

On Landini on Wittgenstein's Objection to Russell's Multiple-Relation theory of Judgement

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November 29, 2007

Revised December 18, 2007

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From Gregory Landini's book Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell

Page 68.

In the lectures on logical atomism, Russell wrote of "the impossibility of putting the subordinate verb on a level with its terms as an object term in the belief," and concludes that the multiple-relation was "a little unduly simple" because it does treat the object verb as if one could put it as just an object like the terms, "as if one could put 'loves' on a level with Desdemona and Cassio as a term for the relation 'believe'". Russell confesses that it was Wittgenstein who convinced him that in statements of judgement or belief there are two verbs and that both must occur in predicate positions.

How this applies to my theory

The belief_r applies to symbols not what they represent. Thus, if one considers the symbols to be the typed words, the belief_r would relate the word 'loves' to the words 'Desdemona' and 'Cassio', and the subject of the belief_r. The problem, if there is one, would occur in the symbol_1r relation:

Symbol1_1r(Tom,now,'loves',loves)

Where the verb loves occurs as an object.

But for me, unlike Russell (and Wittgenstein at this time), all this means is that Tom uses the word 'loves' appropriately.

So I don't see any problem.

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