Discussion
If one adopts a multiple-relation theory of belief, then if there are to be propositions independent of any particular person,
one is led to postulate the existence of "God". Whether one regards this as fact or useful fiction is up to the individual, but
there is no questioning its usefulness for logic, if one adopts such a multiple-relation theory. For it seems that if one adopts
the multiple-relation theory then the existence of a proposition depends on the existence of a subject to a propositional
attitude. And that the models, e.g. in
Blackwell's Guide to Philosophical Logic as early as p. 14 on FOL it is
assumed that there is a vocabulary for the universe or domain. And that for the "model theoretic" reasoning this is true of HOL
and modal logics as well. But even though people do exist to believe these things, surely this is contingent. And even
though people exist we do not collectively, little alone individually, have names for everything. So it is useful to at least
pretend there is a subject with true beliefs about everything and names for everything. If one doesn't say this being really
exists, it amounts to saying nothing outside human [or whatever intelligent life there is] beliefs are true or false.
On the other hand, one could view the "universal point of view" as a tendency toward objectivity in science.
In our imaginations we can escape our subjectivity, and imagine, e.g. that some of our beliefs are false and imagine other points
of view - even a universal one. We also can recognize the incompleteness of our knowledge. This ability may be essential
to science - look at Einstein's General Theory of Relativity - which
makes all viewpoints equal and in which it would be as true that the sun revolves around a hypothetical tea cup as that
the tea cup revolves around the sun. Such viewpoints may be imaginary - but such imagination [though only human] may be
essential to human science.
This may be the essence of Realism.
Maybe, although the correspondence of human beliefs is necessarily incomplete, we can imagine it completed. The pattern of
naming and uses of names can be imagined projected to completion. Thus, even without a God, or actual all-knowing being, we can
give a meaning of truth. And we can, although the relation wouldn't exist, project the correspondence to worlds where there
is no intelligence or even life at all.
William James discusses this problem in
The Meaning of Truth in the "dialog" at the end. I do not think he has
altogether avoided the problem.
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