Predicates, Intension, and Induction

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Quine wanted to abolish intension mainly due to opacity which I have already shown can be avoided. Now I want to show, in addition, that intensions, in fact, are required to solve other problems. For, if we only allow ourselves extensions, or classes, and not intensions, or predicates, some of which are more primary than others defined in terms of them, we cannot deal with the grue problem. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grue_(color)

Whitehead and Russell defined classes in terms of predicates. It seems that all classes would, even not considering that definition, have the same ontological status. The classes of green, blue, grue, and bleen objects are equal as classes. But, as predicates, green and blue are more primary. People are unable to learn grue, and bleen in the ordinary way they learn green and blue. We can learn them because they have a different sort of practical role in our lives. The natural laws we discover, even if now explicitly, involve primitive predicates differently than ones only defined in complex terms of them. We, ourselves, obey the same laws, so this is only natural. With intensions (meanings of predicates or relations) you can apply them in *new* cases, but with extensions you can only go by prior knowledge, and any way the term is applied in a new case could be equally valid. We learn the intensions from a finite number of cases, but can apply them to a potentially infinite number more. This is because the primitive predicates play important roles in our lives, while the infinite number of alternative meanings do not. In some cases we may make mistakes in going on from the finite examples – that is disagree with others – but there are ways of resolving these disagreements.

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