On Sensation Langjuage

How Sensation Language is Possible

By Dennis J. Darland

November 15, 2007

Definitions:

chair(g,x) – x is ordinary chair perceived by group of subjects g.

s_chair(s,x) – x is sensation caused by chair in subject s

w_chair(g,x) – x is public word token for chair (token - spoken, written, or printed) for group of subjects g

sw_chair(s,x) – x is sensation caused by public word token for chair in subject s

Quine says “Entification begins at arm’s length; the points of condensation in the primordial conceptual scheme are things glimpsed, not glimpses.” (Word and Object, p. 1)

If we have chair(g,x) then for every s in g s_chair(s,x). I.e, if a group of people perceive a chair, they each have a sensation caused by the chair. The sensations may vary as the subjects move around in relation to the chair. Because their sensations are caused by a similar physical object, and they are taught English, etc. they will come to use a common word for the chair, say “chair”. This word is also public. Each member of the group has relations to similar objects as the word ‘chair’. It is known from physics that light reflects of the chair to the people’s eyes, which causes, through the people’s nervous systems to see the chair. Similarly the sound ‘chair’ is propagated by sound waves to their ears. They do not have to know this! The chair could, have produced different sensations in each person, and the word ‘chair’ also. But if the sensations (of the chair and the word ‘chair’) were consistently related for each member of the group and also similar objects and words as well, people would have no way of knowing they had different sensations for the same objects. They would agree in their language, because of the consistent correspondence between word and object, despite different sensations.

But it would seem there would have to at least be a structural similarity between the sensations of members of the group, or the constant correspondence would be incredibly improbable! Also the laws of science would seem to indicate there would be similar effects at our sensory surfaces. Thus, though the origin of our language is in things glimpsed, we are able to reason to knowledge of glimpses. Thus we can reason to similarity of our sensations (at least structurally) from agreement in our language about public objects. We learn to identify the objects and words for them from a consistency of the sensations we have of the objects and words. This in turn allows us to reason to a resemblance of sensations as the only reasonable explanation of agreement in our language. We can then extend language to these sensations. The sensations are usually described in terms of the physical objects.

Sensations other than those of objects, such as pain, can be explained similarly. We learn a practice of using ‘pain’ publicly under similar circumstances. We can then connect the word with the sensation.

But, besides the sensation or image of a public word, it seems we sometimes have other personal symbols we think in. If these have connections to words we have public uses for, I see no problem. But symbols with no connection to a public use would seem meaningless.