


THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY QUARTERLY

August, 1998

No. 99



THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

3802 North Kenneth Avenue,
Chicago, Il. 60641-2814, U.S.A.

The Bertrand Russell Society was founded in 1974 to foster a better understanding of Russell's work and to promote ideas and causes he thought important. The Society's motto is Russell's statement, "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly is published in February, May, August, and November. Letters and manuscripts should be addressed to:

John Shosky
BRS
1806 Rollins Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

OFFICERS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY

Chair	Kenneth Blackwell
President	John Lenz
Vice President	Jan Eisler
Secretary	Peter Stone
Treasurer	Dennis Darland

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY ON THE NET

The Bertrand Russell Society Home Page

<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/brd.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly

<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/gtly.html>

The Bertrand Russell Society Annual Book Award

<http://daniel.drew.edu/~jlenz/bkaward.html>

Russell-L is a world-wide electronic discussion and information forum for Russell studies, with about 245 members from 28 countries. To subscribe, send the following message on electronic mail to listproc@mcmaster.ca stating "subscribe russell-l" and follow with your name on the same line. The Russell Archives' home page is at: <http://www.mcmaster.ca/russdocs/russell.htm>.

It is time to renew your membership for 1999.

- ◆ If you have already renewed for 1999 or have joined the BRS in 1999, **please accept the thanks of the Society** once again for your participation.

- ◆ If you have **not** yet renewed your membership for 1999 -- or if you would like to join the BRS for the first time -- **please mail the form on the next page along with your payment TODAY.** Thank you.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY 1999 MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL FORM

Please mail this form and payment to:

John Lenz
BRS President
38B Loantaka Way
Madison, New Jersey 07940 U.S.A.

I have looked at the membership categories below and have checked the appropriate category for my circumstances. I have enclosed my 1999 dues in U.S. funds payable to the "Bertrand Russell Society". (Please print clearly.)

- Individual \$35
 Couple \$40
 Student \$20
 Limited Income Individual \$20
 Limited Income Couple \$25

 Contributor \$50 and up
 Sustainer \$75 and up
 Patron \$250 and up
 Organization Membership \$50
 Sponsor \$100 and up
 Benefactor \$500 and up
 Life Member \$1,000 and up

 PLUS \$10 if outside U.S.A., Canada or Mexico
 PLUS \$4 if in Canada or Mexico

Total _____

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

ADDRESS:

THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY

Newsletter of the Bertrand Russell Society

August, 1998

No. 99

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**FROM THE EDITOR
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY**

This edition and the next primarily will present papers and information about the 1997 Annual Meeting, held in St. Petersburg at the campus of the University of South Florida.

First, by popular demand, Board Chairman Ken Blackwell has submitted a copy of the BRS By-Laws. These By-Laws have proven indispensable at our annual meetings and are obviously important in conducting the business of our society. I suggest you keep this edition handy for easy reference to this society constitution.

Next you will find the minutes of the annual meeting and a list of attendees.

There is also a paper by Victoria Patton, winner of the 1996 BRS Student paper Prize. When presented at the 1996 annual meeting in Amherst, New York, in absentia by Katie Kendig standing in for Ms. Patton, the audience expressed its great pleasure at the careful scholarship evident in this analysis of Russell's theory of judgment. I highly recommend this valuable paper to you.

There is also a video review of a recent *International Biography* program on the life of Bertrand Russell.

If you haven't filled out a membership profile form, please do so we can learn more about your interest in, and appreciation of, Russell.

As explained in the last issue, the cover drawing is by Iva Petkova, an outstanding artist from Sofia, Bulgaria.

Again, my apologies for the delayed appearance of this issue. The fault is entirely mine. We'll try to get the *Quarterly* back on schedule. The November issue will follow this one within a few weeks. The February issue will be out at the beginning of March, 1999.

Again, I thank my assistant editors, Katie Kendig and Robert Barnard.

####

BYLAWS OF THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.

Revised June 1984; revised June 1985

Article 1. Name

The name of this organization shall be The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc. It may also be referred to as "the Society" or "the BRS".

Article 2. Aims

The aims of this Society are: (1) to promote interest in the life and work of Bertrand Russell; (2) to bring together persons interested in any aspect of the foregoing; (3) to promote causes that Russell championed.

Article 3. Motto

The Society's motto shall be Russell's statement: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

Article 4. Power and Authority

Ultimate authority resides in the Members. The Members elect the Directors. The Directors elect the Officers. The Officers make decisions and take action.

Article 5. Membership

Section 1. General. Membership in the Society shall be open to all persons and organizations interested in Bertrand Russell and the Society's activities. Types of membership shall be: Individual, Couple, Student, Limited Income, Life, Organization, and Honorary. Dues shall be set by the Board of Directors, and are to be paid annually. Life members shall pay dues only once in an amount set by the Board. Honorary members pay no dues. Life and Honorary memberships are for life unless terminated for cause, as specified hereafter.

Section 2. Individual Membership. Individual Membership shall be available to all persons.

Section 3. Couple Membership. Couple Membership shall be available to two persons sharing the same mail address. Each person shall have one vote; two mail ballots shall be sent, but only one copy of other Society mailings.

Section 4. Student Membership. Student Membership shall be open to any

student enrolled in an educational institution and who is less than 25 years old.

Section 5. Limited Income Membership. Limited Income Membership shall be available to a person who, as the name implies, is living on a limited income.

Section 6. Life Membership. Life Membership can be conferred on any person who meets the minimum dues set by the Board of Directors for Life Membership.

Section 7. Honorary Membership. Honorary Membership may be conferred on a person who has been nominated by a member and approved by two-thirds of the Directors voting, after having met one or more of the following conditions: (1) is a member of Bertrand Russell's family; (2) had worked closely with Russell in an important way; (3) has made a distinctive contribution to Russell scholarship; (4) has acted in support of a cause or idea that Russell championed; (5) has promoted awareness of Russell or of Russell's work; (6) has exhibited qualities of character (such as moral courage) reminiscent of Russell. Honorary Members have the same rights and responsibilities as Individual Members, but they pay no dues.

Section 8. Organization Membership. Membership of organizations--such as libraries, associations, corporations--is available upon payment of dues and approval of the President. Dues shall be higher than for a Couple. Organizations may not vote or be on the Board. Only one copy of Society mailings shall be sent.

Section 9. Conditions of Membership. Application for membership shall be made in writing, submitting name, address, and correct amount of dues. The Board may refuse an application, in which case the President must notify the applicant within 30 days, stating why the application was turned down.

Membership terminates when a member fails to pay dues, resigns, dies, or is expelled.

Any member--including Life or Honorary--may be expelled for seriously obstructing the Society's business, misappropriating the Society's name or funds or acting in a way that discredits the Society. The expulsion procedure consists of five steps:

Step 1. A formal expulsion proposal shall be presented in writing to the Board by any member.

Step 2. The Board shall examine the evidence. If a majority of the Board Members voting decides, either by mail ballot or at a meeting, that expulsion

may be appropriate, the matter will be submitted to, and decided by, the members. This shall be done by mail, or at an Annual Meeting if one is scheduled within two months. If it is to be done by mail:

Step 3. The case against the member shall be presented in the next newsletter or by a special mailing.

Step 4. In the following newsletter, or in a second special mailing, the accused member shall present a defense against the charge. A ballot shall be included in the second newsletter or second special mailing, so that members can vote on whether to expel. If the expulsion process takes place at an Annual Meeting:

Step 4'. The equivalent of Steps 3 and 4 shall be followed, that is, the case against the member shall be presented, after which the accused shall present his defense; and then the members present shall vote on whether to expel. The President shall notify the accused member as soon as the result of the vote is known.

Article 6. The Board of Directors

Section 1. Responsibilities. The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") shall be responsible for Society affairs and policy, and shall elect the Officers. The Board shall be subject to these Bylaws and to the Bylaws of The Board of Directors of The Bertrand Russell Society, Inc.

Section 2. Constitution. The Board shall consist of not less than six nor more than 24 elected members. Society Officers are ex-officio members of the Board. Elected and ex-officio Board members shall have the same rights and responsibilities.

Members may nominate candidates for the Board, or volunteer to be nominated as candidates. Directors are elected to three-year terms that start on January 1 of the following year; one-third are elected every year. Directors may be reelected. If a Director dies, resigns, or is expelled, the Board may fill the unexpired term with any member.

Article 7. Officers

Section 1. General. The Society shall have the following Officers: President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Secretary. There may also be other Vice-Presidents whose duties shall be specified by the Board. Officers shall be at least 18 years old and shall have been members for at least one year. They shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's

Annual Meeting. An Officer's term of office lasts until the next election of Officers, the following year. No one shall hold more than one Office at a time, except that the same person shall be Secretary of the Society and Secretary of the Board. An Officer may be removed or suspended by a majority of the Board members voting. An Officer may resign by notifying the Chairman of Board in writing. If an Office becomes vacant, the Board shall elect a successor to fill the unexpired term. If an Officer is temporarily unable to serve, the Board may elect a temporary replacement.

Section 2. The President. The President shall be the Chief Executive Officer, coordinating the work of other Officers and Committees. Other Officers and Committee Chairmen shall consult the President about their activities, and submit a written report on their activities to him *one month before the Annual Meeting*, with a copy to the Chairman. The President shall promptly inform the Chairman of any major decisions. After the Board has selected the site and time of the next Annual Meeting, or of a Special Meeting, the President shall be responsible for making all Meeting arrangements, including compiling the Meeting's agenda. The President shall chair the Meeting. The President shall report regularly, through the BRS newsletter.

Section 3. The Vice-President. The Vice-President becomes President if the President's Office becomes vacant; and assumes the office temporarily if the vacancy is temporary. The Vice-President shall assist the President as requested.

Section 4. The Secretary. The Secretary shall: (1) record the minutes of Society and Board meetings; (2) handle Society and Board correspondence; (3) maintain a permanent file of Society and Board Bylaws and other corporate documents, including minutes of Society and Board meetings, Officers' and Committee Chairmen's reports, newsletters, correspondence; (4) maintain a permanent record of Society and Board decisions, rules, motions made and carried; (5) have custody of the Society's corporate seal.

Section 5. The Treasurer. The Treasurer shall: (1) keep records of money received and spent; (2) safeguard Society funds; (3) invest funds, with Board approval; (4) submit an annual budget to the Board; (5) submit quarterly and annual reports, for publication in the BRS newsletter.

Section 6. Other Vice-Presidents. The Office of "Vice-President/ ..." may be created and filled by the Board. There is no connection between this Office and that of the Vice-President.

Article 8. Committees

Section 1. General. There shall be standing (permanent) and ad hoc (temporary) Committees. Each shall have a Chairman, and may have a Co-Chairman and other members. A member may serve on, or chair, more than one Committee. Committee Chairmen shall consult with the President about their activities, and describe them in a written report to the President *one month before the Annual Meeting*, with a copy to the Chairman.

Section 2. Committees. The Board shall establish standing and ad hoc Committees, and appoint their Chairmen who, in turn, appoint Committee Members. Each Committee shall provide the Secretary with a written statement of Committee aims and procedures.

Article 9. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Meetings. The Society shall hold an Annual Meeting, at a time and site determined by the Board *and in time to give the members at least two months' notice of the Meeting*. As to time: it should suit the convenience of as many members as possible. As to site: it should be either (a) near locations of special interest to the BRS, or (b) near population centers having many members. Any member may propose agenda items, in writing, to the President, in advance of the Meeting. At Meetings, items may be added to the agenda with approval of the majority of the members present. Six members constitute a quorum.

Section 2. Special Meetings. Any member may write to the Chairman requesting a Special Meeting, claiming that an emergency exists requiring immediate action. The Chairman shall decide whether the request merits consideration by the Board; if it does, the Chairman shall promptly inform the Board, which shall decide, within three weeks, by mail ballot, whether, when and where to hold a Special Meeting. The Special Meeting shall be held no later than six weeks after the Chairman's initial receipt of the request. The Chairman shall announce the Special Meeting to all members by letter, as soon as possible. A quorum shall consist of the members present.

Section 3. Board of Directors' Meetings. The Board shall hold its Annual Meeting during the Society's Annual Meeting and at the same site. The Board may also hold Special Meetings, in accordance with its own Bylaws. Board Meetings shall be open to Society members.

Article 10. Publications

Section 1. Newsletter. The Society shall publish a newsletter at regular intervals.

Section 2. Other Publications. The Society may authorize other publications.

Article 11. Voting

Section 1. General. All members, other than Organization Members, shall be entitled to vote. All votes shall have equal value. Members may vote by proxy. In contests of more than two candidates or choices, a plurality shall be sufficient.

Section 2. Voting by Mail. Voting may be by mail. Ballots shall be sent to all eligible members, either in the BRS newsletter or by special mailing. The deadline for the return of ballots shall be not less than three weeks from the date ballots are mailed by first class mail, not less than four weeks if mailed third class. Ballots must go first class to Canada and Mexico, and by airmail to other foreign countries. Mail ballots shall be tallied by the Elections Committee, and verified by the Secretary. Ballots for the Board's voting by mail shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary; the Chairman may designate a substitute for the Secretary.

Article 12. Amendments to These Bylaws

Section 1. Voting to Amend at a Meeting. These Bylaws may be amended at a Society Meeting by a majority vote of those members present and voting.

Section 2. Voting to Amend by Mail. These Bylaws may also be amended by mail ballot. The proposed changes, with supporting arguments, will appear in the BRS newsletter or a special mailing. In the following BRS newsletter or second special mailing, other views, including opposing views, will appear, along with a mail ballot. To pass, the Amendment must be approved by a majority of the ballots cast.

**BYLAWS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY, INC.**

Revised June 1984

Article 1. Responsibilities and Obligations

The Board of Directors (also referred to as "the Board") has these responsibilities: (1) to set policy for the Society's affairs, and (2) to elect officers of the Society and of the Board. The Board has these obligations: to be governed by these Bylaws and by the Society's Bylaws.

Article 2. Membership

Membership shall be in accord with Article 5 of the Society's Bylaws.

Article 3. Officers

Section 1. The Chairman. The Chairman shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Chairman's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Chairman may be reelected. The Chairman presides at Board Meetings, and rules on procedure.

If the Chairman is absent, the Directors may elect an Acting Chairman. If the office of Chairman is vacant, the Directors shall elect a new Chairman as soon as possible, at an Annual or Special Meeting or by mail ballot. The votes shall be tallied by the Acting Chairman and verified by the Secretary. The Chairman may be removed from office by a majority of Directors present and voting at a meeting, with the Secretary presiding.

Section 2. The Secretary. The Secretary shall be elected by a majority of the Directors present and voting at the Board's Annual Meeting. The Secretary's term of office shall start as soon as elected, and shall run till the next election, at the Annual Board Meeting the following year. The Secretary may be reelected. The Secretary of the Board and the Secretary of the Society shall be the same person. If the Secretary is absent from a Meeting, the Chairman shall appoint an Acting Secretary.

Article 4. Voting

Voting shall be in accord with Article 11 of the Society's Bylaws, except as follows: the Chairman's vote counts as one except in a tie, when it

counts as two.

Article 5. Committees

Committees may be created by the Board, to perform Board functions, and shall follow Board instructions.

Article 6. Meetings

Section 1. Annual Board Meeting. The Board shall meet annually, at some time during a Society Annual Meeting, and at the same site. Society Members may attend Board Meetings.

Section 2. Special Board Meetings. A Special Board Meeting shall be called by the Chairman when at least three Directors request it, stating the purpose. In choosing the time and site, the Chairman shall aim to achieve the largest possible attendance by Directors.

Section 3. Agenda. The Agenda for Board Meetings shall be prepared by the Chairman. Additions to the Agenda may be made by any Director, with the concurrence of the Chairman.

Section 4. Quorum. The quorum for any Board Meeting is three Directors.

Article 7. Amendments to Board Bylaws

Any Director may propose an amendment.

At an Annual or Special Meeting, a majority vote of the Directors present and voting shall carry the proposed amendment.

When an amendment is proposed by the Chairman, in writing, between Meetings, the Chairman shall decide whether to hold the proposal for the next Meeting or put it to an earlier vote by mail. For voting by mail, the Chairman shall promptly notify the Directors by a special mailing of the proposed amendment, with supporting arguments, requesting opposing arguments by 21 days after the date of mailing. Thereafter, the Chairman shall mail the opposing arguments, and a ballot, to the Directors, with a voting deadline of 21 days after the date of mailing. The votes shall be tallied by the Chairman, and verified by the Secretary, who shall notify the Directors of the outcome.

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING PETER STONE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

The 1998 Annual Meeting of the Bertrand Russell Society took place at the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida, St. Petersburg Campus, located at 100 5th Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The meeting ran from Friday, June 19, to Sunday, June 21.

This year, the Society held its Annual Business Meeting in conjunction with the Annual Meeting of the Board of Directors. These minutes record the decisions of both meetings.

Peter Stone announced the results of the elections to the Board of Directors held at the beginning of the year. The eight Board members elected were Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Gladys Leithauser, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, David Rodier, Tom Stanley, and Ruile Ye.

John Lenz chaired the joint meeting. Ken Blackwell and Peter Stone took notes. Board Members present were James Alouf, Ken Blackwell, Dennis Darland, Jan Loeb Eisler, John Lenz, Stephen Reinhardt, Michael Rockler, Peter Stone, and Ruile Ye.

The Board then took up the issue of electing Board and Society officers. The following individuals were unanimously elected:

Chairman--Ken Blackwell
President--John Lenz
Vice President--Jan Loeb Eisler
Secretary (Board and Society)--Peter Stone
Treasurer--Dennis Darland

The process of nominating and electing officers required the reassignment of a few responsibilities. Mr. Blackwell agreed to take over from Mr. Lenz the job of managing the Russell-1 listserv. He will also take on the responsibility of pursuing additional renewals this year. In addition, Mr. Darland may be unable to perform his duties as treasurer for part of the year, and so Blackwell and Lenz later agreed to work out an arrangement to take over his duties temporarily. These duties include keeping a computerized version of the membership list, printing out labels for the Society newsletter, handling the Society's money, and keeping track of who has paid dues and who owes the Society money. In addition, Darland also sent out postcards to delinquent members in the past; in light of the Society's current membership problems (to

be discussed later), it will be necessary to resume this practice as soon as possible.

The Board then took up the subject of the next annual meeting. Alan Schwerin, a professor at Monmouth College, volunteered to arrange holding the meeting at Monmouth. The chair of his department would support this move, there is a very good limo service available to provide transportation, the drive from Newark Airport is not too bad, and there may even be dorm space available. Ms. Eisler moved that the next meeting be held at Monmouth College at a time to be arranged by Schwerin and Lenz. The Board unanimously approved the motion.

The site for the annual meeting in 2000 was also briefly discussed. Mr. Rockler would like the meeting to move back to the West Coast, or possible the Midwest. He noted the meeting hadn't been held in either area since the 1993 meeting in San Diego. Mr. Lenz thought that it would be necessary to have someone on site to organize the meeting there, but Mr. Rockler and a few others disagreed.

Mr. Stone inquired if another joint meeting will be held in 2000 with the Humanist Society of Canada, the Council for Democratic and secular Humanism, and others; Mr. Lenz and Mr. Blackwell responded that it might be, but that nothing was definite yet. Stefan Anderson indicated that he might within a year or two be able to organize a meeting at Vancouver. No final decision was reached.

The Society then discussed the question of incorporation. Don Jackanicz, the BRS's Secretary for many years, had handled the paperwork for our continued incorporation in Illinois. He has now asked the Society to be relieved of this duty within a year. This means that the Society must forego continued incorporation, find a new agent in Illinois to incorporate us, or reincorporate in another state.

Two specific options were discussed. Jan Loeb Eisler announced to the Society that the Center for Inquiry in Buffalo is willing to incorporate the BRS at its address and handle all the paperwork. The Center would apply for nonprofit status for the Society in New York and act as agent for the state's annual report. It would also provide a permanent space for the BRS at the Center, including space for a Society library (as part of their larger collection) and commission a sculpture or painting of Russell for the Center.

Ms. Eisler read a letter from Paul Kurtz at the Center outlining the proposal. She strongly endorsed the move. Other members, including Mr. Blackwell and Mr. Rockler, were more wary. Rockler was unsure what "affiliation" with the

Center would entail. Blackwell also expressed concern that humanism represented only one of Russell's interests, and that affiliation with a humanist center would suggest that the Society was uninterested in other aspects of Russell's life and thought (including even positive aspects of religion). He thought that it would be better for all of Russell's interests (including humanism) if the BRS remained independent in both appearance and fact. In addition, Mr. Lenz wanted to know whether the Center would help us publicize the Society amongst the many people connected to the Center.

The second option discussed involved finding an independent agent in Illinois willing to serve as a registered agent for the BRS. The Society would have to locate such an agent, probably through the Secretary of State's office (Mr. Jackanicz would know how to do this), but for an as-yet undetermined yearly fee this agent would do all the work for us. Either way, the BRS would need a new address by January 1999, unless Mr. Jackanicz could be persuaded to give the Society another year.

In the end, the Society agreed to seek out an agent in Illinois willing to do the work for us and inquire into the price. This was agreed to with two abstentions. The Society also decided by a 9-6 vote (no abstentions) to obtain more information as to what affiliation with the Center for Inquiry would entail. Mr. Lenz and Ms. Eisler will prepare a mailing to the Board of Directors on the topic by September.

Mr. Lenz raised several issues for Mr. John Shosky, who was unable to attend. First Shosky wanted to solicit materials from the membership for the newsletter, especially membership profiles. Second, he nominated Peter Strawson for Honorary membership in the Society. Mr. Stone moved successfully that the Board table this nomination until Shosky can provide a short statement in support of his nomination. Third, he announced that there are two organizations in Eastern Europe that wish to obtain organizational memberships in the BRS--the Institute of Logic of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, and the Institute of Social Science at the University of Plovdiv in Bulgaria. The Society advised Shosky to check the bylaws; no vote should be necessary on this action (in any event, no one seemed to have any objection to the new memberships).

The Society also made several requests of the editor of the BRS *Quarterly* (Shosky). Mr. Blackwell requested that Shosky provide in a future issue a list of all the BRS's honorary members and award recipients, as well as a copy of the Bylaws of the Society and Board of Directors. Mr. Lenz also requested a list of all the BRS's members, which used to be published annually in the *Quarterly*. Some objected that there may be people who would not want the publicity. And so it was agreed that people should be given a chance to indicate that they do

not want their names publicized in a non-commercial way. This should be done on the membership renewal form; the Editor should make the appropriate changes before renewal time.

A motion was made to rename the Society's Service Award (an ad hoc award given to members who perform outstanding service to the Society) for Lee Eisler. The motion was unanimously approved with one abstention.

The Society discussed publicity. Among the methods discussed were slipping BRS bookmarks into books in bookstores and print ads (the latter having been discontinued, without any loss in new memberships according to Mr. Lenz).

A large number of members have so far failed to renew this year. The Society agreed that the renewal form in the Quarterly must be made more visible, and if possible a return envelope should be provided in the Quarterly.

Mr. Schwerin advised the BRS to hold sessions at the APA's annual meetings. Mr. Lenz explained that the Society did indeed have such meetings but has not done so lately for lack of someone to organize them. Schwerin will look into doing Russell events at the APA.

Ms. Eisler inquired if the BRS was in arrears with its membership in the International Humanist Ethical Union. Mr. Lenz claims we were given an honorary membership but fears that the IHEU has forgotten this. He will write to the Union.

Mr. Schwerin suggested that the BRS hold an annual paper contest, much as the Leibniz Society apparently does. Mr. Lenz informed him that the BRS has such a contest but that in recent years no contest has been held due to lack of an effective committee to run it. He will look into reviving it.

Ms. Eisler asked how much money it costs the BRS to have a membership. No one had an effective answer.

MEETING ATTENDEES

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RUSSELL'S THEORIES OF JUDGMENT 1903-1913
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The development of Russell's theory of judgment was accompanied by a change in his metaphysics. In 1903, Russell believed that it was propositions that constitute reality. But by the time of the 1910 multiple-relation theory, propositions were displaced from this role by facts. With this change came a shift in Russell's account of truth. Truth and falsehood were no longer seen as inexplicable properties of propositions, and something like a correspondence theory of truth came to be adopted. My aim in this paper is to give a detailed outline of the development of Russell's theory, and assess his success in providing a viable account of judgment. In particular, I will be looking at the change in Russell's attempt to provide an adequate account of the unity of the proposition - a notion which will be discussed in detail below.

Section 1

I would like to begin with a few comments on Russell's 1903 account of propositions. Russell's view of propositions in *The Principles of Mathematics* was shaped by a reaction against the suggestion that a proposition consisted of ideas or concepts of objects. Russell believed that "[on this account] ideas become a veil between us and outside things ... [so that in knowledge, we never really] attain to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things."¹ That is, if a proposition consisted of ideas, we would never have access to anything outside our own minds. For Russell, who wanted the mind to have maximum exposure to the external world², this suggestion was abhorrent.

Accordingly, Russell held that a proposition does not consist of words or ideas,

¹ B. Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description in *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 221-222. Although this quotation is taken from a 1911 publication, I think the ideas it expresses are latent in *The Principles of Mathematics*. At any rate, it was Russell's fear of Idealism that led him to hold that a proposition consisted of real things.

² D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy*, p. 198.

but "contains the entities indicated by words".³ Russell referred to the constituents of propositions as 'terms'. Every term was a "logical subject . possessed of all the properties commonly assigned to substances".⁴ This implies that terms are no different in kind from actual objects out there in the world. For Russell, then, the constituents of a proposition are the real things which the proposition is about.

Also central to Russell's 1903 account of propositions is the idea that propositions are unified entities. The source of propositional unity, Russell says, is the verb.⁵ On his view, the verb is not a name for a relation, it is the actual relation itself. By relating the other terms that occur in the proposition, the verb distinguishes a proposition or judgment like 'A loves B' from a mere list of its constituents, (A, love, B) so that it actually says something.

There is, however, a difficulty with Russell's 1903 account of propositional unity. In an article published in *Mind* 1911, F.H. Bradley writes:

Is there anything, I ask, in a unity [i.e. a proposition] besides its 'constituents', i.e. the terms and the relation, and, if there is anything more, in what does this 'more' consist? Mr Russell tells us that we have got merely an enumeration or merely an aggregate . But, since we seem to have something beyond either, the puzzle grows worse. If I remember right, Prof. Stout some years ago stated the problem as attaching essentially to the fact of 'relatedness'. What is the difference between a relation which relates in fact and one which does not so relate? And if we accept a strict pluralism, where, I urge, have we any room for this difference?⁶

Whether or not it is correct to say that Russell thinks of unities as merely enumerations or aggregates of terms, Bradley does have a point here. For the pluralist, the world consists of a multiplicity of self-subsistent entities; entities

³ B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, sec. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec 47.

⁵ See *Ibid.*, sec. 54.

⁶ F. H. Bradley, 'Reply to Mr Russell's Explanations', *Mind*, Volume 20 (Jan. 1911), p. 74-6.

which exist independently of each other. In accordance with this view, Russell held that "every constituent of every proposition must, on pain of self contradiction, be capable of being made into a logical subject".⁷ The verb, then, on Russell's account, must also be something capable of being made a logical subject. That is, it must be a term. But the verb must be a very peculiar kind of term for it must have a "two-fold nature": it must be the source of the proposition's unity, relate all of its constituents, and at the same time be one of the related Items. As Bradley points out, however, these roles are inconsistent.

Russell himself was also aware of this problem and illustrates the point with the following example:

Consider the proposition 'A differs from B'. The constituents of this proposition, if we analyse it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis [i.e. after we make the verb a logical subject] is a notion which has no connection with A and B.⁸

In other words, as soon as we treat the verb as a mere term of the proposition, we are forced to identify it as a "relation in itself", rather than a relation actually relating the other constituents. All we have now is an ordered list of elements (A, difference, B). In this way, we immediately destroy the unity of the proposition which the verb is supposed to be creating. How it is that the verb simultaneously manages to be a constituent of the proposition and also the source of its capacity to communicate a meaning thus looks very difficult to explain.

At the time of *The Principles of Mathematics*, Russell had no solution to this problem. He said only that:

A proposition is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition,

⁷ *The Principles of Mathematics*, sec 52.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sec 54.

and is thus distinguishable from the verb considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear account of the nature of the difference.⁹

Despite his inability to resolve the above difficulty, the 1903 Russell was committed to the view that a proposition is a complex entity whose constituents are real things. On this account, it is propositions which make up reality. As I will attempt to show in the following, most of the problems with the 1903 theory of judgment can be traced back to Russell's attachment to these ideas.

Section 2

Russell's account of the proposition in *The Principles of Mathematics* has, as a by-product, a very simple account of judgment. On the binary relation theory: "every judgment whether true or false, consists in a certain relation, called 'judging' or 'believing' to a single object which is what we judge or believe ." I will now give a brief outline of the theory and discuss some of the problems associated with it.

(i)

The binary relation theory of judgment is described by Russell in 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood'. In this article, Russell rejects the theory and attributes it to Meinong. Meinong called the single objects to which we are related when we judge 'objectives', so that "every judgment has an objective. True judgments have true objectives and false judgments have false objectives".¹⁰ Meinong's objectives are equivalent to Russell's 1903 propositions. They are unified entities which either have the property of being true or the property of being false.

To use Hylton's example of how the theory works, suppose I form the judgment that John is taller than Mary. On this account of judgment, there is a single objective - the proposition that John is taller than Mary - and in judging I am related to it. Judgment thus involves acquaintance with a proposition: it is a two-place relation holding between a person or mind, on the other hand, and a proposition (or objective) on the other.

(ii)

Russell had a number of reasons for rejecting the binary relation theory of judgment. The first was his growing intuition that there are no propositions in the sense he was using the word. This intuition resulted from a consideration of the fact that although

⁹ *Ibid.*, sec 54.

¹⁰ B. Russell, 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood' in *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Logical and Philosophical Papers 1903-1913*, Volume 6, Routledge, 1992, pp. 115-124.

the 1903 theory does seem plausible when applied to true judgments, it cannot give an adequate account of what happens when a judgment is incorrect. For if we hold that all judgment consists in a relation of the mind to a single proposition, then we have to admit that a false judgment is a relation to the mind to a false proposition. This means that "there will be in the world entities, not dependent on the existence of judgments, which can be described as objective falsehoods."¹¹

But as Russell himself points out, the idea that the world contains peculiar things like that Charles I died in his bed even though Charles I died on the scaffold is "almost incredible". For we generally feel that truth and falsehood are primarily properties of beliefs or judgments, not of actual objects. That is, "we feel that there would be no falsehood if there were no minds to make mistakes".

Although the existence of objective falsehoods is an unwelcome consequence of the 1903 account of judgment, the only other alternative for the theory would be to say that false judgment is impossible. The dilemma arises as a result of Russell's attachment to the idea that propositions are unified entities whose constituents are real things. Russell himself seems to be aware of this and illustrates the problem with the following example: "If [on the binary relation theory] I judge that A loves B. [my judgment] would be impossible unless there were such a thing as 'A's love for B'".¹²

Because Russell held that the terms of a proposition are actual objects in an actual relation, I would not even be able to make the judgment 'A loves B' unless it were true. Consequently, unless there are entities out there in the world (1903 propositions) which have the peculiar property of being false, there would be no such thing as an incorrect judgment: every judgment would be made true by the mere act of formulation.

It could be argued that we can avoid postulating the existence of objective falsehoods by adopting an asymmetric theory in which true judgments have objectives while false ones do not. Russell considers this suggestion but rejects it on the following grounds. Firstly, an asymmetric theory of this type would entail that in judging falsely the mind is related to nothing. And if this were the case, a false judgment would not even be a judgment at all. Secondly, if true judgments have objectives and false ones do not, there would be an "intrinsic difference" between true and false judgments which would be visible on inspection. This, Russell says, is "obviously impossible": we cannot tell

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Russell, 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood', p. 119.

truths from falsehoods simply by examining the intrinsic nature of our judgment.¹³ The only way to avoid the problem of objective falsehoods thus seems to be to abandon the view that judgment consists in a dual relation of the mind to a single proposition.

The other reason Russell had for rejecting the binary-relation theory of judgment was that it cannot provide a sensible account of truth. On the 1903 view, truth and falsehood have to be seen as ultimate and unanalysable properties of propositions. 'That the sky is blue' and 'That the sky is green' play exactly the same role in constituting reality even though the sky is in fact blue. Every proposition is either true or false, but this is just a brute fact which cannot be explained.

It is easy to see why Russell eventually found this account of truth and falsehood unacceptable. For surely there should be some explanation of what makes these properties different, and why it is that truth is generally considered to be a better guide to the external world. For example, we may want to express the difference between truth and falsehood by reference to the notion of fact; to whatever is actually in the world regardless of what we see fit to believe. Russell's 1903 account of propositions, however, makes an explanation of this type impossible. For since a proposition is an objective, unified entity whose constituents are real things, a true proposition and the fact it is about are exactly the same thing. As a result, the difference between the two properties and our preference for truth over falsehood simply has to be accepted as 'ultimate' and 'inexplicable'.

The above problems with the 1903 theory of judgment led Russell to abandon the idea that propositions are unified entities. He came to believe that it was facts and not propositions, which make up the world. Propositions (or rather, the phrases which express propositions) thus became 'incomplete symbols' which require the addition of a mind to render them meaningful. When taken out of the context of a belief or assertion, they do not denote a definite object. Accordingly, Russell no longer thought of judgment as "a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but [as] a multiple relation of the mind to the various other constituents with which the judgment is concerned".¹⁴ The 1910 version of the multiple-relation theory will be outlined in the following section.

¹³ *Ibid.* It is interesting to note that although this point against an asymmetric theory is a good one, Russell is not entitled to this commonsense view. As Candlish points out, on the 1903 account, the "constituents of judgments are real things. [so] inspecting the proposition cannot be distinguished from inspecting the world." Inspecting the world for its contents, however, is exactly how we should go about deciding which judgments are true and which are false. S. Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, Monk and Palmer (eds.), Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 107.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Section 3

This section is divided into two parts. In part (i), I will give a brief outline of Russell's 1910 theory of judgment. Then in part (ii), I shall attempt to show that the advantages Russell claims for the multiple-relation theory - that it allows for a correspondence theory of truth and the possibility of false judgment - are only apparent.

(i)

The 1910 version of the multiple-relation theory of judgment is set out by Russell in 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood'. The theory and its associated correspondence theory of truth can be summarized as follows. When we judge, say, that A loves B, our judgment is not a relation of the mind to the whole proposition as a unit. Rather, it is a multiple relation between the mind and the individual constituents of the proposition, so that we are separately acquainted with the person A, the person B and the relation of loving. We bring these objects together in thought to form the judgment. How, then, does the judgment 'A loves B' differ from the judgment 'B loves A'? Russell's answer to this question is to say that the relation of loving must "not be abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A".¹⁵ This is the 'sense' of the relation. The judgment will be true when the terms in question are actually related in the way they occur in the judgment, (in this case, when A loves B), and false when they are not.

The differences between the above account of judgment and the binary relation theory should be clear. Because the mind is separately acquainted with the objects of judgment and only unites them in thought, there are no longer any propositions in the 1903 sense. The verb no longer has to relate the other constituents and is thus free to fill the role of being a term of the judged relation without difficulty. Nevertheless, the objects of the judgment are still real things, it is just that the unity of the proposition is replaced by what might be called the unity of the propositional act. In contrast to the old view, then, there is now no need for an objective combination formed of the objects of the judgment for the judgment to occur. This, apparently, is what makes false judgment possible without the need for objective falsehoods.

Furthermore, on the multiple-relation theory, truth and falsehood are no longer seen as unanalysable properties of actual objects, but as properties of beliefs or judgments. And because the proposition judged is not an entity in itself, Russell says that the truth of a judgment can be explained in terms of its correspondence with a complex object or fact. The 'corresponding' complex:

consists of the two terms related by the relation R with the same sense.
The judgment is true when there is such a complex and false when

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

there is not.¹⁶

This account of truth means that there would be no truth or falsehood if there were no minds, but Russell makes it clear that: "If I judge that Charles I died in his bed, I judge falsely, not because of anything to do with me, but because he did not die in his bed". That is, the truth or falsehood of a proposition is not dependent upon the judging mind, but only upon the objective fact about which the judgment is made. In this way, the notion of a fact guards against Idealism.

(ii)

The chief difficulties with the 1910 theory arise in respect to Russell's solution to the problem of how we account for the 'sense' or 'direction' of a non-symmetrical judgment. I agree with Candlish in saying that there are two ways in which to interpret Russell's requirement that the judged relation "must not be abstractly before the mind but must be before it as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A". It could be said that the relations not figuring 'abstractly' means:

- (1) not that it actually relates A and B, but that its 'sense' or 'direction' must figure in the judgment. Or, (2) that the relation must actually relate A and B.¹⁷

Let's consider (1) first. There is reason to believe that this is what Russell did mean by his comments about 'sense', because on this interpretation of the theory, the objects of the judgment enter into the act of judging as separate terms. Because these constituents are not related by their judged relation, they are prevented from forming a complex object account and the problem of objective falsehoods is avoided. However, Candlish argues that the problem with this interpretation is that it leaves the 1910 theory open to Bradley's very criticism of *The Principles of Mathematics*.¹⁸ Namely, that it cannot account for the unity of the proposition, without which there can be no judgment.

Candlish's objection seems a reasonable criticism to make. Take for example, the judgment 'A loves B'. If the relation of 'loving' enters into the act of judging, not as relating A and B, but only as a term in itself, all we get is an ordered list of elements (A, love, B). But this cannot be considered a judgment for it doesn't even say anything. For judgment to occur, it is essential that the constituents be somehow

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁷ S. Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 112.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

united, so that A and B are brought into the relation of love and what we get is an actual proposition. What is it, then, that combines the constituents so as to form a judgment?

Russell claims that the person judging unites the objects of his judgment in thought, but it is far from clear what this means. For surely the real things to which we are related when we judge are either already united in fact, (regardless of whether this is judged to be the case), or they are not. If they are so united, then nothing further can be done by the mind in the way of uniting them; and if they are not, then no amount of thinking will bring these objects together. In either case, all we will have is our separate acquaintance with A, B and the relation 'love'. Exactly how it is that the mind has the power to turn this acquaintance into a meaningful judgment is something which Russell leaves quite unexplained.

Under interpretation (1), the 1910 theory is also subject to the following objection from Geach:

If the relation R is before the mind not as relating A and B, but only as a term of the judged relation that holds between the mind, A, the relation R, and B, how can there be any talk of the relation Rs 'proceeding' from A to B rather than from B to A?¹⁹

For the relation to have 'sense' (i.e. to 'proceed') it must actually relate A and B. If it does not do this, then it will enter into the act of judging 'A loves B' in exactly the same way as it enters into the act of judging 'B loves A'; namely, as "a relation in itself". This means that it will not combine or order the other constituents at all. Our ability to form a judgment with the appropriate direction thus looks quite mysterious, despite Russell's claims to the contrary.

In view of the above difficulties, we may want to adopt Candlish's second interpretation of Russell's requirement that the judged relation not be present 'abstractly'. On this interpretation, the objects of a judgment appear before the mind in their actual relation, with that relation actually relating them. The relations being active would thus provide an explanation of what supplies direction to a non-symmetrical judgment and how it is that a list of constituents is turned into a unified assertion.

Yet despite these advantages, the problem with interpretation (2) is that it makes the 1910 theory incompatible with its correspondence theory of truth. For if the judged relation actually relates the constituents of the judgment, then these constituents will no longer enter into the act of judging as separate terms. And as Candlish points out, since

¹⁹ P. Geach, *Mental Acts*, Humanities Press, 1964, p. 51.

Russell held that the constituents of judgments of real things, the immediate consequence of their being united is that when a judgment is true:

... the combination involved in the judging cannot after all differ from the actual fact which is being judged to obtain.²⁰

A distinction between judgment and fact is essential if the truth of a belief is to be explained in terms of correspondence with an outside entity. But on the 1910 theory, if the relation is allowed to relate A and B and thus supply unity and direction to the proposition judged, judgment and fact become one.

A further difficulty concerns false judgment. Under interpretation (2), the relation R has to be a 'relating relation'. This means that simply by forming the judgment that A loves B, I must somehow bring the actual objects A and B into the real relation of love. For if I do not have these 'psychokinetic powers', then the unified proposition necessary for judgment will not be achieved. Consequently, false judgments become impossible on the 1910 theory: they either resist formulation or any act of judging will create the fact which makes the judgment true.

The above points highlight the central flaw in Russell's 1910 account of judgment. On the multiple relation theory, unity is imposed by the mind. But Russell attributes the ability to order the constituents of a non-symmetrical judgment to a property of the judged relation. This, however, explains direction in a way that involves unity. For the relation to 'proceed' from A to B, it must actually relate the two items, thereby turning the objects of the judgment into a single entity. Ironically, it was this unity of propositions and all its associated problems that Russell wished to deny.

Section 4

This section will deal with Russell's 1912 account of judgment. In 1910, Russell had held that the 'sense' of a non-symmetrical judgment belonged to the judged relation. The difficulty with this idea had been that a relation cannot have direction without actually relating and thereby creating the judged fact. The 1912 multiple-relation theory is only a modification of the 1910 version, but the modification is an attempt to overcome this problem.

On Russell's 1912 account, direction belongs not to the relation R, but solely to the relation of judging. He writes: "The relation of judging has what is called a 'sense' or 'direction'."²¹ It is thus the propositional act and not the judged relation which puts

²⁰ Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 113.

²¹ B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1912, p. 126.

the objects of the judgment into a certain order.

This suggestion, however, does not do much to clarify how it is that we turn a list of constituents into a judgement. For when I judge that A loves B, the relation of love enters into the judgment as a "relation in itself". It is a related relation, not a relating one, and so cannot be used to supply unity or direction to the proposition judged. And if the judged relation cannot unite the constituents, the only alternative for Russell is to say that "the relation judgment is special: it is the sole relation which combines its relata into a judgment". So, as Candlish points out, while the 1910 theory attributed the ability to correctly combine the constituents to "an otherwise mysterious power of the mind",²² the 1912 theory just re-delegates this power to the relation of judgment.

Furthermore, like the 1910 theory, the 1912 account of judgment is subject to criticisms that Russell received from Wittgenstein. The theory allows for the formation of nonsensical judgments. On Russell's view, the function of the judged relation R is not to relate the other constituents, it is only to be thought of as relating them. But if this is the case, the "relation does not have to do anything. It is as if it were a dormant relation". The problem with this is that if the relation is 'dormant', then there is nothing in Russell's theory to prevent a person from forming judgments like 'Loves A B' where the relation occurs in the wrong place in the proposition. Neither is there anything to prevent me from forming the judgment 'The knife is to the square root of the fork' where the relation is incapable of relating the other items. This is a real problem for Russell's theory because things like 'the knife is to the square root of the fork' cannot even coherently be thought, let alone judged true.

Section 5.

In an attempt to avoid some of the aforementioned problems, Russell added the notion of logical form to his multiple-relation theory of judgments in 1913.

On the 1913 version of the theory, in order to make a judgment or understand a proposition I need acquaintance not only with the constituents of a proposition, but also with the way they are to be united. The logical form of a judgment is the manner in which the constituents are to be combined. It is the form of the fact which corresponds to the judgment when the judgment is true. And when the judgment is false, the logical form is the form of at least some fact out there in the world.²³ Russell claims that, by

²² Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 117.

²³ Russell says: "In an actual complex, the general form is not presupposed; but when we are concerned with a proposition which may be false. We have only the 'idea' or suggestion' of the terms being united in such a complex, and this, evidently, requires that the general form of the merely supposed complex should be given." *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell: Theory of Knowledge*,

definition, the introduction of form makes it impossible for nonsensical judgments to fit within the theory.

Russell introduced the notion of logical form to deal with the problem of unity, not the problem of the 'sense' or 'direction' of asymmetrical judgments.²⁴ He argues that the introduction of form provides a means of making sense of the notion of uniting the constituents of a judgment in thought which does not imply uniting them in reality. The idea is that:

The judgment represents the constituents as combined in the right way, not by so combining them but by including 'the way they are to be combined' as a further entity, the logical form, which the judging mind combines with all the others.

For Russell, then, judgment and judged fact differ via the inclusion of logical form. The judgment contains the form as an element, but the fact does not. This, supposedly, is what makes a correspondence theory of truth possible.

What, then, are logical forms? Since we must be acquainted with forms it is necessary that they be actual entities in some sense, not merely creations of language like classes. To meet these requirements, Russell claims that:

The form [of a judgment is] is the fact that there are entities which make up complexes having the form in question.²⁵

The logical form, then, is a fact of a peculiarly abstract kind: the fact that there are facts of the given form.

According to Russell, the fact which is form can be obtained by replacing every name in a given sentence by a variable or its linguistic equivalent. For example, in 'Socrates loves Plato', the name 'Socrates' becomes 'something', 'Plato' becomes 'something', and 'loves' becomes 'some relation'. The logical form of the judgment 'Socrates loves Plato' will thus be the abstract fact that 'Something has some relation to something'.

Volume 7, Eames and Blackwell (eds.), Routledge, 1984, p. 116.

²⁴ This point is made clear by Peter Hylton. See Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 344-345.

²⁵ Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 114.

There are, however, a number of difficulties with Russell's notion of logical form. The idea that we are acquainted with from-facts seems to imply that the logical form of a judgment or proposition is another one of its constituents. But as Russell himself notes if this were the case:

There would have to be a new way in which it and the other constituents are put together, and if we take this way as again a constituent, we find ourselves embarked on an endless regress.²⁶

To avoid this problem, Russell insists that although he calls the form an object, it is a logical object and therefore not a constituent of the proposition. But the difference between a logical object and something that is a constituent is not a clear one, and Russell offers no explanation of what the conditions for membership of this class of logical objects actually are.

Neither is it clear that the introduction of form actually solves the problem of the unity of the proposition. For the fact remains that in judgment, it is the act of judging or understanding itself that unites the constituents, not the logical form.

How it is that the mind has the capacity to unite real things in thought is never explained by Russell. All that happens on the 1913 theory is that the "psychokinetic powers" he attributed to the mind on his earlier accounts of judgment are now "transferred from the mind alone to the mind with access to logical forms."²⁷

And even if form could explain how it is that we achieve a unified judgment, it is questionable as to whether it would allow for this without the creation of the judged fact. I mentioned earlier that Russell believes that the form's presence in the judgment but absence in the fact allows him to account for the truth of a belief in terms of correspondence with an outside entity. But if Hylton is correct in saying that "the logical form which figures in the judgment is the form of the corresponding fact,"²⁸ it seems that facts must have forms. Although Hylton does not demonstrate his claim by reference to the text, it does seem a reasonable one to make. For Russell himself states that the logical form of a judgment is "the fact that there are entities having the form in

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁷ Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 123.

²⁸ Hylton, *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy*, p. 345.

question."²⁹ And this can only imply that facts also include the way they are to be combined as an ingredient.

Yet if we allow facts to have form on the 1913 theory, a correspondence theory of truth would once again become impossible and there would be no account of falsehood at all. For given that Russell holds that the constituents of judgments are actual objects, fact and judgment would be exactly the same thing. What is it, then, that prevents facts from including logical form? This is an important question, but it is one to which Russell offers no coherent answer.

A further problem arises when we consider that the form of (say) a dual complex - 'Something has some relation to something', is actually a proposition. How is it that we understand this proposition, and account for its unity, without invoking the multiple-relation theory and embarking on an infinite regress? Russell sees this objection and attempts to counter it by saying that in the case of logical form, the proposition is both a simple and a fact. Because these propositions are simple objects of acquaintance, Russell says that the duality of truth and falsehood does not apply to them.³⁰ All such propositions are necessarily true. On introspection, one thus finds that understanding logical form is simply acquaintance with the logical truth it expresses.

The problem with all this is not just the question of how something can be both a simple and a complex fact. More importantly, Russell's proof that understanding pure form is acquaintance commits him to the logical truth or a contingent proposition. For 'Something has some relation to something' is evidently an existential claim. This aspect of Russell's theory is criticized by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein points out that, on Russell's view, "the enumeration of special forms...[becomes] entirely arbitrary." We can formulate an infinite number of n-termed relational sentences, and according to Russell, all these contingent propositions are logical truths. One consequence of this, Wittgenstein says, is that it looks as if we can anticipate the existence of a certain kind of fact simply by considering a relational statement.

²⁹ Russell, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 114.

³⁰ Russell argues: "The dualism of true and false presupposes propositions and does not arise so long as we confine ourselves to acquaintance, except, possibly, in the case of abstract logical forms, and even here there is no proper dualism, since falsehood is logically impossible in these cases."

Russell, cited in Pears, 'The Relationship Between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theories of Judgment', *The Philosophical Review*, 1977, p. 182.

This presents a real problem for Russell's theory because:

How could we decide a priori whether, for example, I can get into a situation in which I need to symbolize with the sign of a 27-termed relation?³¹

The question of whether reality contains a fact with 27 constituents in a certain relation to one another is an empirical question. To answer it, we need to look to the world and investigate its contents. And although it may be necessary that such a fact be possible, it does not seem that there actually has to be one if all we want to do is understand the 27-termed logical form. But if propositions expressing form are logical truths, as Russell maintains, then there must be such a fact and we should know this a priori. For in this case, understanding the proposition is becoming acquainted with just that state of affairs; the fact that there is a fact of the given form.

Attacks on the 1913 account also came from Wittgenstein before the *Tractatus* was published. In a letter to Russell dated 1913, Wittgenstein questions Russell's theory of types. Then in June of the same year he writes:

I can now express my objection to your theory of judgment exactly: I believe that it is obvious that, from the proposition 'A judges (say) a is in relation R to b', if correctly analysed, the proposition 'aRb' v '-aRb' must follow directly without the use of any other premiss.³²

It is far from clear exactly what Wittgenstein meant by these objections, but we do know that they provide at least part of the reason for Russell's decision to cease work on *The Theory of Knowledge*. One possible interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks has been offered by Ray Monk,³³ the main thrust of which shall be outlined below.

As we have seen, Russell held that whole propositions could be broken down into the constituents, which are real things. This means that if we analyse the proposition

³¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (trans. C.K. Ogden) Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, 5.554.

³² This, incidentally, is the precursor of *Tractatus* 5.5422: "The correct explanation of the form of the proposition 'A judges p' must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition.)"

³³ R. Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude*, Jonathan Cape Publications, 1996, p. 296.

'Socrates is mortal' we will end up with 'Socrates' and 'mortality' as actual objects. And since Russell held that "everything is at bottom an object of the same sort",³⁴ both 'Socrates' and 'mortality' have to be the same type of thing (i.e. objects of the same logical type). Monk suggests that Wittgenstein saw a problem with this because there is nothing in Russell's theory to prevent a person from taking the two objects together and forming the judgment "Mortality is Socrates", a judgment which is obviously nonsensical. Yet surely it is a legitimate requirement that what is judged must at least make sense.

The logical form cannot prevent the above situation from occurring because it can only guarantee that the judged relation gets into the right place in the proposition. If 'Socrates' and 'mortality' are both objects of the same status, then they are both equally capable of taking the place of either of the lower case variables in the form of a dual complex - 'aRb'. The only way for Russell to prevent nonsensical judgments from fitting within his theory would be build a theory of types into his account of judgment. That is, he would have to distinguish between different kinds of objects, so that there is some explanation of why 'mortality' cannot take 'Socrates' as a predicate.

This solution, however, is not available to Russell because his theory of understanding propositions relies on the idea that we have acquaintance with their constituents. Acquaintance is supposed to be direct and immediate knowledge of an object, not about it. It therefore need not carry with it any information about what kinds of objects 'Socrates' and 'mortality' are, nor how they can occur in a proposition. The consequences of Wittgenstein's objection thus look unavoidable.

The above difficulties with Russell's notion of logical form prevent the 1913 theory from being a viable account of judgment. The problems associated with how to account for the unity of the proposition are not solved, and cannot be solved so long as Russell holds to his view of propositional constituents. To allow for the possibility of incorrect judgment and a correspondence theory of truth, there needs to be a distinction between the constituents of the judgment and the physical objects about which the judgment is made. If the mind manipulated tokens of these objects and not the objects themselves, as in Wittgenstein's picture theory, we could account for propositional unity without the creation of the judged fact. But since Russell held that the constituents of judgments were always real things, this was out of the difficulty was never open to him. Russell's growing awareness of these problems, plus the criticisms that he received from Wittgenstein, eventually led him to abandon the multiple-relation theory in 1919.

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³⁴ Candlish, 'The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment', p. 104

THE LIFE OF BERTARND RUSSELL
A DOCUMENTARY REVIEW BY
JOHN SHOSKY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

***Bertrand Russell*, International Biography Series. Produced and Directed by Denys Blakeway, 1997 (BBC) and 1998 (A&E). Hosted by Peter Graves. Narrated by Jack Perkins. Ray Monk, Consultant. Series Editor, Janice Hadlow.**

In the Spring of 1997, Denys Blakeway's documentary of the life of Bertrand Russell was shown in Great Britain as part of the *Reputations* Series produced by the BBC. This documentary has now been shown in the United States as part of the Arts and Entertainment Network's *International Biography* Series.

The documentary features an impressive array of interviews about Russell: daughter Katherine Tait, son Conrad Russell, grand-daughter Felicity Russell, Dora Black's daughter Harriet Ward, Alyce Russell's cousin Barbara Strachey, Russell archivist Ken Blackwell, biographer Ray Monk, philosopher Roger Scruton, Beacon Hill student Roger De Vere, friend Mary Feddon, Russell Secretary Pat Pottle, and *Peace News* correspondent Adam Roberts. There are also numerous still photographs of Russell, portions of the Freeman interview with Russell, other interview clips, and readings from Russell's letters and *Autobiography*.

So, with all of this material, one should assume that the documentary was a well-told tale. Far from it. The documentary concentrated on Russell's sex life, marriages, affairs, and political notoriety. While host Peter Graves (yes, Mr. *Mission: Impossible* claimed that Russell was "the most influential British philosopher of the Twentieth Century," he also spoke of the "terrible suffering" caused by Russell and his "great destruction in the lives of those closest to him." For Graves, Russell was a "mass of contradictions" and his "public image was a lie." Narrator Jack Perkins (surely not the narrator of the BBC production -- if so, why?) concentrates on Russell's "darker side", his feelings that he was "a vampire" living off those around him. Russell is singled out for his romance of Alyce's sister Mary in Paris, Alyce's long-suffering love after he divorced her, John Russell's insanity, the misfortunes of John's three daughters (two suffered severe depression and other mental illness, a third committed suicide), the insanity of Peter Spence, and, the narration "destruction and desolation" of his family and his relationships. Monk claims that "Russell revelled in the role that there was something satanic about him." Grand-daughter Felicity Russell said the terrible life she suffered and that suffered by her sisters says all one needs to know about Russell.

Get the picture: Russell as villain, liar, cheat, blood-sucker, and evil genius. Of course nothing is really said about his contributions to philosophy, except a brief mention of

Principia Mathematica and Scruton's comments about its importance (one wishes Scruton was given more to say here). There is also an off-hand comment in the narration that "Russell was never at home with modern British analytical philosophy," which is surely false. The writer of the script probably meant that Russell was never "at home" with Oxford linguistic philosophy and the later work of Wittgenstein. But such a comment would have required an explanation of Russell's titanic contributions to philosophy, logic, and political theory, which would have cut into the time allotted for scandal. There is also a kind word by De Vere, who said that the Beacon Hill students "loved" Russell. There is also a brief mention of Russell winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Otherwise, the script is dominated -- overwhelmed -- that the portrait of Russell as blatant hypocrite, selfish savant, and wacky liberal.

The documentary begins with Russell's "ban the bomb" activities in 1961, but then transitions into a chronological story that starts with Russell's birth and early life, his time at Trinity College, Cambridge, his marriage to Alyce Pearsoll Smith, his affair with Ottoline Morrell, his anti-war activities in the First World War, his marriage to Dora Black, his work in progressive education and the founding of the Beacon Hill School, his marriage to Patricia "Peter" Spence, the financially-difficult years in America during the Second World War, his return to Trinity, his efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the establishment of the Peace Foundation, his involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis, his association with Ralph Schoenmann, and his death in 1970.

Conspicuous in absence, there is no mention of Frege, Moore, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Sartre, Einstein, and the other giants who appreciated Russell's genius. Whitehead is mentioned only as the co-author of *Principia*. And I guess time constraints prevented any explanation of Russell's theories or philosophical positions, except his advocacy of free love.

In the end, I was saddened by this documentary. In my political and consulting life, I've worked closely with three cabinet members, two U.S. presidents, and several high-profile corporate executives. I'm no stranger to harsh press. But I always try to see what motivates bad press, which usually has an underlying, untold story. This documentary is too blatant to misunderstand or under-estimate. It is one of the worst examples of character assassination in my experience. Frankly, it is a disgrace. I don't expect much from American television. But I'm used to a larger sense of fair play from the BBC. What happened to intellectual honesty and some semblance of the complete truth? This is a shameful documentary that gives us scandal instead of substance, forgetting the essence of the subject and his vast accomplishments. I suppose in our current media pre-occupation with sex and voyeurism, this documentary is a sign of the times. In an attempt to diminish Russell, this documentary reduces all involved. The rejoinder might be that Russell's affairs, disappointments, fears, and failures are all true. I can't argue with that. But I can demand a more balanced, fair,

honest perspective, which is only found in a comment by Blackwell late into the documentary: Russell's wisdom about nuclear warfare saturated into the minds of the reading public, who in turn influenced political viewpoints, thereby helping to avoid nuclear catastrophe. Other than that one comment, one would be hard-pressed to understand Russell's greatness and his many positive accomplishments from his disappointing documentary.

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**THE BERTRAND RUSSELL SOCIETY
MEMBERSHIP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to:

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Alexandria, Virginia 22307

NAME:

ADDRESS:

First book of Russell's I read:

Last book of Russell's I read:

Favorite Russell Quotation:

Reason(s) for Joining BRS:

Recent Applications of Russell's Views to Your Own Life:

Additional Comments: _____
