

On Symbolism

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May 28, 2007

Revised December 18, 2007

Revised (to pdf) May 13, 2011

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The symbol relation

My discussion of belief and opacity uses the notion of a symbol

See

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where I use

Symbol_{2r}(S, t, v, B)

Or

Symbol_{1r}(S, t, w, R)

Or

Symbol_{0r}(S, t, x, a)

Here S is the subject – a person

- v, w and x are symbols
- B is a propositional attitude
- R is a triadic relation (but you can imagine other arities)
- a is the name of a object.
- t is the time

It may be that **Symbol_r's** in the three cases are of different types, they may be taken as typically ambiguous as is commonly done in [Principia Mathematica](#). The analysis of belief given may be correct with the right interpretation of Symbol_r relations without me being able to explain Symbol_r relations, but I will try to do so now. I will also have to say something about **persons** and **relations** and **objects**.

Process Philosophy

Events

Both [Bertrand Russell](#) and [Alfred North Whitehead](#) after [Principia Mathematica](#) went on to develop philosophies in which **events** were primary.

Later [Whitehead](#) used the terms actual entity and actual occasion. [Whitehead's](#) work developed out of the work he started on what was supposed to be volume IV of [Principia Mathematica](#) which was going to develop geometry. Events are basically just volumes of space-time. [Whitehead](#) invented extensive abstraction, adopted by [Russell](#), to define **points**, **lines**, **planes**, etc out of events.

Persons

Also **persons** are defined in terms of **events**. They are pretty much the class of events inside the track that person occupies in space-time, but, at least [Whitehead](#), used the (causal?) relation between such events in his definition, so not just any collection of events would be a person.

Relations

Relations hold either between one (a predicate) or more objects. Higher order relations can hold between lower order relations. [Whitehead](#) later calls relations eternal objects.

Objects

Objects in the usual sense are, like persons, classes of events. Different sorts of objects can be defined, physical objects, etc.

Symbols

Symbols are whatever stand in the **Symbol_r** relation to an **object**, i.e. the class of x such that $\text{Symbol_r}(S,t,x,a)$ for some S,a,and t.

This relation is difficult to fully explain as it may take many forms. **Wittgenstein** took it to be picturing in the **Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus**. **Russell** tried to define it causally in **The Analysis of Mind**. **Whitehead** discussed it in his little book, **Symbolism**. **Quine** tries to define it in **Word and Object**. The later **Wittgenstein** shows the many forms it can take. I think they are all pointing, at least at some of, the instances of the relation. (Of course none of them spoke of the **Symbol_r** relations, but they spoke of people using symbols to stand for objects at some time.) (Although the later **Wittgenstein** may have insisted this was too narrow.) I think the later **Wittgenstein** came closest here. The relation is established by a **practice** of using the symbol to stand for the object. The symbol's meaning may depend on its context in a sentence (e.g. **definite descriptions** or **classes** which are **incomplete symbols**) or a larger context, such as knowing a common (at least mostly) language where **Symbol_r**(s,t,x,a) holds between, at least mostly, the same x's and a's for many s's and t's.

Variables

There are also the **variable_0r**, **variable_1r** and **variable_2r** relations. They represent a relationship (in conjunction with quantifiers) between something sort of like a symbol, but generalized – like ‘some’ or ‘all’. We have a different application of these than the other symbols so I am calling them ‘variables’ – not ‘symbols.’

An objection answered

It might be said, “You say **Wittgenstein** is right in saying ‘Meaning is use’, but you define **persons**, **relations**, **objects**, and **symbols** different than their common usage.” “Yes”, I say, but **Wittgenstein** said “for most purposes.” I think we can take, from our scientific knowledge, some symbols as more “real” – as corresponding to objects recognized by science, and see how the use of other words can be explained in terms of them. The use of the other words can be continued though not taken as real as the symbols used by science.

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