ergo sum*" is proposed by Flew for analysis as a possibly "radical and totally devastating objection to the position that Descartes had reached in the second paragraph of Part IV of his *Discourse on the Method*."

Rom Harré's 'Reference Revisited' is more technical. Ostension had a crucial role in Russell's philosophy of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. While Harré agrees about ostension's importance, his concern here is to stress the vital function demonstratives (pronouns like 'this' or 'that' which point to an intended referent) serve as "indexicals" (words whose meaning is determined by the context of their utterance, such as 'I', 'you', 'here', 'now', 'this', 'that', etc.) in existence demonstrations. As Harré will have it, Russell not only failed to grasp the importance of the statement/sentence distinction, but the very type of issue that was an impetus for Russell's attempt to "outflank Alexius Meinong's ontologizing" arises in the realm of statements only. And yet "[i]f...we were to follow Russell in restricting genuine pure acts of reference to those that can be performed by the use of 'this', noting the shift in article as we moved from 'This is...' to 'There are...', we would land ourselves in a positivism of the most extreme sort."

For guidance here, Harré cites the work of Czeslaw Lejewski based on the insights of Stanislaw Lesniewski according to which an overhauling of scientific realism is recommended in which genuine instances of certain types of entities are initially ascertained and then symbols, or variables, to stand for them are concocted. In such a scheme, "the question of the truth-values of any given sentence arises only when a sentence is used to make a statement about the world. And this is how it should be."

In 'Our Statements Are Likely to Be Wrong: On Russell's Big Thesis', Alan Schwerin takes Russell to task for his statement toward the very beginning of his 1912 *Problems of Philosophy* that "In our search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong." Schwerin argues that the discussion following Russell's mention of this view makes it "abundantly clear" that Russell is committed to what Schwerin calls (with "deliberate irreverence") "Russell's Big Thesis," namely, that "Any ordinary language statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong." Schwerin thinks that this introductory statement is either unimportant as "mere complaints, not to be taken too seriously," or misguided as too dismissive of the possibility that at least some of our ordinary assertions can be correct.

Schwerin not only thinks it significant that the "Big Thesis" is neither repeated nor referred to in the rest of the book but notes how "Russell is clearly impressed by the prospect that multiple observation reports are possible in any observation instance." But "[h]is argument does not preclude the possibility that at least one ordinary language observation report can be true. Ironically, the stress in his argument on the *multiplicity* of the possibilities ought to have alerted him to this distinct possibility."

Schwerin also cites Ken Blackwell's research on the "intimacy" between the ideas expounded in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*, and how the dismissive treatment of skepticism in paragraph 6.51 of the *Tractatus* quite likely has Russell as its target.²

The final paper featured is Nicholas Griffin's 'Russell, Logicism, and "If-thenism"'. "If-thenism" is the doctrine that "all mathematical statements are conditional in form", a view asserted by Russell in the very first sentence of his 1903 *Principles of Mathematics*, when he says: "Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form 'p implies q'." (Russell 1903, p.3) While a

² Ken Blackwell, 'The Early Wittgenstein and the Middle Russell', in *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, pp. 1-30, Irving Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.

step in the direction of logicism, "if-thenism" is to be understood as quite distinct from it. Griffin acknowledges that there are indeed elements of "if-thenism" in Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*. He contends, however, that such elements are (i) narrower in scope than supposed by the "if-thenist" interpretation proponents, (ii) remain present in *Principia Mathematica*, and (iii) are evidence of Russell's failed hopes for the logicist project. Griffin argues that, while Russell's *Principles of Mathematics* views all mathematical statements as taking conditional form, this was not derived from "if-thenism."

Griffin criticizes Hilary Putnam's interpretations of Russell in this matter as being wholly destitute of a textual basis and utterly alien to anything Russell ever intended. Griffin also criticizes Alberto Coffa's attribution to Russell of "if-thenism," saying that there are no logistically significant differences in doctrine between *The Principles of Mathematics* and *Principia Mathematica* as Coffa supposes. In any case, "It defies belief that his (Russell's) thinking about the nature of mathematics should have undergone so striking a change without his having commented upon it."

The contributions to this volume vary in readability, which is to be expected in any attempt at surveying the thought of an author like Russell who involved himself in subjects of such vastly varying levels of accessibility. Overall, the diversity of topics addressed in this book is one of its assets, and it better reflects the range of Russell's interests than something more specialized in scope.

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END MATTER

100 YEARS OF DENOTING

In 1905 Bertrand Russell published 'On Denoting' in the journal *Mind*. To state its topic as starkly as possible, the paper proposed a way of treating definite descriptions (singular referential expressions beginning with 'the') within the resources of what is now known as classical predicate logic (a branch of logic created by Gottlob Frege in 1879 which Russell had discovered in 1902) without treating them as names. In the course of doing so Russell provided an answer to the question he made famous: Is it true that the present king of France is bald? And, if it is not, do we conclude that he has a full head of hair? This may seem at best like an arcanelly technical topic in formal logic and, at worse, the sort of concern with mere puzzles that can get philosophy a bad name, but the ramifications of Russell's theory of definite descriptions—in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics and epistemology, even in the way it was thought philosophy ought to be conducted—were enormous. Some people see the paper as inaugurating analytic philosophy; others as the paper in which analytic philosophy came of age; almost everyone would list it as one of the five most important philosophy papers written in the twentieth century.

The centenary of Russell's paper is being widely recognized: by a special issue of *Mind*; by a conference in Spain; by a new collection of articles on the theory; but above all by a major international conference at The Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University—home of the Bertrand Russell Archives. When Russell's theory was published, among its many achievements one of the most definitive was taken to be its demolition of an alternative treatment of definite descriptions, the theory of objects of the Austrian philosopher and psychologist, Alexius Meinong. If Russell became notorious for suggesting that it was false both that the present king of France was bald and that he was not bald; Meinong became notorious for suggesting that it was true both that the round square was round and also that it was square. For many decades after 1905, Meinong's theory of objects was widely held to have been completely discredited by Russell. Since the 1970's, however,

Meinong's theory has staged a comeback, so that it (or some variant of it) is now quite widely regarded as a serious competitor to Russell's theory. The Russell Centre decided, therefore, to focus its conference on the Russell-Meinong debate and to invite both Russellians and Meinongians to the Centre to hash it out.

The conference, 'Russell v Meinong: 100 Years after *On Denoting*', is being jointly organized by Dale Jacquette, a prominent contributor to the Meinong revival at Pennsylvania State University, and myself, another Meinongian I hesitate to confess in this journal. We have a stellar line-up of speakers from both sides of the debate, including Alasdair Urquhart, who edited Volume 4 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* (1994) which includes 'On Denoting' as well as Russell's much more extensive pre-'On Denoting' manuscripts. On the other side, we have Rudolf Haller, one of the editors of Meinong's collected works, the 7 volume *Gesamtausgabe* (1969-73), and one of the leading interpreters of Meinong's philosophy. The publication of the collected works of both philosophers has played an important role in framing the recent debate between their respective proponents. In particular, the pre-'On Denoting' manuscripts make it clear that Russell's motivation in creating the theory and his view of the theory's importance were quite different from what they had been supposed to be. There can be few theories in the history of philosophy that have been so widely accepted and so evidently misunderstood. No one has made this clearer than another speaker at the conference, Gideon Makin in his wonderfully revisionary book, *The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation* (2000). And lest readers fear that two cunning Meinongians have contrived to bring only Russell exegetes to a contest about the current value of the 2 theories, we also have Stephen Neale, the author of *Descriptions* (1990), for my money the best book on contemporary description theory and a *tour de force* from the Russellian point of view.

The conference's objectives are thus both systematic and historical. It will review what has been learnt in the last few decades about the origins of Russell's theory, as well as reassessing the relative merits of Russellian and Meinongian approaches. But, because the impact of Russell's theory of descriptions was felt so widely throughout analytic philosophy, the conference will take a wider view as well. For example, Russell's initial engagement with defin-

ite descriptions was in many ways just a preliminary to a hoped-for paradox-free analysis of classes which would thus remove the last blockage on the road to a logicist analysis of number. David Bos-tock, the author of a 2 volume work on *Logic and Arithmetic* (1973, 1979), will speak on the development of Russell's views on classes before and after the theory of descriptions. Ruth Barcan Marcus, the creator of quantified modal logic which is now seen as the obvious theory for dealing with some of the puzzles Russell attempted to solve by means of the theory of descriptions, will consider whether Russell remained as faithful as he claimed to the theory of descriptions in his later philosophy. Again, in 'On Denoting' Russell not only criticized Meinong's theory of objects but also Frege's theory of sense and reference. Jeffrey Pelletier and Bernard Linsky in a joint paper will discuss Frege's theory, and Nathan Salmon will discuss Russell's main argument against that theory. The conference will thus explore some of the wider issues associated with the theory of descriptions. The ramifications of Russell's theory are so extensive that it will be impossible for all of them to be addressed in the conference. We hope we will be able to achieve a good balance between specialized topics of current research on the theory, and papers on broader, related issues which will attract an audience beyond those working directly on the theory.

Many other philosophers from around the world have also agreed to give papers. It has been thirty-two years since a conference of this size and importance was held in conjunction with the Russell Archives, the last one was to celebrate the centenary of Russell's birth. The conference will be held on 14-18 May 2005, starting the same weekend that the Bertrand Russell Society holds its annual meeting at McMaster. It's hoped that even the non-philosophers in the BRS will drop in for at least session or two to see what all the fuss is about. For further details of the centenary conference, see <http://denoting.mcmaster.ca>

—Nicholas Griffin

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

When a big snowstorm hits Boston as it often does in December, narrow streets become medieval footpaths and traffic laws are abandoned. When, in addition, the air is so cold that grey cracks appear in the pavement and it hurts to breath, then it must be time for the Eastern APA to come to town. The event took place this year within the Boston Copley Marriot, a hotel housed inside an up-up-up-market indoor mall. Not that I was there to shop: I was expected to be responsible for three groups sessions, two by HEAPS, the new History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, and one by our own BRS. As host of the party, so to speak, I was especially pleased at the turn out for the BRS group session.

The Bertrand Russell Society met on Tuesday evening and was attended by about 15 people, who remained for all three talks. This was a good turnout for a group session at the Eastern APA, especially given the last minute withdrawal of one speaker (Henrique Ribeiro) and a mistake in the program that led some to expect Nick Griffin (McMaster University), who was in Australia, to put in an appearance. The first paper of the evening, 'Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Theory of Propositions', delivered by David Godden (University of Winnipeg) and co-written with Nick, concerned the evolution of Russell's thought towards psychologism in the teens and early twenties. Gary Hardcastle (Bloomsburg University), who had served as moderator of an earlier HEAPS session, gave a largely sympathetic response; and because this subject is of particular interest to me, I shamelessly abused my power as Chair to hog the question and answer period.

In the next talk, titled 'The Significance of Moore's Theory of Judgment for an Understanding of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction', Consuelo Preti (College of New Jersey) outlined what she sees as important anticipations in the early G. E. Moore of externalist views of semantic content (where a part of the meaning of a belief is a function of the believer's physical environment). In his commentary, John Ongley (Edinboro University of PA) discussed Consuelo's evidence for this view and presented evidence for an alternative interpretation of Moore. The two of them then engaged in a brief debate over the nature of Moore's extra-mental objects. Standing in for the absent Henrique Ribeiro, David White (St. John

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by Dennis J. Darland (who scanned them)

Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.

Fisher College) delivered the final talk on Russell's work of fiction *Satan in the Suburbs*, after wisely distributing copies of the little known piece to the audience to peruse. The session was attended by some of the audience from the two HEAPS sessions that met earlier that day, confirming my belief that the two groups will benefit each other.

The first HEAPS group took place in the morning and addressed the theme, *Frege, Husserl, and Analysis*. Sanford Shieh (Wesleyan University) chaired as Michael Beaney (Open University-U.K.) spoke on 'Frege and the Paradox of Analysis', Sandra LaPointe (Concordia University) discussed 'Frege and Husserl on Signs and Linguistic Behavior', and Matthew Morgan (Duquesne University) explored 'A Graphic Display of Sinn: Frege and Husserl on Sense and Meaning'. In commentary, Sanford Shieh raised several objections to Beaney's talk, Ed Boedecker (University of Northern Iowa) used symbolic logic to address LaPointe, and Mirja Hartimo (Boston University) doubted the wisdom of Morgan's emphasis on Frege's theory of *sinn*.

The second HEAPS session, chaired by Gary Hardcastle, turned to the theme of Logical Positivism. Michael Stoelzner (University of Bielefeld) presented 'Quantum Mechanics without Indeterminism: On the Surprising Strength of Verificationism within Schlick's 2nd Theory of Causality', Uljana Feest (Max Planck Institute—History of Science) spoke on 'Meaningful Structures: Placing the *Aufbau* in the Context of Holistic Science', and Mazi Allen (Binghamton University-SUNY) concluded with 'A Road Less Traveled: The Lasting Significance of Waismann's "How I See Philosophy"'. Melanie Frappier (University of Western Ontario), Chris Pincock (Purdue University), and David Godden delivered comments. Though with an audience of 10, this session of HEAPS drew fewer than the 22 people attending the morning one, the turnout was nevertheless fair to good for the vastly over-booked Eastern APA.

—Rosalind Carey

Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
3rd Quarter 2004 Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow
7/1/04 - 9/30/04

| | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| BALANCE 6/30/04 | 9,515.75 |
| <hr/> | |
| INFLOWS | |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | 430.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 430.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 59.28 |
| Renewals | 430.00 |
| TOTAL Dues | 489.28 |
| Meeting Income* | 1,578.00 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 2,497.28 |
| | |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 19.71 |
| Library Expenses | 5.30 |
| Meeting Expenses | 3,564.22 |
| BRSQ | 356.60 |
| Other Expenses | 5.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 3,950.83 |
| TOTAL OVERALL | -1,453.55 |
| <hr/> | |
| BALANCE 9/30/04 | 8,062.20 |
| <hr/> | |

*Some of the meeting income was in the 2nd Quarter

Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer
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Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
4th Quarter 2004 Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow
10/1/04 - 12/31/04

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| BALANCE 9/30/04 | 8,062.20 |
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INFLOWS

| | |
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| Contributions | |
| BRS | 100.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 100.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 101.86 |
| Renewals | 41.68* |
| TOTAL Dues | 143.54 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 243.54 |

OUTFLOWS

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| Bank Charges | 16.70 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 16.70 |

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| TOTAL OVERALL | -1,453.55 |
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| BALANCE 12/31/04 | 8,289.04 |
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* Renewals for 2005 will mostly appear in 2005

Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer
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Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2004 Annual Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow
10/1/04 - 12/31/04

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| BALANCE 12/31/03 | 5,440.32 |
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INFLOWS

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| Contributions | |
| BRS | 1,344.15 |
| <i>BRS Quarterly</i> | 950.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 2,294.15 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 538.94 |
| Renewals | 3,805.81 |
| TOTAL Dues | 4,344.75 |
| Meeting Income | 4,568.65 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 11,207.55 |

OUTFLOWS

| | |
|----------------------|----------|
| Bank Charges | 84.10 |
| BRS Paper Award | 400.00 |
| Library Expenses | 5.30 |
| Meeting Expenses | 3,564.22 |
| <i>BRS Quarterly</i> | 1,988.21 |
| Other Expenses | 5.00 |
| <i>RUSSELL Sub</i> | 2,312.00 |

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| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 8,358.83 |
|-----------------------|-----------------|

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| TOTAL OVERALL | 2,848.72 |
|----------------------|-----------------|

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|-------------------------|-----------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/04 | 8,289.04 |
|-------------------------|-----------------|

Dennis J. Darland, Treasurer
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THE
GREATER ROCHESTER
RUSSELL SET

2005 SCHEDULE

- Jan. 13 Howard Blair: BR on *Mathematical Philosophy*
Feb. 10 Tim Madigan: Russell and Fiction
Mar. 10 Linda White: Lady John Russell
Apr. 14 Alan Bock: BR's essay "On Catholic and Protestant Skepticism"
May 12 Panel on Bertrand Russell: Apostle of Reason
Jun. 09 Panel: Bertrand Russell's Continuing Relevance for Philosophy and Public Affairs
Jul. 14 Phil Ebersole: BR's essay "Philosophy and Politics"
Aug. 11 Joint meeting with Chesterton Society of Rochester
Sep. 08 David White: *Beyond Wittgenstein's Poker* by Peter Munz
Oct. 13 George Campbell McDade: *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* by Bertrand & Dora Russell
Nov. 10 Gerry Wildenberg: BR's short story "The Theologian's Nightmare"
Dec. 08 Phil Ebersole: BR's essay "The Essence of Religion"

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
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL
SOCIETY
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Double Issue

Numbers 125-126 / February-May 2005



BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE COLD WAR

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

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BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE COLD WAR

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Cover: Bertrand Russell at Trafalgar Square, February 1962

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IN THIS ISSUE

JUST WEEKS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR, in 1989, a frenzy of activity began among historians in cold war studies. The reason for this activity, which has only intensified in the subsequent 16 years, is simple: after every major world event, history must be rewritten, for we then know things we didn't know before. For example, only when an event is over do we know its outcome and can then properly judge it. With the fall of the wall, historians were in a unique position to understand the cold war and they were not about to waste time in taking advantage of it.

Ever since this activity began, increasingly complex, and increasingly interesting pictures of the cold war have emerged. One subject—the study of the so-called “cultural” cold war, that is, of the role played by intellectuals in the cold war, and the influence the cold war had upon them—has raised the question of the effects and propriety of covert government support for intellectual activity during the cold war. It is that question that concerns us here.

In its August 2003 issue, the BRSQ published a brief report on allegations by Timothy Garton Ash that Bertrand Russell had not only been paid by secret British government agencies to write anti-communist tracts that were then published and distributed with funds by the same government agencies, but that Russell had known at the time that it was government agencies that were paying him and publishing the pamphlets. After a lengthy and intense discussion of these charges by a wide variety of Russell scholars in the online Russell discussion group, *russell-l*, JACK CLONTZ wrote a systematic account of them for the BRSQ that was published in its August 2004 issue.¹

In this issue, ANDREW BONE, Senior Research Associate at the Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University, examines Clontz's claims in greater detail and with further evidence, and essentially agrees that Russell not only wrote his anti-communist tracts knowing that he was being paid by the British government,

¹ Jack Clontz, “Bertrand Russell and the Cold War: Orwell's List”, *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* no.123 (August 2004), 29-38; Timothy Garton Ash, “Orwell's List”, *New York Review of Books*, Sept. 25, 2003.

but that he took very specific instructions from his publishers about what he should say. But more importantly than this, Bone goes on to provide a comprehensive survey of Russell's entire anti-communist work for the British government and supplies a richer context for Russell's activities and writings in the early cold war than we have previously had.

This is the first comprehensive discussion of Russell's work for the British government as an anti-communist cold warrior. It is, I think, significant both for Russell studies and cold war studies, for the story Andy tells is not yet standard even among Russell scholars and certainly not among cold war historians. For example, Francis Stonor Saunders has written the most widely read book on the cultural cold war, and yet, as David Blitz has pointed out, she did not even consult the Bertrand Russell Archives when writing her book.²

And if one were to look for a picture depicting Russell as an anti-communist cold warrior, one would look in vain. Every photograph of Russell and the cold war in any book on Russell this editor knows of either depicts him as an anti-nuclear campaigner or anti-Vietnam War activist, but none as a cold war anti-communist. Since photographs in such books serve mainly as icons of various aspects of the subject's life, it seems that the idea of Russell as an anti-communist cold warrior working closely with his government in the conflict is not yet a part of the standard view of him, even among Russell scholars, and so is still in need of emphasis and exploration.

Also in this issue, NIKOLAY MILKOV writes about RUSSELL STUDIES IN GERMANY—past and present—in his review of Guido Imaguire's recent book on Russell's early philosophy *Russells Frühphilosophie: Propositionen, Realismus und die sprachontologische Wende*. Of special interest is information Milkov provides about the roles played by Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson in early German studies of Russell.

Milkov, the author of two books on the history of 20th c. English philosophy, several detailed studies of the influence of Rudolf Hermann Lotze on Russell and Moore, and several other articles on early German influences on analytic philosophy, will spend the

² Frances S. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press, 2000); David Blitz, "Cultural Cold War", *Russell*, n.s. 21 (Winter 2001-02): 176–80.

2005-2006 academic year in the United States as a Research Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh's Center for the History and Philosophy of Science. This coming December, he will speak at the BRS session of the Eastern APA meeting in NYC on Lotze and Russell. David Sullivan, who has written an excellent article on Lotze for the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, will comment on Milkov's talk. Everyone is encouraged to attend. It promises to be a significant session.

THIS YEAR is both the 100th anniversary of Russell's groundbreaking study, 'On Denoting', and the 50th anniversary of the equally groundbreaking anti-nuclear statement, THE RUSSELL-EINSTEIN MANIFESTO. 'On Denoting' was celebrated at a conference this past May at McMaster University in conjunction with the Russell Society's own annual meeting. The next issue of *Quarterly* will report on both the 'On Denoting' conference and the BRS annual meeting. In this issue, we have a report from RAY PERKINS, JR. on the continuing relevance of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. As Joseph Rotblat reminded us in a recent New York Times editorial (May 17, 2005), today we face the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the former superpowers still hold enormous nuclear arsenals, North Korea and Iran are advancing in their capacities to build nuclear weapons, and other nations are increasingly likely to acquire them on the excuse that they are needed for their own security. The work of Russell and Einstein 50 years ago indeed continues to be relevant.

CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK, of Purdue University, discusses another article from a past issue of the BRSQ when he questions some of the claims made by JUSTIN LIEBER in Lieber's May 2004 BRSQ essay on Russell and Wittgenstein. Those questions have provoked Justin to dig deeper into the story and provide further evidence for his claims. Finally, ROSALIND CAREY's Conference Report of the BRS session at the Pacific APA and DENNIS DARLAND's Treasurer Report of the Society's presently healthy finances, which are published in the back, round out this issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*.

SOCIETY NEWS

REPRESENTING PEACE. On June 16, 2005, Representative Neil Abercrombie, Democrat of Hawaii, BRS member since 1989, and man of peace, and Walter Jones (R-NC) introduced a Joint Resolution into the House calling for an end to the Iraq war. If put into effect, the bill would require President Bush to draft a plan for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq starting October 2006. The resolution now has a total of 30 co-sponsors, both Democrats and Republicans. It will be recalled that the Bertrand Russell Society, at its June 2004 BRS Annual Meeting, passed its own resolution calling for an end to the Iraqi war and withdrawal of the troops, with the establishment of a secular democratic state by the Iraqi's themselves under U.N. auspices. Both resolutions seem clearly representative of the Russellian tradition of peace.

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TILL DEATH DO US PART. Since the start of year, two more names have been added to the list of BRS life members: Warren Allen Smith, Humanist, BRS founding member, BRS Vice President from 1977-1980, and decades-long member of the BRS board of directors, and William Calder III, professor of classics at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign and BRS member since 1996. Not since 1992, when Don Jackanicz and Jim Reid both became life members, have two people become life members of the Russell Society in a single year. We would like to thank our new life members, Warren and William, for their generous contributions to the Society and its activities.

Prior to Warren and William, the Society's life members were: Dennis Darland of Rock Island IL (BRS since 1977), Don Jackanicz, of Chicago Illinois (BRS founding member—since 1974—and rumored owner of the last stock of Red Hackle in the world), Jim Reid of Wellesley MA (BRS member since 1991), and Charles Weyland of Fountain Valley CA (BRS since 1977). Dennis thinks there was previously a fifth life member—a friend, now deceased, of founding member Peter Cranford—but can't remember his name. Warren and William are welcome additions to this special group of friends of the BRS.

NEXT YEAR, IOWA CITY. The BRS Board of Directors met twice at this year's BRS annual meeting and elected the following members as officers: President, Alan Schwerin; Vice President, Raymond Perkins, Jr.; Secretary, David Henehan; Treasurer, Dennis Darland; Board Chair, Chad Trainer. It was decided that next year's annual meeting will be hosted by Gregory Landini and held at the University of Iowa. Located in Iowa City, the University of Iowa is readily accessible by plane and public transportation. The date has not yet been set, but the *Quarterly* will be sure to convey this information to you when it becomes known. The minutes of this year's board meeting will be published in the next issue of the *Quarterly*.

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HURRY! SPACE IS LIMITED! Warren Allen Smith is revising his magnum opus *Who's Who In Hell* (Barricade Books, 2000, \$125.00) in order to put it on the web. If you didn't make the cut the first time, here's your chance. The deadline, as it were, is November 15, 2005.

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NEW YORK, NEW YORK. The BRS will host a group session at the forthcoming meeting of the Eastern APA, which will take place at the Hilton in New York City December 27 - 30, 2005. Speakers and titles include Gary Cesarz on "McTaggart and Broad on Leibniz's Law", Nikolay Milkov on "Lotze's Influence on Russell" (David Sullivan commenting), and John Ongley on "Lotze at Cambridge".

Related talks at the Eastern APA will be hosted by the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society (HEAPS) and include Sandra Lapointe on "Husserl and Frege on Formal Meaning", Chris Pincock on "An Overlapping Consensus Model of the Origins of Analytic Philosophy" (Aaron Preston commenting), and Karen Green on "Fregean Existence and Non-Existence" (Kevin Klement commenting). BRS members are urged to attend for a great time and great talks in a great city.

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BRS AWARD: CALL FOR NOMINATIONS. Each year, the BRS bestows an annual award to an individual or organization whose work best furthers the interests and commitments of Bertrand Russell. Any member of the Society can nominate a person or organization that meets these criteria.

If you have someone you would like to nominate, please submit the nomination, with a short paragraph on why they should be considered for the award, to Kevin Brodie at kevin.brodie@lebanonct.org or mail them to: Kevin Brodie Chair, Awards Committee, 147 Dunn Rd, Coventry, CT 06238. The deadline is September 15th.

If you submitted in the past, but your choice did not win, feel free to resubmit your nominee. Nominations not accompanied by reasons for the nomination—in other words, a submitted name and nothing else—will not be considered.

Previous winners include: Paul Arthur Schlipp (1980), Steve Allen (1981), Harry Kendall, Union of Concerned Scientists (1982), Joseph Rodblat, 1995 Nobel Peace Prize Winner (1983), Dora Black Russell (1984), Robert Jay Lifton and Lester Denonn (1985), People for the American Way (1986), John Somerville (1987), Paul Kurtz (1988), Paul Edwards (1989), Planned Parenthood Federation of America (1991), Karl Popper (1992), Harry Ruja (1993), Zero Population Growth (1995), Willard Van Orman Quine (1996), Irving Copi (1998), Dr. Henry Morgentaler (1999), Stephen Jay Gould (2000), Stephen Toulmin (2001), Studs Terkel (2002), Katha Pollitt (2003), Daniel Dennett (2004)

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NEW HELP AT THE Q. It is our pleasure to introduce Cory Hotnit, our new editorial assistant, to the Russell Society. Cory is a student at Lehman College and the recipient of a \$2,000 work-study grant to work at the *Quarterly*. Special bonus: *Cory knows HTML*. Please visit the BRSQ's newly updated website to see the fruits of his labor at: <http://www.lehman.edu/deanhum/philosophy/BRSQ/>.

FEATURE

BERTRAND RUSSELL AS COLD WAR PROPAGANDIST

ANDREW G. BONE

Jack Clontz's review essay in the August 2004 BRS *Quarterly* includes a harsh indictment of propaganda activities engaged in by Bertrand Russell at the height of the Cold War.¹ Specifically, Clontz condemns Russell's writing for a series of publications (Background Books) subsidized clandestinely by the Information Research Department (IRD), a shadowy branch of the British Foreign Office entrusted since 1948 with the covert dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda at home and abroad. In preparing these publications, Clontz argues, "Russell compromised himself in two important respects":

The first is that he violated his own belief in the paramount importance of the individual being able to make judgments on their merits without societal or political pressure, in the full light of evidence that should be freely available to all. By hiding the fact that he had engaged in surreptitious propaganda Russell deeply compromised himself. He also compromised himself by presenting himself as a detached, independent observer of political trends, one who was not beholden to hidden or special interests. In effect, therefore, Russell lied to his readers by not revealing the provenance of the writing of these works.²

These are serious charges which, if possible, warrant corroboration for readers of the *Quarterly* with evidence from the Russell Archives. This will be assayed in the first two parts of this article. Part One will try to shed some light on Russell's involvement with the Background Books enterprise, while Part Two will probe further into his association with the IRD. Not all Russell's anti-Communist

¹ "Bertrand Russell and the Cold War: Orwell's List", *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* no. 123 (August 2004), 29–38.

² *Ibid.*, 34.

activities, however, were carried out in the rather cloak-and-dagger fashion associated with the intelligence and security community. In his *Autobiography* he was perfectly candid about acting as an unofficial spokesman for the Foreign Office in the late 1940s and early 1950s.³ This more transparent side to Russell the Cold War propagandist will be examined in the third part of the article. The final part will review Russell's troubled relationship with another secretly funded Cold War project, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). It will offset any negative portrait that may have emerged of Russell as a dupe or agent of powerful forces beyond his control, by showing him to be a far from pliant or passive honorary chairman of this CIA-backed organization of the international anti-Communist Left.

1. RUSSELL'S BACKGROUND BOOKS

According to Clontz, Russell was at fault less for the sometimes strident anti-Communist arguments employed in his contributions to Background Books and more for failing to disclose that these publications were sponsored by a secret propaganda arm of the British Government. Moreover, Russell did not even take advantage of a perfect opportunity to set the record straight when he decided to reprint two of these works, *What Is Freedom?* and *What Is Democracy?*, in his 1961 collection of essays, *Fact and Fiction*. But exactly how aware was Russell of the connection between Background Books and the IRD? Clontz cites anecdotal evidence used by Timothy Garton Ash to suggest that Russell was fully cognizant of the sources of funding for the Background Books series.⁴

The publishing correspondence for "*What Is Freedom?*, *What Is Democracy?* and Russell's other contributions to Background Books was not conducted through the IRD (not surprisingly), but by the "journalist and literary agent" (the description is from his letterhead) Colin Wintle. As a wartime officer in the Special Operations Executive, Wintle had been involved with the conduct of political

³ *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*. Vol. 3: 1944-1967 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), pp. 19-21.

⁴ See Timothy Garton Ash, "Orwell's List", *New York Review of Books*, 25 Sept. 2003; referred to by Clontz, "Bertrand Russell and the Cold War", 33.

warfare in Nazi-occupied Europe. In 1946 he co-founded a public relations firm that would be called upon by MI6 to conduct clandestine media operations.⁵ Meanwhile, the editor of Background Books, Stephen Watts, also had an intelligence and security background, having served in MI5 during the Second World War.

In his letter of approach to Russell, dated 12 December 1951, Wintle reported that Watts was "interested in obtaining an authoritatively written contribution for a booklet under the title *What Is Freedom?*".⁶ There is nothing odd about this correspondence. Russell received numerous solicitations of this kind, some of which he accepted and rather more of which he declined. The handsome fee of £262.10 (or US \$734 at 1951 exchange rates) no doubt had some bearing on his acceptance of this particular commission. More unusual is the following memorandum which Wintle enclosed with his letter:

Inherent in the discussion would be the contrasts between the freedoms enjoyed outside and those enjoyed inside the Communist world.

While the writer should not assume that his readers will have more than a layman's knowledge of politics and philosophy, it would of course be inappropriate to deal with the theme in unmodified blacks and whites, or by an emotional approach.

Full allowance should be made for the imperfections of the non-Communist world, but a firm stand taken about absolute standards of individual freedom—a point upon which one could well afford to dogmatise.

Education perhaps provides the most telling contrasts between the two worlds. However deplorable the quality of education may be in large regions of the non-Communist world, it can claim to be free from the explicit aim of the Soviet system to confine the mind within the limits of a doctrine which is philosophically untenable.

Briefly, the editor envisages an essay which would accept the proposition that the prospects of human freedom are better

⁵ See P. Lashmar and J. Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), 31. I am grateful to Amanda White of the BRRC for supplying me with this reference.

⁶ RA1 410 (Wintle), the archival location for all correspondence between Russell and Wintle referred to in this section.

outside Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and would develop arguments to show why this is so.

While Russell was often asked to write on particular topics, he was not used to following such precise editorial or ideological directions. After the manuscript of *What Is Freedom?* had been submitted early in 1952, Wintle sent Russell a long and detailed letter asking him to tone down his criticisms of American anti-Communism. He made this request with a certain diffidence but also by reference to the opinion of “a very intelligent publisher’s reader”, who thought that “both the effectiveness and, in some quarters, the commercial acceptability of the booklet would be increased by these slight modifications” (21 March 1952). Russell’s marginal notations convey his compliance with each of Wintle’s suggestions.⁷

The next letter from Wintle in the Russell Archives, dated 17 February 1953, contains an offer to undertake on the same terms a “companion booklet” to *What Is Freedom?*. The editorial instructions for this book, *What Is Democracy?*, were less detailed than those for its predecessor, although Stephen Watts (the Background Books editor) had asked Wintle to suggest “two things”:

- 1) that a start might be made from the point that two opposed systems are now being called by the same name—an extreme

⁷ The letters and enclosures pertaining to *What Is Freedom?* were not Wintle’s earliest contacts with Russell. The first correspondence from him in the Russell Archives is dated 3 May 1951. From that letter it is apparent that Wintle had also shepherded to publication Russell’s first contribution to Background Books, the essay “Dictatorship Breeds Corruption” in the symposium *Why Communism Must Fail* (London: Batchworth Press, 1951). Wintle then wanted 1,200 words from Russell on “What Communists Really Think of Christian (or Islamic) Socialists”. Wintle explained further that he had in mind something with a strong anti-Communist flavour: “As I view it, one of the points is the essential dishonesty of present Communist attempts to encourage the establishment of ‘popular front’ governments—especially in the East—in which Communists and various brands of Socialists are supposed to combine, and the Socialists’ unawareness that they are being invited to sup with their Communist ‘brothers’ in order that the latter shall eat them!” The notation on Wintle’s letter indicates that Russell responded affirmatively to this suggestion, although it is not known whether the typescript “Communism and Christian Socialism” (RA1 220.019220) ever appeared in print.

example of the corruption of words—so that in certain contexts (e.g. ‘People’s Democracy’ in Eastern Europe) it stands for the opposite of what is meant in the West. This might clear the way for explaining that neither meaning is the original one—and then giving an historical review of the word and the idea.

- 2) that the conclusion might be, in effect, that however faulty Western democracy is, it is in practice at least not the negation of everything we mean by the word, as is the Communist version.

Again, this advice was far more explicit than that which Russell customarily received from his editors. The proposed thrust of the new Background Book, however, would have been congenial to Russell, for he had frequently lambasted the political hypocrisy of Soviet-style democracy from the earliest days of the Cold War, such as in his essay “What Is Democracy?”, published in *The Manchester Guardian* seven years before his Background Book of the same title.⁸

Shortly after the arrangements for *What is Democracy?* had been settled, Wintle had asked Russell for a 1,250-word article using as a “topical starting-point” the forthcoming Moscow show-trial of the Jewish doctors implicated in a fabricated anti-Soviet conspiracy. “You will, of course, know best how to elaborate the theme”, he continued in his letter of 24 February 1953, “but if you feel so disposed, I would like you to take a ‘high line’ and pour as much scorn as you please upon a political, social and philosophic system which produces manifestations of such barbarity while simultaneously expecting the societies of the West to admire and imitate them”. Russell’s acceptance of this request is indicated by his customary “Ans. Yes” in the upper-left corner of Wintle’s letter of 24 February. As it turned out, Stalin’s death provided Russell with an even more dramatic point of departure for this rhetorical attack on the Soviet Union. Wintle had intended the typescript⁹ for overseas circulation only, but he told Russell in his letter of acknowledgement that “it would be a pity not to submit it to one of the more serious-minded provincial publications in the United

⁸ 4 May 1946, p. 4 (B&R C46.05).

⁹ “Stalin’s Legacy”, RA2 220.148003.

Kingdom as well" (7 April 1953). However, no record has been found of its appearance in print either in Britain or abroad. The typescript is not to be confused with a similar one used by Russell for a broadcast on the late Soviet dictator which the BBC's Central European Service supposedly decided not to air.¹⁰

Russell's last known assignment for Background Books appeared in another symposium, entitled *Why I Oppose Communism*.¹¹ Noteworthy among the other contributors were the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper and the poet Stephen Spender, the ex-Communist co-editor of *Encounter* whose apostasy had been recounted in that Cold War classic *The God That Failed* (1950). Russell was asked by Wintle "to write as an internationalist" (26 March 1954), although his contribution eventually appeared under the heading of "The Philosopher". Commissioned in March 1954, publication of the pamphlet was delayed for two years, when Russell's piece was run more or less simultaneously as "The Marxist Fraud" by the *News Chronicle*.¹² Later in the year the essay was reprinted again, as "Why I Am Not a Communist", in *Portraits from Memory* (1956).

Prior to its appearance in this collection of essays, Russell transformed some of its harsh and blanket criticism of Soviet political practice into retrospective censure of a bygone Stalinist dictatorship.¹³ Similar changes would be made on a larger scale for the reprinting of *What Is Freedom?* and *What Is Democracy?* in *Fact and Fiction*.¹⁴ Russell was prepared to soften the anti-Communist content of his Background Books as his own views changed and as a thaw in the Cold War set in later in the 1950s. He was arguably remiss, however, in failing to reveal the rather dubious publishing history of these works, although Russell himself may have regarded the involvement of the IRD as irrelevant to the writings in question since they merely reiterated long-held political opinions of his own.

¹⁰ "A New Russian Policy?", RA2 220.148004; see *Autobiography* 3: 20.

¹¹ London: Phoenix House, 1956 (B&R B117).

¹² 26 March 1956, p. 4 (B&R C56.03).

¹³ *Détente or Destruction, 1955–1957 (The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell 29)*, edited by Andrew G. Bone (London and New York, Routledge, 2005), pp. 55–6.

¹⁴ See Stephen Hayhurst, "Russell's Anti-Communist Rhetoric before and after Stalin's Death", *Russell*, n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 67–82.

Some forty Background Books were in print five years after the series started in 1951. Roughly 300,000 copies in all were in circulation in English by this date, and a number of foreign-language editions had been produced as well. The literature for export would be dispatched to British diplomatic posts, and consular and other officials were encouraged, irrespective of costs incurred, to enlist local publishers to further assist with the distribution.¹⁵ The Indian impression of *Why Communism Must Fail*,¹⁶ for example, may have been printed on such terms.

Aside from its anonymous authorship, the inaugural Background Book, *What Is Communism?*, set the tone for much of what followed. Many of the subsequent publications—including the two pamphlets of which Russell was sole author—offered condensed, laymen's guides to large or controversial questions. Among titles available when *Why I Oppose Communism* appeared in 1956 were Leonard Schapiro's *How Strong Is Communism?*, Edward Atiyah's *What Is Imperialism?*, and Robert Bruce Lockhart's *What Happened to the Czechs?*¹⁷ The literature was pitched at a mass rather than elite audience. As explained by Batchworth Press—one of the publishers of Background Books—each work was intended "to provide ordinary people, interested in what is going on in the world today, with some background information about events, institutions and ideas".¹⁸ They were also economically packaged and sold. Most Background Books ran to no more than forty pages and were for sale at a shilling or one shilling and six pence (US \$0.14 to \$0.21), although a smaller number of book-length studies retailed for five or ten times these modest sums.

The IRD also arranged for the dissemination of a few previously existing and independently created works, such as R.N. Carew-Hunt's *The Theory and Practice of Communism* and Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *1984*. But securing copyright over books in

¹⁵ See Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–1953: The Information Research Department* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 166.

¹⁶ Bombay: Democratic Research Service, 1951 (B&R B101.1b).

¹⁷ See the list of titles on the back cover of *Why I Oppose Communism*.

¹⁸ Quoted in Hayhurst, "Russell's Anti-Communist Rhetoric", 71.

print could be problematical, and it made more sense, therefore, for the IRD to act as its own commissioning editor. Sometimes the department would solicit contributions from trusted authors (like Bruce Lockhart) with Foreign Office or intelligence credentials. Whenever possible, however, they preferred to enlist authors or intellectuals whose views, like Russell's, just happened to be more or less congruent with those of the British Government.¹⁹

2. RUSSELL AND THE INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

The very foundation of the IRD in 1948 had been a reflection of the Labour Government's anxiety that recent setbacks in the Cold War—the Berlin Blockade and the Communist coup in Prague most notably—required Britain to pursue a more aggressive anti-Communist strategy. Some permanent officials at the Foreign Office wanted to turn the new department into a full-fledged instrument of political warfare, aimed at destabilizing the Communist bloc as much as shoring up domestic, allied and neutral opinion. The Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin tried to resist these pressures exerted by his departmental hard-liners, but after the Conservatives regained power in 1951 the “offensive” orientation of the IRD became rather more pronounced—a reflection in part of Prime Minister Churchill's fascination with propaganda as a tool of politics and diplomacy, together with his “well-known appetite for covert operations”.²⁰ Most routine work of the IRD, however, remained focused on the Western side of the Cold War divide.

Unlike the more conspicuous and overt approach characteristic of American propaganda, the British preferred to wage the Cold War by more discreet means. This is not to suggest that the IRD was half-hearted or genteel, merely that it tended to dwell less than did American agencies on the threat posed by a powerful and belligerent Soviet Union, and more on the defects of Communism and the manifest superiority of Western democratic institutions and ideals.²¹ The Background Books series certainly conformed with this general

¹⁹ See Defty, *op. cit.*, 165.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 182, and (more generally) 246–9.

²¹ See Philip M. Taylor, “The Projection of Britain Abroad, 1945–51”, in *British Foreign Policy, 1945–56*, edited by Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 23.

approach to propaganda of the IRD, as did its other line of approach (indeed, its main one) to people such as Russell—namely, the circulation of (presumably) factually accurate but ideologically slanted information in sub-classified reports for unattributed use by those privy to them.

It is highly likely that Russell would have been regarded as a prize asset by the IRD, whether an independent author of works such as *What Is Freedom?* and *What Is Democracy?* or a trusted recipient of the semi-confidential intelligence documents described above. By the late-1940s Russell commanded world-wide recognition and respect. Many of his shorter political writings were commissioned by or reprinted in newspapers overseas, and he also reached a wide and varied international audience from his broadcast work for the BBC's external services.

One revealing gauge of the esteem in which Russell was held by the IRD is that even routine correspondence with him was conducted by successive departmental chiefs, John Peck and John Rennie. A close confidant of and former wartime private secretary to Churchill, Peck had taken over as head of the IRD from Ralph Murray after the Conservative Party's general election victory in October 1951. Peck, in turn, was succeeded by Rennie late in 1953. Rennie held the office until 1958 and subsequently (1968–1973) served as director of MI6. Although it is not clear whether Russell knew Peck and Rennie headed the IRD, they conducted their correspondence with Russell on stationary with Foreign Office letterhead or bearing the address of the IRD's headquarters at 12 Carlton House Terrace in south-west London.

On 15 November 1951 Russell thanked Peck for sending him some documents on “Rural Life in Russia”, which he promised “to study with care”.²² Unfortunately, neither this report nor a companion investigation of “Town Life in the Soviet Union”²³ appear to be in the Russell Archives. Among the substantial holdings of typescripts, manuscripts and off-prints by other authors, however, is a cache of Foreign Office documents from the early Cold War years, containing among other things two other reports in the same

²² RAI 710.054249.

²³ Sent to Russell 14 Nov. 1951. Peck's letter 7 Aug. 1952 (RA2 910 F14b).

series of critical exposés of Soviet tyranny and backwardness: “Education in the Soviet Union” and “Religion in the Soviet Union”.²⁴ (Both sets of mimeographed documents seem to have been based mainly on the testimony of former Soviet citizens who had found refuge in the West.) On at least two separate occasions, Russell also received documents from the IRD detailing the ideology, activities and objectives of the Communist-aligned peace movement. The second of these enclosures, Peck promised, would “explain the true nature of the [World] Peace Congress to be held in Vienna in December [1952]”.²⁵

On 14 July 1952 Peck had dispatched to Russell a copy of the “Interpreter”, an obviously official study which “purposes to show the salient facts of Soviet policy during the month and to demonstrate how Soviet diplomatic activity and propaganda and the activities of the Soviet political warfare network throughout the world form a coherent whole”.²⁶ Peck also asked if Russell might be interested in receiving this briefing paper every month. (Russell accepted the offer but, rather innocently perhaps, wondered whether a subscription fee would be required.) Further correspondence from Russell, dated 15 May 1953, suggests that Peck had also sent Russell some material on the political persecution or “brainwashing” of Chinese intellectuals by the Communist regime.²⁷

In his letter to Russell of 14 July 1952, Peck had alluded to translations from Soviet sources which he had been forwarding to Russell “from time to time”. There is a considerable quantity of such material at the Russell Archives. These translated items include several polemical attacks on Russell in the Soviet press, where he was frequently pilloried in the decade after the Second World War.²⁸ On 1 September 1951, for example, Peck sent Russell the “latest bouquet from *Pravda*”, a piece entitled “The Prophecies of an Obscurantist” from the issue of 20 August 1951. Beginning in April

²⁴ See Peck 7 Aug. 1952 & 29 Dec. 1953, RA2 910 F14b & 14c.

²⁵ 20 Nov. 1952, RA2 910 F14b. See also T.S. Tull to Russell, 15 Aug. 1951, *ibid.*, F14a.

²⁶ RA1 710.054250.

²⁷ RA2 750.

²⁸ See RA2 910 F14a.

1950, Russell would also receive from the IRD every few months or so a batch of translations from Soviet journals and newspapers illustrating the relationship between science and the state behind the Iron Curtain. This was a topic of particular interest to Russell, and, as one IRD official promised, the translations would reveal “the exact nature of the Kremlin’s assault on freedom in science”.²⁹

The last batches of material on Soviet science (Russell seems to have received nothing more after early 1956) also contained translated reports of Soviet military thinking about nuclear weapons which Russell referred to anecdotally in a couple of his anti-nuclear writings.³⁰ All of these enclosures were accompanied by instructions from the IRD that recipients were “free to use the information contained in these translations, but we should be grateful if you did not refer to the Foreign Office as your source”.³¹ From the point of view of attribution the same guidelines were applied by the IRD to the intelligence reports and notes which were sent to Russell on occasion and distributed fairly widely on the same semi-confidential basis.

Although the evidence in the Russell Archives pertaining to the IRD is somewhat fragmentary, it reinforces what historical accounts have said about the department’s cultivation of such prominent public intellectuals as Russell. Sponsored book publishing became one of its “favoured methods of disseminating information as the Foreign Office believed that the public would more readily accept information which did not emanate from official sources, and that the most effective propaganda was attributable to authoritative or prominent authors”.³² The IRD obviously hoped that the reasoned anti-Communist arguments of its Background Books (not to mention the other publishing fronts used by the IRD) would reach a wide audience. But its overall strategy was perhaps better illustrated by the premium attached by the IRD to its distribution to a wide range of public figures of material such as that sent to Russell

²⁹ J.H.A. Watson to Russell, 25 April 1950, RA2 910 F14a.

³⁰ See “The Road to Peace”, *Papers* 28: 359 and “Science and Human Life”, *Papers* 29: 16.

³¹ See Peck to Russell 29 June 1952, *ibid.*, F14b.

³² Defty, *op. cit.*, 165.

by Peck and Rennie. This indirect *modus operandi* clearly reflected a Foreign Office preference (which the post-war Labour Government tried unsuccessfully to challenge) for targeting the shapers of opinion at home and abroad—journalists, academics, politicians, trade unionists, student and youth leaders—rather than appealing directly to the masses.³³

As Lynn Smith has written of these IRD briefing papers:

All of this was energetically reproduced and distributed to a great variety of recipients. These included: British Ministers, M.P.'s and trade unionists, the International Department of the Labour Party and UN delegates, British media and opinion formers including the BBC World Service, selected journalists and writers. It was also directed at the media all over the non-communist world, information officers in British Embassies of the Third World and communist countries, and the Foreign Offices of Western European countries.³⁴

By such means, the most critical accounts of post-war British propaganda have alleged, Labour politicians, leftist intellectuals and institutions such as the BBC were co-opted into a titanic ideological struggle being directed by some of the most reactionary elements in British public life.³⁵

Such interpretations perhaps over-estimate the influence of the IRD and the credulity and pliability of the journalists and others, including Russell, who were privy to the IRD's reports. According to the then head of the BBC's Eastern European Service, the IRD was regarded as "just another source of factual information" to be taken or left alone as desired.³⁶ It is difficult to conceive of him being entirely credulous of these official documents, especially since his assessments of the international situation tended to draw on a range of sources.

Yet, it seems that, on occasion, Russell's published work did draw on information supplied to him by the IRD. His critical com-

³³ See *Ibid.*, 248.

³⁴ Quoted in Defty, *op. cit.*, 6, from Smith, "Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department, 1947–1977", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 9 (1980): 67–83.

³⁵ The literature is reviewed by Defty in his introduction.

³⁶ Quoted in Defty, *op. cit.*, 6.

mentary on the Lysenko affair, for example, was based upon two pages of notes in Russell's hand taken from a mimeograph that is not present among the Foreign Office documents in the Russell Archives but is similar both in physical appearance and content to some of the other IRD material.³⁷ Interestingly, when his relationship with the IRD was petering out in the mid-1950s, Russell used translations from the Soviet armed forces journal *Red Star* to bolster an anti-nuclear case that was definitely at odds with policies pursued or approved by the British Government.³⁸ A meticulous analysis of Russell's political writing between, say, 1948 and 1955 would be necessary to determine the precise nature and extent of his use of IRD material. Nevertheless, at the very least, it is disconcerting to think that Russell felt at all comfortable in using non-attributable material to which he was privy only because of a covert propaganda agency's desire to influence (perhaps even deceive) opinion-shapers such as himself.

3. "GLOBE-TROTTERING FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE"

If Russell was conscripted, either unwittingly or (as the balance of evidence presented here suggests) knowingly, into Britain's covert Cold War propaganda campaign, he was only a small cog in a very large machine. As Andrew Defty has written in his recent study of the IRD, propaganda in the post-war era was employed on an unprecedentedly grand scale by peacetime standards and for a variety of purposes besides combatting Communism, however central that political objective was to the overall effort.

The Labour Governments of 1945–51 presided over perhaps the greatest expansion of the British Government's propaganda apparatus until the election of the Labour Government in 1997. Propaganda was used widely by the Labour Govern-

³⁷ I am grateful to Kenneth Blackwell for drawing my attention to Russell's notes, which are filed with his typescript carbon version ("Scientists in Slavery", RA1 220.018840) of the article published as "First Sign of Decay", *News Review*, London, 27, no. 11 (17 Mar. 1949) 10–11 (B&R C49.07). The anonymous mimeograph is entitled "The Conflict between Science and State in the U.S.S.R." (RA2 910 C20).

³⁸ See above note 30.

ments: to explain their policies at home and abroad; to reassure Britain's allies, most notably the USA, about Labour's socialist policies; to promote trade; to counter colonial insurgency; to promote good relations with the newly independent colonies; and to undermine Britain's enemies.³⁹

In addition to his clandestine cooperation with the IRD, Russell was also part of the public face of British propaganda during the early Cold War. The IRD was merely one of several Foreign Office branches concerned with propaganda work; other government departments engaged in similar activities—openly as well as in secret. The more benign and transparent (yet sometimes indistinguishable) counterpart of covert government propaganda operations was official publicity.

At the apex of the institutional structure for the production and dissemination of material in this category, both at home and abroad, stood the Central Office of Information (COI). Established in 1946, the COI was a successor organization of sorts to the much-derided wartime Ministry of Information.⁴⁰ The new agency lost the departmental ranking that had been enjoyed by the Ministry of Information, but it remained independent—notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of the Foreign Office to subordinate the COI's overseas role to its departmental control.

Rather than directing information policy across the board—this remained the preserve of each Cabinet-level department—the mandate of the COI was more of a coordinating one, to ensure publicity for material produced in other official circles. Additionally, an Overseas Press Services Division was responsible for keeping foreign news sources informed about government policy, for promoting balance in their coverage of British affairs, and for publicizing British accomplishments in industry, science, technology and culture. In tandem with these functions, this Division also commissioned feature articles about current events—ideally from prominent authors like Russell—and the COI regularly acquired the overseas rights to a range of articles from the British national,

³⁹ Defty, *op. cit.*, 17.

⁴⁰ See Mariel Grant, "Towards a Central Office of Information: Continuity and Change in British Government Information Policy, 1939–51", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 34 (1999): 49–67.

weekly and periodical press. The COI operated from the premise that "every British newspaper or book sold abroad, every film show, and every photograph or article published helps to determine the way in which the peoples of the world think and feel about Britain; and it is the way in which the world thinks and feels about Britain that is the basic concern of the Information Services".⁴¹ The overseas representatives of the British Council—set up by the Foreign Office in the 1930s to foster a positive image of Britain abroad—performed a complementary role by sponsoring a wide variety of "British" cultural activities all over the world.

In the fulfilment of these essentially cultural and educational objectives, Russell made a small but not insignificant contribution. A number of his writings were reissued by the COI in the manner described above, including his series of BBC talks on "Living in an Atomic Age" (reprinted in *New Hopes for a Changing World*), his 1956 radio broadcast on "The Story of Colonization", and the last of his contributions to Background Books, the essay "Why I Am Not a Communist". An article entitled "British Opinion on Hungary" was specially commissioned by the Overseas Press Services Division in response to the Soviet suppression of the anti-Communist uprising in that country in 1956. But this seems never to have been circulated, perhaps because Russell took aim not only at Soviet actions in Hungary but also those of Britain and France in Suez.⁴² If Russell's earlier attractiveness to the COI reflected the convergence of his political outlook with that of the British Government, the waves created by his Hungary piece suggest that the official mind was beginning to grasp that his views were becoming, by this time, increasingly antithetical to their own.

In addition to this miscellany of contributions to the more indirect side of Britain's Cold War propaganda efforts, Russell also worked more directly for the British Government. By his own admission, for example, he was sent to Berlin during the 1948 Blockade "by the Government ... to help to persuade the people of Berlin that it was worthwhile to resist Russian attempts to get the

⁴¹ Quoted in Taylor, "Projection of Britain Abroad", 17.

⁴² See *Papers* 29: 123–4.

Allies out of Berlin".⁴³ Reinforcing the "official" character of this mission in 1948, Russell was given a military passport and temporary standing in Britain's armed forces, allowing him, he recalled with amusement, for his "first and only time ... to parade as a military man".⁴⁴ Russell's *Autobiography* placed a similar interpretation on his visit earlier the same month (October 1948) to Norway, where "the Government sent me ... in the hope of inducing Norwegians to join an alliance against Russia".⁴⁵

More than two years previously, in June 1946, Russell had undertaken a lecture tour of Switzerland arranged by the British Council. He also visited Holland and Belgium in September and October 1947 and Sweden in May 1948, although his speaking engagements on these trips abroad do not seem to have been carried out under official auspices. The tour of the Low Countries had been sponsored by the New Commonwealth Society, a political movement which, like Russell, was dedicated to promoting international control of atomic energy—by coercive means if necessary.⁴⁶ On returning to Britain Russell was alerted by C.R.A. Rae of the Foreign Office to the "hornet's nest in Moscow" which his lectures on world government and atomic energy had stirred.⁴⁷ Enclosed with this letter were some translated copies of Soviet newspaper criticisms of Russell, including a piece from the journal *Trud* deriding him as a "Philosopher Bomb-Thrower". Russell's reply is missing from the Russell Archives but Rae's next communication acknowledged with thanks "your letter about your tour in the Low Countries".⁴⁸

⁴³ *Autobiography* 3: 19–20.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁶ Founded in 1932 by the wealthy Liberal businessman and politician David Davies (Baron Davies of Llandinam), the New Commonwealth Society had always stood for a tough-minded internationalism. Dismayed by the ambivalence towards sanctions of the League of Nations Union in the early 1930s, the rival organization patronized by Davies had campaigned for international arbitration by a tribunal whose decisions would be enforced by an International Police Force.

⁴⁷ 5 Nov. 1947, RA2 910 F14a.

⁴⁸ 19 Nov. 1947, *ibid.* Enclosed with this letter was a confidential assessment made by Britain's Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow of the latest ideological offensive launched by the high priest of Stalinist cultural policy, Andrei Zhdanov.

The correspondence is interesting because it shows that Russell was privy to Foreign Office material even before the inception of the IRD, and suggests that he already enjoyed a close and comfortable association with the department. Russell may also have been in contact with senior figures in Britain's armed forces at this time. In private correspondence he alludes to "conversations with professional strategists".⁴⁹ Among other things, such discussions may have been responsible for one of the most intriguing public speaking engagements that Russell was asked to take on during the early Cold War—namely, the annual lecture on "The Future of Mankind" which he gave to the Imperial Defence College each December from 1947 to 1952.⁵⁰ In his *Autobiography* Russell recalled how the invitations to speak here eventually "stopped coming after the lecture in which I remarked that, knowing that they believed you could not be victorious in war without the help of religion, I had read the Sermon on the Mount, but, to my surprise, could find no mention of H-bombs in it".⁵¹

In their respective biographies of Russell, Ronald Clark and Ray Monk both imply that Russell's autobiographical recollections exaggerated his role as a roving emissary for the Foreign Office in the late 1940s and early 1950s.⁵² Yet, Clark especially uses evidence that conveys a contrary impression. On 28 December 1949, Russell told his friend Irina Wragge-Morley that his impending visit to Paris (to lecture at the Sorbonne and at the Centre d'Études de Politiques Étrangères) was "for the Foreign Office". The following March, three months before embarking on tours of Australia and the United

⁴⁹ To Walter Marseille, 5 May 1948. Six years later this letter was published (see *Papers* 28: 72), adding to the controversy that dogged Russell throughout the 1950s—not to mention posthumously (see below, n. 57)—and arising from his alleged prior advocacy of preventive war.

⁵⁰ See Ronald Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell* (London: Jonathan Cape and Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), p. 523. Only the first of Russell's six annual lectures to the Imperial Defence College was published; it was reprinted subsequently in *Unpopular Essays* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), Chap. 3.

⁵¹ *Autobiography* 3: 19.

⁵² Clark, *Life of Bertrand Russell*, 503–4; Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), 304.

States, Russell told the same correspondent that he was “busy globe-trotting for the Foreign Office”.⁵³ The Russell Archives also contains letters from the Foreign Office itself, deepening the impression left by the personal correspondence quoted by Russell’s biographer Clark (and referenced to “private sources”) that Russell indeed made trips for the Foreign Office.

On 2 October 1951 Angus Malcolm of the Information Policy Department—a “purely propaganda section” of the Foreign Office according to Philip Taylor⁵⁴—thanked Russell for informing him of his intention to visit France early the following year en route to England from Germany. Malcolm had already “written to our Embassy in Paris and asked them what subjects they would like you to speak on”.⁵⁵ A couple of weeks later Malcolm again wrote Russell, asking if he would be willing to visit Brussels as well as Paris on the same trip to the continent, “particularly as the Ambassador [to Belgium] is so keen on the project”.⁵⁶ As it turned out, these lecturing plans were scuttled by Russell’s cancellation of his German trip, but the correspondence suggests that the Foreign Office regarded nothing unusual about the arrangements that were planned. Moreover, the initiative for them, on this occasion, had not come from the department but from Russell himself.

4. RUSSELL AND THE CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

This article has so far presented Russell as a public intellectual whose reputation for independence and integrity was at best tarnished by overly cozy relations with various official agencies and at worst much more seriously damaged by his participation in covert propaganda work. As seen in Part Three, however, Russell’s actions were broadly consistent with the energetic and *open* support which he extended to the anti-Communist foreign policies of the post-war Labour Governments and of the last Churchill administration in its early years.

⁵³ Clark, *Life of Bertrand Russell*, 504.

⁵⁴ “Projection of Britain Abroad”, 16.

⁵⁵ RA1 710.052346.

⁵⁶ 19 Oct. 1951, RA1 710.052347.

Recent contributions to Russell studies have debated the extent of Russell’s belligerence towards the Soviet Union during his so-called preventive war phase, when he had seemed willing, at the very least, to threaten Russia with atomic weapons to force its acceptance of a system of international governance more binding than that of the United Nations.⁵⁷ Regardless of its degree, the mere fact of this belligerence is worthy of comment, for it separated Russell from sections of the Left with whom he would have been comfortable in association at previous and subsequent points of his political life. This is not to suggest, however, that anti-Communist tendencies were alien to the democratic socialist movement in Britain (or elsewhere for that matter). The Labour Party was steeped in anti-Communism, owing in large part to the determined resistance mounted during the inter-war period by people such as Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary from 1945 to 1951) to Communist encroachment in the trade unions. But for Russell, as is well known, the formative influence on his anti-Communist political thinking was rather different: namely, the disillusioning experience of his journey to revolutionary Russia in 1920, from which the highly critical account, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, emerged later the same year. And nothing in the political development of the Soviet Union prior to the death of Stalin had caused Russell to soften the stand taken in his book.

It is not difficult, therefore, to fathom the attractiveness to Russell of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. This international movement of anti-Communist leftist intellectuals was founded in 1950; the following year Russell agreed to serve as one of its honorary chairmen, along with Benedetto Croce, Karl Jaspers, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Dewey, Jacques Maritain, and Salvador de Madariaga.⁵⁸ The

⁵⁷ See Ray Perkins, Jr., “Bertrand Russell and Preventive War”, *Russell*, n.s. 14 (winter 1994–95): 135–53.; David Blitz, “Did Russell Advocate Preventive Atomic War against the USSR?”, *Russell*, n.s. 22 (summer 2002): 5–45; and the exchange between Perkins and Blitz in *Russell*, n.s. 22 (winter 2002–03): 161–72.

⁵⁸ See the contrasting accounts of Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Post-war Europe* (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1989) and Frances S. Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: New Press, 2000), as well as reviews of these two works by, respectively, Louis Greenspan (“Liberal Conspirators”, *Rus-*

founders and sponsors of the CCF, including Russell, believed that culture no less than politics was a critical arena of Cold War conflict and that it was imperative to challenge the perceived domination of the arts and letters by Communists and fellow-travellers. This intellectual struggle was to be waged through academic conferences and seminars, writers' congresses, and literary and political journals. The institutional base of the CCF was in Paris, but a number of national affiliates were created and operated with considerable autonomy.

Both the CCF and the journals which were published under its auspices—*Encounter* in Britain, *Preuves* in France, and *Cuadernos* in Latin America—received clandestine subsidies via fake charitable foundations set up by the CIA. It is apparent, however, that Russell (and many other CCF luminaries) were genuinely unaware of their organization's sources of financial support, which were exposed in 1967.

Russell regarded the CCF as a liberal bulwark not only against Communism but also against the excesses of right-wing anti-Communism. When the organization appeared to Russell to be insufficiently vigilant in the face of this second threat, he became alienated from it and eventually resigned in 1957. By the latter date, Russell's views on the Soviet Union had undergone some modification, at least to the extent that he no longer saw any good in placing on record his fundamental objections to Soviet-style dictatorship.⁵⁹ He even exhibited on occasion a modicum of optimism about the prospects for internal reform being carried out by the post-Stalin leadership, as indicated by some revealing revisions that were introduced to the reprint in *Portraits from Memory* of "Why I Am Not a Communist". When Russell had written this essay for a Background Book in 1954 he thought that it was merely "possible that in the course of time Russia may become more liberal". Two years later he altered this passage to suggest that there were "signs" that it "will" proceed in this direction.⁶⁰

sell n.s. 10 [winter 1990–91]: 180–3) and David Blitz ("Cultural Cold War", *Russell*, n.s. 21 [winter 2001–02]: 176).

⁵⁹ "I have taken a great deal of time to sift truth from propaganda in regard to Communist countries", he had told a Mr. Beer on 1 February 1955, "and I am left with a conviction that Communist régimes are very bad. But I no longer think that much purpose is served by saying so in public" (quoted in *Papers* 29: 54).

⁶⁰ See *Papers* 29: 58.

At the same time that Russell's hitherto staunch anti-Soviet posture was beginning to soften somewhat in the mid-1950s, he was growing increasingly disturbed by the reactionary side-effects of Cold War anti-Communism on American political and intellectual life. Ever since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 (if not before) he had regarded the threats to civil liberties and academic freedom posed by the phenomenon of McCarthyism as intrinsically bad. But he also came to harbour a deeper fear—namely, that any further escalation of the Senator's brand of strident anti-Communism, would be ruinous of the (already attenuated) prospects for a stable peace. He felt that it was particularly irresponsible and reprehensible, therefore, for an ostensibly liberal organization such as the CCF to be complicit in promoting this form of anti-Communism in the highly charged atmosphere of American domestic politics.

Russell's first challenge to what he regarded as the misdirected anti-Communism of the CCF arose in 1953 after he discovered that its U.S. branch, the American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF), had smeared as pro-Communist (with classic guilt-by-association tactics) a symposium on the Bill of Rights hosted by the purportedly fellow-travelling Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. Russell asked his name to be removed from the CCF's letterhead list of honorary chairmen and was dissuaded from this course only by assurances that the fractious American affiliate had been acting independently of the parent body of which he was a sponsor. He again reacted angrily the following year, when the ACCF asked him to withdraw his endorsement of a seventy-fifth birthday tribute to Einstein that was being staged at Princeton by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.⁶¹

Two years later, in 1956, Russell drew the ire of the ACCF once more when he publicly (and polemically) protested the conviction and continuing imprisonment of Morton Sobell, a co-accused of the executed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. What especially irked critics such as Sidney Hook and Norman Thomas (both directors of the ACCF) were Russell's sweeping condemnation of criminal justice in the United States and the bolstering of this critique by reference to a book on American civil liberties by Corliss Lamont, a

⁶¹ See *Papers* 28: 179.

notorious fellow-traveller. After Russell's opening salvo in Sobell's defence provocatively compared "Nazi atrocities" with "atrocities committed by the FBI",⁶² he opened himself up—neither for the first nor the last time in his public life—to charges of anti-Americanism. Given Russell's impeccable anti-Soviet credentials, it was more difficult to smear him as pro-Communist, but after his campaign for Sobell was publicized in the *National Guardian* (a progressive New York weekly), Sidney Hook accused Russell of "being used—and effectively used—as a weapon in the Communists' political war against the United States".⁶³ The ACCF objected strenuously to the manner in which Russell had defended Morton Sobell.⁶⁴ Russell took their open letter to him as an inexcusable *ad hominem* attack and as a cue, at last, to resign the honorary chairmanship of the parent body which he had been holding with some reluctance for the past three years. This decision was deferred for almost a year as the executive of the international organization strove desperately to deter one of their "biggest attractions" from taking such a regrettable step. This characterization of Russell was made by the CIA's most highly placed operative in the CCF, the latter organization's executive director, Michael Josselson.⁶⁵

Russell's break with the Congress for Cultural Freedom is significant in two respects. First, it reveals how seriously the non-Communist left was divided over the types of anti-Communism that were desirable. The controversy had pitted Russell against liberal or social democratic intellectuals for whom he might otherwise have felt a certain affinity. As he told the American Socialist Party leader,

⁶² "The Sobell Case", *The Manchester Guardian*, 26 March 1956, p. 6 (B&R C56.04); *Papers* 29: 153.

⁶³ 18 June 1956; quoted in B. Feinberg and R. Kasrils, eds., *Bertrand Russell's America*. Vol. 2: 1945–1970 (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 86.

⁶⁴ See "Bertrand Russell Taken to Task", *The Manchester Guardian*, 6 April, p. 6.

⁶⁵ See Hugh Wilford, "'Unwitting Assets?': British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom", *Twentieth Century British History*, 11 (2000): 58. Russell's final breach with the Congress is also covered in *Papers* 29: xxxviii–xli; *Bertrand Russell's America*, 2: 78–81, 97–8; Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, 165–7; and Saunders, *Cultural Cold War*, 231–2.

Norman Thomas: "You and I are on the same side in most matters, and I have every wish to avoid magnifying our differences".⁶⁶ Where Thomas (and Sidney Hook) differed from Russell was in the enduring intensity of their anti-Communism and especially in the persistence of their determination to avoid all political contact with Communists and fellow-travellers. Russell was far from naïve about the risks of such associations but had decided by the mid-1950s that the pressing need for an ideologically diverse peace initiative outweighed the risk of such an enterprise being tarnished as pro-Soviet or captured by the Communist-aligned peace movement.⁶⁷ Second, and of more direct relevance to the present article, Russell maintained a vigorous independence throughout his troubled association with the CCF. Indeed, his relations with the organization grew progressively more combative. While his future in the CCF remained in doubt in the fall of 1956—on account of his still unresolved dispute with the American Committee—Russell took umbrage at the failure of the international Congress to denounce the Franco-British-Israeli attack on Egypt with the same vigour that it had censured Soviet military intervention in Hungary.⁶⁸

Clearly Russell was not following a script that the CCF's paymasters in the CIA (and IRD⁶⁹) may have expected him act to out.

⁶⁶ "The State of U.S. Civil Liberties", *The New Leader*, 40, no. 7 (18 Feb. 1957): 16–18 (B&R C57.04); *Papers* 29: 175. Before long, as it turned out, the passionate commitment of both Thomas and Russell to the cause of nuclear disarmament had revived a "basis for cooperation ... which transcended their sharp disagreement about the impact of the Cold War on American civil liberties" (James Duram, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Bertrand Russell, Norman Thomas, and the Cold War", *Russell*, nos. 25–8 [1977]: 66).

⁶⁷ See the present author's "Russell and the Communist-Aligned Peace Movement in the mid-1950s", *Russell*, n.s. 21 (summer 2001): 31–57.

⁶⁸ See *Papers* 29: xxxvii–xxxviii.

⁶⁹ For example, the British CCF publication *Encounter* received a small and secret stipend from the IRD, which also bought up copies of the monthly magazine for overseas distribution (see Defty, *op. cit.*, 205). Other ties existed between the IRD and the British Society for Cultural Freedom (the CCF's British affiliate). Two of its executive officers, secretary Michael Goodwin and national organizer John Clews, had connections to the Foreign Office or IRD, while a third, chairman Malcolm Muggeridge, helped set up a covert subsidy to the British organization from MI6 (see Wilford, "British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom", 49, 56–7).

Like other British intellectuals in the Congress, Russell evidently “favoured a definition of cultural freedom that was more expansive than, and therefore, sometimes in conflict with, that of the CCF”. Far from accepting the guiding hand of the CIA, their behaviour “often confounded and frustrated the intentions of their secretive American patrons”.⁷⁰ Russell’s truculence was a source of acute consternation to the parent body in Paris which, as indicated already, regarded Russell as an invaluable patron—especially of its work in Europe and Asia. Michael Josselson might privately dismiss Russell as an “old fool”, but he was nevertheless furious with the CCF’s American affiliate for provoking the dispute which led to the latter’s relinquishment of his honorary chairmanship.⁷¹ Favouring a more subtle approach to the cultural Cold War than the liberal anti-Communists in the American Committee, the CIA’s Josselson believed that it was imperative for the CCF to find room for those who wished to criticize the United States.

But perhaps Russell’s breach with the Congress could not have been averted. His departure was, in a sense, a telling reflection of a sea change in outlook on the Cold War that had taken place since he agreed to sponsor the organization some six years previously (around the same time that he embarked upon the publishing venture with Background Books). The most succinct appraisal of this transformation has been supplied by Russell himself:

I was brought around to being more favourable to Communism by the death of Stalin in 1953 and by the Bikini test in 1954; and I came gradually to attribute, more and more, the danger of nuclear war to the West, to the United States of America, and less to Russia. This change was supported by developments inside the United States, such as McCarthyism and the restriction of civil liberties.⁷²

When Russell tendered his resignation from the CCF for a final time in January 1957, he had already embarked on an anti-nuclear

⁷⁰ Wilford, “British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom”, 58, 42.

⁷¹ See Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, 166.

⁷² *Autobiography* 3: 20.

quest which led first to the inauguration of the Pugwash movement and then to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The heroic years of public protest which followed are of course integral to Russell’s biography. But they may also have served to divert attention from some murkier activities engaged in by Russell the Cold War propagandist. It is to be hoped that the present article has added some clarity to this earlier phase of Russell’s political life simply by laying out some of the pertinent evidence in a systematic fashion. For a still clearer picture to emerge, however, it will be necessary to scrutinize more closely all of Russell’s Cold War associations and contacts, perhaps from other as yet untapped sources of archival information.

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REVIEW ESSAY

RUSSELL STUDIES IN GERMANY TODAY

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Review of Guido Imaguire, *Russells Frühphilosophie: Propositionen, Realismus und die sprachontologische Wende*, Georg Olms Verlag: Hildesheim-Zürich-NY, 2001, Reihe "Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie", vol. 58, 227 + viii pages, € 58.

1. OPENING: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF RUSSELL STUDIES IN GERMANY

German philosophers were among the first to creatively assimilate Bertrand Russell's philosophy. In 1908 Kurt Grelling and Leonard Nelson, two pupils of David Hilbert and Edmund Husserl in Göttingen, published the paper "Remarks on the Ideas of Paradox by Russell and Burali-Forti" in which the so-called Grelling paradox was first formulated. (Grelling and Nelson 1908) Hilbert made many efforts to establish a chair in exact scientific philosophy based on the model of the program for exact philosophy put forward by Russell.¹ Eventually he succeeded, and the newly founded chair was occupied by his protégé and friend Nelson in 1919. Soon after he received the chair, however, Nelson became obsessed with political activity against the rise of the right radicalism in Germany which absorbed all his powers – this to such an extent that he died of physical exhaustion in 1927 at the age of 45. (Torbov 2005)

Grelling was estranged by the political strivings of his friend Nelson and soon moved to Berlin to work with Hans Reichenbach. Among other things, in 1929 he published the well-informed and insightful paper "Realism and Logic: An Investigation of Russell's Metaphysics" in *The Monist* and in 1936 "The Logical Paradoxes" in *Mind*. At the same time, Grelling translated Russell's *The Analysis of Mind* into German in 1927, *The ABC of Relativity* in

¹ On Russell's influence on Hilbert in the years 1910-14 see Mancosu 2003.

1928, *The Analysis of Matter* in 1929, and *An Outline of Philosophy* in 1930. It is highly probable that Grelling's intensive work on Russell acquainted the other members of the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy, Reichenbach in particular, with Russell's work and with philosophical realism in general.²

Another example of the creative reception of Russell's philosophy in Germany during this period is that of Rudolf Carnap. We know from his "Autobiography" that Russell's influence on him was formative. Indeed, Carnap's *Der Raum* (1922) and *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928) were, pace alternative claims by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson, decisively inspired by Russell's ideas.³ Unfortunately, this tradition of productive reception of Russell's philosophy in Germany was soon ended. Carnap moved in 1926 to Vienna and then to Prague, only to immigrate to the United States in 1936. After Hitler came to power in 1933, Grelling immigrated to Belgium but was subsequently captured by the Nazis and sent to Auschwitz where he died in September 1942.

The situation in Germany today with regard to Russell studies is different from that of the early years of the twentieth century. It is true that for decades now, serious efforts have been made to revive analytic philosophy in the country. Unfortunately, Russell is not among the authors who are seriously investigated; he is used mainly for didactical purposes as propaedeutic. In line with these developments, many of Russell's books have been translated into German. (So well developed were Russell studies in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s in Germany that many Russell translations today simply remix translations of these years.⁴) Some of them, especially *The Problems of Philosophy*, are regularly discussed in undergraduate seminars of philosophy departments. This, however, scarcely promotes a profound knowledge of his philosophy.

² Evidence for Reichenbach's substantial knowledge of Russell in these years is provided by his early paper (Reichenbach 1967), first published in German as "Bertrand Russell", *Vossische Zeitung*, December 2, 1928.

³ Richardson and Friedman claim, in contrast, that Carnap was primarily influenced by the German neo-Kantians of the period. (cf. Richardson 1998, Friedman 2000) For a critique on their thesis see Milkov 2004.

⁴ See Russell 2002, 2004.

This state of Russell studies in Germany is reflected in the following two facts: (1) There are several publishing houses in the country which issue series on "Past Masters" in philosophy: Campus Verlag (Frankfurt), Junius Verlag (Hamburg), Beck Verlag (Munich), Herder Verlag (Freiburg), and Fischer Verlag (Frankfurt), among others. But there is no book on Russell in any of these series. The only introductory book on Russell in German today is the Ernst Sandvoss volume (Sandvoss 1980) published by Rowolt Verlag that appeared in the "Bildmonographien" series in which biographical data (with pictures), at the cost of philosophical analysis, have prominence.

(2) Indeed, there are some good investigations conducted by German authors on early analytic philosophers. These early analytic philosophers are, however, all German-speaking authors. Such investigations are Wolfgang Carl's book on Frege (Carl 1994) and Joachim Schulte's books on Wittgenstein (Schulte 1992, 1993), which were both translated into English. Thomas Mormann's book on Carnap (Mormann 2000) is also of good quality. Unfortunately, there is no book on Russell of a similar standing. The books on Russell published in Germany in the last decades are typically dissertations which demonstrate that the post-graduate student has reached a certain level of knowledge of parts of Russell's philosophy (e.g., Bornet 1991,⁵ Rheinwald 1988, and Tatievskaya 2005). They are anything but mature achievements in Russell studies. Even the newly published book *One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox*, edited by Imaguire's dissertation supervisor, Godehard Link (Link 2004), does not disprove this claim. There are few German authors in it who discuss Russell's paradox in the context of his philosophy.

2. MY OVERALL IMPRESSION OF IMAGUIRE'S BOOK

Guido Imaguire's recent book, *Russell's Early Philosophy: Propositions, Realism, and the Linguistic-Ontological Turn*, is a typical example in this respect. It is the work of a young scholar who is familiar with Quine, David Lewis, and other recent analytic philosophers. He apparently sees his task as that of putting the philosophy

⁵ Gérard Bornet's dissertation was actually written and published not in Germany but in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.

of Russell in the scheme of analytic philosophy as he understands it. The knowledgeable student of Russell, however, can easily see that the author is entering the realm of Russell studies for the first time. Imaguire's endeavor is apparently to outline and deliver a unifying picture of Russell's philosophy. As we will see in the pages to come, he succeeds in this, though only at the cost of a series of oversimplifications.

The author claims, in particular, that the whole philosophy of Russell is divided into two parts: before and after July 1905 and the composition of "On Denoting". His philosophy before "On Denoting" is called by Imaguire "Russell's early philosophy", and his philosophy after this paper is called "Russell's later philosophy". According to Imaguire, Russell's early philosophy was radically realistic, and his later philosophy moderately realistic. This moderateness is claimed to be a consequence of the use of Occam's razor which does not tolerate the assumption of superfluous existences. (p. 188)

Few readers will welcome these claims. (1) The mainstream interpretation of Russell, with which I agree, is that his philosophy can be divided most instructively in four periods: early, till his realistic turn and his acquaintance with the works of Peano (1898/1900); early middle, until he met Wittgenstein (November 1912); mature (1913-1919); later, which started with his embrace of neutral monism in 1919. (2) Russell started using the term Occam's razor in print only in 1914. (Russell 1914, p. 112)

The book profits from the newly published manuscripts in Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of Russell's *Collected Papers*; it is actually the first book in German in which this new material is used. Furthermore, the book is strongly influenced by Peter Hylton's 1990 *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, and is also influenced by Paul Hager's 1994 book, *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy*.

Russell's Early Philosophy has four chapters: Chapter 1, Propositional Realism – Chapter 2, Theory of Relations and Pluralism – Chapter 3, Foundations of Mathematics – Chapter 4, Critical Realism: Russell's Linguistic-Ontological Turn. My impression is that Chapters 1 and 4 are organically connected and together state the main thesis of the book, while the other two chapters only deliver additional information about what the author calls "Russell's early philosophy". This point determines the order of my exposition of

Imaguire's book. After some general comments, I shall review Chapters 1 and 4 of the book, after which I shall go to Chapters 2 and 3.

3. IMAGUIRE'S GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY

According to Imaguire, the principal metaphysical *position* of Russell's philosophy was that of realism. Russell started with a Platonic realism, and transformed it in 1905 into a kind of critical, or reductionist realism. (Only a few will find this claim of Imaguire's convincing. Russell's 1912 *The Problems of Philosophy* was still informed with a kind of Platonic realism.) This was a turn from naïve and extreme realism to a critical form of realism. (p. 216)

The author further claims that the most important *concept* in Russell's philosophy is that of a proposition. (p. 3) Russell changed the term "judgment" to "proposition" in his 1899 paper "The Classification of Relations" (Russell 1899) after his and Moore's realistic turn of the summer of 1898. It is not by accident that in the same paper Russell introduced the logic of relations: the two conceptions are intrinsically connected.

Russell's *method* in philosophy is, according to Imaguire, that of analysis of propositions. (p. 2) This method constitutes the unity of Russell's philosophy. (p. 3) This reflects the influence on Imaguire of Paul Hager's book, in which Hager asserts that the unity of Russell's philosophy results from the method of analysis (as such) and the role of relations in this analysis. There is not only unity in Russell's philosophy, there are many changes as well. But a single method runs through all of these changes, and this is the method of analysis of propositions. The claim also holds true for all other aspects of his philosophy. Russell's realism, his pluralism, and as well, his philosophy of mathematics are all run through with a certain kind of analysis of propositions. (p. 217)

4. CHAPTER 1: PROPOSITIONAL REALISM

The task of Chapter 1 is to show that the central concept of Russell's investigation is that of a proposition. For this purpose Imaguire first reviews Moore's and Bradley's notions of a proposition. Russell introduced propositions into his ontology, following these two authors, in the summer of 1898 with his turn towards realism.

My impression is that Imaguire primarily treats Russell's propositions like those of the Austrian realists, in particular Meinong. Indeed, to Imaguire, Russell's propositions are Meinong's possible objects of judgments (p. 38) or his objective complex objects of judgments (p. 120); Imaguire compares them expressly with the concept of "states of affairs" of Reinach, Stumpf and Marty. (p. 34) This explains why Russell's 1904 paper "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", and its critical 1905 pendant "On Denoting", occupy such a prominent place in Imaguire's book.

Imaguire argues that Russell, in his early pre-1905 theory of propositions, accepts the view that there are entities which exist and other entities which subsist; objects in space and time exist, while abstract entities, such as propositions, subsist. Only contradictory objects, such as round squares, do not exist. Russell's attitude towards contradictory objects distinguishes him from Meinong in 1904: Meinong embraces even them. Thus, Imaguire notes, existence and subsistence are primitive concepts for Russell. The objects in the world obtain their metaphysical status (as non-existing, existing, or subsisting) through their relation to these two primitive concepts. Further, a fact is an existing proposition. This means that it is not the facts (the world) which determine which propositions are true or false, but the other way round: the true propositions determine what exists in the world. Imaguire notes further that Russell's identification of the sum of all true propositions with existence, also accepted in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, paves the way for the ontology of possible worlds. (p. 58) It remains unclear why Wittgenstein's logical atomism was closer to the Russell of 1898-1903 than to Russell after 1905 (and especially to Russell from 1912-1918).

Unfortunately, Imaguire fails to mention in his discussion of Russell's propositions that these disappear from his writings with the introduction of the multiple relation theory of judgment around 1910. Another criticism of Imaguire's treatment of Russell's theory of propositions from 1898-1904 is that in the *Principles*, e.g. in §§ 43 and 65, Russell often speaks as if propositions consist of words. It is thus far from clear that his propositions are only ontological (non-linguistic) entities. It is also frustrating that the author is silent about the "Russellian propositions" introduced into recent discussion of propositional attitudes by David Kaplan as a way of explaining his notion of "direct reference".

5. CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL REALISM:
RUSSELL'S LINGUISTIC-ONTOLOGICAL TURN

This chapter treats the most important turn in Russell's philosophy, according to Imaguire – that of 1905. In "On Denoting", Russell allegedly introduced the principle of ontological reduction, also called by Russell "Occam's razor".⁶ The idea of logical construction plays a central role in the principle of reduction: indeed, only constructed entities can be reduced. (p. 201) That interpretation of Imaguire is certainly incorrect. Russell started to speak of "logical constructions" only in *Principia Mathematica*.

Imaguire's interpretation of "On Denoting" is made wholly in (Dummett's interpretation of) Fregean terms. On the differences between Russell and Frege, so widely discussed in the literature, Imaguire says nothing. Here is his story:

Until 1905 Russell believed that language is a "transparent medium" which gives us an unproblematic access to ontology. That is why he claimed that "the study of grammar ... is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers." (Russell 1903, § 46) Russell jettisoned this belief in "On Denoting" when he argued that there are defects in ordinary language. In particular, he showed that the form of a sentence hides and disguises the form of the proposition. That is why philosophers must concentrate their efforts on criticizing language. To be more specific, language must be purified in the direction of an ideal language. This was a real linguistic turn!

In connection with these ideas of Russell, Imaguire sees the theory of descriptions as the beginning of a new critical realism. It critically views assumptions of existence which are suggested by the form of our particular language. (p. 194) This disproves naïve realism and establishes a much more consistent and moderate realism. This is due to the fact that "On Denoting" eliminates Meinong's presupposition that there is a real object corresponding to every meaningful expression. (p. 185)

This may be a fair appraisal of Russell, but calling Russell's post-1905 realism a "critical" realism is at least a bad choice of

⁶ For criticism of this view, see § 2, (2) above.

words, since the expression has been used at least since 1916 to refer to American realists such as Roy Wood Sellars, George Santayana, and A. O. Lovejoy, who had little in common with Russell. The expression "critical realism" has also commonly been opposed to "direct realism",⁷ and as long as Russell had a theory of acquaintance, even after 1905, he is probably more of a direct realist than a critical realist in this latter sense of the term.

In the last pages of his book, Imaguire claims that this interpretation also explains Russell's philosophy from 1912-1918. The main change in his philosophy of these years was that Russell now eliminated the physical objects he accepted in *The Problems of Philosophy* and replaced them with logical constructions. According to Imaguire, all these developments were a consequence of ideas articulated in "On Denoting". Finally, Imaguire takes the main claim of the theory of descriptions to be that denoting phrases never have meaning in themselves. (p. 183) With this claim, Russell accepted the context principle.

I have three criticisms of this interpretation of "On Denoting":

(1) I do not believe that we can explain the changes in Russell's philosophy of 1912-1918 in terms of his ideas expressed in "On Denoting". There were other considerations (other tasks) in play now, some of them suggested by Wittgenstein.

(2) Something similar to the context principle was already accepted in the *Principles* with the theory of denoting phrases which Russell elaborated after he became acquainted with the works of Peano. (There, he claimed that the terms in denoting phrases do not have meaning in isolation; their meaning is contextually determined.⁸)

(3) Russell was always uncertain about the correctness of the context principle. So his logical atomism, as we find it in "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", *Our Knowledge of the External World*, and in some papers of *Mysticism and Knowledge*, accepts as atoms some individuals (particulars and universals). Only in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* did he accept facts as logical

⁷ This sense of "critical realism" that was opposed to "direct realism" was widely used in German philosophy of the late nineteenth century as referring, e.g., to the realisms of Eduard von Hartmann, Alois Riehl, and Wilhelm Wundt.

⁸ Cf. Milkov 2003, p. 52.

atoms. All this is evidence for the fact that Russell did not become an ardent supporter of the context principle in 1905.⁹ Rather, his position on this point was ambiguous.

6. CHAPTER 2: THEORY OF RELATIONS AND PLURALISM

As already noted, Chapters 2 and 3 of Imaguire's book are not a part of the main story which it tells. Here is the content of Chapter 2 in short:

Russell used his thesis of irreducibility and hence thesis of the reality of relations in order to disprove idealism and to justify his propositional realism. (p. 61) In the *Foundations of Geometry*, he claims that the objects of cognition are complex: in order to know them, we must be able to differentiate them, and in order to differentiate them, they must be external (divergent) to one another. This is the principle of differentiation, which is based on the form of externality of individuals (i.e., "terms"). There are at least two forms of externality, space and time, which are most important for humans: indeed, two time-points can be different only when they are mutually external; in contrast, two events can happen together in time. This is our most fundamental a priori knowledge about space and so is the first axiom of geometry.

Russell claims further that points are the main category of geometry; geometry is understood by him as investigating relations between points. (pp. 67 f.) This conception identifies geometrical and physical points. In his early philosophy of time¹⁰ Russell criticizes people's inclination to accept the view that time is a property, whereas space is a relation: This belief in the asymmetry between space and time is a prejudice. In fact, space and time have the same *relational* structure. (p. 70) At the end of this chapter Imaguire emphasizes that even before his anti-idealistic turn, Russell was convinced of the importance of relations and believed that they cannot be reduced to properties.

7. CHAPTER 3: FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS

Chapter 3 of Imaguire's book discusses Russell's philosophy of mathematics in relation to his realism and his method of propositional analysis. Imaguire's (neo-Fregean) thesis is that "the analysis

⁹ See *ibid.* pp.81 f.

¹⁰ See Milkov 2005.

of propositions is the methodological basis of Russell's philosophy of mathematics" as well (p. 120). Indeed, Russell's fundamental concepts of logic and mathematics originated and were founded in connection with the analysis of propositions.

Imaguire substantiates his interpretation of Russell's philosophy of mathematics with the fact that in the *Principles* Russell defines mathematics as the set of all absolute general propositions with the form of implication " p implies q ". Further, the essence of the proposition is the propositional function with a variable. Only when all constants except logical ones are replaced with a variable can a proposition reach the realm of mathematics. This means that only the introduction of variables, and the method of generalizing mathematics, which Russell accepted after he became acquainted with the work of Peano, made possible the transition from the theory of propositions to the theory of mathematical propositions.

In a generalization typical of him, Imaguire claims that "English analytic philosophy initially came into being (and similarly in Germany for Frege) within the framework of the procedure of analysis of mathematical propositions." (p. 121) In truth, Russell introduced the concept of "analytic philosophy" only in March 1911 (Russell 1911). Three years later, in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, it was characterized as being apart from other sciences and mathematics, a discipline which typically starts from complex and vague data, which are analyzed to simple but most general items. In contrast, science starts from what is simple, and its results are complex. (see Russell 1914, pp. 240 ff.) This description of analytic philosophy surely has little to do with the procedure of analysis of mathematical propositions.

8. SOME QUESTIONS OF STYLE

The style of the book is worse than the book itself. Above all, there is a problem with the system of reference; in particular, Imaguire uses two different systems of reference. In some cases, he lists sources cited in the book in a six-page Bibliography printed at the end of the book. When a work from this list is cited, Imaguire puts the name of the author and the year of publication together with the page number of the cited material in brackets immediately after the citation. The problem is that he uses another method of reference along with this one, which places the references in footnotes.

This confusion of two methods of reference in one book is annoying enough. Unfortunately, it is not the whole story. More than this, the author often mixes the two methods of reference into one. Then, he often cites sources according to the first method, but does not list the source in the bibliography. For example, on p. 198 he refers to a passage from "Smith 1985: 385" despite the fact that there is no "Smith" in the bibliography. The same failure is repeated on the next page, where he speaks of "Makin (1995)" despite the fact that there is no "Makin" in the bibliography. Only on p. 203 do we find the source "Janet F. Smith *The Russell-Meinong Debate* (1985)" in a footnote, though without the specification of where it was published. (In fact, it was published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 45, pp. 305-350.) Even worse, in some places the author simply gives false bibliographical information. For example, Gideon Makin is referred to on p. 195 n. 143 as "Gideon Making" and his paper "Making Sense of On Denoting" is claimed to have been published in 1985 when in fact, it was published in 1995 in vol. 105 of *Synthese* on pages 383-412.

There are also problems with hyphenation: In several places, the first vowel is divided from the rest of the word, e.g., "E-xistenz" (pp. 34, 206). That kind of hyphenation is not acceptable in any European language. At other times, the words are not hyphenated at all (for example, "*Propositionssubjekten* [subjects of propositions]" on p. 188), so that the words in the line above are separated with enormous spaces between themselves. And with quotation marks, a passage is often started with German quotation marks only to end with English quotation marks. (see, e.g., p. 147)

The index, shorter than two pages, is also strikingly poor. It combines, unusual for German standards, the index of names and of concepts into one. I have already mentioned that Imaguire often appeals to the authority of Peter Hylton, and occasionally also to that of Paul Hager. Unfortunately, we do not find these two names in the index nor the names of approximately two-thirds of the other authors referred to in the book. The concepts are even more badly indexed than the proper names.

9. EPILOGUE

In my comments above, I made a number of critical remarks about Imaguire's book. In this last section of my review, I want also to emphasize that the author's exposition of Russell's thought is for long stretches clear and persuasive. Especially well written are parts of Chapter 2, an extract of which was recently published in *Grazer Philosophische Studien*. (Imaguire 2001) Students of Russell's philosophy will find these fragments of Imaguire's narrative interesting, even stimulating. Imaguire's overall picture of Russell, however, has little to do with the real Russell.

My guess is that Imaguire's failure to give a true picture of the whole of "Russell's early philosophy" is due only to the fact that his theme is too far flung for him at this stage. However, I can not preclude that after further study of Russell, he will deliver a more precise treatment of a part of Russell's philosophy. His momentary failure shows only that Russell studies is a rather difficult field of investigation, in which academic excellence is only possible after many years of continuing efforts.

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OPINION

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND THE RUSSELL-EINSTEIN MANIFESTO

RAYMOND PERKINS, JR.

Bertrand Russell, the great 20th century philosopher and peace activist, has been gone for 35 years. Russell wrote widely and made many contributions to our understanding of the world, but he was especially concerned with the human problem of war and peace in the nuclear age. His internationalist message—today as relevant as ever—is one which we ignore at our peril.

The great evil of his time, no less than today, was what he called “fanatical dogmatism”. Its main manifestations were in politics and religion. Its causes were rooted in a certain narrowness of intellect and emotion which he believed the study of philosophy could remedy by the cultivation of impersonal thinking and generalized sympathy, and by the practice of rational skepticism—suspending judgment where lack of evidence precluded knowledge. His philosophy was an antidote to dogmatic “certainty”, with its inevitable intolerance, cruelty and violence, and it was an affirmation of the importance of reason in pursuit of world peace.

This July marks the 50th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. With the growing intensity of the Cold War and the advent of the H-bomb, Russell came to believe that the continued existence of the human race was in doubt. With the support of Albert Einstein (who died soon after he signed the Manifesto) and other eminent scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain, an international plea was issued to renounce war and nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy. The essence of the Manifesto, fashioned after Russell’s 1954 BBC Christmas talk, “Man’s Peril”, was as powerful as it was simple: “We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death.” The Manifesto stopped short of advocating the remedy Russell and Einstein favored—a system of world governance with a monopoly on weapons of war

and the democratic machinery to make, interpret and enforce world law. But it did call on the international scientific community to work to publicize the perils of nuclear annihilation. The Manifesto led directly to the international Pugwash Conferences first convened in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in 1957. The Pugwash Movement was a prime mover in nuclear arms control, helping to establish Nuclear Free Zones, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) which ended atomic testing in the atmosphere, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), now ratified by 189 nations, which has done much to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In recognition of its work, the Pugwash Conference received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.

Russell died in 1970, when the SALT process was just getting underway, and never saw the great progress in arms control and the end of the cold war. But he did live to see the advent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by which the nuclear weapons states share nuclear technology with the non-nuclear states who forswear nuclear weapons. And the Treaty requires that the nuclear weapons states too must eventually abolish their nuclear weapons: they must seek “... the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and ... nuclear disarmament, and ... a treaty on general and complete disarmament...” And most heartening for Russell must have been the Treaty’s insistence that the disarmament be “under strict and effective international control”—a phrase suggestive of the world authority that Russell and Einstein had long felt necessary for world peace.

What would Russell say about the state of the world were he alive today? Certainly he would have been amazed and greatly uplifted by the end of the Cold War. But he would see the world as having squandered the opportunity of the last decade to abolish nuclear weapons, what Jonathan Schell has poignantly called our “gift of time”. No doubt, he would rightly assign much of the blame for this political waste to the unilateralist policies of the sole superpower whose leadership could have fostered a truly international turn in world history and put us on the way to the “new Paradise” that the Manifesto envisages. Indeed, the world since 9/11 has in some ways slipped back into the perils of nuclear madness stimulated by the Pentagon’s new doctrines of usable nukes and preemptive war. And the unsolved problem of nuclear war has been compounded by the problem of nuclear terrorism. This is a development that Russell might have predicted for a lawless world where

“might makes right”—a world ultimately incapable of providing either justice or security. If he was right, the solution for our nuclear nightmares will require a new way of thinking based on open minds and open hearts—and a genuine commitment to the idea of world peace based on world law. This is the legacy and lesson of Russell and the Manifesto for the 21st century.

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DISCUSSION

COMMENTS ON LIEBER'S “RUSSELL AND WITTGENSTEIN” *

CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK

I very much enjoyed Justin Lieber's account of his philosophical education at the University of Chicago in the 1950s and the differences between Russell and Wittgenstein in his essay “Russell and Wittgenstein: A Study in Civility and Arrogance”,¹ but he makes two remarks in passing which I believe should be corrected. These corrections do not affect his main interpretative claim about Russell's and Wittgenstein's personalities.

First, Lieber claims that the result of the Wittgenstein-Waismann collaboration, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, “was in galley proofs in the late 1930s when Wittgenstein finally put his foot (or jackboot) down, using his considerable influence on Waismann and the press to stop publication” (16). However, one of the foremost experts on the Waismann-Wittgenstein relationship, Gordon Baker, has recently claimed “The German invasion of Holland scuppered the publication of the German text of the book. For unknown reasons the scheme for publishing the English translation was aborted.”² There is no evidence that I am aware of that Wittgenstein's misgivings about Waismann's manuscript were the reason for its failure to appear as planned.

Second, Lieber repeats a common misunderstanding of Russell's reactions to Wittgenstein's criticism of the *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript in the spring of 1913, stating that it “affected Russell so deeply that he felt, for many years, that he was incapable of serious technical philosophical work (the manuscript itself

* Received January 17, 2005.

¹ *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* no. 122 (May 2004): 11-22

² L. Wittgenstein & F. Waismann, *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle*, G. Baker (ed.). New York: Routledge, 2003, p. xxi.

was not published until years after Russell's death). Russell turned to writing on political and social topics and fiction" (18). This view of how Russell reacted can most likely be traced to Russell's infamous 1916 letter to Ottoline Morrell, reprinted in his *Autobiography*, where he laments that "I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater."³ Even the hyperbole of this letter should not lead us to ignore the fact that Russell wrote some of his most interesting and influential material in the period between June 1913 and the composition of this letter. These include the lectures published as *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy* and the papers "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics", "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" and "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter".⁴ While perhaps it is possible that Russell did not view this as "fundamental work in philosophy", we should certainly classify it as "serious technical philosophical work".

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³ B. Russell, *Autobiography*. New York: Routledge, 1998, 282, quoted at J. Slater (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, volume 8. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pp. xix-xx. See also N. Griffin (ed.), *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years, 1914-1970*. New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 114.

⁴ B. Russell, *Our Knowledge*. Chicago: Open Court, 1914. The papers mentioned have been reprinted in J. Slater (ed.), *op. cit.*

REPLY TO PINCOCK *

JUSTIN LEIBER

I am delighted and encouraged that Christopher Pincock agrees with the main thrust of my essay, "Russell and Wittgenstein: A Study in Civility and Arrogance." Still, respecting the withdrawal of Waismann's book from Oxford Press in the late 1930s, I think Pincock's comments may stand in need of correction or, perhaps, amplification. On the issue of Wittgenstein's negative influence on Russell, however, there is certainly some justice in his rejection of what may be my overreliance on Russell's almost certainly exaggerated claim that due to Wittgenstein's criticisms he "could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy." I probably should have emphasized that Russell *felt* that he was incapable of serious technical philosophical work and not that he was *in fact* incapable of it, although he still came to devote much of his time to political and social matters rather than to technical philosophy after his encounter with Wittgenstein. Still, as usual, there is more to be said.

Pincock quotes Gordon Baker's comment that a German language version of Waismann's book was "scuppered" by the German invasion of Holland, while "For unknown reasons the scheme for publishing the English version was aborted [it eventually appeared, much emended, as *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*,¹ in 1965]." Pincock adds that he knows of no evidence that Wittgenstein's "misgivings" caused this failure to publish. However, we do have the following reports about the publication of the book.

First, Rom Harre, editor of *Principles*, writes in its preface:

The original version of this book was written and prepared for publication before the Second World War, but was withdrawn by Waismann on the eve of publication. Thereafter he worked over and over the galleys adding to and developing the material, and compiling hundreds of sheets of inserts. (p. xii)

* Received January 23, 2005.

¹ F. Waismann, *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, Rom Harre (ed.). London: Macmillan, 1965.

And Marie McGinn writes in her review of the Baker-edited *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circles*:

Waismann eventually conceded that the whole [collaborative] scheme was unworkable [because at each meeting, Wittgenstein would passionately demolish ideas he had expressed at the previous meeting], and he and Schlick persuaded Wittgenstein to abandon the idea of co-authorship and authorize the two of them to write the text. After Schlick's murder in June 1936, Waismann felt he owed it to his former mentor to see the project through to completion, although it seems clear that Wittgenstein became increasingly hostile to Waismann's use of his ideas. The hostility is not altogether impossible to understand. The thoughts that Wittgenstein expresses in 'Dictation for Schlick' are ones that form the basis of many of the themes of the *Philosophical Investigations*, and it must have been extremely difficult to watch someone else give a presentation of them in which they can still be recognized but in which they have also been completely transformed. Gordon Baker concedes that Waismann is almost certainly one of the people Wittgenstein has in mind when he speaks, in the Preface to the *Investigations*, of his ideas being "variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down". In the circumstances, it may seem an act of exceptional generosity by Baker – prompted in part, perhaps, by the poignant story of Waismann's life – to suggest that we hear Wittgenstein's voice in Waismann's text.²

So we *do* seem indeed to know the reason why the book, which was already in galley proofs and so already, expensively, set in type, was withdrawn: Waismann withdrew it. We also have some evidence as to why Waismann might have withdrawn it. Moreover, Waismann continued vigorous philosophical publication until his death in 1959, while at the same time working away at the galleys but making no attempt to publish it, which he easily could have done. In the 1970s, I was told by a scholar in a position to be quite sure about it that Wittgenstein demanded that Waismann withdraw the book from publication. Although this individual did not purport to say this in confidence, I am unable now to get permission to identify him.

² Marie McGinn, "Review of L. Wittgenstein and F. Waismann, *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle*," *Notre Dame Phil. Rev.*, 2004.06.06.

Russell's case is more complex. Respecting the *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*,³ its editor, Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, comments:

It is strange that Russell, who seldom retreated from recounting his own failures or faults, should have not reported the fact that he had written a large part of a major work on the theory of knowledge which had been intended as his first important philosophical work after *Principia Mathematica* and which he was forced to abandon under circumstances which constituted an "event of first-rate importance in my life." In fact, the existence of the partial book manuscript was not known until the Bertrand Russell papers were catalogued in 1967, prior to their sale, and, at that time Russell did not respond to inquiries about it (*ibid.*, viii).

Eames also tells us that Russell "leapt over" the theory of knowledge in the immediately following work that Pincock cites. Respecting "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," which Russell delivered as a lecture prior to publication in 1914, Eames quotes Russell to Ottoline Morrell:

It worries me, because I can't get interested, or feel that it matters ...It will bring me 20 but it will be a miserable pot boiler (p. 55)

Throughout this period, Eames suggests, Russell's pressing need to earn what money he can forces him to put together the lectures that become *Our Knowledge of the External World*, and the three essays that Pincock cites, which she suggests derive from the lectures, and thus also from his financial circumstances. Furthermore, it is not absurd to suppose that Russell regarded all this work to derive from the thinking he had done before Wittgenstein's criticisms of 1913; *Our Knowledge of the External World* is commonly thought to have been what Russell intended to write as a part of the 1913 manuscript, had he finished it. In any case, with the exception of "The Relation of Sense Data to Physics," he may well have thought of this work as popularization.

³ Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript*, E. R. Eames (ed.) in collaboration with K. Blackwell, London: Routledge, 1984.

Still, in keeping with his civility and his modesty, Russell had, even before 1913, made it clear to a number of people that he supposed Wittgenstein to be his successor, who would take the next important steps in philosophy. It is surely in keeping with the Socratic tradition that the man who was the greatest philosopher of the Twentieth Century should have, again in his civility and modesty, under-estimated his own achievements and capacities.

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END MATTER

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

Right up until the last moment, whether the Pacific APA would actually occur in San Francisco was an open question. Rumors of striking hotel workers flew back and forth, causing many to ask whether the APA could in good conscience break faith with the workers of the world (who have nothing to lose but their jobs) or whether it perhaps ought to meet in San Diego.

I hear from a colleague that the conference did come off, but you can't blame it on me.

When I departed New York for the conference the weather was clear and fine and I was excited. Big hills, blue sky, and the sun setting over the ocean were in my future. Though I would drive 7 hours to Erie, PA and fly to San Francisco in the morning I was carefree: work was over, the Easter weekend was imminent, and life was good. My optimism remained untouched by the snow and rain that worsened as traffic crept towards Pennsylvania's Pocono mountains; and after driving several hours along I-80 my principle concern was simply to find a place to stop. I was to get my wish.

Around 6 pm our painful stop-and-go slowed to a stop. Like well-trained dogs that both sit and stay, we were immovable. An hour passed, two, then three: I ate raisins, read a book, cleaned out my car in the center of a ring of diesels, back-lit by towering klieg lights. Outside the circle was snow and ice and black night.

By midnight a tiny amount of shuffling forward and sliding managed to open a gap next to me through which I could squeeze, perpendicular to my by now good friends. Having done so, I turned my car onto the breakdown lane and limped off in a snit. I passed alongside an endless queue of trucks and cars, learning that I-80 was "closed", that I should abandon all hope. But I was defiant. My options being what they were (slim), I took a side-road, driving in righteous wrath the road and into a ditch, where I stuck, blinkers blinking, like a candle in a birthday cake.

[Fade to black]

On the road again around 1:00 am, I crept ever so cleverly and stubbornly along an unfamiliar road in the wake of a number of

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Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process.
Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.

colossal plows. Turns out they were going my way, since I was eventually brought past the mountains and back to I-80.

Even out of the mountains the scene was apocalyptic. Everywhere cars lay strewn: belly up on the meridian, on the shoulder, snow-covered and abandoned, or fallen to a terrifying doom in the depths beyond the guardrails. Like Cerebus guarding Hell's gate, a police car blocked the entrance to the interstate. Perhaps it too was stranded. In any event, I slipped by it undeterred. Conceding that I had missed my flight – it was 3:30 am, the airport was still 6 hours away, and I was exhausted – I found a motel. There I slept, rose, and rushed to the highway by 7:00 am, driving to the Erie airport in hopes of a later flight only to discover that no seats were to be had on any plane going anywhere. Ah, Easter: symbol of the Resurrection, of the spirit traveling from death to life, no doubt by plane.

I wasn't the only casualty of the BRS session. One speaker dropped out early; fortunately, Bob Riemenschneider was able to step in to replace him. Jane Duran, another speaker, became ill and missed the session altogether. A similar fate must have hit the audience, who, according to Sandra Lapointe, the third speaker, was also missing from the session.—ROSALIND CAREY

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| Library Expenses | 94.37 |
| PayPal Fees | 31.03 |

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| TOTAL EXPENSES | 156.59 |
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 - 10/13 George Campbell McDade: *The Prospects of Industrial
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 - 11/10 G. Wildenberg: Bertrand Russell's Short Story
"The Theologian's Nightmare"
 - 12/08 Phil Ebersole: Bertrand Russell's
Essay "The Essence of Religion"

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


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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL
SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Number 127 / August 2005



WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Number 127 / August 2005

WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

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Cover: Bertrand Russell lecturing at UCLA, 1939.

MIND

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IN THIS ISSUE

THE HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY MOVEMENT exploded onto the philosophic scene in 1990 with the publication of Peter Hylton's study *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Though the movement had existed at least a decade before that, it was then that it reached critical mass. A flood of works in the subject quickly followed Hylton's 1990 book, and history of analytic philosophy emerged as a prominent part of contemporary philosophy. One problem with the early work in this new field was that it did not often ask what analytic philosophy itself was, but assumed that this was already well known. As a result, these works frequently ended up uncritically fleshing out old stories about the history and nature of analytic philosophy with new details, rather than revising our pictures of what analytic philosophy is and was. However, this shortcoming of much of the new history soon became apparent, and toward the end of the 90s, historians of analytic philosophy increasingly began asking the question: What is analytic philosophy? Today there are a respectable number of studies on just this question and interest in the subject is still growing.

THE PRESTON CHALLENGE: In this issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, AARON PRESTON surveys the recent historical work on the nature of analytic philosophy and draws the controversial but plausible conclusion that there is not now, nor has there ever been any such school, movement, or tradition of thought as analytic philosophy, and that the idea that any such philosophy ever existed is an illusion. Call this "The Preston Challenge". If you think there was one particular kind of philosophy that was analytic philosophy, Aaron Preston would like you to please tell him what it was, preferably defining the entity in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. He says it can't be done.

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE, we review MICHAEL BEANEY's study of philosophical analysis. Beaney is writing a lengthy and ambitious survey of the various ideas of philosophical analysis that have existed from Plato to Quine and beyond. A first report of his study exists as a long entry by him on "Analysis" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and a book by him on the subject is near completion.

While Beaney's *Stanford* article on analysis surveys the idea from Plato to the present, it focuses on analysis as it was conceived by 20th century analytic philosophy, and so has attracted much attention among historians of analytic philosophy. Beaney's work is one of the most ambitious attempts in the field to date to say what analysis is. In it, he describes the various types of philosophical analysis that have existed throughout the history of philosophy using descriptions of his own design of these different types of philosophical analysis. According to our review, sometimes his descriptions work and sometimes they don't.

ONCE AGAIN, RAY PERKINS SELECTS AND INTRODUCES a letter to the editor by Russell. This issue's letter was written to the *New York Times* 6 weeks before the 1955 announcement of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. Though unpublished at the time, the letter has recently been published in Russell's *Collected Papers*.¹ In the letter, Russell reaffirms his commitment not just to the abolition of nuclear weapons but more broadly to the abolition of war.

In Society News, TIM MADIGAN shares his memories of PAUL EDWARDS, recently deceased honorary member of the Bertrand Russell Society and editor of the 1967 Macmillan *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, which is one of the monuments of 20th c. philosophy. Also in Society News, PETER STONE reviews WARREN ALLEN SMITH's new book *Gossip from Across the Pond*. And rounding out the *Quarterly*, this issue's installment of the Traveler's Diary reports on the BRS session at the last Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

¹ CPBR Vol. 28, *Man's Peril*, ed. Andrew Bone, Routledge 2003, p. 289.

SOCIETY NEWS

THE 32ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY convened May 13-15 at MCMASTER UNIVERSITY, as it has in 2001, 1990, 1983, 1981, and 1978. This year's meeting, hosted by Kenneth Blackwell and Nicholas Griffin, overlapped with the conference 'Russell v Meinong: 100 Years after *On Denoting*', which was organized by Griffin and Dale Jacquette to celebrate the centenary of Russell's landmark essay 'On Denoting'. The two conferences attracted an interesting mix of Russellians and Meinongians, 63 people in all. As always, the talks were excellent, the company enjoyable, and the conversation stimulating.

McMaster University, home of the BERTRAND RUSSELL ARCHIVES and BERTRAND RUSSELL RESEARCH CENTRE, and epicenter of Bertrand Russell studies, takes up a substantial portion of real estate on the southwest corner of Hamilton. Located in the vicinity of Niagara Falls, Hamilton is easy to reach from Toronto by driving alongside shimmering Lake Ontario on the QEW. But within Hamilton, streets become willful, seemingly intent on turning you back downtown, away from McMaster. Once arrived, however, there is always much to do—parking, dithering, checking in and registering, meeting others, and, especially, nosing about the Russell Archives. Later, a crowd of Russellians enjoyed a buffet of lasagna and listened to a recording of the July 9 1955 Russell-Einstein Peace Manifesto press conference. Ken Blackwell, Andy Bone and David Blitz also engaged in a panel discussion, *The Russell/Einstein Peace Manifesto: 50th Anniversary Reflections*.

Both the BRS AM and the OD conferences turned out to be located in the vast basement of a complex of buildings near the library and student center. In some ways the venue was ideal, with large and small classrooms, a big room for gathering between talks for snacks and coffee. But the rooms might as well have been in a maze, a fact adding much to the disorientation and mass confusion of latecomers arriving minutes before curtain call. Meanwhile, the appearance of new blood—the Meinongians!—added a frisson of excitement. What strange, pale breed was this, come to share space with us Russellians? What would the day hold?

If titles of talks are any indication of intellectual sensibilities, compared to the Meinongians, who fixed their minds' eyes chastely on *the* and *a*, Russellians are intellectually wanton, ogling any sub-

ject that comes along. This was apparent on the first morning. Chad Trainer began the day with “Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish and Short: Russell’s View of Life Without World-Government”, a talk in which he compared Thomas Hobbes’ views on national governments with Russell’s views on world governments. Chad sees Russell adopting Hobbesian views on world government, despite Russell’s disapproval of Hobbes’ views on government.

With the discovery that Ed Boedeker’s scheduled discussion of Logical Platonism and the Theory of Types had been cancelled, Cara Rice took the stand. Speaking on “Who Stole the Future?”, Cara discussed the allegations that Aldous Huxley’s novel *Brave New World* is based on the penultimate chapters of Russell’s earlier philosophical work *The Scientific Outlook*. Throughout his life Russell claimed that Huxley borrowed heavily from *The Scientific Outlook*; Cara, who carefully scrutinized his claim, came down on Russell’s side, along the way giving us insight into Russell’s views on science.

Andrew Bone, of the Bertrand Russell Research Center, delivered the final talk before lunch. In “What Russell Got Wrong in the 1930s”, he discussed Russell’s pacifism leading up to World War II in the 1930s, suggesting that Russell’s acceptance of the need to stand up to Germany militarily was reluctant and slow in coming.

Lunch break meant work for Board members: deciding the location of next year’s meeting (Iowa City) and the like: readers may consult the meeting minutes at the back of this issue for further details of the meeting. After lunch, BRS President Alan Schwerin led a master class in a debate on Russell’s essay “On Vagueness”, asking whether objects and not merely our knowledge of them can be vague. The debate was animated in its inability to agree as to what Russell thought was or wasn’t vague. Howard Blair followed with “Russell on the Structure of Spaces (and Times)”. A mathematician at Syracuse University, Blaire explained in lay terms how Russell constructed concepts such as number, continuity, space, and time from structures of relations, while demonstrating some problems with Russell’s views; it was a pleasure to have a mathematician share his point of view with us, as he did during his own talk and in later discussions.

When Andrew Lugg addressed the Society with a talk on “Russell as a Precursor of Quine, Quine as a Follower of Russell”,

he emphasized the similarities between the philosophies of W.O. Quine and Russell; he maintains that it makes more sense to view Quine as the last Russellian rather than as the last Logical Empiricist. Bernard Linsky followed with a description of his current research at the Russell Archives into the second edition of Whitehead and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica*, suggesting, among other things, that Russell merely experimented with the Wittgenstein-Ramsey views he is commonly thought to have embraced there.

As the day progressed a mysterious television crew appeared, and began to interview Chad and others—about *j’ne sais quoi!* The afternoon saw a gradual ebbing of shyness, an impulse to mingle, and ties began to be forged between the ‘Others’ and us. The evening commenced, as custom demands, by imbibing thimbles of Red Hackle and chattering over supper, this time with several of the cerebral Meinongians as guests. Over dessert Tim Madigan entertained us with “What a Character – Bertrand Russell in Fiction.”

On Sunday, Michael Potter began the session with a talk on “Impulse and Desire in Russell’s Emotivism”, in which he examined the emotivism in Russell’s 1916 *Principles of Social Reconstruction*. David Goldman, psychiatrist and BRS board member, then shared his discipline’s perspective on Russell in ‘A Psychiatrist Looks at *The Conquest of Happiness*’. Following this, a panel consisting of Tim Madigan, Bob Riemenschneider, and Peter Stone came together to discuss “Harriet Ward’s *A Man of Small Importance*”. Harriet Ward, it will be remembered, is the daughter of Dora Russell and Barry Griffin—Griffin is the “man of small importance” referred to in the title of the book. In the book, Ward discusses the relations between Dora Russell, Bertrand Russell, and Griffin. A review of the discussion will be published in a future issue of the *Quarterly*.

Concluding the conference with a bang, Stephen Heathorn, a historian at McMaster University, spoke on ‘The Eugenic Discourse in Russell’s *Marriage and Morals*’. Heathorn stated that his talk would show Russell’s thinking on eugenics up to the 1930 *Marriage and Morals*, but it delivered even more than was promised, giving us, in fact, a fairly comprehensive survey of the state of eugenic thought, along with Russell’s place in, it up to 1930. It was a delightful history lesson and a delightful note on which to end the conference. All in all, the weekend was a pleasant one indeed

and made a strong case for combining BRS annual meetings with those of other groups in the future.

OUR FRIENDS AT *MIND*, the premier British journal of analytic philosophy, report that this October they are celebrating the centenary of Russell's landmark article "On Denoting", which they call "the most famous paper in analytical philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century", with a special centenary issue of *Mind*. Their October 2005 Centenary Issue of *Mind* is edited by Stephen Neale and contains articles by Ray Buchanan and Gary Ostertag ('Has the Problem of Incompleteness Rested on a Mistake?'), David Kaplan ('Russell on Denoting'), Richard L. Cartwright ('Remarks on Propositional Functions'), David Kaplan, Saul Kripke (Russell's Notion of Scope and the Hydra Problem), Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley ('Plural Descriptions and Many-valued Functions'), Nathan Salmon ('On Designating'), Stephen Schiffer ('Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions'), and Zoltán Gendler Szabó ('The Loss of Uniqueness'). To order, visit www.mind.oxfordjournals.org

DO TELL! Warren Allen Smith has a collection of essays out—*Gossip from Across the Pond*. (chelCpress, P.O. Box 30196, New York, NY 10011, chelCpress@nyc.rr.com). Peter Stone sends us this report of it:

Who says philosophers can't enjoy gossip? That, in a nutshell, is the message of *Gossip from Across the Pond*, by longtime BRS member Warren Allen Smith. *Gossip from Across the Pond* collects a decade's worth of Warren's regular column from the British magazine *Gay and Lesbian Humanist*. The articles included cover a wide variety of topics, but all relate to two eternal subjects of gossip—who's gay and who doesn't believe in God. The reader encounters the "gay mafia" (p. 79), gay penguins (pp. 102, 106), Elton John checking into hotels under the name "Sir Colin Chihuahua" (p. 19), as well as plenty of humanist philosophy. Some is serious, as when Gore Vidal states, "I'm really interested now in trying to destroy monotheism in the United States. That is the source of all of the problems" (p. 8). Some is less so, as when mocking the idea that "the Good Lord works in mysterious ways" (pp. 42-43). There's even the occasional reference to philosophy more traditionally conceived, although always spun in Warren's inimical way. One involves Gore Vidal, Paul Newman,

Nietzsche, and a horny army chaplain (p. 8). And what discussion of philosophy (gossipy or otherwise) would be complete without at least one reference to Russell? Warren tells of taking a house tour in which he met renowned architect Philip Johnson. "Johnson," he writes, "asked me my occupation, and I replied that at the moment I was teaching Bertrand Russell's *Why I Am Not a Christian*.... He knew Russell's work well, so I asked if he was a naturalist. He said something to the effect that the word had many meanings but that he was no super-naturalist" (p. 121). It's always good to know how successful Russell is as an ice-breaker during house tours. All in all, this little book is an entertaining and refreshing journey into topics of interest to philosophers from an angle often pursued though seldom admitted.

TIM MADIGAN REMEMBERS PAUL EDWARDS (1923-2004): A member of the editorial board of *Free Inquiry* magazine and the International Academy of Humanism, Paul Edwards was born in Vienna, Austria. A gifted student, he was admitted to the prestigious Akademische Gymnasium. But after the Nazi annexation of Austria his family sent him to stay with friends in Scotland. He later went to Melbourne, Australia, where he studied philosophy at the University of Melbourne and was influenced by the analytic tradition that held sway there. After the war he came to Columbia University, where he completed a doctorate in philosophy. He was to spend the rest of his life in New York City, teaching at such institutions as New York University, the New School for Social Research, and Brooklyn College.

Edwards is best known for editing the monumental *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, which originally appeared in 1967 and has never since been out of print. It remains the essential reference work for the field of philosophy. Using his editorial prerogative, Edwards made sure that there were plentiful entries on atheism, materialism, and critiques of God's existence, and he himself wrote the long entry on his own philosophical hero, Bertrand Russell. In 1959, Edwards edited a collection of Russell's previously scattered writings dealing with religion, titled *Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays*, which became a seminal work in the promotion of unbelief.

Those who knew Edwards will always remember his erudition and his wicked sense of humor. An admirer of Voltaire and Russell for their great wit, Edwards had a special fondness for the life and

works of David Hume, the man he considered to be the best exemplar of a learned individual who lived life to the fullest and who remained to the day of his death a cheerful nonbeliever.

Shortly before his death, Edwards published a collection of essays entitled *Heidegger's Confusions*, dedicated to demolishing the legacy of the man whom Edwards considered to have done the greatest damage to the field of philosophy in the twentieth century. He particularly abhorred Heidegger's confusing writings on the nature of death and his cryptic comment that, "Only a God can save us now." For Edwards, such an expression was beneath contempt.

Edwards also wrote a biting critique of reincarnation, *Reincarnation: A Critical Examination*. The volume he co-edited with Arthur Pap, *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, was one of the most influential textbooks ever published in the field, and contained copious selections from such unbelievers as Paul Rée, John Stuart Mill, Clarence Darrow, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, Ernest Nagel, and A. J. Ayer, as well as Edwards' own insightful introductions and annotations. Never one to hide his own unbelief, Edwards often commented that his two main goals were to demolish the influence of Heidegger and keep alive the memory of Wilhelm Reich, the much-reviled psychoanalyst whose critiques of religion Edwards felt remained valid. Edwards final book, *God and the Philosophers*, a summation of the views of all the major Western philosophers on the subject of the deity, will be published posthumously.

I was privileged to get to know Paul as a person. For many years no visit of mine to New York City was complete without stopping at Paul's huge apartment on Broadway and 72nd Street. He would regale me with stories about his teaching career, his various battles with his nemesis Sidney Hook, and the adventures he had in editing *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Given Paul's own biting wit, it's not surprising that he so admired Voltaire and Russell. He also had a great fondness for Benjamin Franklin, whose own wit is often unappreciated. Shortly before his death I told him about a television program devoted to Franklin—I hope that he was able to view it before his untimely demise. Paul was one of the last living links to the world of the Vienna Circle, and I miss him greatly.

FEATURE

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT WORK IN THE HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY*

AARON PRESTON

0. Introduction

Though the genre has existed since the middle of the twentieth century, reflection on analytic philosophy's history and nature has come into its own as a field of inquiry only in the last fifteen years. In this essay, I aim, first, to survey some of the main ways in which analytic philosophy has been represented in historical work concerning it, and second, to discuss the implications of certain inconsistencies in these representations. Specifically, I will argue that (1) historical work on analytic philosophy has undergone an evolution that can be parsed roughly into three main phases, (2) work in the first phase helped to solidify a received view of analytic philosophy which, though erroneous, was crucial to the movement's success, (3) work in the second and third phases have a shared tendency to define analytic philosophy in ways that fail to do justice to the facts surrounding the rise of analytic philosophy, especially as concerns the historical significance of the erroneous received view, and (4) all of this points to the conclusion that analytic philosophy is something of an illusion.

1. *The 3-Stage Evolution of Historical Work on Analytic Philosophy*

On my view, historical work on analytic philosophy falls roughly into three categories, which I prefer to characterize as three evolutionary stages of its development.¹ The first stage consists of contemporaneous first-hand accounts of analytic philosophy in its early

* This essay is based on a talk entitled "Current Work on the History and Nature of Analytic Philosophy", given at a joint session of the Bertrand Russell Society and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, APA-Central Division Conference, Chicago, April 28, 2005.

¹ Some works may occur out of sequence and others may not fit precisely into a category but be transitional stages with characteristics of several stages. These are exceptions, however; the general trend of development is well represented by this three stage schema.

and middle stages (approximately 1900-1950), and near-contemporaneous, memoir-like accounts of the same. Gilbert Ryle, himself an important contributor to this category, once observed that "history begins only when memory's dust has settled" (Ryle 1963, 1). The defining characteristic of work in this category is that it came into being while memory's dust was still loose in the air: the "analytic philosophy" of which its authors speak is, for them, either a living reality or at least one retained in living memory; the observations are largely first-hand even if retrospective, as opposed to current work which reconstructs the early history of analytic philosophy on the basis of written records.

Given its memoir-like status, we may call work in this category "proto-history". Proto-historical works on analytic philosophy include J.O. Urmson's 1956 *Philosophical Analysis*, G.J. Warnock's 1958 *English Philosophy Since 1900*, and the 1963 collection *The Revolution in Philosophy*, which includes essays by such analytic luminaries as A. J. Ayer, P. F. Strawson, and Gilbert Ryle.²

One notable feature of work in this proto-historical stage is the tendency of its authors—especially those writing from within the analytic tradition—to act as if the "essence" of analytic philosophy was relatively easy to pick out. They seem to take it for granted that analytic philosophy originated around the turn of the twentieth century in a radical break with philosophy in the great tradition, and that this revolution in philosophy was founded primarily on a novel method—the analysis of language—and the novel metaphilosophical view it inspired, namely, that philosophers should conduct their business by analyzing language because analyzing language is the only business that philosophy can legitimately claim as its own. The tendency among proto-historical authors is to treat this metaphilosophical view as the central doctrine of analytic philosophy. They take

² One can also include in this category Nagel 1936a-b, Pap 1949, scattered reflections made in prefaces or introductions to works not otherwise historiographical (see, for example, the introduction to each volume of Ryle 1971), and critical observations made by opponents of analytic philosophy (such as Collingwood 1933, 1939, 1940, Gellner 1959, and Mundle 1970). Though not intended as history, all of these give us snapshots of analytic philosophy at various stages of development, and thus provide data for history in the same way that other proto-historical works do.

it for granted that analytic philosophy's other characteristic features, such as its anti-historical and anti-metaphysical tendencies, all derive from its core belief that the right way to do philosophy had been discovered, and that it was the analysis of language. Finally, they take it for granted that the main figures responsible for the revolution were, first, Moore and Russell (and Frege, insofar as Russell appropriated his techniques in mathematical logic), and, later, Wittgenstein.

Works about analytic philosophy written during this early period were guided largely by this received view. It is true that they frequently mention the fact that there were differences among analytic philosophers, and they note the confusion this sometimes caused for people (usually characterized as "outsiders") trying to understand the movement. However, in the usual case, these differences are quickly dismissed as inconsequential in light of the deeper unity to be found in the analysts' common acceptance of the analysis of language as the sole legitimate, or at least the most important, mode of philosophical activity.

For example, Arthur Pap claimed that, though there were significant differences among analytic philosophers, "the unanimous practice of the analytic method as a powerful instrument of criticism tends to blur these differences..." (Pap 1949, ix). What was this unanimously-practiced analytic method? Pap preferred to call it 'logical analysis', but it is clear that he had in mind the analysis of language, broadly construed:

in general, all the typically philosophical questions of the form 'what is the nature of *X*' can be interpreted as questions of logical analysis, of the form 'what is the meaning of the word '*X*' or of any synonym thereof,' or 'what is the meaning of sentences containing the word '*X*'. (Pap 1949, vii).

Thus, for Pap, analytic philosophers were united in their practice of the analytic method understood as the analysis of language.

Similarly, though Urmson notes that "the analytic practice had no clearly defined dogmatic background at all" concerning the objects of philosophical analysis, he goes on to say that analytic philosophers

were united at least in the view that analysis was at least one of the most important tasks of the philosopher; and by analysis, they meant something which, whatever precise description of it they chose, at least involved the attempt to rewrite in different and in

some way more appropriate terms those statements which they found philosophically puzzling. (Urmson 1956, vii)

By emphasizing its linguistic aspects while simultaneously diminishing the significance of any theoretical disagreements among analytic philosophers that might have undermined the linguistic interpretation of philosophical analysis, Urmson's description reveals the centrality of that interpretation for the mid-century conception of analytic philosophy.

This pattern of emphasis and diminution is even clearer in a similar statement from Peter Strawson's 1963 essay "Construction and Analysis". Strawson was aware that there was considerable divergence of opinion over just what the objects of philosophical analyses were, even noting that this seemed to have an effect on the kind of enterprise a philosopher is engaged in—if they are sentences or statements, then philosophy is like grammar or linguistics, if they are thoughts or beliefs, then philosophy is like psychology. Nonetheless, Strawson affirms that the unity of analytic philosophy is grounded in the unanimous practice of the analysis of language:

It does not matter much ... [what we say the objects of analysis are], ... Maybe it is best to say, as Moore always said, that the objects of analysis were propositions. This answer, whatever its shortcomings, emphasizes, without over-emphasizing, *the linguistic nature of the enterprise, the preoccupation with meaning*. For, however we describe the objects of analysis, particular analyses ... always looked much the same. A sentence, representative of a class of sentences belonging to the same topic, was supposed to be elucidated by the framing of another sentence. (Strawson 1963, 98; my emphasis)

Again we see an insistence upon the view that philosophical analysis is the analysis of language; any *theoretical* differences that might have suggested otherwise are shrugged off as unimportant relative to overwhelming similarity in the linguistic aspects of the *practice* of analysis.

In sum, then, what we see coming out of the proto-historical stage of historical work on analytic philosophy is a record of what was then, and what by and large has continued to be, the received view of analytic philosophy. On this received view, analytic philosophy is a school of philosophy that originated in a revolutionary break with philosophy-in-the-great-tradition around the turn of the twentieth century. The break was fueled by the perception that the correct method of philosophical inquiry had finally been discover-

ed, and that it was the analysis of language (hereafter, I shall call this view *the linguistic thesis*).

The second half of the twentieth-century saw astonishing changes in the analytic world, changes that would ultimately make it impossible for the received view to persist. In the 1960s and 70s, analytic philosophy's linguistic character began to fall away, and metaphysics reemerged as a legitimate enterprise. In the 1970s and 80s, analytic philosophy's anti-historical attitude began to loosen up, and space was made within the social scope of the movement for people to do more purely historical work on the history of philosophy (cf. Schneewind (ed.) 2004). By the early 1990s, this new historical approach was adopted by philosophers interested in applying it to the history of analytic philosophy itself.

Thus emerged a second stage in the historiography of analytic philosophy, which I call "new wave" history. New wave history is exemplified by such figures as Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Ray Monk, Peter Hylton, and Michael Beaney, among others. The title "new wave" signifies not only the use of the new historical approach, but also the fact that the results of their studies frequently challenge the received view of the proto-historical period, which persists today in a somewhat altered form, expanded so as to accommodate the developments within analytic philosophy during the latter half of the twentieth century—it is *our* received view (cf. Preston 2004, 2005).

In my estimation, the most important finding of new wave scholarship is that *no* view traditionally connected with analytic philosophy was actually shared by all and only canonical analysts—not even the linguistic thesis, which, as we have seen, seemed absolutely central to the analytic self-image in the proto-historical period.³ This lack of a common view does not result merely or even primarily from the fact that more recent analytic philosophers have abandoned the views of earlier analytic philosophers, so that, as Richard Rorty has observed, "most of those who call themselves 'analytic philosophers' would now reject the epithet 'linguistic philosophers' and would not describe themselves as 'applying linguistic methods'" (Rorty 1992, 374 n. 9). Rather, the deeper problem,

³Cf. Hacker 1998, 4-14; Monk 1997; Hylton 1996, 1998; Beaney 2003.

which the new wave scholars have rooted out, is that the traditional defining doctrines of analytic philosophy never achieved universal acceptance even among core, canonical analysts in the early and middle periods of the movement.

By reading the main works of canonical analytic figures in light of each one's broader corpus and their respective intellectual and social contexts, the new wavers have discovered what some of the proto-historians already knew: there were deep differences among the central movers and shakers in early analytic philosophy over issues so fundamental as what philosophical analysis was, and what the objects of analysis were. At least one canonical analyst, G.E. Moore, did not conceive of the objects of philosophical analysis as linguistic at all.⁴ Others did—such as Wittgenstein (in both his early and late phases), the Logical Positivists, and the Oxford 'ordinary language' philosophers—but they had different conceptions of what it meant to be a linguistic entity, what language was, how it functioned (i.e., how it *meant*, *referred*, etc.), and what the significance of all this might be for philosophy-at-large.⁵

Though this has the status of newly acquired knowledge for many of the new wavers and their generation, those in the proto-historical period were not unaware of these differences; as we have seen, they acknowledged them quite explicitly. The crucial difference is that, whereas the proto-historians saw these differences as trivial, at least some of the new wavers have taken them to be significant enough to undermine the received view and to send them searching for new ways of conceptualizing analytic philosophy. I will have more to say about this shortly, but we must first turn to

⁴ For example, Ray Monk has argued that Russell's "linguistic turn" in logic and mathematics (around 1912, at the hands of Wittgenstein) did not lead him to adopt a linguistic metaphilosophy; rather "the lesson he took from this is not that philosophers should now seek to analyze sentences, but rather that logic did not have, after all, the philosophical significance he had earlier attached to it" (Monk 1996, 56).

⁵ See Moore's rejection of the linguistic interpretation of his own work in Moore 1942, 660 ff. It is noteworthy that this comes several years before Pap's 1949 claims about the unity of analytic philosophy. In light of Moore's protestations, it seems that it should have been impossible to say that Moorean analysis was *the analysis of language*; and yet, this is exactly what was asserted repeatedly by Pap and other proto-historians of analytic philosophy.

the third stage of development in historical writing about analytic philosophy.

We may characterize work of the third stage or type as "analytic history" for several reasons. First, it tends to be written by philosophers who work mainly in what are now called "core analytic" areas—philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology—"hard-core" analytic philosophers we might call them, or to borrow John Ongley's clever term, "high church" analytic philosophers. As one might expect from people who have their understanding of analytic philosophy as well as their general intellectual habits formed in these contexts, they exemplify a mentality and a method very different from the new wavers. In fact, it is much closer to what was standard in analytic circles prior to the historical movement of the 1970s. At that time, if the history of philosophy was studied at all, it was studied in the form of rational reconstructions of the views of historical figures, usually taken out of context and anachronistically assimilated to current interests and approaches. Thus, a second reason to call this "analytic history" is that it can be characterized as an application of the traditional analytic approach to the history of philosophy—the one against which the historical movement rebelled—to the history of analytic philosophy itself.

What is most characteristic of analytic history is a tendency to work within the parameters of the received view, in some cases despite the fact that it has been severely shaken by the findings of new wave history. An early, paradigmatic case of analytic history is Michael Dummett's *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (Dummett 1993). The influence of the received view can be discerned in his choice to define analytic philosophy in terms of a metaphilosophical view involving the analysis of language:

What distinguishes analytic philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be obtained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so obtained (Dummett 1993, 4 f.).

Or, as he also puts it, the "fundamental axiom of analytical philosophy [is] that the only route to the analysis of thought goes through the analysis of language" (Dummett 1993, 128).

Dummett's book was written after the historical movement but largely before the new wavers arrived on the scene. When they did, they quickly made Dummett's definition their whipping-boy. For

example, Ray Monk has argued that, on Dummett's characterization, even Bertrand Russell fails to qualify as an analytic philosopher (Monk 1997). Insofar as Russell is widely considered to be a patriarch of analytic philosophy, Monk's argument amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of Dummett's definition. A similar argument could be made putting G. E. Moore in the place of Russell. Beyond this, Dummett's interpretation of Frege has been challenged (Hacker 1997, 52 f.; cf. Baker & Hacker 1983, 1984, 1987, 1989), so that perhaps even Frege fails to meet the criteria Dummett purports to draw from Frege's own work. Given the utter untenability of Dummett's definition in light of the historical and textual facts, where, we may wonder, did he get the idea for it? The only reasonable answer, it seems to me, is that he was guided by the received view.

A similar influence is discernable in what is arguably the best and most important example of analytic history to date: Scott Soames' monumental *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* (Soames 2003). Unlike Dummett, Soames had the advantage of writing after new wave history had begun to make a noticeable mark.⁶ Consistent with new wave findings, Soames eschews a doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy, instead characterizing it as a "trail of influence" beginning with Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein (Soames 2003a, xii f.). But this cannot *really* be Soames' conception of analytic philosophy, for it cannot justify the principled selectivity Soames exhibits in tracing what he presents as the central storyline of analytic philosophy's development. Trails of influence can easily be traced beyond the canonical domain of analytic philosophy, whether we understand that in historical or thematic terms. For instance, Frege and Peano influenced Russell in ways that helped him make significant strides toward *Principia Mathematica*. And yet, neither of them is included as a key player in Soames' history—Frege is merely mentioned several times, and Peano not at all. Either these limitations are arbitrary, or Soames' "trail of influence" is circumscribed by something more substantial,

⁶ Both Soames' indices and his treatment of canonical early figures like Russell and Wittgenstein suggest that he is largely unaware of new wave history (cf. Kremer 2005). Still, "ideas are in the air", and Soames does exhibit a much greater degree of caution than Dummett about offering defining doctrines for analytic philosophy.

by a *different* conception of analytic philosophy according to which something other than influence holds it together and sets its boundaries. And here, again, I suggest that the best candidate is the received view, for Soames focuses on just the figures and exactly the issues *it* designates as being central to the rise and development of analytic philosophy.

Indeed, Soames comes close to acknowledging the received view in at least one place. By neglecting Frege, Soames is aware that he is leaving "an undeniable gap in the story" of analytic philosophy (Soames 2004b, 462). However, he excuses this on the ground that most of Frege's work, which was done in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, "falls outside our official period" (Soames 2004b, 461). Given the scope of his history, it is clear that Soames' official period begins around the turn of the twentieth century, with the work of G.E. Moore—exactly as the received view has it.

2. Current Definitions of Analytic Philosophy

So much, then, for the evolution of historical work on analytic philosophy. What has come of it? Despite the flourishing of work in this genre, little light has been shed on analytic philosophy's true nature, or on the historical and intellectual factors most responsible for its advent and quickly-gained ascendancy in certain circles of academic philosophy. In fact, much current work in this genre is driving us further away from achieving this kind of understanding. This is because the inadequacy of traditional definitions of analytic philosophy, brought to light by the new wavers, has driven philosophical historians of all stripes to suggest a host of new definitions which diverge in significant ways from the received view. These definitions differ not only in respect of the particular features proposed as definitive of analytic philosophy, but also in respect of the *types* of features proposed as definitive.

Hans-Johann Glock (Glock 2004) has recently provided a helpful taxonomy of the definitional types currently in circulation. His categories are:

1. doctrinal (in terms of the views analytic philosophers espouse)
2. topical (in terms of which topics analytic philosophers tend to be interested in)
3. methodological (in terms of the methods they use)

4. stylistic (in terms of the style of their philosophizing)
5. genetic (in terms of who influenced whom)
6. family resemblance (in terms of some set of overlapping features, none of which is necessary and sufficient for analytic philosophy)

Glock's taxonomy adequately captures the range of definitional types currently in circulation. However, most are flawed in ways that warrant their rejection. Some authors, including Glock himself, have marshaled arguments against some one or more of these definitional types, or, more frequently, against particular cases falling under them. Important as many of these arguments are, I am going to ignore them in order to focus on a general argument against all but the doctrinal type of definition. My claim is that all the other types fail *qua* types precisely because their generic content is not of the right sort to pick out a group of the sort usually called a philosophical school, movement, or tradition. In what follows, I will use these terms synonymously, and will frequently use "school" to stand for them all.

It seems to have gone completely overlooked in the current definitional controversy over analytic philosophy that the way we define a philosophical school has metaphilosophical implications. There are different kinds of definition, but the kind traditionally aimed for in philosophy—and the kind needed in the case of analytic philosophy—is called "real definition". Real definitions are supposed to pick a thing out according to its most fundamental, or essential, features, its necessary and sufficient conditions. With the exception of those in the family resemblance category, most other current attempts at defining analytic philosophy seem to be attempts at real definition—at least their proponents make no effort to explain that they are trying to provide something different. Thus, in proposing to define analytic philosophy topically, methodologically, or stylistically, genetically, or however, one implicitly proposes that topics, methods, styles, lineage, or whatever, are most fundamental to something's nature as a *philosophical* school.

But this is at variance with what most philosophers, both currently and historically, take to be true of the philosophical schools with which they affiliate. With the exception of a few dyed-in-the-wool Wittgensteinians of a certain variety, few in the contemporary analytic world would deny that philosophy is a theoretical disci-

pline. Its business is, minimally, the production and critical assessment of theories by means of reasoning. Theories, minimally, are sets of views (propositions) about the way things are, or what is the case, in some region or other—or possibly the whole—of reality. And, again minimally, in order for philosophers to deal with such views corporately, they must be verbally articulated in a relatively straightforward way, in the form of a sufficiently clear declarative sentence. I trust it will be recognized that this minimal conception of what philosophy is and what it involves has been widely held, at least implicitly, throughout the history of the discipline.

Now, this minimal metaphilosophical view has implications for how the emergent social world of philosophers (academic or otherwise) *ought* to take shape. On this view, what is most fundamental to philosophy is reasoning, on the one hand, and the objects of reasoning—ideas, views, and so forth—on the other. The constant in this pair is reason, and the variables are the particular ideas or views to which reason is applied. Thus, insofar as there are *philosophically* relevant divisions to be made within the social world of philosophy, they will be made along ideological lines.

This suggests that there is a minimum standard, a necessary condition, for the initial formation and the retrospective demarcation of groups that, like schools, movements or traditions, purport to mark out not merely a region of *social* space, but of *philosophical* space: such groups must rely for their cohesion, and hence also their existence, on a kind of unity that is constituted by agreement in theoretical matters. That is, a group is most properly called a philosophical school (etc.) only when it has come together on the basis of a shared philosophical view (or some set of them).

With this in mind, I shall say that a group counts as *philosophical* in the most proper, primary, or focal sense if and only if its criterion for membership is acceptance of some set of views on the basis of rational understanding. I will say of any group which meets this requirement that it is *philosophically unified*, or that it possesses *philosophical unity*. And, when a view actually functions in this way to ground the unity of a group, I shall call it a *defining doctrine* of that group.

What is fundamental, then, to the sort of group commonly called a philosophical school, is its defining doctrines. And, since a definition is supposed to pick something out according to its most funda-

mental features, the doctrinal approach to definition is the only legitimate one for a philosophical school. Looking to styles, topics, methods, or anything other than defining doctrines is either to mistake the accidental for the essential or to misunderstand the nature of a philosophical school.

3. *An Evaluative Taxonomy*

The position described in Section 2 provides the foundation for a larger taxonomy that runs somewhat skew to Glock's:

DEFINITIONS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

| I. NON-DOCTRINAL | II. DOCTRINAL |
|----------------------|---------------|
| 1 Stylistic | 1 Traditional |
| 2 Genetic | 2 Revisionist |
| 3 Family Resemblance | a Benighted |
| 4 Topical | b Illusionist |
| 5 Methodological | |

The categories in this taxonomy are not merely descriptive but evaluative; for, as I shall argue, falling into one of the left-hand options at any fork marks a definition as defective. The remainder of this essay will be given to explaining and systematically rejecting each of those left-hand categories until the *illusionist* variety is the only option left on the table.

In fact, we have already taken a first step toward this conclusion. The first division in this new taxonomy is between *doctrinal* and *non-doctrinal* definitions. A doctrinal definition is one framed in terms of a school's defining doctrines, in accordance with the position laid out in Section 2. A non-doctrinal definition is one framed in terms of anything else. We have already seen an example of a non-doctrinal definition in Soames' characterization of analytic philosophy as a trail of influence. Here are two other examples. Brian Leiter gives a stylistic definition, saying:

'Analytic' philosophy today names a *style* of doing philosophy, not a philosophical program or a set of substantive views. Analytic philosophers, crudely speaking, aim for argumentative clarity and precision; draw freely on the tools of logic; and often identify, professionally and intellectually, more closely with the sciences and mathematics, than with the humanities. (Leiter 2000).

Avrum Stroll gives what is perhaps best characterized as a family-resemblance definition: "it is difficult to give a precise definition of

'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems" (Stroll 2000, 5). According to the position of Section 2, non-doctrinal definitions are inadequate to define a philosophical school and should be rejected.

Focusing only on the doctrinal definitions currently in circulation, we can make a further division: some doctrinal definitions of analytic philosophy are *traditional*, others *revisionist*. Traditional definitions are doctrinal definitions that keep to the received view, such as Dummett's. Other, more recent characterizations fit the received view just as well. For instance, John Searle describes analytic philosophy as the dominant school in contemporary academic philosophy in the English speaking world and in Scandinavia, as "primarily concerned with the analysis of meaning" (Searle 1996, 2), as originating with Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, and Moore, and as perpetuated by the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and by the Oxford ordinary language movement. Similarly, Louis Pojman has recently claimed that "Analytic Philosophy is centered on language and logic, analyzing the meanings of words and sentences even as it analyzes arguments and builds comparatively modest epistemological and metaphysical theories" (Pojman 2001, 1). This, he says, constitutes a "simplistic but meaningful" characterization of analytic philosophy.

Now these are exactly the sorts of definitions that, in Section 1, I claimed had been undermined by new wave scholarship. Indeed, this is why the perplexing variety of new definitions exists—because it has been shown that definitions involving traditional defining doctrines, in line with the received view, are not accurate. In the wake of this discovery, some have chosen to abandon the strategy of defining analytic philosophy according to doctrines, thereby implicitly rejecting the view that analytic philosophy is a philosophical school. This is a departure from the received view, but it is a subtle one. *Prima facie*, it allows us to preserve much of the received view, especially as concerns the extension of "analytic philosophy". For instance, we saw earlier how defining analytic philosophy in non-doctrinal terms allowed Soames to focus on just the figures and thought-trends picked out as central and canonical on the received view, despite the fact that his canonical figures held no common views. Others, though, have departed from the received view in more conspicuous ways, ways that force the extensional

scope of “analytic philosophy” well beyond its canonical domain. Definitions formed along these lines I call *revisionist*.

Perhaps the most striking case of revisionism comes from Ray Monk. Taking a vague conception of analysis as the defining feature of analytic philosophy, Monk suggests that we carve up the philosophical world in such a way that Frege, Russell, Meinong and Husserl count as analytic philosophers while Wittgenstein does not (Monk 1996).⁷ To count Meinong and Husserl among the analysts while excluding Wittgenstein is unquestionably contrary to tradition—in fact, it is hard to imagine a definition more at odds with the canon derived from the received view of analytic philosophy.

Another respect in which Monk’s view conflicts with the received view is that, since plenty of earlier philosophers used *analysis* in Monk’s sense, it detaches analytic philosophy from its customary turn-of-the-twentieth-century origin. Some revisionists acknowledge and accept this consequence. L. J. Cohen, for example, has argued that the analytic philosophers are united in that the problems they are interested in “are all, in one way or another, normative problems about reasons and reasoning, ...” (Cohen 1986, 10 f.). But certainly interest in normative problems about reasons and reasoning is not unique to those who are commonly taken to be analytic philosophers. Cohen himself admits that, on his definition, analytic philosophy turns out to be “...a strand in the total history of western philosophy from Socrates onwards rather than just a modern movement” (Cohen 1986, 49). Similarly, Dagfinn Follesdal has defined analytic philosophy as philosophy with a strong commitment to argument and justification (as opposed to the kind of philosophy done by, e.g., Heidegger and Derrida, which relies mainly on rhetoric rather than clear argument), admitting that this makes Aristotle, Descartes, and perhaps even Thomas Aquinas count as analytic philosophers (Follesdal 1997).⁸

⁷ Monk is one of the few new wavers who, like Strawson in the proto-historical period, rejects the notion that differences over the nature of the objects of analysis should make a difference to how we group philosophers together as “analysts”.

⁸ It will be noted that Monk’s definition can be taken as methodological, while Cohen’s is topical and Follesdal’s stylistic. Given my views about non-doctrinal definitions, these would be non-starters. However, to allow

It seems to me that revisionism is misguided, for two reasons. First, it is self-undermining. The authors who end up proposing revisionist definitions do so only after using the received view to provide them with an initial orientation toward their subject matter. Starting off from the received view, they look for the defining doctrines of analytic philosophy. Finding none, they revise their conception of analytic philosophy in ways that utterly obliterate the received view, but then they carry on as if they had simply refined it. However, this involves what Putnam calls “excessive charity” in interpretation, similar to what would be required (borrowing Putnam’s example) to regard the concept of oxygen as a mere revision of the concept of phlogiston, rather than as a total replacement. Thus, on analogy with the phlogiston case, the original *definiendum*, analytic philosophy on the received view, doesn’t exist any more than phlogiston does. And, thus, it is clearly a mistake to carry on as if one has offered an improved definition of analytic philosophy, as the revisionists do. Moreover, this calls into question the whole line of thought involved in revisionism, since the first step taken in that line is guided by a conception that is not merely flawed, but false to the very core.

Perhaps a more worrisome problem with revisionism is this practical one: by shifting the traditional boundaries of analytic philosophy both extensionally (in terms of who gets included or excluded) and temporally (in terms of when the school originated), it draws our attention away from the locus of the phenomena that explain analytic philosophy’s meteoric rise to power and prominence during the twentieth century—and this, I think, is what most needs to be explained by work in the history of analytic philosophy. As I have argued elsewhere (Preston 2005), and as can be gleaned from the proto-historical citations given earlier, this involved the widespread *impression*, itself originating and flourishing in the early-to-mid twentieth century, that there had been a philosophical revolution, complete with the emergence of a new, united philosophical regime. Assuming that analytic philosophy’s phenomenal social

such definitions as much mileage as possible, it is my policy to treat topical, methodological, stylistic, and (insofar as is practicable) other types of non-doctrinal definitions as containing implicit doctrinal definitions, and to take their doctrinal import as supplying their real significance.

success in the twentieth century was to an appreciable extent due to the impression (which, from the standpoint of current scholarship, must be seen as a *misimpression*) that it was a united, revolutionary force armed with a powerful philosophical method (namely, the analysis of language), the problem with the revisionist strategy becomes clear: by detaching analytic philosophy from its turn-of-the-twentieth-century origins, it deprives us of any reasonable explanation for, first, analytic philosophy's meteoric rise to power in the twentieth century, and, second, the fact that, even if there never was any real philosophical unity in analytic philosophy, it was for a long time thought that there was, and that it consisted in a metaphilosophical view according to which the nature of the philosophical enterprise was linguistic.

The foregoing would seem to recommend the rejection of revisionist definitions. In doing so, however, it may seem that we have exhausted all our definitional options, with each type turning out to be a dead-end. Indeed those working in the history of analytic philosophy are presently confronted with a surprising quandary (though few, I think, have realized it, allowing themselves to escape from it too easily and before it fully emerges). The quandary can be expressed as follows. Contemporary historians begin their work with the following two assumptions:

- (1) Analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.
- (2) Analytic philosophy originated in the early twentieth century.

Both these assumptions are grounded in the received view of analytic philosophy as I have described it, and as represented by the proto-historians. However, recent scholarship has led many to the observation that:

- (3) There is no set of views accepted by all and only those figures *ordinarily* taken to be analytic philosophers (i.e., on the received view).

Clearly, these propositions form an inconsistent triad, and one of them must be rejected. However, given that (3) is well supported, we cannot reject *it*; thus, the inconsistent triad reduces to a dilemma between (1) and (2). Rejecting (1) is the mark of a non-doctrinal definition; rejecting (2) is the mark of revisionism. But now, if (as per the arguments presented earlier) both these options are to be rejected, and if (3) demands the rejection of traditional definitions, what is left?

What is left is the approach I call *illusionist*. On the illusionist view, we accept that the received view does not correspond and never has corresponded to anything in reality. Consequently, insofar as it has ever seemed to anyone that it did, that "seeming" was an illusion. More completely, the illusionist takes current work in the history of analytic philosophy to indicate that the received view was simply a guise that enabled a non-doctrinal and so non-philosophical group of some sort to come to dominate academic philosophy in various geographic regions by masquerading as a philosophical school.⁹

In this respect, the illusionist view can be characterized as rejecting (1): if analytic philosophy as ordinarily conceived is an illusion, then it is not a philosophical school, and (1) is false. And yet, the illusionist rejection of (1) does not qualify it as a variety of non-doctrinal definition; for the illusionist does not pretend, as those who offer non-doctrinal definitions do, that the lack of defining doctrines doesn't matter to analytic philosophy's nature as a philosophical school, and that the group represented by the received view can be recast as something lacking philosophical unity without destroying its philosophical nature and legitimacy. Instead, recognizing the centrality of the received view to the actual, historical developments associated with the name "analytic philosophy" (and *vice-versa*), illusionists allow it to exercise total control over the definition of analytic philosophy: for the illusionist, analytic philosophy is exactly what the received view says it is.

In this respect, the illusionist view endorses a traditional definition. However, while other traditional definitions conflict with (3), the illusionist is saved from this precisely by treating analytic philosophy as an illusion. Thus, the illusionist is a traditionalist concerning *what* analytic philosophy is supposed to be, but differs from other traditionalists concerning *whether* analytic philosophy exists at all.

This gives rise to a subordinate division in the category of traditional definitions: *illusionist* and *benighted*. Both adhere to the received view, but they differ in how they make use of it. Illusionism makes an enlightened use of the received view; it is analogous to the use that Wittgenstein made, and wanted his readers to make,

⁹ Just what sort of group was behind the guise, and just how it carried off its masquerade, cannot be dealt with here. Preliminary answers are given in Preston 2005.

of the propositions of the *Tractatus*: it is a ladder to be used to ascend to a higher plane of understanding, upon which one is freed from a kind of delusion concerning the meaningfulness of what one was doing previously—in this case, trying to unearth the true nature of analytic philosophy. Editing *Tractatus* 6.54 to fit our topic, we might say that

The received view elucidates the true nature of analytic philosophy in this way: he who understands analytic philosophy according to the received view finally recognizes analytic philosophy as illusory, when he has climbed out through the received view, on it, over it. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) ... He must surmount the received view; then he sees analytic philosophy rightly.

Those who attain this elevated vantage point enjoy an illumination that frees them from the spell of the received view. They are no longer convinced that they are dealing with a type of philosophy. Consequently they feel no need to salvage something of the received view by searching, as the revisionists do, for some set of views to pull its raveling threads together into some really-existing philosophical school. Thus, illusionism is enlightened traditionalism.

The alternative, unenlightened or *benighted* traditionalism, would be traditionalism which has not taken sufficient stock of the current state of research on analytic philosophy and its disturbing findings, and which, failing to climb out through, on, and over the received view, continues to operate under it.

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LETTER TO *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, 25 MAY 1955

BERTRAND RUSSELL

INTRODUCTION

RAY PERKINS JR.

In this letter to *The New York Times*, written six weeks before the press conference announcing the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, Russell underscores the paramount importance of the abolition of war. The Manifesto, essentially completed in April, was fashioned from his earlier BBC Christmas address, "Man's Peril." There too Russell emphasizes the need for abolishing war and says that those who hope to solve the problem of nuclear annihilation by (merely) prohibiting nuclear weapons are espousing a hope which "is illusory". In his February letter to Einstein, Russell had said that an agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons would be "wholly futile". But the Manifesto concedes some positive value to such an agreement which "we should ... welcome ..., though only as a first step". Here, in this May 25 letter, Russell's tone is slightly less positive, claiming that such a ban "would do very little good".

Ray Monk (*The Ghost of Madness*, p. 377) speculates that the Manifesto's positive tone regarding a ban on nuclear weapons was due to Russell's giving way to Communist opinion and interests. This may be partly true. Russell at the time was trying to include perspectives on peace from both sides of the Iron Curtain. But another point seems at least as weighty. The value of a ban on nuclear weapons depends on how the ban is to be undertaken. If it is merely a substitute for the abolition of war, rather than an ingredient in a larger movement to rid the world of the institution of war, it is not likely to be very effective for the reasons that Russell states. But as part of a more radical abolition of war itself, it could be an initiating and reinforcing component of a general movement towards enforceable world law, i.e., world government.

25 May 1955
41 Queen's Road
Richmond, Surrey

To the Editor of *The New York Times*

Sir,

It has just come to my notice that in your issue of May 19 you say that I celebrate my birthday "by renewing his demand for a ban on the hydrogen bomb". This is not quite accurate. I consider that a ban on the hydrogen bomb would do very little good since it would be disregarded in the event of a major war. What I demand is a more difficult thing: a ban on war. The world has to realize that, whatever agreements may be concluded, a serious war probably means the end of the human race. Is it worth it?

Yours etc.,

Bertrand Russell

REVIEW ESSAY

WHAT IS ANALYSIS?

JOHN ONGLEY

Review of Michael Beaney, 'Analysis', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2003, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/>

Michael Beaney is writing a survey of philosophical analysis from ancient Greek philosophy through the 20th century. He has posted a first report of that work on the internet—in the form of an entry on analysis in the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*—and he will publish a book on the subject soon. Though Beaney's survey covers the idea of philosophical analysis from Socrates to Soames, its main focus is on the types of analysis characteristic of 20th c. analytic philosophy. It is thus a part of the recent history of early analytic philosophy movement that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s and is a major force on the philosophical scene today. That movement has only recently focused on the nature of analytic philosophy itself, that is, on the question of what analytic philosophy is, and in particular, on what philosophical analysis is. Beaney's *Stanford* essay on "Analysis" is at the forefront of this recent turn towards examining the nature of analytic philosophy historically, and has consequently drawn a great deal of attention from the members of the new historical movement and is a frequently cited work among them on the subject. This review of Beaney's online article will consider his account of philosophical analysis in each major historical period in philosophy.

I. SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Beaney groups the methods of analysis found throughout the history of philosophy into three major types: decompositional, regressive and interpretive. In general, he says, *analysis* breaks a concept or proposition down into elements that are used in *synthesis* to justify or explain it. *Decompositional analysis* breaks a concept or proposition down and resolves it into its components. *Regressive analysis*, which was invented by the ancient Greeks who modeled it on geo-

metric methods of problem-solving, works back to first principles which can then be used *in synthesis* to demonstrate the truth of a proposition or meaning of a concept. Finally, *interpretive analysis*, which Beaney claims was used by Frege and Russell, first translates a statement or concept into correct logical form before resolving it into simple components. He claims that this interpretive form of analysis also has its roots in ancient Greek geometry and in medieval philosophy.

Beaney points out that several kinds of analysis are typically going on at once in any actual analysis; for example, a regressive analysis can also be a kind of decomposition and at the same time a kind of interpretive analysis. He also notes that philosophers often practiced some form of analysis without ever using the term, as in the case of Socratic analysis though the term 'analysis' never occurs in a Platonic dialogue, and that fields outside of philosophy have their own different notions of analysis, such as cost-benefit analysis, functional analysis, systems analysis, and psychoanalysis, though he does not rule out the possibility that these may be related to philosophical analysis in some way.

II. GREEK AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Among the ancient Greeks, the term 'analysis' was first used in the *regressive* sense to refer to the method of working backwards from a desired conclusion to first causes and principles. This method was modeled on the geometric method of solving problems or arriving at conclusions by breaking them down to known principles by which they can then be proved. Note that such analysis is also a *decomposition* into simpler parts, as well as a kind of *interpretation* that transforms what is being analyzed into different kinds of parts and concepts. Such geometric analysis influenced Plato and Aristotle, but Socrates' concern with real definitions and essences is thought to have been a separate influence on Plato and Aristotle. In this latter method, Socrates typically asks for the definition of some concept, and then analyzes attempted definitions or examples of it or beliefs about it with a method of dialogue and questioning in order to arrive at its meaning. It is here, Beaney says, that the roots of modern conceptual analysis are to be found.

It is commonly claimed that philosophy has for most of its history been armchair theorizing – that it is apriori reasoning about the world. On this assumption, it is sometimes claimed without further argument or examination that methods of analysis used by these philosophers must likewise be apriori. Thus, analytic philosophers, who usually claim that their own method is apriori, will often also claim that what they are doing in analysis is simply what the ancient Greeks and all good philosophers since have done, namely, analyzing concepts with an apriori method. Plato himself helped foster this image of the Socratic method as apriori when he had Socrates say about the dialectical method in the *Republic* that “a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intellect he arrives at the perception of the absolute good...”¹

To judge these claims that analysis is an apriori method, we must consider how those methods work in detail. Take, for example, the following argument from the *Euthyphro* where Socrates uses his dialectical method of analysis with Euthyphro to find a definition of 'piety':

SOCRATES: ...what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose, for example, that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to calculation and end them by a sum?

EUTHYPHRO: True.

SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly put an end to that difference by measuring?

EUTHYPHRO: That is true.

[...]

SOCRATES: But what differences are those which, because they cannot be decided, make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? ... I will suggest that this happens when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Are not these the points about which, when differing,

¹ *Republic*, 532.

and unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, we quarrel, when we do quarrel, as you and I and all men *experience*?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, that is the nature of the differences about which we quarrel.²

Here, contrary to the common view, and even to Plato's own stated view, we can see that Socrates uses many empirical assumptions in philosophical analysis, as when he appeals to experience to know which differences do and do not cause us to be angry; he even *says* that he knows these things by experience, so his method cannot be apriori. By applying the same scrutiny to 20th c. methods, when we get there, we can test similar claims made for them.

Beaney does not claim that any philosophical method is apriori—in fact, he does not consider whether they are apriori or not. What he does, for the most part, is describe various instances of analysis as 'regressive', 'decompositional', or 'interpretive'. But by simply attaching one of these labels to a method of analysis, we do not learn the details of how the method works, and it is the details that will tell us such things as whether it is empirical or apriori, that is, whether or not empirical propositions must be assumed in order to analyze some concept or proposition. With his own approach to analysis, Beaney cannot answer such questions. This is the major limitation of his approach.

While methods of analysis in the medieval and renaissance periods tended to be mixes of earlier forms, with an emphasis on the geometrical concept of analysis and synthesis, Beaney claims that an original conception of an *interpretive* analysis emerged in the late medieval period that anticipated 20th c. forms of analysis.³ Beaney takes the process of minimizing, or at least revealing, our ontological commitments by transforming one concept into a set of other concepts to be a central form of 20th c. analysis. It is this method that was anticipated by medieval scholastics, in particular

² Plato, *Euthyphro*, my emphasis.

³ This is reminiscent of Michael Dummett's claim that analytic philosophy made a linguistic turn that set aside the epistemological concerns and methods of modern philosophy and returned to scholastic concerns and methods where philosophical logic is foundational rather than epistemology. (Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, 1973, p. xxxiii)

by Ockham, with his eponymous razor, and by Buridan, who practiced philosophy with Ockham's razor.

Buridan's notion of nominal definition, where expressions are clarified by explaining what the expression means, is one such anticipation of modern analysis. Medievals especially used this notion to explicate the logic of statements containing ambiguous quantifiers. The middle ages were thus both a reworking of ancient ideas and an anticipation of modern ones. During the renaissance, the general inclination was to repudiate scholastic logic, which led to a reduction of clarity among renaissance philosophers about the notion of analysis.

III. EARLY MODERN NOTIONS OF ANALYSIS

The major inspiration for early modern ideas of analysis was again the ancients' geometrical notion of analysis, especially the Aristotelian version of it, which assimilated the process of going from theorems to axioms with the process of going from effects to causes. The early moderns thus viewed analysis "as a method of discovery, a working back from what is ordinarily known to the underlying reasons (demonstrating "the fact"), and synthesis as a method of proof, working forwards again from what is discovered to what needed explanation (demonstrating "the reason why")."⁴ (Note the conflation of explanation and justification or proof in the account of synthesis; to some extent, this was typical of the early modern era, but Beaney also regularly conflates the two ideas of synthesis as proof and synthesis as explanation.) The Port Royal *Logic*, published in 1662 and probably the most influential work on methodology from then to the middle of the 19th c., supported this basic view of analysis as discovery and of synthesis as proof or explanation.

The authors of the Port Royal *Logic* claimed that their views on method were principally derived from Descartes' *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. Beaney thus devotes much of the discussion in the section on early modern philosophy to Descartes. Descartes relied mostly on the geometrical regressive model, with its emphasis

⁴ Beaney 2003.

on discovery and proof of principles and causes, but he also used decompositional analysis in his work, reducing something, especially a concept, to its simplest terms and dividing it into its smallest possible parts; this is then expressed in the form of a definition. Beaney sees a shift occurring during the early modern period of philosophy in general from the regressive model of analysis of finding principles and causes to the decompositional one of analyzing concepts and finding definitions.

Beaney devotes just one paragraph to Locke and does not mention Hume at all. This is unfortunate, because one of the major dramas in philosophy and psychology in the 19th century was the struggle between British associationists and Kantians over the correct nature of the analysis of concepts, with associationists following Locke and Hume in holding that all concepts are constructed from observations and experiences and can be analyzed entirely into these units, while Kantians argued that there are concepts that cannot be discovered in experience and that are necessary for the construction and definition of most other concepts (i.e., Kant's categories, or Whewell's "fundamental ideas").

What Beaney does say about Locke is that Locke viewed all ideas as resolvable into simple ones that are copies of sense impressions, so that Locke's method of analysis is 'decompositional': its aim is to provide an account of ideas by explaining how they arise, showing what simple ideas make up our complex ones, and distinguishing the various mental operations performed on them in generating what knowledge and beliefs we have. But again, we do not get the details of how this method is supposed to work. If we knew this, we could compare Lockean analysis to 20th c. analysis and see if they really are the same, or even similar, and thus test the claim of analytic philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and Richard Rorty that analytic philosophy is just a type of British empiricism. Beaney's account does not go deep enough to answer such questions.

Leibniz, whose method of analysis Beaney also calls 'decompositional', is a major figure in Beaney's history of analysis. Leibniz's method of analysis rests on his *principle of containment*, the view that the predicate of every true affirmative proposition is contained in the subject whether the proposition is necessary, contingent, universal, or particular. Given this, the task of analysis for Leibniz is to make explicit the containment of the predicate in the subject of any

proposed proposition. With such an analysis, the proposition can then be proved, by synthesis, to be true.

More specifically, Leibnizian analysis proceeds by using a series of definitions to analyze the subject of a proposition and reduce the proposition to an identity. Identities are, for Leibniz, self-evident truths. But again, we are not told how Leibniz thinks we know these definitions that reduce the proposition to an identity. Are they, at least in some cases, known empirically? For example, do we know the definition 'a goose is a bird' is true, while 'a goose is a reptile' is false, by examining geese? If so, then Leibniz's method of analysis is an empirical one, at least sometimes, and a theory of meaning where we know the meanings of at least some concepts a posteriori is being presupposed. Are definitions of concepts all known a priori? If so, then the method is a priori and a theory of meaning where we know the meaning of terms a priori, as some philosophers claim, is being presupposed. Knowing how analysis works would in this way show us some of the presuppositions about language and meaning assumed by a philosopher or philosophical movement.

IV. KANT AND ANALYSIS

Kant's method of analysis is likewise 'decompositional' according to Beaney. I hope it is becoming apparent how limited the use of these metaphorical labels to describe types of analysis is. Locke, Leibniz and Kant are all called 'decompositional' analysts, yet the differences in their methods of analysis are at the center of major debates in philosophy throughout the 19th century and are important for understanding twentieth century analysis.

Kant, Beaney tells us, takes over Leibniz's method of analysis with its principle of containment, but rejects Leibniz's view that the predicates of *all* true affirmative propositions are contained in its subject, so that all truths are analytic. For Kant, like Leibniz, "analytic" propositions have subjects that contain their predicates, but unlike Leibniz, Kant also recognizes a class of synthetic propositions whose subjects do *not* contain their predicates.

In his *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Prolegomena to Any Future*

⁴ A150-1, B189-91; *Prolegomena*, Hackett, 1977, p. 12.

Metaphysics, Kant identifies analytic propositions as those whose negations are self-contradictory.⁵ Kantian analysis would thus show, according to Beaney, that a proposition is analytic by showing that its denial is self-contradictory, and this would show that the predicate of the proposition is contained in the subject, and so clarify the meaning of the subject. For Kant, Beaney tells us, analysis can at most clarify our concepts but cannot extend our knowledge.

It is odd, however, that Beaney assumes that the results of Kantian analysis are analytic statements. After all, Kant refers to the entire *Prolegomena* as a work of analysis, while calling the *Critique of Pure Reason* a “synthetic” work, and the results of the *Prolegomena*’s analysis are famously synthetic apriori statements, not analytic ones. Like most philosophers of the early modern period, what Kant meant by ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ is that analysis is a method of discovery that uncovers the self-evident presuppositions of some desired conclusion and that synthesis is a chain of reasoning in the reverse direction, that is, a proof or explanation of the conclusion in terms of the self-evident presuppositions discovered by analysis.

For example, Kant says of the *Prolegomena*: “...I offer here [an outline of the first *Critique*] which is sketched out after an analytical method, while the *Critique* itself had to be executed in the synthetical style, in order that the science may present all its articulations [in this analytical sketch, i.e., in the *Prolegomena*], as the structure of a peculiar cognitive faculty, in all their natural combination.” (Kant, 1977, p. 8) So for Kant, the *Prolegomena* is an analysis and the first *Critique* is a synthesis.

Moreover, Kant’s analytic propositions are not to be confused with his method of analysis or the results of such analysis. As Kant says: “The analytical method, insofar as it is opposed to the synthetical, is very different from an aggregate of analytical propositions. It signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if it were given, and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible [that is, show what is necessary for it to be true]. In this method, we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in mathematical analysis...” (Ibid., p. 21.)

⁵ A150-1, B189-91; *Prolegomena*, Hackett, 1977, p. 12.

Kant’s analytical method of the *Prolegomena* is thus meant to articulate the ideas of the first *Critique*, that is, show the synthetic apriori ideas that are necessary for knowledge. So the results of the analysis of the *Prolegomena* are, for Kant, synthetic apriori propositions, not analytic ones. In Beaney’s terminology, Kant’s analytic method is regressive (finding the necessary presuppositions for something to be known), not decompositional.

Why then does Beaney think that Kant’s method of analysis yields only analytic apriori propositions? Perhaps because analytic philosophers have frequently asserted that in doing analysis, analytic philosophers are just doing what all great philosophers of the past have done in analysis, and they further assume that the results of their own analyses are analytic apriori, so that the results of all philosophical analyses must be analytic apriori. But for Kant (and for Plato, Locke, Hume and probably Leibniz as well), this is not true.

For Kant, then, the *Prolegomena* is an analysis while the first *Critique* is a synthesis. But what does Kant think a *synthesis* is? Either a proof or an explanation, but which? Beaney is carelessness in distinguishing between synthesis as proof and synthesis as explanation throughout his essay on analysis. Here, a correct answer to this question is crucial for a proper understanding of the first *Critique*.

Most Kant scholars today view the argument in the first *Critique*, put forth in the Transcendental Deduction, as purporting to establish that objective and valid apriori categories are necessary for knowledge; that is, they view the argument of the first *Critique* as an analysis in Kant’s sense of the term. Beaney himself assumes that the first *Critique* is such an analysis when he says that Kant “recognizes a ... class of ... synthetic apriori truths, which it is the main task of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to elucidate”.

From the above discussion, however, we know that elucidation for Kant is what analysis does—in fact, this particular elucidation (establishing that objective and valid apriori categories are necessary for knowledge) is exactly the analysis that Kant says that the *Prolegomena* performs—and that according to Kant, the first *Critique* is not an analysis, but a synthesis. Therefore, the argument of the first *Critique* cannot be an analysis of knowledge showing that it presupposes (valid and objective) categories. Instead, Kant must

think the first *Critique* is an argument that either justifies or explains knowledge based on self-evident principles found out through analysis.

Understanding how the first *Critique* can be a synthesis, rather than the analysis it is now standardly viewed as being, is, by my view, the fundamental problem of Kant scholarship—one that comes before all others. If Kant is explaining how categories can be objective and valid apriori, he needn't prove this point—explanations assume the truth of what they are explaining. In that case, the standard view of the first *Critique* is not particularly threatened, because an analysis doesn't prove that the categories are apriori objective and valid either, except in a question-begging way. (If there is objective and valid knowledge, there are objective and valid apriori categories. But is there objective and valid knowledge? This is just what we want the first *Critique* to tell us.) But if Kant thinks he is justifying the apriori objectivity and validity of the categories with a view to eventually justifying knowledge, this calls for a radically different reading of the first *Critique* from the way we read it today.

V. THE 19TH CENTURY

Beaney devotes just one brief paragraph to 19th century philosophical analysis. He claims that many 19th c. concepts of analysis were responses to Kant's so-called "decompositional" method of analysis, for example, those of German or British idealists, who viewed such analysis as trivial and "destructive and life-limiting" and thus took a negative attitude toward it. He claims that later Kantians, such as the neo-Kantians, took a more positive attitude toward analysis and used it to disclose the essential synthetic apriori structure of science. (Due to his abovementioned confusion between Kant's analytic propositions and Kantian analysis, Beaney does not see that Kant used analysis to do this same thing.)

But it was the British empiricist forms of analysis, not Kantian analysis, that 19th century Kantians and other idealists took to be trivial and incapable of correctly analyzing concepts. British empiricists ("associationists") followed Locke and Hume in claiming that concepts are constructed from and can be entirely analyzed in terms of associations of sense impressions. For Kantians and other idealists, Hume had shown that concepts such as 'causality' cannot be

defined *just* in terms of sense impressions. They felt that Kant had then shown, on the basis of Hume's arguments, that we must add metaphysical concepts (the transcendental categories) to our impressions in order to construct the concepts of science and everyday life, and that these categories can only be found in the mind, not in experience.

However, the kind of Kantian analysis preferred by the Germanic opponents of empiricism was one revised in the light of romanticism, which relied heavily upon intuition. For example, among the neo-Kantians, Wilhelm Windelband and Ernst Cassirer held a more romantic view that we come to these ideas that cannot be found in experience by a kind of artistic intuition, though some, such as Heinrich Rickert, rejected this romantic view and stuck to the more strictly Kantian one that it is by pure reason that we know of these categories. Husserl, of course, came down firmly on the side of intellectual intuitions of concepts.

There was, however, a more holistic strain in German and British idealism that *did* view analysis not just as trivial, but as "destructive and life-limiting", as Beaney puts it, and also as a kind of falsification. The roots of this holism can be found in Goethe, parts of Kant, and of course in Hegel, among other places. It is this latter more holistic strain of idealism that early 20th century analysts like Russell and Moore attacked with their insistence that analysis is possible. But again, much of Russell and Moore's attack was actually focused on Kant, who did not deny that analysis is possible, but only that empiricist analysis is. But Russell and Moore were not defending an empiricist form of analysis! So why attack Kant? As Peter Hylton has noted, this is a puzzle that needs solving.⁶

Though each of the other historical sections of Beaney's essay have lengthy supplements linked to them which elaborate on the ideas of analysis characteristic of that period, there is no supplement linked to Beaney's one paragraph section on the 19th century. The text says that it is not yet available. But without a careful study of 19th century analysis, basic questions such as "How much is 20th century analysis like 19th century analysis?" and "What in the

⁶ Peter Hylton, 'Hegel and Analytic Philosophy', *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

world were the 20th century analysts rebelling against anyway?" cannot be answered. Beaney's strategy of writing the history of 20th century analysis before doing the 19th century is unwise. As it is, we must now leap into a discussion of 20th century analysis without first understanding its background in the 19th century.

V. ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

We often hear that what characterizes 20th century analytic philosophy is a kind of decompositional analysis, where we clarify concepts by breaking them down into more basic concepts. Because Kant played down this sort of analysis, and Kantians and other idealists after him explicitly attacked it, one might expect that if analytic philosophy is a reaction to idealist claims that empiricist analysis is impossible, it would be a swing back to the empirical analysis that preceded it. This would support to A.J. Ayer's story that analytic philosophy is just "British empiricism plus logic"—a return to the methods of Locke and Hume.

In Brazil, after the bossa nova movement, which can crudely be described as a combination of samba and jazz, there was a "purist" reaction (the "tropical" movement) where the jazz was taken back out. But what was left was not, as you might expect, samba again, but something quite different, and thus MPB, or modern Brazilian pop, was born. Similarly, the turn back to analysis by early 20th c. analytic philosophers did not yield anything like earlier, empiricist forms of it. The analytic philosophers were doing something quite different. But what was it? If we could get clear on this question, we would understand this philosophy better.

Examining the twentieth century, Beaney begins with a general characterization of 20th century philosophical analysis. "What characterizes analytic philosophy as it was founded by Frege and Russell," he says, "is the role played by *logical* analysis, which depended on the development of modern logic. Although other and subsequent forms of analysis, such as linguistic analysis, were less wedded to systems of formal analysis, the central insight motivating logical analysis remained." Beaney admits that this characterization does not fit Moore or one strand of analytic philosophy, but thinks that the tradition founded by Russell and Frege is analytic philosophy's central strand.

What is characteristic of Russell and Frege's sense of analysis, and thus of 20th century logical analysis in general, Beaney tells us, is that it is interpretive—we first interpret what we wish to analyze by transforming it according to some system of interpretation, so that we may then solve a particular problem. Analytic geometry, for example, transforms geometric problems into algebraic ones so it may then solve them. Similarly, Frege, Russell, and 20th c. analytic philosophers in general attempted to solve philosophical problems by translating natural language sentences into predicate logic, so that a possibly misleading grammatical form, which a purely decompositional analysis would take as given, is replaced with the sentence's true logical form. If the sentence is decomposed into its components *after* we have translated it into its correct logical form, we will not then be misled by grammar as to what its components are. 'On Denoting' is thus Beaney's model of 20th c. analysis.

This sort of analysis is the key to reducing mathematics to logic, and many would argue that the primary motive for the development of it was to make explicit the sort of analysis necessary for reducing mathematics to logic. We translate mathematical concepts like 'number' into logical ones, so that we can derive mathematical truths from logical truths and show mathematics to be pure logic. The method applied to language more generally may similarly solve many philosophical problems. For example, the statement 'Unicorns do not exist' can be understood as saying that 'The concept *unicorn* has no instances' ('The class of unicorns is empty', or ' $\sim (\exists x) Fx$ '). The subject is no longer unicorns by the new translation, but the concept 'unicorn'. In this way, we do not need to think that non-existing objects like unicorns have some reality or "subsistence" in order for statements about them to be meaningful. This analysis is a strategy used by Russell in his theory of descriptions and Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*.

What is crucial to this sort of analysis is the development of modern quantification logic. For Frege and Russell, it is predicate logic that statements are to be translated into. As Beaney notes, this introduced a divergence between grammatical and logical form, so that "the process of translation itself became an issue of philosophical concern". Hence, the need for articles like 'On Denoting' arose.

But what of subsequent analysts in the 20th century? Beaney asserts that though later ordinary linguistic analysts questioned

whether there could ever be a definitive logical analysis of typical statements, they retained the idea that ordinary language could mislead. For example, in his essay 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', Gilbert Ryle used such analysis to avoid attributing existence to concepts, and he retained this concept of analysis to solve problems in his later years as an ordinary language philosopher. This, then, is what Beaney finds common to 20th century analytic philosophy—a method of analysis that translates ordinary expressions into more philosophically and logically respectable expressions.

There are, however, important questions that Beaney's characterization of 20th century analysis does not address. One—already touched upon in this review—is that of the presuppositions of the method in question. In the case of the analysis of mathematical concepts in terms of logical ones, we know we have correctly analyzed a mathematical concept when the logical construction does everything the mathematical one does. But then we must presuppose mathematical theory in order to know that our logical constructions adequately replace mathematics. Similarly, logical theorems meant to replace mathematical truths can only be known to be equivalent to the mathematical ones by the same sort of comparison.

Cases outside of mathematics and pure logic proceed similarly; when we reduce non-logical concepts to other non-logical concepts (for nowhere except in mathematics and logic itself are we going to reduce concepts to logical ones), we again know that we have correctly defined our concept when the definition functions identically to the original concept. But non-logical concepts are typically about the world and occur in theories about the world, so we can only know that a logical construction of such a concept is equivalent to the original one when it agrees with our best theories about the world. Such logical analysis would thus be a posteriori.

The important question, then, of whether or not analysis is apriori or a posteriori seems answered. Though commonly claimed to be apriori (though not by Beaney; his own interpretation of analysis into decompositional, regressive, and interpretive types does not ask such questions), analysis of empirical concepts and propositions must presuppose empirical theories in order for us to know that the analysis is correct.

What, then, can people be thinking when they claim that philosophical analysis is apriori? Many of them seem to be assuming this: we know the meanings of words apriori, and thus can know apriori that the reconstruction of some original concept is correct by comparing it to meanings that we "just know". (One way it is thought that we know the meanings of words apriori is by having apriori "intuitions" of meanings.) It seems to me that this idea, that meanings are the sorts of things we know apriori, is the major unstated presupposition of 20th c. ideas of philosophical analysis and 20th c. analytic philosophy.

But it is unlikely that we can know the meanings of words apriori, except perhaps in the case of stipulative definitions, which clearly do not represent the majority of cases. For example, the dictionary tells us that a whale is an ocean-going mammal that suckles its young. But for 'mammal' to be part of the meaning of 'whale' required people to go out and look at whales to see this, for formerly whales were thought to be fish and only when people looked more closely and saw, e.g., that they had no gills, were warm-blooded, had lungs, had breasts that gave milk, etc., did the meaning of the word change and 'whale' come to include the concept 'mammal'. Words signifying empirical concepts thus get their meaning empirically. When we try to determine if an analysis of them is correct, we must look to the world to determine that the new definition functions the same as the original term.

Analytic philosophy presents itself as apriori but is not; it presents itself as an innocent method of logical analysis that makes no controversial metaphysical assumptions when in fact it does make such assumptions; and it is likely that it makes such assumptions due to 19th century influences on it. Again, however, these are not issues addressed by Beaney.

VI. GOTTLIB FREGE AND THE ELEPHANT IN THE PARLOR

Fregean analysis translates a proposition into argument-function form rather than the subject-predicate form that decompositional (whole-parts) analyses provide. Thus, Frege analyzes 'Socrates is mortal' into an argument 'Socrates' and function '___ is mortal' rather than into the grammatical form 'S is P'. By developing a logic of functions and arguments, Frege was able to logically analyze

complex mathematical statements and achieve much (if not complete) success in the logical analysis of mathematics. This was then taken as a model for the logical analysis of sentences and concepts in other domains of knowledge and common sense. However, what makes the new logic so suitable for analyzing mathematics, namely, mathematics' own essentially argument-function structure, may well make it unsuitable for analyzing natural languages.

Take for example the statement 'All horses are mammals'. Predicate logic would analyze this as 'For all objects x , if x is a horse then x is a mammal'. Where is the copula, the verb "to be", in this analysis, and how well does the analysis explain the copula's meaning? Well, first of all the conditional connective 'if-then' connects the concepts 'horse' and 'mammal' instead of the copula. Here of course we already have a problem, since modern logic uses the material conditional in this analysis, and the material conditional of modern logic does not really capture the sense of 'if-then'. We will return to this problem of the conditional in a moment.

In any case, the conditional connective does not entirely replace the copula, for we need the quantifier to specify that the same thing that is a horse is a mammal. Since the two quantifiers of modern logic, 'all' and 'some', can be defined in terms of each other ('All x 's are F ' = 'It is not the case that some x 's are not F ') and so reduced to one concept, let us take the existential quantifier ("some", or "there exists an x such that") as the primitive concept. So the quantifier (and the variables and apparatus of the scope of the quantifier), which is roughly the concept of 'existence', also does some of the work of the copula in our analysis.

But of course, the idea of a logical (not grammatical) predicate-as-function itself contains a copula, as when we say " x is a horse" and " x is a mammal", so it too does some of the work of the original grammatical copula.⁷ Rather than explaining and giving us some insight into this most basic concept of natural language, modern logic seems to spread the work of the copula around in a careless, unexamined way.

An even more serious shortcoming of predicate logic is that it doesn't provide an analysis of conditional, "if-then" reasoning that works outside of mathematics. When modern logic uses the mater-

⁷ Jaakko Hintikka, from whom I first heard this analysis, has made this same point in print.

ial conditional, where 'if p then q ' is taken to mean 'either not p or q ', to analyze mathematics, no problems arise for it. Outside of mathematics, however—in ordinary language or empirical science—numerous problems arise for the material conditional, especially in counterfactual cases, but there is to date no analysis of 'if-then' that works better. In other words, modern logic does not yet have an adequate translation of the conditional, although conditional reasoning is the backbone of all reasoning.

The ineptness of quantification logic at analyzing English grammar or conditional reasoning as it occurs outside of mathematics suggests that other logics would better serve us in analyzing English sentences and describing everyday logic. And this suggests that the logic we now have is not *the* logic of our language or everyday reasoning, not a fundamental part of the universe or of our minds, but merely a convenient calculus that is especially good for describing mathematical logic. This provides us with further reason for caution about claims that a logical analysis of language can solve philosophical problems. If our current logic is not the last word in the subject but merely a conventionally convenient one that could be improved upon or even radically altered for the better, there is no reason to believe that in translating English sentences into this logic we are reducing them to a more fundamental, truer form.

VII. BEANEY ON RUSSELL, MOORE, WITTGENSTEIN, CARNAP, CAMBRIDGE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND OXFORD ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

Although Beaney sees logical analysis the major and unifying form of analysis for 20th century analytic philosophy, he acknowledges other kinds of analysis. However, Beaney sees the idea of interpretation that lies behind logical analysis as motivating these other kinds of analysis as well, and thus being what is common to 20th c. philosophical analysis in general.

Bertrand Russell was never entirely clear on what he meant by 'analysis', his practice often did not match his words, and his clearest statement on the subject, in his 1913 manuscript *Theory of Knowledge*, defines 'analysis' in a decompositional sense as a "discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex" (TK, 119). Beaney acknowledges all of this, but still

thinks logical analysis of language into the new logic best exemplified the analytic philosophy that emerged from his work. This, for example, is the characteristic form of analysis in Russell's essay 'On Denoting', where problems that emerge from a decompositional analysis of English sentences such as 'The present King of France is bald' disappear upon a logical analysis of them. However, as Beaney himself admits, Russell's idea of analysis is not clearly or entirely interpretive.

Beaney finds G.E. Moore's notion of analysis to be of a traditional decompositional sort, where complex concepts are analyzed into their constituents. This puzzles Beaney: while he admits that Moore influenced conceptions of analysis among analytic philosophers, Beaney does not address the fact that this means that his theory that 20th c. analysis as Fregean/Russellian logical analysis does not seem to work even for the major analysts. He simply ignores this problem and goes on to Wittgenstein.

Because Wittgenstein accepted Frege's assumption that quantification logic was *the* logic of language, and because he utilized Russell's method of logical analysis from 'On Denoting', Beaney places the early Wittgenstein in the Frege/Russell tradition of logical analysis. At the same time, Wittgenstein's method was also decompositional, because he claimed that an analysis of language reduced it to its simple constituents. Beaney thus sees Wittgenstein's notion of analysis as a combination of logical and decompositional methods. And although the emphasis in later Wittgenstein is on decompositional methods, Beaney claims that a role is left by Wittgenstein for logical analysis as well.

The Cambridge school—of Susan Stebbing, John Wisdom, and Max Black, and including Oxfordians Gilbert Ryle and C.C. Mace—who founded the journal *Analysis*, based their notions of analysis on Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein. While taking Russell's theory of definite descriptions in 'On Denoting' as a "paradigm" of analysis, they emphasized the logical analysis found in the article and de-emphasized the metaphysical reduction of concepts to other ones.

Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein similarly influenced Carnap, who developed a method of construction reminiscent of Russell that he first called quasi-analysis and later called logical analysis. Carnap used quasi-analysis in his 1928 *Aufbau* to construct simple

qualities from individual experiences. At the same time Carnap developed a notion of explication he called 'rational reconstruction'. This is a different kind of translation, where vague everyday concepts are replaced with more precise "scientific" ones.

Beaney finds Oxford linguistic "ordinary language" philosophers to be less like Frege and Russell and more like Wittgenstein in believing that the analysis of language can tell us about thought. Russell and Frege were dismissive of ordinary language as misguided and misleading. Oxfordians believed that language pretty clearly reflects our concepts. Ryle and Austin are discussed as examples of this view, as are Strawson's more Kantian analyses. Though Beaney recognizes that they are straying from the logical analysis he thinks unifies analytic philosophy, he thinks that like the earlier forms of analysis, they all seek to clarify concepts.

This may seem to be a rather thin comparison, but perhaps after reviewing 26 centuries of philosophical analysis, Beaney is simply running out of steam. However, it should be obvious even from this brief description of Beaney's survey of the 20th c. that his model of 20th c. analysis as based on logical analysis does not fair well even on his own terms. In the end, Beaney changes tack and defines analytic philosophy as being a set of interlocking subtraditions unified by a shared repertoire of conceptions of analysis that different philosophers drew on in different ways. But it is not clear that this definition is adequate to distinguish analytic philosophy from any other philosophy, for as Beaney himself has shown, all philosophies seem to draw on this shared repertoire of conceptions of analysis, each in its own way.

VIII. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

Beaney's essay on analysis is a historical one, a part of the recent history of early analytic philosophy movement. Early work in this new field seldom asked what analytic philosophy is, but assumed that we already know this and simply elaborated on the standard picture of analytic philosophy with new facts and greater detail but without presenting us with a different overall picture of it.¹ Recently, there has been a revisionist turn in the field, a turn towards asking the initial questions of what analytic philosophy and analysis are. This new trend threatens to reject conventional answers and

provide us with new ones, and Michael Beaney is out ahead of this pack, and to some extent leading it in this direction. His entry on analysis in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* has itself stimulated some of this activity, the April 2005 conference on *Varieties of Analysis* that he organized was the big event in the field for the year, and it is hoped that the publication of his book on analysis will push the field even further in this direction, and so push historians of analytic philosophy to a better understanding of their subject. For this reason alone 'Analysis' is a significant work. It is also significant for its ambition and scope, and, I must say, for its depth of analysis. Although I have criticized Beaney here for not digging deeply enough into methods of analysis to answer important questions about them, the amount of analysis he *has* done is impressive. Also impressive is his bibliography, which is an extensive survey of the literature on this subject. Anyone who likes books and has an interest in the history of philosophy, and especially in the history of analytic philosophy, will enjoy reading through it nearly as much as they will enjoy reading the article itself.

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⁷ This work in the history of analytic philosophy should not be confused with the parallel but separate movement in the history of philosophy of science, which has been exuberantly revisionist.

END MATTER

MINUTES TO THE BRS ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING

The Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors annual meeting was scheduled for Saturday, May 14 from 12:30pm to 1:30pm. At 1:30pm, the meeting was recessed and then resumed at 2:30pm, and concluded at 3:15pm. Directors in attendance were Ken Blackwell, Andy Bone, Rosalind Carey, David Henehan, Tim Madigan, Ray Perkins, Steve Reinhardt, Cara Rice, Alan Schwerin, Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone, and Chad Trainer.

The Board's first item of business was the selection of an interim chair. Peter Stone agreed to act in this capacity. Warren Allen Smith then moved to approve the minutes from last year's meeting. Alan Schwerin seconded the motion, and they were approved unanimously. Ken Blackwell then made a motion to approve the e-mailed versions of the Treasurer's report, and Warren Allen Smith seconded the motion.

The directors then elected the following officers by acclamation: President: Alan Schwerin (nominated by Ken Blackwell and seconded by Rosalind Carey); Vice President: Ray Perkins (nominated by Alan Schwerin and seconded by David Henehan); Secretary: David Henehan (nominated by Alan Schwerin and seconded by Ken Blackwell); Treasurer: Dennis Darland (nominated by Alan Schwerin and seconded by Chad Trainer; and Chair: Chad Trainer (nominated by Ken Blackwell and seconded by Cara Rice);

The subject of outreach for the Bertrand Russell Society was next discussed. Specifically, the worth of positions established for these purposes was revisited. Rosalind Carey indicated her support for this type of position and cited the work that John Ongley is already doing in this area. Tim Madigan moved to have the positions that were divided (at the 2004 board meeting) into vice-president for international outreach and vice president of outreach in North America combined into one position to be occupied by John Ongley. Cara Rice seconded the motion, and it passed with eleven to one votes.

The place and time of next year's annual meeting was the next item on the agenda. It was agreed by all to accept Gregory Landini's offer to host next year's annual meeting at the University of Iowa. There was less agreement about the exact weekend the meeting should occur. Cara Rice supported the idea of holding the meeting as late in June as possible. John Ongley, on the other hand, supported the idea of the meeting occurring around the end of May, or beginning of June. Peter Stone suggested taking a "straw pole" on the matter. One person voted for mid-May, three people for early June, and twelve people for mid-June. Cara Rice moved to have the next annual meeting held at the University of Iowa, Warren Allen Smith seconded the motion, and it passed unanimously.

On the subject of the site for 2007's meeting, Alan Schwerin mentioned Monmouth University as a candidate. John Ongley mentioned the possibility of Drew University. Peter Stone noted the good attendance at Drew's last meeting, but it was agreed that the availability of John Lenz as a host needed to be determined. Rosalind Carey volunteered Lehman as a candidate with the caveat that it lacked dormitories.

Next on the agenda was the subject of honorary memberships. Peter Stone read aloud the conditions for honorary members. Ken Blackwell moved to make Joseph Rotblat an honorary member, alluding to the well-known Nobel Prize-winning work Rotblat had done with Russell and continues to do with the Pugwash conferences. Ken also reminded the directors that Rotblat is 97 years old. Ray Perkins seconded the motion, and it carried unanimously. Peter Stone brought up the proposal that Tariq Ali be made an honorary member, citing the work he did for the Russell War Crimes Tribunal along with other related work, his correspondences with Russell, and his memorandum on Russell's secretary Ralph Schoenman. Ray Perkins moved to make Tariq Ali an honorary member. Warren Allen Smith seconded the motion, and it carried with eleven yes votes and one abstention.

Steve Reinhardt then asked whether there was any method on the Society's Web site for briefing members on what sort of topics the annual meetings' papers will concern and what sort of preparatory reading members can do to get the most out of the meetings' talks. He referred specifically to a couple of papers delivered that Saturday morning based largely on books with which he could easily have become reacquainted (and so derive more out of the talks)

if only he had had a way of knowing about these papers' subject matter in advance. Alan Schwerin responded that the papers accepted for the meeting are indeed listed on the Society's Web site with accompanying abstracts. Chad Trainer claimed that, on his computer at least, only the titles of papers could be accessed and not any of the abstracts. Rosalind Carey then suggested the possibility of a "recommended reading" list that could be compiled for each meeting.

The next matter addressed was that of funding students interested in presenting papers on Russell at academic conferences. Alan Schwerin explained that Nicholas Griffin had approached him with the idea of the Society helping to fund a student interested in delivering a paper at a conference in Portugal. The Directors considered the problems of setting such a precedent, especially in cases where students do not yet belong to the BRS. There was common agreement that a pledge, at least, to join the BRS should be a precondition for receipt of such funding, and Peter Stone reminded the directors that a student prize was already in existence.

There was then a digression about the perennial problem of how to expand membership. Peter Stone and Rosalind Carey suggested the value of membership drives, especially advertising. Alan Schwerin explained his disappointment after his experience with writing to forty-five universities inviting people to submit papers and/or become members and having had nothing to show for it as a result. Rosalind Carey supported the idea of the editors of the Society's quarterly journal printing "free year's membership tickets". Dennis would give recipients interested in redeeming these tickets a free membership and they would be sent a "welcome package" of sorts. David Henehan encouraged people to think along the lines of using World Wide Web options, and he asked for a clarification of exactly how flush with money the BRS is.

Ken Blackwell cited recent payments for a couple of lifetime memberships and university funding for printing the BRSQ as some reasons for the surplus, and he made reference to Dennis Darland's records of ten or eleven-thousand dollars currently at the Society's disposal. Ken Blackwell then introduced a motion to empower the executive committee to fund students attending conferences who are members of the BRS up to \$200. Alan Schwerin seconded the motion. The motion passed with six of the seven directors present at this point voting in its favor and one director voting against it.

Finally, Ken Blackwell suggested coming up with an automatic method for selecting a substitute Chair for meetings such as this one when the Chairman of the Board is not in attendance. Ken suggested, as an example, that such a role could automatically devolve upon the former Chairman. Dave Henehan wondered whether the position of substitute chair could automatically go to the President, but Alan Schwerin replied that that would empower the President excessively. Peter Stone mentioned the option of mailing out ballots for such cases. David Henehan questioned the propriety of conducting such an election by mail, and Ken Blackwell made the point that this has been the settled manner in which Directors have been elected. Dave Henehan then suggested that a Vice-Chair position might be worth considering. Alan Schwerin replied that the Chairman should have to appoint a substitute or proxy.

Cara Rice made a motion to adjourn the meeting. Dave Henehan seconded the motion, and it passed by acclamation.

CHAD TRAINER

~*~

IN MEMORIAM

JOSEPH ROTBLAT, 96, died in London on 31 August 2005. A 1995 Nobel Peace Prize recipient (with Hans Bethe), knighted in 1998, and member of the Royal Society, Dr. Rotblat, a physicist, was among those scientists who signed the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto. A long time Secretary General of the Pugwash initiative, which is credited with being instrumental in decelerating the cold war nuclear arms race, Rotblat was the only scientist to leave the Manhattan Project on moral grounds. For this act, he was banned from the US for several years.

WHITFIELD COBB died in Blacksburg, Virginia on 31 July 2005. A member of the BRS, and a statistician with a doctorate from UNC, Cobb first studied philosophy, receiving a BA and MA from UNC in that field before turning to mathematics. A longtime teacher of mathematics, Cobb taught at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and was retired as emeritus at State University. He is remembered for his social conscience and his willingness to defend unpopular positions in the face of threats to his person, as in his defense of school integration.

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

To those who identify the meetings of the APA with its Eastern incarnation, the Central division conference is a surprise. Compared to the Eastern conference, it's small – though not as small as the Pacific – and it moves at a leisurely, dignified pace: each speaker is given a full hour in a group session at the Central; at the Eastern, each speaker has a breathless 40 minutes. Moreover, the Central conference rotates on the axis of Chicago, returning each year to the Palmer House (*the* Palmer House, if you please, and “Palmer” as in *palmy*); in contrast the Eastern careens through the orbit of New York, Boston, Washington, New York, Boston, Washington.

Satisfaction, as everyone knows, is measured in the units of time one gets to spend talking about or listening to pet ideas. This year's crop of BRS talks (combined with sessions of HEAPS) was especially satisfying. Moving backwards, the afternoon session heard first from Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen on “Significs and Early Analytic Philosophy”. *Significs* is the branch of linguistics mothered by Lady Welby. Prof. Pietarinen revealed in the course of his talk the existence of correspondence between Lady Welby and Russell, and this exciting tidbit led me to read these instructive letters during a later visit to the Archives. In my opinion, they reveal Russell's skill in giving the brush-off, though he later seems to have changed his assessment of the value of Welby's work, and it is perhaps mostly through Russell's intellectual honesty in attributing certain ideas to Welby that most of us know of her work at all.

In “Russell, Wittgenstein, and Logical Atomism” Prof. Paul Los argued against the view that atomism arose under Wittgenstein's influence, giving evidence of an earlier date and a different provenance for that theory by referring us, in part, to Russell's baldly explicit realism in his 1911 French paper “Analytic Realism”. Fellow Russellian James Connelly spoke on “Wittgenstein On Proper Names and Logical Truth” arguing for the presence in the *Tractatus* of an interesting and important theory of proper names. In taking this line James perhaps places himself in the overdue backlash to the current fashion of denying that Wittgenstein ever had any theories, meant to express theories - or heck! - even knew what a theory was.

INSERTED into scanned documents 7/18/2015
by Dennis J. Darland (who scanned them)

Note: Treasurer's Reports in Issues 120-127 contained errors introduced in the editing process. Corrected reports were included in combined issue 128-129. This is noted on page 7 of that issue.

In the morning session, Prof. David Martens gave an exquisitely crafted argument in a paper called "McTaggart On the Conditions for Knowledge". I have since come to realize exactly how rare McTaggart scholars are, so this was a unique treat. Prof. Stefanie Rocknak of Hartnack College in New York spoke on "Russell's Impact on Quine". Her paper (and those of the other speakers) was well received by a healthy audience of about 12 souls.

Aaron Preston's paper "Current Work on the History and Nature of Analytic Philosophy" created sufficient flap and high feeling that it was necessary for the group to continue the conversation afterward in the calming presence of food and drink. His talk describes analytic philosophy as a will o' the wisp, a *façon de parler* with no common feature or language game uniting its supposed representatives. What is interesting about Aaron's treatment of the topic - for me anyway - is what it reveals about his conceptions of philosophy in general. Not everyone will agree with me that philosophy is essentially meta-philosophy; this is a matter of taste. And so, too, is the Central APA. —Rosalind Carey

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Vote!

Vote!**Vote!**

Vote!

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Email all votes to
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Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.
2nd Quarter 2005 Treasurer's Report
4/1/2005 - 6/30/2005

| | |
|------------------------|------------------|
| BALANCE 3/31/05 | 14,164.00 |
| <hr/> | |
| INCOME | 248.24 |
| Contributions | 248.24 |
| Contributions BRS | |
| TOTAL Contributions | |
| Dues | 242.00 |
| New Members | 905.00 |
| Renewals | 1,147.00 |
| TOTAL Dues | |
| Library Inc | 6.00 |
| Meeting Inc | 1,598.92 |
| OD Conference Fees | 0.00 |
| Other Income | 38.82 |
| TOTAL INCOME | 3,038.98 |
| <hr/> | |
| EXPENSES | 41.51 |
| Bank Charges | 14.92 |
| Library Exp | 2,104.69 |
| Meeting Exp | 517.45 |
| BRSQ | 269.40 |
| Other Expenses | 24.52 |
| PayPal Fees | |
| Russell Subscriptions | 3,171.00 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | 6,143.49 |
| <hr/> | |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -3,104.51 |
| <hr/> | |
| BALANCE 6/30/05 | 11,059.49 |

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- DEC. 4 "WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN"
- JAN. 8 RUSSELL AND CRITICAL THINKING
- FEB. 5 RUSSELL AND OLD AGE
- MAR. 4 RUSSELL ON WORLD GOVERNMENT
- APR. 2 THE CUNY AFFAIR
- MAY 18 A CELEBRATION OF RUSSELL'S BIRTHDAY*
* This event takes place on Thursday

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Double Issue

Numbers 128-129 / November 2005-February 2006



WAS RUSSELL A SECULAR HUMANIST?

Published by The Bertrand Russell Society with the
support of Lehman College – City University of New York

THE *BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY* is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society news and proceedings and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

EDITORS: Rosalind Carey and John Ongley.
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SUBMISSIONS: All communications to the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, including manuscripts, book reviews, letters to the editor, etc., should be sent to: Rosalind Carey, Philosophy Department, Lehman College-CUNY, 250 Bedford Park Blvd. West, Bronx, NY 10468, USA, or by email to: rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Double Issue

Numbers 128-129 / November 2005-February 2006

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Cover: Bertrand Russell on the terrace at Portmeirion about 1950

MIND

BERTRAND RUSSELL CENTENARY SPECIAL ISSUE

Mind has celebrated the Centenary of Bertrand Russell's landmark essay 'On Denoting' by devoting our October 2005 issue entirely to this seminal paper.

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IN THIS ISSUE

WAS RUSSELL A SECULAR HUMANIST? Many members of the Russell Society seem to think so; others disagree. Francis Mortyn of the American Humanist Association reports that the term 'secular humanism' was first used by the Moral Majority in the 60s and 70s as a form of disparagement and only gained currency among humanists when Paul Kurtz adopted the term in 1979 or 1980 to refer to his own humanist group, which today is the Council for Secular Humanism. Mortyn further claims that the concept of secular humanism "offers no philosophical advance" over that of humanism, that is, there is no theoretical difference between the two terms.¹

There is some justice to the claim that there is no philosophical difference between humanists and secular humanists. What American humanists have meant by 'humanism' from at least 1933 on can be seen in their 1933 *Humanist Manifesto*. Comparing this document to the description of secular humanism at the website of the Council of Secular Humanism shows that both humanists and secular humanists reject theism (belief in a supernatural being) and accept naturalism (the view that it is only within science itself that reality can be described). Both reject a supernatural creation of the earth, both accept evolution theory as best accounting for the creation of human beings, both seek moral values that will make people's lives better, and both think it is by reason and experience that such values will be found.²

The difference between humanists and secular humanists, if any, seems to be an emotional one. Though rejecting theism and accepting naturalism, the humanists of the 1933 manifesto quite astonishingly called themselves 'religious humanists' – the majority of the signatories of the manifesto were in fact Unitarian clergy! Essentially, they were naturalists committed to using reason to improve people's lives *who liked religion* and so wanted to call this view religion too. In contrast, secular humanists are naturalists committed to using reason to improve people's lives who, according to their website, are people who "typically describe themselves as non-religious", that is, they are people who *don't* like religion.

¹ Francis Mortyn, private email to John Ongley, July 16, 2006.

² The 1933 Humanist Manifesto and Council of Secular Humanism description of secular humanism can both be found on the web.

So where does Russell belong in all of this? While he was a member of the British Humanist Association (at one time presided over by A.J. Ayer), he tended to call himself either a rationalist or a skeptic. Still, it seems fair to say that he was some sort of humanist. But what kind? He valued what he called "personal religion" by which he seems to have meant ecstatic religious experiences and strong moral intuitions, though he refused to infer from these experiences to belief in a supernatural being, much like the religious humanists, and so would have fit well among them. At the same time, he never passed up an opportunity to kick organized religion and so would have also fit in well among the secular humanists.

Then again, humanists are naturalists, so if Russell was not a naturalist it would not be right to call him a humanist of any kind. Was Russell, then, a naturalist?

IN THIS ISSUE, ANDREW LUGG ARGUES, in 'Russell as a Precursor of Quine', that yes, Russell was indeed a naturalist in his philosophy from at least 1914 on. Lugg argues this point by comparing Russell's views on philosophy with Quine's naturalism, showing that Russell and Quine agree on most fundamental issues, and concludes that the best way of viewing Russell is as a precursor of Quine's naturalism and the best way of viewing Quine is as a follower of Russell. And if Lugg is correct, then given Russell's other likenesses with humanism, perhaps it is most fair to say that on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays Russell was a religious humanist and on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays a secular one. I leave it to the reader to decide what Russell was on Sundays.

The nature of Russell's views on naturalism are not all that are examined in this issue. Alongside these matters, CHAD TRAINER explores THE NOOKS AND CRANNIES OF RUSSELL'S VIEWS ON WORLD GOVERNMENT in his essay 'Solitary, Poor, Nasty, Brutish and Short: Russell's Views of Life without World Government'. Trainer begins by noting that Russell's views on world government were nearly the same as Hobbes's views on national ones and then fleshes this observation out, exploring the details of their similarities and differences, ending with an assessment of the pertinence of Russell's views on world government for today's world.

SOCIETY NEWS

TIME TO RENEW. The BRS exists to serve you by providing you with annual and other meetings, various publications and an online community, and the membership dues of the society enable the BRS to fulfill its function, so if you have not already paid your dues, we hope that you will do so now.

IOWA CITY, IOWA. The weekend of June 1-3 marked the occasion of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the BRS, convening for the first time at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa. The Society extends its thanks to Gregory Landini, convener, for making the event possible and for seeing to it that the weekend went smoothly. This was the first time that the BRS annual meeting has made it to this part of the US, and a general sense of excitement about the venue accompanied the many fine talks. A complete report of the Annual Meeting will be published in the next issue of the BRS *Quarterly*.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Editors:

I was saddened to learn in the August 2005 *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* of the death of Whitfield Cobb. He was an extremely warm and engaging man who I met at several BRS annual meetings in the early 1990s. I was new to the Society then, and Cobb was one of the several people who helped me feel at home and convinced me that I was in the right place (despite being perhaps 20 years younger than most of the meeting attendees). He will be missed.

Yours very sincerely,

Peter Stone.

A BRS LIFE MEMBERSHIP COUPLE! The Bertrand Russell Society gained two new life members this past spring *and its first life membership couple* when Eberhard and Yvonne Jonath of Volketswil Switzerland became life members of the Society in March. Yvonne says that it was from reading his *History of Western Philosophy* that she first became impressed by Russell – for his rationalism, courage, humor, and personality. Eberhard says he admires Russell's willingness to give up his scientific opinions when they were no

longer well-grounded. Yvonne suggests a BRS meeting in Europe sometime, something that has been discussed now and then in the BRS but never acted on. We are grateful to the Jonaths for their generous gift and are delighted to have them as life members.

AND YET ANOTHER LIFE MEMBER. Michael Berumen has also become a life member of the Russell Society. Michael is a businessman and philosopher who lives in Southern California (Laguna Niguel) who has written a book on ethics called *Do No Evil: Ethics with Application to Economics Theory and Business*. Michael has wondered about a BRS meeting in California, another prospect that has been discussed now and again in the BRS. As with the Jonaths, we are grateful to Michael for his generous gift and pleased to have him as a life member of the BRS.

NEW SOCIETY HONORARY MEMBER. David Henehan reports that after months of searching for Tariq Ali, David finally found him and notified him of the Society's offer of an honorary membership. Ali has accepted the offer and so is the newest honorary member of the Society. Tariq Ali is a noted author, filmmaker, BBC commentator and historian who regularly contributes to the *Guardian*, *Counterpunch*, and the *London Review of Books*. We feel privileged to have him as an honorary member of the BRS.

GET ON THE MAP! Curious where other BRS members live? Thanks to Bob Riemenschneider, you can now find out! To find the BRS map site, go online to <http://frapper.com/bertrandrussellsociety>. Once there and enrolled, you can add your name—and a photo if you like—to the BRS map along with the 29 members who are already on it. A tiny balloon marks your spot on the map. (It marks your movements too, if you travel.) Clicking on your balloon expands it and displays your name, photo, and message to the BRS community. Clicking on any area of the map allows you to zoom into a location almost to street level. Besides being useful, the website contains such moving tributes to intellectualism and free thought as “Philosophy is mathematics”, “Mathematics is philosophy” and “Warren, move your balloon, you're crowding me!”

APROPOS OF THE MAP, a pipe-smoking Bertie was spotted in the (Frapp) vicinity of Pembroke Road, East of Ham and Northwest of London. The same Bertie was subsequently reported wandering around Utah in an empty field West of Route 50. According to our sources, Bertie appears to be lost and resorting to strong language.

EASTERN AND CENTRAL DIVISION ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE APA. The Bertrand Russell Society hosted sessions of talks at both the Eastern and Central APA meetings this past year. An account of the sessions at the Eastern meeting (December 27-30) can be found in the Traveler's Diary in the back of this issue. This year's Central meeting (April 26-29), housed within the gilt walls of the Palmer Hotel in Chicago, included a broad mix of talks, with Stephen Mumford (University of Nottingham) speaking on “Russell's Defense of Idleness”, Nikolay Milkov (Bielefeld University) on “The Joint Program of Russell and Wittgenstein: March-November 1912”, and Eric Wielenberg (DePauw University) speaking on “Bertrand Russell and C. S. Lewis: Two Peas in a Pod”, with Nikolay Milkov responding. Our friends in HEAPS (History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society) sponsored a related session of talks there, with Paul Pojman (Towson University) speaking on “From Mach to Carnap: A Tale of Confusion”, Aaron Preston (Malone College) speaking on “Scientism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy”, and Giancarlo Zanet (University of Palermo) speaking on “Pragmatism, the A Priori and Analyticity: C. I. Lewis and Quine”.

THIS ISSUE'S TREASURER'S REPORTS. In order to correct for some past inaccuracies, we are republishing several past BRS treasurer's reports.

FEATURES

RUSSELL AS A PRECURSOR OF QUINE *

ANDREW LUGG

AT THE END OF HIS CONTRIBUTION to a panel on Bertrand Russell's philosophy at the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia in 1966, W.V. Quine draws attention to Russell's "increasing naturalism".¹ Unsurprisingly given Quine's belief that "it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described",² he applauds Russell's move to neutral monism and the subsequent "drift" in his thinking towards a more comprehensive naturalism. He only regrets that Russell's "neutral particulars are on the side of sense data" and his later epistemology falls short of "the physicalistic pole, even in *Human Knowledge*". On his interpretation, "Russell had stated the basis for [the naturalistic] attitude already in 1914 [in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, one of Russell's earliest forays into epistemology]".³ He observes that in *Our Knowledge* Russell says: "There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from which to criticize the whole of knowledge of daily life. The most that can be done is to examine and purify our common knowledge by an internal scrutiny, assuming the canons by which it has been obtained".⁴

Quine's account of Russell's developing philosophical views is not uncontroversial. It is questionable whether Russell advanced a "frankly phenomenalist form" of "logical atomism" and developed his more naturalistic version of neutral monism by "warping" his

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¹ 'Russell's Ontological Development', p. 85.

² 'Things and Their Place in Theories', p. 21.

³ 'Russell's Ontological Development', p. 85.

⁴ p. 71 in the edition of *Our Knowledge* that Quine quotes, pp. 73-74 in later editions.

atomism.⁵ And questionable too whether he came to favour the naturalism Quine attributes to him only in 1928 and whether his philosophy became increasingly naturalistic in the years that followed. Naturalism makes an appearance in the 1914 lecture Quine refers to, and Russell's epistemology of the 1940s is not significantly more naturalistic than his epistemology of the 1920s. Quine is surely right, however, about the naturalistic cast of Russell's thinking. Early and late, Russell rejected the possibility of justifying our knowledge of the external world without assuming anything whatsoever about the world itself and never attempted to seek out "superfine ... knowledge".⁶ However much Russell changed his views between the early 1910s and the late 1950s, he took the methods of epistemology to be the methods of science and everyday life. He shunned the idea of a first philosophy and demonstrated, as Quine notes, "a readiness to see philosophy as natural science trained on itself and permitted free use of scientific findings".

In what follows I take up Quine's hint and defend his conception of Russell as a naturalistic epistemologist. I argue that Russell approaches the problem of our knowledge of the external world in much the same way as Quine approaches the problem and the difference between them regarding the relationship of our knowledge to the evidence on which it is based, though important, is one between philosophers in the same naturalist camp. Nobody needs reminding that Russell does not agree with Quine on everything – that, for instance, he has a different view of the nature of necessity and the *a priori* and thinks of analysis as getting at hidden meanings rather than as a clarificatory enterprise. My contention is that Russell advances his epistemological speculations in as scientific a spirit as Quine, occasional appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. He intends his discussion of our knowledge of the external world to be understood as a contribution to science and is far better viewed as a precursor of Quine than as the traditionally-minded philosopher he is usually taken to be – and Quine correspondingly better viewed as a follower of Russell than as a lapsed logical positivist. I start by noting some important similarities between Russell's thinking and Quine's.

⁵ 'Russell's Ontological Development', p. 85.

⁶ *Ibid.*

IT NEEDS NOTICING RIGHT AWAY that Russell is as antipathetic as Quine to the dream of a foundation for scientific and commonsense knowledge firmer than and prior to science and commonsense. He does not discuss our knowledge from a standpoint beyond what we know but scrutinises it given what we know. It is, he thinks, no part of the philosopher's task to demonstrate once and for all that belief in the existence of the external world is justified, and he devotes his efforts to critically examining and organising our beliefs to reveal their relative strengths and how they are interrelated. Thus in 1927 in *Outline of Philosophy* he writes: "Philosophy involves a criticism of scientific knowledge, not from a point of view ultimately different from science, but from a point of view less concerned with details and more concerned with the harmony of the whole body of special sciences" (p. 2). And still earlier, in 1912, he writes in *Problems of Philosophy*, his first major work in epistemology: "Philosophical knowledge ... does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science, and the results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those obtained from science" (p. 149).⁷

Time and again Russell declares that he takes epistemology to be a science combining logic and psychology. In *Theory of Knowledge*, for instance, he avers that "it is impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic and psychology" (p. 46) and in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* he underlines that "[e]pistemology involves both logical and psychological elements" (p. 18). On his reckoning, as he explains in *Inquiry*, epistemology is psychological insofar as it concerns "the relation of basic propositions to experiences, the degree of doubt or certainty that we feel in regard to any of them, and the methods of diminishing the former and increasing the latter", logical insofar as it concerns "the inferential relation ... between basic propositions and those we believe because of them; also the logical relations which often subsist between different basic propositions, ... also the logical character of the basic propositions themselves". For all the differ-

⁷ Also compare *Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 25-26, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 74, and Quine's quotation from the same work cited earlier.

ences between Russell and Quine regarding experience, basic propositions and the character of the “inferential relation”, their general stances are much the same. Both are concerned with “the central logical structure of empirical evidence” and both persuaded that the “essentials” of “the relation of evidential support ... can be schematized by little more than logical analysis”.⁸

When Russell turns to the specific problem of the external world, moreover, he states without qualification that he is engaged in a scientific endeavour. Thus in ‘Professor Dewey’s “Essays in Experimental Logic”’, a review he wrote for the *Journal of Philosophy* in 1919, he says: “The chief thing that I wish to make clear is that in discussing the world as a logical problem, I am dealing in a scientific spirit with a genuine scientific question, in fact a question of physics” (p. 21). (The reason Russell refers to the problem of the external world as a “logical problem” is that he takes it to concern the question of “[w]hat, apart from argument and inference ... surviv[es] a critical scrutiny [and] what inferences will then be possible?” (pp. 20-21).)⁹ Here Russell not only anticipates Quine’s question: “Whence then the strength of our notion that there is a physical world?”, he also anticipates his view of the question as one “for the natural science of the external world, in particular, for the psychology of human animals”.¹⁰ (Incidentally, Russell also agrees with Dewey regarding the nature of the problem. He is not, as followers of Dewey frequently assume, committed to the idea of a first philosophy.)¹¹

Russell avails himself of scientific results whenever he can. He would have had no quarrel with Quine’s claim that “it is a finding of natural science itself, however fallible, that our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors” or with his conception of “the relation of science to its sensory data

⁸ Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, p. 18 and pp. 1-2.

⁹ Also compare *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Lecture III. In this lecture Russell speaks of himself as “apply[ing] the logical-analytic method” to the problem (p. 72).

¹⁰ Quine, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p. 230.

¹¹ In ‘Professor Dewey’s “Essays in Experimental Logic”’, Russell writes: “I suppose [Dewey] would say, what I should agree to in a certain fundamental sense, that knowledge must be accepted as a fact, and cannot be proved from the outside” (p. 17).

[as] a relation open to inquiry as a chapter of the science of [an antecedently acknowledged external] world”.¹² As Russell explicitly notes in his review of Dewey, in observing that “the conception of a ‘datum’ becomes, as it were, a limiting conception of what we may call scientific common-sense”, he is “proceeding along ordinary scientific lines” (p. 21). And as he explicitly says in his 1923 article on ‘Vagueness’ he thinks that “if you are going to allow any inferences from what you directly experience to other entities, then physics supplies the safest form of such inferences” (p. 154).¹³

More striking still, Russell’s picture of those doing the knowing is reminiscent of nothing so much as Quine’s picture of them. Like Quine, he conceives the knowing subject as a physical object acted on by external forces and reacting from time to time by disturbing his or her immediate surroundings. It was Quine who said: “I am a physical object sitting in a physical world. Some of the forces of this physical world impinge on my surface. Light rays strike my retinas; molecules bombard my eardrums and fingertips. I strike back emanating concentric airwaves. These waves take the form of a torrent of discourse about tables, people, molecules, retinas, air waves, prime numbers, infinite classes, joy and sorrow, good and evil”.¹⁴ But it could have been Russell. Certainly Russell had no compunction about writing in *The Analysis of Matter*: “In the last analysis, all our knowledge of matter is derived from perceptions, which are themselves causally dependent on effects on our bodies.... What we hear, and what we read in books, comes to us entirely through a flow of energy across the boundaries of our bodies” (pp. 27, 28).¹⁵

To picture knowers as surfaces across which energy travels, as Russell – and following him Quine – does, is to opt for the physicist’s view of them and to refrain from describing them in intention-

¹² *Pursuit of Truth*, p. 19.

¹³ Also compare *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 75-80.

¹⁴ These are the opening sentences of ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, the paper in which Quine lays out his epistemological project for the first time.

¹⁵ Burton Dreben, perhaps Quine’s closest associate, told me that when he asked Quine about the similarity of his view to Russell’s, Quine assured him – much to Dreben’s surprise – that he had not read *The Analysis of Matter* before writing ‘The Scope and Language of Science’.

al or mentalistic terms. The thought is that each of us comes up with our knowledge of the world from the slenderest of data, specifically physical, sensory data, and it falls to the epistemologist to explain how we can know about the world beyond our surfaces given that we only have (according to natural science) what crosses our surfaces to go on. Though it is hard to imagine Russell declaring in so many words: "All I am or ever can hope to be is due to irritations of my surface, together with such latent tendencies to response as may have been present in my original germ plasm",¹⁶ he is as committed as Quine to regarding the knowing subject as a system governed by the laws of physics. In his 1927 book *The Analysis of Matter*, for instance, he stresses the "physical significance" of his conception and treats the individual knower as "an oval surface, which is liable to continuous motion and change of shape, but persists throughout time", a surface across which energy flows, "sometimes inward, sometimes outward" (pp. 27-28). He even writes in 'Vagueness': "People do not say that a barometer "knows" when it is going to rain; but I doubt that there is any essential difference between the barometer and the meteorologist, who observes it" (p. 154).

HAVING DRAWN ATTENTION to important similarities between Russell and Quine, I turn now to what may be thought to be stumbling blocks to grouping them together, starting with the seemingly awkward fact that Russell avails himself of the method of Cartesian doubt, something Quine never does. It is tempting to object that no naturalistic philosopher would appeal as brazenly as Russell to such doubt, never mind invoke it as he does in *Our Knowledge of the External World* to isolate data "which resist the solvent of critical reflection" (pp. 77-78).¹⁷ This objection, however, labours under the difficulty that Russell does not invoke the method of doubt to determine what is "completely indubitable", only deploys it in the course of his logico-psychological investigations, as he says in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, to determine a set of propositions "not wholly derived from their logical relations to other propositions" (p. 125). It is no coincidence that he emphasises in *Human Knowledge*

¹⁶ Quine, 'The Scope and Language of Science', p. 228.

¹⁷ Russell also describes his task in this work as one of "discovering what sort of world can be constructed by ... means [of hard data] alone" (p. 79).

that he is "expounding part of Descartes' argument", not the whole of it, and troubles to note that Cartesian doubt has "value as a means of articulating our knowledge and showing what depends on what" (pp. 188, 196).

Russell does, it is true, say in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* that "the whole subject [of epistemology] is a product of Cartesian doubt" (p. 16; also p. 117). But Quine, a naturalistic thinker if ever there was one, believes the same thing, his view being, as he puts it in 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', that "the theory of knowledge has its origin in doubt" (p. 67). Moreover, as Quine immediately goes on to note, the crucial question is not whether "[d]oubt prompts the theory of knowledge" but whether "knowledge, also, was what prompted the doubt", i.e. whether the doubts are "scientific" rather than independent philosophical doubts (pp. 67, 68). And in any case Russell himself is motivated by doubts that arise within science, not by ones imported from the outside. To his way of thinking, epistemology would be an idle pastime were it not for the fact that, as he says in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, science undermines "the doctrine that things are what they seem", indeed is "at war with itself" (p. 15). He takes our knowledge to be worth scrutinising, criticising and reorganising for the simple reason that whenever he ponders the external world from within the framework of science he finds himself "full of hitherto unquestioned assumptions, for many of which [he has] as yet no adequate reason".¹⁸ In other words for him the method of doubt is a method of science, one that scientists help themselves to from time to time, for instance when they submit their own scientific beliefs to "internal scrutiny".

Nor is it a problem for the interpretation of Russell's philosophy I am defending that he stands foursquare against the Quinean view that behaviourism is mandatory for a properly scientific epistemology. Russell does, to be sure, criticise behaviourism by arguing that psychologists may be deceived in much the same way as "the animals [they are studying] are deceived by mirrors" and that "[w]hen the behaviourist observes the doings of animals, and decides whether these show knowledge or error, he is not thinking of himself as an animal, but at least as a hypothetically inerrant recorder of what

¹⁸ 'Professor Dewey's "Essays in Experimental Logic"', p. 20.

actually happens".¹⁹ For Russell the behavioural scientist "gives a false sense of objectivity to the results of his observation[s]" because he "omit[s] the fact that *he*—an organism like any other—is observing".²⁰ None of this, however, shows Russell to have been less than fully consistent in regarding the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a scientific problem. To the contrary, far from repudiating naturalism and opting for first philosophy, he simply draws what he takes to be a consequence of our present-day scientific knowledge. His attack on behaviourism is an attack from within the naturalist's framework, not from outside it.

Russell's central point about behaviourism is, as he put it in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, that it fails to acknowledge an important item of scientific scripture, "scripture [that], in its most canonical form, is embodied in physics (including physiology)" (p. 15). He holds that a "serpent [has been introduced] into the behaviourist's paradise" once "the fallibility of the observer" is noticed, a serpent that "has no difficulty in quoting scientific scripture [to prompt doubts about the external world]". It is, he would have us appreciate, a consequence of science itself that we must start from sensory data rather than from overt behaviour and consider how we manage to obtain our knowledge of the world from our perceptions. The epistemological problem concerns our knowledge of human behaviour (and human physiology) as well as our knowledge of the physical world, and only by considering the antecedents of behaviour and what goes on in our heads from a scientific standpoint can we hope to clarify how human knowers know anything at all.

In this context it is also important to notice that Russell's remarks about acquaintance in *Problems of Philosophy*, *Theory of Knowledge* and other early epistemological writings do not cause trouble for my line of interpretation. Though his conception of knowledge by direct, unmediated acquaintance is foreign to Quine, his epistemological project, early and late, is not fundamentally different. There is for one thing more than a slight echo of Russell's view that "the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted" in Quine's view that "all inculcation

¹⁹ *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, pp. 14-15. Also compare *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 105.

²⁰ *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 15.

of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence".²¹ And for another the principle of acquaintance – "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted"²² – is not in and of itself antithetical to naturalism. Nor, contrary to what is often supposed, did Russell himself regard the principle as an independent constraint on analysis, one that precedes scientific investigation. In good Quinean fashion, he took it to stand and fall with his theory of the world and treated the question of what we are (directly) acquainted with, if anything, as a scientific question.²³

Again it is no objection to the present line of thought that Russell contrasts his brand of "'theory of knowledge' ... or 'epistemology', as it is also called", with "theory of knowledge [that] accept[s] the scientific account of the world ... as the best at present available".²⁴ To insist, as Russell does, that the first kind of theory of knowledge is "deeper and [of] much greater importance" than the second kind of theory is not to come down on the non-naturalist side of the fence. The distinction in question is a distinction between two types of naturalistic theory of knowledge, the sort Russell aims to develop and the sort a psychologist or sociologist might attempt to provide, i.e. one that recognises that "the world ... contains a phenomenon called 'knowing', and ... consider[s] what sort of phenomenon this is". In fact there is no discernible difference between the sort of "theory of knowledge" Russell favours and the sort Quine envisions in point of depth and importance. Both philosophers are occupied with what in *Pursuit of Truth* Quine characterises as "central to traditional epistemology", namely the job of clar-

²¹ Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 58; Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized', p. 75.

²² Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 58 (Russell's italics).

²³ A full discussion of this point is out of the question here. I shall only say that I believe Russell is best read as revising his views about acquaintance along with his understanding of the deliverances of natural science (in this connection see the references in footnote 7 and the accompanying text). Also I would argue that Russell eventually dispensed with the notion of acquaintance because he came to think it scientifically problematic and superfluous.

²⁴ *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, pp 15, 14. The following quotations are from p. 14 and pp. 12-13.

ifying the relation of our knowledge as a whole to the sensory information on which it is based (p. 19). And both philosophers take the epistemologist's main task, as Russell says in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, to be one of arranging "what we think we know in a certain order in which what comes later is known (if it is known) because of what comes earlier" (p. 16).

Finally to allay another possible worry, I should stress that nothing I have been suggesting runs counter to Russell's conception of logic in *Our Knowledge of the External World* as "the essence of philosophy" (Lecture II) or his view in 'On the Scientific Method in Philosophy' that "*philosophy is the science of the possible*" (p. 84, italics in the original). These remarks, as Russell intends them, are perfectly compatible with the naturalistic attitude Quine discerns in his thinking, even required by it. He takes logic to be at the heart of philosophy because, as he says in Lecture II, it "enlarg[es] our abstract imagination" and "provides a method which enables us to obtain results that do not merely embody personal idiosyncrasies" (pp. 68, 69). And he takes philosophy to deal with "the possible" because, as he immediately goes on to note in 'On the Scientific Method in Philosophy', it deals with "the general", the possible and the general being "indistinguishable" (p. 84).²⁵ Moreover I am persuaded that when considered in context, other seemingly troublesome remarks – e.g. Russell's claim in *Theory of Knowledge* that "[a] *knowledge of physics and physiology must not be assumed in theory of knowledge*" (p. 50; italics in the original) – are no less readily accommodated within the framework of the interpretation I am promoting.

MY ARGUMENT HAS BEEN that however much Russell differs from Quine about the nature of natural knowledge, he agrees with him in taking epistemology to be a branch of natural science and in regarding the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a scientific problem. He is an empiricist in the Quinean mode, one who takes the doctrine that there is nothing in the mind about the

²⁵ Compare Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, p. 18. It is, I fancy, hardly accidental that Quine writes: "In the fused phrases of Kant and Russell, [I am concerned with] a question of how our knowledge of the external world is possible."

world not first in the senses to be a finding of science (as opposed to a result of pure inquiry prior to scientific research). His empiricism is integral to his naturalism and he intends his claims about the evidence of the senses and our knowledge of the external world to be understood as hypotheses open to criticism and improvement.²⁶ Where he disagrees with Quine is over what science tells us regarding the data and how the rest of our knowledge is related to them, his epistemological naturalism being one of sense and sensibilia, Quine's one of neural receptors and their stimulation.²⁷ One can summarise how Russell differs from Quine, not too misleadingly, as stemming from the fact that whereas Quine takes the epistemologist's task to be one of shedding light on the transition "from stimulus to science", as the title of his last book has it, Russell takes it to be, as he puts it in his final important philosophical work, one of clarifying "the transition from sense to science".²⁸

The picture I've been sketching of Russell as a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould is very different from the usual picture of him. He is not engaged in a none too successful quest for certainty (over and above the certainty provided by science) or trying to answer the sceptic who aims to put the whole of science into question. The object of the exercise, as Russell understands it, is to develop a genuinely scientific account of "hard" and "soft" data and the relationship between them, and nobody should be fooled by the question he raises at the beginning of *Problems of Philosophy*, his most widely read book: "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?" (p. 7). The reasonable people he has in mind are scientifically-informed thinkers, not sceptics, and he does not mean to suggest his conclusions are immune to sceptical doubt. Rather the opposite. He allocates to philosophy "the more modest function" of providing "an orderly systematic organisation of our knowledge" and allows "it is ... *possible* that all our beliefs may be mistaken"

²⁶ See especially *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 94, and *My Philosophical Development*, p. 20.

²⁷ Compare Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, p. 19.

²⁸ *My Philosophical Development*, p. 153. See also *ibid.*, p. 80, and 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics', pp. 111-113.

(pp. 26, 25; italics in the original). In fact he thinks "the sceptical philosophy is so short as to be uninteresting".²⁹

I hope I have said enough to show that Russell's post-1912 epistemological writings deserve more attention than they are usually accorded and it is a mistake to dismiss them as dull, lacking in substance or without lasting importance. Russell pioneered an important approach to the subject, one that is nowadays commonly endorsed, not least by Quine and philosophers influenced by him. Though perhaps not the first to turn his back on *a priori* philosophical speculation about our knowledge of the external world, Russell is one of only a few philosophers to have attempted, using all the resources of modern logic and modern psychology, to provide a detailed, scientific account of what we know and how we know it. In resisting the lure of *a priori* (non-scientific) conceptual analysis, he can be seen in retrospect at least as attempting to rescue epistemology from what in 'Things and their Place in Theories' Quine calls "the abyss of the transcendental" (p. 23), indeed as paving the way for Quine's own naturalistic epistemology. One can debate whether Russell succeeded in reconstructing epistemology as a branch of natural science and whether he proceeded in a genuinely scientific fashion just as one can debate whether Quine managed to pull off the trick. But there can be no denying his exceptional contribution to naturalistic epistemology as a going concern in the twentieth century.

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²⁹ 'Vagueness', p. 154. See also *An Analysis of Matter*, p. 28, *An Outline of Philosophy*, p. 234, *Human Knowledge*, pp. 9, 196, and *My Philosophical Development*, p. 78.

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SOLITARY, POOR, NASTY, BRUTISH, AND SHORT
RUSSELL'S VIEW OF LIFE WITHOUT
WORLD GOVERNMENT*

CHAD TRAINER

THE JUDGMENTS PASSED BY BERTRAND RUSSELL in his *History of Western Philosophy* on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes are primarily negative. However, the type of politics Hobbes advocated that countries adopt domestically Russell advocated that countries adopt internationally. Though others have noted this analogy, including Russell himself, more needs to be made of the Hobbesian that Russell was capable of being when it came to international relations, especially since Russell was the sort of rebellious reformer who probably would not be tolerated by the sovereign of a Hobbesian state.

I.

THE FOUNDATION OF HOBBS' POLITICAL THINKING is that "the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was ... a war of all men against all men", with Hobbes citing native Americans as an example of this principle.¹ Justice does not exist in such circumstances, and "the time...wherein men live without ... security [is] ... solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". Lamenting this "war with every other man" as "the greatest evil that can happen in this life", Hobbes envisioned our refuge in a governed and legal society where we would have a greater chance of achieving our interests than in a state of nature.²

Hobbes advocated a complete concentration of power in the sovereign both because the separation of powers is thought to diminish power's efficacy and because, however much power corrupts and is subject to abuse, such corruption and abuse only in-

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¹ *Elements of Law* Pt. I, Ch. 14, § 11; *De Cive* VIII, 3; *Leviathan* 1, 13, at *De Cive* I, 13; *De Cive* VIII, 10.

² *Leviathan* 1, 13; 2, 30; *De Cive* I, 2 and *Leviathan* 1, 11.

crease in proportion to the number of parties empowered. Moreover, for Hobbes it is inconceivable that the interests of the sovereign and interests of the subjects diverge.³ The interests of the people are best served by their having an absolute sovereign.

The sovereign's absolute rights include "the absolute use of the sword in peace and war, the making and abrogating of laws, supreme judicature and decision in all debates judicial and deliberative, the nomination of all magistrates and ministers, with the rights contained in the same", and they ought to re-enforce each other and not be divided. For example, the power of the judiciary is vain without the power of executing the laws. Hobbes thought democracy's supposed superior liberty is really just its proximity to the state of nature and war of all against all. If supporters of democracy would only grasp this, they would abhor the liberty of democracy as "worse than all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever".⁴

In his *History of Western Philosophy*, Russell was persuaded by few of Hobbes' points and took him to task, observing that:

[Hobbes] always considers the national interest as a whole, and assumes tacitly, that the major interests of all citizens are the same. He does not realize the importance of the clash between different classes, which Marx makes the chief cause of social change.... In time of war there is a unification of interests, especially if the war is fierce; but in time of peace the clash may be very great between the interests of one class and those of another. It is not by any means always true that, in such a situation, the best way to avert anarchy is to preach the absolute power of the sovereign. Some concession in the way of sharing power may be the only way to prevent civil war. This should have been obvious to Hobbes from the recent history of England (1945 pp. 556-7).

Russell believed that the gravest danger of the state is that its paramount objective is power for its own sake. Given this priority, he says: "It is of the essence of the State to suppress violence within and facilitate it without", maintaining that "The tyranny of the holders of power is a source of needless suffering and misfortune to very large sections of mankind". Democracy, by preventing the

³ *Leviathan* 2, 30; *Elements of Law* Pt. II, Ch. 5, §§ 4-8.

⁴ *Elements of Law* Pt. II, Ch. 1 § 8-13. *De Cive* X, 8. *Elements of Law* Pt. II, Ch. 1 § 16.

concentration of power in the hands of the few, has "... in addition to stability ... has the merit of making governments pay some attention to the welfare of their subjects – not, perhaps, as much as might be wished, but very much more than is shown by absolute monarchies, oligarchies, or dictatorships." In response to the BBC's Woodrow Wyatt's query about the quality of the West's democratic systems, Russell touted the checks on their power as their primary merit.⁵

Moreover, while he agreed with Hobbes that the earlier sort of anarchic existence is worse than legally governed societies, Russell preferred even anarchy to efficient fascism, arguing that "A state may ... be so bad that temporary anarchy seems preferable to its continuance, as in France in 1789 and Russia in 1917". And the perils that accompany the exercise of power can only be compounded by a minority's incompetent approaches to governing.⁶

Within the realm of Russell's own thinking, though, a sharp contrast can be found between his political thinking on domestic and foreign policy. In domestic matters, Russell expressly preferred erring on the side of anarchy rather than tyranny, but when it came to international politics, Russell believed that "only one thing can make world peace secure, and that is the establishment of a world government with a monopoly of all the more serious weapons of war" (1952, p. 277).

A Utopian vision? Not to Russell. He saw the idea of world government as being no less fantastic than the idea of national governments had been during the Middle Ages. In *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, Russell says:

All this, however utopian it may appear, is only a close parallel to what happened in national States as a result of the invention of gunpowder. In the Middle Ages throughout Western Europe powerful barons in their castles could defy the central Government. It was only when artillery became able to destroy castles that the central Government was able to control feudal barons. What gunpowder did in the late Middle Ages, nuclear weapons have to do in our time. I do not

⁵ Russell 1916, pp. 43, 45; Russell 1917b, p. 23; Russell 1938, p. 132; Russell 1960, pp. 81-2.

⁶ Russell 1916, p. 34; Russell 1945, p. 556; Russell 1938, p. 71.

mean that they have to be actually employed. Gunpowder does not often have to be employed to enforce the authority of national Governments against internal criminals.... Submission to a Central Authority may be as distasteful as submission to the king was to medieval barons, but it is in the long run equally necessary" (pp. 69, 71).

Nor did he think because a world government was most likely to be a tyranny, at least at first, that this made the idea unacceptable. In *Unpopular Essays*, he wrote:

In the history of social evolution it will be found that almost invariably the establishment of some sort of government has come first and attempts to make government compatible with personal liberty have come later. In international affairs we have not yet reached the first stage, although it is now evident that international government is at least as important to mankind as national government (p. 142).

Russell's political activism ranged from supporting the West's Cold War priorities to campaigning for nuclear disarmament. The fixed stars in this ever-changing constellation of his political stances, though, were his support for world government and his view that "The only legitimate use of force is to diminish the total amount of force exercised in the world" (1917b, p. 70).

During the 1920s, 30s and 40s, Russell believed that "Far the easiest road to international government would be the unquestionable preponderance of some one State. That State would then be so strong that no other would venture to quarrel with it, and it might for its own purposes forbid the others to fight among themselves...." And in a 1945 article for *Cavalcade*, he more specifically remarked: "I would rather see the United States conquer the whole world and rule it by force than see a prolongation of the present multiplicity of independent Great Powers." However, when Russia acquired nuclear weapons, Russell retreated from the idea of establishing a world government by force and began looking more and more to the United Nations to serve the function of a world government with "sole possession of the major weapons of war".⁷

For example, in a July 14, 1960 letter to *The Guardian*, Russell declared: "The road to World Government, if it is to become possible, must be through the United Nations, enlarged and strength-

⁷ Russell 1923, p.75; Russell 1983 Vol. 2, p.313; Pigden 2003, p.492.

ened, and not through rival military alliances" (Perkins 2002, pp. 223-5). And in his *Autobiography* he said:

The ultimate goal will be a world in which national armed forces are limited to what is necessary for internal stability and in which the only forces capable of acting outside national limits will be those of a reformed United Nations. The approach to this ultimate solution must be piecemeal and must involve a gradual increase in the authority of the United Nations or, possibly, of some new international body which should have sole possession of the major weapons of war. It is difficult to see any other way in which mankind can survive the invention of weapons of mass extinction" (1969, p. 268.).

But whether advocating world government via the US or the UN, Russell's view was that "Every argument that [Hobbes] adduces in favour of government, in so far as it is valid at all, is valid in favour of international government. So long as national States exist and fight each other, only inefficiency can preserve the human race. To improve the fighting quality of separate States without having any means of preventing war is the road to universal destruction" (1945, p. 557). Hobbes' reasons for replacing the state of nature with the sovereign were Russell's reasons for replacing this planet's individual autonomous states with world government.

Interestingly though, it is at just this level of international relations that Hobbes despaired of a legal society with power concentrated in a sovereign; whereas it is precisely at such a level that Russell seemed particularly sanguine about seeing power so concentrated. True, the whole notion of international law was not as common in Hobbes' time as it is in our own. But Hobbes' despair on this front is more attributable to the darkness of his overall outlook than to the conventional wisdom of his day. Over a century earlier, the University of Salamanca's Francis of Vitoria (1480-1546) had composed his landmark tract defending the native Americans in the light of the *ius gentium*, or law of nations. Francis Suárez (1548-1617) further developed the concept of international law, and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) remains renowned to this day for his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*'s contribution to the field.

II.

WERE RUSSELL ALIVE TODAY, it is interesting to consider how he would respond to charges that, while he may have been duly cynical regarding authority figures when it comes to countries' do-

mestic matters, he was unduly optimistic regarding a world government's authority figures, especially considering that he would have a world government enjoying a monopoly on military power.

I suspect that Russell would have encouraged us to understand the contrast as being not so much between domestic politics and foreign policy as between civil and military power. Russell was in favor of this dissociation of civil and military power on the grounds that "The greater modern States are already too large for most civil purposes, but for military purposes they are not large enough, since they are not world-wide" (1916, pp. 71-2). I think Russell would also have hastened in directing us to understand that for Hobbes the power of the sovereign is absolute,⁸ whereas Russell saw himself as preferring the establishment of a world government by consent rather than by force (1948). He further advocated much narrower powers for a world government than anything involved in Hobbes' sovereign. For example, in *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, Russell spoke of how "There will need to be, as in any Federation, a well-defined Constitution, deciding which powers are to be federal. It should be understood that these powers must be only such as are involved in the prevention of war. There must be no interference by the Federal Authority with religion or economic structure or the political system" (1959, p. 68).

At the beginning of World War I, Russell's view was that an international council charged with arbitrating all disputes between nations should rely on moral force alone, for fear that if it tried to enforce its verdicts with armed force, the world was likely to become embroiled in warfare as a result. In taking this view, Russell assumed that such a council would be armed with the forces of its member nations rather than with an international force directly under its control. Such a situation, he thought, would lead to coalitions of belligerents defying the council and neutral states refusing to take part in opposing them so the result was more likely to be a world-wide war than to any other outcome. However, by the following year, he had come to the view that a truly international force assembled under the direct control of the council would be the best way to maintain peace.⁹

⁸ *Elements of Law* Pt. II, Ch. I §§ 8-13; *De Cive* VI, 13; *Leviathan* XVIII.

But what assured Russell that a world government with a monopoly on military power, whether it is the United States or the United Nations, would not seek power for its own sake much as national governments do? Russell's faith in a world government's police power seems to contrast quite sharply with his grim assessments of police power within a country. In *Political Ideals*, Russell made the issue seem as simple as "Just as the police are necessary to prevent the use of force by private citizens, so an international police will be necessary to prevent the lawless use of force by separate states" (1917b, p. 71). And yet, in his 1938 work *Power*, Russell made the point that, even in democracies, "individuals and organisations which are intended to have only certain well-defined executive functions are likely, if unchecked, to acquire a very undesirable independent power. This is especially true of the police" (p. 192). So why would this not be equally true of an international police?

In the ninth chapter of *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, Russell addressed this issue when he said:

Whenever an international armed force is suggested, many people at once raise objections which are equally applicable to municipal police forces. They suggest that such an armed force might make a military revolution and establish a tyranny over the civil authorities. In theory this is possible in the case of national armed forces, and in the less settled parts of the world it sometimes occurs. But there are well-established methods, both in Communist and in non-Communist countries, by which, not only in Russia and in the United States, but even in Nazi Germany, the civil authorities have maintained their supremacy. I see no reason to doubt that these methods would be equally effective in the international sphere (1959, p. 70; see also 1961a, p. 264 and 1961b, pp. 86-87).

And in "Ideas That Have Helped Mankind", Russell stated:

I find it often urged that an international government would be oppressive, and I do not deny that this might be the case, at any rate for a time, but national governments were oppressive when they were new and are still oppressive in most countries, and yet hardly anybody would on this ground advocate anarchy within a nation ... as in the course of the past 5,000 years men have climbed gradually from

⁹ Russell 1915, 1916; Lippincott 1990.

the despotism of the Pharaohs to the glories of the American Constitution, so perhaps in the next 5,000 they may climb from a bad international government to a good one (1950, pp. 142-3).

In 1945, Russell expressed his preference for "all the chaos and destruction of a war conducted by means of the atomic bomb to the universal domination of a government having the evil characteristics of the Nazis".¹⁰ Yet in the 1950s and 60s, Russell was horrified by claims like those of Eleanor Roosevelt and Sidney Hook that the extinction of the human race would be better than life under Soviet rule.¹¹

For example, in the early 1960s Russell inveighed against anti-Communists who invoked Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty, or give me death!" to support their claims that "a world without human beings would be preferable to a Communist world". Russell countered that Patrick Henry's words were "right and proper" in his day because a loss of American lives was an inevitable price to be paid for triumph over British hostility, so "his death might promote liberty". However, Russell contended, "ordered liberty such as Patrick Henry wanted" would never result from a nuclear war.¹²

Significantly, then, if forced to choose between "peace under a tyranny" and "bloodshed under a democracy," Russell would have opted for the former. In "World Government: By Force or Consent?" in the September 4, 1948 edition of *The New Leader*, Russell acknowledged that "I should wish the advocates of world government to realize that its greatest merit, namely the prevention of war, does not depend upon its being established by general consent, but upon its possession of obviously irresistible armed force."¹³ And besides, he viewed history's most horrific regimes as having had a sufficiently brief duration so as to make the long-term preservation of the human race worthwhile. For example, he noted that Genghiz Khan and Kublai Khan were only a generation apart.¹⁴

¹⁰ "Humanity's Last Chance", in *Cavalcade*, October 20 1945, See 1983, p. 312.

¹¹ Russell 1969, pp. 146-7.

¹² Russell 1961b, pp. 42,43.

¹³ I am indebted to Ray Perkins for bringing this source to my attention.

This preference has been aptly characterized by J.C.A. Gaskin as "pure Hobbes".¹⁵ Predictably, Russell would have retorted that "peace under a tyranny" and "bloodshed under a democracy" do not exhaust the options. Rather there is the third option, which he in fact favored, wherein a world body governs countries federally and voluntarily.

The present writer's reservation about Russell's imaginary retort here is that even Hobbes would have been quite fine with voluntary and democratic institutions, provided they acted as a "unitary" sovereign that did not share power with some other governmental unit such as a monarch or other assembly. It is, however, precisely when ideal choices are *not* available that the resulting tough choices provide an index to a person's true politics. In that context, Russell was prepared, with Hobbes, to make the pragmatic choice of tyranny over anarchy.

III.

SINCE RUSSELL WROTE ON THESE SUBJECTS, many changes have taken place in the world, including some international agreement on limiting nuclear weapons, the most important being the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT). However, the UN has not proven to be the force for world government many had hoped it would, much less has it become the "sole possessor of the major weapons of war" that Russell envisioned. When playing peacekeeper in world trouble spots, it frequently has only enough authority to defend itself, and hardly even has the power to collect dues from its members, most notoriously, from the US. Nor has the US, now that it is once again the dominant world power, fulfilled Russell's early hopes that it would create a world government with its unique position in the world.

As noted above, the US is reluctant even to pay its UN dues, and especially during the Bush administration, has withdrawn from or declined to participate in international treaties at an alarming and unprecedented rate, in particular from treaties that aim to make the world safer from war. Among others, it has withdrawn from the

¹⁴ Russell 1959, p. 74-6, Russell 1961b, p. 43, Russell 1969, p. 59; Russell 1969, pp. 146-7.

¹⁵ Gaskin 1994, p. xlii.

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, rejected the Landmine Treaty of 1997, opposed a UN agreement to restrict international trade in small arms (the only UN member to do so), rejected the Kyoto Agreement on Global Warming, and opposed the international criminal court, demanding immunity of all US citizens from prosecution by it. And in threatening to deny Iran (which is an NNPT signatory) civilian nuclear technology while agreeing to provide India (which is not an NNPT signatory) with civilian nuclear technology, both in defiance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the US threatens to destroy, or at least leave that treaty agreement as well. If anything, the US is kicking to pieces whatever international agreements on limiting war there once were.¹⁶

At the end of the Cold War, the world seemed suddenly safer than it had at anytime since the end of WWII, but that greater safety is not so apparent today. While the Cold War's strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) has receded into the background of international relations, the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons has not, especially with the chance that North Korea and Iran might soon have such weapons (along with Israel, India, Pakistan, China, Russia, France, Britain, and the US, who already have them). In fact, just before his death, Joseph Rotblat argued that the threat of a new nuclear arms race is more possible now than ever before given the relaxation about arms control after the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared that nuclear weapons should now be treated like any other weapons in the military arsenal, that is, used whenever militarily appropriate, and the fact that the US is now building new nuclear weapons that will need to be tested. Similarly, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, with their famous Doomsday Clock set to just a few minutes before midnight to represent the threat of nuclear holocaust, moved the minute hand back to 10 minutes to midnight in 1990 from 3 minutes to midnight in 1984, and then back again in 1991 to an unprecedented 17 minutes to midnight, in the same sense of safety others felt at the end of the Cold War. Since then, however, citing circumstances similar to those

¹⁶ Coates 2003, p. 42.

cited by Rotblat, they have moved the minute hand steadily forward again until it now stands at 7 minutes to midnight, in the same position at which it began when the clock first appeared on the *Bulletin's* cover in 1947.

Russell's disappointment with the ability of the United States or United Nations to effectively serve as a world government, combined especially with what Joseph Rotblat and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* see as a recent heightened threat of nuclear war, would probably have prompted Russell, were he alive today, to contend that now, more than ever, even with its attendant risks, efforts should be directed toward power being concentrated in a world government.

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Book Review

A COPIOUS HARVEST: FREGE AND CARNAP AT JENA

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Review of Erich H. Reck, Steve Awodey, Gottfried Gabriel, and Gottlob Frege, *Frege's Lectures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes, 1910-1914*, Open Court Publishing, 2004.

PRIOR TO HIS EMERGENCE as one of the most significant figures in analytic philosophy, Rudolf Carnap attended several courses offered between 1910-1914 by an aging Gottlob Frege at the University of Jena, where the latter had been a professor of logic and mathematics since 1874. The recent publication of Carnap's notes from these courses, as *Frege's Lectures on Logic: Carnap's Student Notes, 1910-1914*, is a significant event in Frege scholarship in particular and the history of analytic philosophy in general. In addition to being of intrinsic interest as a documented philosophical interaction between these two seminal thinkers, the notes also provide extensive insight into the evolution of Frege's logical system and the content of his teaching following Russell's 1902 discovery and communication of his eponymous paradox to Frege.

As the editors of *Carnap's Notes* point out, the volume sheds valuable light on those aspects of Frege's thought that he felt could be retained despite the failure of his logicist project, thus indicating what he saw as the harvest of his life's work (p. 4). The volume also illuminates an important source of Frege's influence within the analytic tradition, namely, Carnap's absorption and subsequent dissemination of Frege's ideas as he encountered them in these lectures.

I

IN ADDITION TO THE TRANSCRIPTIONS of Carnap's notes from three separate lecture courses, *Begriffsschrift I*, Winter 1910-11, *Begriffsschrift II*, Summer 1913, and *Logic in Mathematics*, Summer 1914, the volume contains two appendices meant to be part of either *Begriffsschrift I* or II (it is not clear in which lecture they belong). The transcriptions are accompanied by two introductory essays, which provide key historical, biographical, logical and philosophical background.

The first introductory essay is written by Gottfried Gabriel, the editor of the original German version of these lecture notes.¹ Gabriel compares the exposition found in the notes with those occurring in Frege's *Begriffsschrift* (1879) and *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* (*The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*), Vols. I (1893) and II (1903). He finds that while the exposition is by and large congruous with that offered in *Grundgesetze* – right down, for instance, to the employment of identical code numbers for the relevant laws and theorems – there are some important differences.

As in the *Basic Laws*, Frege employs additional rules of inference beyond the *Begriffsschrift's* single *modus ponens*, and there is a corresponding reduction in the number of the *Begriffsschrift's* basic laws. In fact, the number of basic laws is reduced even further in the notes than in the *Grundgesetze*; here Basic Laws IV, V and VI are all eliminated. While there is “no obvious reason” (p. 3) to dispense with Basic Law IV, Gabriel notes that the elimination of Basic Laws V and VI corresponds to Frege's eliminating value ranges and the description operator, reflecting his retreat from the more constructionist ambitions of his logicism following Russell's identification of the contradiction inherent in it.

Further evidence of Frege's retreat from the logic of the *Grundgesetze* can be found in his analysis of the notion of ordering in a series, which dispenses with value ranges. Other such instances include his use of the term ‘content-stroke’, as he had in the *Begriffsschrift*, in lieu of his later phrase, ‘the horizontal’. Despite this change in terminology, however, “in substance ... the conception of the *Basic Laws* dominates”, the content-stroke being characterized as “a special function of first-level, whose value for the argument ‘the true’ is the true and for all other arguments is the false” (p. 4).

Other highlights of Gabriel's essay include a discussion of how the notes support but also belie Carnap's later and somewhat controversial insistence that Frege defended the viability of logicism in these lectures. Gabriel notes that though Frege had “quietly drawn

¹ The English version, unlike its German counterpart, contains the material included under the title *Logic in Mathematics*, which is the first publication of this material in any language (p. 1), although it “is related to the *Nachgelassene Schriften* (Frege 1983) item by the same name and should be compared to it” (p. 34).

the consequences” of Russell's paradox by eliminating value-ranges, he is nevertheless silent about the antinomy, a fact which may have “led Carnap to the premature conclusion that it presented no problem for him” (p. 7). His “casting doubt” at the outset of the third lecture course “on the representability of mathematical induction ... in purely logical terms” (p. 6) confirms that though Frege treated the *methods of proof* in mathematics and geometry as logical, he did not in these lectures defend the stronger thesis that arithmetic (or geometry) is reducible to logic. Despite his evident abandonment of logicism, Frege nevertheless seems to have continued to conceive of numbers as non-logical objects and “attributions of number as statements about concepts” (p. 7).

The second introductory essay, by Eric H. Reck and Steve Awodey, explicates key ideas and notation prominent in the logical system developed in the notes and provides sketches of Frege as a person and lecturer by people who came into contact with him while Carnap studied at Jena. Carnap's own reflections are included as well as Wittgenstein's. Frege appears as a somewhat frail and unapproachable older gentleman, possessed of an unquestionable charisma, perhaps as a result of the keen intellect and immense passion for logical and scientific work he continued to display despite his advancing years.

II

THE FIRST LECTURE COURSE, *Begriffsschrift* I, resembles the sort of introduction to Frege's key logical and semantic contributions one might get in any contemporary North American philosophy department. Frege begins by explaining such rudimentary elements of his notation as the content-, judgment-, conditional- and negation-strokes, showing how these operate as functions from the truth values of the component sentences they take as arguments to the truth values of the compound statements formed from them, and how other truth-functions, such as conjunction and disjunction, may be built up in turn out of these more primitive ones.

Frege presents several key rules of inference, the most basic of which is transportation (or contraposition (p. 160)), in which an upper term negated takes the place of a lower term, and the lower term negated takes the place of the upper term. Other more intricate forms of inference, like ‘cut’ and ‘negation’, are also introduced

(pp. 33, 60-63). Frege then analyzes rules of inference involving generality, culminating in the classical square of opposition presented in his own function-theoretic and quantificational notation.

Frege notes that the propositions displayed in the square of opposition are identified only for the purposes of showing the connection between his own system and that of traditional logic and that the distinction between subject and predicate, characteristic of the traditional Aristotelian analysis of these forms of judgment, "does violence to the nature of things" (p. 71). The course concludes with a discussion of such semantic distinctions as that between meaning and sense as it applies in the cases of proper names, sentences, concepts, and indirect discourse, as well as such logical distinctions as that between first and second order functions. Interestingly, Frege insists on treating concept words as names of certain sorts of quasi-objects, i.e., concepts (p. 74), despite continuing to adhere to a rigorous distinction between concepts and objects and despite eliminating concept-extensions.

Following *Begriffsschrift* I are two appendices. In the first, Frege analyzes the ontological proof of the existence of God, noting that existence is a 'feature' (*Beschaffenheit*) rather than a 'characteristic' (*Merkmal*) of a concept; in the second he analyzes statements of number as statements about concepts. The appendices are followed by *Begriffsschrift* II. It begins by recapitulating some of the basic logical and semantic notions covered in *Begriffsschrift* I, building on these notions to present a more systemic and advanced treatment of formal deduction.

Frege first shows how his notation can be used to define two key mathematical notions, namely, the continuity of an analytic function at a particular point and the limit of a function for positive arguments increasing towards infinity (pp. 88, 91). Following a four page gap in the notes, which the editors conjecture is where Frege introduced Axioms I and II, he then introduces Axiom III, using it to derive such properties of identity as Leibniz's law, reflexivity, and symmetry (pp. 37, 93-97). This is followed by two proofs, the first that two numbers are equal if each is greater than the other when increased by an arbitrarily small amount and the second that limits are unique. These examples are provided, Frege says, for the purpose of showing "how one can conduct proofs with our notation" (p. 98).

Frege rounds out *Begriffsschrift* II by stressing the importance of rigour in mathematical proof, along with relevant distinctions between the psychological and the logical, functions and their values, real and apparent variables, as well as signs and what those signs signify. He considers several examples from differential and integral calculus, employing them to show that failure to maintain the requisite philosophical distinctions leads to the result that "one contradicts oneself continually" (p. 133). He then concludes by recommending the various questions considered to the student "for further reflection" (ibid.).

Logic in Mathematics, the third lecture course, picks up where *Begriffsschrift* II leaves off, that is, in a more philosophical vein than the earlier material, which consists, by and large, of a technical, if rudimentary, exposition of Frege's logical system. Frege opens the course asking: "Are the inferences in mathematics purely logical? Or are there specifically mathematical inferences that are not governed by general laws of logic?" (p. 135) He then examines a proof of the proposition ' $(a + b) + n = a + (b + n)$ ' via mathematical induction, which he identifies as an inference of the later, specifically mathematical sort (ibid.). After a discussion of this proof, Frege concludes that "every mathematical inference is analyzed into a general mathematical theorem or axiom and a purely logical inference" (p. 134), thus rendering questionable Carnap's claim that at the time of these lectures Frege adhered to the logicist program.

Frege goes on to detail the role played by logical inference within the sort foundational project which he *does* intend to endorse, which involves supplementing purely logical laws with "axioms, postulates, and perhaps definitions" (p. 138). These, he maintains, should be limited to as few a number as possible in the interest of discovering "that kernel out of which all of mathematics can be developed" (p. 137).

Following cursory remarks on postulates and axioms, Frege shifts to a detailed discussion of definitions, which he characterizes as "stipulations that a group of signs can be replaced by simple signs" (p.139), and which he argues are "logically superfluous, but psychologically valuable" (p.140). The discussion leads him to consider some contemporary views of definition and to a critical discussion of various putative definitions of the concept of number reminiscent of that undertaken in the *Foundations of Arithmetic*. In

particular, Weirstrass's definition that "a number is a group of similar things ... (and) a numerical magnitude results from the repeated positing of similar elements," comes up for consideration, leading Frege to remark that "(a)ccording to Weierstrass a railroad train would be a number...(which) now comes racing along from Berlin" (pp. 139-144).

In the remainder of the course, Frege develops some familiar themes in an extended discussion of distinctions between the psychological and the logical, the sense and meaning of proper names and sentences, concepts and objects, as well as first and second order functions. Frege also repeats ideas developed in *Begriffsschrift* II on the importance of distinguishing between a function and its value, particularly when one seeks to identify a complex function as comprised of two simpler component functions, e.g., '(1 + 2x)' from '(1+ 2x)' and 'z' (p. 154).

Some important ideas introduced here include Frege's insistence on the importance of clear and sharp boundaries for concepts, and on the philosophically essential role played by elucidations: "what a function is cannot be defined, it cannot be reduced logically to something more simple; one can only hint at it, elucidate it" (p. 152). The course concludes with reflections on the distinction between direct and indirect proof, with Frege giving examples from geometry which show that false propositions can be employed in constructing sound proofs, provided those propositions are never asserted but are rather explicitly taken throughout the proof as antecedents of conditional statements.

III

I HAVE TRIED TO GIVE A SENSE of the quality and content of the volume by tracing a path through it, highlighting some of the elements which seem to me most interesting and relevant. Specialists in Frege's logical and mathematical work are likely to discover much of value in the volume which has not been touched on here at all, or else very briefly – for example, Frege's discussion of indirect proof vis-à-vis non-Euclidean geometry in the latter portions of the course on *Logic and Mathematics*. By contrast, specialists in philosophy of language are likely to be intrigued by the various discussions of key themes in Fregean semantics developed throughout the volume, which are worth examining both in connection with their

reception by Carnap and in light of developments in Frege's system after the failure of his logicist program. For example, Carnap's claim in *Meaning and Necessity* that Frege held concept-extensions to be meanings of concepts is contradicted in the notes and examined by the editors. Even a non-specialist will benefit from the editors' and Frege's own presentation of key logical and semantic innovations and from the wealth of historical and biographical information concerning both Carnap and Frege. The volume is a first rate piece of scholarship which I recommend to anyone working on or interested in Frege in particular or the history of analytic philosophy in general regardless of their specific level of expertise.

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DISCUSSION NOTES

APPRECIATING THE VARIETIES OF ANALYSIS A REPLY TO ONGLEY

MICHAEL BEANEY

In 'What is Analysis?' (2005), John Ongley reviews my entry on analysis in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. On the whole, he gives a fair summary of the survey of conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy that I offered, and his criticisms raise important issues. However, he fails to do justice to my account in one fundamental respect, and this gives those criticisms an inappropriate edge. As I state explicitly at the beginning of my entry, one of my main aims was to give a sense of the varieties of analysis that can be found in the history of philosophy. It was not my aim to pigeon-hole philosophers into particular categories, which is what many of Ongley's criticisms seem to suggest. Of course, some kind of conceptual framework must be developed to elucidate the various forms of analysis and their interconnections, but it was not my intention to impose a rigid taxonomy. Analytic methodology in the history of philosophy is a dense and tangled forest, and it has too often been assumed that the trees are more or less the same. In recent years there have been fine studies of individual philosophers' conceptions and practices of analysis, but few attempts to see the wood as a whole. Ongley makes pertinent points in relation to individual philosophers, but in offering them up as criticisms of my account, mischaracterizes my project.

In section 1 of his review, Ongley notes correctly that I distinguish three main modes of analysis – decompositional, regressive and interpretive. But he then remarks that "In general, [Beaney] says, *analysis* breaks a concept or proposition down into elements that are used in *synthesis* to justify or explain it" (p. 33). This is not well expressed, and is not what I say; at best, it just reflects the decompositional conception. One of my aims in writing about analysis has been to try to break the stranglehold that the decompositional conception has had on philosophical methodology in the modern period, and in discussions of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, in particular. What I call 'regressive' analysis, understood as the

process of working back to first principles (by means of which something can then be justified or explained in a corresponding process of 'synthesis'), was the dominant conception in the pre-modern period, and is still influential today. (Such a conception is illustrated, for example, in Russell's 1907 paper, 'The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premises of Mathematics'.) Interpretive analysis, too, I argue, is an important mode of analysis, which came to prominence in early analytic philosophy in the emphasis placed on translating propositions into 'correct' logical form, but which also has been implicitly involved in practices of analysis throughout the history of philosophy and science. Although he recognizes these three modes, Ongley fails to appreciate that the assumption that 'analysis' essentially means conceptual decomposition is what most needs to be questioned in understanding the nature of analytic philosophy (in my view). In his final section, he talks of a 'revisionist turn' in the recent history of early analytic philosophy movement, a turn which my work has helped foster. But it is my attack on this assumption that I would want to single out as fundamental in my work.

This is not to say, however, that the decompositional conception is not important, or even central, in many projects of analysis. Rather, when we look at actual practices of analysis, we must recognize that other conceptions may also be involved. Ongley notes this, too, in the first section of his review and in the first paragraph of the second section (p. 34). But he then seems to forget it in the rest of his essay. In the light of his criticisms, I can see now that I should have stressed it more throughout my entry, but as I have said, my main aim was to clarify some of the key forms of analysis and not to do justice to any individual philosopher's conception or practice. For example, in my discussion of Kant (which I admit is far too brief), I was mainly concerned to illustrate the decompositional conception that reached a highpoint in the Leibnizian/Kantian conception of an 'analytic' truth as one in which the predicate is 'contained' in the subject. I had not meant to imply that this was the only conception of analysis in Kant's philosophy. Indeed, on the contrary, I have elsewhere indicated some of the complexities involved in Kant's actual talk of 'analysis' and the 'analytic' method (Beaney 2002). As Ongley quite rightly says (p. 41), Kant also has a regressive conception of analysis. I also agree with Ongley (p. 42)

that sorting out the sense in which the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a 'synthesis' and the *Prolegomena* is an 'analysis' is a key question for Kant scholarship.

Another issue that Ongley raises in his discussion of Kant is that of whether any analytic method is apriori or not. In fact, my failure to address this issue is the main complaint that he makes in his review. In section 2 he writes:

Beaney does not claim that any philosophical method is apriori—in fact, he does not consider whether they are apriori or not. What he does, for the most part, is describe various instances of analysis as 'regressive', 'decompositional', or 'interpretive'. But by simply attaching one of these labels to a method of analysis, we do not learn the details of how the method works, and it is the details that will tell us such things as whether it is empirical or apriori, that is, whether or not empirical propositions must be assumed in order to analyze some concept or proposition. With his own approach to analysis, Beaney cannot answer such questions. This is the major limitation of his approach. (p. 36)

Ongley is right that I do not adequately address the issue of the apriority of analytic methodology, and he has persuaded me that I need to say more about it in my subsequent work. But part of my target in attacking the assumption that analysis is essentially conceptual decomposition is indeed the idea that analysis consists in uncovering the meanings of terms by some apriori method. Ongley comments on the issue at various points in his review, and I found his remarks pertinent and helpful.

Nevertheless, this concession aside, Ongley is bizarrely uncharitable in the passage just cited. For the impression is given that my 'approach' is simply to label different instances of analysis as 'regressive', 'decompositional' or 'interpretive'. This is a caricature of the crudest kind, which is reflected elsewhere in Ongley's review. In opening section 4, for example, he writes (p. 39): "Kant's method of analysis is likewise 'decompositional' according to Beaney. I hope it is becoming apparent how limited the use of these metaphorical labels to describe types of analysis is." Fortunately, however, this caricature is contradicted by Ongley's own summary of my survey, a summary which provides at least some details of specific methods of analysis; and many more details are provided in my survey itself. Ongley makes use of my terminology, too, in pointing out (correctly, as just noted) that Kant has a regressive as

well as a decompositional conception of analysis: expressing it like this neatly encapsulates a feature of Kant's work which has not been sufficiently recognized. Of course, 'regressive', 'decompositional' and 'interpretive' are only terms that represent the first step in going beyond simple talk of 'analysis', and one needs to look at the details of how any given method works to understand it properly. I find it baffling that someone could have read my entry on analysis and thought that all I was doing was offering a tripartite taxonomy, not least because of my emphasis on the way that all three modes are typically implicated in any actual practice of analysis. The conceptions of analysis I distinguish are intended as tools to open up our thinking about analysis, and not as a classificatory device to block further understanding.

In fact, in elaborating my account, I draw all sorts of other distinctions (which can be found in the literature) – between whole-part (decompositional) analysis and function-argument analysis, between 'logical' or 'same-level' analysis and 'metaphysical' or 'new-level' analysis, between 'analysis' and 'quasi-analysis', between reductive analysis and connective analysis, and so on. I also discuss related conceptions such as that of Plato's method of division and Carnap's notion of explication, and issues such as the paradox of analysis and Ryle's idea of a 'category-mistake'. Ongley mentions some of this (pp. 47, 50-1), which makes it even more surprising that he should think that I am essentially engaged in a pigeonholing exercise.

Ongley and I share an interest in the history of early analytic philosophy, and it is here, in particular, that Ongley's assumption that I am essentially pigeonholing distorts his discussion of my account, and motivates some unwarranted complaints. In section 5 of his review, he writes:

Examining the twentieth century, Beaney begins with a general characterization of 20th century philosophical analysis. "What characterizes analytic philosophy as it was founded by Frege and Russell," he says, "is the role played by *logical* analysis, which depended on the development of modern logic. Although other and subsequent forms of analysis, such as linguistic analysis, were less wedded to systems of formal analysis, the central insight motivating logical analysis remained." Beaney admits that this characterization does not fit Moore or one strand of analytic philosophy, but thinks that the

tradition founded by Russell and Frege is analytic philosophy's central strand. (p. 44)

At the level of conversational implicature, this is misleading. For it makes it look as if I am offering a general definition, but then finding myself forced to admit an important exception. What I actually do in beginning my section on conceptions of analysis in analytic philosophy (note the use of the plural here) is criticize the assumption that decompositional analysis is what characterizes analytic philosophy (since decompositional analysis was around long before analytic philosophy emerged). I remark that "This might be true of Moore's early work, and of one strand within analytic philosophy; but it is not generally true". It is *at this point* that I then say what Ongley quotes me as saying. The "as it was founded by Frege and Russell" makes clear that I am just referring to one – albeit central – strand in analytic philosophy, and not to analytic philosophy as a whole. Ongley gets the dialectic of my argument wrong. I am not forced to 'admit' that my characterization does not fit Moore. It was never intended to do so in the first place.

As I said above, one of my targets in writing about analysis is the view that philosophical analysis is essentially conceptual decomposition, and that this is therefore what characterizes 'analytic' philosophy. But this view does no justice at all to the actual methodologies employed by those who are generally regarded as analytic philosophers (understood as including Frege and Russell, as well as later philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ryle, etc.). So in focusing on logical analysis, and the Frege-Russell strand, my aim is to correct this mistaken view. Ongley seems to think that I am merely replacing one crude definition of analysis in analytic philosophy with another, whereas my main concern is to show just what a rich variety of conceptions of analysis there are even within analytic philosophy. In fact, we have only to consider the Frege-Russell strand itself to see that there are important differences here, too. As I point out in my entry, and have argued in more detail elsewhere (2003b, §6), for Frege function-argument analysis is fundamental, whereas for Russell decompositional analysis remains at the core of his thinking. (Cf. also Levine 2002; Hylton 2005b; Griffin forthcoming.) The case of Russell is instructive here. For it shows just how complex a particular philosopher's practice or conception of analysis can be. Russell may engage in logical analysis, in showing,

for example, how definite descriptions can be 'analysed away' when sentences in which they appear are recast into their 'correct' logical form. But decompositional analysis is still assumed to be required in identifying the ultimate constituents of a proposition.

Ongley's failure to appreciate all this leads him to make some quite unjustified criticisms of my account. He writes, for example:

Beaney finds G. E. Moore's notion of analysis to be of a traditional decompositional sort, where complex concepts are analyzed into their constituents. This puzzles Beaney: while he admits that Moore influenced conceptions of analysis among analytic philosophers, Beaney does not address the fact that this means that his theory that 20th c. analysis as Fregean/Russellian logical analysis does not seem to work even for the major analysts. He simply ignores this problem and goes on to Wittgenstein. (p. 50)

This is a travesty of my account. There is much to be puzzled about in Moore's philosophy. (Indeed, Moore would hardly approve if one did not feel puzzlement.) But I am not puzzled that he had a decompositional conception of analysis. I say it is "surprisingly traditional", given his status as one of the founders of 'analytic' philosophy, but that just shows that the use of decompositional analysis cannot be the hallmark of 'analytic' philosophy. More importantly, I do not have a 'theory' that twentieth-century analysis is Fregean/Russellian logical analysis, and so do not feel flummoxed that Moore does not fit this straitjacket. On the contrary, I pointed out from the very start that Moore represents one genuine strand in analytic philosophy. So there is no problem that I ignore and quickly cover up by turning to Wittgenstein.

Am I just being overly sensitive to the rhetorical flourishes of Ongley's exposition? As I said at the beginning of this reply, Ongley gives a fair summary of the main elements of my survey. However, it is to some of his connecting critical patter that I object. The impression is given at numerous points that I am simply pigeonholing philosophers and offering a crude generalization as to what 'analytic' philosophy is, which does not do justice to my aim of showing the variety of conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy. In concluding his account of my survey of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, Ongley remarks: "it should be obvious even from this brief description of Beaney's survey of the 20th c. that his model of 20th c. analysis as based on logical analysis does

not fair well even on his own terms. In the end, Beaney changes tack and defines analytic philosophy as being a set of interlocking subtraditions unified by a shared repertoire of conceptions of analysis that different philosophers drew on in different ways." (p. 51) I do indeed suggest that analytic philosophy should be seen in this latter way (but not 'defined' like this, which is not how I put it). I am not changing tack, however, since I was never in the game of offering a 'theory' (or 'definition') of analytic philosophy. As I have stressed, I was concerned all along to indicate the richness and complexity of conceptions of analysis throughout the history of philosophy, and not least, within analytic philosophy itself.

Let me end, though, by thanking John Ongley for his detailed review. As he notes at the beginning of his essay, I am currently writing a book on analysis, and my entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia* was a first report on the work I have been doing. The hypertext format of the *Stanford Encyclopedia*, and the fact that entries can be updated in the light of criticism and further research, made writing such an entry the ideal way to proceed. I could offer an outline of conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy in the main document, while reserving further details for the linked subsections. I could also make available the extensive bibliography I had been compiling, to help and encourage others to explore the topic of analysis. Of course, even with the subsections, attempting to cover twenty-six centuries of history of philosophy in just one entry is asking for trouble, and as Ongley notes at various points, there are significant gaps (not least concerning conceptions of analysis in the nineteenth century), some of which I am hoping to fill in soon. But I am grateful for the generous remarks Ongley makes in the concluding section of his review. I have concentrated in this reply on the main (and only real) grumble that I have with Ongley's review, but as indicated above, I accept his key criticism, about the need to address the issue of the apriority of analytic methodology. Ongley also makes other, more specific comments in his review, such as those concerning Kant mentioned above. I know that these, too, will be helpful to me both in revising my *Stanford Encyclopedia* entry and in completing my forthcoming book on analysis.

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PROPERTIES OF ANALYSIS: REPLY TO BEANEY

JOHN ONGLEY

In my review of Michael Beaney's entry on analysis for the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, I made several statements to which he takes exception. His main criticism is that my review fails to appreciate the rich varieties of analysis that he was trying to show exist in philosophy. Instead, it focuses on only three types discussed by him – regressive, decompositional and interpretive analysis – and ignores the other kinds he mentioned and also ignores the complex interrelations between these various methods.

I am glad that Beaney has taken the opportunity to stress this point in his reply to my review. I agree that it is much more interesting to look at the various periods in the history of philosophy as a rich complex of methods rather than as consisting of a few methods that can be categorized as belonging to one of three types, and it is true that he mentions and describes many more than these three kinds of analysis. Still, it is decompositional, regressive or interpretive analysis that Beaney mainly discusses, and he most often says of some method of analysis, after describing it, that it is like one or more of these three major types, which is why I focused on them.

What other types of analysis does he mention? One that he discusses throughout the text is "reductive" analysis. In it, a concept is said to be "reduced" to others when one can eliminate it in favor of the other concepts, for example, in one's description of the world, in which case one has discovered a metaphysical fact about the world. Beaney principally describes reductive analysis as a kind of interpretive analysis that interprets talk using the concept into talk without it, though I suppose decompositional analyses can be equally reductive.

Beaney discusses reductive analysis at length in the case of Gilbert Ryle and other Oxford analysts, making the point that Ryle shifted from this principal method of analytic philosophy to a kind of non-reductive interpretive analysis that Beaney calls "connective" analysis. Where one cannot eliminate a term without circularity, so that it is in some metaphysical sense irreducible, one can still (circularly) clarify its meaning by interpretating it in terms of other

concepts that can only be defined in terms of it. Such an interpretive analysis is a connective one, one that shows the logical connections between these basic irreducible concepts. Though I did not quite gather what claims are made for such analysis, that is, what its significance is supposed to be (are these the "true meanings" of the analyzed concepts or are they something more arbitrary), Beaney makes the intriguing suggestion that "connective analysis would seem to be particularly appropriate ... in the case of analysis itself" (that is, I think, in analyzing analysis itself).

It needs to be emphasized however that my point in discussing the three kinds of analysis I saw Beaney spending most of his time on was not to say that they are inadequate to describe the varieties of analysis in philosophy and that we need a richer taxonomy than he provides, but that there are certain questions about analysis which Beaney's explication of even these three types does not answer for me. Nor do I take this as an inadequacy of Beaney's discussion, since his purposes are not to answer my questions, but his own.

Beaney refers to some of my concerns when he says that I am right in saying that he needs to address the issue of the apriority of these and other methods of analysis. My point, though, is more general than this. What puzzles me whenever I hear people talk of analysis or see such ideas in print is how exactly the analysis is supposed to work. What are the specific steps that one takes in each kind of analysis, and most important, how does one justify each of these steps? (It would also be interesting to learn how it is thought that we psychologically move from step to step, how we are thought to discover the various steps in an analysis.)

When asking how a step in an analysis is justified, the question of whether the justification is supposed to be a priori or a posteriori does arise, but so do other questions such as what metaphysical assumptions are being made in each case, and since it is usually concepts that are being analyzed, what theories of meaning are being presupposed. (These questions might also arise when trying to say how the various steps of an analysis are arrived at, that is, discovered.) But these are my questions. This being the case, perhaps it is up to me and no one else to answer them. Beaney has done an impressive job of answering his own questions, one that that I think will

inspire others to try to push the subject even further.

To move back to Beaney's criticisms of my review, he points out that right at the start of it I attribute to him a general characterization of analysis as being decompositional when that is not what he says, and I am chagrined to see that I do make this error. His most general characterization of analysis comes in the second sentence of the piece and is that "in its broadest sense, [analysis] might be defined as disclosing or working back to what is more fundamental by means of which something can be explained (which is often then exhibited in a corresponding process of synthesis)...." As he notes, he then goes on to emphasize that decompositional analysis (breaking a concept down into more simple parts) is not the only sort of analysis that philosophers have practiced, and is arguably not the most important one.

Beaney also points out that I suggest that he tries to give a single characterization of analytic philosophy and must then immediately admit Moore as an exception. I did erroneously suggest this and I withdraw the suggestion. Beaney emphasizes that there are several major strands of analysis to be found in analytic philosophy and that Moore's is one of them. (He also points out that the "knowledge is or isn't justified true belief" discussion in analytic philosophy is another instance of decompositional analysis.)

A final quibble with Beaney though. He says in his reply to me that it is not his aim to pigeonhole philosophers into various categories or impose a rigid taxonomy. I hope this is just a matter of emphasis and that he will not wholly dismiss taxonomic tasks in his further work on the subject, and I suspect that he won't, for he also says that "of course, some kind of conceptual framework must be developed to elucidate the various forms of analysis and their interconnections". For my part, I do not think that any historical period can be accurately discussed or even clearly thought about without a good taxonomy and genealogy of its ideas, and the game of taking someone's taxonomy (even one's own) and trying to refine or modify it or elaborate on it is an important and probably essential way of moving the understanding of a period forward.

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Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

The Annual Meeting of the Eastern APA (December 27-30) shares in the emotional angst of the holiday season in which it occurs. Like the extended visits with extended family these holidays involve, the normal person approaches the Eastern with mingled excitement, resentment and dread. This year's conference location, Times Square, being what it is, is unlikely to sooth these feelings. This is especially true if, like me, you're ignorant of the fact that the Square contains two Hilton Hotels. Yes, my unplanned run-walk from Hilton A to Hilton B was a "special" joy, as was my subsequent disheveled Grand Entrance to the APA, gripping tatty plastic bags stuffed with Quarterlies and flyers in each sweaty hand.

Hilton B, though grander than Hilton A, is something of a disappointment: what on earth did they do with the chairs? Are they outlawed in New York along with cigarettes, or are the hoteliers trying to prevent riffraff from settling down for a rest? There were some chairs, to be sure, but they were fiercely guarded, and whole stretches of hallway, vast acres of registration area, and echoing chambers of bookseller space were chair-free zones. I did notice a father and his three children sitting on the floor in front of the ATM (and thereby inconveniently blocking access to it), but none of the gilt-tongued concierges seemed to notice. After locating the room in which the BRS session was to occur, I therefore laid out my Society trifolds and other wares and had a seat. But what a sitting it was!

The first session of the day, hosted by the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, and chaired by Stefanie Rocknak (Hartwick College), boasted Sandra Lapointe (Kansas State) speaking on "Husserl and Frege on Formal Meaning", Karen Green (Monash University, Melbourne, Australia) speaking on "Fregean Existence and Non-Existence" with commentary by Kevin Klement (U Mass/Amherst), and Chris Pincock (Purdue University) speaking on "An Overlapping Consensus Model of the Origins of Analytic Philosophy" with commentary by Aaron Preston (Malone College). Sandra Lapointe's paper remains an unknown to me, as I stepped out at for a bit to get money from the ATM (where I found the encampment mentioned above) and to register for the conference. I returned in time to hear Karen Greene deliver a very persuasive

paper that received high praise from Kevin Klement, followed by a debate between Chris Pincock and Aaron Preston, on the topic of whether we analytic philosophers have a topic, to a large and sometimes electrified audience. As convener of these events, it behooves me to count heads: I counted 24.

The BRS group session immediately followed the HEAPS session with three speakers of its own: Gary Cezarz (Southeast Missouri State University), speaking on "McTaggart and Broad on Leibniz's Law", Nikolay Milkov (Bielefeld University), with a paper titled "Lotze's Influence on Russell" and John Ongley (Edinboro University of Pennsylvania), with a paper on "Lotze and Anti-Psychologism". John Symons (The University of Texas at El Paso) served as Chair and as commentator of Gary Cezarz' talk, while David Sullivan (Metropolitan College of Denver) commented on Nikolay Milkov's paper. The lack of a respondent for John Ongley's paper turned out to be fortunate, as each speaker ran so overtime that no commenting would have been possible in any case, and John's talk was written as a follow-up commentary to Milkov's paper anyway. Milkov argued that Russell's turn from idealism and monism actually preceded Moore's, despite Russell's own story to the contrary, and that in turning this way, Russell exhibited the influence of Hermann Lotze, a forgotten but influential philosophical muse of the 19th century. Some historians in the audience argued for a broader view, and Sullivan began to summarize his own objections, which were based on his claim that Russell studied Lotze's *Metaphysics* and not his *Logic* so that the influences from Lotze that Milkov claimed to find in Russell and Moore (from the *Logic*) could not have been from Lotze, but Ongley's analysis of the historical influence of Lotze in at least some ways supported Milkov's general point. Counting heads was interrupted by the sudden appearance of Warren Allen Smith, Peter Stone and other BRS regulars, crashing into our midst with their boys like gangsters before a shootout. Even after the dust settled, I still counted two-dozen heads.

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 Meeting Expenses 712.04
 Newsletter 3,396.06
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| Category Description | 1/1/04 – 12/31/04 |
|------------------------------|-------------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/03 | 5,440.32 |
| INFLOWS | |
| Uncategorized | 0.00 |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | 1,344.15 |
| BRS <i>Quarterly</i> | 950.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 2,294.15 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 538.94 |
| Renewals | 3,805.81 |
| TOTAL Dues | 4,344.75 |
| Meeting Income | 4,568.65 |
| TOTAL INFLOWS | 11,207.55 |
| OUTFLOWS | |
| Bank Charges | 84.10 |
| BRS Paper Award | 400.00 |
| Library Expenses | 5.30 |
| Meeting Expenses | 3,564.22 |
| Newsletter | 1,988.21* |
| Other Expenses | 5.00 |
| <i>Russell</i> Subscriptions | 2,312.00 |
| TOTAL OUTFLOWS | 8,358.83 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 2,848.72 |
| BALANCE 12/31/04 | 8,289.04 |

* There is an unknown liability for the *Quarterly*.

Dennis J. Darland
BRS Treasurer
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BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.

2005 ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT
Cash Flow January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2005

| Category Description | 1/1/05 – 12/31/05 |
|------------------------------|-------------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/04 | 8,289.04 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | 1,009.24 |
| BRS <i>Quarterly</i> | 408.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 1,417.24 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 692.00 |
| Renewals | 6,798.27 |
| TOTAL Dues | 7,490.27 |
| Library Income | 75.10 |
| Meeting Income | 1,832.92 |
| Other Income | 38.82 |
| TOTAL INCOME | 10,854.35 |
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charges | 98.00 |
| BRS Paper Award | 200.00 |
| Library Expenses | 181.81 |
| Meeting Expenses | 2,104.69 |
| Newsletter | 925.45* |
| Other Expenses | 259.40 |
| PayPal Fees | 63.48 |
| <i>Russell</i> Subscriptions | 3,171.00 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | 7,003.83 |
| TRANSFERS | |
| FROM PayPal | 1,538.27 |
| FROM Deposit Intra | 9,328.65 |
| TO Checking | - 10,866.92 |
| TOTAL TRANSFERS | 0.00 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 3,850.52 |
| BALANCE 12/31/05 | 12,139.56 |

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Einstein and a world without time.

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
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Double Issue

Numbers 130 - 131 / May – August 2006



THE RETURN OF NATURALISM

Published by The Bertrand Russell Society
with the support of Youngstown State University

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
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
Number 130-131 / May-August 2006

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Cover: Iowa Advanced Tech Lab, an early work by Frank O. Gehry
at the University of Iowa.

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IN THIS ISSUE

NATURALISM RETURNS

IN THIS ISSUE OF THE BRS *QUARTERLY*

IN OUR LAST ISSUE of the *Quarterly*, Andrew Lugg argued for the controversial thesis that Russell was a naturalist (one who presupposes scientific theories to answer philosophical questions, so that philosophy is a part of science) from at least 1912 on. Most Russell scholars would disagree and respond to Russell's claims that his philosophy is scientific by saying: "Well, yes, he *says* that, but you have to understand that what he *means* by 'scientific philosophy' is not at all what we would call science, but something wildly metaphysical and purely philosophical." In contrast, Lugg has taken seriously Russell's claims to have been doing scientific philosophy, and has constructed a systematic interpretation of Russell's philosophy from them that seems to be an accurate account of Russell's views.

Several people besides Lugg have taken Russell's claims to have been doing scientific philosophy seriously: these are Thomas Baldwin, Graham Stevens, Paul O'Grady, and the recently deceased Ned Garvin. But each has viewed Russell's naturalism differently, with each emphasizing different aspects of it. In this issue, Graham Stevens responds to Lugg's views, agreeing with parts, disagreeing with others and presenting an alternative view of Russell's naturalism. Lugg replies to Stevens with an elaboration of his own views of the matter.

FRIEDRICH WAISMANN was a student of Wittgenstein's philosophy for most of his adult life, but because Wittgenstein repeatedly insisted that Waismann did not understand him, Waismann's philosophy, especially his views on Wittgenstein's philosophy and ordinary language philosophy, is not highly regarded by most philosophers today. In this issue's feature essay, 'A Road Less Traveled', Mazi Allen gives us a detailed sketch of Waismann's philosophy on the way to correcting Richard Rorty's misrepresentation of it. The picture of Waismann's philosophy that Mazi presents us with is one that makes Waismann sound much more interesting than the standard view has it.

Waismann was one of the original members of the Vienna Circle and a student of Moritz Schlick – it was in fact Schlick who assigned Waismann the project of speaking with Wittgenstein in Vienna and writing a systematic exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy. However, Wittgenstein's philosophy was in constant transition and the project soon evolved from providing a systematic exposition of the *Tractatus* to one of recording Wittgenstein's post-Tractarian thought and then to one of describing his philosophy that emerged still later. Waismann worked at this task from 1927 to 1939, but in 1936 Wittgenstein withdrew from the project completely. Waismann continued with the project alone and his book on Wittgenstein was set for publication in 1939, only to be withdrawn by Waismann at the last minute. It was finally published in 1965, six years after Waismann's death.

Because of all this, Waismann is often thought of as having been a mere expositor of Wittgenstein and a poor one at that, one who in the end simply failed to appreciate Wittgenstein's thought. After all, the master himself had made this judgment, hadn't he? Moreover, A.J. Ayer, in his anthology of the Vienna Circle philosophers, *Logical Positivism*, includes just one article by Waismann, 'How I See Philosophy', and he puts that at the very end of the book, as though including the essay out of a sense obligation or as an afterthought, as if to say: "Well, Waismann was a member of the Vienna Circle, so I guess we should include something by him; but let's stick it in the back out of the way; we'll put Schlick and Carnap up front; theirs are the important essays." However, after reading Allen's essay on Waismann, and I hope after also going back and reading or rereading one or more of Waismann's own essays, the reader may well come away with a new appreciation of Waismann. I know I have. It now seems to me that his later philosophy is the most mature of the analytic philosophers of the period – the most grown-up and subtlest. Perhaps, then, Ayer didn't put Waismann's essay in the back of his book as an afterthought and because he thought it the least important of the essays in that volume, but because he thought it the aptest conclusion for Logical Positivism, the best ending for his book and for analytic philosophy as well. If this is so, perhaps Ayer's philosophy itself had more subtly than it's usually given credit for having. It's possible. I may go back and take another look soon.

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE, we include a 1946 review by George Orwell of Russell book *Power*, with an introduction by Peter Stone (and a thanks to Phil Ebersole for suggesting the review for inclusion in the BRSQ), and a new review by Chad Trainer of Chris Shute's book *Bertrand Russell: "Education as the Power of Independent Thought"*. Chad provides us with a detailed view of Shute's book. And finally, we have at the back of the issue, in the traveler's diary, report of the 2006 BRS Annual Meeting held in Iowa City and the minutes for the BRS Board of Directors meeting held there.

An INVITATION

To a relaxing, learned weekend



THE 34TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
JUNE 8-10, 2007
MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY, NEW JERSEY

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SUBJECT RELATED TO BERTRAND RUSSELL'S LIFE AND
WORK TO BRS PRESIDENT ALAN SCHWERIN AT
aschweri@monmouth.edu

SOCIETY NEWS

AFTER 27 YEARS OF REMARKABLE SERVICE TO THE BRS, our treasurer, DENNIS DARLAND, has resigned from that position. More than anyone else, Dennis is responsible for having kept this Society on a steady keel and functioning reliably from one year to the next. *Thank you, Dennis.* We are grateful for everything you have done for us and won't soon forget it.

AS OF THIS WRITING, the Society is looking for someone replace Dennis as its treasurer. The only requirement for being treasurer that is stated in the Society bylaws is that you must have belonged to the Society for at least one year. If you fit that description and are interested in being the Society's treasurer, please contact any BRS executive officer or board member at once. For the interim (until the BRS June Annual Meeting), KEN BLACKWELL will be acting treasurer of the Society.

IT'S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP to the Bertrand Russell Society! If you have not yet done so, we hope you will renew your membership now, using the form enclosed with this issue of the BRS *Quarterly*. For those wishing to pay their dues online using a credit card, you can now pay via PayPal. Just go to <https://www.paypal.com> and open a free account. When prompted for the recipient's email address, enter brs-pp@sbcglobal.net. There is no charge to make PayPal payments, which – foreign members take note – will be handled in US dollars. When prompted for a message to send to our treasurer, state the purpose of the payment and any change of address but do not include your credit card information. Our treasurer will send you an email receipt and update the membership records accordingly.

CURIOUS TO KNOW

WHO'S NEW ON THE BOARD OF THE BRS?

The fall election results for the Russell Society Board of Directors are as follows: Ken Blackwell (28 votes), David Blitz (28 votes), Philip Ebersole (26 votes), David Henehan (27 votes), Kevin Klement (28 votes), Tom Stanley (29 votes), Russell Wahl (27 votes) and David White (26 votes).

The election results were not much of a surprise – eight people were elected from a slate of eight candidates. But two of those elected, Kevin Klement and Russell Wahl, are new to the board. It is healthy for the Society to have fresh voices on its executive board and a quick look at the recent past shows a reassuring regularity to this influx of new people on the board. In the 2005 election, Gregory Landini and John Ongley were elected to the board both for the first time, and Marvin Kohl (board chair from 1989 to 1995) was re-elected to it after a long absence. In 2003 David Blitz and David Henehan were both elected to the board for the first time, in 2002 Andrew Bone and Cara Rice were new board members, in 2002 Rosalind Carey was elected for the first time, and the pattern continues back to the founding of the Society in 1974.

A list of Society Board members going back to 1995 can be found at: http://www.user.drew.edu/~jlenz/BRS_Officers_past.htm. If you have any information as to who was on the Society's board of directors before that, please contact the editors of this journal and those names will be added to this list at the Society's website.

COMING SOON!

THE 34TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BRS!

This happy event, hosted by BRS President Alan Schwerin, returns to Monmouth University in New Jersey June 8-10, 2007. Rooms are available on campus for the event, but space is limited, so contact Alan at aschweri@monmouth.edu soon with your requests. Details of the meeting will follow, but if the future resembles the past it will be a weekend of engaging talks, good company and an overall good time. We hope to see all of you there.

A CALL FOR ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS. The annual meeting's success turns in large part on its papers, and for this *we need you*. Are you working on a paper or presentation? Do you have an idea that would be a hot topic for the annual meeting? Share it with us! How about running a seminar on readings from Russell that you have found interesting? The master classes have all been well attended in the past and generate a good deal of response from the floor. So be sure to contact BRS President Alan Schwerin soon (at aschweri@monmouth.edu) with your ideas and contributions on Russell's thought and his life. They will be most welcome.

CALL FOR APA PAPERS. If you're interested in reading a paper on Russell at the BRS session or on the history of early analytic philosophy at the HEAPS session of the Eastern or Central meetings of the APA (in Baltimore December 27-30, 2007 and at the Palmer House in Chicago April 14-20, 2008 respectively), please be sure to contact Rosalind Carey (rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu) about it soon. (HEAPS is the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society that often co-hosts APA sessions with the BRS.)

RUSSELL SPEECH ON THE INTERNET. The Bertrand Russell Society Librarian, TOM STANLEY, reports that Russell's 1959 address to the CND is available for download as 'Bertrand Russell on the Arms Race' from the website of the Talking History Project at: <http://www.albany.edu/talkinghistory/arch2006july-december.html>. Here is their description of the speech: "Bertrand Russell, the Nobel prize-winning philosopher, mathematician, and author, became a vocal critic of the arms race in the post-WWII Cold War era. In this selection of a speech on nuclear disarmament, first recorded in Manchester England on May Day of 1959, Russell expressed some of his concerns about the fate of humanity in the face of the growing arms race." The speech is approximately 12 minutes in length. Tom also reports that there are a large number of speeches, interviews and other recordings by Russell that are available for downloading from SVEINBJORN THORDARSON's excellent Russell webpages at: <http://www.sveinbjorn.org/russell>. These recordings include many of the Woodrow Wyatt interviews with Russell, and an audio book of readings from Russell's *Religion and Science*.

ALAN SCHWERIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSELL SOCIETY, has recently had a new collection of papers on Russell accepted for publication. It is scheduled to be published January 2008 by Cambridge Scholars Publishing and will be called *Revisiting Russell: Critical Reflections on the Thought of Bertrand Russell*. It will include papers from the past two annual meetings of the BRS. This volume follows an earlier collection of essays edited by Schwerin from Bertrand Russell Society annual meetings called *Bertrand Russell on Nuclear War, Peace, and Language: Critical and Historical Essays*. There is an online review by DAVID BLITZ of this earlier volume at: http://russell.mcmaster.ca/blitz_schwerin.pdf.

ETHAN HOUSER, AN AMERICAN SCULPTOR now living in Mexico City, has just completed a sculpture bust of Bertrand Russell. He describes it as depicting "a younger Russell with a suppressed smile at the height of his productive life" and says that it is a piece he has wanted to do for a long time. The piece is 31 cm. high (slightly over 12") and will be cast in bronze, given a deep rich 19th century type patina, and mounted on a base of black granite. The base will bring the total height of the piece to around 17". It will be a signed, hand numbered limited edition piece and no more than forty will ever be cast, with a price "under \$2,000 USD". Ethan Houser can be contacted at ethantaliesin@yahoo.com.

FINALLY, BRS MEMBER MIKE BEANEY will be publishing a collection of essays on analysis sometime next year with Routledge. It will be called *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology* and will include the following essays on Russell, along with a host of essays on a wide variety of related analysts and topics: 'Frege-Russell Numbers: Analysis or Explanation?' by ERICH H. RECK, 'Analysis and Abstraction Principles in Russell and Frege' by JAMES LEVINE, 'Some Remarks on Russell's Early Decompositional Style of Analysis' by NICHOLAS GRIFFIN, "'On Denoting" and the Idea of a Logically Perfect Language' by PETER HYLTON and 'Logical Analysis and Logical Construction' by BERNARD LINSKY.

FEATURE

A ROAD LESS TRAVELED: THE LASTING SIGNIFICANCE OF WAISMANN'S 'HOW I SEE PHILOSOPHY'*

MAZI ALLEN

In his introduction to *The Linguistic Turn*, the anthology that established him as an authority on the history of analytic philosophy, Richard Rorty makes several questionable claims regarding various major philosophers – dismissing J. L. Austin as a lexicographer, Ludwig Wittgenstein as a self-styled therapist for philosophers and Martin Heidegger as a poet.¹ However, his most questionable claim concerns Friedrich Waismann, member of the Vienna Circle and later (after 1939) lecturer at Oxford. Of Waismann's later philosophy, Rorty says:

[For Waismann] methodological nominalism would be retained [the assumption that universals and concepts themselves do not exist and can be explained scientifically in terms of observations of particulars or else as misuses of language], but ... the demand for clear-cut criteria of agreement about the truth of philosophical theses would be dropped. Philosophers could then turn towards creating Ideal Languages, but the criterion for being "Ideal" would no longer be the dissolution of philosophical problems, but rather the creation of new and fruitful ways of thinking of things in general. This would amount to a return to the great tradition of philosophy as system-building – the only difference being that the systems built would no longer be considered *descriptions* of the nature of things or of human consciousness, but rather *proposals* about how to talk. By such a move, the "creative" and "constructive" function of philosophy would be retained. Philosophers would be, as they have traditionally been supposed to be, the men who gave one a *Weltanschauung*.²

* An earlier version of this essay was read at a History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society session of the December 2004 eastern division meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

¹ Richard Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 34-35.

² *Ibid.*, 34.

This account of Waismann's aims and methods, though correct in some respects, is quite flawed in others. Is it true that Waismann no longer aimed for the "dissolution of philosophical questions"? Did Waismann really propose "creating Ideal Languages" and returning "to the great tradition of ... system-building"? Can we really say that Waismann conceived of philosophers as being "the men who gave one a *Weltanschauung*"?

In order to support his claims, Rorty refers to Waismann's essay 'How I see Philosophy'³ – a work which I will reengage in order to place Waismann's views in their proper perspective. In doing so, I will show that Waismann's method and aims are not exactly what Rorty presents them as being. Waismann's method does not consist in system-building in the traditional sense, nor in giving a *Weltanschauung*, nor even in constructing an ideal language, but in fundamentally questioning all of the above endeavors in open dialogue.

1.

The essay 'How I See Philosophy', originally written for the anthology *Contemporary British Philosophy*, begins with the claim that philosophy is not like science at all.⁴ Given the influence of the later Carnap and Quine,⁵ most analytic philosophers today would find this view shocking – but this in fact was the view held by many members of the Vienna Circle, including Moritz Schlick.⁶ Waismann further claims that philosophy offers no proofs nor admits of theorems nor even asks questions that can be decided decisively by arguments. "Philosophy" he says,

is very unlike science; and this in three respects: in philosophy there are no proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions that can be decided, Yes or No.

Nor for Waismann does philosophy engage in the tradition of casting ... ideas into deductive moulds, in the grand style of Spinoza.⁷

³ Ibid., 36, n.66.

⁴ H. D. Lewis, *Contemporary British Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956).

⁵ D.S. Clarke, *Philosophy's Second Revolution: Early and Recent Analytic Philosophy* (Chicago: Open Court, 1997), p. 110; 110, n.7.

⁶ Rorty, *The Linguistic Turn*, 50-51.

⁷ Friedrich Waismann, *How I See Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1968), 1-2.

Hence, just two pages into the article, Waismann has denied one of the first views Rorty attributes to him, namely, the seeking of a return to the philosophical system-building of early modern rationalism. But if Waismann says philosophy should not try to construct deductive systems that conclusively establish truths through arguments, isn't he also saying that philosophy – as a "quest for truth" – has come to an end? Fortunately not. What philosophy does offer, according to Waismann, are not answers but questions. If we are lucky, he contends, dialogues about these questions would lead us to new and interesting ways of speaking about and so observing the world. As an example of this way of doing philosophy, Waismann reexamines the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise (Zeno's paradox).

In considering whether Achilles could ever catch the tortoise a few feet away from him if he had to cross an infinite series of intervals to do so, Waismann first notes that the common objection to Zeno's paradox – that "of course" a finite end exists between the supposedly infinite series between two points (namely, the second point) – entirely misses Zeno's point. The paradox is really concerned with the infinite series itself and how one could come to the end of it if it were possible to prolong the series merely by adding another term. Yet looked at another way, the problem is easily dealt with – for if we take the same principle of Zeno's paradox (that an infinite series can be extended "forever") and apply it to a temporal phenomenon such as a minute, we find that the paradox falls apart. Zeno would be forced to say that "at no time" would a minute come to an end, since a half-minute, quarter-minute, and so on, would all have to end in turn.⁸ Hence there could be no time whatsoever.

Thus, merely placing Zeno's paradox in a different context reveals that the notion of sequence upon which it depends may be described in two different senses – temporally and atemporally. The paradox of Achilles and the tortoise merely confuses these senses.⁹ As Waismann put it, the question of Zeno's paradox was never solved but "dissolved" as a question arising from the confusion of different senses of the same term.¹⁰ In clarifying the terms of the

⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁹ Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁰ Ibid., 10.

discussion – and not merely answering the questions put before it – philosophy would find its use. But this is an example of the very thing Rorty says Waismann rejects – the “dissolution of philosophical problems”. Indeed, it is this possibility of “dissolving philosophical problems” that is essential to the method Waismann proposes for philosophical discussion. In fact, the method of questioning he proposes depends upon it. Therefore, we need to examine Waismann’s method of questioning in order to understand his view of philosophy. Here too, his proposal is quite interesting.

First, according to Waismann, one should never force the interlocutor – if the use of unusual terms is the only way in which a person can express an idea, such usages must be permitted. Further, the speaker should even be free to use the same term in widely differing – even contradictory – senses: the only requirement for such usage is that the speaker be aware of what he or she is doing and the consequences of doing it. At every phase of the account the speaker would be questioned, when necessary, as to the usefulness of terms that arise. If the terms are found necessary, the speaker would continue, if not, the questioner might propose a different set of terms and possibly even a different account.¹¹ Again, we see that the goal of such discussion is not to prove the correctness of a system, nor to provide anyone with a complete, much less completed, *Weltanschauung*, but to engage in discussing and describing one’s experiences in dialogue with others.

In keeping with this dialogical method, Waismann further suggests that arguments to prove or disprove the view under examination in such a philosophical dialogue should not be used – the goal of such dialogue, and really philosophy itself, is to clarify the views in question, not to solve problems or derive proofs. Instead of argument and proof, the experience being spoken of would be discussed by all precisely as it presented itself to each of the discussants. In this way, through providing differing perspectives on the same subject, all of the discussants would aid in truly addressing the question. This would lead either to the clarification of the meaning of the terms used to describe such experience or dissolution of the worldview initially proposed.¹² In this way, Waismann sought to

¹¹ Ibid., 12.

¹² Ibid.

strengthen philosophical debate – by moving it away from the rigid systemization of philosophers like Spinoza, and even away from the stiff formalism of present-day analytic philosophy, towards a more open method of analysis.

Finally, according to Waismann, what is sought in philosophy is a new way of describing the world, especially a new vocabulary and grammar with which to describe it. But note that this new way of describing the world would be neither a universal explanation nor a deductive one beyond which nothing more could be added. Instead, it would be a worldview constructed through dialogue and the clarification of language – continually open to modification by the same means.¹³ Waismann’s way of constructing a worldview, or rather world conception, through dialogue would affect the vocabularies and grammars of both the discussant and interlocutors – creating new problems for each in speaking about experiences, and so stimulating further discussions on the subject and further growth in vocabularies, grammars, and modes of thought.

Thus, Waismann’s later method presents a means of examining our most fundamental and deeply held views – either to clarify them through dialogue or eventually dissolve them if indefensible. Philosophy, then, is not merely a debunking of theories for Waismann, but a process of learning how and why certain descriptions of experience are used in the first place. In doing so, the practice of philosophy serves as a liberating force not only from the rigid bounds of language (both formal and ordinary) but even from the modes of thought and prejudices accompanying them.¹⁴ Take for instance Waismann’s criticisms of the then-current uses of language within philosophy.

Regarding the insistence on the ordinary use of language in philosophy, Waismann states in his article ‘Ordinary Language’ that,

even if there were such a thing as a stock-use [of language], it need not matter much to the philosopher ... I should say that, sooner or later, he is bound to commit the crime and depart from it – that is, if he has something new to say.¹⁵

¹³ Ibid., 12-13.

¹⁴ Ibid., 13, 21.

¹⁵ Ibid., 187.

And in his article 'Verifiability', he claims that new ways of speaking even affect the way people perceive their environments, as was also supposed by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in linguistic anthropology.¹⁶ Waismann also asserts this view in 'How I See Philosophy' and approvingly quotes Nietzsche as saying:

It is quite possible that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altai languages ... will look differently "into the world" and be found on paths of thought quite different from those of the Indo-European....

And he further elaborates on these views later in the article, arguing that Frege could not ask "What is a number?" – with number being an ideal, even Platonic entity, as opposed to a symbol used in counting – if his language did not allow for Platonizing (which, apparently, Waismann believed the Chinese language did not allow for). However, such relativity – even in the conceptualizing of such things as number – need not be denied or seen as obstacles to understanding in Waismann's view but rather seen as opportunities to understand differently, to "swim up-stream ... against the current of clichés."¹⁷ Hence, far from the position of Quine and others,¹⁸ Waismann might have been expected to defend the usage of obscure terms even by thinkers such as Derrida – that is, if Derrida actually had "something new" to say.

2.

But what does all this say about Rorty's claim that Waismann's philosophy consists in creating ideal languages? Rorty uses Gustav Bergmann's account of language as an example of an ideal language. According to the view Rorty lays out, analytic philosophers who advocate constructing an ideal language do so as a means of dissolving philosophical problems. Thus Bergmann, Rorty's exemplar of such a view, states that an ideal language must serve to both (a) dissolve "philosophical puzzles" (b) "show, in principle, the structure and systematic arrangement of all major areas of ... experience."¹⁹

¹⁶ Ibid., 59-60.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ 'Open Letter Against Derrida Receiving an Honorary Doctorate from Cambridge University' *The Times* (London), May 9, 1992.

¹⁹ Rorty, *The Linguistic Turn*, 132-134.

Although this view of an ideal language seems similar to what Waismann has said about the aim of his philosophy, there are important differences. Bergmann, among others, believed that such a language could be established once and for all. However, this type of ideal language – single, final and universal – is not what Waismann was proposing. Waismann would have considered such language a hindrance to philosophy – in fact, in 'How I See Philosophy', he compares such formalized language to "an axe of glass that breaks the moment you use it...."²⁰ More importantly, for Waismann, the creation of such an 'ideal language,' or even a slightly improved one, could only occur through dialogue. Such dialogue would seek to test the supposed "ideal" (or at least adequate) nature of pre-existing language(s) used by participants in terms of how adequate they were for dissolving philosophical puzzles and presenting new insights into various sorts of experience. Only when these were found inadequate would the task of clarifying language and hence creating an "ideal" language (or really, a somewhat improved language) begin. Regarding the role of dialogue, however, Bergman was silent.

For Waismann, what was sought was to create language(s) adequate to the experience being described and hence to remove certain linguistic practices as well as the long-held prejudices accompanying them. This would be accomplished through an on-going, collective undertaking to create a fundamental change in our "angle of vision" as philosophers. Waismann thus proposed that "cases" for a certain view or other would be built up and dialogically contested as to their descriptive adequacy instead of a single ideal language being created to encompass every aspect of experience.²¹

It seems that Waismann was on to something: language is "plastic", shaped both by its use and the material conditions of its users.²² The particular linguistic turn made by Waismann was significant in going beyond Bergmann and others in conceiving of the use of language as being one which was contested in an open-ended (indeed "open textured") dialogue, rather than being firmly,

²⁰ Waismann, *How I See Philosophy*, 23.

²¹ Ibid., 30.

²² Ibid., 23.

definitively, set in rigid conventions. Thus his method, instead being of a return to rationalist metaphysics, was really a return to the older tradition of Socratic dialogue. This rediscovery of question and dialogue as a philosophical method is perhaps Waismann's most overlooked as well as most important achievement.

3.

In a discussion of an earlier version of this paper, David Godden brought up an interesting point regarding Waismann in asking "whether any employment of language (whether this involves the introduction of new vocabularies, or new uses to which an existing vocabulary might be put) would be either encouraged or accepted by Waismann" and whether "Waismann [would] really sanction the use of obscure terms by certain postmodernist thinkers ... as a matter of general principle?"²³ For his example, Godden used Alan Sokal's book *Fashionable Nonsense* and its account of Sokal's well-known hoax perpetrated on the "postmodernist" editors of the journal *Social Text*. If Waismann were to allow the use of unusual senses unqualifiedly, Godden would indeed be correct in saying that this would be "certainly more permissive than we [philosophers] ought to be." However, as Godden himself noted, Waismann does not. Instead he says:

we merely remind him of how these words have always been used by him, in non-philosophical contexts that is, and then point out that, to say what he wanted to say lands him in an absurdity. All we do is to make him aware of his own practice. We abstain from any assertion. It is for him to explain what he means.²⁴

Unlike Waismann, however, Godden was pessimistic as to whether the interlocutor could in fact "explain what he [or she] means" in such a situation where he or she was seemingly talking nonsense. Waismann, I contend, was far more of an optimist.

For Waismann, whether or not a point being argued *was* nonsense was an open question to be decided in discussion. If the ideas being presented were sheer nonsense – as was Sokal's "physical

²³ Godden, now at the University of Windsor in Ontario, made these comments at my presentation of this paper at the December 2004 meeting of the APA.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

reality is a social ... construction" article²⁵ – a well executed philosophical dialogue would surely have brought this to the fore, allowing the "Sokal" figure to be caught in the linguistic trap he had laid for his audience. However if a person truly had something new to propose for which the terminology was not presently available, this too would become apparent. Indeed, the type of discussion proposed by Waismann would even help the philosophical interlocutor find the terminology needed to express the new idea. Hence, unlike the former editors of *Social Text*, who seemed to have accepted Sokal's propositions uncritically, the philosophers engaged in discussion structured along Waismann's lines would be in little if any danger of embarrassments like the Sokal Hoax.

4.

Whether Waismann was really trying to build a system of philosophy or not would depend on the way we conceive of 'a system of philosophy'. If we mean that he was trying to find one, complete, final system of meaning, the answer would be that Waismann was not engaged in this sort of thing, whereas Spinoza certainly was. Indeed, given the various factors that go into creating a philosophical system, Waismann would have probably thought such a system impossible. However, if constructing systems means clarifying pre-existing or emerging systems of thought, comparing their merits, or tentatively introducing new concepts into our vocabularies and so new ways of looking at the world into our languages, then for Waismann too philosophy works at system-building – though through open-ended discussion and an ongoing search for language adequate to everyday experience in the more modest style of Socrates as opposed to Spinoza. The Spinozist project described by Rorty was not a part of Waismann's own conception of philosophy.

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²⁵ Alan Sokal, "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity", *Social Text* 46/47, 1996.

DISCUSSION

ON RUSSELL'S NATURALISM

GRAHAM STEVENS

In an article published recently in this journal,¹ Andrew Lugg contends that Quine's naturalized epistemology was pre-empted in most important respects by Russell's epistemological project from roughly 1912 onwards. Contrary to the (arguably) standard interpretation of Russell as a Cartesian foundationalist in epistemology, Lugg presents the following portrait of Russell the epistemologist:

He is an empiricist in the Quinean mode, one who takes the doctrine that there is nothing in the mind about the world not first in the senses to be a finding of science (as opposed to a result of pure inquiry prior to scientific research). His empiricism is integral to his naturalism and he intends his claims about the evidence of the senses and our knowledge of the external world to be understood as hypotheses open to criticism and improvement.²

I share Lugg's conviction that the naturalistic elements of Russell's philosophy are important. The subject is one deserving of further attention. In the following paper, I will offer a somewhat different slant on Russell's naturalism to the one Lugg presents. Although I am in agreement with Lugg's general theses that (1) Russell's naturalism is an important element of his philosophy that has been overly neglected in studies of him, and (2) Russell's naturalism is an important precursor to Quine's, I will take issue with the details of his take on each thesis. With regard to (1) I will argue that naturalism of the Quinean variety cannot be accurately attributed to Russell in as neat and simple a fashion as Lugg does. One reason for this is that Russell cannot be accurately characterized as an empiricist, even if the characterization is a qualified one of an empiricist "in the Quinean mode". With regard to (2) I will argue that Russell's greatest influence on Quine's naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics. In criticizing Lugg's (2), I will therefore simultaneously be defending my own interpreta-

¹ Andrew Lugg, 'Russell as Precursor Quine' *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* 128-129, 9-21.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

tion of Russell's naturalism as given in detail elsewhere.³ On that interpretation, Russell took the naturalistic turn when he looked to psychology to provide a new home for propositional content. Once located in empirical psychology, Russell then took the further natural step of seeking to explain content in purely causal terms. Russell's greatest contribution to philosophical naturalism was his attempt to naturalize *content* via a causal theory of meaning. It is not, as Lugg claims, Russell's *empiricism* that is integral to his naturalism; it is his *psychologism*. The point is important for two reasons: first, Russell's attitude to empiricism was variable and rarely resulted in unconditional subscription;⁴ second, it means that Russell was only really engaged in a project that can be usefully labelled "naturalistic" after he abandoned the anti-psychologism that was central to his early philosophy.

There is, as Lugg notes, plenty of evidence against the picture of Russell as a naturalized epistemologist. Russell repeatedly talks about the importance of establishing certainty in philosophy and it seems that the quest for such certainty was the original motivation for his interest in philosophy and, more particularly, for his desire to establish the truth of logicism in mathematics.⁵ But these issues are only apparent obstacles to Lugg's thesis. For one thing, he does not attribute any commitment to epistemological naturalism prior to 1912. (Lugg does not explicitly date the emergence of Russell's naturalism but he does cite 1912's *Problems of Philosophy* as evidence of it, so I will assume that he holds Russell's naturalism to be an active component of his philosophy from then onwards.) For another, even had he done so, it would be feasible to assume that one must tell a different epistemological story with regard to mathematical knowledge to that told about empirical knowledge. Whatever problems Russell's philosophy of mathematics might face when it

³ Stevens, 'Russell's Re-Psychologising of the Proposition', in *The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, ch. 5.

⁴ See Anthony Grayling's 'Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science' for detailed discussion of Russell's attitude towards empiricism and pp. 38-41 of Nicholas Griffin's introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell* for an overview of the exegetical dispute regarding that attitude.

⁵ See, e.g., Ray Monk's *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*.

comes to explaining how we access the logical truths that mathematical truths are taken to be, these problems may be safely kept in quarantine, leaving the rest of Russell's epistemology uninfected by them.⁶ Empiricists (of which, it will be recalled, Lugg thinks Russell is one) have always had to make a special case for logical and mathematical knowledge. If the influence of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* on Russell was as great as some maintain, it may have convinced Russell, as it did the Vienna Circle, that mathematical knowledge is a special case because, being trivial knowledge of analytic truths, it scarcely counts as knowledge at all. It is knowledge of truths which are "all of the same nature as the 'great truth' that there are three feet in a yard".⁷

Furthermore, there is evidence for Lugg's claim that Russell was a naturalistic epistemologist. Aside from the Russell texts he cites, the portrait of Russell as an early proponent of naturalized epistemology fits well with Russell's own characterisation of his philosophy as a "a gradual retreat from Pythagoras" (that is, from the view that mathematical objects and the truths about them are wholly independent of the minds that grasp them). If Russell once believed that secure foundations for knowledge could be uncovered prior to (and distinct from) the gathering of scientific knowledge, he appears to have rejected it by the time he parted company with Pythagoras.⁸ It is no easy task, though, to determine just when Russell really did turn his back on Pythagoreanism, as he preferred to call the doctrine that most philosophers of mathematics nowadays would not distinguish from Platonism. Some rough location of that

⁶ This might be thought to be difficult due to Russell's use of set-theoretic constructions in his analyses of the alleged denizens of the external world. E.g. physical objects are defined as series of classes of sense-data in Russell's logical atomist period. But there is no need to appeal here to our knowledge of the raw logical materials out of which classes and series are constructed according to the doctrines of *Principia Mathematica* in order to explain our knowledge of objects. Rather objects "in themselves" (insofar as it is admissible to use such a locution at all) are constructed out of the immediately available empirical information we already do have (sense-data).

⁷ Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 860. See pp. 54-58 of my 'From Russell's Paradox to the Theory of Judgement' for discussion of Wittgenstein's influence on Russell on this point.

⁸ See, e.g., *My Philosophical Development*, p. 17.

point in Russell's philosophy is surely required, however, if Lugg is to establish his claim that the Russell of *The Problems of Philosophy*, *Theory of Knowledge*, and *Our Knowledge of the External World* is seeking to naturalize epistemology. It is doubtful, to say the least, that the class of Quinean naturalists and the class of Pythagorean realists intersect.

Russell's memory, I believe, had a tendency to both accelerate and overstate his retreat from Pythagoras in his later recollections of it. This has encouraged some commentators to see Russell as one who, on discovering the theory of descriptions in 1905, wielded Occam's Razor with all the fury of a demented axe-murderer, slaughtering all but the most indispensable members of his ontology in a violent bloodbath that left reality as he envisioned it by the time *Principia* was completed, if slightly more populated than that envisioned by the nominalist, then nonetheless comparable in taste to the "desert landscapes" relished by Quine.⁹ This version of events, propagated in no small measure by Quine himself, has been severely challenged – arguably refuted – in recent years.¹⁰ As an account of Russell's ontological development it is no more than a crude caricature. Russell's retreat from Pythagoras was more complicated and drawn out than this. For one thing, the theory of descriptions played a somewhat different role in Russell's philosophy than the one it played when absorbed into Quine's. For Quine the theory of descriptions was a method of ontological pruning. For Russell it was something more: it was a method of logical construction.

It is not my intention to get drawn here into well-known debates about the ontological status of Russellian logical constructions. I do however want to point out that whatever the theory is employed in constructing, and whatever the ontological status of those constructions, the raw materials of construction are essential to the process. It is here that Russell's epistemology famously infiltrates his logic, his semantics, and even his metaphysics: the raw materials from

⁹ Quine, 'On What There Is', p. 4.

¹⁰ This applies not just to the immediate motivations behind the development of the theory of descriptions, but also to Russell's general ontological development, including the ontological status of the theory of types. See my *Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (especially chapters 1-4) for a detailed discussion of these points, including an overview of the recent exegetical disputes surrounding them.

which logical constructions are constructed must be items with which the constructor has immediate acquaintance. The paradigm case, of course, is the case of definite descriptions. As sentences containing them contain no corresponding constituent when re-parsed into their correct logical form, definite descriptions are "incomplete symbols" and their apparent referents are "logical constructions" the existence of which we need neither deny nor affirm.¹¹ Note that the things we are going to have to be acquainted with in order to understand the propositions expressed by descriptive sentences according to Russell's principle of acquaintance ("in every proposition that we can apprehend ... all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance")¹² are going to have to be just the kinds of things that one would not expect to find obscuring the elegant view provided by any Quinean desert landscape: namely universals or attributes in intension. Since, on analysis, the descriptive sentence 'G[the F]' has the logical form

$$\exists x((Fx \ \& \ \forall y(Fy \supset x = y)) \ \& \ Gx),$$

acquaintance with the universals F and G is needed for its proper understanding.¹³ Now for the most part, these universals are not of the kind where the problem of explaining our epistemic access to them can be conveniently restricted to the philosophy of mathematics in the way outlined above. When invoking the epistemic relation of acquaintance to explain my understanding of 'the present King of France is bald', no presumed privileged access to an *a priori* realm of mathematical truths will be relevant. Bearing in mind, then, the centrality of the acquaintance relation to Russell's epistemology, how is it to be explained as a constituent of a *naturalistic* epistemology?

¹¹ See, e.g., 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', p. 273.

¹² 'On Denoting', p. 56.

¹³ I am deliberately giving Russell the benefit of the doubt by ignoring the questions of whether the existential quantifier, the conjunction and implication relations and even suitably ontologized variables must also be constituents with which we are acquainted in order to understand 'G[the F]' on his account as given in 'On Denoting'. (Russell did not take the logical constants to be truth functions in 1905 but still maintained his view that they were relations. See chapters 1-3 of *The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy* for arguments in support of this claim.)

According to Lugg (p. 16), Russell's obsession with acquaintance, while alien to Quine, is not fundamentally at odds with his epistemological project. Lugg thinks that the two following quotations, the first from Russell, the second from Quine, are so similar that Quine's remark contains "more than a slight echo" of the view expressed in Russell's remark:

The meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted. (Russell)¹⁴

All inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. (Quine)¹⁵

Contrary to what Lugg says, I do not think there is the slightest hint of an echo here. Quine might not have disapproved of the intrusion of an epistemological principle into a semantic doctrine such as we find here in Russell's comment. After all, Quine thinks that once naturalized, "epistemology now becomes semantics".¹⁶ But the semantic theory Russell's epistemological principle is associating with is one that Quine holds to be very bad company. To say that the meanings we attach to our words are things we are acquainted with is to say that the meanings we attach to our words are *things* we attach to our words. This is just the semantic theory that Quine dismissed as "the myth of a museum".¹⁷ The view that Quine is offering in the above quote is antithetical to such a semantic theory. The inculcation of meanings of words rests on sensory evidence for Quine, because of his commitment to a behaviouristic account of how languages are first ingested by their speakers. The semantic theory associated with Quine's behaviourism does not assign to our words "something with which we are acquainted". On Quine's semantic theory, there is nothing more to the "meaning" of a word than the systematic contribution it makes to determining the conditions under which sentences containing it are true.¹⁸ The assignment of truth-values to observation sentences is then bestowed on them by the "tribunal of sense-experience" not as individuals but as

¹⁴ *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 58.

¹⁵ 'Epistemology Naturalized', p. 75.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁷ Quine, *Ontological relativity and Other Essays*, p. 27.

¹⁸ See Quine, *Word and Object*, ch. 2.

holistically united portions of the "web of belief". There is no place for Russell's atomistic principle of acquaintance with the meanings of individual words in Quine's landscape.

The principle of acquaintance, it seems, is a greater obstacle to Lugg's thesis than he thinks. This is partly because the principle captures the complexity of Russell's attitude towards empiricism. It is easy to mistake the principle as nothing more than an elaborate statement of empiricism. But it would be mistaken to see the principle this way because it devalues the principle. Russell's principle is not a recycled relic of early modern philosophy; it is a truly insightful and original contribution to contemporary analytical philosophy. But its proper home is in the philosophy of language, not in epistemology. It places a restriction on what counts as understanding in order to gain a better insight into what the things that we understand are. (At the time the principle is first enunciated these things are Russellian propositions.) Obviously it is an epistemic remark, but it is intended to motivate a semantic theory. That semantic theory is hard to square with an epistemology that "simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science",¹⁹ as it is a semantic theory that relegates psychology to a position where it is unable to contribute anything to semantic matters.

Russell's naturalism, in my view, emerges only after the rejection of his anti-psychologism. But this change of heart on Russell's part was not the result of any epistemological considerations. Nor, for that matter, did it have much to do with his often self-advertised commitment to a scientific method in philosophy. Rather, as Russell made plain in later discussion of this development in his thought, the motivations again stemmed from reflection on semantics: "The problem of meaning is one which seems to me to have been unduly neglected by logicians; it was this problem which first led me, about twenty years ago, to abandon the anti-psychological opinions in which I had previously believed".²⁰

¹⁹ 'Epistemology Naturalized', p. 82.

²⁰ 'The Relevance of Psychology to Logic', p. 362. It is also worth noting the explicitly semantic flavour of the title of the paper in which Russell first sets out his new commitment to psychologism: 'On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean'.

Having abandoned those opinions, Russell became persuaded that propositions, far from being mind-independent abstract objects, are mental occurrences of some kind. This is a dramatic alteration in Russell's thought: the robust mind-independent reality of propositions was central to his and Moore's rejection of Hegelian idealism and their development of analytical philosophy. In rejecting Russellian propositions, Russell was rejecting the very doctrine that most of us who are happy to be called "Russellians" subscribe to. Of course, Russellian propositions had been officially rejected for around a decade by the time Russell endorsed a psychological theory of propositional content. Throughout this period, however, Russell had seemingly nurtured the hope of replacing Russellian propositions with some alternative truth-bearers, such as the judgement-complexes of the multiple-relation theory, that would be compatible with his anti-psychologism. The psychologising of propositional content marks the moment when Russell conceded defeat for his semantic theory.²¹

Along with many others, I think that Russell was overly hasty in abandoning that semantic project and take it to be the most important of his many lasting contributions to philosophy.²² One philosopher who would certainly not have shared my view, however, is Quine. The psychologised theory of content, in contrast to its more famous Russellian predecessor, quickly took shape in Russell's writings from 1919 onwards as a theory that is much more in tune with Quinean intuitions. Having located propositions within the domain of psychology, Russell embarked on an extensive attempt to "reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics".²³ I will not here enter into debate over the degree of success this project, carried out rather fitfully over several years and published in *The Analysis of Mind* and *The Analysis of Matter*, had. What is of interest to this discussion is the form that Russell's psychological analysis of propositions took in

²¹ This is not to say that there weren't benefits to be had from Russell's psychologistic turn. See my 'Russell's Re-Psychologising of the Proposition' for details.

²² I am not claiming that naturalism is incompatible with what we now call "Russellian" semantics. I am claiming that psychologism is.

²³ *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 114.

that project. What emerges is a causal theory of meaning which substitutes for the principle of acquaintance a causal relation between a word and its meaning. In short, Russell offers an early naturalized semantic theory.

Very early in Russell's philosophical career he wrote: "That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand proof".²⁴ By the time he was endorsing a causal theory of meaning, he clearly could not have held to this view anymore. For now philosophy is surely entitled to help itself to scientific theory in explaining propositional content: meaning is just an object of study for empirical psychology (or perhaps other branches of empirical science) and is not something that can be explained in advance of scientific findings. It is just another element of the causal order. No doubt Quine approved. No doubt he saw similarities with his proposed revamping of epistemology. But the key to Russell's naturalism is to be found in his theory of meaning, not his theory of knowledge.

I have argued that Russell's naturalism cannot be present quite so early in his work as Lugg alleges. More importantly, I have argued that this is because the catalyst for Russell's naturalistic turn was his psychologising of propositional content in 1919. I do not doubt that a naturalistic approach to epistemology is present in Russell's work after this time. But to present Russell's epistemology rather than his account of propositional content as the source of his naturalism is to paint a distorted portrait of Russell's philosophical development.

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²⁴ *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, § 7.

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MORE ON RUSSELL AND QUINE

A REPLY TO STEVENS*

ANDREW LUGG

In 'Russell as a Precursor of Quine', I argued that from 1912, if not earlier, Russell was "a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould".¹ I drew attention to Quine's view of Russell as a kindred spirit and expanded on a remark from *Our Knowledge of the External World*, which Quine quotes at the end of 'Russell's Ontological Development', his most important discussion of Russell's philosophy: "There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a standpoint from which to criticize the whole of daily life".² My central point was that though differing from Quine in many ways, Russell hewed to a similar philosophical line and was no less concerned to develop a system of the world from within the framework of scientific theory. I was of the opinion then, as now, that an appreciation of the naturalistic cast of Russell's thought is essential for understanding his philosophical views, and I wrote the paper in the belief that this is all too often overlooked.

Graham Stevens agrees that "the naturalistic elements of Russell's philosophy are important" and "Russell's naturalism is an important precursor of Quine's". But he believes I go astray since "Russell cannot be accurately characterised as an empiricist", even a Quinean empiricist, and "Russell's greatest influence on Quine's naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics". In Stevens's view, Russell's change of heart regarding propositions in 1919 prompted him to adopt a naturalistic standpoint and he was not a naturalist, Quinean or otherwise, earlier in

* I am grateful to Graham Stevens for writing up his thoughts about my paper. He has helped me to get clearer – at least in my own mind – about the complex relationship between Russell and Quine. In addition I should like to thank to Paul Forster and Peter Hylton for helpful comments.

¹ *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* 128-129, 9-21.

² Cited in context in the first paragraph of my paper.

the decade.³ The trouble with this, as I see it, is that it assumes I place Russell in the empiricist camp as well as the naturalist camp and neglects that I reckon the empiricist elements of Russell's philosophy to be secondary to his naturalism.

Like Stevens I think it wrong to read *The Problems of Philosophy* and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, as many commentators do, as empiricist works. No doubt in these works Russell takes there to be much in the mind that is not first in the senses – for one thing he thinks we apprehend relationships among universals. What I dispute is only the further suggestion that this excludes him from the ranks of the naturalist. There is a world of difference between holding that Russell's thinking was empiricist in thrust or intent and holding, as I do, that it was naturalistic in inspiration and execution.

When considered without the surrounding text, my remark about Russell being “an empiricist in the Quinean mode” is doubtless misleading. But I think it fairly clear that I was emphasising that Russell construes the problem of the external world in much the same way as Quine, i.e., as a scientific problem about the relationship of scientific knowledge to its sensory basis. (Russell deemed the sensory basis of knowledge to be part of the physical world and took this to be revealed by scientific inquiry.) In the offending passage I was summarising how I read Russell. I was out to stress, as I put it in the preceding sentence, that “however much Russell differs from Quine about the nature of natural knowledge, he agrees with him in taking epistemology to be a branch of natural science and in regarding the problem of our knowledge of the external world as a scientific problem”.

Similarly in the only other remark I in which mention empiricism – “[Russell's] empiricism is integral to his naturalism” – I was not implying that Russell was an empiricist pure and simple, still less equating his naturalism with empiricism. I was noting that, like Quine, he took the picture of knowers as surfaces across which energy travels to be a finding of empirical science. I did not, and would not, dispute that “Russell's attitude to empiricism was variable and rarely resulted in unconditional subscription”. I would only

³ For more on Russell on propositions I'd recommend Stevens's *The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy* and ‘Russell's Repsychologising of the Proposition’.

add that Russell revised his views about what people know and how they know it in accordance with his understanding of the findings of natural science. My main contention was that in the 1910s, as well as later, he regarded his speculations as contributions to our theory of the world as a going concern.

Nor would I want to be thought of as believing the principle of acquaintance is “nothing more than an elaborate statement of empiricism”. I believe – and would attempt to show if pressed – that Russell took his view that we are directly acquainted with sense data, universals, and maybe ourselves to be, if not a clear-cut scientific result, a reasonable inference given what is known about human knowledge.⁴ Indeed, as I remarked in a footnote, I take Russell to have revised “his views about acquaintance along with his understanding of the deliverances of natural science” (p. 17). On my reading of the relevant texts Russell regarded acquaintance as a scientific notion comparable to absolute simultaneity and later discarded the idea because he came to think of it – as Einstein thought of absolute simultaneity – as scientifically problematic and superfluous.

In this connection I would take exception too to Stevens's objection that I am wrong to discern an echo of Russell on meaning and acquaintance in Quine's view of meaning as resting on sensory evidence. What I was after was the idea that there is a similarity between Russell's conception of immediate knowledge and Quine's conception of an observation sentence (as expressed in *Word and Object*). It was not my intention to deny the obvious – that Quine and Russell differ regarding meaning. Rather I was pouring cold water on the common assumption that acquaintance is antithetical to naturalism and pointing out that science is reasonably thought of as revealing the existence of two sorts of knowledge, direct and indirect.

⁴ This is perhaps clearest in Russell's discussion of the (epistemological) problem of “mixed psychology and logic” (‘Professor Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*’, p. 234). See also *Theory of Knowledge*, especially p. 46, and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 72-80. In his review of Dewey, Russell notes that he “agree[s] entirely” with Dewey when he says: “To make sure that a given fact is just and such a shade of red is, one may say, a final triumph of scientific method” but disagrees with him when he adds: “To turn around and treat it as something naturally or psychologically given is a monstrous superstition” (p. 235).

Stevens also intimates (see his note 6 and discussion of Russell on descriptions) that I fail to notice that Russell made significant use of set theory in the constructions in *Our Knowledge of the External World* and related works. In particular Stevens seems to think that I believe that during the years in question Russell's universe was, "if slightly more populated than that envisioned by the nominalist, then nonetheless comparable to the 'desert landscapes' relished by Quine". This doubly misses the mark. I take both Russell and Quine to be robustly Platonist in their thinking, and I do not presume that nominalism, or something close to it, is a prerequisite for naturalism – after all Quine, a naturalist if ever there was one, posits abstract objects and appeals to resources of set theory in his own constructions.⁵

In any event, I wonder how Stevens is able to square his picture of Russell's taking "the naturalist turn" in 1919 with the remarks I quote from *The Problems of Philosophy*, *Theory of Knowledge*, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, and Russell's 1919 review of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*, a paper in which Russell restates his earlier thinking about empirical knowledge in an especially uncompromising fashion. In these works Russell commits himself unequivocally to naturalism, and there is, I would argue, every reason to regard him as developing his new view of propositions in 1919 within the context of his naturalism. Even if "overly hasty", the shift in his thinking is one that would have come naturally to a naturalistic philosopher.

As for Stevens's insistence that "Russell took the naturalistic turn when he looked to psychology to provide a new home for propositional content", I think I see what he is suggesting and why. Taking Russell's post-1919 "psychologised theory of content [to be] much more in tune with Quinean intuitions [than his earlier thinking]", he concludes, none too surprisingly, that Russell "was only really engaged in a project that can be usefully labelled as "naturalistic" after he abandoned the anti-psychologism that was central to his early philosophy". For Stevens, Russell was antipathetic

⁵ As an aside, I might mention that in *The Russellian Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, Stevens speaks of Russell's pre-1919 philosophy as having "an empiricist flavour in the sense that [his] justification for admitting universals is that we have acquaintance with them" (p. 109).

to psychologism from early on and he embraced a naturalistic (Quinean) line only after he had made a place for psychology in his philosophy.

This is an attractive story but I remain unpersuaded. As I argued, before 1919 Russell treated epistemology as "contained in natural science" (to borrow a phrase from Quine) and viewed the problem of the external world as "a question of physics" (to put it as he does in a passage in his review of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*, quoted in my article). Moreover, and more importantly, Russell's anti-psychologism prior to 1919 did not extend as far as Stevens suggests.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World*, a work composed in 1913/1914, for instance, Russell not only observes that "psychologists ... have made us aware that what is actually given in sense is much less than most people would naturally suppose" (p. 75), he also stresses that the distinction between hard and soft data, crucial to his discussion, is "psychological and subjective" (p. 79) and speaks of his "hypothetical construction" as effecting a "reconciliation of psychology and physics" (p. 104). Furthermore he avers in *Theory of Knowledge*, as I noted in my paper, that "it is impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic and psychology" and he devotes the first part of his Dewey review to "Logical and Psychological Data".⁶

Neither Russell nor Quine pay much attention to the distinctions and categories of contemporary philosophy, and it is important that they not be read as if they do. Stevens is right that "Russell's epistemology ... infiltrates his logic, his semantics, and even his metaphysics" – in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, for instance, he candidly acknowledges a "somewhat puzzling entanglement of logic and psychology" (p. 76). And Quine is equally cavalier regarding the divisions among subjects that good philosophers are

⁶ Nor, incidentally, is it entirely obvious what Quine means when he says epistemology is "a chapter of psychology" ('Epistemology Naturalized', p. 83). While he sees the problem of the external world as a problem for the psychology of human animals, he also treats it as one of rationally reconstructing how we manage to get from the stimulations of our neuroreceptors to scientific discourse, something that can be "schematized by means of little more than logical analysis" (*Pursuit of Truth*, p. 2).

supposed never to transgress – in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, for instance, he declares that “epistemology ... becomes semantics” and “merges with psychology, as well as with linguistics” (pp. 89-90). This may or may not be as deplorable as Stevens implies. But it is, I think, pretty uncontroversial that Russell would applaud Quine’s addendum that the “rubbing out of boundaries could contribute to progress ... in philosophically interesting inquiries of a scientific nature” (p. 90).

Finally regarding Stevens’s claim that Russell’s “greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project ... stem[s] ... from his semantics”, I shall only say this does not seem to be how Quine himself saw things. As far as I am aware, Quine never spoke of being influenced by Russell’s “semantics”, never mind extolled Russell’s “psychologising of propositional content”. Rather he dwelt on the problem of our knowledge of the external world, the theme I focused on in my paper. Thus in ‘Russell’s Ontological Development’ he refers to Russell’s attempt to construct the world from sense data (using the resources of logic and set theory) as “a great idea” (p. 83) and in ‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’ refers to the task of “deriving the world from experience by logical construction” that Russell “talked of” and Carnap “undertook ... in earnest” as “a grand project” (p. 40).⁷

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⁷ Significantly, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, the paper in which Quine sets out his philosophical programme for the first time, and *Word and Object*, Quine’s greatest work, both begin with a discussion of Russell’s epistemological problem of the transition from sense to science. And in his last book, *From Stimulus to Science*, Quine again praises Russell’s attempt to realise “the dream of empiricist epistemologists: the explicit construction of the external world, or a reasonable facsimile, from sense impressions” (p. 10).

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BOOK REVIEWS

REVIEW OF *POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS* BY

BERTRAND RUSSELL, *ADELPHI*, 1939

GEORGE ORWELL

Introduction by Peter Stone

First published in 1938, *Power: A New Social Analysis* is one of the few books by Russell dealing with political affairs that did not focus on questions of war and peace. Alongside a handful of other works – notably *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (1954) – it also represents one of his few attempts to talk about politics in a systematic and theoretical way. And like *Human Society*, *Power* is generally not judged a success in terms of its theoretical ambitions. “In the course of this book,” Russell writes in the first chapter of *Power*, “I shall be concerned to prove that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics.” Few would say that Russell fulfilled this ambition. He was always more successful as a political polemicist than as a political theorist, and *Power* reflects this. In it, Russell reflects on some of the most important issues of the time – most critically, the rise of Stalinism and fascism – with his usual clarity, intellectual independence, courage, and wit. It is this virtue of *Power* that George Orwell noted in his review of the book. Orwell’s review was first published in *Adelphi* in January 1939 and is reprinted below.

George Orwell review of Russell’s *Power: A New Social Analysis*

If there are certain pages of Mr. Bertrand Russell’s book, *Power*, which seem rather empty, that is merely to say that we have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men. It is not merely that at present the rule of naked force obtains almost everywhere. Probably that has always been the case. Where this age differs from those immediately pre-

ceding it is that a liberal intelligentsia is lacking. Bully-worship, under various disguises, has become a universal religion, and such truism as that a machine-gun is still a machine-gun even when a “good” man is squeezing the trigger—and that in effect is what Mr. Russell is saying—have turned into heresies which is it actually becoming dangerous to utter.

The most interesting part of Mr. Russell’s book is the earlier chapters in which he analyses the various types of power—priestly, oligarchical, dictatorial, and so forth. In dealing with the contemporary situation he is less satisfactory, because like all liberals he is better at pointing out what is desirable than at explaining how to achieve it. He sees clearly enough that the essential problem of today is “the taming of power” and that no system except democracy can be trusted to save us from unspeakable horrors. Also that democracy has very little meaning without approximate economic equality and an educational system tending to promote tolerance and tough-mindedness. But unfortunately he does not tell us how we are to set about getting these things; he merely utters what amounts to a pious hope that the present state of things will not endure. He is inclined to point to the past; all tyrannies have collapsed sooner or later, and “there is no reason to suppose (Hitler) more permanent than his predecessors.”

Underlying this is the idea that common sense always wins in the end. And yet the peculiar horror of the present moment is that we cannot be sure that this is so. It is quite possible that we are descending into an age in which two and two will make five when the Leader says so. Mr. Russell points out that the huge system of organized lying upon which the dictators depend keeps their followers out of contact with reality and therefore tends to put them at a disadvantage as against those who know the facts. This is true so far as it goes, but it does not prove that the slave-society at which the dictator is aiming will be unstable. It is quite easy to imagine a state in which the ruling caste deceive their followers without deceiving themselves. Dare anyone be sure that something of the kind is not coming into existence already? One has only to think of the sinister possibilities of the radio, state-controlled education and so forth, to realize that “the truth is great and will prevail” is a prayer rather than an axiom.

Mr. Russell is one of the most readable of living writers, and it is very reassuring to know that he exists. So long as he and a few others like him are alive and out of jail, we know that the world is still sane in parts. He has rather an eclectic mind, his is capable of saying shallow things and profoundly interesting things in alternate sentences, and sometimes, even in this book, he is less serious than his subject deserves. But he has an essentially *decent* intellect, a kind of intellectual chivalry which is far rarer than mere cleverness. Few people during the past thirty years have been so consistently impervious to the fashionable bunk of the moment. In a time of universal panic and lying he is a good person to make contact with. For that reason this book, though it is not as good as *Freedom and Organization*, is very well worth reading.

Adelphi, January 1939



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WHEN SCHOOL INTERFERES WITH EDUCATION

CHAD TRAINER

Review of Chris Shute, *Bertrand Russell: "Education as the Power of Independent Thought"*. Chris Shute. Nottingham: Educational Heretics Press 2002. Pp. viii, 71

Schools have not necessarily much to do with education...[T]hey are mainly institutions of control where certain basic habits must be inculcated in the young. Education is quite different and has little place in school.

WINSTON CHURCHILL

The man who does not read good books has no advantage over the man who cannot read them.

MARK TWAIN

Bertrand Russell had not attended school until he was a student at Cambridge. But he, along with his wife Dora, ran a school for young children and he authored two books on the subject of education. Chris Shute, self-described "cog in the machine of state education" for twenty-five years in Britain, explains that, some time after leaving his career, he attained a sufficiently detached perspective to appreciate the accuracy of Russell's insight that "children need teaching far less than they need exposure to interesting new knowledge, and the opportunity to interact with it freely."

A professional schoolteacher taking the trouble to study Russell's philosophy of education is remarkable enough. But the marvel is compounded by the fact that Shute is "a Christian of the evangelical variety" who is not afraid to concede his sympathy with Russell's approach to religion and who sides with Russell against the strict application of religion's "'old-fashioned', harsh attitudes."

Shute's mission in *Bertrand Russell: "Education as the Power of Independent Thought"* is not so much to provide an exposition of Russell's philosophy of education. Rather, it is to show that Russell, notwithstanding the standard image of him as a "utopian leftie", was a penetrating and lucid analyst of the human race's true needs as well as a master at presenting such analyses in an accessible and enduring way. Shute defends Russell's analysis of the defects in the education system with many examples of its inadequacies. As such,

the book is a lamentation of formal education peppered with anecdotes and examples substantiating Russell's insights. It makes a compelling case that significant improvements of schools are in order. The biggest disappointment with the book, though, is its lack of advice on how to go about instituting such enhancements. The present writer was himself a victim of compulsory schooling who has yet to outgrow his pre-pubescent convictions that it is possible to learn things *informally* and in a fashion much more nearly resembling recreation than regimen. Consequently, Shute's disparagement of compulsory schooling resounded for me and was of special interest.

While Shute exhibits a competent grasp of Russell's philosophy of education, he is not one to subscribe to it uncritically. Toward the beginning of *Roads to Freedom's* final chapter, Russell comes out in favor of compulsory schooling to, at least, age 16. And Russell deems the argument for compulsory education "irresistible" toward the close of *Principles of Social Reconstruction's* second chapter. For Shute, by contrast, compulsory education is to be opposed categorically. He is willing to take libertarianism to extremes not dreamt of by Russell.

Russell had certainly been interested in children's freedom and having their well being as the primary focus of education, but he disapproved of the lengths to which the likes of A.S. Neill went to grant children autonomy. Russell believed, instead, that children should be compelled to learn the fundamentals in subjects like mathematics and English, geography and history. As Shute sees the matter, though, there is plainly and simply no traditional school subject that is to be considered "essential": "[W]e British have still a long way to go before we feel really safe with a curriculum which is a catalogue and not a prescription."

Shute and Russell are at one, however, in the conviction that "the grim-faced, repetitive, lackluster rote-learning so common in the early days of state schooling, and the heavy-handed, competitive driving of knowledge into young minds which is still promoted by the government through its League Table and ceaseless testing was an offence against the very soul of our youth, and should be eliminated at all costs." Shute speaks of how "the State system ... limits its vision to the nineteenth century idea that all children need to be dragged into classrooms and stuffed with undigested and disjointed

knowledge. It cannot allow teachers and pupils to pursue learning in their own chosen rhythm, because to do so would interrupt the 'delivery' of the curriculum, the whole curriculum and nothing but the curriculum which has become the sole purpose of schooling, as much now as it was in the late 1800s."

While Shute decries "repetitive, lackluster rote-learning", he is not one to lose sight of memorization's genuine value in authentic education. In an era when computer literacy is celebrated more than traditional literacy, Shute makes an observation that cannot be over-emphasized in our so-called Information Age:

We have, perhaps, lost our taste for knowing things well enough to be able to recite them from memory. We can easily recall information from databases, without even the inconvenience of looking it up in books. We tend to see memorization as 'rote-learning', and less valuable to youngsters than being able to find information from established sources when and where it is needed. There is a lot to be said for our adaptation to an information-rich environment, but to lose entirely the mechanisms by which we furnish our minds with permanent resources in the form of memorable ideas and beautiful words would be a sad loss of intellectual independence.

Shute speaks of how Russell "would not have had much time for our present school system in which the only imperatives are smooth organization, efficient control and the certainty that if anything goes wrong no adult in the school can be blamed for it". Such a defective culture can hardly be expected to foster progressive thought, let alone progressive action.

For Shute, education, as currently practiced, amounts to no more than the oppression of children by coercing them to conform uncritically to "our tribal mores", and he cites as ample evidence the philistines that are the products of the last century's educational practices. "Critical thought in children is not valued, despite the fact that the aim of all education is to produce adults who, supposedly, can 'think for themselves'." Rather, for all too many "educators", "if school pupils decide for themselves to take an independent line of some question of school policy they become on the instant bad, rebellious, dangerous and subject to severe punishment."

Shute explains that "Since most people, even in 21st century Britain, think that the main purpose of 'good' teachers is to show children that life is often unpleasant, and that they must not expect everything to happen as they wish it to, the education system which

adults will vote for is unlikely to correspond very closely to that which reason suggests is best.”

In a day and age when parents say with straight faces that they are happy with their children’s education because their children are on the honor roll, are excelling on standardized multiple-choice tests, and/or being accepted to “gifted and talented programs”, Shute, like Russell, is bound to sound utopian. Both men are to be respected for believing that accreditation is worth much less than actual education and that education is to be valued primarily as leisure rather than as regimen. But their writings here tend to assume these tenets rather than provide reasoned defenses of them.

As critical as Shute is about British schooling, the mind reels at what Shute would have to say of the American system. According to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, the United Kingdom has 100% literacy while only 25% of the population has more than secondary schooling. What does it say about the United States when it boasts a full 50% having at least some post-secondary schooling but a literacy rate of 85%?

Shute, like Russell, does not address the substantial problems posed for youngsters who might very well be in wholehearted agreement with their philosophies of education but find themselves trapped in the one-size-fits-all Simon-says approach of mass-produced compulsory “education”. These youths live in an establishment that is all too eager to punish those who have exhibited the effrontery to simply not play the game. Such budding contrarians regularly have their prospects of attaining a self-supporting livelihood threatened because of their “audacious” irreverence toward the system.

Shute’s book is at its best when it comes to criticizing current practices. It is short, however, on concrete suggestions for reform, unlike his earlier book *Compulsory Schooling Disease* which devotes its eighth chapter to such improvements. The present reviewer is in full agreement with Shute’s criticisms of formal education but is not optimistic that Shute can sell them to the establishment. Overall, though, Shute’s book, while not quite the roadmap to improvement for which one may have been hoped, is exquisite in its expressions of indignation and criticism.

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DOUGLAS ADAMS’ LAST BOOK

PETER STONE

Review of Douglas Adams, *The Salmon of Doubt: Hitchhiking the Galaxy One Last Time* (Ballantine Books, 2003):

Douglas Adams, a radical atheist who passed away in 2001, is best known for creating the humorous science fiction masterpiece *The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy*, which has been incarnated in books, radio and television series, and recently film. Though *Salmon of Doubt* shamelessly capitalizes on publicity generated by Adam’s death to publicize a film well worth avoiding, the book contains much of value. Besides a collection of Adam’s published fiction and nonfiction, *Salmon* contains chapters of his last unfinished novel from which the collection gets its name. Much additional unpublished material was fished from Adams’ fleet of Macintosh computers in which lie some 2,579 pieces of writing. Monty Python’s Terry Jones thoughtfully provides an introduction to the new edition as well as an introduction to his introduction (to the new edition). Naturalist Richard Dawkins gives a tribute in which he describes finishing an Adams’ novel only to flip to page one and read it all over again.

The Salmon is a fitting tribute to Adams’s views. Worth noting is an interview conducted by American Atheists in which Adams discusses his views in no uncertain terms. Some memorable lines in the book are these:

The agenda of life’s important issues has moved from novelists to science writers, because they know more. (p. 160)

The whole business of religion is profoundly interesting. But it does mystify me that otherwise intelligent people take it seriously. (p. xxvii)

America is like a belligerent boy; Canada is like an intelligent woman. Australia is Jack Nicholson. (p. 45)

In England it is considered socially incorrect to know stuff or think about things. It’s worth bearing this in mind when visiting. (p. 69)

THE 33RD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY convened this past May 26-28 at the University of Iowa, at the invitation of Gregory Landini. The University of Iowa spreads across several blocks of pleasantly wide streets with the Iowa River flowing through its center and several bridges connecting the two halves. The river and a narrow footbridge across it lie behind the Iowa House Hotel, where some of the Russell Society members stayed. Between the hotel and the bridge stands a beautiful, futuristic early building by the California architect Frank O. Gehry, the prosaically named Iowa Advanced Tech Lab (see cover). Going out the front door of the Iowa House and through the park in front of it and along the river beside it brought us to the English and Philosophy building, where the conference was held. The Old Capital Building, which is now part of the university, stands across the road from the park facing the river, and its gold dome, which rises above the campus, serves as a marker for the area as well as point at which the university and its life passes into that of the town. And the town does have a life. Iowa city is energetic and eclectic, with an indisputable college-town feel, a fabulous bookstore, and streets tightly packed with pubs, stores, open squares, street music, deadbeats and out-of-town gawkers – such as myself.

Though I arrived too late for it, the Russell Society's Friday evening dinner was at *The Cottage*, a restaurant in the middle of town (and hence in the middle of a small music festival) and the first of two BRS board meetings, which I also missed, was held there after dinner. Some of the business requires explanation. The Board needs to be able to vote on issues by email and postal mail between annual meetings, and prior to the meeting a committee had been appointed to propose bylaws allowing for this, but after discovering that laws for non-profits prohibit just this thing, the committee found itself at an impasse on this issue, but proposed bylaws concerning several other issues, which the Board approved. These included creating the position of Board Vice-President so Board meetings can run more smoothly when the Chair is absent, creating a membership category of life couple membership and rewriting the bylaws in gender-neutral language.

However, the real business of the annual meeting – which I did attend – began later that evening in the auditorium of the English

and Philosophy building, when Gregory Landini kicked off the talks with 'Solving the Russell Paradoxes' to an audience comprising regular BRS members as well as new faces, including two very advanced undergraduates. In his talk, Landini (University of Iowa) defended the controversial thesis that Russell's paradoxes of attributes and classes did not refute logicism (the view that arithmetic truth is logical truth), because, though not well known, Russell had in fact solved the paradoxes, and there is an available for the solution of them within Frege's early system as well. Thus Fregean and Russellian logicism is successful, Landini concluded, "relative to their respective ontologies".

On Saturday, Peter Stone (Stanford University) opened the morning session with 'Russell, Mathematics and the Popular Mind', addressing Russell's views on the value of a mathematical education and using those views to critique misperceptions of mathematics in such recent movies about mathematics as 'Good Will Hunting', 'A Beautiful Mind', 'Pi', and most recently, 'Proof'. Following Peter, Tim Madigan (St John Fisher College) spoke on 'Arthur James Balfour: The Anti-Russell', describing Balfour – who authored books on philosophy of religion and the paranormal and ran as Conservative Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1902-1905 and was Foreign Secretary in 1917 when he wrote the famous 'Balfour Declaration' – as Russell's "bête noir". Emilio Reyes Le Blanc (University of Toronto) then spoke on 'Russell on Acquaintance and *de re* belief' in which he developed a Russellian analysis of *de re* belief. Before breaking for lunch, Dorothea Lotter (University of Central Arkansas) spoke on 'Frege and Russell on the Justification of a Logical Theory', in which she gave a fascinating account of the differences in Frege's and Russell's views on logic that are suggested by Frege's assertion that arithmetic is a branch of logic and Russell's assertion that logic is a branch of mathematics.

Lunch was downtown, and for many meant a long table in an Indian restaurant, with quite delicious food served buffet style. After lunch, a second Board meeting was held to discuss the location of the next Annual Meeting, and the talks resumed at 2 pm with Matt McKeon (Michigan State University) reading a paper titled 'A Plea for Logical Objects'. McKeon looked at a problem first raised by John Etchemendy for the modern Tarskian semantic account of logical truth: that the Tarskian account cannot be correct because it

makes the extension of logical truth turn on the cardinality of the world, which is claimed to be a non-logical fact. McKeon appealed to Russell's early conception of logical objects to respond to this objection. Following his discussion, Christopher Pincock (Purdue University) spoke on 'The Scientific Basis for Russell's External World Program', arguing that in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, rather than attempting to reconcile physics with his views on acquaintance, Russell was trying to remove conflicts between the sciences of psychology and physics. After Pincock, Max Belaise (University of Martinique) spoke on 'Russell on Science and Religion', using Russell's essay *Religion and Science* as his point of departure to explore the relation between science and religion. In 'On Denoting with Denoting Concepts' Francesco Orilia (Università di Macerata), the final speaker of the afternoon, defended Russell's 'On Denoting' approach to semantics and ontology against neo-Meinongian objections.

The Society met for dinner on the second floor of a local bistro – the *One Twenty Six* – filling it to the bursting point with people and conversation. It is the first time in my memory that the society ate dinner in public, but this detail seemed to have little impact on its members' pleasure in good food and company. After dinner, the party trooped back to campus to enjoy a presentation by David Blitz (Central Connecticut State University) on 'Bertrand Russell Audio-Visual Project: the Andrew Wyatt Interviews'. In his presentation, David showed recent digitalizations of old television interviews of Russell by Andrew Wyatt.

On Sunday, Chad Trainer (Independent Scholar) gave a talk called 'In *Further Praise of Idleness*', in which he argued that Russell, who insisted that "there is far too much work done in the world, [and] that immense harm is caused by the belief that work is virtuous" in his 1935 book *In Praise of Idleness*, if he were alive today, would have even greater cause for concern about our current lack of idleness than he did for the lack of idleness in the world of 1935. After Chad's talk, Allan Hillman (Purdue University) discussed 'Russell on Leibniz and Substance'. Concluding the weekend came a master class hosted by Alan Schwerin (Monmouth University) on 'Russell, Hume and the Idea of Self'. – RC

MEETING MINUTES, BRS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
MAY 26 AND 27, 2006

The Friday, May 26, 2006 Board of Directors meeting of the BRS began at 7 pm at The Cottage in Iowa City. BRS President Alan Schwerin officiated.

Attending were Alan Schwerin, Chad Trainer, Cara Rice, David White, Tim Madigan, Phil Ebersole, Peter Stone, David Blitz, Gregory Landini, Warren Allen Smith, John Ongley, Rosalind Carey and David Henehan.

Minutes from the 2005 Board of Directors meeting were approved. The Treasurer's Report was approved. Reports from the various committees, especially the Bylaw Review Committee, vice-presidents and the *Quarterly's* editors were heard.

The Bylaw Review Committee introduced their proposed revisions to the BRS Bylaws and the remainder of the meeting was spent discussing and voting on these revisions to the bylaws. The committee had been established to devise a system for the board to vote on issues by email and postal mail between annual meetings, but did not address the issue since they had discovered that Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation Law requires unanimous written consent for an action to be valid, which would be virtually impossible with a 24 member board. (The BRS is incorporated in Illinois.) The proposed amendments to the bylaws were all approved. Revisions adopted included the use of gender-neutral language in the bylaws and provisions for conducting Board meeting when the Chair is absent.

The meeting adjourned at 8:30 pm.

THE SATURDAY, MAY 27, 2006 CONTINUATION of the BRS Board of directors meeting began at 1 pm at the English-Philosophy building on the University of Iowa main campus, where the annual meeting took place, in Iowa City. BRS President Alan Schwerin officiated.

Attending were Alan Schwerin, Chad Trainer, Cara Rice, David Goldman, Thom Weidlich, David White, Tim Madigan, Peter Stone, David Blitz, Gregory Landini, Warren Allen Smith, John Ongley, Rosalind Carey and David Henehan.

Business of the meeting included: election of officers, choice of a site for the 2007 annual meeting, a discussion of whether the Society's bank balance, or a significant part of it, should be invested in a reasonably secure but interest-earning account (this was Ken Blackwell's suggestion), whether a Nominating Committee for Board positions should be created (Peter Stone, Ken Blackwell, and Dave White's suggestion), whether a statement to Iran (Dennis Darland) should be adopted and whether the BRS position on the U.S. invasion of Iraq should be reaffirmed (Ray Perkins' suggestion). due to lack of time, the last four issues were not voted on.

The following officers were duly nominated, seconded and unanimously elected for the 2006-2007 year: President: Alan Schwerin; Vice-President: Ray Perkins, Jr.; Secretary: David Henehan; Treasurer: Dennis Darland; Chair: Chad Trainer; Vice-Chair: David White.

For the site of the 2007 annual meeting, it was decided that it would be either hosted by David White in Rochester or by Alan Schwerin at Monmouth University with the other person hosting the meeting for 2008. David and Alan were to decide between themselves which of them would host the meeting first. (They later decided that it would be Alan who hosted it at Monmouth in 2007 with David hosting it in Rochester in 2008.)

The meeting adjourned at 2 pm.

David Henehan, Secretary, BRS

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2006 ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT
Cash Flow January 1, 2006 – December 31, 2006

| | |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| BALANCE 1/1/06 | 12,139.56 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | 760.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | 760.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 563.00 |
| Renewals | 6808.54 |
| TOTAL Dues | 7371.54 |
| Library Income | 69.00 |
| Other Income | 6.00 |
| TOTAL INCOME | 8206.54 |
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charges | 32.93 |
| BRS Paper Award | 425.90 |
| Library Expenses | 276.90 |
| Meeting Expenses | 64.69 |
| BRS <i>Quarterly</i> | 2444.08* |
| Other Expenses | 112.23 |
| PayPal Fees | 88.85 |
| <i>Russell</i> Subscriptions | 3444.00 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | 6889.58 |
| TRANSFERS | |
| FROM PayPal | 2441.50 |
| FROM Deposit Intra | 5780.00 |
| TO Checking | - 8221.50 |
| TOTAL TRANSFERS | 0.00 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | 1316.96 |
| BALANCE 12/31/06 | 13,456.52 |

* Some *Quarterly* expenses were not turned in by the end of the year.

Dennis J. Darland, BRS Treasurer
dennis.darland@yahoo.com

The Greater Rochester Russell Set

Writers and Books' Verb Café
740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY
7 pm
\$3 to Public - Free to Members

- Apr. 12 Alan Bock on Russell's essay 'The Value of Free Thought'
- May 10 Howard Blair on Bertrand Russell and quantum physics
- June 14 John Belli on advice from Bertrand Russell
- July 12 George McDade on Russell's essays 'Ideas That Have Helped Mankind' and 'Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind'
- Aug. 09 Phil Ebersole on Russell as a guild socialist
- Sept. 13 Gerry Wildenberg on Sam Harris's book *Letter to a Christian Nation*

BARS

The Bay Area Russell Set

The next meeting will be in celebration of Bertrand Russell's birthday (May 18)

Time and place - TBA

THE SPOKESMAN Founded by Bertrand Russell



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The First Holocaust

Robert Fisk

Hans Blix - Why Trident?

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Harold Pinter & José Saramago
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Making Britain's Nukes 'Usable'?

Paul Rogers

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Robert Norris & Hans Kristensen
Nuclear weapons: A disarmament deficit
Hans Blix

Woe unto Trident

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
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Aaron Preston

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
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL
SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Quadruple Issue

Numbers 132 - 135 / November 2006 - August 2007



NOAM CHOMSKY AND BERTRAND RUSSELL

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Quadruple Issue


Numbers 132-135 / November 2006 – August 2007

NOAM CHOMSKY AND BERTRAND RUSSELL

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IT'S TIME TO
RENEW
YOUR MEMBERSHIP
TO THE
BERTRAND RUSSELL
SOCIETY



If you haven't renewed your membership, now is the time to do it! Fill out form enclosed in this issue and send it, with a check (in US or Canadian dollars) payable to *The Bertrand Russell Society*, to Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer, at the address on the form.

IN THIS ISSUE

THE EDITORS' PREOCCUPATION with writing a Russell book has resulted, as you may have noticed, in a certain amount of procrastination in the production of the *Quarterly* over the past year. The need has therefore arisen for a quadruple issue. We expect the issue's quadruplicity to drink up, it might be said, the backlog in the production of the *Quarterly*, relying, that is, on the editorial truism that quadruplicity drinks procrastination.

NOAM CHOMSKY, honorary member of the Russell Society, well known admirer of Russell, and author of the sentence 'Colorless green ideas sleep furiously', is the featured subject in this issue of the *Quarterly*. Not only is Chomsky, like Russell, a linguistic theorist, he is also, like Russell, a political polemicist of the left, a pamphleteer, a speaker and an activist for causes promoting greater happiness and decency for humanity. In this issue, we have an interview with Chomsky by Russell Society member Brandon Young. In russell-l; the internet discussion group devoted to Russell studies, questions recently arose about comments attributed to Chomsky by a political journal concerning Russell's Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal. Brandon contacted Chomsky to clarify the matter; Chomsky, himself an early critic of the Vietnam War, replied with some interesting observations about the Russell Tribunal and similar tribunals, setting the record straight about his views on them. We are glad to be able to publish his comments. Peter Stone's review essay on some recently published political works by Chomsky follows this interview. Peter compares Chomsky's ideas on socialism and anarchy with Russell's in an enlightening discussion of their respective views.

WILLIAM EVERDELL, author of *The First Moderns* and member of the BRS, reviews Matthew Stewart's new book, *The Courier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World* in this issue of the BRSQ. Russell's own study of Leibniz is first rate history of philosophy that influenced several generations of Leibniz scholars. Stewart's account elaborates on Russell's in the light of 100 years of Leibniz and Spinoza research and publishing, with a fresh retelling of the tale of Spinoza and Leibniz's meetings in 1676. Not only did Russell respect Leibniz's work in mathe-

matics and mathematical logic, he also claims, in his *History of Western Philosophy*, that the *Monadology* is a useful picture of subjective and objective space and of the relation between perception and physics, if one rejects the view that monads are windowless, for then each monad is a subjective perspective and the totality of their points of view is objective space. This, of course, sounds suspiciously like Russell's own construction of space and time in his 1914 book *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In fact, Russell begins his construction of the external world in OKEW by saying: "Let us imagine that each mind looks out upon the world, as in Leibniz's monadology, from a point of view peculiar to itself..." (94) and then proceeds to construct his own "monadology". Concerning Russell's views on Spinoza, it can be simply be said that Russell found Leibniz's best work, which he admired, to be largely Spinozistic. Ken Blackwell has further argued that there is a strong Spinozistic aspect to some of Russell's ethics. Everdell's review of Stewart's book is thus on a most Russellian subject.

WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY? – TAKE TWO. In a previous issue of the *Quarterly*, Aaron Preston argued that analytic philosophy was not a single school of philosophy because there is no set of doctrines that all analytic philosophers ever shared that can thus be taken to define 'analytic philosophy'. This presupposes, of course, that to be a school of philosophy, all or almost all of the people in it must share a set of common philosophical doctrines. Several people have protested Aaron's claim, for example, in the internet Russell studies discussion group, russell-1, though they have not done so by arguing that there *are too* unifying doctrines shared by most analytic philosophers. Rather, they have protested that Aaron's criterion unfairly limits what might be called a "philosophical school" and that philosophical schools can also be unified, and so defined, by non-doctrinal criteria, such as a shared method or shared problems or shared influences. In this issue, BRS member Mike Beaney also objects to this idea in Aaron's thesis, but more than that, he argues that Aaron tries to go beyond that view to claim that there is no such thing as analytic philosophy at all. Beaney tries to clarify what that might mean, while also arguing that Aaron has unwarrantedly limited the idea of what may count as a philosophical school. But read Mike's comments for yourself. Aaron's reply follows.

SOCIETY NEWS

IT'S TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP to the Bertrand Russell Society! If you have not yet done so, we hope you will renew your membership now, using the form enclosed with this issue of the *Quarterly*. For those wishing to pay their dues online using a credit card, you can now pay via PayPal at <https://www.paypal.com>. New users may open a free account at that page. Then, after entering the amount being sent, and, when prompted for the recipient's email address, enter brs-pp@hotmail.com. PayPal is free of charge, and – foreign members take note – transactions are handled in US dollars. When prompted for a message to send to our treasurer, Kenneth Blackwell, state the purpose of the payment and any change of address but do not include your credit card information. Ken will send you an email receipt and update the membership records accordingly.

WHO KNEW? The Bertrand Russell Society has a *library*. If you're not familiar with it, you can acquaint yourself with its holdings by going to its website at <http://www2.webng.com/brslibrary>. Click on any of the links there to visit a section of the library. Current and out-of-print books by and on Russell are offered at a significant discount – sets of Russell postcards, available at US\$6 per dozen, are currently on sale. There is also a lending library for members with a full list of books for loan at the website. But books are only the beginning: cassettes of speeches, debates and interviews by Russell are also available for lending. Finally, there is a members' area where audio and video files of Russell's speeches, debates, and interviews are available for download. This can make for a pleasant Friday evening – pour a glass of wine, sit back, and click on a particular speech or interview: it's a great way to relax and enjoy yourself after a long and busy week. Right now, there are about fifty audios and a few video clips, including 'Reflections on my Eightieth Birthday', 'The Humanist Approach', an interview of Russell by Studs Terkel, Russell on Einstein, A.J. Ayer on Russell, and much more. Email Tom Stanley, the Russell Society librarian, at tjstanley@verizon.net for a user name and password to obtain access to the members area of the library. Similarly, you should contact Tom to borrow from the lending library and to obtain cassettes or purchase the discount books and postcards.

REPORT ON THE 2007 BRS ANNUAL MEETING

While much of northeastern America can be a little too warm for comfort in June, the proximity of Monmouth New Jersey to the Atlantic Ocean provides it with cool breezes and a pleasantly moderate climate in that month. With Monmouth University already closed for the summer, we had the campus to ourselves, and the availability of pleasant walks around its attractive surroundings was conducive to both solitary and social reflection. It was in this environment that the Bertrand Russell Society held its 34th annual meeting last year from June 8 to June 10, thanks to the hospitality of Alan Schwerin, President of the Bertrand Russell Society, and his wife, Helen Schwerin. (Alan and Helen also hosted annual meetings at Monmouth in 1999 and 2000.) The Turrell boardroom in Bey Hall served as the Society's home base that weekend, with dormitory space for its members available just several buildings away.

Following registration late Friday afternoon, the Society met for dinner on campus at "The Club", after which they returned to Bey Hall for a board meeting of the Society. Following the business meeting, we relaxed in the boardroom while David Blitz updated the Society on the progress the Bertrand Russell Audio-Visual Project is making. David and four of his students (Sotzing, Rutkowski, Cavallo and Notaro) then provided us with some quite interesting audio-visual samples of Russell. Friday closed with members enjoying the Greater Rochester Russell Set's hospitality suite/salon.

The first presentation Saturday morning was Marvin Kohl's "Bertrand Russell on Fear" (to be published in the next issue of the *Quarterly*). Kohl discussed Russell's idea that *all* fear, whether it be unconscious, conscious, or attitudinal, is bad and ought to be eliminated. Contra Russell, Marvin argued that the deserving target is not fear *per se*, but panic fear and those human ideas and practices that tend to produce it. Tim Madigan then gave a talk on "The Bertrand Russell Case Revisited". As all Russellians know, after being denied a position at the College of the City of New York, Russell taught for a time at the Barnes Foundation in Philadelphia. However, Russell and Barnes had a bitter falling out a few years later, and in 1943, Barnes self-published a pamphlet entitled "The Case of Bertrand Russell *versus* Democracy and Education." In that pamphlet, Barnes argued that Russell had nothing but derision and contempt for democracy and education, and had betrayed the ideals of

Barnes' friend and associate John Dewey. In his talk, Tim critiqued Barnes's claims and arguments.

Russell archivist Kenneth Blackwell of McMaster University followed with a presentation on Russell's Electronic Texts. Ken explained that many of Russell's texts are now available electronically, some freely on the web, some at login websites, and others purchasable through e-publishers. Details of sites were offered. He then pointed out that the availability of the e-texts raises the prospect of being able to search them, perhaps altogether in a "federated" search. McMaster's Digital Commons, where the back issues of *Russell* now reside (and are accessible in their entirety to BRS members on the internet at digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/russelljournal/), may provide an approach to accomplishing this. The last presentation before lunch was by Ilmari Kortelainen on "The Compositional Method of Analysis". Kortelainen used Russell's philosophy to demonstrate the relationship between the method of analysis and contextuality by addressing the question: how can the principle according to which a sentence gets its meaning from its context be understood when one also accepts the principle of compositionality, that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its constituent elements? From the viewpoint of contemporary theory of meaning these two semantic principles seem to be incompatible.

After lunch, there was a general meeting of the Society, followed by a panel discussion by Alan Bock, Tim Madigan, Thomas Riggins, and Peter Stone on Russell's book "*Understanding History, 50 years later*". Following the panel discussion, Phil Ebersole presented a paper for David White, who was unable to attend the meeting. David's paper was entitled "Russell and Horace Liveright" and described how the publishing firm of Boni & Liveright was founded in 1916 to bring modern and controversial literature to the American readers, and how it went out of business in 1930. The company specialized in authors whose material was considered improper, immoral and indecent. Boni & Liveright are less well remembered today, but the Modern Library series, which evolved out of their publishing program, is universally known. Russell became involved with Boni & Liveright through three books, *Education and the Good Life* (1926), *Marriage and Morals* (1929), and *The Conquest of Happiness* (1930), all published in the later years of the firm's history. White's main focus was on Russell's personal and professional

dealings with Horace Liveright (1884-1933), in particular, Russell's difficulties with the fast and loose lifestyle of drink, women and song associated with the firm. The last speaker of the day was David Blitz, on "Russell's Little Books", a series of pamphlets by Russell that were published in Girard Kansas by Emanuel Haldeman-Julius.

Dinner consisted of a banquet (from 8:30 to 10:00 pm) at a local Japanese Restaurant. The evening was then topped off again with the Greater Rochester Russell Set's hospitality suite.

Sunday's talks opened with Gregory Landini on "The Number of Numbers". Gregory argued that though Frege's later work offered a theory of numbers as objects, what is shared by Frege and Russell is a conception of numbers in terms one-one correspondence relations, and that on this view natural numbers are not objects and the infinity of the natural numbers may well not be necessary. Following this was a talk by Michael Garrall on "Russell: Between Deism and Atheism". Chad Trainer then read a paper entitled "Russell's Empiricist Propensities: Empiricism's Survival of Russell's 'Last Substantial Change'". Trainer began by pointing out that according to Nick Griffin, the years in which Russell came closest to being an "empiricist" are the years 1912 to 1914. Trainer then discussed the limits to Russell's empiricism during the same period, and concluded by proposing an alternative view that, regardless of where one places Russell on this sliding scale between rationalism and empiricism, we should see Russell as more empiricist after 1914 than during the 1912-14 period.

The final paper of the annual meeting was Chris Russell on "Kant and Russell's Logicism". Chris argued that what appears to be a change in view for Russell on the question of whether arithmetic is analytic or synthetic a priori was actually more simply due to a change in the meanings of the terms. Concluding the meeting was a fine lunch at the home of Alan and Helen Schwerin.

— Chad Trainer, RC

HUMANIST NOTE. Marc Carrier, Canadian humanist, has written on the religious agenda behind the façade of intelligent design and the Discovery Institute. Based on exclusive interviews, his essay will appear in *The American Atheist* in July.

INTERVIEW

ON THE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL AN INTERVIEW WITH NOAM CHOMSKY

BRANDON YOUNG

Last year marked the 40th Anniversary of the commencement of the International War Crimes Tribunal, initiated by Bertrand Russell and known popularly as the Russell Tribunal. It was an organization of civilians acting to hold world leaders accountable for what they viewed as grave violations of international law in the conduct of the Vietnam war. The Russell Tribunal further aimed at gathering testimony and documents showing the massive violence perpetrated by the United States against the Vietnamese people. Not an actual jurisprudential undertaking, it was rather an exclamation intended to break the silence, and an affirmation of the responsibility that people of free democracies have to be liable when international and national institutions fail.

Nearly forty years later, the legacy of the Russell Tribunal continues to be an influence in world affairs, most recently by the formation of the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI), another citizens' tribunal set up to assert international law by making clear the disparity between world citizens' opinion and the action of international institutions regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Like the Russell Tribunal, it challenges the justificationist orthodoxy of western governments and media alike by condemning preventative war as nothing more than a euphemism for a crime of aggression. But unlike the Russell Tribunal, which at least received ridicule in the press, the WTI has been ignored by the Western media where it could have its most effect. Interestingly, many of its participants and leading organizers are women, a striking contrast to the Russell Tribunal, which the WTI acknowledges as its model.

In the last chapter of *At War with Asia* (1970), Noam Chomsky addresses the subject of war crimes and the Russell Tribunal. Prompted by a discussion in the Russell studies group, russell-I, of a purported account of his views, I recently asked Chomsky about his thoughts on the Russell Tribunal, its legacy, and the new WTI. The following is an edited transcript of that correspondence.

BY: In a recent issue of the *Radical Philosophy Review* (v. 8, no. 2), you are quoted as saying that you refused to take part in the tribunal and that it engaged in “self promotion” on the part of elite intellectuals, of which, I presume you are including Russell. You are also quoted as saying that “...it had virtually no effect. It was just marginalized and vilified.” Can you give some comment on this, on how the tribunal was perceived at the time, and on various people’s adherence to its legacy since then?

NC: I admire Russell very greatly. One of the main organizers of the Tribunal, Vlado Dedijer, was a close personal friend, also a person I admired greatly, as I did many of the participants and witnesses. The Tribunal itself was, in fact, marginalized and vilified and that is not contested to my knowledge. Just take a look at the press and journal coverage at the time, and since. You’ll find out the extent to which it was vilified – to the extent that it was mentioned at all. If you are interested in the vicious treatment of Russell himself in the American press, particularly the *New York Times*, have a look at the South End book *Russell in America*.

The people’s tribunals and others since that time, including now, vary in character. Some involve small groups of intellectuals; others have a more popular base. Some are hailed by elite opinion – specifically, the People’s Tribunal on Russian Crimes in Afghanistan. It even got a report in the *New York Times*, if I recall correctly. Elite opinion is always very eager to focus on someone else’s crimes, particularly when we can do little about them, so there is no potential cost associated with posturing before the cameras. Those that focus attention “the wrong way” – namely, on crimes for which we are responsible and can definitely do something about – continue to be ignored or vilified. These are simply aspects of intellectual culture, and the reaction to principled dissent, that trace back to the earliest recorded history and are close to historical universals, to my knowledge.

There are very well-publicized international tribunals today, some condemned as not being harsh enough in their judgment of the criminals, some praised for creating a larger audience for their crimes. Their crimes, not ours. That’s crucial. In a typical case, the ICJ [International Court of Justice] just a few days ago condemned Serbians for not doing enough to stop the massacres in Bosnia, with a

toll of 70,000 Muslims killed according to the most respected recent analyses. But there is no judgment condemning Americans for providing crucial support for and direction of massacres in El Salvador at about the same time, with about the same toll: perhaps 75,000. Obviously that is vastly more serious than not doing enough to stop them, and it was only one part of the Central American slaughters (themselves only one part of huge crimes around the world at the time) for which responsibility lies in the hands of the present incumbents in Washington or their immediate mentors, and the president who has since been deified in one of the most vulgar and embarrassing propaganda campaigns I can recall this side of Kim il-Sung, reaching as far as left-liberal opinion (recently the *New York Review of Books*). In fact, such a judgment, which would be unimaginable, unthinkable, at other times, is another sign of the moral depravity of the reigning intellectual culture.

As for the legacy of the Russell Tribunal, I wish it had turned out to be an important step in history. I doubt that it did.

BY: Why did you decide not to take part in the Russell Tribunal when asked?

NC: It’s true that I rejected the invitation to be one of the “judges,” for the same reasons I have in all other such cases. Worthiness of a cause depends on assessment of likely consequences. My judgment at the time – and since – is that for me at least, continued active participation in resistance and other popular efforts against the war was more important than participating in the Tribunal, which would have meant terminating these efforts for a considerable time, right at a critical period. Of course it all gets vilified, but that’s not the criterion: [it is], rather, [what are the] likely consequences of this as compared with other efforts that it naturally displaces.

BY: And the World Tribunal on Iraq?

NC: I did not accept requests to participate in that either. I felt, and feel, that my time could be more effectively spent. Others have to make their own calculations. But although, to its credit, it acknowledges the privatization of the economic resources as a crime, there is no mention in its declaration of that of the use of private mercenaries, e.g., Blackwater USA and others, who are accountable to no

one and are roughly 40,000 personnel, according to the Government Accountability Office. People are quite right to be concerned about the creation of a mercenary army. It is somewhat surprising that it has taken the US this long to adopt the standard imperial pattern: French foreign legion, Gurkhas and sepoy, Hessians, etc.

REVIEW ESSAY

CHOMSKY AND RUSSELL REVISITED

PETER STONE

Noam Chomsky, *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*. New York: The New Press, 2003, pp. xi, 111. US\$12.95.

Noam Chomsky, *Chomsky on Anarchism*. Ed. By Barry Pateman. Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2005, pp. 241. US\$16.95.

Noam Chomsky, *Government in the Future*. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005, pp. 73. US\$7.95.

The recent publication of three books by BRS honorary member Noam Chomsky – *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* (2003), *Chomsky on Anarchism* (2005), and *Government in Our Future* (2005)¹ – provides an excellent opportunity to revisit the relation between his ideas and those of Bertrand Russell. The reason for this is not that Chomsky says something fundamentally new in these works. Indeed, virtually all the content of these three books has been available in one form or another for some time.² But together, they collect most of Chomsky's writings relevant to an assessment of the relation of his ideas with Russell's.

The relation between Chomsky's and Russell's ideas is worth exploring because of their similar reputations. Both are leading intellectuals who earned their reputations through their work in highly technical fields. Both became radical critics of the existing social order and made use of their reputations to help get their criticisms before a wider audience. As a result, both have had to face the accusation that they are nosing around in areas outside their areas of expertise. Why should their social criticisms be regarded as anything

¹ These three works will be cited here as *PKF*, *CA*, and *GF*, respectively

² *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* was originally published by Pantheon Books in 1971 and *Chomsky on Anarchism* is a collection of previous essays and interviews that includes both well-known classics and more recent and lesser-known pieces. Only *Government in Our Future* is available here for the first time, but it is based on a talk given at the Poetry Center in New York City 1970, being the first complete published transcription of that lecture.

but mere carping? Is there something more to their ideas than that?³

In these three works, Chomsky displays a keen awareness of what meaningful social criticism, as opposed to mere carping, requires. "Social action," he writes,

must be animated by a vision of a future society, and by explicit judgments of value concerning the character of this future society. These judgments must derive from some concept of the nature of man, and one may seek empirical foundations by investigating man's nature as it is revealed by his behavior and his creations, material, intellectual, and social (CA, 113-114).

Social criticism – or, for that matter, a defense of the status quo, or any kind of social action in between – thus rests ultimately upon some conception of human nature, a conception that "is usually tacit and inchoate, but it is always there, perhaps implicitly, whether one chooses to leave things as they are and cultivate one's garden, or to work for small changes, or for revolutionary ones" (CA, 190). It is the development of a meaningful and defensible account of human nature – and through it the development of a compelling social vision – that distinguishes positive social criticism from merely negative hectoring.

In all three books under consideration, Chomsky lays out his vision of a better society along with the conception of human nature that he believes underlies it. The most concise statement of both the vision and the conception appears in *Government in Our Future*. Here, Chomsky contrasts four visions of what government in the future might look like – classical liberal, libertarian socialist, state socialist, and state capitalist, the last of which is meant to represent the American political system at present. The core of Chomsky's argument is twofold. First, the classical liberal and libertarian socialist visions each have the same basic conception of human nature at their core, and libertarian socialism is the vision that would do most justice to that conception in complex and technologically ad-

³ See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) and Paul Johnson, *Intellectuals* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988) for such criticisms. For responses to Posner and Johnson, respectively, see Russell Jacoby, "Cornering the Market in Chutzpah," *Los Angeles Times*, January 27, 2002 and Christopher Hitchens, "The Life of Johnson," in *For the Sake of Argument* (New York: Verso, 1993).

vanced societies such as our own. Second, the state socialist and state capitalist visions – represented by V.I. Lenin in the first case and Robert McNamara in the second – share fundamentally the same conception of human nature, a conception that is markedly inferior to, and less inspiring than, the conception underlying libertarian socialism.

The conception of human nature that Chomsky sees underlying both classical liberalism and libertarian socialism is complex. Human beings have a natural need to control their own lives, an "instinct for freedom," as Bakunin famously put it.⁴ This need expresses itself individually through the need for meaningful work and collectively through the need for democratic association. Healthy people leading healthy lives are free people, and free people both engage in creative work and relate to each other as equals. People are not free to the extent that they must obey the orders of others; when people relate to one another as master and servant, especially in the workplace, they are both alienated from their powers of creativity and denied the meaningful connection with others that democracy makes possible.⁵

To derive a vision of modern society from this conception of human nature requires some understanding of how society works, of how people who act in accordance to the conception will be affected by different forms of social organization at a given time. Here, Chomsky argues, classical liberalism did not so much go wrong as become outdated; social conditions changed, and with them changed the nature of the fundamental threat to human freedom. In the past, state power could reasonably be described as the gravest threat to freedom; in the modern era, private power poses just as big a threat, if not a bigger one. The classical liberal vision is thus antiquated,

⁴ Quoted in CA, 155.

⁵ Of course, not all master-servant relations are alike. In capitalist workplaces, but not authoritarian regimes, workers have the right of *exit*, even if they lack a voice in how both sorts of organizations are run. Chomsky does not believe that the existence of an exit option can meaningfully compensate for the lack of a free and equal voice in the government of any organization. For an interesting effort to contrast exit and voice in organizations of all sorts, see Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

and requires updating. Chomsky's argument on this point is worth quoting at length:

To summarize, the first concept of the state that I want to establish as a point of reference is classical liberalism. Its doctrine is that state functions should be drastically limited. But this familiar characterization is a very superficial one. More deeply, the classical liberal view develops from a certain concept of human nature, one that stresses the importance of diversity and free creation, and therefore this view is in fundamental opposition to industrial capitalism with its wage slavery, its alienated labor, and its hierarchic and authoritarian principles of social and economic organization. At least in its ideal form, classical liberal thought is opposed to the concepts of possessive individualism, that are intrinsic to capitalist ideology. For this reason, classical liberal thought seeks to eliminate social fetters and replace them with social bonds, and not with competitive greed, predatory individualism, and not, of course, with corporate empires – state or private.

"Classical libertarian thought seems to me," he concludes, "to lead directly to libertarian socialism, or anarchism if you like, when combined with an understanding of industrial capitalism (22-3).

The collection *Chomsky on Anarchism* covers much of the same ground as *Government in the Future*. It does, however, stress two other points that are worth noting. First, his argument depends on the assumption that human nature is not a *tabula rasa*, that is has certain fixed features that it brings to the table in interacting with the world. Second, the state and capitalism are not the only threats posed today to human freedom. Indeed, it is impossible to compile a list of possible threats that will be valid and relevant for all time. Rather, the conception of human nature that he endorses prescribes a method for formulating social vision, the results of which will change as social conditions change and as social knowledge advances. Chomsky relates both points together in the following passage:

Looked at in this way, the empty organism view is conservative, in that it tends to legitimate structures of hierarchy and domination. At least in its Humboldtian version [Chomsky relies heavily on Wilhelm von Humboldt's work, especially his book *The Limits of State Action*], the classical liberal view,

with its strong innatist roots, is radical in that, consistently pursued, it challenges the legitimacy of established coercive institutions. Such institutions face a heavy burden of proof: it must be shown that under existing conditions, perhaps because of some overriding consideration of deprivation or threat, some form of authority, hierarchy, and domination is justified, despite the *prima facie* case against it – a burden that can rarely be met. One can understand why there is such a persistent attack on Enlightenment ideals, with their fundamentally subversive content (*CA*, 174).

The innatist view of human nature that Chomsky endorses implies that all possible threats of human freedom should be challenged and, if possible, overcome. Note that while in *Government in the Future* Chomsky uses 'anarchism' and 'libertarian socialism' interchangeably, in *Chomsky on Anarchism* he restricts the latter to the specific social vision he has in mind for modern societies, while the former refers to the general method of challenging threats to human freedom that he recommends. Chomsky is thus both an anarchist and a libertarian socialist; the latter commitment depends heavily on his understanding of social conditions, whereas the former commitment depends only on his conception of human nature itself.

The social criticisms made by Russell and Chomsky are similar in many ways. Does that mean that Chomsky's social vision is Russell's as well? And do they share the same conception of human nature? Chomsky greatly admires Russell and discusses his ideas frequently.⁶ "To several generations, mine among them," he writes, "Russell has been an inspiring figure, in the problems he posed and the causes he championed, in his insights as well as what is left unfinished" (*PKF*, x). It is his concern with what Russell has left unfinished or unsatisfactorily resolved that motivates Chomsky's views on Russell. Chomsky does not approach Russell as an intellectual historian, determined in getting precise about what Russell had in mind. Rather, he approaches Russell as a source for intellectual inspiration, for ideas that may be of use in formulating his own positions. Thus, the similarities between Chomsky's and Russell's ideas about human nature and social vision are there, but the differences are there as well.

⁶ See, e.g., *CA*, 156, 194-195, 205.

Chomsky's most systematic engagement with Russell's thought is in *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*. Based on the Russell Lectures delivered by Chomsky at Cambridge University a year after Russell's death, this book takes up Russell's mature views on knowledge and freedom with an eye for their relevance to contemporary concerns. One of the lectures is devoted to questions of knowledge and the other to questions of freedom. Chomsky perceives some unifying threads in Russell's writings on the two topics and draws them out, not coincidentally relating Russell's conception of human nature and his social ideals to Chomsky's own (*PKF*, x-xi).

Chomsky takes Russell's 1948 *Human Knowledge* as representative of Russell's mature (in fact, final) position on questions of epistemology.⁷ He sees the mature Russell as recognizing that pure empiricism alone could not account for the knowledge human beings obtain. Both prescientific knowledge, the knowledge people obtain naturally without scientific reflection, and the philosophical study of the relationship between knowledge and experience require specific fixed cognitive mechanisms for knowledge acquisition. It cannot just be bald induction from experience plus generalized reasoning capacity, not least because the principle of induction itself, which is necessary to derive *anything* from experience, seems hard to ground in reason alone. In Russell's words, "Either, therefore, we know something independently of experience, or science is moonshine" (*PKF*, 4). Chomsky believes that this insight suggests the existence of a human nature with certain fixed capacities that it uses to derive working knowledge from a relatively information-poor environment (although he concedes that Russell might not have agreed with him on this). Chomsky sees his own work on the nature of human language as providing insight into how one particular human capacity works; this insight might be used as a starting point for the study of other, less accessible human cognitive systems.

This view of human nature as having certain fixed capacities that determine how we are capable of interacting with the world has certain implications. It suggests, for example, that there might be limits to the kinds of knowledge that human beings can have. "We might say," Chomsky writes,

⁷ Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948).

that our mental constitution permits us to arrive at knowledge of the world insofar as our innate capacity to create theories happens to match some aspect of the structure of the world. By exploring various faculties of the mind, we might, in principle, come to understand what theories are more readily accessible to us than others, or what potential theories are accessible to us at all, what forms of scientific knowledge can be attained, if the world is kind enough to have the required properties. Where it is not, we may be able to develop a kind of "intellectual technology" – say, a technique of prediction that will, for some reason, work within limits – but not to attain what might properly be called scientific understanding or common-sense knowledge (*PKF*, 20).

There might, for example, be languages that from a purely logical standpoint do not seem more demanding to learn than English, but that the cognitive capacities of humans do not allow them to "pick up" as easily as virtually every American or British child learns English. Similar constraints might apply to nonlinguistic knowledge systems. Chomsky further suggests that by this view, the principles demonstrated by human knowledge patterns "are a priori for the species – they provide the framework for interpretation of experience and the construction of specific forms of knowledge on the basis of experience – but are not necessary or even natural properties of all imaginable systems that might serve the functions of human language" (*PKF*, 44-5).

While rejecting the *tabula rasa* thus has many philosophical implications, it is the political implications that attract Chomsky's attention in *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*. Chomsky sees Russell's admission of a fixed human nature with certain definite capacities as supportive of Russell's political vision. The political ideals that Russell held, according to Chomsky, cannot be sustained if human beings are as malleable as the *tabula rasa* conception of human nature is accurate. Why demand that the political system be molded to fit human needs, if human beings can be molded to fit the political system? The recognition that human nature is richer than that is the necessary foundation for any social vision based on human freedom, something that both Russell and Chomsky tried to construct.

As for Russell's own social vision and conception of human nature, they are remarkably similar to Chomsky's. With regard to the

latter, Russell views humans as free agents whose natural development requires opportunities for individual creativity and self-expression along with egalitarian and democratic relationships with others. Chomsky describes this as “a humanistic conception of man, with due respect for man’s intrinsic nature and the admirable form it might achieve” (*PKF*, 54). With regard to the former, Russell endorses a form of social organization similar to those advocated by anarchists Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin.⁸ These two anarchist thinkers, writes Chomsky,

had in mind a highly organized form of society, but a society that was organized on the basis of organic units, organic communities. And generally they meant by that the workplace and the neighborhood, and from those two basic units there could derive through federal arrangements a highly integrated kind of social organization, which might be national or even international in scope (*CA*, 133).

The social vision offered by Russell as appropriate to the modern age – grounded in his “humanistic conception of man” – also turns out to be strikingly similar to the libertarian socialism advocated by Chomsky, a social vision informed by a conception of human nature very similar to Russell’s.

Any attempt to assimilate Russell’s political vision to Chomsky’s, however, must deal with two potential stumbling blocks. First, there is the matter of the rationalist model of human beings, in which people are born with certain cognitive abilities that do far more than simply compile data from the environment. Chomsky endorses this model, identifies elements of it in Russell, and links it to his vision of human beings as free creatures that require both creative self-expression and egalitarian social relations. But the link is not as clear as Chomsky would have it.⁹ Granted, a conception of human beings as totally malleable could not support a vision of a free society, or any other social vision for that matter. But the basic insight that people have inborn capacities of one sort or another could be developed in many different directions, some humane and enlightened, some not. It could be used, for example, to justify a

⁸ For example, in Russell’s *Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1918).

⁹ For other criticisms of Chomsky’s efforts to derive enlightened political

patriarchal society on grounds that women are “built” differently than men. (Needless to say, this is not a hypothetical scenario.) Indeed, the unenlightened uses of the idea of a fixed human nature throughout history have arguably outnumbered the enlightened ones. It was recognition of this fact, I suspect, that led Russell himself to perceive a relationship between empiricism (i.e., a conception of human nature that attributed much more to social environment than to inborn capacity) and liberal democracy – for example, in his essay “Philosophy and Politics.”¹⁰ This fact does not demolish Chomsky’s case, but it does suggest that the link between Chomsky’s philosophical work on language and the mind and the conception of human nature he needs to sustain his libertarian socialism is even more tentative than he has so far admitted.¹¹

Second, there is the matter of anarchism. As noted before, Chomsky’s vision of the appropriate form of social organization for a modern industrial society is very similar to that advocated by Russell. But while Chomsky employs the term ‘anarchism’ to describe his approach to social vision, Russell’s relationship to the term is ambiguous. On the one hand, he once described anarchism as “the ultimate ideal to which society should approximate” (cited in *PKF*,

implications from rationalism and nefarious political implications from empiricism, see John Searle, “The Rules of the Language Game,” *Times Literary Supplement*, September 10, 1976 and Bernard Williams, “Where Chomsky Stands,” *New York Review of Books*, November 11, 1976.

¹⁰ Bertrand Russell, “Philosophy and Politics,” in *Unpopular Essays* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), 1-20.

¹¹ Chomsky is on firmer ground when he links the possibility of creativity and self-expression with a mind fixed within certain limits. “The principles of mind,” he writes, “provide the scope as well as the limits of human creativity. Without such principles, scientific understanding and creative acts would not be possible. If all hypotheses are initially on a par, then no scientific understanding can possibly be achieved, since there will be no way to select among the vast array of theories compatible with our limited evidence and, by hypothesis, equally accessible to the mind. One who abandons all forms, all conditions and constraints, and merely acts in some random and entirely willful manner is surely not engaged in artistic creation, whatever else he may be doing” (*PKF*, 49-50). A completely unconstrained mind, then, would have difficulty creating or learning anything. For further discussion of the link between constraints (self-imposed or otherwise) and creative expression, see Jon Elster, *Ulysses Unbound* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3.

59-60). On the other hand, he perceived the social system he advocated – a decentralized, federated system of democratically organized communities and workplaces – as an alternative to, and not an embodiment of, anarchism. ('Guild socialism' was his term for it, as Chomsky acknowledges; see *PKF*, 60.) The difference may be more or less terminological; still, Russell's complex relationship to the word should make one pause before equating his political position with that of an avowed anarchist like Chomsky.¹²

Neither of these stumbling blocks, however, need prove fatal to Chomsky's endeavor. His goal, after all, is less to assimilate Russell's political position to his own than to identify political ideas in Russell's writings that may be of use to social critics today. These ideas have been developed by Chomsky in ways that would seem strange to Russell, and they certainly require further development in light of the questions and difficulties posed by them. In the end, however, anyone interested in understanding Russell the social critic would do well to consult these three books. In doing so, one might not only learn something about the ideals underlying Russell's social criticism, one might also learn something about which elements of those ideals are worth preserving for use by today's social critics.

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¹² To some extent, the word 'socialism' plays a role in Russell's thought similar to that played in Chomsky's by 'anarchism' – designating less a concrete political system and more a way of formulating social ideals. Indeed, Russell takes anarchism to be a concrete political system while Chomsky takes it to be a way of formulating social ideals, and Russell takes socialism to be a way of formulating social ideals while Chomsky takes it to be a concrete political system. "Russell believed," Chomsky writes, "that 'socialism, like everything else that is vital, is rather a tendency than a strictly definable body of doctrine.' It should, therefore, undergo constant change as society evolves" (*PKF*, 58). This fact goes a long way toward explaining why they agree on so much but have different assessments of anarchism.

BOOK REVIEW

THEMES SPINOZISTIC, LEIBNIZIAN, AND RUSSELLIAN

WILLIAM EVERDELL

Matthew Stewart, *The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World*, NY: Norton, 2006

How can a book on two seventeenth century rationalists by a businessman who retired early to study philosophy be important for Russell studies? Let's begin by recognizing that it is an excellent introduction to the history of philosophy, nearly as enticing – though hardly as comprehensive – as Russell's own. A longer answer would have two parts: first, that Russell's most notorious legacy to the non-philosophical reader has been arguments for atheism anticipated first by Baruch Spinoza and later by the "Spinozists" of the radical Enlightenment. Second, Russell's greatest intellectual breakthrough, his refounding of ontology on mathematical set theory and logic, followed immediately on his thorough reevaluation of seventeenth century philosophy in general and particularly of the philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz, which was a major inspiration for him. Indeed, two other early influences, Louis Couturat and Charles Sanders Peirce, were Leibniz editors.

Russell's first book was about German Democratic Socialism, his second about Geometry, but his third was about Leibniz, written after he took over J. M. E. McTaggart's introductory historical lectures on philosophy in 1899. ("Accident led me to read Leibniz, because he had to be lectured upon.")¹ The writings of the prolific, polymathic German rationalist were scattered, many unpublished, and in three languages, but Russell knew all three and became a good editor. (They are less scattered now; the first real attempt at a complete edition, begun in 1923 in eight series, reaches the twentieth printed volume of Series One, the second of Series Seven, and soon begins going direct to the internet.) Russell was excited to find in the available texts a sort of Rorschach for his own emerging intellectual concerns, especially on the foundations of mathematics.

¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 136

In Leibniz he saw, first, an extreme example of the seventeenth century's faith – almost an alternative religion – in the apodeictic certainty of mathematics, and the hope that it could be applied in ways that would bring all intellectual conflict to an end.

The other aspect of Leibniz's thought that seems to have fascinated Russell was the German's lifelong struggle with what Leibniz called "the labyrinth" – the antinomy of continuity/discontinuity – and the fact, which is reinforced by the calculus that Leibniz co-invented, that the numbers on the real number line, and possibly the parts of anything (but never the integers), succeed each other without any "between."² So arbitrarily small was the separation from a real number's predecessor and successor that Leibniz and his contemporaries baptized it "infinitesimal." Much of analysis, or the post-calculus study of functions, has depended on proofs that some sets with an infinite number of elements sum to a finite number – especially those whose elements are infinitesimal. The acceptance of this continuity of number, and perhaps of space, was unavoidable; but did that imply that the material universe was similarly composed of inseparable parts? Or were there places in space that were empty of matter?

Much of physics since Leibniz's time has depended on the assumption, as old as Leucippus and Democritus, that the universe is composed only of matter and void. We – scientists, philosophers and twenty-first century laypersons alike – still believe that all matter is made of separable particles, small but never infinitesimal, called molecules or atoms (later split, to the confusion of Democriteans, into yet more integral and separable particles like hadrons or leptons), which have nothing at all between them. That doctrine, called atomism, was an obvious threat to religion as far back as Epicurus, and seventeenth century European thinkers wrestled continually with the on-

² Leibniz's remarks on continuity which are cited by Russell in his *Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900) come from Leibniz, *Die philosophische Schriften* (ed., Gerhardt, Berlin, 1875-90): v1, pp338, 403, 416; v2, pp77, 98, 261, 278, 279, 282, 300, 304, 305, 315, 379, 475, 515, 517; v3, pp583, 591; v4, pp91-93, 394, 491; v5, pp142, 144, 145, 209; v6, p629; v7, pp18, 404, 552. Repeated, in the order Russell took them up in his *Philosophy of Leibniz*, 1900: v2, p98, 77; v1, p403; v5, p144, 145; v6, p629; v1, p338; v5, p209; v2, p305, 315; v4, p91-93, 394; v2, p379, 475, 278, 282; v3, p583; v4, p491; v5, p142; v1, p416; v3, p591; v2, p279; v7, p18; v2, p515, 300, 304; v7, p404, 552; v2, p261, 517, 304.

tology of atoms and of void, or empty space, and its atheistic implications. If gods or God were not made of atoms, their existence was less likely, and if the void was truly empty, there might be no place for them. More crucially, if all the causes of change could be reduced to the consequences of encounters of atoms, and if, as Epicurus and Lucretius had argued, there was a random element, or "swerve," in atomic motions, there was no necessity for God or gods to intervene in the cosmos at all. On this great question Pascal went one way, Spinoza the other, and Leibniz clung to the middle of the road.

For Matthew Stewart, the great issue in Leibniz's life is neither mathematical logic nor continuity, but whether he is capable of acknowledging the atheistic implications of virtually all his philosophical work. Matthew sets up Spinoza as the lone climber defending the heretical proposition (nearly unthinkable in his time) that there is no God separate from the material universe, nor any scripture or other supernatural self-revelation of its being or activities. Leibniz he suits up for this bout as "the courtier," a paradigmatic compromiser of truth for community – even conviviality – trying to negotiate a theist peace among the warring theologians and the disdainful atheists. The only meetings between Spinoza and Leibniz were in November 1676, when Leibniz visited Spinoza in The Hague; during that month the two had frequently discussions together. These meetings serves Stewart as the fulcrum of his narrative, and what the two said to each other, which is almost completely undocumented, is teased out of other sources and woven into a paradigmatic confrontation between the lonely courage of atheism and the busy hypocrisy of religious diplomacy.

In the process, the reader gets a good introduction to the philosophical interests and achievements of both men, as Stewart skillfully attaches them to their memorably described characters. For Leibniz, in Chapter 5, "God's Attorney," Stewart gives a summary of the aims set forth by the 25-year-old Leibniz in his ultimately successful attempt to secure the lifetime patronage of the Elector of Hannover. He had already achieved some of them: a universal mathematical language, proof of the existence of the vacuum, a mathematical account of motion, a calculating machine, three new optical devices, a means of measuring longitude, a submarine, an air compressor pump, a summary of natural law jurisprudence, a solution to the mind-body problem, two arguments for the Catholic doctrine of

transubstantiation, and proof of the two principles that everything has a sufficient reason for being, and that the ultimate reason for all things is God (pp 89-90).

Spinoza's philosophical career is to be found largely in the even-numbered chapters. He began it by publishing a laudatory critical summary of Descartes. He then followed the modest success of this work with a book that was to resonate through the next century and a half as the first comprehensive and thoroughgoing attack on scripturalism, or what Americans would call the fundamentalist reading of the Bible: *The Tractatus Theologo-Politicus* [*Theological-Political Treatise*, 1670]. Discussed at length in Chapter 6, "The Hero of the People," the *Tractatus* maintains that the Bible, especially the Hebrew Bible, is to be read as history – the fragmentary history, corrupted by myth and wishful thinking, of a people foolishly convinced that they were favorites of God. The *Ethics*, published posthumously in 1678, escapes the careful attention Stewart gives the *Tractatus*, but it is not misrepresented, least of all its remarkable materialist pantheism, expressed in the famous phrase, "*Deus, sive Natura.*" ("God or Nature.") The poet Novalis may have thought Spinoza, "a man drunk with God," and Einstein may have "believe[d] in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with the fates and actions of human beings,"³ but for the "Spinozists" of the French and later Enlightenments, Spinoza was simply the first thoroughgoing scientific atheist.

For Bertrand Russell both Leibniz and Spinoza were monuments of Western Philosophy. For Matthew Stewart, they are just as monumental, but Spinoza, who influenced Russell less, is a persecuted hero in Stewart's story, and Leibniz, who influenced Russell much more, is a convivial, compromising coward. I doubt Russell was either of those, and I think Stewart exaggerates his characterizations; but the reader will enjoy the argument and should judge for him- or herself, as my high-school juniors and seniors have this year.

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³ Einstein to Rabbi Herbert S. Goldstein (1929) in answer to Goldstein's telegraphed question whether he believed in God.

DISCUSSION

IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AN ILLUSION? A REPLY TO PRESTON

MICHAEL BEANEY

In his paper on 'The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy',¹ Aaron Preston offers a sketch of the history of conceptualizations of analytic philosophy and argues that the genre of "analytic philosophy" is an illusion. Preston is right to point out some of the problems that face attempts to define 'analytic philosophy', but he draws the wrong conclusion from his historiographical investigations. Indeed, that conclusion undermines the value of his investigations. There may be no set of views accepted by all and only those who have traditionally been regarded as analytic philosophers, but that does not mean that analytic philosophy does not exist; it just means that we need to conceptualize it more carefully. Preston's paper has three sections. I shall comment on each in turn.

1 APPROACHES TO THE HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

In the first section of his paper, Preston distinguishes three stages in the history of conceptualizations of analytic philosophy. The first he calls "proto-history", involving first-hand accounts by those working in the formative period of analytic philosophy. The second is "new wave history" (seen as pursued by Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Peter Hylton, and me, among others), which challenges the received views, and seeks to offer accounts more faithful to the actual history of analytic philosophy. The third is "analytic history" (exemplified, most notably, by Michael Dummett and Scott Soames), which provides rational reconstructions of the history of analytic philosophy.

Preston is right to identify a "proto-historical" stage, since first-hand accounts do indeed constitute important data without adding up to an historical story in themselves. But Preston fails to stress the multifarious and often inconsistent nature of this data. The period Preston has in mind runs from roughly 1900 to 1950, but there were

¹ Preston 2005. In what follows, page references are to this paper.

significant developments within this period, mostly notably, in relation to the linguistic turn, which was arguably only properly taken by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. According to Preston, the “tendency among proto-historical authors” was to treat the view that the analysis of language was the method of philosophy as “the central doctrine of analytic philosophy” (p. 12). But as Preston later recognizes (p. 16), this was not the view of Russell and Moore in the early phase of analytic philosophy, and indeed, even in his later work, Moore rejected the view. Yet in talking of this as the “received view”, Preston persists in regarding the proto-historical stage as being far more unified than it actually was.

I also find it surprising that Preston treats “analytic history” as a third stage, suggesting as it does that it is a response to “new wave history”. Admittedly, Dummett’s *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (1993) was published *after* the pioneering work of Hylton (1990) and Griffin (1991) on Russell, and Soames’ two volumes on *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* (2003) have only recently appeared. Yet these are retrograde works, taking us back to the historiographically primitive days of “rational reconstructions” of the kind illustrated by Dummett’s first book, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (1973). Preston acknowledges the deficiencies of Dummett’s and Soames’ contributions to the history of analytic philosophy, but provides no justification for regarding them as in any way evolving *out of* new wave history. If anything, I would have reversed the order: the genre of analytic history came into being before new wave history. At the very least, it would have been better to have seen analytic history and new wave history as just two approaches to the history of analytic philosophy. The former has its merits, but in my view, the latter is far more sophisticated, historiographically, and takes seriously the aim of getting the history *right*.²

² Preston admits in fn. 1 that “Some works may occur out of sequence and others may not fit precisely into a category but be transitional stages with characteristics of several stages”. Nevertheless, he claims, “These are exceptions ... the general trend of development is well represented by this three stage schema”. As far as his second and third stages are concerned, however, I think he is mistaken. Most of those working on the history of analytic philosophy today want to go beyond mere “rational reconstruction”. Dummett and Soames have been widely criticized for getting the history wrong. For criticism of Soames, for example, see Kremer 2005, Beaney 2006.

2 DEFINING ‘ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY’

In the second section of his paper, Preston takes the taxonomy of definitions of analytic philosophy offered by Hans-Johann Glock (2004), and claims that only doctrinal definitions are of the right kind to identify a philosophical school. Preston dismisses, in other words, topical, methodological, stylistic, genetic, and family resemblance characterizations of analytic philosophy. But I find his reasons for this dismissal unconvincing. Even if we allow that philosophical schools are individuated by their doctrines, this does not exclude consideration of other features, since, for any characterization in terms of some other feature, a corresponding doctrine can always be formulated. Assume, for example, that a certain method of analysis is distinctive of analytic philosophy. Then a corresponding doctrine can be formulated to the effect that this method is a central method of philosophy. Even in the case of genetic or family resemblance characterizations, corresponding doctrines can be formulated. Analytic philosophy might be (partly) defined, say, by the view that Frege’s and Russell’s work is an essential point of reference in discussions of fundamental issues in the philosophy of language, logic and mathematics.³

Preston suggests that what unites a *philosophical school* is its set of defining doctrines. But if this is how ‘philosophical school’ is to be understood, then analytic philosophy should not be thought of as a philosophical school. There have been periods in the history of analytic philosophy when philosophical schools (in something like the sense Preston has in mind) were important parts of it – most notably, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Cambridge School of Analysis (so-called at the time) and the Vienna Circle were active.⁴ But as ‘analytic philosophy’ has come to be used today, it has a far broader sense, encompassing a range of subtraditions, as I would describe it. This is precisely what makes it appropriate to consider topical, methodological, stylistic, genetic, and family resemblance features in characterizing analytic philosophy. In this respect, analytic philosophy might be compared to the religious movement we call

³ Again, in a footnote later on, Preston admits that we can see “non-doctrinal definitions as containing implicit doctrinal definitions” (fn. 8). But then I am baffled as to why he didn’t make this point in the section where he discusses definitions of analytic philosophy.

⁴ Cf. Beaney 2003, §§ 6.6, 6.7.

'Christianity', regarded as composed of the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Methodist Church; and so on. Analytic philosophy is no more a single school than Christianity is a single church. Of course, we might say that Christianity is united in its belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ, but this is manifested in so many different ways that a full characterization requires specification of the different conceptions, creeds, practices, etc., that define the constituent churches. In assuming that analytic philosophy must be construed as a philosophical school, Preston has misunderstood the nature of what it is he is attempting to explain.

3 PRESTON'S ILLUSIONISM

Having rejected "non-doctrinal" (descriptive) definitions of analytic philosophy, Preston offers an alternative (evaluative) taxonomy in the third and final section of his paper. Under the general heading of doctrinal definitions, he first distinguishes between "traditional" and "revisionist" definitions, and then divides the former into "benighted" and "illusionist" definitions.⁵ Traditional definitions he simply characterizes as "doctrinal definitions that keep to the received view", that is, the view that analytic philosophy is primarily concerned with the analysis of language (p. 23). He takes these definitions to have been undermined by new wave history. This leaves revisionist definitions, which reclassify philosophers according to some alternative definition. Ray Monk, L. J. Cohen and Dagfinn Føllesdal are given as examples of revisionist historians of analytic philosophy. But by reclassifying, Preston argues, revisionism fails to explain "first, analytic philosophy's meteoric rise to power in the twentieth century, and, second, the fact that, even if there never was any real philosophical unity in analytic philosophy, it was for a long time thought that there was, and that it consisted in a metaphilosophical view according to which the nature of the philosophical enterprise was linguistic" (p. 26).

I agree that an account of analytic philosophy must explain its rise and the various conceptualizations of it (including its own self-images). But I was puzzled by the corner that Preston seems to have

⁵ The diagram that Preston offers on p. 22 in introducing his taxonomy is misleading, for it suggests that the final subdivision is a division within "revisionist" definitions, whereas Preston says on p. 27 that the subdivision is within "traditional" definitions.

painted himself into. For in rejecting both non-doctrinal and revisionist definitions, all Preston finds himself left with is the traditional doctrinal definition – the "received view", as he alternatively calls it. But this, too, he describes as "not accurate" (p. 23). So where are we left? This is where his distinction between "benighted" and "illusionist" definitions comes in. According to Preston, benighted traditionalists accept the received view, but fail to realize its inadequacy; illusionists, however, do realize its inadequacy, but still manage to "accept" it. What the illusionist rejects is the following assumption:

(1) Analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.

But in rejecting (1), he claims, the illusionist is not thereby committed to finding a non-doctrinal definition. Preston writes:

the illusionist does not pretend, as those who offer non-doctrinal definitions do, that the lack of defining doctrines doesn't matter to analytic philosophy's nature as a philosophical school, and that the group represented by the received view can be recast as something lacking philosophical unity without destroying its philosophical nature and legitimacy. Instead, recognizing the centrality of the received view to the actual, historical developments associated with the name "analytic philosophy" (and *vice-versa*), illusionists allow it to exercise total control over the definition of analytic philosophy: for the illusionist, analytic philosophy is exactly what the received view says it is.

In this respect, the illusionist view endorses a traditional definition. However, while other traditional definitions conflict with [the results of new wave history], the illusionist is saved from this precisely by treating analytic philosophy as an illusion. Thus, the illusionist is a traditionalist concerning *what* analytic philosophy is supposed to be, but differs from other traditionalists concerning *whether* analytic philosophy exists at all. (p. 27)

According to Preston, then, 'analytic philosophy' does indeed mean what the received view says it means; it is just that there is nothing answering to that description. Denying the existence of analytic philosophy, however, cannot be the right conclusion to draw from new wave history, and is inconsistent with Preston's own talk of analytic philosophy in his paper. For if analytic philosophy does not exist, then what is Preston doing in writing about the history of

analytic philosophy? He stresses the need – quite rightly – to explain the rise of analytic philosophy and the various conceptualizations of it; but what, then, is being explained? Clearly, there must be something that is the object of all the (productive and legitimate) work that is currently being done on the history of analytic philosophy. That object may not constitute a “philosophical school”, as Preston understands it, but there are certain figures widely regarded as analytic philosophers, such as Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Carnap, whose work is the source of the variety of interconnected approaches and subtraditions that fall under the general umbrella of ‘analytic philosophy’.

The inconsistency in Preston’s position is reflected in a crucial ambiguity in his talk of rejecting (1). That ambiguity can be brought out if we construe ‘analytic philosophy’ as a definite description and interpret (1) along the lines of Russell’s theory of descriptions:

- (1*) There is one and only one thing that is analytic philosophy and whatever is analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.

This can be false in three different ways, if either of the following is true:

- (a) there is no such thing as analytic philosophy, i.e., analytic philosophy does not exist at all;
- (b) there is more than one thing that is analytic philosophy;
- (c) whatever is analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school.

Preston fails to distinguish the three different ways in which (1) might be regarded as false – ironically, given the status of Russell’s theory of descriptions as a paradigm of analytic philosophy. There may be grounds for rejecting (1) because (b) is true, i.e., because there is more than one thing denoted by ‘analytic philosophy’. But the key contrast, as far as Preston’s paper is concerned, is between rejecting (1) because (a) is true and rejecting (1) because (c) is true. On Preston’s view, new wave historians reject (1) by taking (c) as true. But Preston himself seems to slide between rejecting it by taking (c) as true and rejecting it by taking (a) as true. Or rather, what seems to be happening is that he takes the rejection of (1) because (c) is true to imply rejection of (1) because (a) is true. But this is clearly a

non sequitur. Analytic philosophy may not be a philosophical school, but that does not mean that it does not exist at all.

Preston would presumably reply that what is really doing the work here is his definitional argument. Once one accepts the “received view” as the definition of analytic philosophy, one seems forced to conclude that there is nothing answering to it (or nothing like what one wanted). But in my view, given the widespread use of ‘analytic philosophy’ today, any such implication constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum* of the definition. Preston himself talks freely of analytic philosophy in his paper, and provides no reason for accepting the received view, other than that it is the received view. This makes me suspect that he is also relying on new wave history to support his rejection of (1). But as I have shown, one can reject (1) without denying the existence of analytic philosophy altogether. What is illusory is the received view itself.

The main metaphilosophical argument of Preston’s paper seems to boil down to this. ‘Analytic philosophy’, if it means anything at all, must refer to a philosophical school; and the only candidate is a school defined by its endorsement of the doctrine that the method of philosophy is linguistic analysis. But there is no such school. Therefore there is no such thing as analytic philosophy. The objection to this argument can be stated with equal brevity. There is no reason to accept the assumption that analytic philosophy must be a school, just as there is no reason to accept the received view as the definition of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy, as it has developed and ramified from its sources in the work of Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, is a complex movement; and the task is to make sense of this with the help of all the conceptualizations – doctrinal, topical, methodological, and so on – that have been offered throughout its history. Dismissing all but doctrinal definitions, and then endorsing just the “received view” – in effect, defining analytic philosophy away – is a perverse way to understand such a complex historical movement.

Of course, this is not to say that there are no illusions about the nature of analytic philosophy lurking in its history. On the contrary, there are all sorts of misconceptions and confused self-images, not least about its supposed unity, and Preston is quite right to draw our attention to these. But an exposition of these misconceptions can proceed alongside a satisfying account of the history of analytic phil-

osophy which does not undermine itself by denying the existence of analytic philosophy. Fortunately, Preston's own practice belies his theory. In his paper, and no doubt in his ongoing work, Preston presupposes that there is a movement worth exploring. I am sure that his historiographical investigations will make a useful contribution to our understanding of the history of analytic philosophy. But I am even more sure that this can be pursued without taking analytic philosophy itself to be an illusion.⁶

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REPLY TO BEANEY *

AARON PRESTON

I. BEANEY ON MY HISTORY OF
CONCEPTIONS OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

In my article 'Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy', I argue that among histories of analytic philosophy we should recognize an initial stage of "proto-history" made up of "contemporaneous first-hand accounts of analytic philosophy in its early and middle stages (approximately 1900-1950), and near-contemporaneous, memoir-like accounts of the same."¹ A notable feature of this work is the convergence of opinion in a "received view" of analytic philosophy, according to which it originated around the turn of the 20th century, in the work of Moore and Russell, in a revolutionary break not only from British Idealism but from traditional philosophy on the whole, all because of the metaphilosophical view that philosophy just is the analysis of language.

While Michael Beaney agrees that we should recognize a proto-historical stage in histories of analytic philosophy, he disagrees with me about the existence of a received view. Beaney objects that "in talking of this as the 'received view', Preston persists in regarding the proto-historical stage as being far more unified than it actually was", and that I "fail to stress the multifarious and often inconsistent nature" of the proto-historical data. As a counterexample to my claim, Beaney cites the fact that, whereas I claim that "the 'tendency among proto-historical authors' was to treat the view that the analysis of language was the method of philosophy as 'the central doctrine of analytic philosophy' ... this was not the view of Russell and Moore in the early phase of analytic philosophy, and indeed, even in his later work, Moore rejected the view" – facts that I myself acknowledge.

However, this is not a counterexample to my claim – though neither Moore nor Russell accepted the linguistic view of philoso-

* Considerations of space have required that I cut my reply to about half its original length. The full version is available at blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/reply-to-beaney.doc.

¹ Aaron Preston, 'Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy', *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* no. 127 (August 2005), 11-30.

phy and Moore explicitly disavowed having ever held that view, these facts do not count as proto-historical data on my view. Again, proto-history consists in contemporaneous first-hand accounts of *analytic philosophy* in its early and middle stages, and near-contemporaneous, memoir-like accounts of the same. The texts from which the current, nonlinguistic understanding of Moorean and Russellian analysis are derived, texts like 'The Nature of Judgment', 'The Refutation of Idealism', 'On Denoting', and *The Principles of Mathematics*, are not accounts of analytic philosophy, nor is Moore's disavowal in the *Library of Living Philosophers* such an account. All of these are data for histories of analytic philosophy, of course, but they are not themselves histories of analytic philosophy.

In order to qualify as proto-history as I use the term, a text must involve explicit reflection on analytic philosophy *as such*, conceptualized as a movement attached to some philosophical views. That is, to count as a reflection upon analytic philosophy *as such*, a reflection must have to do with either the movement or the views of the movement *explicitly recognized as such*. And so, not even Moore's 1942 disavowal counts; for while it is a reflection on philosophical views and methods, these are presented only as Moore's own, not as the views and methods of a movement, let alone the movement then dominating academic philosophy in the English speaking world. Though Moore acknowledges that his metaphilosophical and methodological views had been widely misunderstood, the notion that a movement had been founded on this misunderstanding is hardly even adumbrated in Moore's disavowal.

Even less do the early works of Moore and Russell (1898-1915, say), in which they developed their views about – or at least their techniques of – philosophical analysis, count as proto-history in my sense. While there are plenty of reflections on philosophical views and methods to be found in these early works, these are not reflections on analytic philosophy *as such*. Indeed, they could not be, since the category 'analytic philosophy' seems to have emerged only around 1930. To treat these early works as containing reflections *on analytic philosophy* in any sense at all requires that we read them anachronistically, in light of the fact that, several decades after they were written, they came to be understood as belonging to the textual canon of a school called 'analytic philosophy', and as involving reflections on *that school's* views and methods.

To sum up, the sources which reveal diversity *in* analytic philosophy in its early to middle stages do not also reveal diversity of opinion *about* analytic philosophy during those stages, for the simple reason that they do not contain any reflection about analytic philosophy *as such*. On the other hand, every text prior to 1970 – and a great many thereafter – that does contain reflection on analytic philosophy *as such* represents it along the lines of the received view.

Beaney also finds it "surprising that Preston should have treated 'analytic history' as a third stage, suggesting as it does that it is a response to 'new-wave history'.... If anything," he objects, "I would have reversed the order: the genre of analytic history came into being before new-wave history. At the very least, it would have been better to have seen analytic history and new-wave history as just two approaches to the history of analytic philosophy."

This is a legitimate objection. The proper sequence of these two types of history is difficult to determine, and there are good reasons for preferring either of Beaney's suggested alternatives. However, I think there are also good reasons for thinking that the new-wavers conditioned the emergence of analytic history – for instance, without the challenge to the traditional analytic self-conception brought about by the new-wave historians, there would have been little motive for hard-core analytic philosophers to chronicle the history of their own movement – and that is why I placed analytic philosophy third. Ultimately, however, I don't think that much of significance hangs in the balance between my way of characterizing the relationship between these two types of historiography and either of those suggested by Beaney. All three perspectives allow us to pick out analytic history as a distinct type in order to highlight its deficiencies, and that, I take it, is the most important reason for making the distinction between it and new-wave history.

II. WORRIES ABOUT DOCTRINAL DEFINITION

In the second section of my paper, I offered a metaphilosophical argument for the view that philosophical schools should be defined doctrinally, to which Beaney objects that non-doctrinal criteria should be allowed as well. I agree. My view is that doctrines are necessary but not always sufficient for defining a philosophical school, so that non-doctrinal features *can* form *part* of the content of a school's definition. However, this may have been obscured by

the rigid delineation of the taxonomic categories employed in my article. The taxonomy served the purpose of framing a concise discussion of the varieties of definition that have been proposed, but it did not allow for the possibility of hybrid definitions containing both doctrinal and non-doctrinal elements. Consequently, by arguing for doctrinal definitions over against all other "pure" types, I'm afraid it may have seemed that I was arguing that nothing but doctrines should show up in a definition for a philosophical school. To the contrary, I think that non-doctrinal features may be helpful, even indispensable, in discerning what a given figure or group's doctrines (views) really were, and also that they may themselves serve as part of a school's definition. However, among the "pure" categories of the taxonomy, I still think that only doctrinal definitions are suited to pick out philosophical schools, because philosophy is essentially a theoretical enterprise. Even in a hybrid definition, doctrinal elements will count as more fundamental than non-doctrinal ones, since the doctrinal elements are necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) for the school to be a *philosophical* one.

Beaney also offers a second objection, saying that, if a philosophical school is to be a thing of doctrines, "then analytic philosophy should not be thought of as a philosophical school". His argument is based on the current use of 'analytic philosophy':

as 'analytic philosophy' has come to be used today, it has a far broader sense, encompassing a range of subtraditions, as I would describe it. This is precisely what makes it appropriate to consider topical, methodological, stylistic, genetic, and family resemblance features in characterizing analytic philosophy

I will put off commenting upon this "argument from current use" until the next section, for it reappears in Beaney's argument against illusionism.

III. WORRIES ABOUT THE ILLUSIONIST THESIS

Beaney points out that there is "a crucial ambiguity" in my claim that on the illusionist view analytic philosophy is not a real philosophical school, and he does a nice job of disambiguating the claim by applying Russell's theory of descriptions. Rephrasing the view I claim is false as,

(1*) There is one and only one thing that is analytic philosophy and

whatever is analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.

Beaney explains that it can be false in three different ways:

- (a) there is no such thing as analytic philosophy, i.e., analytic philosophy does not exist at all;
- (b) there is more than one thing that is analytic philosophy;
- (c) whatever is analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school.

Now, Beaney is correct to note that I did not distinguish these three ways in which the claim could be false. And he is also correct to say that my own talk of analytic philosophy seems to oscillate between (a) and something like (c). On the one hand, in the context of presenting the illusionist view, I claim (a); but, as Beaney notes, in setting up the argument that leads me to the illusionist view, "Preston himself talks freely of analytic philosophy," in such a way that I seem to presuppose the existence of some reality designated by the name. And, of course, lots of people talk about analytic philosophy in this way. Thus, he concludes, "there must be something that is the object of all the (productive and legitimate) work that is currently being done on the history of analytic philosophy." But if there is something that is the object of all this work, and it is not, as I claim, a philosophical school, then the "analytic philosophy" of which I speak must be something other than a philosophical school, just as (c) has it.

I agree with Beaney that there is something that is the object of all the productive and legitimate work that is currently being done on the history of analytic philosophy, in the sense that claims made about "analytic philosophy" in the context of this research frequently have referents, and sometimes even a common referent. I take it that the referent of 'analytic philosophy' is some subset of the vast network of persons, ideas, and events in philosophy from the late 19th through (so far) the early 21st centuries (hereafter "the subset"). For example, work in the history of analytic philosophy investigates the relationships among Moore, Russell, and the British Idealists; it traces the development of Russell's or Wittgenstein's thought, or the relationships between their thought and Frege's; it reconsiders the nature and aims of logical positivism; and so on. These figures, their thoughts, the relationships of influence among them, the events in which they were involved – all of these are real, and a great many of

them, by convention and by tradition, fall under the heading 'analytic philosophy'.

However, while I grant that the subset can serve as the object/referent of 'analytic philosophy' when the term is used in the context of productive and legitimate historical work, I would not want to define 'analytic philosophy' in terms of it, as Beaney seems prepared to do when he says:

Once one accepts the "received view" as the definition of analytic philosophy, one seems forced to conclude that there is nothing answering to it (or nothing like what one wanted). But in my view, given the widespread use of 'analytic philosophy' today, any such implication constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum* of the definition.

Here again we are confronted with an "argument from current use". This type of argument first confronted us in section II, where Beaney was prepared to deny the need for doctrinal definition on the grounds that (i) current use is sufficient to define analytic philosophy, and (ii) current use reveals 'analytic philosophy' to be an umbrella-term designating "a range of subtraditions" exhibiting no thoroughgoing doctrinal unity, but only a "family resemblance" of belief and practice. Now he argues that current use nullifies the illusionist approach on the basis of the additional assumption that (iii) since people talk so much about "analytic philosophy" today, there must be something non-illusory answering to this talk.

But there are problems with this approach to defining 'analytic philosophy'. By way of explanation, let me first note that (iii) is by no means clearly true. Contra Beaney, it is far from clear that there *must* be an object answering to all the current talk of, and work on, analytic philosophy. As the later Wittgenstein showed us, discourse about a non-existent object might easily be carried-on in the context of an established "language game" without anyone expressly realizing that the object under discussion is non-existent (e.g., the "beetle in the box"). So long as 'analytic philosophy' has a use in some language game – which it does – it is possible (in principle) to talk about analytic philosophy till the cows come home without there actually being any such thing. In such a case, the question to ask is not "what is analytic philosophy?", but "why did people start speaking of analytic philosophy?", that is, "why does this language-game exist in the first place?"

Still, it makes good sense to suppose that all the contemporary talk about analytic philosophy corresponds to something non-illusory, as Beaney's (iii) has it. I am happy to affirm this and to say that this is the subset. However, only the correct subset will do, and correctness here can only be judged in light of a preferred way of carving up the socio-historical landscape of philosophy. Indeed, by limiting the relevant portion of that landscape to the late 19th century and after, I have already imported part of this preferred way into my description of the subset. But this preferred way will in turn depend upon a prior conceptualization of analytic philosophy: it is because I take analytic philosophy to be *this* and not *that* that I associate it with just *these* bits of the socio-historical landscape of philosophy.

Because demarcating the correct subset requires a prior conception of analytic philosophy, our ultimate sense of what analytic philosophy *is*, our definition of analytic philosophy, cannot be framed solely in terms of the subset. Nor can we let current use carry the weight of demarcation, for several reasons. First, if Beaney's sense of current use is correct, the term picks out "a range of subtraditions"; but this is just another way of saying that it picks out the subset (or several subsets of the subset). Thus, just as we cannot define analytic philosophy in terms of the subset, we cannot define it in terms of "a range of subtraditions", since we will have to justify our selection of some range as the correct range.

To this, Beaney may reply that current use itself is what justifies the selection: since *this* is what everyone today means by 'analytic philosophy', *this* just is what the term means today. However, second, current use is not sufficiently uniform to demarcate a common conception of analytic philosophy. This is demonstrated most vividly by the existence of radical revisionist definitions of analytic philosophy that make Aquinas or Husserl analytic philosophers. Unless we exclude these from current use, we will not be able to find a common conception of analytic philosophy in current use. But we can't simply choose to exclude these definitions without begging the question against them. So, Beaney's assumption (ii) seems to be false as well.

Third, even if current use was sufficient to provide a common conception, it would still be legitimate – and historically necessary – to ask why and how the "analytic philosophy" language-game

began and why it is as it is. This is a question about the history of analytic philosophy that cannot be answered just by looking to the term's current use. Rather, the question has a historical answer. In my book, I outline the answer as follows:

...the very fact that AP [analytic philosophy] exists as something to be discussed under a single name is historically and hence unalterably – I am tempted to say necessarily – connected to ... the early success of a particular philosophical outlook in securing both (1) the attention and (2) the loyalty of academic philosophers both (3) in places that mattered (and so at *prestigious* intuitions) and (4) in numbers large enough to generate the kind of regular and widespread discussion that would both (5) require the coining of a new term and (6) explain that term's subsequent entrenchment as one of the most familiar in the philosophical lexicon....²

And, so far as the historical record is concerned, the philosophical outlook in question was the linguistic thesis, the metaphilosophical view that philosophy just is the analysis of language, and its corollaries – just as the “received view” or “traditional conception” has it.

Fourth, and finally, since the origins of the “analytic philosophy” language-game can be traced back to around 1930, and since the rules of the game have developed and been modified over time (indeed, current use simply represents the most recent modifications), a definition based on current use alone would not be historically illuminating and could easily be historically misleading.

So, it seems that a definition framed in terms of current use will not be adequate for saying what analytic philosophy is *simpliciter*, since it is a historically extended entity whose status as a subject of conversation depends in various ways upon the received view. Nor will such a definition be legitimate for guiding historical work on analytic philosophy. Consequently, Beaney's assumption (i) is false, and his arguments from common use fail to undermine my views.

Let us return now to Beaney's main objection, raised at the beginning of this section: namely, that I failed to disambiguate (1*) by not saying which of (a), (b), or (c) I meant. Earlier, I clarified that I meant (a) in the context of presenting the illusionist view, and that I meant *something like* (c) in setting up the argument that leads to it.

² *Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion*, London and New York: Continuum, 2007, pp. 1-2

Beaney suggested that my meaning (c) was necessary since, otherwise, there would be no object for the talk of analytic philosophy that I engaged in. Though an object is not required for meaningful talk, but only an established language-game in which the term has a use, I nonetheless agree that there is an object of such talk: “the subset”. However, I would not call this “analytic philosophy” *simpliciter*, or say that analytic philosophy *just is* this subset. Consequently, I am going to resist acceding to Beaney's (c), “whatever is analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school”. This might be taken to mean “there is something that is analytic philosophy, and it is not a philosophical school”, but, given my reluctance to define ‘analytic philosophy’ in terms of the subset, I take this to be false, historically misleading, and explanatorily inadequate. Instead, I submit that the following is sufficient to justify talk of analytic philosophy both in setting up the case for illusionism, and in all other legitimate and productive work on analytic philosophy:

(c*) there is something that ‘analytic philosophy’ refers to, and it is not a philosophical school.

Beaney's claim, that “analytic philosophy may not be a philosophical school but that does not mean that *it* does not exist at all” (my emphasis) is misleading. Instead, what we should say is that the fact that analytic philosophy never was what it was originally thought to be *does* mean that *it* doesn't exist at all, but this fact doesn't imply that there's nothing to which the term ‘analytic philosophy’ can legitimately be taken to refer.

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END MATTER

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

THE CENTRAL APA is as predictable as a spring cold – almost every year it meets in April in Chicago at the Palmer House. This year, I roped a colleague, Michael Garra, into attending, and made my way through the old-money ambience of the hotel as if a proud homeowner showing off her property. But to do so I'd first had to get to Chicago, which I did by flying to Pittsburgh, then renting a car to drive to Chicago. I had reserved an economy car, but they were out when I got there, so they charged me the economy rate for a steroidal monster SUV they did have. Not a novice to driving, my "car" was all the same a challenge to drive, especially in Chicago, where I could have squashed pedestrians flat without being any the wiser and where threading the nearby parking garage required the concentration of Buddha.

But, still, I got there – hungry. Sad to say, the APA bulletin's section on dining in downtown Chicago is outdated, a fact my friends and I only discovered after walking many, many blocks. Achieving a meal nevertheless and moving along Maslow's hierarchy of needs, I subsequently desired sleep, which I accomplished in a room in the Palmer House somewhat smaller and less well appointed than my vehicle. Still, I chose the hotel room over the SUV, and woke in the morning looking forward to the quartet of talks ahead of me at the combined session of the Russell Society and History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society.

James Connelly, the first speaker of the day, spoke to the approximately 16 people there on a new, and to his mind simplified, reading of Wittgenstein's private language argument. At the heart of that argument, he sees a rejection of Leibniz's principles of identity. Following this was a talk by Joongol Kim comparing Wittgenstein and Frege on the concept 'object'. Frege rejected the possibility of a concept of 'concept' because he found it to be paradoxical, but retained a concept of 'object'. Wittgenstein rejected both. Joongol explained why they diverged in their thinking on this.

Another talk on Wittgenstein followed, this time by Tuomas Manninen, on "A Bipartisan Interpretation of the *Tractatus*". While Wittgenstein acknowledged his debt to both Russell and Frege in

the *Tractatus*, interpreters of that work tend to read it either as influenced primarily by one or the other of these two men. Manninen finds elements of both in the *Tractatus*, to wit, Russell's eliminative program and Frege's notion of elucidation. Viewing the *Tractatus* in these terms provides Manninen with what he takes to be a decisive argument against the "new Wittgensteinians" who view the propositions of the *Tractatus* as nonsense. Finally, Sandra Lapointe gave a talk on Bolzano's conception of scientific proof, arguing that it rested upon epistemological and pragmatic principles overlooked by Bolzano's successors, including Alfred Tarski.

During the discussion that followed these talks, an elderly lady across the aisle from me caused an awkwardness by thumping her cane and demanding an account of Russell's substitutional theory, which we were discussing. Claiming that some had even called her "the last Russellian", she said she had never heard of Russell holding such a theory. Chris Pincock obliged her with an explanation and she seemed satisfied as well as totally indifferent to the possibility of having committed an intellectual *faux pas*. My curiosity was aroused: who was this person who claimed to have been called "the last Russellian"? What a thought! If that were true, then what the hell were we? As the session came to an end, I popped over to her chair and peered at the words 'Ruth Barcan Marcus' on her name-tag, greeting a lady as dignified as the queen of England, but a good deal more interesting. I gave her BRS flyers and pumped her hand – she was one of the first logicians I read as a graduate student under Jaakko Hintikka and I was thrilled to meet her. I provided her with more details about Russell's substitutional theory and promised to send her some articles about it. Perhaps she might come to the annual meeting if invited!

After the excitement of meeting RBM, I returned home feeling a certain malaise that devolved into a cold as the day wore on. Misfortune followed misery, as it came to pass that Jet Blue misplaced my bag. I waited all day in JFK, sick as a dog, only to go home bagless and defeated. Delivery came slowly. Days later a chagrined Jet Blue representative came to my door with bag in hand for a weak and slightly wobbly claimant.—RC

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2008 1ST QUARTER TREASURER'S REPORT
Cash Flow January 1, 2008 – March 31, 2008

| | |
|--|-------------|
| BALANCE 1/1/2008 | \$14,535.96 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | 86.00 |
| TOTAL Contributions | \$86.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 70.00 |
| Renewals | 1,332.00 |
| TOTAL Dues | \$1,402.00 |
| Interest Income | 98.01 |
| TOTAL INCOME | \$1,586.01 |
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charges | 32.56 |
| Bay Area Expenses | 74.50 |
| Conversion Expense | 14.11 |
| Library Expenses | 93.42 |
| PayPal Fees | 20.26 |
| <i>Russell</i> Subscriptions ¹ | 4,209.40 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | \$4,444.25 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -\$2,858.24 |
| BALANCE 3/31/2008 | |
| US\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 1,368.20 |
| Cdn\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | .89 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | 10,308.63 |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$11,677.72 |
| Plus: to be transferred from US\$ PayPal a/c | \$95.74 |

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)

US and Cdn. dollars are treated as equal here. ¹ The *Russell* invoice was paid first with available Cdn. funds. The total charge was US\$4,225.00.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2007 ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT
Cash Flow January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2007

| | |
|--|-------------|
| BALANCE 1/1/07 | \$13,456.52 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | |
| Bay Area | 100.00 |
| BRS | 1,775.29 |
| TOTAL Contributions | \$1,875.29 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 797.35 |
| Renewals | 4,528.15 |
| TOTAL Dues | \$5,325.50 |
| Interest Income | 283.11 |
| Library Income | 73.00 |
| Meeting Income | 1,912.00 |
| Other Income [T-shirts] | 131.00 |
| TOTAL INCOME | \$9,599.90 |
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charges | 164.48 |
| Bookkeeping Expense | 440.00 |
| BRS Paper Award | 200.00 |
| BRS T-shirts | 280.00 |
| Conversion Expense | 28.44 |
| Library Expenses | 167.78 |
| Meeting Expenses | 3,043.81 |
| BRS <i>Quarterly</i> | 687.34 |
| Other Expenses [Quicken] | 38.93 |
| PayPal Fees | 88.68 |
| <i>Russell</i> Subscriptions | 3,381.00 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | \$8,520.46 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | \$1,079.44 |
| BALANCE 12/31/07 | |
| US\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 3,669.68 |
| Cdn\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 655.66 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | 10,210.62 |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$14,535.96 |
| Plus: to be transferred from US\$ PayPal a/c | \$86.48 |

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackw@mcmaster.ca)

Note: US and Cdn. dollars are treated as equal.

GRRS

The Greater Rochester Russell Set

Writers and Books' Verb Café
740 University Avenue, Rochester, NY
7 pm
3\$ - Free to Members

- Apr. 12 Alan Bock on Russell's essay 'The Value of Free Thought'
- May 10 Howard Blair on Bertrand Russell and quantum physics
- June 14 John Belli on advice from Bertrand Russell
- July 12 George McDade on Russell's essays 'Ideas That Have Helped Mankind' and 'Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind'
- Aug. 09 Phil Ebersole on Russell as a guild socialist
- Sept.13 Gerry Wildenberg on Sam Harris's book *Letter to a Christian Nation*



BARS

The Bay Area Russell Set

- May 15 A celebration of Bertrand Russell's birthday
- June 16 On Humanistic Education
- July 18 Report on the BRS Annual Meeting
- Time and Place – 7 pm, Szechwan Café, 406 S. California Ave, Palo Alto, CA – ph: 650-327-1688

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
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
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http://bluehawk.monmouth.edu/%7Easchweri/Bertrand_Russell_Society_Annual_Meeting.html

For further information,
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL
SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Quadruple Issue

Numbers 136 - 139 / November 2007 - August 2008



PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND RUSSELL

Published by The Bertrand Russell Society with the
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those pertaining to Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Quadruple Issue

Numbers 136-139 / November 2007 – August 2008

PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND RUSSELL

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Cover: Bertrand Russell, from *Am I an Atheist or Am I an Agnostic?*, 1949

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TO
VOTE!**



*in the
upcoming election
for*

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

to the

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY



BALLOTS COMING SOON!

IN THIS ISSUE

THOUGH MOST FAMOUS for his work on technical issues in professional philosophy and popular ones in social and political thought, Bertrand Russell also wrote extensively on human emotion and the habits of mind and behavior that lead towards or away from a joy-filled life. With articles on Russell, psychiatry, and happiness by David Goldman, Russell, psychology, and fear by Marvin Kohl, and a review of recent work in psychology on happiness, this issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly* focuses on Russell and human nature.

DAVID GOLDMAN, in his essay "A Psychiatrist Looks at Russell's *Conquest of Happiness*" considers Russell's relevance for psychiatry today. He finds the views on human happiness expressed by Russell in his 1930 book, *The Conquest of Happiness*, to be not only of value for many people unhappy in their lives, but to also contain important lessons for psychiatric theory today. It is a view of human nature, Goldman says, that has important lessons for us all.

BERTRAND RUSSELL had strong views on fear, which Marvin Kohl surveys and critiques in his essay "Bertrand Russell on Fear: A Prolegomena." Kohl finds Russell's view important, though at times unrealistic, with Russell holding what he argues is an overly simplistic idea of fear that ignores some kinds of fear that cannot be confronted in the way Russell thinks all fears should be faced. This is due, Kohl claims, to an inadequate view of human nature on Russell's part.

ROUNDING OUT the theme of human emotion is Brandon Young's review of the psychiatrist Daniel Gilbert's book, *Stumbling on Happiness*, which pursues a theme not unlike Russell's own: that happiness is possible, if we would only get out of our own way. How it is that we stand in our own way, according to Gilbert, raises issues of human abilities at prediction and choice Russell would have found fascinating.

WE HAVE STILL NOT YET determined what analytic philosophy is or isn't, so Gary Hardcastle and Chris Pincock provide further elucidation on this point by way of criticizing Aaron Preston's article in an earlier issue of the BRS Quarterly, and Aaron Preston provides still

further elucidation on the point by way of criticizing Hardcastle's and Pincock's views and defending his own view that the earlier standard view, that analytic philosophy was a common practice of linguistic analysis shared by most members of the movement, is false, an "illusion" he claims, and yet it is still the only acceptable definition of analytic philosophy, the only view that justifies calling earlier members of this movement 'analytic philosophers' at all.

THIS ISSUE of the Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is rounded out by a report in "Society News" on last June's annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society held in Rochester NY. Meeting minutes for both the board meeting and members' meeting held there can be found at the back of the issue, along with the most recent Treasurer's Report from Society treasurer Kenneth Blackwell.

SOCIETY NEWS

INCREASE IN MEMBERSHIP FEE: In response to rising costs, in particular, to two successive increases in the price the Society now pays McMaster University for *Russell*, the board of directors, after lengthy deliberation at the last board meeting, voted to increase membership fees by \$10 per year. This will be the first increase since 1992. Thus, for 2009 the annual regular membership fee will be \$45, couple membership \$50, limited income membership \$30, limited income couples \$35, and contributors \$60. There is one exception: student membership will remain at \$20 a year at least through 2009.

THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING of the Bertrand Russell Society took place from June 27 to June 29 at St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York at the invitation of David White and Tim Madigan. Located in upstate New York, the college was unexpectedly found to be less in the suburbs of Rochester and more in the country outside of Rochester. The setting for the meeting was beautiful and the meeting convivial. After the usual registration and settling in, the board of directors met for a prolonged discussion of the business affairs of the society, followed by a gathering at a local pub. It was the general consensus of those present that more work was accomplished at the meeting than at any other board meeting in recent memory. (See the meeting minutes in this issue of the *Quarterly*.)

Presentations began the next morning and continued through Sunday noon. On Saturday, Marvin Kohl addressed the potentially controversial issue of "Russell and the Utility of Religion" and was followed by Tim Madigan and John Novak's informative talk "Russell and Dewey in China." The editors of the *Quarterly* then took turns describing the process of writing (and rewriting) their forthcoming *Historical Dictionary of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*. Andrew Cavallo took the floor immediately before the session broke for lunch, with a discussion titled "Russell's Conception of Ethics."

A catered lunch was followed by a master class hosted by Peter Stone (Stanford University) on "Russell's Appeal to the American Conscience." Due to the cancellation of Weiping Zheng's trip, his paper "Remarks on Russell's Logic from a Chinese Point of View," was not heard. Thomas Riggins concluded the afternoon with his talk "Russell and Rousseau."

As is customary, the BRS session then broke and members met later for a cocktail hour and banquet at a local restaurant. Thimble amounts of Red Hackle were ceremoniously quaffed in honor of Russell's favorite scotch. In the morning, the talks resumed after breakfast, with Gregory Landini speaking on "Russell and the Ontological Argument" followed by Andrew Bone's informative talk on "Russell and India." Chad Trainer, an independent Russell scholar currently interested in the history of philosophy, then gave a talk titled "Russell's *History* on Locke and Spinoza."

After lunch Russell Wahl addressed the subject of "Analysis and Acquaintance," before Howard Blair asked "Did Bertrand Russell Know the Deal on Causation?" Many of these talks employed a computer-driven projection screen, and Blair was able to demonstrate his advanced technical proficiency not only in physics but in computers by employing his cell phone as a modem so as to run the projector when the internet was temporarily unavailable via the computer. Cara Rice completed the program with "Russell and Shelley," showing clearly the unexpected interest Russell took in that poet.

VOTER ALERT! Forget national politics. It will soon be time for the Bertrand Russell Society to vote for eight new members to its board of directors! Nominations are drawing to a close and ballots will be in the mail soon. Come what may, don't delay, but make hay, and vote today!

UPCOMING PAPERS AT THE EASTERN APA. The Bertrand Russell Society in conjunction with HEAPS, the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, will meet for a combined session at the eastern division of the American Philosophical Association on December 29, 9-11 am. Speakers are Nikolay Milkov (Universität Paderborn-Germany) on "Bertrand Russell's Religious Humanism," David Godden (Old Dominion University) on "Frege on the Nature of Proof", and Montgomery Link (Suffolk University) on "Russell's Constructivistic Introduction to the Second Edition of the *Principia*."

ENDOWED BERTRAND RUSSELL CHAIRS. Louis J. Appignani has informed BRS board member Warren Allen Smith that he (Appignani) is in the process of endowing two Bertrand Russell chairs at

Colombia University and at the University of Miami. Each endowment will require the university to convene an annual conference relating to the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, with specific emphasis on community outreach.

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY LIBRARY. The following audio, video, film and print items have been added to the members area: "Experiences of a Pacifist in the First World War" (1955), The Kalinga Prize Press Conference (1958, video, 30 minutes), and The Russell-Teller Debate, part 1 (1960, video, 30 minutes) that took place on "Small World" with Edward Murrow, "Speaking of Liberty", an interview with Rex Stout and Bertrand Russell on NBC in 1941, "When the Philosopher Sat Down" a BBC 4 production on the Committee of 100, and "Living in an Atomic Age", six lectures on ABC in 1951.

THE GREATER NEW YORK CITY CHAPTER of the Bertrand Russell Society met August 3, 2008 in the Winter Garden room in lower Manhattan and then moved to a local restaurant with a view of the statue of liberty, the yacht basin, and the ships on the Hudson river.

The attendees discussed the books that Eric Walther contributed to the Commonwealth of Dominica BRS library. Thom Weidlich and Peter Stone reported details about the recent Rochester meeting. Warren Allen Smith called attention to a change in Dr. Marvin Kohl's *Philosophia* entry. He then reported that Taslima Nasrin has received the key to the city by the Mayor of Paris and has received the Simone deBeauvoir Award in Paris. Her application for US citizenship is in process. Smith is currently editing Ms. Nasrin's book, *Women Have No Country*.

CALL FOR PAPERS. The Bertrand Russell Society and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society call for papers for a combined session at the meeting of the Central division of the American Philosophical Association February 18-22, 2009 at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago, Illinois. Send submissions on some topic related to Bertrand Russell's life and work or to the history of analytic philosophy by November 1 to rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu.

NEW AND FORTHCOMING BOOKS. Alan Schwerin, ed., under the auspices of the Bertrand Russell Society, *Russell Revisited: Critical Reflections on the Thought of Bertrand Russell*. Newcastle, UK:

Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. Omar W. Nasim, *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2008. Rosalind Carey and John Ongley, *A Historical Dictionary of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming March 2009.

IN MEMORIAM: Mr. Andres Käärrik (1954-2007) of Stockholm, Sweden. His wife, Karen Käärrik, informs us that her husband passed away on October 20, 2007. Andres Käärrik was a member of the Bertrand Russell Society from 1981 to 2007.

FEATURES

A PSYCHIATRIST LOOKS AT

BERTRAND RUSSELL'S *CONQUEST OF HAPPINESS*

DAVID S. GOLDMAN, M.D.

In his autobiography Bertrand Russell notes that on the publication of *The Conquest of Happiness* in 1930, "highbrows ... considered it as a contemptible pot boiler, an escapist book," but "unsophisticated readers, for whom it was intended, liked it" and that from "professional psychiatrists, the book won very high praise"¹ There are good reasons for the psychiatrists' praise. In the book, Russell brilliantly addresses the causes of unhappiness, which is the fundamental basis for psychiatric practice, and proposes both common sense and novel solutions that offer great value to psychiatric treatment.

Russell's contribution to psychiatry involves three principal areas: an analysis of widespread unhappiness among otherwise successful people, a prescription for applying rational reconstructive practices to combat irrational drives resulting in unhappiness, and a revolutionary vision of embracing the healing potentials of society, nature, and the universe towards achieving balance and happiness. In what follows, I will evaluate Russell's views on these topics in the light of contemporary psychiatry and consider the possibilities for adapting more of Russell's therapeutic ideas.

RUSSELL ON CAUSES OF UNHAPPINESS

Russell's analysis of widespread unhappiness is innovative in tracing its origin to social, political and economic causes. Drawing on what he describes in his autobiography as lessons he learned by painful experience, Russell identifies unhappiness as an imbalance between the willful part of one's personality and the healthy needs for physical and intellectual satisfactions.² He then proceeds to describe unhappiness as the result of a mother's faulty rearing habits.

¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell*, Unwin Paperbacks, Boston, 1978, p. 391.

² Bertrand Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness*, Liveright, 1996, pp. 15-23.

His portrait of the frustrated mother and vulnerable infant rings true; it captures well the actual life experiences of the 1920's era middle class woman living in Britain or America about whom Russell is writing. This mother is bound to the home and in service to birthing and rearing her children. It is her cultural role. As a result, her greater potential, talents, and hopes are sacrificed. To Russell, such a burdened and resentful mother will compensate emotionally by extracting obedience from her children, favoring the more compliant ones and humiliating the more rebellious. She will enhance her own authority by filling her children with unnecessary fears about their own independence, supporting this with a corrupt religion-inspired morality. That defective morality will, for example, restrict swearing and prohibit sexual curiosity.³

Russell shows in painful detail how such a dissatisfied mother will produce a thwarted and exploited child. The child, he argues, will grow up thirsting for individual power to compensate for the lost love and the feeling of defectiveness that this has implanted in him. Self-absorption and self-aggrandizement are the key emotions that will shape this person's growing up and determine the direction of his adult life. Russell further describes how this success-prone individual will be haunted by all the signs of excessive egoism. He will envy everyone else's success. He will drive himself unmercifully at work. This will exhaust him so that only the strongest diversions or stimulants will be able to arouse excitement. He will also easily feel persecuted as he is never as highly regarded as he demands he should be. Finally, he will be constantly fatigued from all his exertions and be frightened of asserting his own tastes and desires as he struggles to preserve his social standing by remaining a member of the herd.

We just have to take Russell's own example of the unhappy man driven to ruthless competition to get the full picture. Russell lays it out as follows:

The working life of this man has the psychology of the hundred yard race, but as the race upon which he is engaged is one whose only goal is the grave, the concentration, which is appropriate enough for a hundred yard race, becomes ... ex-

³ Ibid, pp. 39-47.

cessive. What does he know about his children?... He has probably no men friends who are important to him.... Books seem to him futile and music high-brow.... His life [is] too concentrated and too anxious to be happy.⁴

Such a devitalized individual reminds Russell of the dinosaurs who killed themselves off despite being the most powerful animals to have ever lived.

In a few brief paragraphs, Russell presents us an impressive example of a wrecked personality, and implicit in it is Russell's indictment of a capitalistic society that produces exploitive mothers, who, in turn produce exploitive, but unhappy children. Later in the work, he gives us a way of finding happiness that liberates individuals from the indoctrinated view of puritanical capitalism with its emphasis on individual success and nationalistic dominance. Russell makes clear that happiness also needs a proper social milieu in which patients and individuals can have access to the abundant ways that the community and universe can protect and enrich people. It will take a more equitable social, political, and economic organization to produce happy people.

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHIATRY ON CAUSES OF PATHOLOGICAL UNHAPPINESS

To the contemporary psychiatrist reading *The Conquest of Happiness* seventy-eight years after its publication in 1930, Russell's analysis of emotional disintegration fits well with standard psychiatric concepts of individual psychopathology and the impact of stress. However, very few psychiatrists would grasp the idea that it is society itself that is broadly generating these destructive forces, for they are trained narrowly to consider individual and family disturbances and not as social advocates, so in their analyses they would be unlikely to come to the radical notion that existing corporate, religious, educational, and state polices are creating widespread unhappiness. Rather, as medical specialists in treating emotional and cognitive disorders they look to discover signs and symptoms of disordered mood, disturbed thinking, and inappropriate behavior in specific individuals.

⁴ Ibid, p. 41.

Psychiatric diagnosis is based on identifying overwhelming reactions to major internal and external stresses and to explaining the specific acquired personality vulnerabilities that make such stress more destructive than need be for a particular individual. (An acquired personality vulnerability is a loss of good coping skills because parents inhibited self-assertive behaviors or the individual grew up in a restrictive social environment that thwarted the chance to become more open and assertive.) These strains produce overreactions as the emergency defensive circuits in the brain overwhelm the affected individual with psychic pain, anguished thoughts, and panicked reactions. Rather than simply producing effective flight or fight reactions, their intensity causes either too little activity so the individual become paralyzed or else too much so the individual panics. This in turn leads to breakdowns in routine self-care, self-esteem, and socially adaptive behavior. You can easily appreciate the delicate balance between adequate adjustment and maladaptive behavior by imagining what would happen if you lost your appetite, suffered regularly from disrupted sleep, couldn't carry out basic grooming, and failed to keep scheduled appointments or meetings. Such dysfunctions would soon create crisis after crisis in health, social acceptance, and work responsibilities.

BARRIERS IN PSYCHIATRY TO SEEKING SOCIAL SOLUTIONS TO UNHAPPINESS

Faced with acute clinical illnesses, the psychiatrist is too busy trying to help the sick to be able to address the larger social malaise that generates these problems. And the patients require so much immediate support that being told to look at the larger context would only make them more desperate. Their primary need is to restore basic functioning for themselves. They lack the strength, confidence, and energy to tackle the greater problems of the social causes of their conditions. They are like the asthmatic who must concentrate on restoring unobstructed breathing and cannot worry about the air pollution that causes his attacks.

There is an additional problem for psychiatrists who advocate a social solution to psychiatric problems. In addition to restoring the patient to at least minimal social functioning, psychiatrists are taught to respect the patient's inherent dignity and autonomy in the process. While being helpful in offering specific understanding,

support, and advice, psychiatrists try to avoid imposing their own personal values or philosophies on their patients and aim instead at restoring the patient's undermined autonomy and avoiding any indoctrination that would limit the patient's achieving his own healthy goals.

Two prominent academic twentieth-century American psychiatrists, Fredrick Redlich of Yale and Daniel Freedman of Chicago, in their textbook *The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry*, emphasize that psychiatrists, much like their medical colleagues, should follow the old medical adage that describes effective treatment as "to cure few, improve many, and to comfort most".⁵ Note that they make no acknowledgement of the effects of the larger social context on the development of the patient's disorders. To remove the socio-destructive forces in our society, psychiatry would need reform-minded leadership. If Russell were alive today, and discussing the principles in *The Conquest of Happiness* before the 30,000 participants who gather at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, his passion would stir them to action. We are waiting for that day.

Despite the barriers to their identification and study, it is clear that the role of social forces and institutions as causes of mental illness deserves investigation. As an example of how economic prosperity fails to promote happiness, we find in the wealthiest country of all, the United States, that according to a 1991 National Institute of Health Five Year Catchment study, 32% of American adults in their lifetime will suffer from an emotional disorder that reaches the level of the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic criteria and that in any given year, 20% are actually ill. But to remove the sociodestructive forces in our society, however, psychiatry would need reform-minded leadership. And where is such leadership to be found?

COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RUSSELL'S RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EGO

As a prescription for the unhappiness he has described, Russell argues that the troubled individual overexposed in childhood to the irrationalities of capitalism and materialism should undergo a per-

⁵ Fredrick C. Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman, *The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry*, Basic Books, N. Y. 1967, pp. 268-270.

sonal and dispassionate self-analysis. This is designed to identify the irrationalities of the system and initiate a meticulous re-programming of the individual. It was his practice to re-program, or re-educate, his unconscious by talking to himself in mini-lectures that would provide a rational approach to some irrational impulse, compulsion, or distortion. He offers us a specific approach and provides over sixty-five maxims that were the basis of his mini-lectures, such as the following:

When a rational conviction has been arrived at ... search out ... beliefs inconsistent with [it] ... and when the sense of sin grows strong ... treat it not as a revelation and a call to higher things, but as a disease and a weakness, unless of course it is caused by some act that a rational ethic would condemn.

Even when a man has offended against his own rational code, I doubt whether a sense of sin is the best method of arriving at a better way of life. There is in the sense of sin something abject, something lacking in self-respect. No good was ever done to any one by the loss of self-respect.

Since rationality consists in the main of internal harmony, the man who achieves it is freer in his contemplation of the world and in the use of his energies to achieve external purposes than is the man who is perpetually hampered by inward conflicts. Nothing so dull as to be encased in the self, nothing so exhilarating as to have attention and energy directed outwards.⁶

Russell also favored directly confronting any of his fears. He rejected the normal tendency to avoid these fears, claiming that when he confronted the fears they inevitably subsided. In doing this repeatedly, they became familiar rather than startling or devastating. He says that his brain would eventually become unresponsive to a threat that led nowhere.⁷

With this broad concept of reconstructing the unconscious and ridding it of irrational impulses, Russell was a progenitor of what came to be known twenty-five years later, when Albert Ellis began formulating his views of the theory in 1955, as "cognitive therapy."

⁶ David S. Goldman, "Sixty-five of Bertrand Russell's Maxims for Happiness", distributed May 15, 2005, Bertrand Russell Society Annual Meeting, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.

⁷ Russell, *Conquest*, pp. 60-65.

Cognitive therapy aims at challenging a suffering individual's learnt false assumptions about his fears and guilts and re-directing him or her into more adaptive behavior. For example, in the late 1950s, the psychologist Albert Ellis developed his technique of Rational Emotive Therapy to offset severe sexual inhibitions through a process of sexual re-education.⁸ In the 1960s, the psychiatrist Aaron Beck and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania began formulating cognitive therapy for depression and anxiety. They were able to demonstrate that they could significantly alleviate these disorders by tackling the underlying distorted thoughts and illogically-acquired concepts. Beck wrote a series of papers on depression in which he showed that 16 one hours cognitive therapy sessions could cause effective remission of depressive symptoms.

These results were measured against the effectiveness of imipramine (Tofranil), a leading anti-depressant medication of the time, and the results were shown to be equal to the effectiveness of imipramine. Moreover, he demonstrated that his results continued to equal those of imipramine for follow-up examinations of patients done at six week, six month, and one year intervals.⁹ To give some idea of what these improvements represented, both cognitive therapy and imipramine alike produced a 50% reduction in critical symptoms in 8% of depressed patients in one month, and similar 50% symptom reductions in 37% after three months, 58% after six months and in 70% after one year.¹⁰

LIMITS TO RUSSELL'S METHOD OF RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

As good as these treatment results are, there are naturally upper limits to how much rational reconstruction can help. E. Cameron provides the most extreme example in work done in the early 1960s. He and colleagues devised a treatment called "Psychic Div-ing." Depressed hospital patients were asked to listen to repeated

⁸ Albert Ellis, *Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy*, Lyle Stuart, 1962.

⁹ A. Rush et al., "Comparative Efficacy of Cognitive Therapy and Pharmacotherapy in the Treatment of Depressed Outpatients," *Cognitive Therapy and Research*, vol 1, no. 1, Mar 1977.

¹⁰ David A. Solomon, et al "Recovery from Major Depression: A 10-year Prospective Follow-up across Multiple Episodes," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 54:11, Nov 1997.

recordings of their own voices intoning positive phrases and messages. This was carried out for several weeks or months in which the patients would listen to these recordings for hours at a time. In some cases, the patients heard over 250-500,000 repetitions of their own voices. Unfortunately, while Cameron claimed this showed some usefulness, many of the patients had shrunk into greater states of despair.¹¹


The limits to rational reconstruction are the source of two problems with Russell's techniques. He does not appreciate the therapeutic necessity for a therapist in this sort of therapy nor does he recognize the stubbornness of the fear circuits in the brain to respond to verbal redirection. The presence of a trained therapist who offers an accepting and non-judgmental relationship to the patient is critical in helping the patient to relate the narrative of their sufferings. The therapist facilitates by balancing objectivity with sensitivity, helping the patient to feel comfortable and yet able to accept advice that builds self-esteem and coping abilities. The significance of the therapist in such therapy is indicated by the fact that an untreated depression can last for eight months to over two years with considerable hardship and dysfunction compared to significant symptom relief beginning within 3-6 months with appropriate therapy.¹²

As for Russell's failure to recognize the limits of modifying fear responses by any sort of talk, with or without a therapist, this is easily understandable. He could not have appreciated the stubborn character of depressive fear when he was writing in 1929 as the basic work on these circuits did not begin to produce understanding of their mechanisms until the early 1990s. Only in the last 15 years has research identified the circuits responsible for anxiety and depression; this was accomplished by imaging brain activity using radioactive glucose, which is the primary nutrient of the brain. By seeing where radioactivity is concentrated, it is possible to determine which brain circuits are involved in depression and anxiety.

Helen Mayberg, a research neurology professor now at Emory University, has demonstrated that depression involves a reciprocal

¹¹ D. Ewen Cameron, L. Levy, and L. Rubinstein, "Effects of Repetition of Verbal Signals upon the Behavior of Chronic Psychoneurotic Patients", *Journal of Mental Science* 106, 1960, pp. 742ff.

¹² Stephen Stahl, *Essential Psychopharmacology: Neuroscientific Basis and Practical Applications*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996.



over-activation of fear circuits in the sub-cortical parts of the brain and relative inhibition of the thinking, judging, strategizing, and pleasure experiencing circuits located in the top or cortical areas. (See accompanying illustration.)¹³ Furthermore, she, along with the NYU physiologist Joseph LeDoux, have shown the power of the subcortical circuits to sustain powerful fear responses long after the immediate stressors have disappeared, so that an individual that is suffering from anxiety and depression is repeatedly bombarded by the fear signals underlying his anxiety and depression. These fear responses include hypersensitivity to all environmental stimuli, heightened self-examination, and self-referencing.

¹³ Helen S. Mayberg et al. "Regional Metabolic Effects of Fluoxetine in Major Depression: Serial Changes and Relationship to Clinical Response", *Biological Psychiatry* 48.8 (2000). Helen S. Mayberg, "Defining Neuro-circuits in Depression", *Psychiatric Annals* 36:4 (April 2006).

The heightened and sustained fear responses uncovered by Mayberg and DeLoux make sense if someone is constantly endangered either by hostile individuals or a savage environment. From an evolutionary standpoint, such a person would benefit by keeping on constant guard against emerging threats.¹⁴ However, this does not apply to the pathologically anxious or depressed. When stress sets off fear responses, they usually subside after the original stress ends, but anxious or depressed individuals experience persistent overactive signaling from the fear circuits that do not subside. Without inhibitory messaging from the cortex to demonstrate their irrationality, the fearful feelings dominate, generating an egocentrism that traps the patient in a prison of self-absorption. Fortunately modern anti-anxiety, anti-depressant and anti-psychotic drugs can normalize these disturbed subcortical circuits and restore the brain's reciprocal balance between necessary fear responses and proper intellectual evaluation. When this stability is achieved, it is possible to restore effective rational processes. However, Russell addressed himself to the plight of the functioning though unhappy individual rather than the pathologically depressed and anxious individual, and he neither had to deal with these extremes nor would the science of the time have provided him with clues as to what needed to be done if he had.

RUSSELL ON RESTORING CONNECTION TO EXTERNAL INTERESTS

In addition to suggesting what individuals could do to free themselves from irrational impulses, Russell projected a wider, truly visionary concept of universal happiness available to those who could shed the narrow confines of a life in which selfish fulfillment was the primary objective in part 2 of *The Conquest of Happiness*. Russell offers a plan for genuine happiness, asserting that the values of zest, affection, the family, work, impersonal interests and resignation, along with the cultivation of broad and meaningful relationships with others and the world is what is necessary to provide ongoing fulfillment despite hardships.

¹⁴ Joseph LeDoux, "Emotion, Memory, and the Brain", *Scientific American*, v. 270, no. 6. LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*, Simon & Schuster, N. Y., 1996, pp. 138-178, 225-266.

Russell advocates connecting to a wide variety of outside interests that are readily available to the average individual, some as simple as reading about the excavations at Ur of the Chaldees or engaging in gardening.¹⁵ They could open up the unhappy personality to the rich world of stimulation and interest that never ceases. However, the egocentric, success-driving individual has largely discounted them because they appear so common.

Russell retains the humanistic view that we are part of the universe's creation, with lives that have been harmonized by evolution to fit into its rhythms. To Russell, these rhythms are alternating periods of renewal and quiescence, which allow for energetic activity but also safeguard contemplation. Once the unhappy individual readjusts and starts to experience satisfaction in his family and outside interests, he will cease to be a willful tyrant, exploiting himself and others for his personal glorification, and will become instead a giving and receiving member of the community and world.

Russell stresses how a life that is functioning in many areas protects that individual against the destructive effects of personal loss and despair. He contemplates how having broad-based interests can comfort one when death claims a loved one, and even offers the story of how a scientist with great intellectual desires may suffer a brain-damaging blow to his head, but if he desires the progress of science and not merely to contribute to the field, knowing that others would continue to pursue knowledge he valued, he would not suffer the same despair as would the man whose research had purely egoistic motives. Similarly, despair is more easily faced in less dramatic cases when one has interests outside oneself. Russell gives as an example of this the man who is engaged in absorbing work and is less distracted by an unhappy married life than one not absorbed by interests outside oneself.¹⁶

Russell also values equal development of the intellectual, sensual, and willful drives and warns against an unbalanced development. Not only does he stress the dangers of too egocentric and willful a life, but he also sees dangers in going too far in one-sided intellectual development or sensual indulgence. He esteems, instead, the balanced life where all potentials fit within the boundaries

¹⁵ Russell, *Conquest*, pp. 176, 114.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.

of health and fairness. These he sees as the formula for harmony, solidity, resiliency, and happiness.¹⁷

THE CONCEPT HAPPINESS IN PSYCHIATRY

Despite its fundamental importance, happiness remains an elusive concept in psychiatry. According to the clinical psychologists David Myers and Ed Diener, happiness is underreported in the professional literature. In a literature survey, they have determined that of the 46,380 articles indexed in *Psychology Abstracts* from 1967-1994 only 2,389 or 5% mentioned happiness while depression was cited 37,000 times.¹⁸ However, this situation may be changing. According to "The Science of Happiness," which is highlighted in the *Time Magazine* "Special Mind & Body Issue" of January 17, 2005, academic psychological researchers are concentrating on neurotransmitters and brain regions responsible for happiness. But as is standard for the profession, they focus on the treatable individual rather than the larger society as a source of happiness.¹⁹ And in February 2004, psychiatrist Dennis S. Charney published a physiological study on the genetic basis of resiliency. In it, he concludes that those who produce the least amount of stress hormone (cortisol) and the largest amounts of stress-protecting hormones and/or neuropeptides (DHEA and neuropeptide Y, respectively) are best able to handle stress, and he calls for developing drugs that enhance these protective genes. But as with the others, he does not deal specifically with the social factors that underlie happiness.²⁰

Finally, there are rogue elements in psychiatry that wish to make happiness into a "diagnosis of mental illness." Richard Bentall, for example, argues in a 1992 paper in *The Journal of Medical Ethics* that happiness should be classified as a mental disorder, because its rarity makes it abnormal. Furthermore, its association with excessive pleasure, indulgence in food, drink, and sex and propensity to produce carefree and unpredictable behavior suggest impaired

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 46.

¹⁸ David G. Myers and Ed Diener, "The Pursuit of Happiness", *Scientific American*, v. 274 no. 5 (May 1996).

¹⁹ "The Science of Happiness," *Time Magazine*, Special Mind & Body Issue, January 17, 2005.

²⁰ Dennis S. Charney, "Psychobiological Mechanisms of Resilience and Vulnerability: Implications for Successful Adaptation to Extreme Stress," *The American Journal of Psychiatry* 161(2), February 2004.

judgment and impulse control.²¹ He asks that happiness be classified in the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* as a "Major Mood Disorder, Pleasant Type."

MY CLINICAL PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE USING RUSSELL'S CONCEPTS

As a practicing psychiatrist, I have found Russell's ideas about social pathology, rational reconstruction, and connecting to the wide world of possibilities important therapeutic principles. Using them, I have been able to help my patients look more profoundly at their own psychological make ups and have helped them to see the wide possibilities for feeling and action that their own contextual and personal thinking have minimized.

I typically introduce Russell's ideas while at the same time offering traditional psychological interpretations about the personal conflicts that have arisen within the patients about their identity, goals, family and work relationships. This will be in cases where patients are struggling with why they are so defective, angry, guilty, or psychosomatically ill. At the same time, I have provided these patients with photocopies of selected chapters from *The Conquest*, including those on "Boredom and Excitement," "Zest," "Affection," "Impersonal Interests," "Effort and Resignation," and most frequently "Competition." In most instances, I have been able to help these suffering patients using this double approach. They have achieved greater personal awareness, greater hopefulness, and a sense of re-vitalization and find that Russell's words and messages are inspiring, moving them further to change destructive underlying egoistic patterns.

Let me illustrate the effectiveness of incorporating Russell's ideas into my therapeutic work. A patient of mine, a 49 year-old chronically depressed woman, was struggling with her domineering and controlling 80 year-old mother, who was still very active in the family business. At the same time, the patient experienced intense guilt over defying her mother. This struggle had begun in childhood, when the mother rejected her daughter's ordinary demands for care, preferring to devote herself to friends and business instead.

²¹ Richard Bentall, "A Proposal to Classify Happiness as a Psychiatric Disorder", *Journal of Medical Ethics* 18(2), 1992.

My patient found solace and a new perspective in Russell's chapter on "Effort and Resignation," where he recommends that one avoid asking oneself to do the impossible. She was eager to read the entire book to see what other suggestions Russell might have.

A second case also involved the bitter struggle of a younger woman (32 years old in this case) with a domineering mother, who, unlike the mother in the first case, was intrusive and sought to control her daughter's behavior. I addressed this woman's compulsive compliance to her mother's wishes by focusing on her need to get confirmation from caring friends. With my encouragement she read Russell's chapter on fear of public opinion and after this began to effectively assert herself with her mother. She discovered that her mother could respond positively to my patient's newly-found self-assertion. The fiery confrontation and rejection the patient had long feared were now appreciated as fantasies created by her overactive fear circuits.

In a third case, a 42 year-old anxious and depressed business man was intensely preoccupied with his past failures. He was able to shift away from these self-condemnations after I interpreted to him his mother's oppressively identifying him with his so-called "terrible" father, whom she had divorced when the patient was five. He felt that reading Russell's chapter on "Competition" helped him understand the compulsive origins of his self-hatred.

RUSSELLIAN CONCLUSIONS

We are fortunate to have Bertrand Russell's examination of the causes of unhappiness and happiness. His recommendations about reorganizing a conventionally competitively successful life fraught with angst and despair have provided us with the remarkable discovery that happiness is our natural state if we overcome the narrow bounds of egotism and reconnect with the larger world.

At the same time, we must reflect that Russell was drawn to this study when he was 57 years of age, because despite inheriting a high social position and developing into a widely recognized mathematical and philosophical genius, he was not spared life's tragedies, beginning most profoundly with the loss of both parents by the time he was four. Because he had to deal with family loss so early, the strictness of his puritanical paternal grandmother, and intense isolation growing up, he was no stranger to misery. In his long

life, he also had to endure, despite much positive recognition, the hostility of peers, his jailing for pacifism during World War I, his loss of two parliamentary elections, three failed marriages, a schizophrenic child, strained economics and rejection by his university.

It was humankind's good fortune that Bertrand Russell, the brilliant philosopher, was able to draw on his personal life experience with unhappiness and happiness. Forced like most people to endure what seems to be universal suffering, he used his powerful intellect to understand the origins of misery and find a universal solution for it well within the grasp of the ordinary individual living under peaceful conditions. In overcoming "meditating on his sins, follies, and shortcomings" and centering his attention upon the world at large, he found, as he writes in the last sentence in *The Conquest* that "it is in such profound instinctive union with the stream of life that the greatest joy is to be found."²²

Like his contemporary, Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, Russell used his own life experiences to discover basic psychological truths. He was able to fulfill significantly the second of the life goals that he had formulated for himself. As stated in the Postscript to his *Autobiography*, in addition to wanting to find out what could be known, Russell wanted "to do whatever might be possible toward creating a happier world."²³

Hopefully, psychiatry can heed Russell's 78 year old message. If so, it can recover its goal of helping individuals find happiness by again directing them to rid themselves of egoistic preoccupations and promote beneficial social and external activities even as it strives to develop new biological treatments. Naturally, Russell's more powerful message is addressed to society at large to create new social norms and programs that allow happiness to thrive, and replace the striving for profits, unlimited growth, and dominance with a fair world that offers each of its people a chance for education, health, prosperity, and pleasure.

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²² Russell, *Conquest*, pp. 18, 191.

²³ Russell, *Autobiography*, p. 725.

BERTRAND RUSSELL ON FEAR: A PROLEGOMENA*

MARVIN KOHL

ABSTRACT. Russell maintains that all fear, whether it be unconscious, conscious, or attitudinal, is bad and ought to be eliminated. At best these claims are hyperbole; at worse, false. They also involve an exacting notion of human nature, bringing to mind John Maynard Keynes' charge in *Two Memoirs* that "there was no solid diagnosis of human nature" underlying Russell's theory, and that Russell "sustained simultaneously a pair of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that in fact human affairs were carried on after a most irrational fashion. but that the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was to carry them on rationally."

I. RUSSELL'S STANCE

Bertrand Russell maintains that one of the great obstacles to human happiness is fear. In his essay "On Evils Due to Fear" he argues that "a great many of the defects from which adults suffer are due to preventable mistakes in their education, and [that] the most important of these mistakes is the inculcation of fear."¹ He also insists that *all* fear is bad. Thus, in *What I Believe*, he writes:

Religion, since it has its source in terror, has dignified certain kinds of fear, and made people think them not disgraceful. In this it has done mankind a great disservice: *all* fear is bad, and ought to be overcome not by fairy tales, but by courage and rational reflection.²

In *The Conquest of Happiness*, he again reminds us that fear of any kind is a major obstacle to happiness, whether it be fear of life in general, fear of failure, or some other kind of fear. For example, in discussing the fear of public opinion he writes:

Fear of public opinion, like every other form of fear, is oppressive and stunts growth. It is difficult to achieve any kind of

* This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society, Monmouth University, New Jersey, June 9, 2007.

¹ Bertrand Russell, "On the Evils Due to Fear," in *If I Could Preach Just Once* (New York: Harper, 1929), 219. He later adds "I do not believe that any good thing is to be obtained through fear, and I hold that obedience not otherwise obtainable had better not be obtained." (228)

² Bertrand Russell, *What I Believe* (New York: Dutton, 1925), 13.

greatness while a fear of this kind remains strong, and it is impossible to acquire that freedom of spirit in which true happiness consists, for it is essential to happiness that our way of living should spring from our own deep impulses and not from the accidental tastes and desires of those who happen to be our neighbors, or even our relations.³

All of us probably have had experiences of fear, and so to some extent understand its nature. If we had to describe the general nature of this experience, we might be content to say that fear is the feeling that occurs in the presence of an actual, perceived, or anticipated threat. Perhaps a more sophisticated observer would want to regard fear as the physiological and psychological state that comes about in the presence of an actual, perceived, or anticipated threat.

This characterization has its difficulties in that it leaves obscure the nature or more exact description of this state: for example, the extent to which it conforms with a general reflex type or has the characteristics that have traditionally been associated with instincts. Nonetheless, it is useful at the outset because it reminds us that fear is both a state of mind and a state of body with measurable physiological correlates, and because it appears to be the characterization Russell uses or at least seems to presuppose.

Most of us would agree that fear is a matter of degree and that some fears are more rational than others. For example, some people fear the Tarantula spider and are stricken by panic in its presence because its bite is poisonous. Other people just do not like spiders. They panic in their presence for the same reason as they panic in the presence of other insects, namely, because they believe they definitely cause disease. Still others are terrified of spiders because they believe that the bite of any spider is deadly. Most of us would agree that the first belief is rational; that the second is erroneous because spiders, unlike fleas and ticks, are generally known not to cause disease; and that the third belief is irrational because it is contrary to the widely known fact that while tarantula bites can be extremely painful, they are not deadly.

It is true that Russell distinguishes between the rational and irrational apprehension of danger. It is also true that Russell acknowledges the importance of rationally apprehending danger when faced

³ Bertrand Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness* (Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing, 1930), 138-9.

with its presence or a genuine threat. But he also tends to identify cases as being that of fear only when the individual is stricken with panic. In other words, given the logic of Russell's position he would have to maintain that, because of panic, all three of these cases are examples of irrational behavior. This strikes me as an odd and unacceptably narrow way of characterizing fear.

Perhaps the clearest example of this narrowing of meaning occurs in *What I Believe*. After telling us that the purpose of the moralist is to improve men's behavior, that active malevolence is the worst feature of human nature, and suggesting that most of this malevolence is caused by a haunting fear of danger and ruin, Russell concludes that fear is the great enemy against which we must do primary battle. Thus, he writes:

[love of mental adventure] must ... be one of the chief concerns of the scientific moralist to combat fear. This can be done in two ways: by increasing security, and by cultivating courage. I am speaking of fear as an irrational passion, not of the rational prevision of possible misfortune. When a theatre catches fire, the rational man foresees disaster just as clearly as the man stricken with panic, but he adopts methods likely to diminish the disaster, whereas the man stricken with panic increases it.⁴

Notice that Russell is here not objecting to the belief that the theatre is on fire. Since the theatre is presumably on fire, both the rational and irrational man have grounds for believing that this is the case. What he is objecting to are the feelings — the paralyzing panic — which has become associated with the second man's belief that the theatre is on fire. And I think most of us would agree that being stricken, being paralyzed with fear, is not a rational stance. But having said this, we should also recognize the following: first, that paralyzing fear is not the only kind of fear; second, that there are important differences between having rational and irrational feelings; and finally, that the kinds of fear Russell typically attacks are of this extreme kind. Perhaps all forms of panic are bad but it does not follow from this that all forms of fear are.

His abhorrence of fear has another source. Russell, especially when doing political and social philosophy, became increasing

⁴ *What I Believe*, 70.

aware of the fact that fear kills the love of thought and mental adventure. For example, he concludes his chapter on education in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* by describing the evils caused by a mistaken education, one inspired by fear. Thus, he writes that

If the object [of education] were to make pupils think, rather than to make them accept certain conclusions, education would be conducted quite differently: there would be less rapidity of instruction and more discussion, more occasions when the pupils are encouraged to express themselves, more attempt to make education concern itself with matters in which the pupils feel some interest.

Above all, there would be an endeavour to rouse and stimulate the love of mental adventure.... To give this joy, in a greater or less measure, to all who are capable of it, is the supreme end for which the education of the mind is to be valued.⁵

Russell also explains why, although the love of mental adventure is rare among adults, it is not so with children. Among children, he writes,

It is very common, and grows naturally out of the period of make-believe and fancy. It is rare in later life because everything is done to kill it during education. Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth – more than ruin, more even than death.... It is fear that holds men back – fear lest their cherished beliefs should prove delusions, fear lest the institutions by which they live should prove harmful, fear lest they themselves should prove less worthy of respect than they have supposed themselves to be.... No institution inspired by fear can further life. Hope, not fear, is the creative principle in human affairs.⁶

In *New Hopes for a Changing World* he writes: “The thing that above all others I have been concerned to say in this book is that because of fears that once had a rational basis mankind has failed to

⁵ Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916), 164-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 165-7.

profit by the techniques that, if wisely used, could make him happy” and that “the greatest obstacle to a good world is fear and [that] both conscious and unconscious fear must be eliminated.”⁷ The recurring theme, here taken from *Education and the Good Life*, is that “fear should be overcome not only in action, but in feeling; and not only in conscious feeling, but in the unconscious as well.”⁸

To sum up: Fear, for Russell, as a bio-genetic disposition or emotional attitude based on perceived dangers or threats, is a primary evil because it is responsible for, and continues to produce, the most detrimental kind of cognitive and eudemonic helplessness. It is an evil because it is responsible for causing the worst of human behavior and undermining the best. Russell’s vision is of a world without fear. It is a vision of a universal fearlessness that allows for a fuller nurturing of the good life.

II. CONCLUSION

The type of fear deserving of censure, then, is not any of the ones Russell has chosen. It is not fear *per se*, but panic fear and those ideological stances that inculcate or produce it that deserve censure. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that fear is instinct-like with Russell’s normative claim that it ought to be eliminated. This difficulty, I should like to add, does not seem to be a logical one. For it seems consistent to say that, although X cannot be eliminated, X nonetheless ought to be.⁹

⁷ Bertrand Russell, *New Hopes for a Changing World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), 188, 161-2.

⁸ Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1926), 65.

⁹ Robert Hoffman, in personal correspondence, writes that “perhaps it is not a logical difficulty, but it does *seem* to be one.” Admittedly, there is an inner tension. However, I believe that this tension is not generated by inconsistency. We commonly suppose, though not with unquestioning certitude, a particular notion of consistency. We assume that it is correct to retain the notion that it is logically consistent to say “although X cannot be eliminated, X nonetheless ought to be.” For example, we may say that “although death cannot be eliminated, it nonetheless ought to be.” Now this may be an utterly unwise thing to say, but it is not inconsistent. Why not? To this question I should reply that it is the normative parts of these statements that take us “off the logical hook.” I admit that “*ceteris paribus*, one ought to, and ought not to, do X” is inconsistent; but quickly add the statement “although X cannot be eliminated, X nonetheless ought to be” does not take this form; and to insist that it does, as some may be inclined to do, is to re-

However, the assumption that the principle of futility is trump,¹⁰ when combined with Russell's claims, generates a worry. The principle of futility roughly reads that one ought not attempt to do what one knows cannot be done or that one ought not aim at what one knows to be impossible. Something here seems to be normatively amiss. This does not mean that we should not attempt in education and elsewhere to eliminate as much of the paralyzing and debilitating forms of fear as we can. But if it is true that fear is so deeply rooted in the physiological and psychological nature of man that, at present, it cannot be eliminated, then it seems to be unwise to have that aim. For as Russell elsewhere suggests: "There is no such thing as an irrational aim except in the sense of one that is impossible of realization."¹¹

This brings us to a related difficulty, to what may be called Russell's illusory optimism. For there are few areas of Russell's writings where John Maynard Keynes' criticism may be more applicable. Keynes charged that "there was no solid diagnosis of human nature" underlying Russell's views, and that Russell "sustained simultaneously a pair of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that in fact human affairs were carried on after a most irrational fashion, but that the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was to carry them on rationally."¹²

Keynes' charge of being "ludicrously incompatible" may be too strong. But certainly Russell is overly optimistic about the ease in which fear may be eliminated. Briefly consider the problem generated by just the existence of unconscious fear. How does a conscious mind command or urge an unconscious mind to behave? Is Russell not too sanguine about the ease in which unconscious fears can be recognized and controlled by the conscious mind? He clearly underestimated the power and role played by repression in the minds

commend an unnecessary dilution of the notion of consistency. Therefore, I propose to conclude by at least provisionally saying that although the difficulty may seem to be a logical one, it is not.

¹⁰ For a general analysis of this idea, see Marvin Kohl, "Wisdom and Futility," *The Philosophical Forum* 32:1 (2001), 73-93.

¹¹ Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), 11.

¹² John Maynard Keynes, *Two Memoirs* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1949), 102.

of ordinary human beings. Perhaps, given his own vast power of reason, he assumed that ordinary human beings, most of whom are considerably less well endowed, have the same ability.

Respect for fearlessness and courage is one of the outstanding marks of Western philosophy. Russell's writings bear testimony to the vitality of this tradition. His own indomitable fearlessness is a model even critics respect. Nonetheless, it is one thing to tell us to eliminate fear whenever we wisely can, it is another to be cavalier about the ease and extent of being able to do so.

I am not taking issue with the claim that abusive forms of fear are often inculcated and zealously nurtured and that Russell, as a social reformer, deserves our admiration for his courageous battle against this abuse. Nor do I deny that fear often impedes and destroys human happiness. What I wish to suggest is: (1) that we distinguish between the inculcation of specific abusive attitudinal fears, like the fear of truth or public opinion, and the bio-genetic dispositions or instincts that enable us to fear an approaching fire or enemy; (2) that it generally makes good sense to call for the elimination of the former; but (3) that neither Russell's arguments nor the evidence about the protective nature of non-panic fear warrants the conclusion that all fear ought to be eliminated; and (4) that the most vulnerable aspect of Russell's doctrine seems to be his conviction that it is desirable and possible for ordinary human beings to eliminate all fear.

I would be remiss if I concluded this discussion without commenting on one of Russell's most important insights. Russell is right on the mark in his understanding of how fear may be manipulated in order to control others. The successful manipulation of fear is an instrument of power. Russell also clearly understood that politicians typically manipulate public fear in order to advance their own agendas. From this perspective, his social philosophy may be viewed as a pioneering effort in understanding how the dread of loss and the fear of death may be used as a means of promoting various political agendas. Here I will remain relatively silent about how the current fear of terrorism has been used to reverse welfare gains and to diminish what always has been a fragile ideal, namely, the commitment to a benevolent society. What I find disconcerting is that this vital insight in Russell's may be lost because of his zeal as a social reformer and his hasty generalization.

The main object of the present paper is in part polemical, critically focusing on Russell's claim that all fear is bad and ought to be eliminated, and in part preparatory, hoping this discussion will encourage the development of a contrary neural and philosophical theory, one that conceives of fear as a system that is hardwired, part of the emotional unconscious, "a system that detects danger and produces responses that maximize the probability of surviving a dangerous situation in the most beneficial way," as Joseph LeDoux suggests.¹³ Daunting as the challenge may be, would it not be grand if this new theory also added to our understanding of knowing what to fear and what not to fear, even if this understanding is contrary to the dispositions presently embedded or programmed into the neural system by evolution?

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¹³ Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 128.

BOOK REVIEW

WHAT IS HAPPINESS?

BRANDON YOUNG

Review of Daniel Gilbert, *Stumbling on Happiness* (2005), 336 pp. Vintage Books, New York.

In *Stumbling on Happiness*, a popular work that won the 2007 Royal Society's Prize for Science Books, Gilbert examines the nature of and psychological obstacles to human happiness. The book contains five parts, with eleven chapters, that integrate research from game-theory, economics, neurophysiology, philosophy, experimental psychology and sociological study.

In the professional psychological world, Gilbert is an expert in a field properly called "affective forecasting," a technical phrase for the study of how human beings predict their future emotional state. It is highly likely, he thinks, that this unique human ability, coinciding with the growth of the frontal lobes, helped the species survive by guiding the emotions. "We are," as Gilbert writes, "the ape that looked forward (p. 9)." However, this cognitive ability is anything but perfect. In fact, the constant refrain of the book is that we consistently miscalculate how we will feel in the future.

Gilbert invites the reader to join him in examining this counter-intuitive human cognitive ability. Thus, in chapter two, "The View From in Here," Gilbert shows that most of us make predictions about our future happiness in certain situations (e.g., as a lottery winner versus as a paraplegic) based on imagining further conditions (e.g., a lottery winner with perfect health or a paraplegic without a lover) that may not obtain and that directly influence our actual happiness in those situations. Rather than recommending a remedy for this characteristic, *Stumbling on Happiness* is an work on experimental psychology meant to explain the phenomena, rather than a clinical one meant to correct them.

In chapter 9 ("Immune to Reality") and again in concluding the book, Gilbert looks at the mechanisms we use to fend off unhappiness and spells out the details of what he calls the "psychological immune system." Like the physical immune system that defends us

from illness, the psychological immune system defends us from unhappiness. Psychological traumas (loss of a loved one, divorce, loss of a job) kick the psychological immune system into high gear, and the events are dealt with. The psychological trauma is very complex and must be treated with a variety of healing techniques. But Gilbert does not explain how we are to cope with these traumas; it is, therefore, left to the reader to conceive of the ways in which a person copes with such an event (psychotherapy, anti-depressants, group therapy, exercise, meditation retreats, etc).

Gilbert draws an analogy to the physical immune system with respect to the coping mechanisms. We seek treatment for major injuries (like a major gash) but do not seek treatment for minor injuries (small cuts). The result is that minor injuries can end up being worse over time than major ones. Likewise, the minor annoyance of, say, a spouse being late for an important date, is too small to trigger the psychological immune system, and therefore nothing is done to cope with the event. Yet over time, like tiny cuts that do not heal and lead to serious illness, these events can build to depression and other emotional disorders. These events hurt, and they hurt incessantly because the mental 'immune system' did not have a sufficient catalyst.

Like Bertrand Russell, who explained relativity theory on analogy with India rubber, Gilbert has the gift of finding novel ways to convey difficult ideas. Couple that with his lucidity (also like Lord Russell's) and the result is a book so thoroughly enjoyable it is difficult not to affectively forecast the pleasure of the next chapter. The danger is that the book's readability and (sometimes corny) humor may prevent it from being taken seriously as the scholarly work it is. This book can be recommended to anyone interested in psychology, economics, or philosophy as well as to people who wish to gain some insight into human happiness and the foibles of the human mind.

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DISCUSSION

PRESTON ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY *

GARY HARDCASTLE

Analytic philosophy wasn't what you might have been led to think it was. This is something that Aaron Preston suspects the canonical analytics – Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein – knew, but were inclined to paper over. At any rate, it is something that the "new wave" historians of analytic philosophy (Preston's term) in the 1980s and 1990s, e.g., Michael Beaney, Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Peter Hylton, and Ray Monk, established and made much of. With a recent spate of "analytic historians" (Preston's term again) like Scott Soames writing the history of analytic philosophy in seeming ignorance of the work of the new wavers, Preston is rightly concerned to remind us of the new wavers' chief result, namely, that "no view traditionally connected with analytic philosophy was actually shared by all and only canonical analysts" (15). Analytic philosophers, *especially* the canonical ones, differed over what analysis is, what gets analyzed, and, for that matter, what the point of the entire enterprise might be.

Preston's paper is, however, no mere reminder to keep some Monk nearby while wading through, say, Soames' *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*. According to Preston, the new wavers saw something important, indeed, but failed to see what that something *implied*. The fact that Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein (not to mention A. J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap, Gottlob Frege, etc.) did not see eye to eye on the nature and role of analysis, combined with a bit of thought about what a philosophical *school* is, forces us, according to Preston, to what he calls an "illusionist" view of analytic philosophy. On the illusionist approach, analytic philosophy is what it has traditionally been supposed to be, but, alas, it does not exist. (Did it seem to *you* that it existed? There's the illusion.) This is a view *denied* by the new wavers, though according to Preston, it follows from their work. More on the illusionist approach, and Preston's arguments for it, in a bit. First, a distinction.

The discovery that no single doctrine is shared by analytic philosophy's canonical philosophers could well unsettle someone who has devoted his or her best intellectual years to imbibing, and building on,

* Thanks to Aaron Preston for helpful comments on an earlier draft of these comments.

the analytic tradition. But it shouldn't, at least not if we keep in mind the simple distinction between an idea on the one hand and the people who consider, examine, hold, resist, or flat-out reject it on the other. There are many ways a person can be involved with a particular idea at a particular time beyond simply believing it. Consider the flux of these various attitudes for *one* person over time, multiply that by the several members of an intellectual community, and the diversity of intellectual attitudes to a given idea begins to seem the *norm* in an intellectual community – uniformity, even for short periods, the exception. The *appearance* of uniformity is, of course, another thing. That, as Preston notes, is appreciated and projected by intellectual communities, philosophical schools hardly being an exception.¹

In short, *doctrine* should not be called upon to serve as the basis for defining a philosophical school, at least if our aim is to pick out its canonical figures. Doctrinal definitions of the analytic movement, particularly, would describe a “movement” whose membership vacillated dramatically, with “canonical” figures dropping in and out as their thought developed or as they merely revisited views they'd earlier defended, attacked, or ignored. That is, indeed, just what new wavers taught us. But it hardly means that certain ideas are not at the heart of analytic philosophy, or that there is no such thing as analytic philosophy. Consider, for example, the idea that many (or even *every*) exemplary philosophical problem is artificial, a sort of tangle enabled by nothing more than our normal language, or perhaps our misuse of it. That is a profound and fascinating idea, absolutely central to analytic philosophy and worth thinking hard about even today. But to *define* analytic philosophy in terms of a commitment, conviction, or belief in that idea would be to miss its development, its reconsideration and reformulations in various hands – in short, to miss the history of analytic philosophy at its most significant and exciting. What makes new wave history of analytic philosophy so appealing (to me at least) is not that it disables the popular image of analytic philo-

¹ For a remarkable (and entertaining) example of the *projection* of unity over the fact of disunity in a movement still regarded (despite much research establishing the contrary) as an exemplar of philosophical uniformity, see Paolo Mancuso's account of the Vienna Circle's reaction to Alfred Tarski's theory of truth, “Tarski, Neurath and Kokoszynska on the Semantic Conception of Truth” (forthcoming in D. Patterson, *New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy*, Oxford). Faced with disagreement among logical positivists over the acceptability of Tarski's theory of truth, Carnap, Mancuso recounts, directed participants to “take a waiting attitude and ... not carry out public polemics against semantics as a whole until ... further development.”

sophy as a doctrinally unified school, but that it attempts to trace the development, in different heads across different times, of the very doctrines once taken to be analytic philosophy's defining features.²

Inclined to define analytic philosophy (for the sake, presumably, of having a fixed historical target), and impressed that no doctrine picks out just the right people at the right time, one would presumably be in the market for a *non*-doctrinal definition. Big mistake, says Preston, and here we return to the matter of implications and illusions. According to Preston, what the new wavers missed is that we *must* have a doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy, and among those the only viable candidate is *illusionist*. Here's the argument. Why, first, must we have a doctrinal definition, especially if (as Preston accepts) the new wavers have shown that there *is* no single doctrine the canonical figures share? Well, in defining analytic philosophy (or, presumably, any philosophical school) we must demand a “real definition,” one that picks out analytic philosophy by its essence, its necessary and sufficient conditions (20). That's the first premise. Second premise: philosophy is and always has been a “theoretical discipline”; it produces “sets of views about the way things are” which are “verbally articulated in a relatively straightforward way, in the form of a sufficiently clear declarative sentence” (20-1). Therefore the only acceptable sort of definition of any school of philosophy, analytic philosophy included, is one that identifies the school by way of its doctrine:

There is a minimum standard, a necessary condition, for the initial formation and the retrospective demarcation of groups that, like schools, movements, or traditions, purport to mark out not merely a region of *social* space, but of *philosophical* space: such groups must rely for their cohesion, and hence also their existence, on a kind of unity that is constituted by agreement in theoretical matters. That is, a group is most properly called a philosophical school (etc.) only when it has come together on the basis of a shared philosophical view (or some set of them). (21, emphasis in original)

Philosophical schools like analytic philosophy must be defined doctrinally because, in short, definitions capture essences, and philosophical schools are *essentially* shared doctrines.

² An appreciation of the role of what Thomas Gieryn has, in the context of the history and sociology of science, called “boundary work” is extremely useful here. See Gieryn, T. *Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

There's a problem here, though, in that anyone dubious about the conclusion, demanding as it does that we have a doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy, will be at least as dubious about the argument's second and all-important premise that philosophical schools are essentially shared doctrines. That second premise asserts, after all, the content of the conclusion, and so the argument appears to beg the question. Granted the first premise, the question of whether we can fashion something other than a doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy just *is* the question of whether analytic philosophy in particular is, in essence, a set of doctrines.

That aside, the second premise, that philosophy (again, including analytic philosophy) is "the production and critical assessment" of "sets of views ... about the way things are, or what is the case, in some region or other – or possibly the whole – of reality," (21) (something Preston claims is a "minimal conception of what philosophy is and what it involves [that] has been widely held, at least implicitly, throughout the history of the discipline") was in fact explicitly denied by, for example, assorted logical positivists, notably Carnap. Carnap, with a number of positivists, saw himself *not* as offering claims about the world, but as fashioning tools for the analysis of language. The tools themselves, in the form of formal languages, were developed in the context of, typically, *pure* syntax; they were analytic, and thus made no claims about the world. Carnap's logical syntax program, and the nature of philosophy itself, was of course discussed, contested, and modified at the time, but that, as we saw above, is to be expected.

We should not, therefore, be swayed by Preston's argument for a doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy; its force depends upon an antecedent commitment to its conclusion via its second premise, and its second premise conflicts with what we know to be the case about at least one prominent strain of analytic philosophy. But this hardly squelches the curiosity we ought to have about Preston's illusionist view. What sort of definition of analytic philosophy could this be, and how could it be *doctrinal*, given what we've learned from the new wavers?

According to Preston, the "received" view of analytic philosophy is the view that "analytic philosophy is a school of philosophy that originated ... around the turn of the twentieth-century ... fueled by the perception that the correct method of philosophical inquiry ... was the analysis of language." However, he continues, it "does not correspond and never has corresponded to anything in reality" (14-5, 27). This

idea, that the received view is only an illusion, Preston calls "illusionism." Illusionism adheres to new waver history; there wasn't, in fact, any such thing as analytic philosophy. But what the illusionist takes analytic philosophy to be – what it is that there wasn't any *of*, as it were – is just what traditional definitions have made it out to be, that is, the received view. So, says Preston, "the illusionist is a traditionalist concerning *what* analytic philosophy is supposed to be, but differs from other traditionalists concerning *whether* analytic philosophy exists at all" (27). One is reminded of other mythical beasts, say, unicorns, about which we are all apparently illusionists in Preston's sense. We all subscribe to a traditionalist definition of unicorns but deny that there are any. Anyone who claims otherwise is suffering from, or perpetrating, an illusion.

This is good as far as it goes, except wasn't it part of the traditionalist account of analytic philosophy that analytic philosophy *existed*, that is, that there were analytic philosophers, properly named as such because they in fact belonged to a philosophical school? One suspects that there is in Preston's account of his position an equivocation over 'philosophical school'. Actually, there must be some equivocation, for otherwise what Preston says about the illusionist view is flatly inconsistent. He writes that "for the illusionist analytic philosophy is exactly what the received view says it is," (27) and (earlier) that on the received view, "analytic philosophy is a school of philosophy" (14). So on the illusionist view analytic philosophy is a school. But we also read that if "analytic philosophy as ordinarily conceived is an illusion, then it is not a philosophical school" (27). At this point, really, we can only ask for clarification of what is meant by 'philosophical school' or, barring that, consider the possibility that the illusionist approach is itself an illusion.

Preston's approach to these issues in the history of analytic philosophy is thoughtful and creative, and so these problems might steer us back toward non-doctrinal definitions of analytic philosophy. Or, even better, it might lead us to ask what work a definition of analytic philosophy, in *any* of these senses, does for us, and why we need one to begin with. Quine was fond of noting that the advent, development, and ultimate calcification of definitions is an accurate measure of progress in the sciences. Perhaps just the opposite holds for the history of philosophy?

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PRESTON ON THE ILLUSORY CHARACTER
OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

CHRISTOPHER PINCOCK

I

In his carefully argued and extensively researched article "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy" (Preston 2005a) Aaron Preston has raised what should surely be the central methodological issue for Russell studies and the history of analytic philosophy more generally.¹ That is, what are the goals of the history of analytic philosophy and by what means can we best try to meet these goals? Preston's main conclusion is that historical investigation into the origins of analytic philosophy has made the most common answers to these questions untenable. In particular, we are encouraged to conclude that analytic philosophy is not even a genuine philosophical movement, and is in this sense "illusory". For Preston, then, the history of analytic philosophy should reconcile itself to this fact and adjust its methods dramatically. Once we see that analytic philosophy, as traditionally conceived, never existed, then we are free to apply tools not usually deployed in the history of philosophy, e.g. memetics (Preston 2005b).

In this short discussion piece I aim to challenge this conclusion by arguing that Preston's claims about analytic philosophy depend on ascribing two goals to the history of analytic philosophy. While I will grant that he is largely successful in arguing that no account is likely to be able to meet both goals simultaneously, I will suggest that there is no reason to expect or require a unified means of achieving both goals.

II

A concise version of Preston's argument comes towards the end of his article when he presents three statements which he claims are jointly inconsistent:

- (1) Analytic philosophy is a philosophical school.
- (2) Analytic philosophy originated in the early twentieth century.
- (3) There is no set of views accepted by all and only those

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to Preston 2005a.

figures ordinarily taken to be analytic philosophers (i.e., on the received view [of analytic philosophy]) (p. 26).

(3) is supported by citing what Preston calls the "new wave" of history of analytic philosophy "exemplified by such figures as Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Ray Monk, Peter Hylton, and Michael Beaney among others" (p. 15). They have successfully challenged what Preston views as a prior consensus or "received view" of analytic philosophy that claimed that analytic philosophers agreed that philosophy was primarily focused on the analysis of language. The received view was put in place prior to 1970 by writers like Arthur Pap, J. O. Urmson and P. F. Strawson (pp. 12-13), but failed when it was later critically examined.

Granting Preston's (3), it is not initially clear how (1)-(3) are inconsistent or why (2) is something we should accept. It turns out, though, that Preston has a special understanding of what a philosophical school is. This understanding requires that a philosophical school be unified by a collection of philosophical views or what Preston calls "a defining doctrine":

A group counts as *philosophical* in the most proper, primary, or focal sense if and only if its criterion for membership is acceptance of some set of views on the basis of rational understanding. I will say of any group which meets this requirement that it is *philosophically unified*, or that it possesses *philosophical unity*. And, when a view actually functions in this way to ground the unity of a group, I shall call it a *defining doctrine* of that group (p. 21).

This implies that a necessary condition on the existence of philosophical school X is that all of X's members have some set S of views in common. This condition is not yet sufficient, as Preston also requires that the members of X each accept S for rational reasons, e.g. explicit philosophical arguments, and that it is this very rational acceptance which unifies X.

Understood in this way, (1) is by itself inconsistent with (3). How does Preston motivate such a demanding definition of a philosophical school? He appeals to the metaphilosophical conception of philosophy as a theoretical discipline, i.e. as a discipline that aims at "the production and critical assessment of theories by means of rea-

soning" (p. 21). I agree with Preston that nearly all philosophers would agree with this aim, and most would probably also feel confident in saying what these theories are theories of, e.g. the nature of reality, knowledge, language and ethics. But it is one thing to take part in an activity that has certain aims and quite another to make the achievement of that aim constitutive of the existence of a school of a certain sort. It seems that the only way to move from the aim of philosophy to Preston's definition of a philosophical school is to think of philosophical schools as those groups that realize the ideals of philosophy. A history of philosophy that takes on this definition of philosophical schools seems to have as one of its goals what I will call (G1):

(G1) Determine what sets of philosophical views can be justified by rational argument. That is, what philosophical schools are there?

Looking back over the history of philosophy can provide us with raw materials that will help us meet (G1). Along the way we may find that there are some philosophical schools consisting of actual people. But our focus is mainly on the views themselves and whether or not they can be rationally motivated.

Much of the work in the history of philosophy takes on this form, and we often see (G1) expressed with some degree of clarity. Two examples are Russell's preface to his *Philosophy of Leibniz* and Soames' recent remarks on the value of history for philosophy. Russell writes that in addition to the causal question of influence of one philosopher on another,

There remains always a purely philosophical attitude towards previous philosophers – an attitude in which, without regard to dates or influences, we seek simply to discover what are the great types of possible philosophies, and guide ourselves in the search by investigating the systems advocated by the great philosophers of the past (Russell 1900, xvi).

And, in more strident terms, Scott Soames has said of his *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*,

If progress [in philosophy] is to be made, there must at some point emerge a clear demarcation between genuine accomplishments that need to be assimilated by later practitioners, and other work that can be forgotten, disregarded, or left to those whose interest is not in the subject itself, but in history for its own sake. The aim

of my volumes was to contribute to making that demarcation (Soames 2006, 655).

If our history of analytic philosophy is aiming at (G1), then we must be willing to admit that analytic philosophy is not a philosophical school in the relevant sense. That is, analytic philosophers are not unified by a set of views that can be rationally justified. This would be a disturbing conclusion for someone who defined herself as an analytic philosopher and also subscribed to the ideal of philosophy as a theoretical discipline discussed above. But all would not be lost for such a philosopher, for she could readjust her self-conception by thinking of herself as helping to create an ideal philosophical school through a continuing refinement of her philosophical views through rational reflection. So conceived, "analytic philosophy" would be a label for an as yet non-existent philosophical school that develops rationally from one's current views. We see this conception of philosophy, and the relatively fleeting importance of history according to it, at work in the Soames quotation above. History should bring us up to date and show to what extent we have so far realized the ideal behind (G1), but at some point "progress" in philosophy requires that we go beyond what history can teach us.

It is precisely here that Preston would appeal to a second goal for the history of philosophy and it is this goal that is inconsistent with Soames' approach, or more generally with any "revisionist" conception of analytic philosophy. A second goal for history is:

(G2) To explain how this or that philosophical group achieved and maintained its dominance within academic philosophy.

Here I use "philosophical group", as Preston appears to, for a collection of philosophers who may or may not amount to a philosophical school. Preston appeals to (G2) in arguing against revisionist conceptions of analytic philosophy. A revisionist isolates a defining doctrine for analytic philosophy, but is willing to accept that the analytic philosophers that result might be different than what the received view would lead us to expect:

By shifting the traditional boundaries of analytic philosophy both extensionally (in terms of who gets included or excluded) and temporally (in terms of when the school originated), it draws our attention away from the locus of the phenomenon that explain analytic philosophy's meteoric rise to power and prominence during the twentieth century – and this, I think, is *what most*

needs to be explained by work in the history of analytic philosophy (p. 25, my emphasis).

A revisionist definition of analytic philosophy undermines (G2) because we start with a specified group of philosophers that dominated philosophy for a particular period of time. It is not helpful in answering our historical question to add philosophers to this group from other times or to take out some of the philosophers we started with. It is as if we wanted to understand why a particular explosion took place in the desert on Wednesday and someone proposed an explanation of what happened at the bottom of the ocean on Monday.

(G2), then, motivates (2) by blocking any revisionist accounts of who the analytic philosophers actually are. If we accept (3) and want to also achieve (G1), then we must reject (1). The result is what Preston calls an illusionist account of analytic philosophy. Contrary to the influential picture of analytic philosophy as a philosophical school, we come to accept that "analytic philosophy" merely picks out a group of philosophers who came to dominate philosophy during a certain period of time. But we are a step closer to achieving (G2) because we are now free to consider non-theoretical reasons for the dominance of this particular group. Crucially, Preston argues that the illusion that analytic philosophy was a philosophical school in his sense was in part causally responsible for its social success (p. 27). So, unmasking analytic philosophy is a necessary first step to achieving (G2).

III

My main objection to Preston's argument is that (G1) and (G2) are goals that we should not try to achieve simultaneously or with similar methodologies. If we restrict these goals to analytic philosophy, then the differences become obvious:

(G1-A) To determine if analytic philosophy is a philosophical school. That is, is there a set of views that can be rationally defended that fits with analytic philosophers' views?

(G2-A) To explain how analytic philosophy achieved its dominance in academic philosophy at the time it did.

It is only if we assume at the outset that it is likely that (G2-A) can be met solely through an appeal to philosophical argumentation that we are warranted in trying to meet both goals simultaneously. But this is not likely and work in the history of analytic philosophy is

not necessary to appreciate this. For it does not take too much historical reflection to reveal that if twenty of the most important early analytic philosophers had not survived past the age of eighteen, then nothing like analytic philosophy would have come to dominate philosophy at the time that it did (Simons 2001). So part of a reasonable answer to (G2-A) would include the fact that these philosophers were born and that they survived into adulthood. But, quite clearly, we are not interested in these sorts of facts when we try to answer (G1-A).

More generally, we can insist that some historical and causal factors must be introduced in answering (G2-A), but that these sorts of factors are irrelevant to answering (G1-A). The dominance of a group of philosophers is largely a result of contingent factors and this dominance should not lead us to expect that this group forms a philosophical school in Preston's sense. It may be possible to justify many of their philosophical beliefs, but there is little hope that these very justifications played a crucial part in the popularity of that view at that particular time. To see why in slightly more detail, suppose we have a strong philosophical argument A for a metaphysical theory T. If A is a good philosophical argument, then it will not appeal to the authority of particular individuals or the contingent historical events of some particular historical period. But if A lacks these historical details, then an appeal to A cannot be the whole explanation of why T was adopted at the time that it was. A philosophical school with a defining doctrine fulfills the ideal of philosophy as a theoretical discipline. For this reason, understanding the defining doctrine of the school and its justification will not appeal to the historical factors that are necessary to explaining its popularity or lack of popularity at any given time.

Preston tries to connect what I have called (G1-A) and (G2-A) by insisting that the only content that we can assign to a label like "analytic philosophy" must be based on the prior consensus of the received view. Invoking the error of excessive charity committed by an interpreter who claimed that "phlogiston" had referred to oxygen all along, Preston encourages us to accept that "the original definiendum, analytic philosophy on the received view, doesn't exist any more than phlogiston does" (p. 25). I agree that if we are trying to meet (G2-A) and we initially also assume that analytic philosophy is a philosophical school of the sort specified by the received view,

then we must conclude that analytic philosophy does not exist. But the appropriate thing to do if this happens is to drop our assumption that analytic philosophy is that kind or any kind of philosophical school, and go on to try to resolve (G2-A) by other means. At this point, I do not see why we must remain wedded to the conception of analytic philosophy initially offered by the received view. To extend Preston's analogy, suppose we started with a theory of combustion that included phlogiston. When we later come to believe that phlogiston does not exist, we don't also come to believe that combustion was an illusion. Instead, we adjust our view as to what combustion is and what brings it about. A similar openness is needed when approaching analytic philosophy as a historical movement. It is only after we start to understand why this philosophical movement took over at the time that it did that we will be able to offer an account of its essential features. Our historical explanation will then use these features to explain the fleeting dominance of analytic philosophy so conceived. Here new methods are needed, perhaps even Preston's sociological approach. Other tools worth exploring are comparisons with other philosophical (Köhnke 1991) and intellectual (Kusch 1995) movements that coincided with analytic philosophy.

In answering (G2-A), then, we need to be willing to adjust our conception of analytic philosophy. Similarly, as we engage in the quite different activity of trying to satisfy (G1-A), we must be equally flexible. For there are likely to be several different ways in which the views typically associated with analytic philosophy can be extended, clarified and justified. At the end of the day, we may remain unsatisfied with all of these extensions, but that is not something we can know in advance. On the picture of the history of analytic philosophy that I am suggesting, then, the term 'analytic philosophy' is fairly open-ended, and it may very well happen that our understanding of analytic philosophy as a historical movement may conflict with our favored interpretation of analytic philosophy as a defensible philosophical school. To be sure, these two tasks are difficult to complete. But I believe it is too early to conclude that they cannot be completed.

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REPLIES TO HARDCASTLE AND PINCOCK

AARON PRESTON

I have maintained that the traditional conception of analytic philosophy – according to which it is a philosophical school defined by the view that philosophy is nothing more than linguistic analysis – is the only legitimate conception of analytic philosophy, and that, thus conceived, analytic philosophy is an illusion. In what follows, I respond to objections to my “illusionist” approach to analytic philosophy posed by Gary Hardcastle and Chris Pincock.

I. Reply to Hardcastle

Like Michael Beaney, Gary Hardcastle raises questions both about my insistence that philosophical schools be defined doctrinally and about the meaning and coherence of the illusionist position. I will address these issues in reverse order.

I describe the illusionist position as traditionalist (i.e., it accepts the traditional conception, as described above) concerning *what* analytic philosophy is supposed to be, but as differing from the standard traditionalist account over *whether* analytic philosophy exists at all. “This is good as far as it goes,” Hardcastle says, “except wasn’t it part of the traditionalist account that analytic philosophy *existed*, that is, that there were analytic philosophers, properly named as such because they in fact belonged to a philosophical school?”

Of course there is a sense in which Hardcastle is correct. If we had asked a traditionalist in the 1950s whether anything corresponded to his concept of analytic philosophy, the answer surely would have been yes. But I’m inclined to classify the presumption of existence as an assertoric or doxastic attitude toward what is conceptualized rather than part of a concept’s content, and am in any case skeptical of any “ontological argument” purporting to show that that, by endorsing the traditional conception of *what* analytic philosophy is, one is also affirming its existence. If this is indeed Hardcastle’s view, then I have a nice argument for the existence of God I’d like to sell him.

Related to this is Hardcastle’s charge that my account of illusionism involves an equivocation over the term ‘philosophical

school’, a point he brings out nicely by quoting passages in which I first affirm and then deny that analytic philosophy is a philosophical school. Now, there may well be equivocation afoot in these cases; but not over the term ‘philosophical school’. Instead, the verb ‘is’ is being used in different senses. For when I affirm that, on the illusionist view, analytic philosophy is a school of philosophy, I am using the ‘is’ of predication or classification to make a claim about the *what* of analytic philosophy, just as one might say “a unicorn is a horse with a horn on its head.” By contrast, when I deny that analytic philosophy is a school of philosophy, I am using an ‘is’ of existence to make a claim about the *whether* of analytic philosophy, just as one might say “a unicorn isn’t really a horse at all, since unicorns don’t exist.”

Hardcastle also has several concerns related to my view that philosophical schools should be defined in terms of their philosophical commitments, or doctrines. Two of these are not directly about that requirement itself, but about my argument for it – or, rather, his reconstruction of my argument for it. The first of these is that the “second premise asserts ... the content of the conclusion, and so the argument appears to beg the question.” But it is hard to see how. In Hardcastle’s reconstruction of my argument, the second premise asserts basically that the production of views (doctrines) by means of reason is essential – both in the sense of “necessary” and of “most central” – to philosophy as an historical human enterprise. The conclusion asserts that only doctrinal definitions will do for philosophical schools. Plausibly, different concepts indicate different content. How is it, then, that the former proposition asserts the content of the latter?

Hardcastle’s all too brief explanation is as follows: “Granted the first premise,” which simply insists on *real* definitions for philosophical schools, “the question of whether we can fashion something other than a doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy just *is* the question of whether analytic philosophy is, in essence, a set of doctrines.” But I am at a loss to see how this counts as begging the question; for the complaint seems to amount to this: granted the truth of the first premise, the truth of the conclusion turns upon or is determined by the truth of the second premise. Far from making the argument question-begging, this is just the way any sound syllogism works: if the form is valid and one premise true, then the truth of the conclusion will be determined by the truth of the second premise.

Without further help from Hardcastle in clarifying the nature of the supposed circularity, I am at a loss to know what more can be said in reply. I will note, however, that further discussion of the issue might be helped by a more complete reconstruction of my argument. My argument was originally presented in narrative form rather than by way of numbered propositions. In his reconstruction, Hardcastle provides only an abbreviated reconstruction which, though it captures the gist of my argument, suppresses several of its premises and intermediate conclusions. I count at least twenty propositions crucial to the argument, nine of which are intermediate conclusions.¹ It may be that the perception of circularity depends on eliding the contents of some of the propositions suppressed in his reconstruction with one of his expressed propositions.

Hardcastle's next objection has to do with my claim, captured in the second premise of his reconstruction, that, as a theoretical discipline, philosophy produces "sets of views about the way things are." The objection is that this claim is false in light of the fact that some philosophers ("Carnap and a number of positivists") have disagreed with it. However, while these may be counterexamples to Hardcastle's reconstruction of my second premise, they are not counterexamples to any claims I actually made. For instance, I said that this was "what most philosophers, both currently and historically, take to be true of the philosophical schools with which they affiliate," and that "few in the contemporary analytic world would deny that philosophy is a theoretical discipline" whose business is "the production and critical assessment of theories by means of reasoning," where theories are "sets of views (propositions) about the way things are, or what is the case, in some region or other – or possibly the whole – of reality." And, I summed up the point by saying "I trust it will be recognized that this minimal conception of what philosophy is and what it involves has been widely held, at least implicitly, throughout the history of the discipline."

Now, the existence of a handful of dissenters – which is all that Hardcastle demonstrates – is perfectly consistent with my claims,

¹ Considerations of space required that I cut these replies to less than half their original length. Among the material cut was a complete, formal reconstruction of my argument. The complete set of comments can be seen at: blogs.valpo.edu/apreston/files/2008/01/reply-to-hardcastle-and-pincock.doc.

and does little more than show that there is an alternative to the majority view. Which of these views about philosophy is the correct one is, of course, a different question, and one not to be decided merely by "majority rule". But in this case I think that the majority gets it right. The alternative championed by the logical positivists (and also by Wittgenstein on some interpretations) is not very plausible, as is suggested by its short-lived popularity in philosophical culture and confirmed by the fact that it is not possible to avoid making metaphysical claims by focusing on "pure syntax". Language and its parts (like syntax) are parts of reality, so that to make claims about these things is to make claims about (parts of) reality – just as the traditional view has it.²

So much for Hardcastle's objections to my *argument* for the requirement of doctrinal definition. But he also objects to the requirement itself. Like Beaney, Hardcastle seems to think that the requirement betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a philosophical school or, as he puts it, an "intellectual community". The norm for an intellectual community is diversity rather than uniformity of views. Consequently, to define an intellectual community in terms of consensus-views is to misunderstand the nature of intellectual community as such; and to do so in the context of historical work is to void such work of much of its value and interest.

First, Hardcastle's charge that I have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of a philosophical school *qua* intellectual community depends upon treating 'philosophical school' and 'intellectual community' as synonymous, and as referring to a type of group characterized (and perhaps united) by cooperative intellectual activity – particularly ideational influence and development – but not necessarily by doctrinal unity in the form of shared views. His argument seems to be: philosophical schools are intellectual communities, and Preston fails to see that. Now, I do not deny that these two terms can be used synonymously in some contexts. For instance, treating philosophical schools as intellectual communities seems well suited to looking at them from a predominantly historical or sociological perspective. But there is also a sense of 'philosophical school' which is synonymous with 'school of thought', and doctrinal unity would seem to be essential to philosophical schools thus under-

² For more on this point, see D. Willard, 'Why Semantic Ascent Fails'. *Metaphilosophy*, 14:3-4 (1983), 276-90.

stood. This construal of 'philosophical school' is more in keeping with a predominantly philosophical interest in the socio-historical landscape of philosophy. I am guided by such an interest, and this is how I use the term. So it is not that I have failed to understand the nature of philosophical schools *qua* intellectual communities. Rather, it's that I am not interested in analytic philosophy merely or even primarily as an intellectual community, but as a school of thought, and as an intellectual community only insofar as it is one organized around a school of thought.

Now, one can question the appropriateness of approaching analytic philosophy as a school of thought, but here I appeal to my argument from the nature of philosophy (which, if my replies to Hardcastle have succeeded, still stands), and also to the fact that analytic philosophy originally presented itself as a doctrinally unified "school of thought" even though it wasn't. Hardcastle himself agrees that the early analysts "projected unity" over their doctrinal disunity. What he does not acknowledge is the effect this would have had in shaping the original concept of analytic philosophy, and thereby the authoritative definition of 'analytic philosophy'. But I contend that, on account of its projection of doctrinal unity, the original concept, and hence the original meaning of 'analytic philosophy', included the content "philosophical group united in the view that philosophy is the analysis of language."

For this reason, it is appropriate to approach analytic philosophy as a school of thought first and an intellectual community only second. Also for this reason, it is wrong to approach it merely as an intellectual community. Indeed, the intellectual community that Hardcastle picks out cannot be identical to analytic philosophy, though it may be extensionally equivalent to it. For although 'analytic philosophy' can refer to something like Hardcastle's intellectual community (specifically, a cross-section of persons, ideas and events that are usually taken to constitute the extension of 'analytic philosophy'), the term's referent does not determine its meaning. As I argued more fully in my reply to Beaney, the contemporary use of 'analytic philosophy' is historically grounded in an early, erroneous construal of a cross-section of this sort (there called "the subset") *as unified by certain defining doctrines* (among other attributes), and hence as constituting a school of philosophy in my sense. That is, our practice of holding together a certain set of philosophers under the label "analytic philosophy" is grounded in a monumental and longstanding er-

ror of perception – an *illusion*. Without this fact firmly in place as the foundation of our work on analytic philosophy, there can be no adequate justification for picking out *just these figures and factions* as belonging to analytic philosophy, whether we construe them as merely a subdivision of the history of philosophy (a "cross-section" or "subset"), as an intellectual community, or as a movement, a tradition, or a school.

Indeed, Hardcastle's ability to properly demarcate analytic philosophy *qua* intellectual community depends crucially upon this fact, for it is a *case* of our practice of holding together a certain set of philosophers under the label "analytic philosophy," and that practice is itself explicable only in terms of my proposed "illusion." It is therefore a mistake to say that analytic philosophy *just is* this intellectual community. At best that would be incomplete. Instead, we should say that analytic philosophy was supposed to have been a school with such-and-such defining doctrines, but it turned out not to be, and that the figures and factions thought to constitute this school really only constituted a movement or tradition or intellectual community. But to say *that* for the reasons just given is basically to accept illusionism.

II. Reply to Pincock

Christopher Pincock's objection to my approach is not that I have made an error of principle, but only a strategic error in uniting two aims of history that are best kept separate. I gloss these two aims as follows: (1) to understand or explain the *philosophical* success of analytic philosophy, and (2) to understand or explain the *social* success of analytic philosophy (or analytic philosophers). Since, as Pincock agrees, *philosophical* success is a matter of having rationally defensible views, the strong doctrinal focus of my approach is not only relevant but essential to achieving goal 1. But *social* success is largely the result of non-ideational, causal-historical factors. Thus, the focus on doctrines alone, required for goal 1, is not apropos to goal 2 (hereafter, G1 and G2). From this, Pincock concludes that focus on doctrines should be completely excluded from work on G2, except in the unlikely case that a philosophical group's social success can be explained *solely* in terms of the power and cogency of its defining doctrines.

Now, the reasons for avoiding a focus on doctrines *alone* in pursuit of G2 are perfectly clear – insofar as the introduction of ideas

into human history *always* depends upon the birth, growth and survival of particular humans, a philosophical group's social success will *never* depend solely on the power and cogency of its defining doctrines. But a case for entirely excluding doctrines has not been made. Indeed, although appeal to causal-historical factors is necessary for explaining a group's social success, it is far from clear that this could ever be sufficient, not only in the history of philosophy, but elsewhere as well. Imagine, for instance, a history of Christianity's social success that assigned no explanatory role to the views characteristic of Christianity. Such a history would be insufficient for G2, for it would fail to do justice to the fact that the appeal of Christianity's teachings has contributed to its social success.

The relevance of views to social success in philosophy and other theoretical disciplines is even greater; whereas the role of views in religion and politics need not be understood as fundamental, they must be understood as fundamental in philosophy. Because of what philosophy as a human pursuit *is*, views will be central to it. Moreover, to the extent that the pursuit of philosophy is a human institution occupying a certain social space, either within the academy or beyond it, the very nature of philosophy prescribes certain norms for the sociology of that social space. And one of these is that the position of individuals and groups within the inevitable social hierarchy of that space is to be based on excellence in philosophy, and that means excellence in crafting rational views. Indeed, we can even say that there is a corresponding norm concerning the right of a view to occupy the "attention-space" (I borrow the term from the sociologist Randall Collins) of the philosophical institution, such that only rationally well-crafted views *should* occupy that attention-space. Of course, there are all kinds of epistemological challenges to properly abiding by these norms, but they are norms nonetheless.

So, because the appeal of certain views frequently plays a role in the success of various kinds of social groups, and because the *rational* appeal of views positively *ought* to play this role in the social world of philosophy, there is no reason to exclude a doctrinal focus when trying to achieve G2. On the contrary, to the extent that one is interested in understanding not merely the dominance of a group in the philosophical social space, but also whether its dominance was justified and hence legitimate by the standards of that social space,

we *must* look to the rationality of the views associated with that group. And this is mainly what I aim to do with my illusionist approach.³

Pincock has a second argument for rejecting illusionism, one that proceeds upon different grounds. He says:

I agree that if we are trying to meet (G2-A) [i.e., G2 as applied to analytic philosophy] and we initially also assume that analytic philosophy is a philosophical school of the sort specified by the received view, then we must conclude that analytic philosophy does not exist. But the appropriate thing to do if this happens is to drop our assumption that analytic philosophy is that kind or any kind of philosophical school, and go on to try to resolve (G2-A) by other means. At this point, I do not see why we must remain wedded to the conception of analytic philosophy initially offered by the received view.

But we should not take Pincock's suggestion to heart, for reasons already given in my replies to Beaney and Hardcastle: to do so would be historically misleading, as it would cast aside the very elements in analytic philosophy's historically extended social-ontological structure that give it its unity, establish the "analytic philosophy" language game, and thereby constitute it a named social object – and not just any such object, but the very one that we are interested in when we research the history and nature of analytic philosophy.

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³Admittedly, that this is my ultimate goal in developing the illusionist approach does not always come through clearly in my journal articles due to the limitations of space and scope that are part and parcel of that format. I trust that it comes through clearly in my book (Preston 2007).

BACK MATTER

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY 2008 ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES

June 27, 2008

The annual meeting of the board of directors of the Bertrand Russell Society was held on June 27, 2008 at St. John Fisher College. It was convened at 7:20 pm and presided over by Chad Trainer as chair.

Kenneth Blackwell (treasurer) summarized the financial situation of the Society as follows: bank balance, \$3,500; guaranteed investment, \$8,000; total investment, \$11,500. He reported that Arlene Duncan is serving as bookkeeper for which the Bertrand Russell Research Centre is paid an annual compensation of \$700.00. He stated that McMaster University needs a \$5.00 increase from \$25.00 to \$30.00 per year in Society reimbursement for the cost of publishing *Russell*. On motion made, seconded and unanimously carried, the increase was approved.

The following individuals were duly nominated as officers for 2008-9, with the motions seconded and unanimously approved: chair of the board, Chad Trainer; vice chairman, David White; president, Alan Schwerin; vice-president, Ray Perkins; treasurer, Kenneth Blackwell; secretary, David Henehan.

The location of the next meeting was discussed. John Lenz has offered Drew University. David Blitz offered Central Connecticut State University as a backup.

John Ongley and Rosalind Carey reported on the *Quarterly*. They intend to ask Lehman College to again help finance publication of the *Quarterly*.

Treasurer Kenneth Blackwell discussed the anticipated \$1,800 shortfall in 2008 expenses (\$8,100) over dues income (\$5,300). He predicted that with the \$5.00 increase in payment to McMaster to cover the costs of producing *Russell* the deficit will increase annually by \$800. Ken recommenced a minimum \$5 dues increase. After discussion it was moved by Marvin Kohl, seconded and carried that we increase each dues category \$10 beginning in 2009. This is the first dues increase since 1992.

Various motions were made and withdrawn concerning free first year subscriptions for new subscribers and other special membership prices. David Blitz proposed that every board member sponsor a new member and pay the membership fee. The motion passed (12 in favor, 1 opposed, 3 abstentions).

Kevin Brodie has resigned as head of the awards committee; no award was made by that committee this year.

Rosalind Carey reported on the Riga conference. The conference is asking for additional financial support from the BRS. On motion made, seconded and unanimously carried, it was resolved that we do not make any further financial contribution in addition to the \$1,000 authorized at last year's meeting.

John Ongley announced that Routledge wants to "rent" our mailing list for promotion of its Russell books. After discussion, a motion made to approve was passed (7 in favor, 4 opposed).

Dennis Darland requested \$83 for OCR scanning software. Ken Blackwell moved and John Ongley seconded a motion, which was unanimously passed, to approve the \$83 expense and to limit access to the scanning project to BRS members. On motion made, seconded and unanimously carried, it was resolved to designate Dennis Darland vice-president for electronic projects. As such he will have *ex officio* board membership.

Ken Blackwell discussed his moderating of the BRS list. On motion made by Peter Stone, seconded by Greg Landini, and unanimously carried, it was resolved that Ken continue his current policy of list moderation, and if in his judgment a communication is "highly uncivil" it shall, at his discretion, not be permitted on the list.

Peter Stone announced that the Secular Student Alliance inquired about a speaker's bureau. On motion made by Cara Rice, seconded by Marvin Kohl and unanimously passed, it was resolved that we establish a speaker's bureau of persons ready and willing to give public presentations about Russell.

There being no further business before the meeting, it was, on motion made and unanimously carried, adjourned.

Respectfully submitted,

David L. Henehan
Secretary, Bertrand Russell Society
September 10, 2008

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY 2008
ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING MINUTES

June 28, 2008

President Alan Schwerin convened the annual meeting of the members of the Bertrand Russell Society on June 28, 2008 at St. John Fisher College at 1:35pm. Discussion involved increasing BRS membership. John Ongley suggested we should upgrade our website. Alan Schwerin suggested school competitions/art exhibits and essay contests. To Rosalind Carey's note that BRS membership is aging and we need younger members, Ken Blackwell suggested a \$20.00 trial/student membership category. Rosalind Carey suggested make CDs of the BRS talks and asked that we design a BRS logo.

On motion made, seconded and unanimously carried, it was resolved that at least until the next annual meeting for the year, BRS will offer a \$20.00 student membership category for any matriculated student.

Members also watched Warren Allen Smith, who was unable to attend, on audio/video.

There being no further business before the meeting, the meeting was, on motion made, seconded and unanimously approved, adjourned.

Respectfully submitted,

David L. Henehan
Secretary, Bertrand Russell Society
September 10, 2008

BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2008 2nd Quarter Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow: April 1, 2008 – June 30, 2008

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| BALANCE, 3/31/2008 | \$11,677.72 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | |
| BRS | \$240.00 |
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- 10/09 Ted Lechman, "Harry G. Frankfurt's *On Bullshit*"
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- 12/11 Thomas Flynn, "Confessions of an Encyclopedist"
- 1/08 George McDade, "What's Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy in the Real World?"
- 2/12 Tim Madigan, "Russell's Evasion of Evolution"
- 3/12 David White, "Ken Wilber and the New Age: Are We There Yet?"
- 4/09 To be announced
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
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- 10/23 An Introduction to Bertrand Russell. Suggested Reading: A chapter of a book in progress by Peter Stone, David White, and Tim Madigan (In the "files" section of the BARS Yahoo! Group)
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- 12/11 What I Believe. Suggested Reading: Bertrand Russell, "What I Believe," *Why I Am Not a Christian*

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
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL
SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Spring 2009 Issue

Numbers 140 - 141 / November 2008 - February 2009



RUSSELL AND NIETZSCHE

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society News and Proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those on Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

Spring Issue

Numbers 140-141 / November 2008 – February 2009

RUSSELL AND NIETZSCHE

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Cover: Friedrich Nietzsche and Bertrand Russell

The 36th Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society

June 5-7, 2009

at Central Connecticut State University
New Britain, Connecticut

Papers

- Andersson, "The People's Opinion and International Law"
- Blitz, "Russell and the Dali Lama on Happiness,"
- Blackwell, "Misunderstandings of the Westminster Speech on War, 1948"
- Cavallo, "Russell and the Myth of Simplicity"
- Galaugher, "Russell's 'Decompositional' Approach to the Logical Analysis of Propositions"
- Klement, "The Functions of Russell's Having No Class"
- Kohl, "Upbraiding Russell on Love"
- Lenz, "Russell as a Utopian Thinker"
- Perkins, "Russell, the Bomb and 'The Wickedest People Who Ever Lived'"
- Riggins, "Bertrand Russell on Karl Marx's Theory of Value"
- Schwerin, "Russell on Hume's Views on the Self"
- Shansky, "A Buddhist View of Russell's Opinions on Religion"
- Stebbins, "Russell and Brouwer: Law of the Excluded Middle"
- Chad Trainer, "A U.S. Senator's Adolescent Reflections on Russell's Politics"
- Master Class: Peter Stone, "Social Cohesion and Government," from *Authority and the Individual*

To register, use the enclosed form or download one at the Annual Meeting website: <http://bertie.ccsu.edu/Russell2009/>

IN THIS ISSUE

This issue of the *Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly*, the "Russell and Nietzsche" issue, deals with a topic that might at first surprise the reader. "Russell and Nietzsche? What on earth could be the connection there?" In fact there is probably more than one interesting connection between the two, and the one focused on in this issue will, we hope, be of special interest to many of the *Quarterly's* readers. In his article "Nietzsche's Anticipation of Russell," Steve Sullivan puts his finger on a surprising identity between the two. Like Russell, Nietzsche endorsed Hume's view of the soul – that there is no unchanging, unperceived substratum that is the metaphysical subject of all the varying mental qualities that we experience (e.g., perceptions, memories, or emotions). But more than this and also like Russell, Nietzsche attributed the belief that there is such a substratum at least in part to the misleadingness of subject-predicate grammar.

Russell is famous for criticizing subject-predicate grammar as misleading. He is, in fact, usually thought by analytic philosophers to have originated the view. For example, Peter Hylton claims:

After "On Denoting", [Russell] comes to assume that analysis of a sentence will generally reveal that it expresses a proposition of a quite different logical form.... A consequence of Russell's new view is that he comes to take it for granted that our ordinary language is generally misleading.... Here we have a crucial contribution to an important theme in twentieth century analytic philosophy quite generally: the idea that language is systematically misleading in philosophically significant ways. (*Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*, 2003, pp. 223-4)

No hint is given of this being a standard subject of discussion before Russell. But what the correlation between Russell's and Nietzsche's views suggests is that in fact there is an intellectual iceberg to be discovered of which these two points are only the tip, a historical movement or tradition of thought some time in the nineteenth century in which the misleadingness of grammar, and in particular, subject-predicate grammar, was a common subject. Nietzsche, being a trained philologist, would of course be as privy to such a discussion as Russell.

A first suggestion of what that discussion might have been and where it might have occurred can be found in Pieter Seuren's book *Western Linguistics: An Historical Introduction*. In it (secs. 2.6.3, 7.1.3 and elsewhere) Seuren discusses what he calls "the great 19th c. subject-predicate debate" in which the differences between the grammatical, logical, psychological, and semantical structures of a sentence are debated. Grammar is indeed misleading, these people claimed; what is meant, implied, or psychologically suggested by a sentence may be something quite different from what is indicated by the surface grammar.¹ However, in Seuren's book, there is no explicit discussion, as there is in Nietzsche and Russell, of the subject of a sentence misleadingly suggesting that there is some unsensed substratum in which the qualities of things "inhere." Further evidence for this suspected tradition of thought is required, but Sullivan takes the first large step in this work of finding Russell's predecessors in the view that subject-predicate grammar is misleading by pointing out the identity between Russell and Nietzsche on just this point, indicating the existence of a tradition connecting the two.

Following Sullivan's article is one by Sandra Lapointe providing another comparative historical analysis with her article on Frege's and Husserl's views on the nature of linguistic signs. This will be of special interest to those curious about Russell's later views of meaning, after 1920, when he begins looking carefully at the physical properties of language itself, and not just the meaning of these physical marks or utterances.

Following these articles are books reviews by Timothy St Vincent on Leonard Steinhorn's book *The Greater Generation: In Defense of the Baby Boom Legacy* and Marvin Kohl on Eric Wielenberg's book *God and the Reach of Reason: C.S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell*. Concluding the issue is a membership report with data and graph of the ups and downs of the Society's membership since 1988. And as always, there is a Traveler's Diary/Conference Report, with the annual treasurer's report of the Bertrand Russell Society for 2008 included at the end. JO

¹ I am grateful to Matt Davidson for pointing this book, and its discussion of the 19th c. subject-predicate debate, out to me. Seuren bases his own account of this debate on pt. 2 of Elffers-van Ketel's 1991 book *The Historiography of Grammatical Concepts*

SOCIETY NEWS

THE NEXT BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY ANNUAL MEETING. The 36th annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society will take place Friday through Sunday, June 5-7, 2009 at Central Connecticut State University in New Britain Connecticut (5 miles southwest of Hartford CT and 95 miles from both New York and Boston). David Blitz is this year's host. All are welcome!

Talks there will include Stefan Andersson on "The People's Opinion and International Law," David Blitz on "Russell and the Dalai Lama on Happiness," Ken Blackwell on "Misunderstandings of the Westminster Speech on War, 1948," Andrew Cavallo on "Russell and the Myth of Simplicity," Sarah Stebbins on "Russell and Brouwer: The Law of the Excluded Middle," and many, many more talks about Russell.

Registration fees are: members, \$80 with banquet, \$55 without banquet; non-members, \$90 with banquet, \$65 without banquet; students, \$10/day (includes deli sandwiches Friday and breakfast, lunch and breaks Saturday and Sunday). Rooms (on campus – includes linen) are: single occupancy, \$35/night/person; double occupancy: \$25/night per person. Off-campus rooms at the Marriott Hotel: \$99/night. See registration form for more information

The conference website is at <http://bertie.ccsu.edu/Russell2009/>. To register, use the accompanying form, or download one from the conference website.

APA EVENTS. The BRS will host a session of talks at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association this December 27-30, 2009, New York City, NY at the Marriott Hotel in Times Square. Submissions for talks at the Eastern should be made by May 25, 2009. Send abstracts to rosalind.carey@lehman.cuny.edu. Please note that the Society hosts sessions at the Eastern and Central APA every year. Information on the APA meetings can be found online at: www.apaonline.org/divisions/schedule.aspx.

NEW MEMBERS are always a good sign, and the BRS is fortunate to have had a bumper crop in the last 2 years. We welcome them to the Russell Society. NEW MEMBERS FOR 2009, so far, are: Frank Adams, Melinda Adams, Mirza Ahmed, Min Chang, Ryan Conti, Tim

Facer, Doug Fitz, Jolen Galaugher, Mario Helman, Junling Hu, Herbert Huber, Terrence Hurley, Chris Kazanovicz, Brett Lintott, Seyed Javad Miri, Dustin Olson, Mark Overmyer, George Reisch, Alvin Rogers, Michael Staron, Derek Stoeckle, Robert Summerfield, Warren Wagner, and Edward Yates. NEW MEMBERS FOR 2008 are: Robert Blais, Solomon Blaylock, Andrew Cavallo, Daniel Colonari, Brian Dodd, Kenneth Gallant, Sebastien Gandon, Ray Gattavara, Billy Joe Lucas, Amber McAlister, Fred McColly, Sylvia Nickerson, Charles Peterka, Eric Walther, Robert Zack, and Weiping Zheng.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS ELECTION RESULTS, 2009-2011. The Russell Society holds elections each year to select one third of the directors to its board for a three year term. Once elected, directors carry out the duties of running the Society, conducting Society business requiring a vote at the annual meeting and taking care of other Society business by means of committees and email contact. Nominations for the board occur in October and elections (by mail and email) take place in November and December. Any member of the Society may stand for election, and the Society encourages all who wish to participate to do so.

This year's election results are as follows: Nicholas Griffin 34 votes, Peter Stone 34, John Ongley 33, Cara Elizabeth Rice 31, David Goldman 30, Gregory Landini 29, Marvin Kohl 28, Justin Leiber 24, Billy Joe Lucas 23, with the first eight – Griffin, Stone, Ongley, Rice, Goldman, Landini, Kohl, and Leiber – thus being elected. We thank all these people for participating in this year's election.

THANK YOU FOR SUPPORTING THE BRS! The Society welcomes gifts of all sizes and kinds. In 2008 we gained our most recent LIFE MEMBER, Justin Leiber, who joins the nine others who have contributed by means of taking out a life membership.

THE SOCIETY ALSO GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGES the generous support in 2008 of the following members: PATRON: David Goldman, SPONSORS: Charles Weyland, Marvin Kohl, and Robert Riemenschneider. SUSTAINER: Peter Stanbridge. CONTRIBUTORS: Jay Aragona, Jr., Ken Blackwell, Robert Davis, Linda Egendorf, William Everdell, John Fitzgerald, Ricard Flores and Silvia Pizzi,

Mark Fuller, David Henehan, Carol Keene, Karen and Ray Perkins, Tom Stanley, and David and Linda White.

LIBRARY NEWS. The Bertrand Russell Society's Library website will soon have a new web address: www.russellsocietylibrary.com. Members are urged to take advantage of the many audio/visual materials available in the members' area at the Library website. These include radio and television interviews with Russell on the humanist approach, liberty, religion, human nature, the atomic bomb, and a wide variety of other subjects. Just email Russell Society Librarian Tom Stanley at his new email address, tjstanley@myfairpoint.net, for a username and password to the site's 'members only' area of either the current or future site and spend tonight listening to and watching Russell speak his mind!

WRITING FROM THE PHILIPPINES. A new humanist newsletter has arrived – *The Freethinker's Reader*. Published in the Philippines, this reincarnation of an earlier effort by the late Joachim Po is now under the editorship of Joshua Lipana, president of the Center for Inquiry, Philippines. The first issue features a devil's advocate essay on democracy, a page of quotes (ranging from Voltaire's "Crush the infamy" to Obama's "Yes, we can"), an essay on Nietzsche, and an especially good one by Poch Suzara, in honor of Jose Rizal. No Russellian could object to what is clearly intended to be a venue defending the secularist position, but a better newsletter would result with better overall writing and a clear idea, once and for all, of how to write Russell's name: with *two* l's, as in 'spell.'

Matters improve with the second issue – the newsletter is quick on its feet. In essays that focus, e.g., on the battle over reproductive rights in the Philippines, the issue takes aim against religion and sometimes aims low, as in a jokey piece on "natural planning" that recommends practicing a kind of sex it imputes to priests. Despite an uneven tone, the newsletter conveys clearly the frustration experienced by embattled secular Filipinos, giving voice to the dismay of atheists and freethinkers living in the Philippines. The newsletter can be found online at <http://afreethinkerslife.blogspot.com/> or you can order a copy by contacting philippines@centerforinquiry.net.

NEW AND RECENT BOOKS. Russell Society member Timothy Madigan's new book, *W.K. Clifford and "The Ethics of Belief,"* (Cam-

bridge Scholars Publishing, Jan 2009), has just been published. The book is on the noted mathematician W.K. Clifford, who, in his essay "The Ethics of Belief," argued that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one to believe anything on insufficient evidence." Madigan describes the historical background and context of this essay, along with its influence (William James's "Will to Believe" was a response to it) and its continuing relevance.

ALSO NEW IN PRINT. *The Historical Dictionary of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy* (Scarecrow Press, March 2009), by *Quarterly* editors Rosalind Carey and John Ongley, which has also just been published, has several hundred entries to provide the reader with access to everything from Russell's logic and mathematical philosophy to his moral, religious, and political views.

DECEASED. Chicago radio personality, oral historian and author, Studs Terkel passed away on October 31, 2008 at the age of 96. A much loved and energetic man, Studs wrote numerous books – including *Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression*; *Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do*, and the 1985 Pulitzer prize winner, *The "Good" War* – and conducted regular interviews on his daily radio show with people from all walks of life, including, in 1962, one taped in England with Bertrand Russell. Mr. Terkel visited the Russell Society at its 2003 annual meeting in Lake Forest, Illinois on the occasion of his accepting the Bertrand Russell Society award. He will be remembered with affection.

FEATURES

NIETZSCHE'S ANTICIPATIONS OF RUSSELL*

STEPHEN J. SULLIVAN

The time is perhaps close at hand when it will once again be understood what has actually sufficed for the basis for such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as the dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular superstition ... [or] a deception on the part of grammar.

"Preface", *Beyond Good and Evil*, Friedrich Nietzsche¹

The philosophies of Bertrand Russell and Friedrich Nietzsche might appear to have very little in common, indeed to be antithetical. Although Russell praised Nietzsche's literary style, he had little positive to say about Nietzsche's thought. He focused almost exclusively on Nietzsche's ethical/political views, which he characterized as proto-fascist, and on his critique of religion, and rejected out of hand his ontology and epistemology.² And I suspect that Nietzsche in turn would have dismissed Russell as an English "blockhead" in the broadly liberal, empiricist tradition of John Stuart Mill, on whom Nietzsche famously bestowed that epithet.³ But in fact these two philosophers expressed some remarkably similar views about knowledge, language, and mind – so similar as to raise the possibility that Russell was significantly influenced by Nietzsche on these matters.

The connection between Nietzsche's thought and 20th century analytic philosophy has not gone entirely unnoticed by Nietzsche commentators, especially Walter Kaufmann and Arthur C. Danto.⁴ But it remains a neglected topic, and the relation between Nietzsche and Russell even more so, and I hope to make a start on remedying that situation.

* Thanks to Richard Findler and Andrew Colvin for their responses to an earlier version of this paper.

¹ The translation is a combination of those by Zimmern and Hollingdale.

² Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, 760, 762-6, 772-3.

³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 21. 'Blockhead' is my translation.

⁴ Kaufmann: *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ*, 422-423; "Introduction" to *The Portable Nietzsche*, 18; *Existentialism, Religion, and Death*, 30. Danto: *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 82-89. See also Bernd Magnus, *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative*, 71; and Friedrich Waismann, "How I See Philosophy", *Logical Positivism*, 350.

Arguably the most striking overlap between Russell and Nietzsche lies in their treatment of Descartes' famous elemental certainty *cogito ergo sum* ("I think, therefore I am"). Each of them argued, and in much the same way, that 'I think' goes beyond the data of immediate experience in positing a mental substance or enduring self. And more significantly, both Russell and Nietzsche criticized ordinary language for embodying metaphysical errors, especially an unwarranted commitment to substance by the grammatical subject of a sentence.

I. RUSSELL ON THE *COGITO* AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE

In his classic 1912 work *The Problems of Philosophy*, Russell accepted – though as only probably true – the Cartesian view that each person is directly aware of her own self as the thinker of her own thoughts: as the I of 'I think.'⁵ But by 1913 he had given up somewhat cautiously on direct self-acquaintance,⁶ and by the 1920s he reached the firm conclusion that the 'I think' of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* goes beyond what one is entitled by experience to assert. Here are Russell's own words in *An Outline of Philosophy* (1927):

What, from [Descartes'] own point of view, he should profess to know is not 'I think,' but 'there is thinking'.... I think we ought to admit that Descartes was justified in feeling sure that there was a certain occurrence, concerning which doubt was impossible; but he was not justified in bringing in the word 'I' in describing this occurrence.

And later, in *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945):

'I think' is [Descartes'] ultimate premiss. Here the word 'I' is really illegitimate; He ought to state his ultimate premises in the form 'there are thoughts'. The word 'I' is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum.⁷

Russell denied that thinking, or thoughts, entail a thinker, and he explained the temptation of inferring a thinker from the occurrence of thoughts by appealing to what he regarded as the questionable metaphysical commitments of ordinary language. Again in his own words:

⁵ Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, 19, 50-51.

⁶ Bertrand Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, 36-37.

⁷ *An Outline of Philosophy*, 171-172; *History of Western Philosophy*, 567.

Descartes believed in "substance," both in the mental and in the material world. He thought that there could not be motion unless something moved, nor thinking unless someone thought. No doubt most people would still hold this view; but in fact it springs from a notion – usually unconscious – that the categories of grammar are the categories of reality.⁸

The broader theme that ordinary language, and especially subject/predicate grammar, are laden with metaphysical errors concerning substance and the ego was a constant in Russell's philosophy from the 1920s until his final years. For example, in his 1945 *History of Western Philosophy*, he was concerned to argue that the concept of substance, though grammatically useful, "is a metaphysical mistake, due to the transference to the world-structure of the structure of sentences composed of a subject and a predicate."⁹ And he was surely aware of the theological significance of this point: that we have no knowledge of the existence of the soul.¹⁰ In *An Outline of Philosophy* the argument against substance goes like this:

The notion of substance, at any rate in any sense involving permanence, must be shut out from our thoughts if we are to achieve a philosophy in any way adequate either to modern physics or modern psychology. Modern physics, both in the theory of relativity and in the Heisenberg-Schrodinger [quantum-physical] theories of atomic structure, has reduced "matter" to a system of [very brief] events.... And in psychology, equally, the "ego" has disappeared as an ultimate conception, and the unity of a personality has become a peculiar causal nexus. In this respect, grammar and ordinary language have been shown to be bad guides to metaphysics.... And it must be understood that the same reasons which lead to the rejection of substance lead also to the rejection of "things" and "persons" as ultimately valid concepts.¹¹

⁸ *Outline of Philosophy*, 202.

⁹ However, as early as the 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* Russell maintained that subject/predicate grammar suggests a mistaken view of substance (93-4).

¹⁰ See *History of Western Philosophy*, 567, 663.

¹¹ *Outline of Philosophy*, 254-255; also 201-2. See also *History of Western Philosophy*, 654, 658-659, 662-663, *Human Knowledge*, 203, *The Analysis of Mind*, 141-142; *The Analysis of Matter*, 151-152, 238-244, 284-285; *Religion and Science*, 115-116; *My Philosophical Development*, 101, 178-179; "On Propositions," *Logic and Knowledge*, 285-320.

Note that Russell's grammatical case against substance was linked to his defense of an event ontology – a point to which I shall return in section 2.

Late in his career, somewhat embittered by the dismissal of his work by the then dominant ordinary-language school of analytic philosophy, Russell made some withering comments about that school, which he labeled “the cult of common usage.” Not only did he criticize its anti-science tendencies, but he also said that “it makes almost inevitable the perpetuation among philosophers of the muddle-headedness they have taken over from common sense,” and that it “seems to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things.”¹² Although Russell did not quite live long enough to witness the displacement of ordinary-language philosophy by a broadly Quinean naturalism as the dominant version of analytic philosophy, he would certainly have been heartened by the strong naturalist commitment to the philosophical importance of scientific knowledge and the limitations of common speech.

II. NIETZSCHE ON THE *COGITO* AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE

In the late 1880s, the final years of Nietzsche's career, he wrote two of his most important works: *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Will to Power*, the latter incomplete and published only posthumously. Each of these works contains not only striking passages on the *cogito* that are in some respects reminiscent of Russell's views but also other passages that go beyond them.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche offered some interesting reflections on ‘I think.’ He began by denying in Section 16 that it is known with direct certainty:

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are “immediate certainties”: for example, ‘I think’.... But that “immediate certainty” ... involves a *contradictio in adjecto*, I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!... The philosopher must say to himself: When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence “I think,” I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible to prove: for exam-

¹² Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, 159, 166, 170, 183-4, 186-7.

ple, that it is *I* who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an “ego,” and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking.... In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I *compare* my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; [thus] ... it has ... no immediate certainty for me.

He went on in section 17 to add that ‘It thinks’ is the most that one is entitled to claim possesses immediate certainty:

With regard to the superstition of the logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact ... namely, that a thought comes when “it” wishes, not when “I” wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “thinks.” *It* thinks; but that this “it” is precisely the famous old “ego” is ... only a supposition,... and assuredly not an “immediate certainty.” After all, one has even gone too far with this “it thinks” – even the “it” contains an *interpretation* of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the grammatical habit: “Thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent; consequently”.... Perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, including the logicians, to get along without the little “it” (which is all that is left of the honest little old ego).

Finally, in section 54 he linked belief in a referent for the grammatical subject of ‘I think’ to belief in the soul:

Formerly, one believed in the “soul” as one believed in grammar and the the grammatical subject: one said, “I” is the condition, “think” is the predicate and conditioned – and thinking is an activity to which thought *must* apply a subject as cause.... The possibility of a *merely apparent existence* of the subject, “the soul” in other words, may not always have remained strange to [Immanuel Kant] – that thought which as Vedanta philosophy existed before on this earth and exercised tremendous power.¹³

Clearly Nietzsche shared Russell's doubts about the immediate certainty of ‘I think,’ the validity of inferring a thinker from thoughts,

¹³ Andrew Colvin suggests that in this last passage Nietzsche confused Vedantic or Hindu thinking with Buddhist thinking about the self, since it is Buddhists who maintain that there is no (substantial or enduring) self.

and the reality of the ego or enduring self. The passages also suggest a grammatical diagnosis of the errors of the *cogito*. Although Nietzsche went beyond Russell in explicitly connecting the problems of the *cogito* with belief in the soul, Russell was certainly aware of the connection (as noted earlier), and they both clearly agreed on the faultiness of this belief.¹⁴

But in *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche stopped short of dispensing altogether with a substantive subject for 'thinks' and settled – albeit provisionally – for 'it thinks' rather than 'there is thinking.' Nor did he clearly blame the concept of substance for the difficulties with 'I think'. Finally, in rejecting *all* immediate certainties Nietzsche was more radical than Russell, who was too much of a traditional empiricist to give up on direct certainty concerning first-person, conscious thought and experience. Indeed, a few years earlier in *The Gay Science* Nietzsche referred to "that impetuous demand for certainty that today discharges itself among large numbers of people in a scientific-positivistic form." (288)

The differences between the two philosophers' analyses of the *cogito* narrow considerably, however, in *The Will to Power*. In section 484 Nietzsche abandoned a grammatical subject for 'thinks' in just the way Russell did: "There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks': this is the upshot of all Descartes' argumentation." And in the very next sentence he also connected the flaws in 'I think' with the concept of substance:

But that means positing as "true *a priori*" our belief in the concept of substance – that when there is thought there has to be something "that thinks" is simply a formulation of our grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. In short, this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a logical-metaphysical postulate – Along the lines followed by Descartes one does not come upon something absolutely certain but only upon the fact of a strong belief.

Finally, Nietzsche gave a grammatical diagnosis of the metaphysical problem of substance:

The concept of substance is a consequence of the concept of subject: not the reverse! If we relinquish the soul, "the subject," the precondition for substance in general disappears.

¹⁴ On this faultiness, see Russell, *Religion and Science*, chapter 5; Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 46, and *The Anti-Christ*, 581, 630, 633.

Language depends on the most naïve prejudices. Now we read disharmonies and problems into things because we think *only* in the form of language – and thus believe in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (e.g., subject, attribute, etc).

The separation of the "deed" from the "doer," of the event from someone who produces events, of the process from a something that is not process but enduring, substance, thing, body, soul, etc ... this ancient mythology established the belief in "cause and effect" after it had found a firm form in the functions of language and grammar.¹⁵

In these passages it is clear that in *The Will to Power* Nietzsche not only continued to reject the ego, enduring self, or soul, but also acknowledged the role of the concept of substance in 'I think' and used it to develop further the suggestion that a false metaphysics is built into language and grammar. And the following passage from section 715 not only makes this last point but asserts the priority of becoming over stable being in a way reminiscent of the event ontology that Russell embraced in repudiating mental and physical substance:

Linguistic means of expressions are useless for expressing "becoming"; it accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves to posit a crude world of stability, of 'things', etc.

III. WAS RUSSELL INFLUENCED BY NIETZSCHE?

Russell was certainly well-acquainted with *Beyond Good and Evil*, for he discussed it at length in *A History of Western Philosophy*. (762-6) Yet despite the striking similarities between his and Nietzsche's critiques of the *cogito*, we have seen that he dismissed the latter's contributions to ontology and epistemology. What are we to make of this?

Russell was a proudly progressive individual who was understandably repulsed by much of Nietzsche's ethical and political thought, as the following passage from *A History of Western Philosophy* makes clear:

I dislike Nietzsche because he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into a duty, because the men he most

¹⁵ Sections 484, 485, 533, 631.

admires are conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die.... Nietzsche despises universal love; I feel it is the motive power to all that I desire as regards the world. His followers have had their innings, but we may hope that it is rapidly coming to an end. (772-3)

It is tempting to suppose that Russell was in fact influenced at least by *Beyond Good and Evil* and that he consciously or subconsciously refused to admit it. But I think that there are good reasons for regarding this explanatory hypothesis as unjustified, though not necessarily false. They lie, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the radical empiricist thought of David Hume, and also, unexpectedly, in the work of the 18th century German thinker Georg Christoph Lichtenberg.

Hume is famous for his doctrine that we lack any direct awareness of the self and any good reason to believe in mental substance¹⁶ – a doctrine in obvious agreement with Russell and Nietzsche's claim that 'I think' goes beyond the evidence of immediate experience. And as is well-known, Russell came to accept Hume's doctrine.¹⁷ There is also little doubt that Nietzsche – perhaps from Immanuel Kant or Arthur Schopenhauer – was acquainted with Hume's philosophy.¹⁸ So at least this much of Russell and Nietzsche's common doubts about 'I think' could be due at least in part to Hume's influence on both. And even if Nietzsche were unacquainted with Hume's views on the self, the effect of those views on Russell would still undermine the explanatory hypothesis that Nietzsche influenced Russell. For in that case there would be an adequate historical account of Russell's doubts about 'I think' that made no mention of Nietzsche's similar doubts.

As for Lichtenberg, he is best known for the often philosophically interesting aphorisms – which were admired by some eminent thinkers – in his lengthy notebooks.¹⁹ Here is his aphorism on the *cogito*: "We should say, 'It thinks,' just as we say, 'It thunders.' Even to say *cogito* is too much if we translate it with 'I think.' To assume the 'I,' to postulate it, is [merely?] a practical need."²⁰ Shades of Nietzsche – who indeed was one of the eminent admirers of Lichten-

¹⁶ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 6.

¹⁷ See, e.g., *Theory of Knowledge*, 35-6; *History of Western Philosophy*, 662-3.

¹⁸ See, e.g., *Will to Power*, 295.

¹⁹ See J.P. Stern, *Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions* and Roger Kimball, "G.C. Lichtenberg: A 'Spy on Humanity'", in *Lives of the Mind*.

berg's work!²¹ Another such admirer was Ludwig Wittgenstein.²² And according to Roger Kimball, Wittgenstein "made Lichtenberg one of his causes ... and pressed copies of his work on friends, including Bertrand Russell."²³

Let me be clear about this: I am not implying that Lichtenberg definitely influenced Nietzsche's and Russell's critiques of the *cogito*. We don't even know whether Russell actually read Lichtenberg, much less whether he was acquainted with the latter's aphorism on the *cogito*. But such a chain of influence, with Lichtenberg as "common cause," is certainly a possible explanation of the similarity between those critiques. And it seems to me that this possibility – along with the high probability of Humean influence on Russell and the possibility of Humean influence on Nietzsche – is serious enough to render unjustified the hypothesis that a direct influence of Nietzsche on Russell best accounts for the similarity.

It might be objected that there is more to the overlap I have documented between Nietzsche and Russell than their common rejection of 'I think.' What about their claims that a false metaphysics of substance is built into ordinary language? But once again Hume's radical empiricism, with its repudiation of mental as well as physical substance, could well be a common source of influence on Nietzsche and Russell.

I conclude that at least at the present time, it is doubtful—albeit possible—that Russell was influenced by Nietzsche. There remains the interesting question of why Russell, despite having read *Beyond Good and Evil*, failed to acknowledge (or even notice?) the striking similarities between their views on the *cogito*. I have suggested that the answer lies in the substantial differences in their ethical and political perspectives. But that is a different issue altogether.

²⁰ Stern, 270.

²¹ See Marion Farber, "Introduction" to Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, p. xv; Kimball, 316-317; and Stern, 222. Stern also compares and contrasts the two thinkers (222-226).

²² See Kimball, 317 and Stern, 161. Once again Stern compares and contrasts the two thinkers (159-162).

²³ Kimball, 317. I have not yet found any corroboration of Kimball's claims here; he cites no sources.

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FREGE AND HUSSERL
 ON SIGNS AND LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOUR

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ABSTRACT. Halfway between linguistics and speech act theory, Edmund Husserl's philosophy of language shares many concerns with analytic philosophers, in particular with Gottlob Frege. One concern he shares with Frege is the way in which we recognize linguistic signs as signs and how we recognize them as the particular signs they are.

0. INTRODUCTION

The views of Frege and Husserl on the conditions that make linguistic communication possible both rely heavily on an account of the way in which occurrences of a linguistic sign are identified as occurrences of the same "sign-type." Both attempt to describe the role of mental acts, such as intentions, in recognizing particular signs as occurrences of the same sign type, but their accounts differ in basic ways. This paper compares their respective theories.

1. FREGE

In addition to theories of meaning and denotation, Frege also expressed views on linguistic signs and how they function in linguistic communication. According to Frege (1903, §99), signs would be useless if they could not be understood to denote the same thing at different times and in different contexts. In order to fulfil this purpose, Frege claims, the different occurrences of the same sign type must have sufficiently similar figures. Frege also believes that we cannot recognize two instances of a sign as being of the same type solely on the basis of their physical characteristics. Frege does not himself provide any concrete examples – and he considers only written signs – but he argues that considering the imperfect nature of human perception and the fact that two tokens of the same sign are seldom, if ever, exactly the same physically, we cannot rely on two signs being physically identical to decide whether they are instances of the same type – indeed, they may have quite different physical properties. Frege also thinks that abstraction cannot be used to recognize signs as instances of the same sign type, arguing that "different things cannot be made to coincide by abstraction." (1903, §99)

But then how *do* we recognize signs as being of the same figure? According to Frege, in order for signs to denote the same thing at different times and in different contexts, they must be sufficiently similar. How similar? Frege answers:

... nothing else is required but that there be present the intention of producing a sign which is similar to the one that had been made previously and this need only to succeed inasmuch as the reader correctly recognises this intention. In what follows, we understand by "signs of same figure" those which, following the intention of he who writes, are supposed to be the same so as to designate the same thing. (1903 §99)¹

As for how we recognise that two signs have the same figure, Frege answers: because we recognise the authors' intentions of producing similar signs in order to denote the same thing in each case, where these intentions we recognise are a particular type of mental act.

Frege thus appeals to our ability to recognize the mental acts of others as the basis of language use. But is this consistent with his notorious anti-psychologism? Given the significance of the topic in the literature on Frege, this may be an important question. It is not however my purpose to address it here. Rather, in what follows, I'll consider whether Frege's view that recognizing the intention of a speaker can do the job of determining the type to which a given instance of a sign belongs. To a certain extent, this depends on what Frege's "intentions" are and Frege says little about them.

There are, I think, two plausible ways to understand Frege's appeal to our capacity to recognise A's intention of producing figures in order to designate things; a weak one and a strong one. On the weak interpretation, what a reader recognises is A's intention of producing and employing a sign, that is, A's (unspecified) intention to communicate. Pierre can recognise that Marie uses a sign only if he recognises that Marie's intention is to communicate something. "Figures which we write or print or which, in general, are produced on

¹ My translation. „Wenn nämlich die Zeichen nur den Zweck haben, der Verständigung der Menschen untereinander... zu dienen, braucht beim Schreibenden nur die Absicht vorhanden zu sein, ein dem früher gemachten ähnliches Zeichen herzustellen, und das braucht nur soweit zu gelingen, dass der Lesende die Absicht richtig erkennt. Wir wollen im Folgenden unter « gleichgestalteten Zeichen » solche verstehen, welche nach der Absicht des Schreibenden gleichgestaltet sein sollen um dasselbe zu bezeichnen“.

² Cf. Frege 1903, §98

the surface of a physical object"² need not be used for the purpose of linguistic communication – Marie could be doodling – and in order to recognise them as occurrences of signs we need to recognise that they were produced with the intention to communicate. If this idea is to be taken seriously, it cannot exclude considerations of the way in which, in practical interactions, we can tell what other people are trying to do prior to any understanding of the particular signs.

Let us assume that Frege would agree to say that this idea lies behind his remarks. Would he also claim that in recognising that a graphic sign was produced with the intention of communicating, we recognize the particular type of sign it is an instance of? It seems that the ascription of a communicative intention at most restricts the scope of possible figural types to which the graphic token may belong to linguistic ones – it will neither be a sample of traditional Moroccan decorative art nor a mere doodle since those are not figures used for the purpose of communication – but it does no more than that. Frege needs something stronger.

On the strong interpretation what the observer recognises is the particular sign-type A intended to make, and so the particular thing A meant to denote by the sign. The strong interpretation does not exclude the weak one. In fact, the strong interpretation makes sense only when it is already clear to the agents involved that they are involved in a situation of communication.

Furthermore, I take it that Frege would agree with the following: Marie does not go around in the world with the purpose of denoting objects. Marie believes things about certain objects, and typically she denotes objects only insofar as she expresses or voices her beliefs (or fears, wishes, etc.) about them. That is, some of the words Marie uses denote objects, but only in so far as they are part of more complex expressions, e.g., assertions that express some of her mental states, her beliefs for instance. I take it that Frege would also agree to say that Pierre can only recognise Marie's intention of denoting *y* if he recognises that she has a mental state about *y*'s being so-and-so.

This interpretation enables us to preserve the idea that Frege's theory of sign recognition rests on certain mental states, what he calls "intentions," speakers have – what is intentional here is Marie's use of the sign-token for expressing her belief – without committing him to the view that Marie's having the mental state about *y*'s being

² Cf. Frege 1903, §98

so-and-so, nor her using a sign to refer to *y*, are her primary intention when she seeks to engage in linguistic behaviour. On the strong interpretation, once Pierre has recognised that Marie intends to communicate, in order for him to determine the sign-types of the signs she uses, he needs to recognize her intention to express a particular thought.

The strong interpretation rests on the idea that if Marie utters "I'd like to eat chocolate mousse," typically it is appropriate for Pierre to ascribe to her the desire to eat chocolate mousse. Of course, it may be the case that Pierre ascribes an intention to Marie although there is nothing intentional in Marie's action: she may be talking in her sleep. Nevertheless, this interpretation, which introduces the idea of using the ascription of a mental state, namely, the intention to express a thought, to recognize the sign-type that a sign is an instance of, enriches the Fregean conception of linguistic communication and tackles a problem that has recently become central in speech act theory and theories of communication,³ and will be discussed at length in the following sections. However, mental state ascription does not solve the problem of determining the type to which a sign belongs but, as we will see in the conclusion, more plausibly presupposes it.

2. HUSSERL

The idea the strong interpretation brings forward is that an adequate theory of language should account not only for the fact that words denote objects and concepts, but also for the fact that they "intimate" the mental states of an agent, as well for the fact that these two functions of language fulfil complementary purposes: denotation relies on intimating mental events and the intimation of mental events implies denotation. To my knowledge, this idea was first brought up in the Brentano school and was shared, with different levels of sophistication, by at least three of Brentano's students: Marty, Twardowski and Husserl.⁴ Of the three, Husserl is the one who offered the clearest account of the distinction between these two functions as well as of their connection.⁵

³ See, for instance, Kemmerling 2002

⁴ Cf. Marty 1873, Twardowski 1894

⁵ My remarks in this section are based on Investigations 1 and 5 in *Logical Investigations*

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl notes that in addition to being used to denote objects and concepts and make statements that are true or false, words are also used to inform us of, or *intimate*, mental states of speakers or writers. In *intimation*, Husserl thinks that words function in a way similar to what he calls "indication." Smoke, for instance, is called a sign or indication of fire, scars may be said to indicate a healing wound, and A's pout will indicate A's displeasure. Similarly, on Husserl's account of intimation, A's assertion that *p* intimates A's belief that *p*. According to the *Logical Investigations*, intimation is similar to the relation of indication we find in the three previous examples but also differs from it in substantial ways. On the one hand, unlike a scar or smoke, but like a pout, understanding what an utterance intimates implies our recognizing some of the speaker's mental states. But when it comes to mental state ascription there is also, according to the *Logical Investigations*, an important distinction to be made between bodily and linguistic behaviour.

Marie's nodding accompanied by an avid smiling in the presence of an appetizing hypercaloric dessert will indicate to Pierre that Marie has a certain mental state, namely, the desire to eat this dessert. But the connection between Marie's bodily behaviour and the exact content of the mental state ascribed to Marie is the result of Pierre's interpretation, not the result of his recognizing something communicated as an intended meaning. Marie's bodily behaviour could as well indicate her unrepentant gluttony or her hypoglycaemic condition or yet some other state of affairs. What is indicated by bodily behaviour is thus subjective: it depends on the observer's background knowledge and assumptions, which will vary from one individual to another. But, according to the first *Investigation*, whenever Pierre understands Marie when she says "I would like to eat chocolate mousse," Pierre will typically believe that she would like to eat chocolate mousse. He may or may not ascribe other mental states to her on the basis of his having understood this (or on some other basis), but if he understands what she says, he will typically ascribe at least this desire to her.


So what is the difference between the two cases? Husserl claims that a connection will be made between a person's linguistic behaviour and her mental episode by any competent observer. The connection will furthermore be "systematic" in the following sense: from the observer's standpoint, the utterance and the mental act

have the same content. This is, as far as the *Logical Investigations* are concerned, what makes the difference between the way we understand speech and the way we merely interpret bodily behaviour. Thus, linguistic communication is not subject to interpretative variations the way bodily behaviour is. But what leads the observer to believe that the content of the utterance and the content of the mental act are the same?

3. PIERRE AND MARIE

Although the theory of meaning Husserl puts forward in his *Logical Investigations* has similarities with Frege's theory of sense and reference, it also differs from it in certain important respects. The differences are brought to the fore when we compare their views on the role of mental state ascription and sign recognition. According to the *Logical Investigations*, what explains Pierre's understanding of Marie's utterance is a complex network of relations between:

- (i) Marie's mental state p
- (ii) Marie's utterance of the sentence p
- (iii) the thought p' (caused by Marie's utterance) in Pierre
- (iv) the abstract content of (i) and (iii), i.e. *that p*



Marie's utterance 'I would like to eat chocolate mousse' intimates a certain mental state, a desire she has. This desire to eat chocolate mousse has a "quality" (roughly, its propositional attitude, in this case, a desiring) and a "matter" (what she desires). The matter of Marie's desiring is the aspect of it that makes it *about* eating chocolate mousse. As the diagram shows, the desire, and so its matter, is different from the meaning (i.e., "content") of the expression. It is also not a cause of Pierre's understanding of Marie's utterance.

In *uttering* 'I would like to eat chocolate mousse,' Marie causes Pierre to hear the sentence, which causes him to understand the sentence, i.e., to have a corresponding mental state that is however not itself a desire. Husserl, however, remains undecided as to the explanatory role of causal relations in his theory of language perception and understanding. What is explicit however is that what explains Pierre understanding Marie, according to Husserl, is the fact that the mental state Pierre has upon hearing Marie's utterance (upon *perceiving* the sounds she produces) and the mental state Marie has *have the same content*. And the two thoughts have the same content because their respective matters are instances of the same objective meaning.

So in the *Logical Investigations*, the possibility of communication is explained by there being objective entities, meanings ("contents") which certain aspects of mental states, the matter, are instances of, and that can be instantiated in different speakers simultaneously or in the same speaker at different times. Note that the semantic properties of the sign (meaning and denotation) are not the same as the mental properties of the thought (having a matter, intending an object). What is original in Husserl is the way he reconciles the two sets of properties, semantic and mental: the mental state, by virtue of its matter, is an instance of the meaning. Husserl's view clearly commits him to some conception of objective meaning, so his semantics is anti-psychologistic – yet he still holds that mental states are intrinsically involved in language.

But what, exactly, is the role that the intimation of mental states plays in this model? Although Husserl is adamant that the relation between the meaning of an utterance and the matter of the thought the utterance intimates is systematic and that the latter is invariably involved in the former, the nature of this relation is not made clear. Rather, his theory of meaning in the *Logical Investigations*, that thoughts instantiate meanings, leaves the question of this relation's nature unanswered.

4. HUSSERL'S MATURE THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

Husserl was not satisfied with the theory of meaning he put forward in the *Logical Investigations*, especially with the minimal role claimed for intimation in his explanation of linguistic communication. Later, in his unpublished *Sign and Expression* (1913-14), he explored a different conception of how we come to recognise others' utterances as signs and act upon that recognition. In this later theory, his explanation of how we recognize the meaning of what a speaker says becomes a special case of a more general explanation of the interpretation of (psycho-physical) *actions*. In this explanation, intimation plays a central role. Husserl describes linguistic behaviour as a complex and sophisticated form of voluntary bodily movement that must be perceived *as voluntary* in order to be understood. This involves an elaboration of the idea that one of the conditions of linguistic understanding is the recognition of communicative intentions: Husserl now says that Pierre's perceiving Marie's linguistic behaviour as voluntary has a "motivational" effect on Pierre. Husserl introduces a technical term to designate this motivational effect: Marie's voluntary action seeks to *engage* Pierre to perform a corresponding voluntary (psycho-physical) action.

On Husserl's new view, when Marie asserts "Alonzo is an admirable logician," she is not simply producing sounds meant to be *perceived* by Pierre and that may cause him to have a certain thought; rather, she is seeking to engage him to *do* something. Behaviour and context will typically provide an important part of the information Pierre needs in order to find out what Marie wants from him. This will restrict his range of possible responses. (Questions, commands, etc. will function analogously.) For instance, on the basis of Marie's tone, Pierre can recognize whether she is asking him a question, or ordering him around or just stating something. (Husserl 1913-14b, 90) Typically, what she minimally seeks to engage Pierre to do when she asserts something to him is that he *co-believe* whatever she herself believes. So if Marie asserts "Alonzo is an admirable logician" to Pierre, then, excluding instances of irony, sarcasm, theatrical productions, etc., what she seeks to engage Pierre to do is acquiesce and co-believe that Alonzo is an admirable logician. Of course, Pierre is in no way compelled by Marie's demand. He is free to believe or not to believe that Alonzo is an admirable logician. (He can, for instance, doubt it, deny it, etc.)

Husserl's point is that to understand what Marie asserts and to act on it, Pierre must at least recognise that she has produced the sounds to arouse in him the disposition to believe as she does. More generally, if a person did not recognize a speaker's intention to communicate, and in fact, recognize the speaker's intention to communicate a particular thought, and further recognize that the speaker seeks to engage him to produce a mental act (belief, desire, doubt, etc.) corresponding to one of the speaker's, he could not ascribe to the speaker the relevant mental states and so would not understand her. Without such intimation there is no understanding.

In Husserl's manuscripts on *Expression and Sign*, the recognition of the communicative intention raises an important question: how does Pierre come to recognise *which* belief (answer, response, etc.) Marie demands from him, e.g., how does he come to recognise that she seeks to engage him to believe that *Alonzo is an admirable logician* and not that *Alonzo is a rather pitiful rhymester*? The Husserlian answer would be the following: Pierre recognises what belief Marie seeks to engage him to have because she has made available precisely that which is necessary for his being able to *have* the belief that Alonzo is an admirable logician, namely, a token of 'Alonzo is an admirable logician,' which intimates this thought to Pierre.

A full explanation of this idea would require us to look in detail into Husserl's colossal ontology of language. The framework, however, is already at hand in the *Logical Investigations*.⁶ In the first *Investigation*, Husserl asserts that one cannot have the belief that, e.g., Alonzo is an admirable logician, outside of language, i.e., one cannot have the belief that Alonzo is an admirable logician independently of a graphic or auditory complex of a certain type being available to one through perception or imagination. As he will put it later, one cannot "undress" the belief from its linguistic clothing and retain the "naked" thought.⁷ Husserl's position does not imply that *all* mental states are language dependent: perceptions, for instance, are not. But in the case of the belief that Alonzo is an admirable logician, the marks or sounds being available is indispensable. It is the recognition of the sign's type that ultimately enables the observer to determine what a speaker says.

Contrary to what Frege suggests in the *Grundgesetze 2*, on Husserl's view, mental state ascription is not the only thing that enables

⁶ For Husserl's ontology of language, see Lapointe 2004

⁷ Husserl 1913-14a, A I 18, p.5-44

us to determine what a speaker says. Indeed, what precise mental state a person has in a certain situation of communication can often only be determined on the basis of the type of the linguistic signs she uses. Although Husserl does not have a full-fledged answer to the question of how this is achieved, what he has to say interested the linguists of his time. Roman Jakobson, for example, explicitly pursued the Husserlian semiotic project. Combining linguistics and speech act theory, logic and psychology, Husserl's philosophy of language shares many concerns with contemporary analytic philosophy.

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BOOK REVIEWS

NOT FADE AWAY

TIMOTHY ST. VINCENT

Review of Leonard Steinhorn, *The Greater Generation: In Defense of the Baby Boom Legacy*. St Martins Press, 2006, 318 p. + xvi. \$15.95 paperback.

In his most recent book, *The Greater Generation: In Defense of the Baby Boom Legacy*, Leonard Steinhorn argues that many features of "sixties" culture (or "counterculture") are currently in effect in our daily lives and that this is a generally a good thing. He regards the prominence of right-wing rhetoric as the work of a loud and vocal minority.

Steinhorn opens by citing a list of unjust policies and practices from the fifties that were swept away by the "Baby-Boom" generation, for example, open and legal racism: There were "Jim Crow" laws in the South, but there was also open racism in the North. The General Manager of the Red Sox in 1960 openly proclaimed that there would be no Afro-Americans on the team as long as he was manager. In addition, there was widespread anti-Jewish bias, which was exacerbated by traditional sexual values: A newly married couple had to present a letter from their minister (not rabbi, etc) to the manager of any resort they wished to stay at. Many Jews changed their names or displayed Christmas decorations in order to hide their Jewish identities.

Of course, there was much more open bias against non-religious people than there is today. A poll in the fifties found that a majority of Americans thought that an atheist should not be allowed to teach at a college or make a public speech against religion. (An interesting tidbit: Steinhorn also cites a 1955 poll showing that approximately 50% of Americans then couldn't name a single one of the gospels. To me, this raises doubts about the claim that there has been a general decline in education and literacy during the last five decades.)

Bias against gays was much more blatant and it also targeted straights who didn't conform to traditional gender roles: The Boise Iowa police interrogated hundreds of suspected gays during the early fifties, forcing some to "out" their friends. There was also an

official anti-gay witch hunt at the University of Florida that began in 1958 and lasted until 1962. In the early fifties, the Miami police chief openly proclaimed that his officers would harass effeminate men and make it clear that they were unwelcome on the beach.

In general, there was a rigidly-enforced conformity. Job applicants (almost always men then) had to take personality tests designed to weed out non-conformists: Steinhorn quotes the book *The Organization Man* as saying that the best advice is to answer “that you love your father and mother, but your father a little more, that you don’t care much for books or music, and that you also love your wife and kids, but don’t let them get in the way of company work.”

The “Baby Boom” generation replaced this prejudice and strict conformity with a general “equality of personal worth”, according to Steinhorn. Even though the US has a capitalist economic system, Steinhorn argues that it is currently a system of “economic democracy”, at least compared to the way it was before the mid-eighties when baby-boomers took over the corporate world. Before then, there were no profit-sharing plans; workers dared not question their bosses or come up with their own ideas; there was virtually no flex time. In general, corporations are flatter, i.e., less hierarchical than they were then. Steinhorn argues that this democratization of the economy deserves much of the credit for the technological and economic boom of the late eighties through today, because it gave workers more outlets for their creativity and more of a sense of ownership of their work.

Steinhorn at least pays lip service to the point that “the greatest generation” deserves credit for surviving the great depression and fighting off the tyranny of Nazism and fascism. As for post baby boom generations, he argues that they tend to agree with baby-boomers about equality of personal worth, free expression, diversity and other values. However, they may resent baby boomers because this generation seems to be refusing to “give up the mantle of youth.”

Some other interesting points from this book are:

—Even though there are more working mother’s today than in the forties and fifties, parents tend to spend more time with their children. This is due to factors such as flex time at work, looser gender roles that sometimes even include stay-at-home dads, and the fact that couples tend to have fewer children these days.

—There is less of a generation gap between baby boomers and their

children, with the children often citing their parents as role models.

—Even churches have become more democratic in the baby boom era. For example, a recent poll of American Catholics found that approximately 40% believe that a good Catholic must be a “pro-lifer” whereas 60% believe that a good Catholic must have “concern for the poor.” Steinhorn also quotes a Jesuit theologian as saying “if we insist that Catholics agree with all of the Church teachings, then I’m afraid we’ll have no one for communion.”

—Even though colleges offer much more diversity in literature and other subjects these days, he argues that students also have more opportunities to study the classics. (An interesting point here is that, in the early 20th century, Shakespeare was considered a low quality fad – scholars during this period advocated classics such as works of Plato and Aristotle). While disapproving of so-called “politically correct” speech codes, Steinhorn argues that there is much more academic freedom today than there was before the sixties.

I view this book as a good answer to the notion that there has been a general “decline in morals” since the fifties, but I have two main criticisms of it. The first is that Steinhorn does not address the fact that economic inequality has exploded since the seventies: the median (i.e., 50th percentile) income of American workers has declined since then, even though the average income has increased (because the wealthy are now much wealthier than the average citizen). Similarly, the ratio of the 90th percentile income divided by the 10th percentile income has skyrocketed during the last few decades. These factors would seem to testify against Steinhorn’s praise of the recent “democratization” of the economy.

My second criticism of this book is that Steinhorn, like Tom Brokaw and others, seems the gloss over the fact that there are really no such things as discrete “generations”, unless you’re restricting the concept to a particular family: There are people being born every day throughout history. A 30 year old, for example, is in a slightly different generation from a 31 year old.

In spite of these criticisms, I enjoyed this book immensely and recommend it as a defense of the baby boomer legacy against all the recent talk about post-sixties moral decline.

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ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE, AND RELIGION

MARVIN KOHL

Review of Erik J. Wielenberg, *God and the Reach of Reason: C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell*. Cambridge University Press, 2008, 243 p. + x. \$21.99 paperback.

The past decade has witnessed an increase of interest in atheism that might also be described as an insurgence against belief in God. Under the banner of what may be broadly called the naturalistic point of view, critics have protested against arguments defending God's existence and those concerning the need for, or utility of, theistic belief. The latter is discussed by Erik J. Wielenberg in his earlier book *Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe*,¹ where he maintains that a belief in the existence of the Christian God is not necessary for life to have meaning or for the existence of morality and virtue, since there are objective ethical truths independent of religious belief.

In most of his new book, *God and the Reach of Reason*, Wielenberg deals with C. S. Lewis's arguments for the existence of God by imagining a confrontation on the issue between Lewis, Hume and Russell. In the first chapter, Wielenberg analyzes Lewis's solution for the "problem of pain" (or problem of evil, of how there can be suffering in the world with a good and almighty God), in the second, he analyzes several other arguments for the existence of God by Lewis, including his reworking of the argument from morality, an argument from reason, and argument from desire, and in the third, he considers Lewis's argument from miracles. About these arguments Wielenberg concludes that "Lewis's proposed solution to the problem of pain is incomplete, that his cumulative case for the existence of a Higher Power is, overall, not terribly weighty, and that (consequently) his effort to establish an adequate philosophical foundation for a historical case for the Resurrection of Christ fails." (152) The fourth part of the book is concerned with finding areas of agreement between Hume, Russell, and Lewis on the relation of reason and faith, the argument from design, and the nature of true religion.

¹ Erik J. Wielenberg, *Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Philosophers of religion may find the discussion of Lewis's weak fideism rewarding reading because, unlike the extremist, Lewis is content to argue that what may first be accepted on faith may subsequently find rational support. The book also includes a discussion of the problem facing atheists of giving an evolutionary account of human intentionality and of the claim that moral truths are necessary truths, important but all too brief discussions of happiness and love, and an attempt to coax the Owl of Minerva off her perch by suggesting that philosophy of religion might more fruitfully explore kinds of agreement between believers and non-believers, all written with subtle argument combined with a wonderful tolerance for disagreement.

One area in which Wielenberg finds agreement between Lewis, Hume, and Russell is in what he views as their common passion for evidence and argument. All three, he says, believe "in the importance of following the evidence and on the difficulties humans face in doing this." However, it seems to me that Lewis has two different epistemologies: a proximate one that reveres evidence and an ultimate one that does not. From the perspective of the ultimate epistemology, a Christian should intuitively seize upon the truth on the basis of understanding and celebrating human nature and the history of its culture. It is on the basis of this intuition that Christians are and will continue to be convinced of the verity of "mere Christianity" (Lewis's term for core Christian doctrine). If this is true, then it is misleading to suggest that "all three thinkers share a common perspective: Follow the evidence" (202). Lewis, Hume, and Russell may each have a burning passion for the truth and evidence. But having a passion is one thing; having the same degree of commitment to evidence is another.

According to Russell, it is almost always a mistake to believe without evidence. Respect for evidence is not to be simply tacked on after a faith commitment. So to say as Russell continually does that evidence is the heart of rational belief is tantamount to saying that one also must begin with this kind of critical scrutiny. For Russell, a mere Christianity common to nearly all Christians, a Christianity based on intuition is, at best, the abnegation of having a passion for truth and, at worst, ludicrous or even evil.

Expressed differently, and this time from Lewis's perspective: For a truly religious person, belief in the existence of God is not quite like belief that Bertrand Russell was born in 1872. Truth for him is ultimately other than provability. Truth, from this perspective, involves a sagacity that answers the human need for hope and genuine Christian understanding. This is why the British philosopher J. R. Lucas holds Lewis to be "the twentieth-century's 139th psalm."² With a subtle elegance, the 139th psalm reflects many of Lewis's sentiments and reads as follows:

O Lord, Thou hast searched me, and known me.
 Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising,
 Thou understandst my thought afar off.
 Thou measurest my going about lying down,
 And are acquainted with all my ways.
 For there is not a word in my tongue,
 But, lo, O Lord, Thou knowest it altogether.
 Thou hast hemmed me in behind and before,
 And laid Thy hand upon me.
 Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
 Too high, I cannot attain unto it.³

Indeed, for Lewis, knowing it all is beyond us, but an acquaintance with and acceptance of mere Christianity is not. By way of sharp contrast, Russell would remind us that, while we may be historically aware of the Christianity Lewis holds so dear, we are not, in any genuine cognitive sense, acquainted with it.

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
² J. R. Lucas, "The Restoration of Man: A Lecture Given in Durham, on Thursday, October 22nd, 1992 to Mark the Fiftieth Anniversary of C. S. Lewis's *The Abolition of Man*", *Theology* 1995, 553.

³ 139th Psalm, *King James Version*

BRS 22-YEAR MEMBERSHIP REPORT: 1988 – 2009.

Included in this article below is a graph of BRS membership data for the past 22 years – from 1988 to 2009 – showing membership in the BRS rising to a high of 315 in 1990 and then falling to a low of 143 in 2003, while gradually rising again since 2004. Chart data are from Ken Blackwell's *Russell* database giving the number of BRS subscriptions to *Russell* for each year, and from copies of the BRS database saved by John Ongley from 2003 to 2009.

Russell data (dark bars) count couple memberships as 1 (because couple members receive only one copy of *Russell*) and thus undercount the true number of Society members. BRS database data from 2003 to 2009 (light bars) count couple memberships as 2 and so are more accurate, but incomplete. Data for 2009 are as of May 19, 2009. Both sets of data include honorary members. Since March 2009 we have surpassed 2008's total.



Dark bars: *Russell* data (couples = 1). Light bars: BRS data/actual members (couples = 2)

Additional data were gleaned from the *Russell Society Newsletter* by Ken Blackwell. (These data are not included on the graph and do not include honorary members.) Members: 1973: 0; 1974: 72; 1975: 145; 1977: 164 (from *RSN* nos. 5, 10, 17).

TABLE OF BRS MEMBERSHIP BY YEAR

| year | members | year | members |
|------|---------|------|---|
| 1988 | 268 | 1999 | 165 |
| 1989 | 307 | 2000 | 166.5 |
| 1990 | 315 | 2001 | 157 |
| 1991 | 270 | 2002 | 149 |
| 1992 | 264 | 2003 | 143 (+ 13 uncounted couple members = 156) |
| 1993 | 219 | 2004 | 151 (+ 14 uncounted couple members = 165) |
| 1994 | 217 | 2005 | 167 (+ 14 uncounted couple members = 181) |
| 1995 | 215 | 2006 | 160 (+ 12 uncounted couple members = 172) |
| 1996 | 209 | 2007 | 169 (+ 10 uncounted couple members = 179) |
| 1997 | 200 | 2008 | 157 (+ 9 uncounted couple members = 166) |
| 1998 | 176 | 2009 | 165 (+ 8 uncounted couple members = 173) |

The number of members, as counted by BRS *Russell* subscriptions (where couple memberships count as one), immediately follows year. The data in parentheses for 2003 – 2009 are from the BRS database and include the couple members for that year not counted by the *Russell* subscriptions data and so are more accurate, but incomplete. Data for 2009 are through May 19, 2009, and so incomplete for 2009.

INTERPRETATION. Why the rapid rise and then fall in Society membership around 1990? A likely explanation is this: Member recruitment for the BRS was then headed by the legendary Lee Eisler, who had spent his adult life working in advertising in New York City. His methods of recruitment are known – they were the professional ones he had used all his life, that of placing ads (in this case, classified ads for the BRS) in various magazines and keeping track of those that produced the most responses and most new members. He then calculated the cost spent in recruiting each new member and recommended to the membership committee that it continue placing ads in those magazines that were most productive of new members, cease placing ads in those least productive, while suggesting new advertising venues. This method seems to have been highly successful in finding new members for the Society, but less successful in retaining them, hence there was a rapid falloff in membership when Lee ceased being editor of the *RSN* and became less involved in Society activities. Since 2003, recruitment efforts have primarily focused on retention and encouraging past members to rejoin.

JO, KB

Traveler's Diary / Conference Report

Convening a session at the APA is like hosting a party – you can't enjoy it until it's over. And like the host of a party, there are times when what you enjoy is its being over.

In 2008, the Central APA met, as it often does, in Chicago. On the day of the Society's paper session there, I received a forewarning of exactly how the day would skew. Waking far too early, I was first shooed by security from the booksellers' room only to be promptly turned out of the registration area by the APA conveners. Lacking the better judgment that might have come with some coffee, by 9:00 a.m. I had, in short, managed to annoy everyone in the immediate vicinity. The die, as I was to learn shortly, had been cast.

When it came time for the Bertrand Russell Society session to begin, it was discovered that the putative room assigned us did not exist, even as a logical fiction. Russellians – among them Charles Parsons – milled in the hallway. Overcome by the sight, I hastened again to registration only to be told succinctly that if I had looked, I'd have seen that the correct room was noted on the errata sheet. Clearly, I was becoming an encumbrance to this division of the APA.

As though in anticipatory revenge, it soon became painfully clear that the APA had scheduled the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society meeting at the same time as the meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society. Because concrete particulars cannot be in two places at once, this decision meant that we could not both enjoy the Russell session and hear Peter Simons and others speak on Twardowski and Polish analytic philosophy. Moreover, this overlap had the effect of diminishing the size of both groups. Only later was I to hear complaints on this point from the other group's convener, Sandra Lapointe, but I saw it at the Bertrand Russell Society session myself: when we, the BRS people, finally collected in the correct room, our numbers were sadly diminished.

Of course, this did make it an intimate gathering, which has its own charms. In fact, the speakers and respondents eventually just sat down together and talked about Wittgenstein, Russell, and atheism – the topics of the session. Montgomery Link (Suffolk University) opened the session by addressing Wittgenstein's symbolism in

the *Tractatus* in a paper titled "Russell and Wittgenstein on Logic and Mathematics in their August 1919 Correspondence." In addition to making a substantial response to this paper, Kevin Klement (University of MA) gave the paper "Re-reading A.J. Ayer's Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage," in which he draws on his introduction to the new reprint of A. J. Ayer's book *Russell*. Michael Garal (Baruch College) concluded the session by speaking on "Russell v. Hume, Atheist or Agnostic," addressing the coherence of the kind of knowledge claim made by atheists, as he thinks Russell understands them, and revising a position he first took in a similar paper read at the BRS annual meeting the previous summer.

In an ideal world, scholars would simply talk to each other in the quiet way we did, but at length, without the tension of conflicting appointments, until no ambiguity remained. But this is not an ideal world, and so the session concluded as scheduled, some going on to other talks and others to the booksellers, finally open for business. RC

NOTE ON C.D. BROAD'S ARTICLE IN THE JULY *MIND*

(Below is a note by Russell published in the January 1919 issue of *Mind*. It is made in response to an article by C.D. Broad, "A General Notation for the Logic of Relations," published in the July 1918 issue of *Mind*. The article by Russell referred to below as occurring in Peano's *Revue de Mathématiques*, v. 7 can be found in English in *Logic and Knowledge* as "The Logic of Relations". The article occurring in v. 8 can be found in English in v. 3 of *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* as "The General Theory of Well-Ordered Series.")¹

Mr. Broad's interesting article in the July *Mind* on "A General Notation for the Logic of Relations" attributes to me (for what reason I cannot guess) a number of notations employed in *Principia Mathematica*. As far as my memory serves me, all these were invented by Dr. Whitehead, who, in fact, is responsible for most of the notation in that work. My original notation, before he came to my assistance, may be found in Peano's *Revue de Mathématiques*, vols. vii and viii.

BERTRAND RUSSELL

Mind, n.s., vol. 28, no. 119 (Jan 1919), 124

¹ Location of English translations provided by Ken Blackwell.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
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Cash Flow January 1, 2008 – December 31, 2008

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| BALANCE 12/31/2007 | |
| US\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | \$3,669.68 |
| Cdn\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 655.66 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | 10,210.62 |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$14,535.96 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | \$903.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 498.00 |
| Renewals | 4,433.00 |
| Total Dues | \$4,931.00 |
| Interest Income | 184.61 |
| Library Income | 18.95 |
| TOTAL INCOME | \$6,037.56 |
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charges | 163.36 |
| Bay Area Expenses | 74.50 |
| Bookkeeping Exp | 700.00 |
| BRS Book Award Exp | 62.89 |
| Conversion Exp | -120.12 |
| Donations | 1,000.00 |
| Library Exp | 233.05 |
| <i>BRS Quarterly</i> | 1,352.35 |
| PayPal Fees | 77.24 |
| <i>Russell Subscriptions*</i> | 6,484.40 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | \$10,027.67 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | -\$3,990.11 |
| BALANCE, 12/31/2008 | |
| US\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | \$1,051.69 |
| less o/s checks | 483.38 |
| adjusted US\$ a/c | \$568.31 |
| Cdn\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 1,977.54 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | 8,000.00 |
| OVERALL BALANCE, 12/31/2008 | \$10,545.85 |

* Includes payment for 3 issues: 27,1, 27,2 and 28,1

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)
Note: US and Cdn. dollars are intermixed

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| BALANCE 12/31/08 | |
| US\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | \$1,051.69 |
| less o/s checks | 483.38 |
| adjusted US\$ a/c | \$568.31 |
| Cdn\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 1,977.54 |
| US\$ term deposit (temporarily in US\$ a/c) | 8,000.00 |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$10,545.85 |
| INCOME | |
| Contributions | \$874.00 |
| Dues | |
| New Members | 233.00 |
| Renewals | 3,023.50 |
| Total Dues | \$3,256.50 |
| Interest Income | 47.34 |
| TOTAL INCOME | \$4,177.84 |
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charges | 29.70 |
| Conversion Exp | -232.43 |
| Library Exp | 21.93 |
| <i>BRS Quarterly</i> | 158.83 |
| PayPal Fees | 43.24 |
| <i>Russell Subscriptions*</i> | 2,952.00 |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | \$2,973.27 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | \$1,204.57 |
| BALANCE 3/31/09 | |
| US\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | \$3,318.81 |
| less o/s checks | 650.11 |
| adjusted US\$ a/c | \$2,668.70 |
| Cdn\$ a/c (Toronto Dominion) | 1,034.38 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | 8,047.34 |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$11,750.42 |

* Includes payment for issue 28,2

Kenneth Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)
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GRRS: The Greater Rochester Russell Set

7 pm, Writers & Books Literary Center
740 University Avenue
\$3 or Free to members of Writers & Books

| | |
|----------|--|
| April 9 | Phil Ebersole: Russell's "Philosophy for Laymen" |
| May 14 | Ted Lechman: The Philosophy of Leibniz |
| June 11 | Jim Judkins reading Russell's "The Fate of Thomas Paine" |
| July 9 | Howard Blair: Great Feuds in Mathematics: Russell v Poincare |
| Aug. 13 | Bill Drumright: Russell's Logical Analysis as Applied to <i>The Conquest of Happiness</i> |
| Sept. 10 | Newcomers' Night: Bertrand Russell for Beginners |
| Oct. 8 | John Novak: Why I Am a Deweyan and Not a Russellian |
| Nov. 12 | Discussion of Paul Edwards' book <i>God and the Philosophers</i> |
| Dec. 10 | Lewis Neisner, Tim Madigan, and David White: "Elementary, My Dear Russell: Bertrand Russell and Sherlock Holmes" |
| Jan. 14 | Discussion: Tim Madigan's <i>W.K. Clifford and The Ethics of Belief</i> Contact Phil Ebersole at 585-482-4729 or phileb@frontiernet.net |

BARS: The Bay Area Russell Set

7 pm, Szechwan Cafe
406 S. California Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94301

| | |
|-----------|--|
| March 19 | Russell on Morality. Read: Pigden, "Russell's Moral Philosophy," http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-moral |
| April 16 | Russell and Chomsky on Politics. Read: Noam Chomsky, "Problems of Knowledge and Freedom," Lecture 2 |
| May 21 | Happy Birthday Bertiel Come with a favorite Russell quote or story to share as we celebrate Russell's 137 th birthday |
| June 23 | Report on the BRS Annual Meeting at Central Connecticut State University, June 5-7 |
| July 16 | Russell on Appearance and Reality. Read: Bertrand Russell, "Seems, Madam? Nay It Is" in <i>Why I Am Not a Christian</i> |
| August 20 | The Virtue of the Oppressed. Read: Bertrand Russell, "The Superior Virtue of the Oppressed," in <i>Unpopular Essays</i> |

Readings are in "Files" in BARS' Yahoo! Group. Join at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bay_brs/. Join the BARS Meet-up Group at <http://philosophy.meetup.com/219/>

THE SPOKESMAN Founded by Bertrand Russell

Unholy Land

Edited by Ken Coates

The Second Coming of King Herod
Ken Coates

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'Exterminate all the Brutes' - Noam Chomsky

Israel's War against Hamas - Avi Shlaim

Gaza and the Law - Richard Falk

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A letter from Hamas - Mousa Abu Marzook

'Not simply war criminals'

Gerald Kaufman MP

The Gulf between Us - Trevor Griffiths


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Issue 103



Unholy Land

Slump and War

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Edward Carpenter, Unsung Hero

Michael Barratt Brown

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
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W. K. CLIFFORD AND "THE ETHICS OF BELIEF"



BY
TIMOTHY J. MADIGAN

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W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) was a noted mathematician and popularizer of science in the Victorian era. Although he made major contributions in the field of geometry, he is perhaps best known for a short essay he wrote in 1876, entitled "The Ethics of Belief", in which he argued that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." Delivered initially as an address to the august Metaphysical Society (whose members included such luminaries as Alfred Lord Tennyson, William Gladstone, T. H. Luxley, and assorted scientists, clerics and philosophers of differing metaphysical views), "The Ethics of Belief" became a rallying cry for freethinkers and a bone of contention for religious apologists. It continues to be discussed today as an exemplar of what is called "evidentialism", a key point in current philosophy of religion debates over justification of knowledge claims.

In this book, Timothy J. Madigan examines the continuing relevance of "The Ethics of Belief" to epistemological and ethical concerns. He places the essay within the historical context, especially the so-called "Victorian Crisis of Faith" of which Clifford was a key player. Clifford's own life and interests are dealt with as well, along with the responses to his essay by his contemporaries, the most famous of which was William James's "The Will to Believe."

Madigan provides an overview of modern-day critics of Cliffordian evidentialism, and also examines thinkers who were positively influenced by him, including Bertrand Russell, who was perhaps Clifford's most influential successor as an advocate of intellectual honesty.

The book ends with a defense of "The Ethics of Belief" from a virtue-theory approach, and argues that Clifford utilizes an "as-if" methodology to encourage intellectual inquiry and communal truth-seeking." *The Ethics of Belief* continues to provoke and stimulate controversy, which was perhaps Clifford's own fondest hope, although he had no right to believe it would do so.

"This work is extremely well-written, lucid and well-organized. Madigan gets the reader into the subject with an account of Clifford's life and, equally important, a vivid description of the intellectual climate of the time. Through this, and other means, he conveys the importance of the subject and of Clifford's contribution. The last two chapters illustrate, convincingly, that the subject is still important and not just of historical interest. The views of contemporary philosophers are discussed and perceptively dealt with."

—Richard Taylor, former Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester and author of *Good and Evil*, *Restoring Pride: The Lost Virtue of our Age*, and *Metaphysics*, among many other works.

"Madigan's study of Clifford's best-known work is unusually well-written, is cogently argued, and raises important issues in a thought-provoking way. He shows a discerning appreciation of scholars who do not agree with him. In short, this is a treat to read and ponder."

—Rollo Handy, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo


Timothy J. Madigan teaches Philosophy at St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York. The former editor of *Free Inquiry* magazine, he is on the editorial board of the London-based *Philosophy Now* magazine and is a frequent lecturer on topics related to applied ethics, philosophy and popular culture, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.

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
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

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THE ROAD TO CONNECTICUT

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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY is the official organ of the Bertrand Russell Society. It publishes Society news and proceedings, and articles on the history of analytic philosophy, especially those on Russell's life and works, including historical materials and reviews of recent work on Russell. Scholarly articles appearing in the *Quarterly* are peer-reviewed.

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THE ROAD TO CONNECTICUT

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IN THIS ISSUE

COVER ART. THOSE DRIVING TO LAST YEAR'S ANNUAL MEETING from the south and west traveled there a good part of the way on the famed Merritt Parkway, which cuts across southern Connecticut. The illustration on the cover gives some sense of this remarkable highway. A pet project of Robert Moses, the Merritt has beautifully designed art deco and beaux-arts bridges and exit and entrance ramps; the curves of the highway themselves are art deco. Traveling on it to and from the Society meeting in New Britain was an elegant beginning and ending of an excellent weekend conference.

THIS ISSUE'S FEATURE ARTICLE is (we promise you) an action-packed interview with Nicholas Griffin by Jolen Galaugher and Ilmari Kortelainen. In it, Griffin shares his views on all aspects of the history of analytic philosophy and on the history of the history of analytic philosophy as well (its "historiography" for those preferring ambiguous technical terms), providing us with bold conjectures and startling insights into the now major movement of the history of analytic philosophy, as well as into Bertrand Russell's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's own philosophies. Historians and historiographers alike will not want to miss this interview.

Just as important, Griffin gives us a good idea of what is in store for us next May 21-24 at the *PM@100* conference (celebrating the centenary of the publication of volume 1 of *Principia Mathematica*) at McMaster University. As might be guessed, it is logic, history of logic, philosophy of logic, and then for variety, mathematics, history of mathematics, and philosophy of mathematics. For talks of a more humanistic nature, there will be the Bertrand Russell Society's own annual meeting occurring in conjunction with the *PM@100* conference at McMaster May 21-23, just down the hall.

THE WINNER of the 2009 Bertrand Russell Society book award last year was Omar Nasim for his book *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World*. In this issue of the *Quarterly*, Samuel Lebens reviews Nasim's award-winning book, providing us with a clear understanding of Russell's relations with the Edwardian philosophers, especially of their debate over the nature of sense-data. An important document in the Edwardian debate on the nature of sense-data is Russell's 1915 letter to the *Journal of*

Philosophy clarifying his view that sense-data are physical, not mental. That letter is reproduced in full in this issue. Accompanying this letter is a substantial introduction to it by Omar Nasim, telling us the background to the letter, the contemporary context in which it occurred, and the role this specific letter played in Russell's contribution to the Edwardian's debate on sense-data.

FOLLOWING THE RUSSELL LETTER OF 1915, we indulge in some editorial quibbling over the interpretation of another Russell letter, this one a letter by Russell to *Newsweek* in 1967. This in turn is followed by the *Traveler's Diary*, which in this issue reports on the Russell Society's last annual meeting. Finally, there are the meeting minutes of both the 2009 annual BRS board of directors meeting and 2009 BRS membership meeting, published in the back along with the treasurer's reports. Note that these minutes have not yet been approved by the board or members. The minutes can now be found online. Indeed, the BRS board of directors and membership meeting minutes for every year going back to 1990 can be found online at users.drew.edu/~lenz/brs-minutes.html. Minutes of still earlier meetings will be put online as they are transcribed for the web.

SOCIETY NEWS

IT IS TIME TO RENEW YOUR MEMBERSHIP in the Bertrand Russell Society. Memberships run from January to January, so it is time to renew your membership. Please take a minute to do so now. Details for renewing can be found in the ad on p. 2.

THE LAST (2009) ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY itself took place June 5-7 at Central Connecticut State University in New Britain, Connecticut, hosted by David Blitz. It was a rich and rewarding weekend. See the full report beginning on p. 41 for details of the event.

THE NEXT ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BRS, the Society's 37th, will take place at McMaster University May 21-23, 2010. This will be the 7th time that the Society has met at McMaster. The annual meeting will occur in conjunction with another Russell event – the *PM@100* conference, which is the centenary celebration of the publication of volume 1 of *Principia Mathematica*. The *PM@100* conference will occur on May 21-24, 2010, also at McMaster University – and just down the hall from the BRS conference. The alignment of the annual meeting with another stellar Russell conference is a rare event, and when it occurs, it is a big affair. For this reason alone members should start making plans now to attend this year's BRS annual meeting, especially if you have never been to one before; it will have double the talks, double the people, and double the excitement. And since the Russell Archives are at McMaster, this is another good reason to attend this year's meeting. Go a day early and visit the archives, or if you have research to do there, kill three birds with one stone (your research and two conferences) and go several days early. Details of the meeting program, talks and abstracts, registration, housing, food, and fees, with regular updates, will soon be online at <http://russell.mcmaster.ca/brsmeeting>.

NEXT SPRING'S *PM@100* CONFERENCE. It's full title is "*PM@100: Logic from 1910 to 1927*," it is taking place May 21-24, 2010 at McMaster University in conjunction with the May 21-23 Bertrand Russell Society annual meeting, it is hosted by the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, and it will be a big affair. Its purpose is to celebrate the centenary of the publication of the first volume of White-

head and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, a landmark in the development of logic, the foundations of mathematics, and the use of logic in philosophy, and talks presented there will aim to evaluate the contributions it made, or failed to make, to these fields. You should start making plans *now* to attend this conference. Further news of the *PM@100* conference, including the program, accommodations, food and fees, will be posted at: <http://pm100.mcmaster.ca/> as these details become known.

THE RUSSELL SOCIETY AT THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. This past December 2009, the Bertrand Russell Society hosted a session of talks at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at the Marriott at Times Square in New York City. Participants included Jolen Galaugher speaking on "Russell's Quasi-Leibnizian Construction of 'Distance' in the *Principles of Mathematics*," Sebastien Gandon on "Russell's Analysis, Benacerraf's Multiple Reduction Challenge, and the Philosophy of Mathematics," and Nikolay Milkov on "Russell, Wittgenstein, and the Project for 'Analytic Philosophy.'" At a related session that same day, hosted by the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, Nathan Berber spoke on "A Tractarian Formal Ontology of Objects," James Connelly spoke on "A 'Dissolution' of the Puzzle about Propositional Attitudes on the Basis of Descriptivist Semantics for Singular Terms," and Rosemary Twomey read and commented on Anita Konzelmann Ziv's paper on "Bolzano on Naturalized Rationality and Virtue Epistemology: Achievements in Early Analytic Philosophy."

FUTURE APA ACTIVITIES OF THE BRS. The BRS will host a session of talks at the Central APA this year, which meets at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel in Chicago once again. The Russell Society session will be on Thursday, February 18th from 5-7 pm. Speakers include Jolen Galaugher on "Russell's Logical Approach to Analysis," Richard Schmitt on "Russell's Understanding and Reception of Wittgenstein's Argument," and Dustin Olson on "Russell's 'Limits of Empiricism.'" A BRS session will also take place this year at the Pacific APA in a combined session with the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society. The Pacific APA conference will be from March 31 - April 4, 2010 at the Westin St Francis hotel in San Francisco. At the BRS/HEAPS session there Peter Baumann will speak on "Ful-

fillment or Satisfaction? Russell and Wittgenstein on the Content of Desires," Reshaf Agam-Segal will speak on "A Splitting Mind-Ache: The Case of Self-Legislation," and Russell Wahl will speak on "Analysis and Acquaintance." Finally, Peter Stone may, if his schedule permits, present a paper there titled "Russell on Mathematical Education." Further information about the APA meetings is at: www.apaonline.org/divisions/schedule.aspx. Members of the BRS living in or visiting these areas are urged to come to the sessions!

REPORT ON ELECTION FOR BRS BOARD OF DIRECTORS. This year a near record number of candidates were nominated in the 2009 election for BRS board of directors (serving 2010-2012), and what seems to be a record number of votes were cast: 61 votes for 11 candidates running for the 8 empty board positions, though the number of candidates is still short of the 14 candidates who ran in 2000. On the ballot were: Kenneth Blackwell, Howard Blair, David Blitz, Jolen Galaugher, Kevin Klement, Chris Pincock, Thomas Stanley, Russell Wahl, Billy Joe Lucas, David White, and Robert Zack, with the first eight being elected to the board. We thank everyone involved for taking part in this fine election and hope to see an equally large turnout both of candidates and voters in next year's election for the BRS board.

RUSSELL QUIZ. Where does Russell refer to an okapi - and what *is* an okapi anyway? (Answer is at the end of Society News.)

WELCOME NEW MEMBERS! Last year's new members to the Bertrand Russell Society are: Frank & Melina Adams, Mirza Ahmed, Lois Ario, Ryan Conti, Tim Facer, Gordon Fisher, Doug Fitz, Thomas Foster, Jolen Galaugher, Malachi Hacoheh, Mario Helman, Junling Hu, Herbert Huber, Terrence Hurley, Christopher Kazanovicz, Brett Lintott, Seyed Javad Miri, Dustin Olson, Mark Overmyer, Katarina Perovic, George Reisch, Alvin Rogers, Michael Staron, Derek Stoeckle, Robert Summerfield, Warren Wagner, and Edwards Yates & Min Chang. AND FORMER MEMBERS WHO HAVE REJOINED THE SOCIETY ARE: Alan Bishop, Giovanni de Carvalho, David Gillett & Martha Farmer, Donald Hartman, Thomas Horne, Priyadarshi Jetli, Ilmari Kortelainen, Charles Lauricella, Gary McDole, David Taylor, Raymond White, and Barrie Zwicker.

IN THE PAST YEAR, NUMEROUS MEMBERS HAVE GENEROUSLY CONTRIBUTED to the Bertrand Russell Society by sending more than nec-

essary for membership dues. They are: CONTRIBUTORS (\$50): Mark Adams, M.D., Dong-in Bae, Alan Bishop, Ken Blackwell, Howard Blair, Ricard Flores & Sylvia Pizzi, Mario Helman, David Henehan, Fred McColly, Thomas Stanley, Thom Weidlich, and David & Linda White, SUSTAINER (\$75): Peter Stone, and SPONSORS (\$100): William Bruneau, James Bunton, Robert K. Davis, John Fitzgerald, Mark Fuller, Carol Keene, Marvin Kohl, Gregory Landini, Stephen Reinhardt, Richard Schmitt, Peter Stanbridge. We thank them for their support of the BRS!

FORTHCOMING BOOKS OF INTEREST AND MORE CALLS FOR PAPERS. BRS member Dr. Seyed Javad Miri, Visiting Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies in Tehran, will be publishing a collection of essays on Russell. Those interested in submitting an essay for the collection (essays may be on any aspect of Russell's life or works) should send abstracts of the paper to Dr. Miri at seyedjavad@hotmail.com no later than May 2010 and the completed paper no later than December 2010.

Dr. Miri and the Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IHCS) are also planning to publish a collection of essays that explore religion and spirituality in a postmodern world, focusing in particular on globalization's impact on perceptions of secularism and the relevance of post-secularism. Those interested in contributing to this volume should contact Dr. Miri at seyedjavad@hotmail.com by sending an abstract of a paper by March 2010 and a complete paper by June 2010.

RUSSELL CITINGS. What counts as a philosophical or religious belief? A recent *Guardian* article (Tuesday, November 3, 2009) reports that a judge in the UK has ruled that "a belief in man-made climate change, and the alleged resulting moral imperatives, is capable, if genuinely held, of being a philosophical belief for the purpose of the British 2003 Religion and Belief Regulations" which prohibit discrimination on the basis of deeply held religious or philosophical beliefs. But what counts as a "philosophical belief"? For an answer, the defense cited Russell on the subject, with the judge in the case referring to it as "what must be the first appearance in a bundle of legal authorities of the *History of Western Philosophy* by Bertrand Russell." Russell's view is that "philosophy ... is something intermediate between theology and science." But for the pur-

poses of law, the judge finally decided that by legal precedent a philosophical belief is: (1) "a belief ... genuinely held," (2) "not an opinion or view based on the present state of information available," (3) "a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life," with (4) "a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance," and (5) one "worthy of respect in a democratic society, not incompatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others" – not a bad definition and perhaps even one Russell would have endorsed. See www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/03/tim-nicholson-climate-change-belief to read the Guardian's story of the trial and www.employmentappeals.gov.uk/Public/Upload/09_0219rjfhLBZT.doc for the transcript of the proceedings and judgment itself.

GRRS/BARS REPORT. Upcoming talks of interest in Rochester NY can be found at the monthly meetings of the Greater Rochester Russell Set. On February 11, Gerry Wildenberg will speak there on *Under the Banner of Heaven*, Jon Kracauer's account of recent murders committed, according to the murderer's, under direct orders from God, and March 11, Tim Madigan will speak on his new book *W.K. Clifford and the Ethics of Belief*. Meanwhile, out in San Francisco, the local chapter of the BRS, the Bay Area Russell Set, will be discussing Russell, Moore, and Darwin on February 16, and the Bertrand Russell comic book *Logicomix* on March 16. For details on locations and further talks, see the ad for the GRRS and BARS talks in the back of this journal.

ANSWER TO RUSSELL QUIZ. Russell uses the word "okapi" in *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, chapter 3; it refers to a giraffe-like mammal in Central Africa.



IN MEMORIAM. Theo Meijer, long-time member of the Bertrand Russell Society, died this past June 20th from cancer. He had been a member of the Russell Society since 1978 – over 30 years! Theo was born in Amsterdam in 1935 and moved to Vancouver in 1960. He was an educator (an instructor in the International

Baccalaureate Program at Abbotsford, BC), as well as a freelance court interpreter/translator, life long humanist, president of the British Columbia Humanist Association from 1996 to 1999, and active member of the Victoria Humanists group.

Theo was a regular contributor to the Canadian humanist magazine *Humanist Perspectives*, and was known for writing carefully reasoned articles in a clear and accessible style on such subjects as “Evolution and Education,” “Teaching Theory of Knowledge in Secondary Schools,” “Modern Humanism,” “The War on Science and Reason,” “Eco-Humanism,” “Euthanasia in The Netherlands,” “Democracy and the Media,” and many other issues.

Passages representative of his views include this one on evolution and education: “It is difficult to object to the idea of creation being mentioned in social studies classes, when discussing comparative religious mythologies, but introducing such views in science classes perverts the very essence of the scientific process” (*Humanist Perspectives* no. 54).

Theo was also a member of the British Columbia Society for Skeptical Inquiry, which aimed at providing a reliable source of information to the public and media on claims of the paranormal. As well, he coordinated lecture series on modern humanism for several colleges and universities. We are sorry he is gone.

FEATURE

NICHOLAS GRIFFIN SPEAKS HIS MIND

Interview with NICHOLAS GRIFFIN, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster University, by JOLEN GALAUGHER and ILMARI KORTELAJAINEN.

JOLEN GALAUGHER: We can see posters here already printed for the upcoming PM@100 conference, to be held May 21-24, 2010. It's our understanding that the Bertrand Russell Research Centre is hosting the conference to celebrate the centenary of the publication of the first volume of Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica*. What sorts of philosophers is the conference likely to attract and what issues do you think will get priority?

NICHOLAS GRIFFIN: I think mainly logicians and people interested in the philosophy of mathematics – it will be quite a technical conference – but also people interested in the history of logic and the history of analytic philosophy in the early years of the 20th century. The sorts of issues that will get discussed will be things like the viability of Russell's revision of the second edition of the *Principia*; the tenability of logicism in any form at all – that was the doctrine that the book was written to promulgate and it's an open question, I think, whether logicism can survive or not – what contribution the book made to the development of logic, the importance of some of the doctrines it introduced, like type theory. Those are some of the issues.

JG: In interpreting the revisions to the second edition and the question of whether logicism is defensible, do you think that people are more interested in setting the historical record straight about the text or appraising its actual contribution to logic.

NG: I think both. There's a serious movement now to try to get the history of early 20th century philosophy right in a way that no one paid any attention to for most of the 20th century, so that's certainly one thing that will happen. But there's also an attempt to quarry some of these older works for ideas which are important still today. One example is the way that Frege's *Grundgesetze* is being quarried to create neo-logicism, a revision of that earlier theory. Nothing comparable has come from *Principia Mathematica* yet. Maybe it

will. I've heard of computer scientists who have found inspiration in *Principia's* relation-arithmetic. We're still in the early days of really paying detailed attention to *Principia*.

ILMARI KORTELAINE: What about Russell's other works? He was certainly prolific in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, in the theory of knowledge and in metaphysics, but also in areas of social and political philosophy. Has interest in his writings on social and political topics declined, in your opinion?

NG: Yes, I think it has and I think it's quite natural, because Russell was never a great theorist in political and social philosophy. He was always more practically involved in social and political campaigns, so his effort wasn't devoted to creating major theories in political philosophy. And as the political issues that he was concerned with have receded into the past, obviously the contributions that he made to them have become of more historical interest, so I think there has been a tailing off of interest in his socio-political ideas, especially the political ones; the social ones, less so. The broad social issues – for example, the balance between organization in society and freedom – those big issues go on for ever and ever so Russell's opinions on them remain of interest, but I think what he said about the First World War, what he said about the Second World War, or the Vietnam War, or the situation in China – that's become a historical issue now and not of much relevance to people apart from historians.

IK: So research in this field is mainly historical?

NG: Yes, the historians are working in that area, but the one exception to that, though it's not exactly political or social philosophy, is his contribution to ethics. It was thought for a long time that his contribution to ethics was quite minor and then in the last few years, thanks mainly to the work of Charles Pigden, he has turned out to be quite a significant contributor to 20th century ethics and that's come as a surprise, I think, to a number of us. Maybe there will be similar surprises once the political and social writings are studied in detail.

JG: Returning to the question of his social and political thoughts, woefully under-theorized though they may have been, they also weren't always popular. In some sense, his notoriety in that regard had something to do with McMaster's acquisition of the archival materials, did it not?

NG: Yes, there's a funny story connected with that. Russell wanted

to sell his papers in order to make money to support his political work, and the natural place to sell them was in the United States, and the natural university to buy them in the United States was the University of Texas, which had a major collection of humanities and mathematical papers and apparently a huge acquisitions budget. So Russell had an agent negotiating with the University of Texas to sell the papers to Texas and while this was going on a little article appeared in *Newsweek* saying that the negotiations were underway and that Russell, when he got the money from Texas, was going to send it to North Vietnam to support the war effort. As soon as that came out it became impossible for Russell to sell his papers in America. There was no truth in the story whatsoever: Russell was selling his papers to support his political work, he wasn't selling them to support the Vietnamese war effort. Where the story came from, I'm not sure. It's hard to think that *Newsweek* would have invented it out of nothing, so they were quite possibly set up for it, but it made the papers unsaleable, not just to Texas, but in the whole of the United States. And into that vacuum McMaster stepped, and I suspect that little one-inch story in *Newsweek* probably saved McMaster 100,000 or 150,000 pounds. It was really quite a good deal for McMaster.

IK: And since then you have had these archival materials. Who, by the way, was the first director of the archives?

NG: To go right back to the beginning: actually before McMaster knew about them, Ken Blackwell was working on the papers, cataloguing them, working on them in Russell's house in Wales, and when McMaster discovered that the papers were up for sale it was the catalogue that Ken had created that was the basis for the sale. So when the papers were bought and they came over to Canada, Ken came with them – it was a package deal! The librarian at McMaster who acquired them was William Ready, who was a very enterprising librarian. Ken Blackwell came over with the papers and became the Russell archivist, a position that he held for many years.

JG: Anyone who knows of Ken Blackwell's capacious memory could understand why he may have come over with the materials, but perhaps not why he needed a head start.

NG: That's true.

IK: As a part of the Russell Research Centre's ongoing project of collecting and digitizing Russell's papers, you edited volume two of

the *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, which contains some of Russell's earliest writings, where we see him first breaking with idealism or the neo-Hegelianism that dominated Cambridge even in the last few years of the 19th century, but you have also edited the *Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell*, which spans several decades of the development of Russell's thoughts. Do you still find his earliest writings the most interesting or which of Russell's works, published or unpublished, do you find yourself returning to?

NG: The one I return to the most is the *Principles of Mathematics* – to my mind, his greatest work, certainly to me his most interesting work. So I would say it is not his very earliest writings that I find most interesting, but the ones that come shortly after from about 1900 to about 1910: the work on philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. I think his greatest works come in that period. That is certainly not an unexpected answer; it is a quite conventional one. But I do think that much later in his writing, there are extraordinarily good things. For example, even in his last major philosophical book, *Human Knowledge*, there are extraordinarily important ideas which have been almost completely overlooked. So, the big surprise is how much of interest there is in the later stuff, but that I still prefer the earlier stuff shouldn't really surprise anyone.

JG: Over the years, in returning to the *Principles of Mathematics* and to these earlier works in the period prior to and just up to the *Principia*, what unpublished materials or archival materials have been the most significant or surprising to you in interpreting or reinterpreting those works?

NG: When I first started, it was the neo-Hegelian stuff, because it just seemed so bizarre. I mean, Russell was a philosopher whom you thought you knew: you had been taught him as an undergraduate, you thought you knew a fair bit about him, and then you came upon this material that was written in a wholly alien idiom. It was like discovering that he'd had a Japanese phase or something like that and had written just in Japanese. I remember finding one manuscript "Can We Make a Dialectical Transition from Punctual Matter to the Plenum?" and I thought "What on earth is going on?" I had no idea what he was doing there, so that was really quite surprising for me. It seems less so now because I spent a long time trying to understand it and now it seems quite familiar and quite natural that he should have written those things, but I remember when I first

discovered it I was absolutely astonished.

JG: What, in your opinion, are some of the most important issues in Russell scholarship being discussed now and what unpublished manuscripts do you suspect might contain some gems for resolving those issues?

NG: There are big ongoing issues, for example, about the tenability of logicism. There is a lot of stuff to be discovered, I think, in the later philosophy. The climate in philosophy nowadays is much more sympathetic to the sort of work that Russell did than it was thirty or forty years ago; the sorts of metaphysical issues that Russell was concerned with are once again of central concern in philosophy. The bundle theory of particulars, for example – I've a graduate student who has just finished a thesis on it – is a topic about which very little has been written and which anyone doing philosophy in the 1940s or 1950s would have thought a very old-fashioned topic, because it's straight metaphysics, it's traditional metaphysics, and that was very unfashionable then. But it's a topic which looks much more in tune with the way philosophy is done now and is the sort of topic that modern philosophers would take seriously.

Concerning which unpublished manuscripts are still of interest, one collection that I am particularly interested in at the moment is Russell's correspondence with Whitehead, which covers, of course, the period when they were working on the *Principia* together. But it starts just after Russell graduated from Cambridge – Whitehead had been his teacher and Russell would occasionally write to Whitehead for advice on philosophical issues – so that is a very important correspondence. There is much more of Whitehead than of Russell among the papers, but an edition of both sides of the correspondence is one thing that I'm just starting to work on in collaboration with Sébastien Gandon.

IK: Whitehead is not as well known a philosopher as Russell is nowadays and his work is not studied as much.

NG: It's certainly studied, but by an entirely different group of people. I hesitate to say it, but among certain philosophers Whitehead is almost a religious cult. His later philosophy, his process philosophy, has been tied into a certain type of theology and a certain view of God and religious matters. This makes it seem antithetical to Russell, except that the basic metaphysics behind it is not so radically different from Russell's neutral monism. But those philosophers who study Whitehead's process philosophy have hardly any in-

terest in the earlier logical works of Whitehead or even in his work on the philosophy of science. He did interesting work on the theory of relativity, for example, in the 1920s.

JG: Does the correspondence with Whitehead contain materials relevant to Russell's early attempt to classify relations or, for instance, to the ways that he interprets the methods from the *Universal Algebra* in his *Principles of Mathematics*?

NG: I'm only just beginning the work, so I'm not really in a good position to say what exactly the correspondence contains. It is extraordinarily technical and some of the letters are very hard to construe because they're often speaking in symbols to each other and they're using symbols which, in some cases, don't appear in print. This is *Principia* notation before *Principia* was published, so they know what they mean by the symbols, but we sometimes have to work it out. Part of what they were doing was creating the notation for the *Principia* and, at a deeper level than that, they're talking about issues that they each understood very well – they didn't have to explain anything to each other. I think that of all the material that we know exists, if this correspondence is not going to tell us important stuff about the creation of *Principia Mathematica* nothing will. There is nothing else that we know exists that is going to have anything like that importance for understanding Russell's early logic.

IK: Do you think that philosophers are looking to Russell's work to uncover the precise nature of his contributions to the history of so-called "analytic philosophy" or to see how an understanding of his texts might be informative for solving contemporary problems in philosophy, and in your opinion are these separable tasks?

NG: I think they are separate. Both are going on and different people are doing different things. Those, like myself, who are heavily involved in the history of philosophy are trying to find out what he actually believed and to give a coherent account of his actual philosophy. But I think there are other people who are using his philosophy. One example was Gareth Evans, who plundered the notion of a "Russellian proposition" from Russell, admitting that it probably wasn't what Russell meant by a proposition, but wanting a label to give it, and acknowledging that there were affinities between the notion that Evans wanted and the one that Russell previously had. Another example is a book that came out recently on causation by Huw Price and Richard Corry, which again looks back to Russell,

but appropriates him for contemporary work. I think both approaches are legitimate, but it is important to know which one you're doing and not to pass off appropriated stuff which you're using for contemporary purposes as if it were the historical truth about what Russell actually believed.

JG: It seems that if you're intending to attack a view, it wouldn't make sense to misattribute that view to Russell and if you're going to defend a view that was never Russell's, why in that case...

NG: It may well be a defensible view and you may want to defend it and you might find that even though it wasn't Russell's view, you might find arguments for defending it in Russell and that's all quite legitimate. That sort of scrapping and recycling of positions in philosophy goes on all the time, but there ought to be due care taken with getting the historical philosophies correct.

JG: That makes me wonder whether historians of early analytic philosophy have a role to play – and, if so, what that role is – in solving contemporary problems in philosophy or metaphysics.

NG: I don't think that's the justification for their endeavour. As historians of philosophy, they are trying to understand the thought of the past and that is an important task in itself. So saying "Will it help us solve contemporary problems?" – it might, but in the same way that the reason for an historian to try to understand the causes of the First World War is not necessarily to ensure that it never happens again or to solve current political problems, but to understand what went on in the past.

JG: Isn't there something distinctive, though, about doing the history of philosophy, apart from doing "intellectual history" as it might be carried out by more social scientific means within history.

NG: Yes, that's true and you notice the difference. There are some books published like that which do history of philosophy from a sociological point of view. The authors hardly ever make judgments as to whether positions are coherent or arguments are valid, and that, I think, is the key difference between that sort of work, the sociological work, and the philosophical work on the past. So I think an historian of philosophy is interested in what was actually believed and whether it was coherent to believe it or whether it was, in the terms of that time, justified to believe it.

IK: If we are doing only the history of early analytic philosophy are we really doing philosophy, are we doing analysis or just researching views in context?

NG: There's a book on the reception of logic by German philosophers at the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, by a Finnish scholar, Jarmo Pulkkinen. He isn't a philosopher, but an historian who works in the history department at Oulu University and he did this extraordinarily interesting book in which he, apparently exhaustively, catalogued all the responses that German philosophers had made to the emerging field of formal logic from the time of Frege to, basically, *Principia Mathematica*. In all of that book, he never offered a single thought as to whether any position that was held by any of those philosophers was correct, or justified, or even coherent. He was just prepared to record it, but in recording it he produced an extraordinarily interesting book. He was interested not that philosophers might have held these views because they were the correct views, but that they might have held them because they worked in technical high schools and not in universities and if they'd worked in universities, they would have held different views about the importance of logic. I found that a fascinating book, but one almost completely devoid of philosophical content. It was purely historical or sociological.

JG: In considering the impact that Russell's works have had over several decades and in looking back at the emergence of the history of early analytic philosophy as its own field of study, where do you think that Russell's work had a remarkable, but perhaps short-lived or culturally contingent impact? And where do you think his work has exhibited a significant and sustained – maybe even warranted – even if unacknowledged influence?

NG: On the first question, a key example is the notion of a sense-datum. If you ask what people know about Russell's theory of knowledge, they say "Russell was the philosopher who believed that physical objects could be constructed out of sense-data." Now this was a view that in fact Russell held for five years in a career of about sixty years, but it had a huge impact and is what people nowadays know about Russell.

On the other question, where did he have an important impact which is unacknowledged: here there is one important doctrine which has dominated the philosophy of language through the second half of the 20th century from the later Wittgenstein on and this is the view, usually attributed to Wittgenstein, that meaning is derived from use. Or as Wittgenstein in fact says in the *Philosophical*

Investigations, that the meaning of an expression is its use. This was actually a doctrine that came from Russell. Russell was putting it forward in the *Analysis of Mind* at the very time Wittgenstein was publishing his notorious picture theory of language. So at the time Wittgenstein is putting forward a view of language that he later comes to think is fundamentally flawed, Russell is already, I think, seeing the flaws of that model of language and is looking at a completely different one. He is not particularly interested in it, because Russell was not particularly interested in the philosophy of language, but nonetheless he was wondering what meaning could be and was putting forward a use theory of meaning which we know Wittgenstein read, because there is massive evidence that Wittgenstein got all sorts of things from the *Analysis of Mind* – usually things that he went on to criticize. An exhaustive list of the things that Wittgenstein criticized in that book is to be found in Garth Hallett's massive compilation *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*. But the one thing that Hallett doesn't mention is the use theory of meaning which you find in the *Analysis of Mind*. It's close to plagiarism, in fact, for Wittgenstein to have taken that idea and not credited it, though of course he didn't credit the ideas he criticized either. But that is, I think, one place where Russell had, indirectly through Wittgenstein, an enormous impact. Whether Wittgenstein would have ever thought of it on his own, I don't know, but there is every reason to suppose that he got it from Russell.

JG: That is significant for understanding Russell's influence on Wittgenstein and something perhaps that we don't have a good excuse for not understanding, given that the *Analysis of Mind* is an accessible work.

NG: It's just that Russell doesn't say very much about it. It is a by-product of that work, so he doesn't emphasize it and for that reason it can be overlooked. But Wittgenstein certainly didn't overlook it.

JG: Is there anything in the archives that elaborates the view?

NG: Not very much, because Russell was not concerned about language itself or not very much. And he thought that how words were related to meaning was a contingent, empirical matter that linguists would deal with. It wasn't a philosophical issue of any great importance for him.

IK: I guess we could say that when Russell differentiates logical form and linguistic form, even though he is not explicitly doing the

philosophy of language, he has influenced philosophers who are doing the philosophy of language.

NG: Yes, the theory of descriptions is obviously one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language in the early part of the 20th century. It's just that when Russell was creating it, he didn't think of it as a contribution to the philosophy of language, because he didn't think that the philosophy of language was terribly important.

IK: The question can only be incompletely answered: What direction do you think work on Russell is taking and what trends do you think are emerging more broadly in the history of early analytic philosophy now that the field is established and is perhaps more reflective about its aims?

NG: I think on the second question, there is a new emphasis on getting the history right, whereas before, the idea of getting an interesting story was more dominant. Basically the idea was to show how people had begun there and ended up here; how they'd begun with the positions held at the turn of the century and then by 1940 had come up with some kind of neo-logical positivism. The purpose was to try to tell that story in a way that would make it inevitable that philosophers would end up believing what philosophers in the 1940s believed. So one thing that is being demolished is that view of the history, that there is some sort of grand inevitability such that if you start with Hegelianism and show that that is false, then you go through these steps until you go through logical positivism and then you realize that that won't work and so you end up a logical empiricist or an ordinary language philosopher, one of those two options. That sort of inevitable, a priori history just doesn't pass muster anymore. Some philosophers still do a priori history, but most people think that the history of philosophy is a contingent empirical matter and you actually have to pay attention to what people said and believed.

JG: How would you describe the enterprise now: is it more like tracing Ariadnean threads?

NG: [laughs] Yes, it is. It is. The past is much more labyrinthine than people believed it to be. They told a nice story that was easy to teach to undergraduates, which was its great virtue, and it was easy to discuss at the dinner table, which was another great cultural virtue of it – it was clear, straightforward, and it seemed virtually in-

evitable. You had a few set positions, you could describe them succinctly, and each one had a defect which led to the next one, so it was a very Whiggish view of history and you ended up inevitably with views just like those which you and your other colleagues at the dinner table held. I'm imagining a modern symposium of philosophers in the 1940s sitting at a dinner table: they all agree on certain things, about how metaphysics is not very satisfactory, they've got a certain range of positions that they hold in common, and they have a certain story about how it was inevitable that they ended up holding that set of rational beliefs and that no other beliefs would have been rational.

JG: To belabour the point, how do the roundtable discussions of the history of early analytic philosophy societies or Russell societies differ from those dinner-table conversations?

NG: I think, when they're serious at any rate, they're much, much more complicated. There's no doubt that the story that we've got is less satisfying than the one that they invented – a priori history has its advantages and its great advantage is simplicity, because you're not constrained by what actually happened in the past, you can tell a nice simple story about it.

JG: Could that be alleged of Russell?

NG: Yes, it certainly could. It could be alleged of Russell in *The History of Western Philosophy*. I don't think it could be alleged of Russell in his book on Leibniz, where he really did pay – and I'm not saying he got Leibniz right – but he did pay a lot of attention to what Leibniz actually believed and it was notoriously difficult to get Leibniz right. The history of work on Leibniz exhibits exactly the same sort of duality that I've just mentioned: one the one hand, there is a nice simple story that you can teach to undergraduates about the *Monadology* and it seems, as Russell said, "just like a fairy tale"; no reason to believe it true, but it's a nice story.

JG: And what did Russell say about the value of the true?

NG: Oh, the value of the true! He had a lovely remark about the value of truth: he said that it was "dull, complex, and unifying." And then he acknowledged that that remark about it was not dull, complex, and unifying, so there was sort of a paradox. And I think that that is largely true. The truth about the great dead philosophers is often dull, complex, and unifying, but at the same

time the intricacy of it has its interest, and the a priori view is too simple to command your interest. If actual history were like that, you wouldn't want to do the history of philosophy for long, because it's too simple a story – you'd just teach your undergraduate course in it and pass on. But when you think “what did Leibniz actually believe” or “what did Russell actually believe” – what they believed was much more complicated, much more difficult to pass along to undergraduates, and not at all the sort of thing that you would want in a sort of Rortian after-dinner conversation.

JG: And to the extent that it was aimed at simplicity, it wasn't aimed at simplicity of that kind or at that cost.

NG: You don't want to sacrifice the truth for the sake of simplicity. In a way, Russell's remark about the truth makes me think, by way of the opposite to it, of Rorty's view that the important contribution to philosophy is in the next smart thing to say in the conversation, whereas Russell's view was that what philosophy should be saying is the truth, which is “dull, complex, and unedifying” and not the sort of thing that you'd want in a Rortian conversation.

JG: There's a kind of cynicism in the Rortian view.

NG: Well, certainly a cynicism in my account of it.

JG: Rightly so, I think, but that cynicism has been attributed to the later Russell and I wonder about the extent to which you think that's true.

NG: I don't think it's correctly attributed to Russell. It strikes me as interesting that Rorty, who believed that what passes as the truth will be the next smart thing in the conversation, went on basically saying the same thing for thirty years, as if it were the absolute truth and he had a religious revelation to convey, whereas Russell, who believed the truth was dull, complex, and unedifying, managed to find different things to say, which intrigued both a popular and a professional audience for decades. There's something very odd about that. People do criticize Russell for unduly popularizing philosophy: there's Wittgenstein's famous remark that Russell wrote two series of books, the philosophy ones like *Principia* which should be bound in red, which everyone should read, and the other ones, like *Marriage and Morals*, which should be bound in blue and which no one should be allowed to read. Russell was certainly not being cynical in writing *Marriage and Morals*. It's not in my mind a great book. It was perhaps an influential book; it was influential enough to get him banned from teaching at the City College in New York. There are com-

plaints you may make about it – simple-mindedness or naiveté – but not cynicism. He genuinely thought that this was the right thing to say about sexual morality and was stuff that needed to be said. In the 1960s the book came to seem quite conservative. I think Russell probably thought that it was going to be more provocative than it actually was. It came out when he was lecturing in America and he was fearful he'd get banned from the Bible Belt because of it. But that didn't happen. He gave his talks all over America despite it. Oddly enough, it was only eleven or twelve years later, and in New York not the Bible Belt, that it created a scandal, which is ironical. The American Bible Belt in the 1920s didn't give a damn about it, but New York in the 1940s was up in arms against it. But it was very much an engineered outcry: it wasn't that people were horrified by this infidel in their midst, it was that the Catholic bishops were and the school board that tried to defend Russell's position got no political support, even from the liberals, because they were scared of losing electoral support from the Catholics.

JG: As you said, the decline in interest in the social-political views has something to do with the fact that the controversy that once surrounded them no longer surrounds them.

NG: Yes, that's true.

JG: That said, it's not necessarily desirable to read all of Russell's works even if it were possible. So, what do you think are the most valuable overlooked unpublished materials or is there anything in particular that you're digging for at the moment?

NG: What I'm digging for is in the Russell-Whitehead correspondence. That's my next big project and I think that is some of the most, potentially *the* most, interesting material still unpublished in the archives. There's been a huge amount of material there that was unpublished when Russell died, but a lot of it has now been published and a lot of it has been studied quite closely. It seems to me that the Russell-Whitehead correspondence is the one, large undiscovered landmass that hasn't been explored.

JG: Now that a lot of the materials have been published, what can we look forward to seeing from the Bertrand Russell Research Centre in terms of its upcoming or ongoing projects?

NG: What I'm hoping that you will see in the next two years is 30,000 of Russell's letters, or thereabouts, put up on the web. We're working on an edition of his complete correspondence and the first

step to that is to put up just the images of the letters linked to a directory of them, so that people will be able to access them. Eventually we hope to transcribe them and annotate them and do a proper critical edition of them, but in the meantime, the image will be better than nothing – Russell’s handwriting is quite legible. So that is the main task and I’m hoping that that might happen in the next two years. We’ve been working on it for a long time and money has been in very short supply, but I’m hoping that in two years, we should be able to have those up on the web.

IK: And this is a large project, because Russell wrote a huge number of letters.

NG: He wrote an enormous number of letters. He didn’t keep copies of them all and so we’ve got only a small fraction of the ones that he did write. The complete catalogue of his correspondence, both sides, is well over 100,000 letters and that’s only what we have in the archives. 40,000 were written by Russell himself and of those we’ll put about 30,000 up.

JG: If the work to date on the unpublished correspondence is any indication, these letters would seem an inexhaustible resource for generating new insights into the development of Russell’s ideas, his interactions with his contemporaries, and points of intersection with other developing areas of philosophy, so it would be nice to see this project come together.

NG: Yes, it would. There’s a huge amount of material there on everything under the sun from the philosophy of arithmetic to the politics of Zambia. There are letters to every sort of person from presidents and heads of state to ordinary people who just wrote sometimes asking him his advice on who they should get married to. He almost had a sideline for a while as an agony aunt. People would write him to ask: should they marry the girl they had fallen in love with, should they have children – it’s really astonishing.

JG: So there’s something for everyone: for the dinner-tables or roundtables.

NG: For everyone. Yes, exactly. And there are letters to Einstein, letters to T.S. Eliot, letters to D.H. Lawrence, letters to John Lennon, just a huge range. It is hard to imagine any philosopher having that range of connection.

JG: I wonder then, why is there this obstacle to securing funding? Is it just that people are unaware that these letters exist or contain

those things of interest which they do?

NG: No, I think part of it is that the arts in Canada are very substantially underfunded and it’s not easy to.... I was going to say that it isn’t easy to turn this into new technology, but we in fact have turned it into new technology.

JG: And very successfully.

NG: Yes, because we’ve devised an extraordinarily wide-ranging editing program for the transcription and editing and annotating of these letters. So this publishing project will be automated, or a lot more than any previous editing project – and automated by software that we’ve created for ourselves. But the support for humanities research in Canada is rather slight and at McMaster it is rather slight as well. Hopefully when they see what we can do that might change.

JG: And they have seen some of that already.

NG: I hope so.

JG: Thank you very much for your time, Professor Griffin.

NG: Thank you.

BOOK REVIEW

RUSSELL AND THE EDWARDIANS

SAMUEL LEBENS

Review of Omar Nasim, *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Hardcover, 256 pp, \$80.00.

In his book, *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers*, Omar Nasim applies considerable scholarship and clarity of expression to an important yet neglected subject: Russell's place among his most immediate contemporaries between 1911 and 1915. Nasim concentrates on Russell's earliest attempts to construct the external world from sense-data – for example, in “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, both published in 1914 – and challenges the orthodox view that Russell's epistemology was “simply a direct descendent and response to the Empiricists of old” (Nasim, 169).

In the period Nasim focuses on, Russell was a professional philosopher “participating in symposia, colloquia, writing for English academic and non-academic periodicals, [and] keeping in touch both in person and in letters with many of his colleagues” (14). The orthodox view of Russell's epistemology in this period, though it captures part of the picture, divorces Russell from his historical context by making him merely a descendent of the empiricists. Nasim attempts to right that wrong. In so doing, he hopes to arrive at a better understanding of Russell's early attempts to construct the external world. More radically, Nasim alludes to a future reconstruction of our historical account of the birth of analytic philosophy – a reconstruction in which G.F. Stout and the Edwardian philosophers take their rightful place.

I. RUSSELL, STOUT AND NUNN ON SENSE-DATA

Walking around a table, it seems to change shape and colour; and as you move nearer to and further from it, it seems to get larger and smaller. Because we assume that the real table, if there is one, does not frequently change its colour, shape, or size, we are seemingly

forced to conclude that if it exists, it is not what we directly experience. Russell was therefore forced to distinguish between sense-data that we immediately perceive and ordinary objects, for example, the table, in his 1912 *Problems of Philosophy*.

Russell's appeal there to sense-data was borrowed from G.E. Moore. Russell used Moore's lecture notes to prepare *Problems of Philosophy*, where he develops a broadly Moorean theory of perception. (Moore's lecture notes became *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, published in 1953.) But Moore wasn't working in a vacuum, and Nasim pays little attention to him. Moore and Russell were both appealing to sense-data while a philosophical controversy was waged about sense-data between G.F. Stout on the one hand and Samuel Alexander and T.P. Nunn on the other. According to Nasim (3), the roots of this controversy are planted in Stout's 1904 article "Primary and Secondary Qualities," and the debate rumbled on for many years. Nunn was still actively engaged in his dispute with Stout in his 1916 paper "Sense-Data and Physical Objects."

The controversy centred on the nature of sense-data: both sides adapted a distinction between sense-data and ordinary objects, but were sense-data psychical or physical, did they persist when not being perceived, and how did they give rise to knowledge of the ordinary objects that they were said to represent, if indeed they do give rise to such knowledge? Nasim presents Russell's extraordinary attempts to construct ordinary objects out of sense-data in 1913-14 against the backdrop of two postulates fought over in the controversy: Stout's and Nunn's. This influence resulted in a reversal by Russell of his earlier position, inherited from Moore, that sense-data and ordinary objects are distinct.

In his 1909 article for the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, "Are Presentations Mental or Physical?", Stout attacks Alexander's account of sense-data as physical entities that Alexander had argued for in his article "Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas" published in the same issue of the *Proceedings*. Nasim sketches all of Stout's concerns, though only one will be focused on here.

Consider the following example: Adam puts his hand into a bucket of water and feels a cold sensation; simultaneously, Brenda puts her hand into the same bucket of water and feels a hot sensation. Could the very same thing have two contrary qualities inhering in it at the same time and place? "No," Stout answers "for this

'would involve a contradiction'" (Nasim, 55). Stout's reaction is based on what Nasim calls "Stout's postulate," which states that contrary qualities cannot inhere in the same thing at the same time and place. This line of reasoning leads Stout to conclude that sense-data are mental and subjective, "so that Adam's experience of a cold sensation is a distinct psychical existent from Brenda's hot sensation" (ibid).

In a 1910 article, Nunn leapt to Alexander's defence. Nunn simply denies Stout's postulate. Nunn's postulate, its replacement, says that "a thing actually 'owns' all the qualities that may be offered to sense-experience under different circumstances and conditions" (Nasim, 75). Nasim quotes Nunn's explanation:

There is no difficulty in the case of the water which appears warm to A and cold to B. To me it seems true, not only that both the warmth and the coldness are really experienced, but also that, under the appropriate conditions, both are *there to be experienced*. (Ibid.)

Stout thinks it impossible for a thing to instantiate contrary qualities at the same place and time. Nunn thinks that contrary qualities *can* be located in the same place and time. Russell is able, in his construction of the external world, to adopt both postulates by distinguishing two senses of the phrase 'in the same place.'

In *Our Knowledge*, Russell begins his construction of the external world with the claim that no two percipients ever share an identical world of sense-experience. If we both look at the same table, however similar our experience will be, there will certainly be differences forced upon our experiences given our distinct points of view. Russell maintains that these "private worlds" or "perspectives" exist even when nobody perceives them. And there are, he claimed, an infinite number of existent perspectives.

Russell is now able to adopt both Stout's postulate and Nunn's postulate. The place *at which* an object appears is a single perspective. In such a place no object instantiates contrary properties. This accords with Stout's postulate. The place *from which* an object appears is charted in Russell's six dimensional space. Objects *do* instantiate contrary properties at the places *from which* they appear: this allows you to experience the water as cold while I experience it as hot. This accords with Nunn's postulate. However, Russell

forges this compromise, not to find a middle path between Stout and Nunn, but to refine Nunn's position and maintain, against Stout, that sense-data are not psychical. The mere fact that you experience something as cold while I experience it as hot is not enough to demonstrate that our sense-data are mind-dependent.

By this view, then, Russell's work on sense-data and the external world was intended to take its place within the Edwardian controversy. But perhaps Nasim is reading Russell's work into a debate that Russell cared little for or knew little about. How do we know that Russell was really responding to these features of a debate between the Edwardian philosophers? We know it because Russell said so to Nunn. This conversation was reported by Nunn to Alexander in a letter dated 10 July 1914 that Nasim reproduces (119).¹

In addition to clarifying the historical context of Russell's views on sense-data, Nasim provides his readers with the clearest exposition I have ever seen of Russell's somewhat baffling 1914 construction of the external world. Russell's six-dimensional space, in Nasim's hands, becomes relatively easy to comprehend; this, in turn, allows Russell's genius to shine. Once this six-dimensional space is in hand, and we have grasped the distinction between the place *at which* a thing appears and the place *from which* a thing appears, we can see how Stout's postulate and Nunn's postulate, mutually exclusive though they initially seem to be, can both be accommodated. Stout's postulate is true, when we consider the place *at which* an object appears, and Nunn's is false. Nunn's postulate is true, however, when we consider the place in six-dimensional space *from which* an object appears, and Stout's is false. The limited truth of Stout's postulate in no way entails that sense-data must be psychical.

II. OTHER ISSUES THAT INFLUENCED RUSSELL

Russell's accommodation of Stout's postulate with Nunn's postulate is not the only line of influence that Nasim sketches from the Edwardian philosophers to Russell. Russell's distinctive conception of a sense-datum is best understood, Nasim argues, in the light of the raging debate between Stout, Nunn and Alexander. We have al-

¹ The letter is housed at the John Rylands University Library, Samuel Alexander Papers, University of Manchester.

ready seen how Russell's conception of mind-independent and persisting sense-data arose from his engagement with these thinkers. Furthermore, contrasting Russell's 1914 logical construction of the external world with Stout's "ideal construction" (Stout, 1905) uncovers a hidden motive to Russell's whole epistemological project: Russell wanted to separate philosophy from psychology more distinctly than Stout had managed to – Russell's construction of the external world wasn't merely responding to scepticism, as it is often claimed, it was responding to Stout. Stout thought that psychology would help us bridge the gap between sense-data and the external world. Russell thought that this job should and could be done only by logic: the logical form of our statements about the external world can be analysed in terms of sense-data and logical constructions out of sense-data.

Nasim (ch. 6) also presents an analogy between Russell's earlier construction of irrational and imaginary numbers and his construction of the external world. Russell had considered many ways of constructing these peculiar species of number from less peculiar species of number. Nasim goes to great length to show that the various options open to Russell on this issue correspond to the various ways that the Edwardian philosophers sought to construct the external world from sense-data. It's no wonder, Nasim goes on to conclude, that Russell, who had already provided us with a logical construction of these controversial numbers, would address this Edwardian controversy with a logical construction of the external world.

Nasim's book begins the important and long overdue task of delineating the influence of figures such as Stout, and through him, Brentano, in the emergence and early development of analytic philosophy. Russell has no "philosophically simple and direct link ... with the British Empiricists of the Early Modern period" (169). A more fine-grained picture emerges when we place Russell in his proper historical context. For example, Russell's sense-data, unlike the *sensations* of the empiricists, are real and existent physical appearances. Furthermore, we are acquainted with sense-data, but we are also acquainted with relations. This is no simple empiricism.

Nasim's focus on Russell's philosophy between 1911-15 is appropriate – it is an important period in Russell's work, during which the influence of the Edwardian philosophers was most keenly felt.

But even within this narrow focus, key areas are left untouched. Nasim notes that before arriving at his logical construction of the external world, Russell had avowedly adopted Nunn's position – that sense-data are properties belonging to ordinary objects (114). This view, assimilated into Russell's philosophy, would have had major ramifications. If sense-data are properties, then Russell would not have had to distinguish between acquaintance with sense-data and acquaintance with universals. In fact, he would lose all acquaintance with particulars because, during the period Nasim deals with, Russell thought that sense-data are the only particulars with which we're acquainted. I'm not denying that Russell may have held this view during the rapid development of his epistemology – Nasim's arguments seem conclusive – but its ramifications for Russell's account of the particular-universal distinction deserve spelling out.

Similarly, towards the end of the book, Nasim contrasts Russell's view of philosophy in this period with Stout's. Russell's view, as presented by Nasim, is that all distinctively philosophical questions can be reduced to questions of philosophical logic, and can be answered by logic. This is an interesting view, but in order to assess it, we would need an account of what Russell thought logic to be. This account is missing, as is the role of Russell's theory of descriptions and the notion of an incomplete symbol in his logical constructions. A final criticism: the clarity with which Nasim explains Russell's construction of the external world is sometimes missing from his earlier exposition of the Edwardian philosophers. At times, long and difficult passages are left quoted at length, when they might have been better broken up and explained.

Putting these points to one side, Nasim's book is an important start on a much needed programme: locating Russell's work in its proper historical context. A great deal has been said about Russell's relation to his predecessors. It is time to concentrate more on his relation to his contemporaries. Nasim's book is well worthy of attention and will surely repay careful study.

Birkbeck College
London

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RUSSELL LETTERS

RUSSELL'S JULY 1915 LETTER ON SENSE-DATA

I. INTRODUCTION, by OMAR W. NASIM

The following letter by Bertrand Russell was written to the *Journal of Philosophy* (then called the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*) to correct a misrepresentation of his views on the nature of sense-data that were first reported anonymously in the *Athenaeum* and then repeated in the *Journal of Philosophy*. The *Athenaeum* report, published April 24, 1915, is a summary of a session of the Aristotelian Society, held twelve days earlier, at which C.D. Broad read a paper on "Phenomenalism," later published in vol. 15 (n.s.) of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. Russell was present at the session and opened the discussion to which others, such as H. Wildon Carr and R.M. McIver, contributed. Russell's letter to the *Journal of Philosophy* was written on June 7, 1915 and published just over a month later.

In this letter, Russell is at pains to emphasize that his view, in opposition to what is stated in the *Athenaeum* and *Journal of Philosophy* reports, is that sense-data are not mental, but physical. In fact, Russell asserts, "my whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical." But this was not always so clearly the case for Russell. In his 1912 *Problems of Philosophy* (*PP*), Russell argued that sense-data are non-mental and private – this is his doctrine of "physiological subjectivity." But as in G.E. Moore's lectures of 1910-11 on sense-data, perception, and the external world (published in 1953) from which Russell borrowed some of his views on sense-data for *PP*, nowhere does Russell say in *PP* that sense-data are physical, and this is for at least two reasons. First, he took for granted that whatever is physical may persist unchanged even when not perceived – a key assumption to his distinction between physical objects and sensible objects at that time (*PP*, 20-1). And second, it was by way of an important paper he wrote in 1912 soon after *PP*, but never published, called "On ter" that he was led to seriously engage with the writings of T.P. Nunn and Samuel Alexander. Both of their works not only revealed to Russell the problems associated with taking the persistence of

physical objects to the extreme – partly demonstrated in their own insistence on the non-mental nature of sensible objects – but who also provided the very vocabulary and notion of sensible objects as being physical. It is only in his 1913 manuscript *Theory of Knowledge* (TK), written after this first engagement with Nunn and Alexander, that Russell expresses the claim that sense-data are physical (TK, 22), later so essential to his work of 1914. And it was only two months before Broad's presentation, in an address to the Philosophical Society of Manchester on February 15, 1915, and later published as "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" (UCM) that Russell clearly points out two common errors prevalent in relevant discussions at the time: "the first of these is the error that what we see, or perceive through any of our other senses, is subjective: the second is the belief that what is physical must be persistent." (UCM, 128). A sense-datum may therefore be physical without thereby implying that it persists when unperceived – something that would otherwise already assume too much about an external world, as Nunn, Alexander, and Russell of *PP* did assume.

Finally, it is significant to note that when Russell comes to characterize in the letter what it might mean for something to be mental he directly borrows a characterization advanced by G.F. Stout against Alexander (Stout 1909). Stout was a philosopher who struggled to make sense of the connection between the mental act, or relation, of perceiving, sensing, enjoying, etc, a *mental* sensible object, and an *extra-mental* object. On the one hand, the removal of mind for Stout would involve not only the "annihilation" of mental relations, but would also thereby necessitate the loss of its relata, the sensible object, thus demonstrating, due to this dependence, the latter's mental nature. Russell, on the other hand, suggests that what is lost in such a removal is only the relation of perceiving, believing, remembering, etc, and not any particular object which may be a relatum in such a fact. What is fundamental therefore for Russell's philosophy of physics, matter, and the external world, is that a mental relation of sensing, perceiving, etc, has for its object something physical – we are thus directly connected, as subjects with minds and bodies to the domain of physics. There is a lot going on in Russell's letter, and thus much I have left out, but considering the context and all those implicated, it is no wonder that he wished to publically correct the report's misconstrual of his position on the nature of sense-data.

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II. THE LETTER

To the Editors of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*:

In a quotation from the *Athenaeum* printed in this JOURNAL,¹ I am represented as having said, "there may be perspectives where there are no minds; but we can not know anything of what sort of perspectives they may be, for the sense-datum is mental." I did not see the *Athenaeum*, and do not remember what I said, but it can not have been what I am reported as having said, for I hold strongly that the sense-datum is *not* mental – indeed my whole philosophy of physics

¹ Volume XII., page 308.

rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical. The fact of being a datum is mental, but a particular which is a datum is not logically dependent upon being a datum. A particular which is a datum does, however, appear to be casually dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain. Since we carry those about with us, we can not discover what sensibilia, if any, belong to perspectives from places where there is no brain. And since a particular of which we are aware is a sense-datum, we can not be aware of particulars which are not sense-data, and can, therefore, have no empirical evidence as to their nature. This is merely the "egocentric predicament"; it is a tautology, not a "great truth." It is for this reason, and not because "sense-data are mental," that we can not know the nature of those perspectives (if any) which belong to places where there are no minds.

I do not know what is the definition of "mental." In order to obtain a definition, I should first inquire what would necessarily be removed from the world if it were what one would naturally call a world without mind. I see no reason why colors or noises should be removed, but facts which involve such relations as perceiving, remembering, desiring, enjoying, believing would necessarily be removed. This suggests that no *particulars* of which we have experience are to be called "mental," but that certain *facts*, involving certain *relations*, constitute what is essentially mental in the world of our experience. (I use the word "fact" to designate that which makes a proposition true or false; it includes, I think, everything in the world except what is simple.) The term "mental," therefore, will be applicable to all facts involving such relations as those enumerated above. This is not yet a definition, since obviously these relations all have some common characteristic, and it must be this characteristic which will yield the proper definition of the term "mental." But I do not know what this characteristic is.

Very truly yours,

B. RUSSELL
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
June 7, 1915

Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method vol. 12,
no 14 (July 8, 1915), 391-2

APRIL 17, 1967 *NEWSWEEK* REPORT and
RUSSELL LETTER OF APRIL 24, 1967 IN REPLY

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1967, Bertrand Russell was in the process of selling his papers to pay for the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal and to generally fund the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, which had gone into debt to help finance the Tribunal. The story continues, as related in this issue's interview, as well as in the Blackwell and Ruja *Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*, Griffin *Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, and Perkins *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell*, that the April 17, 1967 *Newsweek* reported that the proceeds of the sale were to go to "Communist forces in Vietnam."¹ Russell then replied in an April 24, 1967 letter to *Newsweek*, saying that it was false that he was giving the proceeds of the sale to the Communist forces in Vietnam. But by that time the damage was done and Russell could not sell the papers in the United States, nor get the price for them that he otherwise would have gotten.

This version of the story, however, though told in three standard reference works on Russell, is not entirely accurate as it stands. For what *Newsweek* reported was that the proceeds would go to *aid* Communist forces in Vietnam, not that they would go to the forces themselves, though it is true that Russell wrote back saying that it was false that the proceeds would go to the "Communist forces in Vietnam." But going to aid the communist forces is not the same as going to those forces directly, a possibility Russell ignored in his letter. And it is likely that many viewed, and would view today, the Vietnam Tribunal as indeed aiding North Vietnam's forces. The *Newsweek* report and Russell's reply are on the following page. JO

¹ *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 299. "Letter ... denying *Newsweek's* story ... that Russell would give the proceeds of the sale of his archives to the 'Communist forces in Vietnam.'" *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Public Years* (Routledge, 2001), pp. 617-8. "Word got out that the university [of Texas] intended to buy the collection [of Russell's papers] and *Newsweek* carried a story saying that Russell intended to send the proceeds to North Vietnam." *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell* (Chicago: Open Court, 2002), pp. 393-4. "In 1967 Russell sold his papers.... Russell denies a *Newsweek* report that proceeds from the sale will go to 'Communist forces in Vietnam.'"

II. REPORT AND LETTER

A. THE *NEWSWEEK* REPORT

“LORD RUSSELL, TEXAS AND THE VC”

Delicate negotiations are underway for the sale this summer of Bertrand Russell’s collection of private papers, a sale that may well be the largest of its kind in history – \$3 million or more. The collection includes 100,000 letters from such correspondents as G.B. Shaw, T.S. Elliot and N.S. Khrushchev (represented by a 30-page missive). One prospective purchaser, as yet unidentified, may donate the collection to the University of Texas. Note: this isn’t likely to please the White House. Russell has indicated that all proceeds will go to aid Communist forces in Vietnam.

Newsweek, vol. 69, no. 16 (April 17, 1967), 25-6

B. THE LETTER

“LORD RUSSELL’S DENIAL”

The item published by *NEWSWEEK* (THE PERISCOPE, April 17) stating that I intend giving the proceeds of the sale of my private papers to the “Communist forces in Vietnam” is totally false.

BERTRAND RUSSELL
Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales

Newsweek, vol. 69, no. 17 (April 24, 1967), 4

REPORTS

TRAVELER’S DIARY / BRS 2009 ANNUAL MEETING REPORT

Part of the delight of the annual meetings is seeing how its familiar patterns, rituals, and people play out in different venues. Central Connecticut State University (CCSU), the 2009 location of the annual meeting, is a very modern, thoroughly new campus, with computer stations sprinkled about, well-designed auditoriums, and eerily polite staff. Against this comfortable backdrop, Friday’s light supper of sandwiches segued into a presentation by CCSU students Tom Toomey and Kris Notaro of videos from the Bertrand Russell Audio Visual Project, with David Blitz, who is in charge of the project, commenting. A members’ meeting ended the evening, marred only by the discovery of certain supposedly implacable campus rules: zero tolerance towards alcohol and careful segregation of males and females to different floors of the dormitory in which we were staying. As with most such rules, these were immediately ignored by some, as they probably are throughout the school year.

The conference proper began Saturday morning, after an early breakfast of coffee and rolls, with a brace of talks criticizing Russell’s interpretations of other philosophers. Alan Schwerin led the day with “Russell on Hume’s Views on the Self,” in which he discussed Russell’s interpretation of Hume in the *History of Western Philosophy*. Russell, he said, attributes to Hume the view that “there is ... no impression of the self, and therefore no idea of self,” but Schwerin was not so sure the evidence supports Russell’s interpretation. The audience was divided. Following Schwerin was Thomas Riggins, speaking on “Bertrand Russell on Karl Marx’s Theory of Value.” Riggins thought that Russell got Marx wrong in *German Social Democracy*, and that in fact, it looked as though Russell had never read *Capital* at all! Again, the audience did not entirely go along with this.

Albert Shansky, a newcomer to the annual meeting, spoke next on “A Buddhist View of Russell’s Opinions on Religion.” Shansky compared Russell’s negative views of Christianity with the teachings of Buddha and found them to be remarkably similar; for example, like Russell, Buddhism does not profess belief in a God, a soul,

or a hereafter and both emphasize the need for benevolence. Andrew Cavallo, a student at CCSU, then spoke on Russell and the concept of simplicity. One kind of simplicity Russell often appealed to is Occam's razor, which, Cavallo argued, is a way of using simplicity for theory choice ("pick the simplest theory; that is what we mean by 'truth'"). Cavallo did not think simplicity is a good criterion for theory choice. Marvin Kohl ended the morning session "Upbraiding Russell on Love." While Russell thought love essential for the good life, Kohl finds that Russell was also wary of it, placing constraints on it for fear it would "usurp the place of reason." A richer conception of love, Kohl argued, can be found in a less constrained love.

After a quick lunch, the members of the board met to discuss old and new board business (minutes of the board meeting follow this annual meeting report). Past minutes were approved, Treasurer and *Quarterly* reports were presented, and officers were elected. The board then discussed the location of the next annual meeting and decided to meet at McMaster University on May 21-23, so that it would overlap with the *PM@100* conference meeting there at the same time. The issue of raising fees was discussed, but though we are now losing a little bit of money on every member, a fee hike was postponed for at least another year. The meeting was then adjourned until 5:40 pm, to follow the membership meeting scheduled for that time.

At 1:30 the afternoon session of talks began with John Lenz discussing "Russell as an Anti-Utopian Utopian Thinker." Lenz finds Russell was both utopian and anti-utopian throughout his career, criticizing utopians from Plato and Thomas More to 20th century communists as unrealistic idealists, yet being committed himself to changing or rechanneling human behavior in his WWI writings on possessive versus creative instincts, his proposals for reform in education, and his campaigns for peace and one-world government.

With Jolen Galaugher's talk on "Russell's 'Decompositional' Approach to the Logical Analysis of Propositions," the discussion shifted back to metaphysics and epistemology, brought up earlier by Andrew Cavallo. Galaugher argued that while the sort of analysis Russell advocated and often used after 1905 was a transformational analysis, as in his theory of denoting, where one translates a statement into a correct logical form that is often different from the

logical form of the original statement, Russell's earlier form of analysis, learned from Moore, was decompositional, that is, one that defines a concept in terms of component concepts without redefining the logical form of the statements in which it occurs.

With Sarah Stebbins' and Kevin Klement's talks, which followed Galaugher's, the discussion shifted again – this time to even more technical themes in Russell's logical theory. In her talk on "Russell and Brouwer: The Law of the Excluded Middle," Stebbins explored the relations between various alternatives to Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* logic. Klement in turn, in his talk on "The Functions of Russell's Having No Class," countered Scott Soames's claims as to the inadequacy of Russell's no-classes theory – Russell's theory that avoids paradoxes resulting from the assumption of classes by re-interpreting talk of classes so as to avoid reference to them. Soames had argued that there is no adequate account of propositional functions, on which the no-classes theory rests. Klement argued that there *is* an adequate account.

For the last talk on Saturday afternoon, the discussion shifted back to political themes with Peter Stone's master class on Russell's theory of "Social Cohesion and Government" from *Authority and the Individual*. Stone presented a lucid account of Russell's theories of group cohesion for different human societies, from primitive societies to the most advanced and large-scale ones.

After the afternoon session of talks was the BRS membership meeting (minutes of the membership meeting follow this annual meeting report), where Ken Blackwell announced that the next annual meeting would be held at McMaster University on May 21-23, 2010, in order to coincide with another conference there celebrating the centenary of the publication of volume 1 of *Principia Mathematica*. Rosalind Carey discussed the upcoming BRS session of talks at the eastern and central meetings of the American Philosophical Association, and John Ongley reported on BRS membership trends from 1989 to 2009, noting that membership had declined from 1990 to 2003 and then began to climb again from 2004 on. It was also announced that the BRS website had been redesigned.

Following the membership meeting, the board reconvened and finished business from the afternoon meeting. The Society itself then regrouped for its traditional "Red Hackle" Hour and then Ban-

quiet. (The CCSU policy on alcohol was suspended during the Red Hackle Hour, perhaps by special dispensation from several college administrators who were enjoying themselves at the event.) At the banquet, people enjoyed a fine meal and got to know each other better. Stefan Andersson entertained the gathering with an original version of "Take Me Out to the Ballgame," and Ray Perkins announced the winner of the 2009 BRS Book Award, who was Omar Nasim for his book *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World*. (See review in this issue.)

Sunday morning the talks began with epistemology and logic, as Ilmari Kortelainen presented "Some Remarks about Russell's Analysis and Contextual Definition in 'On Denoting.'" Then breaking away from Russell, but not too far, Chad Trainer spoke on "A U.S. Senator's Adolescent Reflections on Russell's Politics." But it was also a talk by Chad on Senator Daniel Moynihan on Russell, with Chad recounting, among other things, how, when he was lobbying in Congress for his union, a rapt conversation with the Senator about Russell, starting in the hallway, concluded when he discovered himself to have walked with the Senator right onto the Senate floor.

Ken Blackwell followed this with a discussion on "Misunderstandings of the Westminster Speech on War, 1948." In order to understand Russell's remarks in the 1948 Westminster speech, in which Russell was widely said to advocate dropping a nuclear weapon on the Soviet Union, Blackwell provided much background information on Russell's views on war, pacifism, ethics in general, recent European history and NATO, and world government. On a similarly political note, Ray Perkins spoke on "Russell, the Bomb and 'The Wickedest People Who Ever Lived.'" In April 1961, Russell remarked that the leaders of the nuclear nations (Kennedy, Khrushchev and Macmillan) were "the wickedest people who ever lived." The press and Russell's critics were outraged. But Perkins argued that in terms of the expected harm by the policy of nuclear deterrence in vogue at the time ("massive retaliation"), the statement made sense. The political theme continued in the final talk of the conference, where Stefan Andersson spoke on "The People's Opinion and International Law" in which he described his project of writing a book on the background, preparation, implementation, and influence of, as well as the reaction to Russell's Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY 2009 ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES

The 2009 annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society Board of Directors was held on June 6, 2009 at Central Connecticut State University at 12:30 pm chaired by Chad Trainer, Chair of the Board. Board members in attendance were: Kenneth Blackwell, David Blitz, Rosalind Carey, Philip Ebersole, David Henehan, Kevin Klement, Marvin Kohl, John Lenz, John Ongley, Ray Perkins Jr., Alan Schwerin, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, and Thom Weidlich.

Treasurer Ken Blackwell presented the Treasurer's report. The current cash balance was \$11,900 with \$900 owed to the Russell Centre for bookkeeping services. 2008 membership dues were approximately \$4,900 and contributions \$900. Ken reported that due to the economy and based on an email vote of the Board, the \$10.00 dues increase was deferred through 12/31/09. On motion made by Ray Perkins, seconded by Alan Schwerin and unanimously passed, the Treasurer's report was approved.

After discussion about the \$10.00 increase in dues projected for 1/1/10, on motion made by Ken Blackwell, seconded by Phil Ebersole, and unanimously passed, it was decided that student dues would be increased by only \$5.00 but otherwise the \$10.00 dues increase would take place 1/1/10.

Kevin Klement proposed after further discussion that there could be different categories for student memberships with different dues, either including or excluding the Journal. On motion made by John Ongley and seconded by Phil Ebersole and unanimously passed, it was resolved that there would be no increase in the current dues structure through 12/31/10.

Minutes of the 2008 annual board meeting were reviewed and on motion of Ken Blackwell, seconded by Thom Weidlich and unanimously passed, the minutes were approved.

Nominations were sought for positions of officers to serve until the next annual meeting. On motion made, seconded and unanimously passed, the existing slate of officers was reelected as follows:

Chairman – Chad Trainer
President – Alan Schwerin
Vice-Chairman – David White

Vice-President – Ray Perkins
 Treasurer – Ken Blackwell
 Secretary – David Henehan

The location of the next BRS annual meeting was discussed. Ken Blackwell reported that a conference called “*PM@100*,” celebrating the 100th anniversary of the publication of *Principia Mathematica*, will be held at McMaster University from May 21 to May 24, 2010. Ken suggested that the annual meeting be held at McMaster concurrently with the *PM* conference and offered to host the annual meeting there. On motion made by Peter Stone and seconded by John Ongley, it was unanimously resolved that the 2010 annual meeting will be held at McMaster University May 21 through May 23 2010, thus concurrent with the *PM* conference, but ending a day earlier.

The Lee Eisler Service award was given to Dennis Darland this year for his 27 years of service to the BRS as Society Treasurer. Alan Schwerin had a plaque made for Dennis to acknowledge this service to the Society.

(At 1:30 pm the Meeting was adjourned until 5:40 pm after the close of the BRS membership meeting.)

On motion made by Peter Stone, seconded and unanimously passed, it was resolved that Russell’s grandsons, Earl Russell and Honorable John Russell, be given honorary membership in the Society.

Chad Trainer suggested that the Board consider making Congressman Abercrombie from Hawaii an honorary member next year.

John Ongley made and Ken Blackwell seconded a motion that we establish a Service Award Committee. It was noted that we do already have a Lee Eisler Service Award Committee with the President as Chair and Peter Stone and Chad Trainer as the other current committee members.

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned.

David L. Henehan, Secretary
 Bertrand Russell Society
 Thursday, October 15, 2009

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
 2009 ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING MINUTES

The 2009 Annual Bertrand Russell Society Membership Meeting was held on June 6, 2009 at Central Connecticut State University at 5:10 pm chaired by BRS President Alan Schwerin.

Among the members in attendance were: Stefan Andersson, Kenneth Blackwell, Howard Blair, David Blitz, Andrew Cavallo, Rosalind Carey, Giovanni de Carvalho, Philip Ebersole, Petar Forcan, Jolen Galaugher, David Henehan, Kevin Klement, Marvin Kohl, Ilmari Kortelainen, John Lenz, Jeffrey Ludwig, Ed McClenathan, Nancy Mitchell, John Ongley, Karen Perkins, Ray Perkins Jr., Stephen Reinhardt, Thomas Riggins, Ariel Robinson, Alan Schwerin, Peter Stone, Chad Trainer, Thom Weidlich, and Brandon Young.

Rosalind Carey discussed the upcoming Russell Society session of talks at the December eastern division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in New York City. She needs three commentators. She will send an email to BRS members asking for commentators.

Ken Blackwell announced the location and the dates of the 2010 BRS annual meeting: they are May 21 – May 23, 2010 at McMaster University. It is scheduled to coincide with the *PM@100* conference, celebrating the centenary of the publication of volume 1 of *Principia Mathematica*, that will be held at McMaster from May 21 through May 24, 2010. The BRS annual meeting will thus begin on the same day as the *PM* conference and wrap up a day earlier.

John Ongley presented a report on membership trends from 1988-2009, noting that membership declined from a high of 315 members in 1990 to a low of 156 in 2003, and then gradually rose until it is around 183 at present.

John Ongley reported that he has just redesigned the Bertrand Russell Society website at <http://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/brs.html>.

A recommendation was made for the next year’s Lee Eisler Service Award.

It was announced that Mario Bunge was given the 2009 BRS Award. He was not able to attend the conference but his video

statement accepting the award was shown at the conference on Sunday and will be available by email.

There being no further business before the meeting, it was adjourned.

David L. Henehan, Secretary
Bertrand Russell Society
Thursday, October 15, 2009

Note: At the banquet, Ray Perkins announced that the 2009 BRS Book Award had been given to Omar W. Nasim for his book *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers*.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
2009 Second Quarter Treasurer's Report
Cash Flow April 1 – June 30, 2009

| | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| BALANCE 3/31/09 | |
| US\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | \$3,318.81 |
| less outstanding checks | <u>-650.11</u> |
| adjusted US\$ account | \$2,668.70 |
| Cdn\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | 1,034.38 |
| US\$ term deposit | <u>8,047.34</u> |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$11,750.42 |

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| INCOME | |
| Dues: Renewals | \$406.00 |
| Interest Inc | 14.88 |
| Other Inc [t-shirts] | 80.00 |
| Correction to Q1 Report | <u>0.10</u> |
| TOTAL INCOME | \$500.98 |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| EXPENSES | |
| Bank Charge | \$29.70 |
| Bookkeeping Exp to BRRC (US\$900) | 981.00 |
| BRS Book Award Exp | 54.00 |
| Conversion Exp | -13.94 |
| PayPal Fees | 4.97 |
| <i>Russell</i> Subscriptions | <u>36.00</u> |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | \$1,091.73 |
| OVERALL TOTAL | \$ -590.75 |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| BALANCE 6/30/09 | |
| US\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | \$961.17 |
| less outstanding checks | <u>-54.00</u> |
| adjusted US\$ account | \$907.17 |
| Cdn\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | 252.50 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | <u>10,000.00</u> |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$11,159.67 |

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)

Note: US and Cdn dollars are intermixed.

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.
 2009 Third Quarter Treasurer's Report
 Cash Flow July 1 – September 30, 2009

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|
| BALANCE 6/30/09 | |
| US\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | \$961.17 |
| less outstanding checks | <u>-54.00</u> |
| adjusted US\$ account | \$907.17 |
| Cdn\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | 252.50 |
| US\$ term deposit | <u>10,000.00</u> |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$11,159.67 |

| | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| INCOME | |
| Contributions: BRS | \$111.00 |
| Dues: New Members | 145.50 |
| Renewals | <u>174.00</u> |
| TOTAL Dues | \$319.50 |
| Interest Inc | <u>14.79</u> |
| TOTAL INCOME | \$445.29 |

| | |
|----------------|-----------------|
| EXPENSES | |
| Awards | \$74.52 |
| Bank Charge | 29.70 |
| Conversion Exp | -7.90 |
| PayPal Fees | <u>8.31</u> |
| TOTAL EXPENSES | <u>\$104.63</u> |
| OVERALL TOTAL | \$340.66 |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| BALANCE 9/30/09 | |
| US\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | \$1,032.11 |
| less outstanding checks | <u>-74.52</u> |
| adjusted US\$ account | \$957.59 |
| Cdn\$ account (Toronto Dominion) | 542.74 |
| US\$ term deposit (Toronto Dominion) | <u>10,000.00</u> |
| OVERALL BALANCE | \$11,500.33 |

Ken Blackwell, BRS Treasurer (blackwk@mcmaster.ca)
 Note: US and Cdn dollars are intermixed.

GRRS: The Greater Rochester Russell Set

7 pm, Writers & Books Literary Center
 740 University Avenue
 \$3 or Free to members of Writers & Books

| | |
|-------------|--|
| January 14 | Ted Lechman: Whitehead's <i>Process and Reality</i> |
| February 11 | Gerry Wildenberg: Krakauer's <i>Under the Banner of Heaven</i> |
| March 11 | Tim Madigan: On his book <i>W.K. Clifford and the Ethics of Belief</i> |
| April 8 | Howard Blair: Ambiguity in Russell's Mathematical Philosophy |
| May 13 | Ted Lechman: On <i>Why I Am Not an Atheist</i> |
| June 10 | Robert Brimlow: On "In Praise of Idleness" |
| July 9 | John Belli: On Russell's "The Theologian's Nightmare" |
| August 12 | Phil Ebersole: On Russell's "How I Came by My Creed" |
| September 9 | Open Forum on Why I Am a Russellian |

For updates or other information, contact Phil Ebersole at
 585-482-4729 or phileb@frontiernet.net

BARS: The Bay Area Russell Set

7 pm, Szechwan Cafe
 406 S. California Avenue
 Palo Alto, CA 94301

| | |
|-------------|---|
| January 19 | Russell and the Graphic Novel <i>Logicomix</i> |
| February 16 | Russell, Moore, and Darwin |
| March 16 | Russell and <i>Logicomix</i> (continued!) |
| April 20 | Russell on Philosophy and Politics |
| May 18 | Happy Birthday Bertie! Come celebrate Russell's 138th birthday |
| June 15 | Report on the 36th annual meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society |
| July 20 | On Self-Deception |
| August 17 | Russell on the Art of Drawing Inferences |
| Sept 21 | Russell on the Art of Reckoning |

For updates or further information contact Peter Stone at
 stone1936@hotmail.com

Readings are in "Files" in BARS' Yahoo! Group. Join at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bay_brs/. Join the BARS Meet-
 up Group at <http://philosophy.meetup.com/219/>

THE SPOKESMAN *Founded by Bertrand Russell*

Responsibility to Protest

Edited by Ken Coates
 Lockerbie and the Law - Robert Black
 Unfair Trial - Hans Köchler
 Lockerbie - the Cover-up - Marcello Mega
 The Crime of Lockerbie - Tam Dalyell

 The Party of Criminal War - John Pilger
 Responsibility to Protest - Noam Chomsky
 Pirate's Charter - Tony Blair
 Benign Whitewash - Ken Coates

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A New World at The Globe
 Ann Talbot
 Trevor Griffiths

 Reviews: Bruce Kent, Michael Barratt Brown,
 Christopher Gifford, Graham Hallett,
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Issue 106

Responsibility to Protest



After Lockerbie

If there is any chance of the truth coming out, it will be through the persistent efforts of civil society. The Russell Foundation is doing a great service to all those who do not accept the establishment's "manufacture of consent". Hans Köchler

Money Troubles ... War Crimes

Edited by Ken Coates

War Crimes

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 David Davis MP, George Galloway MP,
 Alan Simpson MP, Adam Price MP

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What Labour Forgot - Jim Mortimer

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My A-Bomb Biography - James Kirkup


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Money Troubles ...



War Crimes

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
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PM@100

LOGIC FROM 1910-1927

Celebrating 100 years of *Principia Mathematica*

21-24 May 2010



The Bertrand Russell Research Centre is hosting a conference to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the publication of Bertrand Russell and A.N. Whitehead's landmark book, *Principia Mathematica*.

Presenters include: Patricia Blanchette, Charles Chihara, Warren Goldfarb, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Leila Haaparanta, Allen Hazen, David Kaplan, Gregory Landini, Peter Simons, Alasdair Urquhart, and Richard Zach

For additional information please visit <http://pm100.mcmaster.ca> or contact Nicholas Griffin at ngriffin@mcmaster.ca

Contributions are welcomed until 1 January 2010. Please submit two copies (with abstract) suitable for a 30 - 45 minute presentation to:


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