

The Nature Of Truth

By Dennis J. Darland

June 1, 2007

Revised December 19, 2007

Revised (to pdf) May 9, 2011

Copyright © 2007 Dennis J. Darland

True_belief

We can define **true_belief**(S,t,R,a,b,c)

As simply S **believes**(R,a,b,c) at time t & R(a,b,c)

And **false_belief**(S,t,R,a,b,c)

As S **believes**(R,a,b,c) at time t & \sim R(a,b,c)

True_proposition

We can define **true_proposition**(R,a,b,c)

As **proposition**(R,a,b,c) & R(a,b,c)

And define **false_proposition**(R,a,b,c)

As **proposition**(R,a,b,c) & \sim R(a,b,c)

On Wittgenstein's Objection to Russell's Theory of Knowledge

From the definition of **proposition**(R,a,b,c) and S **believes** R(a,b,c) at time t

see <http://dennisdarland.com/philosophy/proposition.pdf>

and <http://dennisdarland.com/philosophy/naming.pdf>

It follows from S **believes** R(a,b,c) at t that

S **understands** R(a,b,c) at t thus

Proposition(R,a,b,c)

And from that it follows

True_proposition(R,a,b,c) or **false_proposition**(R,a,b,c)

Which answers, I think, **Wittgenstein's** objection which paralyzed **Russell**.

See [The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell \(vol 7\), Theory of Knowledge, The 1913 Manuscript](#) pp. xxvii-xxviii.

More explanation

Question: Isn't it likely that Russell's paralysis involves

the tension between 1) his need to have a relation occur as such, i.e.

as relating entities ,in order to have a meaningful proposition and not a

mere list and 2) his need to explain false belief without introducing

objective false propositions?

For consider (loves, Amy, Bob): if the relation

loves actually relates the entities Amy and Bob, then what the belief

asserts -that Amy loves Bob-is true, but if the relation does not relate the

entities-i.e. Amy doesn't love Bob-then there is nothing relating the

terms (which might as well be loves, loves, loves; or Bob, Bob, Bob),

hence no proposition the believer may be said to believe, i.e. either

there is no content or there is no false belief.

To be paralyzed over the status of the relation and

over the account of false belief is not to imply the instant rejection

of the (multiple relation) theory of belief, which Russell clings to,

admitting its weaknesses, until 1918.

Answer: I will explain what is a little different about my

analysis (my answer is a bit different than what Russell could have said, because my analysis is a bit different!), which you may not have noticed.

The proposition $R(a,b,c)$ will exist when

$(\exists S) (\exists w) (\exists x) (\exists y) (\exists z) (\exists t)$ such that

• & $\text{symbol_1r}(S, t, w, R)$

• & $\text{symbol_0r}(S, t, x, a)$

• & $\text{symbol_0r}(S, t, y, b)$

• & $\text{symbol_0r}(S, t, z, c)$

(this is implied by S believes $R(a,b,c)$ at time t).

and also, if S believes it you will have that

$\text{belief_r}(S, w, x, y, z, t)$. This belief_r relates the

symbols w, x, y & z in a way to indicate what fact would

hold if $R(a,b,c)$. So the fact, though it may not

exist, is indicated by the relations between the

symbols. Also, if there are propositions, which are

never believed, which seems likely, then we must say

the belief-R is not needed, but that the logical-form

& symbol-R relations are then sufficient, themselves to

make such a proposition exist. These existing would

imply a practice of using w, x, y & z to represent R, a, b

& c , and the logical form rf of relating them.

More explanation

Symbolic relations can hold between tokens and

objects. (actually via a norm for tokens). There can be many utterances of tokens of "cat" but one word cat. The relations of the tokens to the word are resemblance. The relation of the word to the object is a practice.

There are really (at least) two types of symbolic relations. One for relations (between symbols and relations) and another between symbols and objects.

When the symbols for a relation R and symbols for objects a and b exist for Speaker S at Time t there is a proposition $R(a,b)$. We speak of a corresponding fact if a stands in the relation R to b.

Back to Top <http://dennisdarland.com/philosophy/index.html>